## American Political Science Association

## American Political Science Review

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# **Political Science:**

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# The State of the Discipline

(the Centennial edition)

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Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner

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## Notes from the (New) Editor

By the standards of the ancient Chinese curse ("May you live in interesting times"), my transition into the position of Editor of the *APSR* was cursed. Only a few days into these new duties, I looked up one morning from the stack of manuscripts on my desk, glanced out of the window at the beautiful blue sky, and beheld smoke billowing from the Pentagon.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001, affected us all. Certainly they posed unanticipated problems for the APSR's new editorial team. We (a collective consisting of me, Assistant Editor Elizabeth Cook, our Editorial Assistants [John Donaldson, Jason MacDonald, and Tricia Mulligan], our brand-new editorial board [listed elsewhere], and Book Review. Co-editors Susan Bickford and Gregory McAvoy and their Editorial Assistants [Elizabeth Markovits, Maria Riemann, and Carisa Showden]) had "hit the ground running" on September 1. Our careful planning and the extraordinary efforts of Ada Finifter and Harriett Posner at Michigan State were paying off in a smooth transition in our Washington, DC, editorial offices, and the Bickford-McAvoy book review operation in Chapel Hill was off to a good start, too, thanks in part to the cooperation of their predecessor, Mark Lichbach. Then September 11 happened. Here in Washington, DC, offices closed, equipment and supplies went undelivered, and services were suspended. Hard on the heels of September 11 came the anthraxinspired disruption of the mails, which played havoc with our operations. We would go days on end receiving no mail at all and then be deluged, making it difficult to get out of a "scramble" mode and into a normal operating rhythm.

As I compose these notes in the early days of 2002, I am pleased to report that our offices are functioning in a timely, predictable, and appropriate manner. We have come a long way in a short time under conditions that we could not have imagined a few months ago, and things are now more or less "normal," though I have already come to appreciate the wisdom of former Editor Charles Jones's remark (as conveyed by Ada Finifter) that the APSR editorship is a great job but there is a little too much of it.

Many of those with whom I talk about the APSR assume that I must feel cursed by a second accident of timing as well: my assumption of the editorship at a time of widespread expressions of discontent among political scientists—discontent directed at, inter alia, intellectual currents in the discipline, the governing institutions of the profession (ranging from individual departments through the American Political Science Association), and, not least, the APSR itself. It is well to bear in mind that, as Robert Salisbury noted in the December 2001 issue of PS, "Complaints about APSR and petitions to change the structure of APSA have been perennial features of life among political scientists." Even so, in recent years, and particularly with the emergence of the Perestroika movement, these complaints have taken on

a special resonance. It thus seems appropriate that in these initial editorial notes, I address some of these concerns and discuss the role I foresee for the APSR in coming years.

I consider myself not at all cursed by this second accident of timing but, rather, blessed by the opportunity to respond constructively to the challenges it poses. In the remarks that follow, I describe some of the elements of this response. (Some of what I say will come as review material for those who during the last year or so have read e-mail messages I have posted, attended meetings at which I have spoken, or talked privately with me.)

## SOME NEW PERSPECTIVES AND PROCEDURES

Political science is a strange discipline. Indeed, it is hardly a "discipline" at all. A dictionary definition of "discipline" refers, variously, to "punishment," or "a set or system of rules," or "a branch of learning." I will sidestep the issue of whether political science is a punishment, but I do want to express doubt that it is a set or system of rules. Only someone who takes a narrow, procrustean view of political science would characterize it in that way. And rather than being a distinct branch of learning, political science is a crazy quilt of borrowings from history, philosophy, law, sociology, psychology, economics, public administration, policy studies, area studies, international studies, civics, and a variety of other sources. Any real coherence in political science exists only at the broadest conceptual level, in the form of our widely shared interest in power, the "authoritative allocation of values for society," "who gets what, when, how," and the like.

This overriding intellectual diversity endows political science with vibrancy, energy, and openness to new and often challenging perspectives. Even so, I want to register my sense that in many ways we have become less of a discipline over the years. When I entered the profession three decades ago, virtually everyone seemed to be reading and discussing certain contemporary canonical works (Dahl, Easton, Almond and Verba, Downs, and Bachrach and Baratz, among others). I am hardpressed to think of many equivalents today—perhaps Putnam, but what else? These days it is harder than ever to find a center of intellectual gravity in our discipline. More and more we are a confederation of narrowly defined and loosely connected, or even disconnected, specializations. Our heightened specialization is further fragmenting our already disjointed discipline, to the extent that most of us have little knowledge, understanding, or appreciation of what our colleagues in other subfields are doing.

In recent years, the most widely expressed criticisms of the APSR in particular have been that "It doesn't publish the kind of work that interests me," "It's biased

against my kind of work," "I have no idea what most of those articles are even about," and/or "I don't even open it when it arrives." Defenders have countered that the APSR does a good job of publishing the best papers that are submitted to it, and that the problem, if there is one, is that those who feel aggrieved rarely submit their work to the APSR, thereby creating a vicious circle. A second line of defense has been that there is nothing unique to political science about the fact that those in one subfield neither understand nor appreciate what those in other subfields are doing. As seen from this perspective, this is an inevitable by-product of specialization and other aspects of disciplinary "progress," not specifically an APSR problem.

Although the contents of the APSR in recent years have been more diverse than critics often acknowledge, I agree that the rich theoretical, methodological, and substantive variety of our discipline has not been reflected nearly as well as it should be in our premier research journal. (And I am well aware that such variety is not well represented in this particular issue, either.) Recognizing that the problem of the vicious circle is real does not mean that we must bow to its inevitability. Moreover, even while granting that increasingly divergent theoretical perspectives and analytical techniques and the proliferation of specialized vocabularies are barriers to communication, we need to recognize that we have not been doing nearly as much as we should to make our ideas accessible to one another.

The APSR should be an important vehicle for overcoming this isolation, for building and sustaining a sense of intellectual community. It should be the showcase for the best research, representing the wide array of theoretical orientations, substantive foci, and methodological approaches that comprise political science. Opening up the APSR when it arrives should give us a sense of invigoration about all the interesting work that our colleagues are doing. My primary goal as Editor of the APSR is to move as far as possible in that direction, by publishing a broad array of the very best work being done throughout political science and by enhancing the likelihood that this work will actually be read.

The obvious question is how to translate this vision into reality. Among the steps we have already taken or will soon take are the following.

• Because much of the most important political science research is published as books, not articles, the APSR's book review section is avidly read, and the book review editorship is a key position in our discipline. With the completion of Mark Lichbach's term as Book Review Editor, one of my first tasks was to fill that position—a position that requires great intellectual breadth and versatility, innovativeness, tolerance for long hours of drudgery, highlevel organizational skills, and an eye for detail. To fill this tall order, I recruited a pair of scholars who individually and collectively possess the requisite qualities. With Susan Bickford (a political theorist) and Greg McAvoy (a specialist in American)

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- politics and policy) as co-editors, the book review operation is in excellent hands.
- Another early task was to assemble, for approval by the APSA Executive Council, my slate of editorial board nominees. The editorial board must be composed of productive scholars to whom I can confidently turn for wise counsel, and it must reflect the diversity of the discipline. I consulted widely, soliciting suggestions from every APSA organized section and numerous other affiliated committees and formally constituted groups, as well as many informal groups and various individuals, and I received many unsolicited suggestions as well. The result is a brand new board of 44 members, none of whom had previously served on the board. This is an exceptionally accomplished and diverse group, and I am delighted to have the opportunity to work with them. (It is possible that a few more board members will be added as circumstances warrant.)
- By their very presence on the board, these 44 members symbolize, and by their actions they have been asked to carry throughout the discipline, the message that we genuinely want to receive a wider array of submissions than has come to the APSR in the past, and that we are doing our best to conduct a review process that is fair, thorough, and timely. The idea is simple: The greater the variety of papers we receive, the greater the variety of articles we will be able to publish.
- A new editorial board function that will directly involve only a handful of board members is to serve as an advisory/oversight executive committee. This is the group to which I will, other factors being equal, turn first for advice or other forms of assistance on matters involving procedures, policies, and the like. The executive committee will also review my performance as Editor and the operations of the editorial office. The first scheduled review will take place halfway into my three-year term, at which time the committee will assess the fairness, competence, and timeliness of the review process and my decisions, and will offer any recommendations that follow from its assessment. As academicians, we are accustomed to reviewing the performance of students, colleagues, programs, departments, and even colleges and universities. It seems no less appropriate to review our journals as well—especially a journal that receives as much attention as the APSR.
- We have put several modifications of the review process in place in an effort to open it up and make it more transparent. For example, we are trying in several ways to expand the already large pool from which we draw reviewers. (In that spirit, let me add that if you know of anyone, yourself included, who would be a good reviewer but has not previously served in that capacity for the APSR, we would like to hear from you.) Another example is detailed below in the "Specific Procedures" section of the "Instructions to Contributors": When you submit a paper to the APSR, you are now invited to suggest the names of appropriate reviewers of your

paper. Our early experience with this new procedure has been encouraging; authors seem to like it, and their suggestions are bringing to our attention many potential reviewers who might not otherwise have occurred to us. A third example is that when you review a paper for the APSR, you can now expect to receive copies of all the other reviews and my decision letter (all rendered anonymous, of course). The rationale underlying these changes is that increasing the transparency of the review process will boost authors' and reviewers' confidence in the process and their sense of involvement in it. If it turns out that making the process more transparent actually undermines confidence, then we obviously will need to make some major changes to the process.

- I am not necessarily requiring a paper to receive positive recommendations from three reviewers to qualify for publication in the APSR. As I have remarked in several forums, it has sometimes occurred to me that getting a paper accepted by a top journal is something like winning the Olympic gold medal in figure skating. In that competition, what seems to matter most is that one not make a major mistake, so the winning strategy often consists of playing it safe by not doing anything risky. Sometimes a paper that receives two genuinely enthusiastic reviews and one decidedly negative one may be more interesting and important than a competent paper that has nothing seriously "wrong" with it. As Editor, I am trying to diversify the APSR's portfolio by investing in some "speculative" or "growth" stocks along with the normal "blue chips," i.e., by being open to work that is new, different, and perhaps too controversial or too far outside the mainstream to receive unanimously positive reviews.
- I am also willing to apply our 45-page limit on manuscripts flexibly, thereby making publication in the APSR a more realistic prospect for those who do qualitative, "thick-descriptive," or case studybased research.
- I am issuing "revise and resubmit" invitations very sparingly, confining them to situations in which I am confident that if the author implements a relatively narrow and specific set of revisions, the revised paper will warrant publication in the APSR. Genuine enthusiasm among most of the reviewers and a manageable set of suggested revisions that can be accomplished within the current framework of the paper are primary indicators pointing toward a "revise and resubmit" invitation. In the absence of these indicators, I am trying to save time, trouble, irritation, and disappointment for all concerned by rejecting papers rather than inviting resubmissions. I especially dislike the idea of piling one "revise and resubmit" invitation on top of an earlier one, and am willing to follow that path only under extremely unusual circumstances.
- My introduction to the new Style Manual for Political Science includes the following statement:

It is the obligation of authors to make their research accessible to prospective readers, not by 'dumbing it down' but by effectively conveying what they are trying to find out and why this quest is so worthwhile.... [T]he real key lies in careful editing and rewriting designed to open lines of communication rather than to close them. It is not reasonable to expect researchers who use complex formal or statistical models to conduct tutorials on their methods as a part of reporting their work; or to hold those whose research focuses on a certain nation or a certain political thinker responsible for introducing the rest of us to the most basic aspects of their subject matter before turning to the specific issues of concern; or, more generally, to require researchers to eschew all but plain, simple English. Moreover, it is naive to expect that ... those who are untrained in formal or statistical modeling will suddenly become avid and knowledgeable consumers of the technical portions of a statistical or formal presentation, or that those who had previously shown little or no interest in a certain region or thinker will suddenly yearn to master the subtlest nuances thereof. But it is neither unreasonable nor naive to insist at the very least that as political scientists we can and should clearly communicate to a broad range of other political scientists what we are trying to do and why it matters.

In assessing papers, one question I ask myself is whether the authors have done everything they legitimately can to broaden the accessibility and appeal of their work. One way they can do so is by spelling out very clearly at the outset what their basic research question is and why it is so interesting and important that readers who might otherwise ignore an article should instead invest their time in it. To do that, authors must reach out to a broader, more diverse audience than they may be accustomed to addressing-potential readers who cannot be assumed to have any specialized knowledge of their subject matter. Besides broadening the introductory portion of a paper, authors should come back, at the end of the paper, to the questions that motivated the analysis and should clarify what the basic message of their analysis is and why it matters.

- Along the same lines, I will use these Notes from the Editor to provide sneak previews of the articles in each issue, with an eye toward tempting you to take a look at work to which you might not otherwise pay attention. Opening up lines of communication is a two-way street; it requires authors to express their ideas effectively, but also readers to venture outside their well-worn paths.
- It is important to note that some major structural changes are in the works. In the next year or so, the book reviews that currently occupy about a third of the APSR's pages will migrate to the APSA's new journal, Perspectives on Politics. (The new journal will feature integrative essays, survey-critiques of the literature, and analyses of what our discipline has to say about current policy issues, along with book reviews.) Because of these changes, the APSR will be able to publish more articles in a given

year, thereby opening up possibilities that are not currently available.

• Finally, a purely symbolic change: I trust you have noticed that the APSR has an attractive new cover. Both the color and the graphic will change from issue to issue, with the graphic being keyed to the issue's lead article. (For several reasons, I am especially pleased to have a peace symbol adorn the cover of the first issue to appear during my editorship.)

I welcome comments on any aspect of these notes, which can be directed to apsr@gwu.edu.

#### IN THIS ISSUE

With the single exception of the lead article, the articles in this issue were all in advanced stages of the review process when I assumed the editorship in September of 2001. To give credit where it is due, then, I need to acknowledge that responsibility for the contents of this issue belongs more to Ada Finifter than to me. In light of the time lag between the initial submission of a paper and its appearance (almost invariably in revised form) in the APSR, the June 2002 issue, too, will be heavily weighted toward papers that were submitted to, and revised at the invitation of, my predecessor. Thereafter, the balance will shift significantly.

The lead article in this issue, and the immediate occasion for the appearance of a peace symbol on our cover, is "Theories of War in an Era of Leading Power Peace," Robert Jervis's 2001 APSA presidential address. In this essay, Jervis, a leading scholar of international politics, takes three leading schools of international relations theory (constructivism, liberalism, and realism) to task for their failure to explain why wars do or do not occur among members of a security community—in this case, advanced industrial democracies. Jervis argues that the peace that currently prevails among these nations cannot be explained by a singular focus on shared norms, common institutions, or the presence of nuclear weapons. Instead, he argues for melding elements of each approach with an historical, or path dependent, view of behavior. This essay, then, broadens the analytical base from which political scientists and others can consider the fundamental and enduring issue of war and peace.

In "Dictatorial Peace?" Mark Peceny and Caroline C. Beer, with Shannon Sanchez-Terry, shift away from Jervis's focus, and that of the broader international politics literature, on war and peace among democracies. The key assertions of the "democratic peace" argument are that democracies do not go to war with each other and are far less likely than other nations to go to war at all. But might there be a corresponding "dictatorial peace"? Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry argue that some of the same factors that help explain the incidence of peace among democracies (domestic institutions, values, war fighting capabilities, and transparency) also produce peace among authoritarian regimes. However, not all authoritarian regimes (personalist, military, and single-party) are created equal in this regard. Using

new data and sophisticated data-analytic techniques, the authors raise the intriguing possibility that democracies may not be unique after all.

The issue of similarities and differences in the international behavior of democracies and autocracies recurs in the Forum section of this issue, albeit in the context of international commerce rather than war and peace. (The Forum section is where critiques of, or commentaries on, articles previously published in the APSR appear. As noted in our Instructions to Contributors (below), submissions to the Forum undergo our normal review process. If they are accepted for publication, we solicit a response from the author(s) of the original article and we try to ensure that the two pieces appear in the same issue.) In "Political Regimes and International Trade: The Domestic Difference Revisited," Xinyuan Dai takes issue with an analysis of the impact of political regimes on trade barriers that appeared in these pages (Edward Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff, "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade," APSR 94 [June 2000]: 305-321). Recalculating the results after modifying what she considers a problematic component of that analysis, Dai concludes that trade barriers between pairs of democracies are higher than Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff predict, and that barriers between democracies are not always lower than barriers between democracies and autocracies. In their response ("Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade"), Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff contend that Dai's alteration of their model renders it less realistic and less robust than their original model.

Politics, in Harold Lasswell's formulation, is the process of determining "who gets what, when, how." One answer to the question of "Who gets what?" has been that, in an effort to secure their existing political base, decision-makers reward their core supporters by allocating resources to them. A very different answer has been that decision-makers, secure in the knowledge that their core supporters have nowhere else to turn, instead use the resource allocation process to try to expand their political base. Capitalizing on a rare opportunity to test these competing interpretations, Matz Dahlberg and Eva Johansson ("On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments") analyze uniquely suitable data from a "natural experiment" involving a temporary grants program in Sweden. Drawing on this evidence, Dahlberg and Johansson challenge widely held assumptions about the benefits of winning elections, and, thus, provide an intriguing answer to Lasswell's question.

Students of political attitudes and electoral behavior will find much of interest in this issue. One potentially major contribution is Eric Plutzer's analysis of the sources of voter turnout ("Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in Young Adulthood"). Plutzer begins with the simple but powerful idea that voting and nonvoting are matters of habit, and he develops this idea by focusing on voter turnout over the life course. Young adults confronting their first opportunity to vote have not yet gotten into the habit of

voting. They tend not to vote at the first opportunity, and having begun as nonvoters, they tend to remain nonvoters in subsequent elections. Their habitual nonvoting eventually gives way, though, to habitual voting, the basic question being how quickly the transition from one habit to the other occurs. In analyzing the pace of this transition, Plutzer integrates within his developmental perspective many factors that have previously been shown to promote or discourage turnout, thereby providing students of electoral behavior with a more inclusive framework from which to analyze voting and nonvoting.

Another broadening of focus is accomplished by Paul Allen Beck, Russell J. Dalton, Steven Greene, and Robert Huckfeldt in "The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational Influences on Presidential Choices." Though with exceptions ranging back to the first survey-based studies of voting in the 1940s, voting has generally been analyzed as if it were the act of an isolated individual, even though it obviously occurs within, and is inevitably shaped by, a complex social context. Employing an imaginative combination of data sources, Beck et al. gauge the impacts on vote choice of interpersonal discussion, media reports and editorials, and involvement in political party activities and other secondary organizations, along with personal traits that are standard predictors of vote choice. The result is a study that melds meticulous data collection with sound data analysis and, returning to a neglected theme in electoral studies, sheds new light on how social intermediaries affect vote choice.

One particular aspect of the social context of mass opinion and political behavior, media content, serves as the centerpiece of Nicholas A. Valentino, Vincent L. Hutchings, and Ismail K. White's "Cues that Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns." Valentino, Hutchings, and White investigate how subtle racial cues embedded in televised campaign ads influence voters' decision-making processes and lead them to endorse certain candidates. The issue is whether, even though explicitly racist campaign appeals have become rare, campaigners can succeed by "playing the race card" unobtrusively, activating racial attitudes through the use of carefully "coded" communication strategies. The answer that Valentino, Hutchings, and White provide not only does much to clarify the impact of campaign ads, but also speaks to the persistence of what Gunnar Myrdal termed "an American dilemma."

It is not only the news and editorial matter and the advertisements that the media carry that can shape mass political attitudes and behavior. In the irresistibly titled "Sex, Lies, and War: How Soft News Brings Foreign Policy to the Inattentive Public," Matthew A. Baum argues that media coverage of foreign policy crises on entertainment-oriented programs such as *The Oprah Winfrey Show* or on "soft" news-oriented programs such as *Dateline* is likely to reach segments of the public that do not pay much attention to standard news coverage. Taking coverage of the 1998 U.S. missile strikes against suspected terrorist sites in Afghanistan and

Sudan as the case in point, Baum shows that types of coverage that political scientists have ignored can broaden public access to information and thereby enhance public understanding of major policy issues.

Political theorists from John Stuart Mill to Jurgen Habermas have depicted communication among diverse groups as enhancing understanding, mutual tolerance, and even identification and affinity. When communication occurs across social groups, it has the potential to organize disparate groups into "crosscutting" social networks. This notion has informed several influential works, including Robert Putnam's Bowling Alone and Jon Elster's edited volume Deliberative Democracy, which in turn have sparked debates about whether exposure to different viewpoints actually promotes understanding and tolerance. In "Cross-Cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice," Diana Mutz begins to fill this gap by analyzing survey and experimental data. Mutz's findings have direct implications for our understanding of how discourse and communication affect political understanding and toleration.

Although the ability of dissatisfied citizens to turn incumbents out of office is widely seen as critical to the health of representative democracy, do the enormous electoral advantages that incumbent members of Congress enjoy make it possible for them to disregard their constituents' wishes? Analyzing House election outcomes over four decades, Brandice Canes-Wrone, David W. Brady, and John F. Cogan probe the link between members' ideological extremity and their performance in their bids for reelection. The results they report in "Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting" provide a more solid empirical foundation than has previously been available for understanding the connection between what members of Congress do and how their constituents respond.

The link between incumbents and officeholders also serves as the focus of "Coordination and Policy Moderation at Midterm," by Walter R. Mebane, Jr., and Jasjeet S. Sekhon. The technical level of this article is sufficiently high that many readers will find it hard going (in a restaurant this menu item would carry a four-chili pepper designation). However, those who persevere will be rewarded with some intriguing new insights. Among its several contributions, Mebane and Sekhon's "strategic coordination" interpretation provides a rather different account of the sources of divided government than can be found in interpretations based on "surge and decline" or "cognitive Madisonianism."

#### **INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS**

#### **General Considerations**

The APSR strives to publish scholarly research of exceptional merit, focusing on important issues and demonstrating the highest standards of excellence in conceptualization, exposition, methodology, and

craftsmanship. Because the APSR reaches a diverse audience of scholars and practitioners, authors must demonstrate how their analysis illuminates a significant research problem, or answers an important research question, of general interest in political science. For the same reason, authors must strive for a presentation that will be understandable to as many scholars as possible, consistent with the nature of their material.

The APSR publishes original work. Therefore, authors should not submit articles containing tables, figures, or substantial amounts of text that have already been published or are forthcoming in other places, or that have been included in other manuscripts submitted for review to book publishers or periodicals (including on-line journals). In many such cases, subsequent publication of this material would violate the copyright of the other publisher. The APSR also does not consider papers that are currently under review by other journals or duplicate or overlap with parts of larger manuscripts that have been submitted to other publishers (including publishers of both books and periodicals). Submission of manuscripts substantially similar to those submitted or published elsewhere, or to part of a book or other larger work, is also strongly discouraged. If you have any questions about whether these policies apply in your particular case, you should discuss any such publications related to a submission in a cover letter to the Editor. You should also notify the Editor of any related submissions to other publishers, whether for book or periodical publication, that occur while a manuscript is under review by the APSR and which would fall within the scope of this policy. The Editor may request copies of related publications.

If your manuscript contains quantitative evidence and analysis, you should describe your procedures in sufficient detail to permit reviewers to understand and evaluate what has been done and, in the event that the article is accepted for publication, to permit other scholars to carry out similar analyses on other data sets. For example, for surveys, at the least, sampling procedures, response rates, and question wordings should be given; you should calculate response rates according to one of the standard formulas given by the American Association for Public Opinion Research, Standard Definitions: Final Dispositions of Case Codes and Outcome Rates for RDD Telephone Surveys and In-Person Household Surveys (Ann Arbor, MI: AAPOR, 1998). This document is available on the Internet at <a href="http://www.aapor.org/ethics/stddef.html">http://www.aapor.org/ethics/stddef.html</a>. For experiments, provide full descriptions of experimental protocols, methods of subject recruitment and selection, subject payments and debriefing procedures, and so on. Articles should be self-contained, so you should not simply refer readers to other publications for descriptions of these basic research procedures.

Please indicate variables included in statistical analyses by capitalizing the first word in the variable name and italicizing the entire variable name the first time each is mentioned in the text. You should also use the same names for variables in text and tables and, wherever possible, should avoid the use of acronyms and computer abbreviations when discussing variables

in the text. All variables appearing in tables should have been mentioned in the text and the reason for their inclusion discussed.

As part of the review process, you may be asked to submit additional documentation if procedures are not sufficiently clear; the review process works most efficiently if such information is given in the initial submission. If you advise readers that additional information is available, you should submit printed copies of that information with the manuscript. If the amount of this supplementary information is extensive, please inquire about alternate procedures.

The APSR uses a double-blind review process. You should follow the guidelines for preparing anonymous copies in the Specific Procedures section below.

Manuscripts that are largely or entirely critiques or commentaries on previously published articles will be reviewed using the same general procedures as for other manuscripts, with one exception. In addition to the usual number of reviewers, such manuscripts will also be sent to the scholar(s) whose work is being criticized, in the same anonymous form that they are sent to reviewers. Comments from the original author(s) to the Editor will be invited as a supplement to the advice of reviewers. This notice to the original author(s) is intended (1) to encourage review of the details of analyses or research procedures that might escape the notice of disinterested reviewers; (2) to enable prompt publication of critiques by supplying criticized authors with early notice of their existence and, therefore, more adequate time to reply; and (3) as a courtesy to criticized authors. If you submit such a manuscript, you should therefore send as many additional copies of their manuscripts as will be required for this

Manuscripts being submitted for publication should be sent to Lee Sigelman, Editor, American Political Science Review, Department of Political Science, The George Washington University, 2201 G Street N.W., Room 507, Washington, DC 20052. Correspondence concerning manuscripts under review may be sent to the same address or e-mailed to apsr@gwu.edu.

#### **Manuscript Formatting**

Manuscripts should not be longer than 45 pages including text, all tables and figures, notes, references, and appendices. This page size guideline is based on the U.S. standard  $8.5 \times 11$ -inch paper; if you are submitting a manuscript printed on longer paper, you must adjust accordingly. The font size must be at least 11 points for all parts of the paper, including notes and references. The entire paper, including notes and references, must be double-spaced, with the sole exception of tables for which double-spacing would require a second page otherwise not needed. All pages should be numbered in one sequence, and text should be formatted using a normal single column no wider than 6.5 inches, as is typical for manuscripts (rather than the double-column format of the published version of the APSR), and printed on one side of the page only. Include an abstract of no more than 150 words. The APSR style of embedded citations should be used, and there must be a separate list of references at the end of the manuscript. Do not use notes for simple citations. These specifications are designed to make it easier for reviewers to read and evaluate papers. Papers not adhering to these guidelines are subject to being rejected without review.

Use endnotes rather than footnotes; again, like all other text, endnotes are to be double-spaced and in 11-point font. Place tables and figures (on separate pages and only one to a page) at the back of the manuscript with standard indications of text placement, e.g., [Table 3 about here]. If your paper is accepted for publication, you will be required to submit cameraready copy of graphs or other types of figures. Instructions will be provided.

For specific formatting style of citations and references, please refer to articles in the most recent issue of the APSR. For unusual style or formatting issues, you should consult the latest edition of *The Chicago Manual of Style*. For review purposes, citations and references need not be in specific APSR format, although some generally accepted format should be used, and all citation and reference information should be provided.

#### **Specific Procedures**

Please follow these specific procedures for submission:

- 1. You are invited to submit a list of scholars who would be appropriate reviewers of your manuscript. The Editor will refer to this list in selecting reviewers, though there obviously can be no guarantee that those you suggest will actually be chosen. Do not list anyone who has already commented on your paper or an earlier version of it, or any of your current or recent collaborators, institutional colleagues, mentors, students, or close friends.
- 2. Submit five copies of manuscripts and a diskette containing the word-processed version of the manuscript. Please ensure that the paper and diskette versions you submit are identical; the diskette version should be of the fully identified copy (see below). Please review all pages of all copies to make sure that all copies contain all tables, figures, appendices, and bibliography mentioned in the manuscript and that all pages are legible. Label the diskette clearly with the (first) author's name and the title of the manuscript (in abridged form if need be), and identify the word processing program and operating system.
- To comply with the APSR's procedure of doubleblind peer reviews, only one of the five copies submitted should be fully identified as to authorship and four should be in anonymous format.
- 4. For anonymous copies, if it is important to the development of the paper that your previous publications be cited, please do this in a way that does not make the authorship of the submitted paper obvious. This is usually most easily accomplished

- by referring to yourself in the third person and including normal references to the work cited in the list of references. In no circumstances should your prior publications be included in the bibliography in their normal alphabetical location but with your name deleted. Assuming that text references to your previous work are in the third person, you should include full citations as usual in the bibliography. Please discuss the use of other procedures to render manuscripts anonymous with the Editor prior to submission. You should not thank colleagues in notes or elsewhere in the body of the paper or mention institution names, web page addresses, or other potentially identifying information. All acknowledgments must appear on the title page of the identified copy only. Manuscripts that are judged not anonymous will not be reviewed.
- 5. The first page of the four anonymous copies should contain only the title and an abstract of no more than 150 words. The first page of the identified copy should contain (a) the name, academic rank, institutional affiliation, and contact information (mailing address, telephone, fax, e-mail address) for all authors; (b) in the case of multiple authors, an indication of the author who will receive correspondence; (c) any relevant citations to your previous work that have been omitted from the anonymous copies; and (d) acknowledgments, including the names of anyone who has provided comments on the manuscript. If the identified copy contains any unique references or is worded differently in any way, please mark this copy with "Contains author citations" at the top of the first page.

No copies of submitted manuscripts can be returned.

#### **ELECTRONIC ACCESS TO THE APSR**

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Individual members of the American Political Science Association can access recent issues of the APSR and PS through the APSA website (www.apsanet.org) with their username and password. Individual nonmember access to the online edition will also be available, but only through institutions that hold either a print-plus-electronic subscription or an electronic-only subscription, provided the institution has registered and activated its online subscription.

Full text access to current issues of both the APSR and PS is also available on-line by library subscription from a number of database vendors. Currently, these include University Microfilms Inc. (UMI) (via its CD-ROMs General Periodicals Online and Social Science Index and the on-line database ProQuest Direct), Online Computer Library Center (OCLC) (through its on-line database First Search as well as on CD-ROMs and magnetic tape), and the Information Access Company (IAC) (through its products Expanded Academic Index, InfoTrac, and several on-line services [see below]). Others may be added from time to time.

The APSR is also available on databases through six online services: Datastar (Datastar), Business Library (Dow Jones), Cognito (IAC), Encarta Online Library (IAC), IAC Business (Dialog), and Newsearch (Dialog).

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## Theories of War in an Era of Leading-Power Peace Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2001

ROBERT JERVIS Columbia University

The motor of international politics has been war among the leading states. The most developed states in the international system—the United States, Western Europe, and Japan—form what Karl Deutsch called a security community, which is a group of countries among which war is unthinkable. These states are the most powerful ones in the world and, so, are traditional rivals. Thus the change is striking and consequential. Constructivists explain this in terms of changed ideas and identities; liberals point to democracy and economic interest; realists stress the role of nuclear weapons and American hegemony. My own explanation combines the high cost of war, the gains from peace, and the values that are prevalent within the security community. Whatever the cause, the existence of the community will bring with it major changes in international politics and calls into question many traditional theories of war.

From the most remote ages onward, the peoples have perpetually assailed one another for the satisfaction of their appetites and their egotistical interests [and their fears]. I have not made this history, and neither have you. It is. (Georges Clemenceau, December 29, 1918 quoted by Osiander 1994, 265)

A new science of politics is needed for a new world. [Tocqueville (1835) 1945, 7]

7 ar and the possibility of war among the great powers have been the motor of international politics, not only strongly influencing the boundaries and distribution of values among them, but deeply affecting their internal arrangements and shaping the fates of smaller states. Being seen as an ever-present possibility produced by deeply rooted factors such as human nature and the lack of world government, these forces were expected to continue indefinitely. But I would argue that war among the leading great powers—the most developed states of the United States, West Europe, and Japan-will not occur in the future, and indeed is no longer a source of concern for them (Mueller 1989; also see Adler 1992; Duffield 2001; Goldgeier and McFaul 1992; Jervis 1991/1992; Mandelbaum 1998/1999; Shaw 1994; Singer and Wildavsky 1993; Ullman 1991; Van Evera 1990/1991). The absence of war among these states would itself be a development of enormous proportions, but the change goes even farther because war is not even contemplated. During the Cold War peace was maintained, but this was due to the fear that if the superpowers did not take care, they would indeed fight.

Now, however, the leading states form what Karl Deutsch called a pluralistic security community, a group among whom war is literally unthinkable—i.e., neither the publics nor the political elites nor even the military establishments expect war with each other (Deutsch et al. 1957; also see Adler and Barnett 1998;

Melko 1973). No official in the Community would advocate a policy on the grounds that it would improve the state's position in the event of war with other members. Although no state can move away from the reliance on war by itself lest it become a victim, the collectivity can do so if each forsakes the resort to force.

Security communities are not unprecedented. But what is unprecedented is that the states that constitute this one are the leading members of the international system and so are natural rivals that in the past were central to the violent struggle for security, power, and contested values. Winston Churchill exaggerated only slightly when he declared that "people talked a lot of nonsense when they said nothing was ever settled by war. Nothing in history was ever settled except by wars" (quoted by Gilbert 1983, 860-1). Even cases of major change without war, such as Britain yielding hegemony in the Western Hemisphere to the United States at the turn of the 20th century, were strongly influenced by security calculations. Threatening war, preparing for it, and trying to avoid it have permeated all aspects of politics, and so a world in which war among the most developed states is unthinkable will be a new one. To paraphrase and extend a claim made by Evan Luard (1986, 77), given the scale and frequency of war among the great powers in the proceeding millennia, this is a change of spectacular proportions, perhaps the single most striking discontinuity that the history of international politics has anywhere provided.

Two major states, Russia and China, might fight each other or a member of the Community. But, as I discuss below, such a conflict would be different from traditional wars between great powers. Furthermore, these countries lack many of the attributes of great powers: their internal regimes are shaky, they are not at the forefront of any advanced forms of technology or economic organization, they can pose challenges only regionally, and they have no attraction as models for others. They are not among the most developed states and I think it would be fair to put them outside the ranks of the

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> One reason for the difference between my analysis and Mearsheimer's (2001) is that he focuses more on the danger of a war with Russia or China.

great powers as well. But their military potential, their possession of nuclear weapons, and the size of their economies renders that judgment easily debatable and so I will not press it but rather will argue that the set of states that form the Community are not all the great powers, but all the most developed ones.

Other states generally seen as Western also could fight, most obviously Greece and Turkey. Despite their common membership in NATO, the conflicts of interest are severe enough to lead each to contemplate war with the other. Neither is a leading power so this does not disturb my argument, although a thought-experiment that would transform them into such states without diminishing their animosity would.

#### **CENTRAL QUESTIONS**

Five questions arise. First, does the existence of the Community mean the end of security threats to its members and, more specifically, to the United States? Second, will the Community endure? Third, what are the causes of its construction and maintenance? Fourth, what are the implications of this transformation for the conduct of international affairs? Finally, what does this say about theories of the causes of war?

#### **CONTINUED THREATS**

The fact that the United States is not menaced by the most developed countries obviously does not mean that it does not face any military threats. Indeed, even before September 11 some analysts saw the United States as no more secure than it was during the Cold War, being imperiled by terrorists and "rogue" states, in addition to Russia and China.<sup>2</sup> But even if I am wrong to believe that these claims are exaggerated, representing the political and psychological propensity for the "conservation of enemies" (Hartmann 1982; Mueller 1994); these conflicts do not have the potential to drive world politics the way that clashes among the leading powers

did in the past. They do not permeate all facets of international politics and structure state—society relations; they do not represent a struggle for dominance in the international system or a direct challenge to American vital interests.

Even the fiercest foes of Russia, China, or the rogues do not see them as ready to launch unprovoked attacks against the United States or other members of the Community, let alone as out to control the world. Russia and China are not seeking to replace the United States: any clash will come out of these countries' desire for a sphere of influence and the American belief that such arrangements are inappropriate in today's world-at least for others. Thus while there are reasons why the United States might fight the PRC to protect Taiwan or Russia to protect the Baltic republics, these disputes are not like those that characterized great power conflicts over the past three centuries. The United States is defending not traditional national interests, let alone vital ones, but, in seeking what Wolfers (1962, 73–6) called "milieu goals," upholding values such as democracy, self-determination, and rejection of coercion as a means of changing the status quo. These may be deeply held both for their intrinsic value and for their role in maintaining America's worldwide reach, but they are more akin to the concerns of imperial powers than to sources of conflict between equal major powers.

#### WILL THE SECURITY COMMUNITY LAST?

Predictions about the maintenance of the Community are obviously disputable (indeed, limitations on people's ability to predict could undermine it), but nothing in the short period since the end of the Cold War points to an unraveling. The disputes within it do not seem to be increasing in number or severity and even analysts who stress the continuation of the struggle for world primacy and great power rivalries do not expect fighting [Huntington 1993; Kupchan forthcoming; Waltz 1993, 2000; however, Calleo (2001), Layne (2000), and Mearsheimer (1990, 2001) are ambiguous on this point]. If the United States is still concerned with maintaining its advantages over its allies, the reason is not that it believes that it may have to fight them but that it worries that rivalry could make managing world problems more difficult (Layne 2000; New York Times, March 8, 1992, 14; May 24, 1992, 1, 14). The Europeans' effort to establish an independent security force is aimed at permitting them to intervene when the United States chooses not to (or perhaps by threatening such action, to trigger American intervention). not at fighting the United States. Even if Europe were to unite and the world to become bipolar again, it is very unlikely that suspicions, fears for the future, and conflicts of interest would be severe enough to break the Community.

A greater threat would be the failure of Europe to unite coupled with an American withdrawal of forces, which could lead to "security competition" within Europe (Art 1996a; Mearsheimer 2001, 385–96). The fears would focus on Germany, but their magnitude is hard to gauge and it is difficult to estimate what external

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> This paper was completed on September 10 and the obvious question is how the next day's events affect the analysis. Although terrorism of this unprecedented magnitude is horrifying and will have a significant impact on domestic and international politics, I do not think it has the potential to be a functional substitute for great power war and be the driving force of politics. The world is not likely to unite to combat terrorism. Not only are the forms and sources of this scourge varied, but states have many other competing interests and leaders may sometimes find terrorism a useful tool. Indeed by calling for a war against terrorism with a global reach (i.e., able to kill Americans), the United States has indicated both that its narrow interests are primary and that it is hopeless if not undesirable to seek an end to all terror. The United States asks other countries to put aside their individual goals, calls on India and Pakistan to "stand down" to facilitate the campaign against Al Qaeda, and tells Israel and the PLO to stop shooting so that Muslim opinion will not be further inflamed. But these and other countries have concerns that are more important to them than combating terrorism and in a fairly short period of time previous outlooks and conflicts of interest will reassert themselves. Absent the use of nuclear weapons or large-scale biological attacks, I think, that, looking back 10 or 20 years from now, these terrorist incidents and the campaign against them will loom less large than the turning points of the 20th century, such as World War II and the end of the Cold War.

shocks or kinds of German behavior would activate them. The fact that Thatcher and Mitterrand opposed German unification is surely not forgotten in Germany and is an indication that concerns remain. But this danger is likely to constitute a self-denying prophecy in two ways. First, many Germans are aware of the need not only to reassure others by tying themselves to Europe, but also to make it unlikely that future generations of Germans would want to break these bonds even if they could. Second, Americans who worry about the residual danger will favor keeping some troops in Europe as the ultimate intra-European security guarantee.

Expectations of peace close off important routes to war. The main reason for Japanese aggression in the 1930s was the desire for a self-sufficient sphere that would permit Japan to fight the war with the Western powers that was seen as inevitable, not because of particular conflicts, but because it was believed that great powers always fight each other. In contrast, if states believe that a security community will last, they will not be hypersensitive to threats from within it and will not feel the need to undertake precautionary measures that could undermine the security of other members. Thus the United States is not disturbed that British and French nuclear missiles could destroy American cities, and while those two countries object to American plans for missile defense, they do not feel the need to increase their forces in response. As long as peace is believed to be very likely, the chance of inadvertent spirals of tension and threat is low.

Nevertheless, the point with which I began this section is unavoidable. World politics can change rapidly and saying that nothing foreseeable will dissolve the Community its not the same as saying that it will not dissolve (Betts 1992). To the extent that it rests on democracy and prosperity (see below), anything that would undermine these would also undermine the Community. Drastic climate change could also shake the foundations of much that we have come to take for granted. But it is hard to see how dynamics at the international level (i.e., the normal trajectory of fears, disputes, and rivalries) could produce war among the leading states. In other words, the Community does not have within it the seeds of its own destruction.

Our faith in the continuation of this peace is increased to the extent that we think we understand its causes and have reason to believe that they will continue. This is our next topic.

#### **EXPLANATIONS FOR THE SECURITY** COMMUNITY

There are social constructivist, liberal, and realist explanations for the Community which, although preceding from different assumptions, invoke overlapping factors.3

#### Constructivism

Constructivism points to the norms of non-violence and shared identities that have led the advanced democracies to assume the role of each other's friend through the interaction of behavior and expectations.4 In contradistinction to the liberal and realist explanations, this downplays the importance of material factors and elevates ideas, images of oneself and others, and conceptions of appropriate conduct. The roots of the changes that have produced this enormous shift in international politics among some countries but not others are not specified in detail, but the process is a selfreinforcing one—a benign cycle of behavior, beliefs, and expectations.

People become socialized into attitudes, beliefs, and values that are conducive to peace. Individuals in the Community may see their own country as strong and good—and even better than others—but they do not espouse the virulent nationalism that was common in the past. Before World War I, one German figure could proclaim that the Germans were "the greatest civilized people known to history," while another declared that the Germans were "the chosen people of this century," which explains "why other people hate us. They do not understand us but they fear our tremendous spiritual superiority." Thomas Macaulay similarly wrote that the British were "the greatest and most highly civilized people that ever the world saw" and were "the acknowledged leaders of the human race in the causes of political improvement," while Senator Albert Beveridge proclaimed that "God has made us the master organizers of the world." These sentiments are shocking today because they are so at variance from what we have been taught to think about others and ourselves. We could not adopt these views without rejecting a broad set of beliefs and values. An understanding of the effects of such conceptions led the Europeans, and to an unfortunately lesser extent the Japanese, to denationalize and harmonize their textbooks after World War II and has similarly led countries with remaining enemies to follow a different path: the goals for the education of a 12year-old child in Pakistan include the "ability to know all about India's evil designs about Pakistan; acknowledge and identify forces that may be working against Pakistan: understand the Kashmir problem" (quoted by Kumar 2001, 29).

For constructivists, the fact that all members of the Community are democracies is important not so much for the reasons given by liberals (see below) as for the sense of common identity that the similarity in regime has generated (Hampton 1998/1999, 240-4;

<sup>3</sup> Less popular in the United States is a neo-Marxist account of the need and possibilities for capitalists in the advanced industrial countries to work together to maintain their positions of dominancewhat Kautsky called ultraimperialism at a time when most Marxists thought that classical imperialism would bring the European coun-

tries to fight each other. For discussions, see Gill (1990), Halliday (1994, Chap. 3), Shaw (2000, Chaps. 6-9), and Van der Pijl (1998); also see Barkawi and Laffey (1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Wendt (1999) draws here on the social-psychological work of M. Deutsch (1973), which is not well known to political scientists. For a discussion of the central role of interactions in politics, see Jervis (1997).

Quoted by Van Evera (1984, 27); this article provides a thorough discussion of the relationship between nationalism and war. For a more pessimistic view, see Mearsheimer (1990, 20-21, 25).

Kahl 1998/1999; Risse-Kappen 1995; Wendt 1999, 353-7). The formation of common identities has been central to national integration (Cronin 1999; Deutsch 1953), and it stands to reason that it plays a major role not only in keeping states at peace, but in making war unthinkable. The evidence for shared identity within the Community is hard to find, however, or at least has not been produced (Cederman 2001). Moreover, constructivists say little about when and why shared identities disintegrate, as they do when a country lapses into civil war (Arfi 1998). Ironically, the spread of democracy might diminish the importance of democratic identity. The sense that being democratic is a vital part of one's self (as an individual or as a country) may diminish if it becomes less distinctive. Being democratic is highly salient when most others are not and when adversaries are hostile to democracy; in a world that is predominantly democratic, sources of identity may be different and more divisive.

The obvious objection to constructivism is that it mistakes effect for cause: its description is correct, but the identities, images, and self-images are superstructure, being the product of peace and of the material incentives discussed below. What is crucial is not people's thinking, but the factors that drive it.6 The validity of this claim is beyond the reach of current evidence, but what it clear is that the constructivist belief that the Community will last places great faith in the power of socialization and the ability of ideas to replicate and sustain themselves. This conception may betray an excessive faith in the validity of ideas that seem self-evident today but that our successors might reject. Constructivism may present us with actors who are "over-socialized" (Wrong 1976, Chap. 2) and leave too little role for agency in the form of people who think differently, perhaps because their material conditions are different.

#### Liberalism

The liberal explanation has received most attention. Although it comes in several variants, the central strands are the pacifying effects of democracy, economic interdependence, and joint membership in international organizations (Russett and Oneal 2001).

**Democracy.** The members of the Community are democracies, and many scholars argue that democracies rarely if ever fight each other. Although the statistical evidence is, as usual, subject to debate, Jack Levy (1989, 88) is correct that this claim is "as close as

anything we have to an empirical law in international politics."

Less secure, however, is our understanding of why this is the case. We have numerous explanations, which can be seen as competing or complementary. Democracies are systems of dispersed power, and dispersed power means multiple veto points and groups that could block war. (This seems true almost by definition, but if the accounts of former Soviet leaders are to be trusted, Brezhnev was more constrained by his colleagues than was Nixon, at least where arms control was concerned.) Related are the norms of these regimes: democracies function through compromise, nonviolence, and respect for law. To the extent that these values and habits govern foreign policy, they are conducive to peace, especially in relations with other democracies who reciprocate.

Other scholars have argued that the key element lies in the realm of information. By having a relatively free flow of intelligence and encouraging debate, democracies are less likely to make egregious errors in estimating what courses of action will maintain the peace (White 1990). The other side of the informational coin is that democracies can more effectively commit themselves and telegraph their intentions, and so avoid both unnecessary spirals of conflict and wars that stem from others' incorrect beliefs that the democracy is bluffing (although an obvious cost is an inability to bluff) (Fearon 1994; Schultz 2001; for qualifications and doubts, see Finel and Lord 2000).

The two parts of the informational argument can reinforce or be in tension with each other. If democratic processes make behavior highly predictable, then even dictatorships should be able to estimate what they will do, thereby reducing the distinctiveness of interactions among democracies. In fact, this does not seem to be the case, as the misjudgments of Hitler, Stalin and Saddam Hussein make clear. If democratic processes do not provide totally unambiguous evidence, however, one can conclude that predictability will be high only when each side both sends and receives information clearly, thereby explaining the advantages of democratic dyads.

Finally, in a recasting of the traditional argument that democracies are less likely to go to war because those who hold ultimate authority (i.e., the general public) will pay the price for conflict, some argue that the institutional and coalitional nature of democratic regimes requires their leaders to pursue successful policies if they are to stay in office (Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 1999; Goemans 2000; a related argument is Snyder 1991). Thus democracies will put greater efforts into winning wars and be careful to choose to fight only wars they can win (Lake 1992; Reiter and Stam 1998). Autocracies have a narrower base and so can stay in power by buying off their supporters even if their foreign policies are unnecessarily costly. These arguments, while highly suggestive, share with earlier liberal thinking quite stylized assumptions about the preferences of societal actors and pay little attention to how each country anticipates the behavior of others and assesses how others expect it to behave.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> In fact Wendt's analysis relies heavily on changed material circumstances, in contradiction to his theoretical formulation (1999, 343–66).

<sup>7</sup> The literature is voluminous: for good summaries see Ray (1995, 1998), Russett (1993), and Russett and Oneal (2001 Chaps. 2 and 3); for critiques see Gowa (1999) and Mares (2001, Chap. 4). Other scholars argue that the benign behavior is a product not of the broad category of democracy, but of the subset that are liberal and/or mature (Owen 1997; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; Ward and Gleditsch 1999)

For the latest exchange see Green et al. (2001), Oneal and Russett (2001), Beck and Katz (2001), and King (2001).

The explanations for the democratic peace are thoughtful and often ingenious, but not conclusive. Many of them lead us to expect not only dyadic effects, but monadic ones as well—i.e., democracies should be generally peaceful, not just peaceful toward each other, a finding that most scholars deny (but not all: Rummel 1995). They also imply that one democracy would not seek to overthrow another, a proposition that is contradicted by American behavior during the Cold War. Furthermore, most of the arguments are built around dyads but it is not entirely clear that the posited causes would apply to multilateral groupings like the Community.

The more recent arguments implicitly dispute rather than fully engage older ones that focus on the obstacles to effective foreign policies in democracies: the fickleness of public opinion, the incentives that leaders have to seek short-run success at the cost of investing for the long run, the recruitment of inexperienced leaders, the parochialism that makes democracies prone to misunderstand others (Almond 1950; Lippmann 1955). Because extensive citizen participation can easily lead to emotional identification with the country, high levels of nationalism can be expected in democracies. Because public opinion has greater influence and pays only sporadic attention to foreign policy, consistency and commitments should be harder rather than easier for them. These once-familiar views may be incorrect, but they deserve careful attention.

The causal role of democracy is hard to establish because these regimes have been relatively rare until recently, much of the democratic peace can be explained by the Soviet threat, and the same factors that lead countries to become democratic are conducive to peace between them [e.g., being relatively rich and secure, resolving regional disputes (Thompson 1996)]. It is particularly important and difficult to control for the role of common interest, which loomed so large during the Cold War (Farber and Gowa 1995, 1997; also see Elman 1997; Layne 1994). But interests are not objective and may be strongly influenced by the country's internal regime. Thus the democracies may have made common cause during the Cold War in part because they were democracies; common interest may be a mechanism by which the democratic peace is sustained as much as it is a competing explanation for it (for this and related issues, see Gartzke 1998, 2000; Maoz 1997; Oneal and Russett 1999; Schweller 2000). Moreover, if democracies are more likely to become economically interdependent with one another, additional common interest will be created. But to bring up the importance of interest is to highlight an ambiguity and raise a question. The ambiguity is whether the theory leads us to expect democracies never to fight each other or "merely" to fight less than do other dyads. 10 The related hypothetical question is whether it impossible for two democracies to have a conflict of interest so severe that it leads to war. This troubles the stronger version of the argument because it is hard to answer in the affirmative.

But would democracies let such a potent conflict of interest develop? As striking as the statistical data is the fact—or rather the judgment—that the regimes that most disturbed the international order in the 20th century also devastated their own peoples—the USSR, Germany under the Nazis and, perhaps, under Kaiser Wilhelm. One reason for this connection may be the desire to remake the world (but because the international order was established by countries that were advanced democracies, it may not be surprising that those who opposed it were not). Not all murderous regimes are as ambitions (e.g., Idi Amin's Uganda), and others with both power and grand designs may remain restrained (e.g., Mao's China), but it is hard to understand the disruptive German and Soviet foreign policy without reference to their domestic regimes.

Interdependence. The second leg of the liberal explanation for the Community is the high level of economic interdependence, which also could facilitate a common identity (Wendt 1994, 1999, 344-9), as earlier functional theorists of integration argued (Sterling-Folker 2000, 106–7). The basic argument was developed by Cobden, Bright, and the other 19th-century British liberals. As Cobden put it, "Free Trade is God's diplomacy and there is no other certain way of uniting people in bonds of peace." 11 Although the evidence for this proposition remains in dispute, the causal story is straightforward. "If goods cannot cross borders, armies will" is the central claim, in the words of the 19th-century French economist Frederick Bastiat, which were often repeated by Secretary of State Cordell Hull. 12 Extensive economic intercourse allows states to gain by trade the wealth that they would otherwise seek through fighting (Knorr 1966; Rosecrance 1986, 1999). Relatedly, individuals and groups develop a powerful stake in keeping the peace and maintaining good relations (but for evidence that bad relations do not necessarily impede trade, see Barbieri and Levy 1999). Thus it is particularly significant that in the contemporary world many firms have important ties abroad and that direct foreign investment holds the fates of important actors hostage to continued good relations (Milner 1988; Rosecrance 1986, Chap. 7). There can be a benign cycle here as increasing levels of trade strengthen the political power of actors who have a stake in deepening these ties (see, e.g., James and Lake 1989; Milner 1988). Furthermore, interdependence is more politically potent than it was in earlier eras because political leaders are now held accountable for the state of the economy and will be punished for a downturn.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> For his discussion of what he deems an "important anomaly," see Russett (1993, 120-4); for a rebuttal see Mares (2001, 102-4).
<sup>10</sup> Most scholars take the latter view, but this does not mean that this is what most versions of the theory actually imply.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Quoted by Bourne (1970, 85). For a general treatment of Cobden's views, see Cain (1979). For the most recent evidence, see McMillan (1997) and Russett and Oneal (2001, Chap. 4); for arguments that interdependence has been exaggerated and misunderstood, see Waltz (1970, 1979, Chap. 7, 1999). Most traditional liberal thinking and the rest of my brief discussion assumes symmetry; as Hirschman (1945) showed, asymmetric dependence can provide the basis for exploitative bargaining.
<sup>12</sup> Hull (1948, 355, 363–5) gives his views, although not the phrase.

The liberal view assumes that actors place a high priority on wealth, that trade is a better route to it than conquest, and that actors who gain economically from the exchange are politically powerful. These assumptions are often true, especially in the modern world, but are not without their vulnerabilities. At times honor and glory, in addition to more traditional forms of individual and national interest, can be more salient than economic gain. Thus as the Moroccan crisis of 1911 came to a head, General von Moltke wrote to his wife: "If we again slip away from this affair with our tail between our legs.... I shall despair of the future of the German Empire. I shall then retire. But before handing in my resignation I shall move to abolish the Army and to place ourselves under Japanese protectorate; we shall then be in a position to make money without interference and to develop into ninnies" (quoted by Berghahn 1973, 97). Traditional liberal thought understood this well and stressed that economic activity was so potent not only because it gave people an interest in maintaining peace, but because it reconstructed social values to downgrade status and glory and elevate material well-being (Hirschman 1977, 1986, Chaps. 3, 5; Schumpeter 1934). It follows that the stability of the Community rests in part upon people giving priority to consumption. Critics decry modern society's individualistic, material values, but one can easily imagine others that would generate greater international conflict.

Of course conquest can also bring wealth. The conventional wisdom that this is no longer true for modern economies, which depend less on agriculture and raw materials than on the intricate web of skilled tasks, has been challenged by Liberman's careful study of 20th-century conquests (1996a; also see Mearsheimer 2001, 148–52; for a partial rebuttal see Brooks 1999). But the net benefit from trade might have been even greater, especially when we consider the costs of arming and fighting. It also is not clear that conquered people will provide the innovation and ingenuity that produce wealth over the long run.

Here as elsewhere, expectations are crucial and this both strengthens and weakens the liberal argument. It strengthens it to the extent that most people believe that high levels of economic exchange strongly contribute to prosperity and expect tensions, let alone wars, to decrease trade and prosperity. But it is also important that people expect good economic relations to continue as long as their country does not disturb them. Since people set their policies by the predicted future benefits, even high levels of beneficial exchange will be ineffective if a deterioration is foreseen (Copeland 1996, 1999-2000).

Interdependence will have its pacifying effect only if actors who benefit from it are powerful. American social scientists often take for granted the model of contemporary American society in which this is the case and overlook the fact it is not universal. Thus Ripsman and Blanchard (1996/1997) note that while leading businessmen in Britain and Germany opposed World War I, just as liberalism leads us to expect, they were not powerful enough to force their preferences on their governments.

There are four general arguments against the pacific influence of interdependence. First, it is hard to go from the magnitude of economic flows to the costs that would be incurred if they were disrupted, and even more difficult to estimate how much political impact these costs will have, which depends on the other considerations at play and the political context. This means that we do not have a theory that tells us the magnitude of the effect. Second, even the sign of the effect can be disputed: interdependence can increase conflict as states gain bargaining leverage over each other, fear that others will exploit them, and face additional sources of disputes (Barbieri 1996; Keohane 2000, 2001; Waltz 1970, 1979, Chap. 7). These effects might not arise if states expect to remain at peace with each other, however. Third, it is clear that interdependence does not guarantee peace. High levels of economic integration did not prevent World War I, and nations that were much more unified than any security community have peacefully dissolved or fought civil wars. But this does not mean that interdependence is not conducive to peace.

Fourth, interdependence may be more an effect than a cause, more the product than a generator of expectations of peace and cooperation. Russett and Oneal (2001, 136) try to meet this objection by correlating the level of trade in one year, not with peace in that year, but with peace in the following one. But this does not get to the heart of the matter since trade the year before could be a product of expectations of future good relations.

Short of onerous and subjective coding of large numbers of cases to establish expectations about future relations, it may not be possible to ascertain which way the causal arrow runs. Indeed, it probably runs in both directions, with magnitudes that vary with other factors. But it is clear that the economic order in the current Community was premised on the belief that these countries could and had to remain at peace. One part of the reason was the lessons of the 1930s and the belief that economic rivalries led to political divisions and wars. Another part was the perceived threat from the Soviet Union, which, as Gowa (1994) has noted, meant that the fear of relative economic gains was eased if not reversed because partners' economic growth brought with it positive security externalities. This created a situation very different from that in the early 20th century when Britain and Germany, while heavily trading with each other, feared that the other's prosperity would endanger it. As one British observer put it after a trip to Germany in 1909: "every one of those new factory chimneys is a gun pointed at England" (quoted by Kennedy 1980, 315; but also see Liberman 1996b). Post-1945 European economic cooperation probably would not have occurred without American sponsorship, pressure, and security guarantees, and close American economic relations with Japan had similar political roots.

International Organizations. Even those who argue for the pacifying effect of common memberships in international organizations aver that the magnitude of this effect is relatively slight, at least in the short run

(Russett and Oneal 2001, Chap. 5), and so my discussion is brief. The causal mechanisms are believed to be several: enhanced information flows, greater ability to solve problems peacefully, an increased stake in cooperative behavior linked to the risk of being excluded from the organization if the state behaves badly, and possibly a heightened sense of common identity (Keohane 1984; much of the literature is summarized by Martin and Simmons 1998). Harder to pin down but perhaps most important are processes by which joint membership alters states' conceptions of their interest, leading them to see it not only as calling for cooperative reciprocations, but also as extending over a longer time-horizon and including benefits to others (Jervis 1999, 2001; March and Olsen 1998).

The obvious reasons to doubt the importance of shared institutional membership are that the incentives do not seem great enough to tame strong conflicts of interest and that membership may be endogenous to common interests and peaceful relations. States that expect war with each other are less likely to join the same international organizations and political conflicts that are the precursors to war may destroy the institutions or drive some members out, as Japan and Germany withdrew from the League of Nations during the 1930s. Even with a strong correlation and reasonable control variables, the direction of causality is difficult to establish.

#### **Realist Explanations**

The crudest realist explanation for the Community would focus on the rise of the common threat from Russia and China. While not entirely implausible, this argument does not fit the views espoused by most elites in Japan and Europe, who are relatively unconcerned about these countries and believe that whatever dangers emanate from them would be magnified rather than decreased by a confrontational policy.

American Hegemony. Two other realist accounts are stronger. The first argues that the Community is largely the product of the other enormous change in world politics—the American dominance of world politics.<sup>13</sup> U.S. defense spending, to take the most easily quantifiable indicator, is now greater than that of the next eight countries combined (O'Hanlon 2001, 4-5). Furthermore, thanks to the Japanese constitution and the integration of armed forces within NATO, America's allies do not have to fear attacks from each other: their militaries—especially Germany's—are so truncated that they could not fight a major war without American assistance or attack each other without undertaking a military build-up that would give a great deal of warning. American dominance also leads us to expect that key outcomes, from the expansion of NATO, to the American-led wars in Kosovo and the Persian Gulf, to the IMF bailouts of Turkey and Argentina in the spring and summer of 2001 and the abandonment of the latter six months later, will conform to American preferences.

But closer examination reveals differences between current and past hegemonies. The U.S. usually gives considerable weight to its partners' views, and indeed its own preferences are often influenced by theirs, as was true in Kosovo. For their parts, the other members of the Community seek to harness and constrain American power, not displace it. The American hegemony will surely eventually decay but increased European and Japanese strength need not lead to war, contrary to the expectations of standard theories of hegemony and great power rivalry. Unlike previous eras of hegemony, the current peace seems uncoerced and accepted by most states, which does not fit entirely well with realism.

Nuclear Weapons. The second realist argument was familiar during the Cold War but receives less attention now. This is the pacifying effect of nuclear weapons, which, if possessed in sufficient numbers and invulnerable configurations, make victory impossible and war a feckless option. An immediate objection is that not all the major states in the Community have nuclear weapons. But this is only technically correct: Germany and Japan could produce nuclear weapons if a threat loomed, as their partners fully understand. The other factors discussed in the previous pages may or may not be important; the nuclear revolution by itself would be sufficient to keep the great powers at peace.

While there is a great deal to this argument, it is not without its problems. First, because this kind of deterrence rests on the perceived possibility of war, it may explain peace, but not a security community. Second, mutual deterrence can be used as a platform for hostility, coercion, and even limited wars. In what Glenn Snyder (1965; also see Jervis 1989, 19-23, 74-106) calls the stability-instability paradox, the common realization that all-out war would be irrational provides a license for threats and lower levels of violence. In some circumstances a state could use the shared fear of nuclear war to exploit others. If the state thinks that the other is preoccupied with the possibility of war and does not anticipate that the state will make the concessions needed to reduce this danger, it will expect the other to retreat and so can stand firm. In other words, the fact that war would be the worst possible outcome for both sides does not automatically lead to uncoerced peace, let alone to a security community.15

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> For discussions of current and future American hegemony see Sheetz 1997/98; Wohlforth 1999; Waltz 1993, 2000. In an exception to the propensity for liberals to ignore the possible pacifying effects of hegemony, Russett and Oneal (2001, 184–91) propose a rebuttal by looking at earlier eras, but these are not comparable to the current situation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> See Kugler and Lemke (1996), Modelski (1987), Organski and Kugler (1980), and Thompson (1988). In his epilogue Gilpin (1981) discusses the reasons why future hegemonic transitions might be carried out peacefully.

<sup>15</sup> The same logic applies to the independent of the indepe

<sup>15</sup> The same logic applies to the indeterminant effect of the high costs of damaging relations that is a consequence of economic interdependence, but only in attenuated form. Relations are bad when two states confront each other with nuclear weapons, but they are likely to be good under conditions of interdependence, which means that the threat to sever ties will harm relations and decrease economic

#### A Synthetic Interactive Explanation

My explanation for the development and maintenance of the Community combines and reformulates several factors discussed previously. Even with the qualifications just discussed, a necessary condition is the belief that conquest is difficult and war is terribly costly. When conquest is easy, aggression is encouraged and the security dilemma operates with particular viciousness as even defensive states need to prepare to attack (Van Evera 1999). But when states have modern armies and, even more, nuclear weapons, it is hard for anyone to believe that war could make sense.

Of course statesmen must consider the gains that war might bring as well as its costs. Were the former to be very high, they might outweigh the latter. But, if anything, the expected benefits of war within the Community have declined, in part because the developed countries, including those that lost World War II, are generally satisfied with the status quo. <sup>16</sup> Even in the case that shows the greatest strain—U.S.—Japanese relations—no one has explained how a war could provide anyone much gross, let alone net, benefit: it is hard to locate a problem for which war among the Community members would provide a solution.

The other side of this coin is that, as liberals have stressed, peace within the Community brings many gains, especially economic. While some argue that the disruption caused by relatively free trade is excessive and urge greater national regulation, no one thinks that conquering others would bring more riches than trading with them. Despite concern for relative economic gain (Grieco 1990; Mastanduno 1991) and economic disputes, people believe that their economic fates are linked more positively than negatively to the rest of the Community.

Of course costs and benefits are subjective, depending as they do on what the actors value, and changes in values are the third leg of my explanation. Most political analysis takes the actors' values for granted because they tend to be widely shared and to change slowly. Their importance and variability become clear only when we confront a case such as Nazi Germany, which, contrary to standard realist conceptions of national interest and security, put everything at risk in order to seek the domination of the Aryan race.

The changes over the last 50–75 years in what the leaders and publics in the developed states value are striking. To start with, war is no longer seen as good in itself (Mueller 1989); no great power leader today would agree with Theodore Roosevelt that "no triumph of peace is quite so great as the supreme triumph of war" (quoted by Harbaugh 1961, 99). In earlier eras it was commonly believed that war brought out the best in individuals and nations and that the virtues of discipline, risk-taking, and self-sacrifice that war required were central to civilization. Relatedly, honor and glory

used to be central values. In a world so constituted, the material benefits of peace would be much less important; high levels of trade, the difficulty of making conquest pay, and even nuclear weapons might not produce peace.

Democracy and identity also operate through what actors value, and may be responsible in part for the decline in militarism just noted. Compromise, consideration for the interests of others, respect for law, and a shunning of violence outside this context all are values that underpin democracy and are reciprocally cultivated by it. The Community also is relatively homogeneous in that its members are all democracies and have values that are compatibly similar. It is important that the values be compatible as well as similar: a system filled with states that all believed that war and domination was good would not be peaceful.<sup>17</sup> One impulse to war is the desire to change the other country, and this disappears if values are shared. The United States could conquer Canada, for example, but what would be the point when so much of what it wants to see there is already in place?

Central to the rise of the Community is the decline in territorial disputes. Territory has been the most common cause and object of conflicts in the past, and we have become so accustomed to their absence within the Community that it is easy to lose sight of how drastic and consequential this change is (Diehl 1999; Hensel 2000; Huth 1996, 2000; Kacowicz 1998; Vasquez 1993; Zacher 2001). Germans no longer care that Alsace and Lorraine are French; the French are not disturbed by the high level of German presence in these provinces. The French, furthermore, permitted the Saar to return to Germany and are not bothered by this loss, and indeed do not feel it as a loss at all. Although during the Cold War the West Germans refused to renounce their claims to the "lost territories" to the east, they did so upon unification and few voices were raised in protest. Today the United Kingdom is ready to cede Northern Ireland to the Irish Republic if a referendum in the six counties were to vote to do so.

The causes of these changes in values in general and in nationalism and concern with territory in particular are subject to dispute, as are the developments that could reverse them. In particular, it is unclear how much they are rooted in material changes, most obviously the increased destructiveness of war and the unprecedented prosperity that is seen as linked to good political relations, and to what extent they are more autonomous, perhaps following out a natural progression and building on each other. They may be linked (inextricably?) to high levels of consumption, faith in rationality, and the expectation of progress, although it is not unreasonable to argue that this describes Europe in 1914 as well. The decreased salience of territory is almost surely produced in part by the decoupling of territorial control and national prosperity, and most of

activity. Thus even if the state prevails by using coercive tactics, it will pay a price for doing so. For related arguments, see Gartzke et al. (2001) and Morrow (1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Kacowicz (1998, Chap. 2) finds satisfaction with the status quo responsible for peace in several areas outside the Community.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> For a discussion of homogeneous and heterogeneous systems, see Aron (1966, 99–124, 373–403) and Hoffmann (1961, 207–9); for evidence of the central role of common values in relations between individuals and groups, see Rokeach and Mezei (1966).

the other relationships between material structures and ideational patterns are complex and reciprocal. Just as capitalism is built and sustained by precapitalist values and postmaterialism may grow from prosperity (Inglehart 1977, 1997), so the values that sustain the Community can be neither separated nor deduced from changes in the means and levels of production and potential destruction.

The obvious threat to these pacific values is an economic depression, which could also undermine democracy and weaken the links between good political relations and prosperity. If countries were to believe that the only way to halt a downslide was to disadvantage others, or even if they were to develop incompatible views about how to deal with dire economic circumstances, then not only would policies come into conflict, but the values supporting peace might erode. It is also possible that these values could change by themselves as people become bored by the rich, peaceful world and come to desire glory, honor, and extreme nationalism once again. But some changes may be irreversible: just as it is hard to conceive of slavery, torture, or dueling coming back into fashion, so the current values may be highly stable, being sustained by constant socialization and supporting the peace that serves the Community so well. 18

The destructiveness of war, the benefits of peace, and the changes in values interact and reinforce each other. If war were not so dreadful, it could be considered as an instrument for national enrichment; if peace did not seem to bring national well-being, violence would at least be contemplated; that military victory is no longer seen as a positive value both contributes to and is in part explained by the high perceived costs of war. In parallel, expectations of peace allow states to value each other's economic and political successes. Although these may incite envy, they no longer produce strong security fears, as was true in the past. The Community may then contain within it the seeds of its own growth through the feedbacks among its elements.

Another dynamic element is crucial as well: the progress of the Community is path-dependent in that without the Cold War it is unlikely that the factors we have discussed could have overcome prevalent fears and rivalries. The conflict with the Soviet Union produced American security guarantees and an unprecedented sense of common purpose among the states that now form the Community. Since the coalition could be undermined by social unrest or political instability, each country sought to see that the others were well off and resisted the temptation to solve its own problems by exporting them to its neighbors. Since the coalition would have been disrupted had any country developed strong grievances against other members, each had reason to moderate its demands and mediate when conflicts developed between others. To encourage better relations in the future, leaders consciously portrayed the others as partners and sponsored the socialization practices discussed earlier. The American willingness to engage in extensive cooperation abroad, the European willingness to go far down the road of integration, and the Japanese willingness to tie itself closely to the United States were improbable without the Cold War. But having been established, these forms of cooperation set off positive feedback and are now self-sustaining.

#### **IMPLICATIONS**

What are the implications of the existence of the security community for international politics in the rest of the world, for how the most developed states will carry out relations among themselves, and for general theories of war and peace?

## International Politics in the Rest of the World

One obvious question is why the leading powers but not other have formed a security community. The preceeding discussion implies that the outcome is overdetermined. Compared to others, the states in the Community are richer, more democratic, more satisfied with the status quo, would lose more in a war, and have a more explicit American security guarantee. Furthermore, they were the core of the anti-Soviet coalition during the Cold War, which produced benefical path-dependent results. This does not mean that other security communities will not form, but only that they are not likely to fit the pattern discussed here.

Despite the fact that war is thinkable outside the Community, it is striking that several other regions appear to be peaceful, most obviously South America. 19 The reasons remain unclear but may include the role of the superpowers in controlling dangerous conflicts during the Cold War, American hegemony more recently, and the example of peace among the developed countries. Although war remains possible, even a pessimist would have to note that there is little evidence that the countries outside the Community will recapitulate Europe's bloody history. For these countries, the main security danger stems from the civil wars and insurgencies, either of which can lead to interstate war (Herbst 2000; Holsti 1996). These developments are beyond the scope of this article, but the obvious challenge would be to bring them and the Community into a common theory.

#### International Politics Within the Community

In previous eras, no aspect of international politics and few aspects of domestic politics were untouched by the anticipation of future wars among the leading powers. As Charles Tilly (1990, 74) put it, "Over the millennium as a whole, war has been the dominant

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See Jervis (1991/1992, 55), Mueller (1989, Chaps. 10 and 11), and Wendt (1999, 310-2). The movement toward women's rights and the tolerance of diversity has waned as well as waxed in many parts of the world, however, especially within Muslim countries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See Hurrell (1998), Kacowitcz (1998), Mares (2001), and Martin-Gonzalez (1998); for general discussions of the changing incidence and nature of war see Holsti (1996), Kaufman (2001), and Mueller (2001).

activity of European states." Much will then change in the Community. In the absence of these states amalgamating—a development that is out of the question outside of Europe and unlikely within it-they will neither consider using force against one another nor lose their sovereignty. There will then be significant conflicts of interest without clear means of resolving them. The states will continue to be rivals in some respects, and to bargain with each other. Indeed, the stability-instability paradox implies that the shared expectation that disputes will remain peaceful will remove some restraints on vituperation and competitive tactics. The dense network of institutions within the community should serve to provide multiple means for controlling conflicts but will also provide multiple ways for a dissatisfied country to show its displeasure and threaten disruption.

The fact that the situation is a new one poses challenges and opportunities for states. What goals will have highest priority? Will nonmilitary alliances form? How important will status be and what will give it? Bargaining will continue, and this means that varieties of power, including the ability to help and hurt others, will still be relevant. Threats, bluffs, warnings, the mobilization of resources for future conflicts, intense diplomatic negotiations, and shifting patterns of working with and against others all will remain. But the content of these forms will differ from those of traditional international politics.

Politics within the Community may come to resemble the relations among the United States and Canada and Australia, which Keohane and Nye (1977) described as complex interdependence: extensive transnational and transgovernmental relations, negotiations conducted across different issue areas, and bargaining power gained through asymmetric dependence but limited by overall common interests. Despite this path-breaking study, however, we know little about how this kind of politics will be carried out. As numerous commentators have noted, economic issues and economic resources will play large roles, but the changed context will matter. Relative economic advantage was sought in the past in part because it contributed to military security. This no longer being the case, the possibilities for cooperation are increased. States will still seek economic benefit, but will care about whether others are gaining more than they are only if they believe that this can produce political leverage or future economic benefits. The range of cases in which the latter is true is now thought to be fairly small, however (see, e.g., Busch 1999; Krugman 1991).

Even though force will not be threatened within the Community, it will remain important in relations among its members. During the Cold War the protection the United States afforded to its allies gave it an added moral claim and significant bargaining leverage. Despite the decreased level of threat, this will be true for the indefinite future because militarily Japan and Europe need the United States more than the United States needs them. While the unique American ability to lead military operations such as those in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo causes resentments and fric-

tions, it also provides a resource that is potent even—or especially—if it is never explicitly brought to the table.<sup>20</sup>

Four Possible Futures. Even within the contours of a Community, a significant range of patterns of relations is possible, four of which can be briefly sketched.

The greatest change would be a world in which national autonomy would be further diminished and the distinctions between domestic and foreign policy would continue to erode. Medieval Europe, with its overlapping forms of sovereignty rather than compartmentalized nation-states, which might dissolve because they are no longer needed to provided security and can no longer control their economies, is one model here (Bull 1977 264-76; Cerny 1993; Lipschutz 2000; Osiander 2001; Rosenau 1990; van Creveld 1999; for a discussion of how the changed environment will affect state structures and strength, see Desch 1996). Although most scholars see the reduction of sovereignty and the growth of the power of nongovernmental organizations as conducive to peace and harmony, one can readily imagine sharp conflicts, for example, among business interests, labor, and environmentalists; between those with different views of the good life; and between those calling for greater centralization to solve common problems and those advocating increased local control. But state power and interest would in any case greatly decrease and the notion of "national interest", always contested, would become even more problematic.

A second world, not completely incompatible with the first, would be one in which states in the Community play a large role, but with more extensive and intensive cooperation, presumably produced and accompanied by the internalization of the interests of others and stronger institutions (Keohane 2000). A possible model would be the United States before the Civil War (Deudney 1995). Relations would be increasingly governed by principles, laws, and persuasion rather than by more direct forms of power (Lukes 1974; Nye 1990), a change that could benignly spill over into relations outside the Community. Although bargaining would not disappear, there would be more joint efforts to solve common problems and the line between "high" and "low" politics would become even more blurred.

In this world, the United States would share more power and responsibility with the rest of the Community than is true today. While popular with scholars (e.g., Ikenberry 2001; Ruggie 1996), at least as likely is a continuation of the present trajectory in which the United States maintains hegemony and rejects significant limitations on its freedom of action. National interests would remain distinct and the United States would follow the familiar pattern in which ambitions and perceived interests expand as power does. Consistent with the continuing concern with competitive advantages (Mearsheimer 2001), both conflicts of interests and the belief that hegemony best produces collective goods would lead the United States to oppose the efforts of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> For a related debate about the fungibility of military power, see Art (1996b, 1999) and Baldwin (1999).

others to become a counterweight if not a rival to it (Art 1996a). In effect, the United States would lead an empire, albeit a relatively benign one. But doing so would be compleated by the American self-image that precludes it from seeing its role for what it is, in part because of the popularity of values of equality and supranationalism. Other members of the Community would resent having their interests overridden by the United States on some occasions, but the exploitation would be limited by their bargaining power and the American realization that excessive discontent would have serious long-term consequences. So others might accept these costs in return for U.S. security guarantees and the ability to keep their own defense spending very low, especially because the alternative to Americandominated stability might be worse.

The fourth model also starts with the American attempt to maintain hegemony, but this time the burdens of American unilateralism become sufficient to produce a counter-balancing coalition, one that might include Russia and China as well (Waltz 1999, 2000; Layne 2000). Europe and Japan might also become more assertive because they fear not U.S. domination but the eventual withdrawal of the U.S. security guarantee. In this world, much that realism stresses—the clash of national interests, the weakness of international institutions, maneuvering for advantage, and the use of power and threats—would come to the fore, but with the vital difference that force would not be contemplated and the military balance would enter in only indirectly, as discussed above. This would be a strange mixture of the new and the familiar, and the central question is what ultima ratio will replace cannons. What will be the final arbiter of disputes? What kinds of threats will be most potent? How fungible will the relevant forms of power be?

Outlining these possibilities raises two broad questions that I cannot answer. First, is the future essentially determined, as many structural theories would imply, or does it depend on national choices strongly influenced by domestic politics, leaders, and accidents? Second, if the future is not determined, how much depends on choices the United States has yet to make, and what will most influence these choices?

## IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORIES OF THE CAUSES OF WAR

Whatever its explanation, the very existence of a security community among the leading powers refutes many theories of the causes of war or, at least, indicates that they are not universally valid. Thus human nature and the drive for dominance, honor, and glory may exist and contribute to a wide variety of human behaviors, but they are not fated to lead to war.

The obvious rebuttal is that war still exists outside the Community and that civil wars continue unabated. But only wars fought by members of the Community have the potential to undermine the argument that, under some conditions, attributes of humans and societies that were seen as inevitably producing wars in fact do not do so. The cases that could be marshaled are the Gulf

War and the operation in Kosovo, but they do not help these theories. These wars were provoked by others, gained little honor and glory for the Community, and were fought in a manner that minimized the loss of life on the other side. It would be hard to portray them as manifestations of brutal or evil human nature. Indeed, it is more plausible to see the Community's behavior as consistent with a general trend toward its becoming less violent generally: the abolition of official torture and the decreased appeal of capital punishment, to take the most salient examples (Mueller 1989).

The existence of the Community also casts doubt on theories that argue that the leading powers always are willing to use force in a struggle for material gain, status, and dominance. Traditional Marxism claims that capitalists could never cooperate; proponents of the law of uneven growth see changes in the relative power of major states as producing cycles of domination, stability, challenge, and war (Gilpin 1981; Kennedy 1987). Similarly, "power transitions" in which rising powers catch up with dominant ones are seen as very difficult to manage peacefully (Kugler and Lemke 1996; Organski and Kugler 1980; also see Modelski 1987; Thompson 1988). These theories, like the version of hegemonic stability discussed above, have yet to be tested because the United States has not yet declined. But if the arguments made here are correct, transitions will not have the same violent outcome that they had in the past, leading us to pay greater attention to the conditions under which these theories do and do not hold.

For most scholars, the fundamental cause of war is international anarchy, compounded by the security dilemma. These forces press hardest on the leading powers because while they may be able to guarantee the security of others, no one can provide this escape from the state of nature for them. As we have seen, different schools of thought propose different explanations for the rise of the Community and so lead to somewhat different propositions about the conditions under which anarchy can be compatible with peace. But what is most important is that the Community constitutes a proof by existence of the possibility of uncoerced peace without central authority. Because these countries are the most powerful ones and particularly war-prone, the Community poses a fundamental challenge to our understanding of world politics and our expectations of future possibilities.

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## **Dictatorial Peace?**

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Is there a dictatorial peace that resembles the democratic peace? This paper uses a new data set compiled by Barbara Geddes to examine the conflict behavior of three types of autocratic regimes—personalist, military, and single-party dictatorships—in the post-World War II era. We find some evidence that specific types of authoritarian regimes are peaceful toward one another. No two personalist dictators or two military regimes have gone to war with each other since 1945. These dyads were not less likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes than were mixed dyads, however. Although single-party regimes were the only homogeneous dyad in this study to have experienced war, multivariate analyses of participation in militarized interstate disputes suggest that single-party states are more peaceful toward one another than are mixed dyads. Thus, while we have found no unambiguous evidence of a dictatorial peace to match the robustness of the democratic peace, there is substantial interesting variation in the conflict behavior of specific types of authoritarian regimes. The analysis presented here demonstrates that studies of the impact of regime type on conflict behavior must work from a more sophisticated conception of authoritarianism.

s there a dictatorial peace that resembles the democratic peace? Previous research has shown that democracies almost never fight wars with one another and that democratic dyads are less likely to engage in any type of militarized dispute than are mixed dyads (Russett and Oneal 2001). But are democracies special, or is this type of conflict behavior replicated among other homogeneous dyads? Are similar authoritarian regimes peaceful toward one another?

Existing literature on the conflict behavior of autocracies has not provided a satisfactory answer to this question because it is a pale reflection of the voluminous literature on the democratic peace. While some have found that authoritarian regimes are more peaceful toward one another than are mixed dyads (Oneal and Russett 1997; Gleditsch and Hegre 1997; Raknerud and Hegre 1997), others have found no separate peace among authoritarian regimes (Russett and

Oneal 2001). These findings are difficult to interpret because authoritarian regimes are treated as a residual category in studies focused on the democratic peace. Vastly different types of authoritarian regimes are coded as members of homogeneous dyads. If the personalist dictatorship of Saddam Hussein's Iraq attacks the revolutionary theocracy of Iran or if the communist regime of North Vietnam wars with the personalist dictatorship of Ngo Dinh Diem's South Vietnam, existing practice would lead these to be considered wars among homogeneous dyads.

Scholars have increasingly recognized the artificiality of the disciplinary division between the study of comparative politics and that of international relations. Domestic politics inevitably affects the foreign policies of states. The international system shapes the character of domestic political institutions and policy choices. Scholars of international relations have demonstrated conclusively that one cannot understand the central dynamics of contemporary international politics without examining the political institutions and cultural norms of liberal democracies. Indeed, the systematic study of the foreign policy behavior of liberal democracies probably represents the greatest contribution of international relations scholars in the ongoing effort to bridge the gap between the two subfields.

Nearly half of the world's states are governed by authoritarian regimes, however, and the foreign policies of this other half of the world's political regimes have been subjected to much less systematic examination. We study the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes to deepen the integration of the comparative and international subfields of the discipline and expand our understanding of how political regimes shape foreign policy. Moreover, the democratic peace research has had important policy implications, shaping U.S. security policy to emphasize building democracy abroad. Similarly, important policy implications may come out

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of a deeper understanding of the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes.

This article uses a new data set prepared by Barbara Geddes (1999a, b) to examine the conflict behavior of three specific types of authoritarian regimes: personalist dictatorships, single-party regimes, and military regimes. By disaggregating authoritarian regimes into three specific types, not only do we shed light on the conflict behavior of authoritarian regimes, but also we are able to test some of the theoretical explanations of the democratic peace. Scholars of the democratic peace debate whether shared values or domestic institutions explain why democracies are much less likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes but have difficulty distinguishing between these factors since they both typically characterize democracies. By probing the conflict behavior of specific types of nondemocratic regimes, we can isolate and test contending theoretical explanations of the relationship among domestic institutions, values, and peace. Specifically, we hypothesize that personalist regimes are most likely among the three to forge a separate peace because of a particular kind of institutional constraint. Single-party regimes are the most likely among the three to be peaceful toward one another because of shared values. We test these expectations with a multivariate analysis of conflict behavior among homogeneous authoritarian regime dyads in the post-World War II era.

We find that no two personalist dictators or two military regimes have gone to war with each other. These dyads were not less likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes than were mixed dyads, however. Although single-party regimes were the only homogeneous dyad in this study to have experienced war, multivariate analyses suggest that single-party states are more peaceful toward one another than are mixed dyads. Thus, while we have found no dictatorial peace as robust as the democratic peace, there is substantial interesting variation in the conflict behavior of specific types of authoritarian regimes.

## Institutions, Norms, and Peace Among Political Regimes

The initial debate on the democratic peace focused on whether institutional constraints or shared normative values were the source of the separate peace among liberal states (Russett 1993). This preliminary examination of whether there is a separate peace among specific kinds of authoritarian regimes begins with a similar evaluation of the relative importance of institutions and norms. The power of the democratic peace probably flows from the way institutions and norms reinforce one another. We do not see this combination in any of the homogeneous autocratic dyads under study here. For

this reason, we anticipate that any dictatorial peace we discover will be less robust than the democratic peace. Nevertheless, elements of these two broad explanations for how homogeneity can lead to peace can be found for each of the regime types examined here. Political-military constraints may keep personalist dictatorships from fighting one another. A shared commitment to socialist values may inhibit conflict between single-party regimes.

#### Sources of the Democratic Peace

Initial advocates of the institutional argument for the democratic peace accepted Kant's basic insight about the constraining impact of republican institutions. If the people who pay the costs of war in lives and treasure have a say in the decision, they are likely to use their voices and votes in favor of peace (Kant 1983). Leaders are restrained from going to war because they must answer to the electorate (Gaubatz 1991) and/or a legislature (Morgan and Campbell 1991). Shared institutional constraints inhibit war between liberal democratic states because the leaders and citizens of such states can safely assume that other democracies are equally unlikely to engage in aggression (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).

Subsequent work on the relationship between democratic institutions and the liberal peace has not emphasized the dovish character of liberal states. Fearon (1994) and Schultz (1999), for example, argue that the key to the democratic peace is the transparent character of liberal institutions. Freedom of the press and the openness of liberal institutions make it difficult for liberal states to bluff or hide crucial information about their intentions. Once elected leaders threaten to use force, they face substantial "audience costs" from the public if they back down, making their threats to use force more credible than those made by illiberal states (Fearon 1994). Knowing this, other states will seek negotiated settlements rather than face the likely consequence of defiance. The combination of two transparent liberal states provides sufficient information to make wars of miscalculation unlikely.

Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), Lake (1992), and Reiter and Stam (1998) argue that democracies do not fight one another because they are more effective at fighting wars than are authoritarian regimes. Bueno de Mesquita et al. assume that all leaders make choices about war and peace based on how those choices will affect their likelihood of staying in power. Regimes are distinguished primarily by the size of the winning coalition that supports the leader. Leaders backed by large winning coalitions, as in democracies, stay in office by providing good public policy. Because democratically elected leaders are likely to be voted out of office if they fail in war, they fight harder to guarantee victory and avoid war unless they are sure to win. War is unlikely between two democracies because democracies recognize one another as dangerous targets. Large and powerful democracies will consider going to war against smaller and weaker democracies, but the weaker state is likely to accede to the demands of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Subsequent work on the liberal peace has focused on the importance of shared material interests (Farber and Gowa 1995), alliance commitments (Gaubatz 1996), trade, and/or membership in international organizations (Russett and Oneal 2001). Future research will examine the importance of these factors in the context of specific types of authoritarian regimes.

more powerful one rather than fight a war it is likely to lose.

Advocates of the normative argument suggest that shared cultural and philosophical values bind liberal states together. Some emphasize a principled commitment to self-determination as the crucial shared belief that generates a liberal pacific union (Doyle 1983). Others focus on the norms of nonviolent conflict resolution engendered by democratic politics (Russett 1993; Dixon 1994). Advocates of the normative argument suggest that cultural homogeneity alone is not enough to breed peace among like-minded states. The specific content of liberal values is what creates the separate peace among liberal states.

## Potential Sources of Peace Among Authoritarian Regimes

How might these insights about democracy and war be used to understand the conflict behavior of specific types of authoritarian regimes? Previous research has not adequately addressed this question because most advocates of the liberal argument implicitly measure nondemocratic states against the liberal standard. States that lack regular free and fair elections, freedom of the press, and/or strong legislatures are considered equally unconstrained, opaque, and/or inefficient at providing public goods such as victory in war. Peoples who lack a liberal commitment to self-determination and nonviolent resolution of conflicts are considered equally unlikely to sustain peaceful relations.

In contrast, scholars of comparative politics have long known that there exist numerous distinct types of authoritarian regimes (Linz 1975). Geddes' (1999a) data set codes three common types of autocratic regimes-military, single-party, and personalistbetween 1945 and 1994. As discussed below, the most crucial factor differentiating these regimes from one another is whether the government is dominated by the military as an institution, a hegemonic political party, or a single individual. Building on the democratic peace literature, we examine four causal mechanisms that link regime type and war-institutional constraints, transparency, war fighting capabilities, and shared values and apply these insights to the three types of authoritarian regimes catalogued by Geddes. Table 1 provides an overview of our argument. The top of each cell briefly summarizes our observations about each regime, while the bottom of each cell notes whether we consider this factor to have a high, medium, or low probability of leading to a separate peace among specific types of regimes.

Institutional Constraints and Transparency. There are ways in which it is appropriate to consider all of these types of autocratic regimes as fundamentally similar. We accept the liberal argument that these regimes are all less constrained than democracies in the sense that they allow a small elite tremendous leverage in determining national policy. In personalist regimes, one man possesses overwhelming authority to make decisions. Military regimes face somewhat more constraints

because decisions need to be approved by a portion of the officer corps. Single-party regimes also may be somewhat constrained because decisions must have at least the tacit approval of party members.

As Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999) point out, however, the size of the winning coalition in personalist, military, and single-party regimes may be equally small. Leaders in each of these autocratic regimes can, therefore, stay in office by providing private goods to key supporters even if they suffer defeat in war. The size of the "selectorate," however, differs substantially in these regimes, with single-party regimes possessing large selectorates and personalist dictators and military regimes small ones. Regimes that combine a large selectorate and a small winning coalition may be least constrained of all from going to war because it is more risky for members of the winning coalition to defect in such regimes, since defectors can be easily replaced (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, 797). For these reasons, we believe that decisional constraints are unlikely to be the source of a separate peace among certain types of authoritarian regimes. Indeed, the lack of such constraints could lead to conflict between similar authoritarian regimes.

Similarly, we see few systematic differences in the openness of specific types of authoritarian regimes and find them all to be more opaque than democracies. Because of the need to provide information to party members and to remain consistent with their professed ideological vision, single-party regimes may be somewhat more transparent than military or personalist regimes. None of these regimes, however, possesses the combination of a diversity of information sources, freedom of the press, and political contestation that makes democracies systematically more transparent than all forms of authoritarianism. The logic of the transparency approach, therefore, does not help us much in distinguishing between specific types of authoritarian regimes and is unlikely to account for any separate peace between specific types of autocracies.

War-Fighting Capabilities. We believe that the institutional argument about democracy and war-fighting capabilities provides important insights for understanding how political institutions could lead to a separate peace among a particular group of autocracies, personalist dictatorships. Our argument, however, emphasizes the weakness of personalist dictatorships, rather than their strength, and suggests that this weakness can generate a political dynamic similar to that anticipated by the institutional constraint argument for the democratic peace. Democracies are more effective in war not only because of the size of their winning coalitions, but also because of the professionalization of their armies and the clear subordination of those forces to civilian authorities (Huntington 1957). With a few exceptions (Mansfield and Snyder 1995) scholars of the democratic peace have underemphasized this aspect of the relationship between democracy and war and have missed the constraints imposed on the politicalmilitary capability of states by certain patterns of civilmilitary relations.

	Ca	usal Mechanism Li	nking Regime Type and Wa	
	Institutional Constraints	Transparency	War-Fighting Capabilities	Shared Values
Democracies	Most constrained, by elections and legislature	Transparent	Professionalized military, controlled by political leaders	Shared belief in liberal culture
Probability of leading to peace	High	High	High	High
Personalist	Least constrained	Not transparent	Weak, corrupt military	Least shared values
Probability of leading to peace	Low	Low	High	Low
Military	Somewhat constrained, by members of junta	Not transparent	Professionalized military, focused on internal security	Some shared values based on commitment to
Probability of leading to peace	Medium-low	Low	Medium-low	internal security Medium–low
One-party	Somewhat constrained, by party members and local party officials	Not transparent	Professionalized military, controlled by political leaders	Shared commitment to socialism
Probability of leading to peace	Medium-low	Medium-low	Medium-low	High

Among autocracies, single-party regimes have proven most successful in maintaining or enhancing the power of the coercive apparatus of the state. Singleparty regimes have often proven effective at mobilizing the people and resources of their societies in support of the nation's armed forces and have forged strong civilian control over professionalized militaries. Successful single-party regimes not only maintain the unity and discipline of the armed forces but also transform the Army into an instrument of the Party. An effective military has the potential to make single-party regimes more peaceful toward each other because they recognize the threat that another single-party regime poses. Alternatively, since the war-fighting capabilities of single-party regimes are not directly related to the size of their winning coalitions, their effectiveness in war may not lead to a separate peace among singleparty regimes.

The defining characteristic of a military regime is that the military as a unified institution governs the country. Thus, the military retains its cohesion and often increases the resources available to perform its national missions. As Andreski (1980, 3) notes, however, "The more often the armed forces are used internally, the less capable they become of waging a war." Because they focus on internal security missions, military regimes are likely to be more constrained than single-party regimes. Thus, while the Argentine military proved to be very effective in killing Argentines, it was less effective in fighting the British in the Malvinas War.

We argue, however, that personalist dictatorships are substantially more constrained than either military or single-party regimes. Dictatorial regimes thrive by destroying independent institutions, personalizing all pol-

itics, and ensuring that important political decisions are funneled through the one supreme leader (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Dictators gain allies through the creation of clientelistic patronage networks. Graft and corruption bind individual bureaucrats to the leader rather than to rational, insulated bureaucracies. Those who cannot be coopted by inclusion in the corruption, or who might become future rivals for power, are purged. To stay in power, the dictator must skillfully divide and conquer his potential adversaries in the factional politics endemic to personalist regimes.

No institution presents a greater threat to the power of a personalist dictator than the Army does. Like military regimes, personalist dictators depend on the Army and security forces to repress popular dissent. They understand, however, that the armed forces almost always represent a greater threat to their power than do civilian dissidents. Personalist dictators must be constantly on guard against the possibility of a military coup. Indeed, many personalist dictators are former military officers who took power in coups (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 32–8).

Dictators guard against this threat by incorporating officers fully in their network of graft and corruption. Officers are promoted and given choice commands because of their loyalty to the supreme leader rather than their skills as soldiers. They report to the dictator rather than through the chain of command, to strengthen the personal ties between the dictator and officers at the expense of the institutional bonds of the military. Multiple security forces and intelligence units proliferate so that the dictator can play one group off against another. These strategies are often very effective at preserving the dictator's power. Personalist regimes last

longer than military regimes (Remmer 1989; Geddes 1999a).<sup>2</sup> Dictators can resist pressures to leave power because their regimes are unlikely to experience the splits within the governing elite that are essential for negotiating transitions to democracy (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Geddes 1999a).

The strategies pursued by dictators to stay in power, however, render military institutions in personalist regimes incapable of doing much more than repressing unarmed civilians. To construct a "coup-proof" regime, dictators must systematically weaken their armed forces (Quinlivan 1999). These institutional constraints make it difficult for dictators to launch aggressive foreign policies because they know that their armies are unlikely to succeed in real combat with disciplined institutionalized military opponents. Because of the constraints personalist regimes impose upon the capabilities of their armed forces, dictators will generally be cautious about using their armed forces in battle. Saddam Hussein may represent an outlier rather than the norm for personalist dictatorships. Thus, personalist dictatorships that face few of the decisional constraints found in democracies are also constrained from participation in international conflict, albeit through different political institutions.

Shared institutional constraints may lead to peaceful relations among personalistic regimes because dictators are aware that their opponents face serious costs when force is used and are likely to be cautious. They may perceive one another as "dovish," which would reduce the probability that they will engage in wars that flow from security dilemmas (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992).

Any separate peace among personalist dictatorships is likely to be more tenuous than the one between democracies. The institutional incentives for peace are less profound among personalist regimes. Personalist regimes still experience limited decisional constraints and transparency. Furthermore, if personalist dictatorships are known to be weak, this could make them tempting targets. Even other personalist regimes might consider attacking these regimes, especially if there is a wide gap in the relative material capabilities of the two states. To help differentiate between the decisional constraints and war-fighting arguments, we examine the impact of one specific type of mixed dyad, democracypersonalist dictatorship. If constraints are key, the mutual dovishness of democracies and personalist regimes should lead to peace between them. If war fighting capabilities are key, personalist regimes may be precisely the kinds of easy targets that democracies are most likely to attack.

Shared Values and Peace Among Authoritarian Dyads. The political institutions of military and single-party regimes do not provide strong arguments for why these regimes might be peaceful toward one another. Indeed, their lack of decisional constraints, transparency, and weak and divided military institutions could encourage conflict among military and single-party regimes. For these regimes, we must look toward explanations focused on shared interests and/or norms to account for a possible separate peace among similar regimes.<sup>3</sup>

Most military regimes proclaim to be technocratic and apolitical rather than ideological. Despite this, many institutionalized military regimes, especially those concentrated in South America during the 1960s and 1970s, adhere to a well-defined "national security" ideology (Stohl and Lopez 1986). National security ideology maintains an organic concept of the state and proclaims that the military is ideally suited to be the guarantor of the nation, bringing effective government in the national interest. This ideology legitimates aggressive foreign policy "to achieve or defend national goals against existing hostilities and pressures" (Stohl and Lopez 1986, 76). While this vision emphasizes preserving the territorial integrity of the state from external invasion, it focuses more intently on internal threats to the political integrity of the nation. Many of these regimes took power to fight real or imagined communist insurgents and the democratic institutions that might allow communists to achieve power. Shared interests in cooperating against perceived leftist threats could generate a separate peace among military regimes, as illustrated by Operation Condor, in which Latin American military regimes cooperated in hunting down leftist dissidents across national borders. The common socialization shared by most professionalized military institutions could help cement these bonds. Remmer (1998) found that the military regimes of the Southern Cone cooperated extensively on a variety of issues. We test whether these regimes have also avoided engaging in wars or militarized disputes with one another.

We believe that single-party regimes are the most likely kind of authoritarian regime to belong to the same normative community. Marxism-Leninism proclaims that socialists must remain united in their zerosum struggle against capitalism because, if given the opportunity, capitalists will inflict cumulative losses on socialism. Marxist ideology also stresses the necessity for powerful socialist states to provide assistance to radical and other antiimperialist forces abroad. Since socialist states share a common ideology that stresses unity and brotherhood, one may expect that pairs of single-party regimes will not go to war because they share similar worldviews. While they do not focus on shared values, Oren and Hays (1997) find that developed socialist states were indeed peaceful toward one another during the Cold War.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Geddes (1999a) created her data set to examine whether some types of autocratic regimes were more stable and long-lived and whether they exhibited distinctive patterns of breakdowns and transitions to new regimes. She found that military regimes experienced the shortest tenure and were most likely to end in peaceful negotiated transitions to democracy. Single-party regimes were the most long-lived and were also likely to be replaced by some form of negotiated transition. Personalist regimes on average survived much longer than military regimes but not as long as single-party ones. They were also the regimes most likely to be replaced through violence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Weart (1994) finds that shared political culture has led to peace among one type of nondemocratic regime, oligarchic republics.

This hypothesis should be treated with caution, however. While Marxism-Leninism provides a cohesive set of norms that binds these states together, it simultaneously legitimates violent revolutionary means of resolving conflict. Furthermore, the central role and exclusive nature of ideology in socialist single-party states can lead to conflicts about ideological purity. In his classic formulation of the containment policy, Kennan (1947) argued that the Communist Party leadership in the Soviet Union needed both to spread Communism aggressively and to punish satellite states that deviated from Soviet norms to legitimate their dictatorship at home. Any threat to the party's ideological supremacy, from internal or external sources, could be seen as a direct threat to the state. Thus, states governed by single-party regimes may conflict with one another because "they attempt to derive their legitimacy from identification with an ideological corpus" (Linz 1975, 197). Focusing on this dynamic, Bebler (1987) finds that Marxist-Leninist states have been involved in numerous conflicts with one another. Since Marxist ideology contains potentially contradictory ideas, it is difficult to know which ideas will dominate foreign policy.

One additional caveat is important here. China engaged in more disputes with Taiwan than almost any other member of the international system. Each of these cases is coded as a dispute among single-party regimes according to Geddes' guidelines. Clearly, China and Taiwan do not have shared norms and common interests. Therefore, we also examine below the conflict behavior of single-party regimes with Taiwan removed from the single-party regime category, so that we can get a more accurate sense of the importance of shared norms and common interests among single-party regimes.

Finally, it is unlikely that pairs of personalistic regimes will share similar normative values. Because personalistic regimes lack a common ideology, it is difficult to know what shared set of values might unite Saddam Hussein and Mobutu Sese Seko. A defining characteristic of personalistic regimes is that the cult of the leader rather than ideology dominates political life. Therefore, it is unlikely that shared worldviews will unite these regimes.

In sum, we argue that the more sophisticated classification of autocratic regimes presented in this article can lead to a more accurate assessment of whether specific types of autocratic regimes are peaceful toward one another. We anticipate that any dictatorial peace will be less robust than the democratic peace because none of the homogeneous pairs of autocratic regimes simultaneously exhibits the combination of institutional and normative constraints from warring with one another. Nevertheless, shared constraints may provide the foundation for a separate peace among personalist dictatorships, while shared identities and normative values may generate peaceful relations among single-party regimes. Military regimes are in the middle in terms of both shared values and institutional constraints. This leads to the central hypotheses examined in this paper.

- Hypothesis 1. Homogeneous dyads are less likely to engage in wars and militarized interstate disputes than are mixed dyads.
- Hypothesis 2. If institutional constraints are most important, personalist dictatorship dyads will be less likely to engage in wars and militarized interstate disputes than mixed dyads.
- Hypothesis 3. If shared norms are most important, single-party regime dyads will be less likely to engage in wars and militarized interstate disputes than mixed dyads.
- Hypothesis 4. If institutional constraints are most important, democracy-personalist dictatorship dyads will be less likely to engage in wars and militarized interstate disputes than other mixed dyads.
- Hypothesis 5. If war-fighting capabilities are most important, democracy-personalist dictatorship dyads will be more likely to engage in wars and militarized interstate disputes than other mixed dyads.

### **EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS**

### The Dependent Variable

The empirical analysis focuses on militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) as the dependent variable.<sup>4</sup> Militarized interstate disputes are "united historical cases of conflicts in which the threat, display or use of military force short of war by one member state is explicitly directed towards the government, official representatives, official forces, property, or territory of another state" (Jones et al. 1996, 163). Wars are MIDs that have escalated to the point where more than 1000 soldiers died in battle. We examine whether pairs of countries have participated in MIDs of each intensity (threats of force, displays of force, use of force, and/or wars) between 1945 and 1994. The unit of analysis is dyad years. The dependent variables are coded in dichotomous terms for each level of intensity.

### Independent Variables

Two data sets are used to determine regime type. First, we use Polity IIId to classify democracies between 1945 and 1994, with a score of six on Polity's democracy scale serving as the cutoff point (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; McLaughlin et al. 1998). We do not use Polity to classify authoritarian regimes, however, because, as Gleditsch and Ward (1997) indicate, there is a variety of paths through which states can achieve the same scores on the Polity scales. Regimes with different institutions and structures are treated as though they were functionally identical. Single-party, military, and personalist regimes often receive the same score on the Polity autocracy scale. Thus, studies that have found some evidence of an authoritarian peace, such as those by Oneal and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The Correlates of War data set of interstate wars and the Militarized Interstate Dispute data set can be accessed at http://pss.la.psu.edu.

Russett (1997, 281–3), Gleditsch and Hegre (1997, 290), and Raknerud and Hegre (1997, 394–400) may not be measuring truly homogeneous dyads.<sup>5</sup>

Then, as noted above, we use Geddes' (1999a) data set, which relies on a wide range of secondary sources. to classify autocratic regimes as personalist, singleparty, or military during this time period. Cases are coded as military regimes if they are governed "by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism for high level officers to influence policy choice and appointments" (Geddes 1999a, 20). Military regimes share the following characteristics: relationships within the Junta and or military council are relatively egalitarian; the regime has some kind of institutions for deciding succession questions, and for routine consultation between the leader and the rest of the officer corps; the military hierarchy remains intact; and the security apparatus is controlled by the military. Geddes (1999a, 18) does not include governments that lasted for less than three years because they represented "periods of holding customary rules in temporary abeyance, struggle over rules, or transition from one set of rules to the next," rather than regimes, defined as "sets of formal and informal rules and procedures for selecting national leaders and policies." Since most of these temporary authoritarian interregna involved military governments, her list of military governments may underrepresent the universe of cases of military regimes.

Single-party regimes are defined as "regimes in which the party has some influence over policy, controls most access to political power and government jobs, and has functioning local-level organizations" (Geddes 1999a, 20). The party almost always exists prior to a leader's accession to power. It retains important functions down to the local level. Single-party systems routinely require party membership for most government jobs. While there are some exceptions, such as Taiwan and Mexico, most single-party states have been socialist regimes. To determine the dividing line between single-party authoritarian regimes and single-party dominant

democracies, Geddes (1999a, 18) coded cases as authoritarian if the dominant party had never lost control of the executive and won at least two-thirds of all seats in the legislature in all elections prior to 1985.

Regimes were coded as personalistic if "the leader, who usually came to power as an officer in a military coup or as the leader of a single-party government, had consolidated control over policy and recruitment in his own hands, in the process marginalizing other officers' influence and/or reducing the influence and functions of the party" (Geddes 1999a, 20). These regimes lack effective institutions and one ruler dominates politics. To distinguish between military and personalistic regimes, Geddes codes regimes as personalistic when the leader dissolves military councils and other "consultative institutions"; when military officers are forced to retire; the leader forms a "party" to form an alternative base of support; or the leader murders, demotes, or dismisses dissenting officers. A single ruler dominates these regimes and ideology plays little role in politics. Monarchies, another type of autocratic regime in which a single ruler dominates, are not included in this data set.

Regimes that are not accounted for by either of these data sets are included in an "other" category. Many autocracies exhibit important characteristics of more than one category. Regimes Geddes classifies as hybrids are placed in the "other" category in our analysis. There is also a variety of political systems in uncertain processes of political transition that do not fit clearly into either the democratic or autocratic camps. Geddes, for example, does not classify the successor states created after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia because of the fluid nature of the political regimes in many of these states and because insufficient time has elapsed to judge whether their regimes have become institutionalized. These cases are also included in the "other" category here. We include dummy variables for each type of homogeneous dyad, democracies, personalist dictatorships, military regimes, and single-party regimes. Because we hypothesize that homogeneous pairs of states will be less likely to engage in wars and MIDs than heterogeneous ones, we use mixed dyads (including pairs of states in the "other" category) as the excluded category in our analysis.6

We also include five control variables that previous research has shown to have an impact on war and dispute involvement. First, previous research has shown that contiguous states are much more likely to engage

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Both Oneal and Russett (1997) and Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) follow what has become standard practice in the democratic peace field by combining the autocracy and democracy scales of the Polity data set into a single scale from -10 to +10. When Oneal and Russett (1997, 281-3) included the Polity scores of each state of a dyad in their models, they found a "cats and dogs" effect. The greater the distance between two states on the Polity scale, the more likely it was that they would enter into a militarized dispute. Gleditsch and Hegre (1997, 285) classify regimes as democracies if they score +3 or more on the DEMOC-AUTOC scale. They then differentiate between dyads that have zero, one, or two participants that qualify as democracies by this measure. They found that dyads with two nondemocracies were somewhat more likely to be peaceful toward one another than were dyads with only one democracy. Raknerud and Hegre (1997, 393) use only the democracy scale of the Polity data set and code regimes as democracies if they score 6 or above on that scale. They found that dyads with two nondemocracies were less likely to engage in war than were mixed dyads of democracies and nondemocracies but that this was a function of diffusion effects when democracies join ongoing wars on the side of other democracies. These are important, suggestive findings that help underscore the need to conduct more sophisticated tests of the possibilities for peace among specific types of authoritarian regimes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Geddes constructed this data set to examine the longevity of different types of authoritarian regimes. Because she hypothesized that military regimes would be the most likely to break down quickly, while single-party regimes would last longest, she constructed a sixpoint scale that arrayed regimes along the range of their expected longevity: 1 = military regimes; 2 = hybrid regimes that share characteristics of military and personalist governance; 3 = personalist dictatorships; 4 = hybrids that combine elements of personalism and single-party governance; 5 = single-party regimes; and 6 = regimes that combine elements of all three types. In constructing cases of homogeneous dyads, we include only pairs of cases with the same pure type, those that are both coded as 1, 3, or 5.

in conflicts with one another than are states that do not share borders. Therefore, we include contiguity in the models.<sup>7</sup> Second, major powers are more likely to engage in conflicts than are lesser powers, so we include an independent variable that indicates whether a dyad includes a major power.8 Third, some argue that states formally allied with one another are less likely to engage in wars or militarized disputes than those who are not allied, especially in the post-World War II era (Russett and Oneal 2001, 103-4). Hence, we include an independent variable to control for allied dyads. Fourth, advocates of power preponderance theories suggest that the greater the disparity between two states, the less likely those states will engage in conflicts (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992), so we include a variable to control for unequal power capabilities. Finally, previous research has demonstrated that economic development is an important variable in determining conflict behavior (Bremer 1992). Therefore we include a variable to control for economic development. The first three variables are coded as dummy variables. The measure of relative power is a log of the higher/lower ratio between side A and side B in a given dyad according to the COW Composite Indicators of National Capabilities (CINC) data. Following Bremer (1992), we use the energy consumption component of the CINC to measure economic development and code it as a dummy variable that equals one if both states are more economically advanced and 0 otherwise.

#### Method

We begin by presenting the data for all levels of hostility in simple tabular form (see Table 2). We then use multivariate logit regression to estimate the impact of regime type on conflict involvement (see Table 3). We use logit splines, a technique designed by Beck et al. (1998), to address the problems associated with time dependence in analyzing time-series, cross-sectional data with a dichotomous dependent variable. We add a countervariable to the model recording the years of peace between a state's involvement in a militarized dispute and a subsequent involvement. The occurrence of a MID resets the counter to 0. We then generate three splines for each logit equation (see Beck et al. 1998; Enterline 1998, 394). The dependent variable in the results reported in Table 3 takes the value of one in any year in which a dyad is involved in a MID of any intensity and 0 when a dyad has not participated in any type of conflict behavior during a given year. We also estimated our models at each level of hostility and found consistent results across all levels of hostility short of war, suggesting that the dynamics of participation in MIDs is not dissimilar to the dynamics of the escalation of disputes among authoritarian regimes. See Table 4 for the results of these regressions.

### Authoritarian Regimes and War

Our examination of the relationship between homogeneous authoritarian dyads and interstate wars between 1945 and 1994 shows that no two personalist dictators have fought one another.9 The same is true for military regimes. Only single-party regimes have fought wars with one another during this era and they have fought three times. See Table 2. The lack of variance in three of the regime variables makes it impossible to test the complete model using logit. 10 We can say, however, that the absence of war between democracies is not unique. Other types of political regimes have managed to avoid war with similar regimes in the post-World War II era.

Scholars have raised the question of whether the rarity of war and the rarity of democracy in the international system renders the finding of no wars between democracies statistically insignificant (Spiro 1994). This problem is considerably worse in the case of personalist dictatorships and military regimes than for democracies. States initiated wars in only .04% of the dyad years between 1945 and 1994. Personalist dictatorships and institutional military regimes are also rare. Whereas joint democratic dyads constitute 9.8% of the total dyad years during this era, pairs of personalist dictatorships accounted for only 1.27% of the total dyad years. Military regimes were even rarer, with joint military dyads accounting for only .34% of the total dyad years. The absence of war between pairs of personalist dictatorships and pairs of military regimes may, therefore, be the result of random chance.

### Authoritarian Regimes and Militarized Interstate Disputes

Table 2 indicates that militarized disputes are also rare among pairs of military regimes or personalist dicatorships, but their proportion of all disputes roughly matches their share of all regime dyad years. What stands out in an examination of all militarized disputes in Table 2 is the comparison of the dispute behavior of democracies and single-party regimes. Single-party dyads have experienced more militarized disputes than democratic dyads even though there are nearly three times as many democratic dyads in the data set. Singleparty dyads were involved in 5.84% of all disputes, despite representing only 3.35% of all dyad years. Therefore, a simple bivariate chi-square test of the dispute participation of single-party regimes suggests that they are significantly more likely to engage in disputes with one another than are other dyads.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> A dyad is considered contiguous if the two states share a land border

or are within 400 mi of one another by sea (Gochman 1991).

8 For this time period, the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, and China (from 1950) are considered major powers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Personalist dictatorships have fought several wars with democracies, however, suggesting that a simple version of the institutional constraint argument and "dovishness" does not apply to the

incidence of war.

Since we took our war data from the MID data set, the number of war dyad years reported in Table 2 is somewhat inflated compared to data taken from the Correlates of War interstate war data set. This is because the MID data set codes cases at the highest level of hostility for the entire dispute even if the dispute began at a level short of war. Since we do not report separate logit results for wars, this discrepancy does not affect our results.

TABLE 2.		Threat of Force	zed Interstate Disp Display of Force	Use of Force	War	Total
	No MID	Threat of Force		63	<del>- 11</del>	37,770
Democracy	37,687	6	14			100.00
Row	99.78	0.02	0.04	0.17	0.00	
Column	9.82	13.33	5.79	5.75	0.00	9.80
Cell	9.78	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	9.80
Personalist	4,871	0	4	17	0	4,892
Row	99.57	0.00	80.0	0.35	0.00	100.00
Column	1.27	0.00	1.65	1.55	0.00	1.27
Cell	1.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.27
Military	1,297	0	0	3	0	1,300
Row	99.77	0.00	0.00	0.23	0.00	100.00
	0.34	0.00	0.00	0.27	0.00	0.34
Column Cell	0.34	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.34
Cell	0.54	0.00	0.00			
Single-party	12,820	2	13	72	3	12,910
Row	99.30	0.02	0.10	0.56	0.02	100.00
Column	3.34	4.44	5.37	6.57	1.90	3.35
Cell	3.33	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.00	3.35
OCII	0.00	0.00				
Mixed	327,052	37	211	941	155	328,396
Row	99.59	0.01	0.06	0.29	0.05	100.00
Column	85.23	82.22	87.19	85.86	98.10	85.24
Cell	84.89	0.01	0.05	0.24	0.04	85.24
Total	383,727	45	242	1,096	158	385,268
Row	99.60	0.01	0.06	0.28	0.04	100.00
Colun		100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00
Cell	99.60	0.01	0.06	0.28	0.04	100.00

Since militarized interstate disputes are more common than wars and pairs of each type of regime have engaged in disputes, we can use multivariate logit regression to analyze the relationship between regime type and MIDs. Table 3 presents the logit spline regression results of four models. 11 The first one examines the possibility of a general dictatorial peace. To do this, we include an independent variable that takes a value of one for dyads in which both countries have authoritarian governments coded by Geddes and 0 for all others. We also include a dummy for democratic dyads along with the five control variables, the peace years counter-variable, and logit splines to control for time dependence. The second model includes the three homogeneous authoritarian regime dyads as independent variables instead of the general dictatorial dummy. The third model substitutes a modified measurement for single-party dyads. In this model we include a variable, "NoTaiwan," which is the same as the single-party dummy except that dyads including Taiwan are coded 0. The final model includes all four homogeneous dyads as well as one hybrid of democracy and personalist dictatorship dyads.

ative and significant, suggesting that autocratic dyads

and autocratic regimes.12 In Models 2-4 in Table 3 and both models in Table 4, dyads made up of two personalist dictatorships or two military regimes are not significantly different from mixed dyads in their propensity to engage in MIDs. The single-party regime dyad is the only one of the homogeneous authoritarian dyads that is strongly significant across each of these models. The sign for this variable is negative, suggesting that single-party regimes are less likely to engage in MIDs with similar regimes than with other types of regimes. This finding contradicts the expectations of Bebler (1987). It also seems to be

result surprising given our concern with the significant

variation among authoritarian regimes. Nevertheless,

this result confirms the findings of Oneal and Russett

(1997), Gleditsch and Hegre (1997), and Raknerud

and Hegre (1997) and suggests that autocratic dyads

broadly conceived are less likely to be involved in mil-

itarized disputes than are mixed dyads of democracies

at odds with the data presented in Table 2, which sug-

gest that single-party regimes are more likely to engage

in disputes with other single-party regimes than with

other regimes. These results support those of Oren and

In the first model, the autocratic dyad dummy is negare more peaceful than mixed dyads. We found this

<sup>11</sup> The logit models in Table 3 include fewer cases than reported in Table 2 because we possessed control data only through 1992.

<sup>12</sup> Russett and Oneal (2001) suggest that the "cats and dogs effect" that they had found in their 1997 study disappeared once they controlled for time dependence in their more recent analyses. Our tests include controls for time dependence and still find some evidence of a peace among authoritarian dyads.

	egressions: Depend Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Autocracies	-0.438			
	(6.51)**			
Personalist		0.167	0.155	0.234
		(0.71)	(0.66)	(1.00)
Military		-0.368	<u></u> 0.380	-0.300
0		(0.62)	(0.64)	(0.51)
Single-party		-0.739	, ,	-0.691
N		(5.87)**		(5.47)**
NoTaiwan		, ,	-0.915	(•)
<b>-</b>			(6.55)**	
Personalist/democracy			,	0.654
_				(6.61)**
Democracy	<b>–1.187</b>	<b>–1.184</b>	-1.204	-1.136
	(9.08)**	(8.93)**	(9.05)**	(8.54)*
Contiguous	2.965	2.964	`2.962	2.993
	(47.35)**	(47.40)**	(47.46)**	(47.63)
Major-power dyad	2.261	2.349	` 2.346́	2.335
	(31.96)**	(32.58)**	(32.69)**	(32.45)*
Allied	0.084	0.064	` 0.08Ó	0.040
	(1.19)	(0.89)	(1.12)	(0.56)
Higher/lower ratio	-0.326	-0.331	<u>~</u> 0.33´1	-0.325
<u>·</u>	(14.96)**	(15.23)**	(15.23)**	(14.97)
Economically advanced	0.341	-0.270	`0.2 <del>5</del> 0	-0.244
	(3.51)**	(2.76)**	(2.54)*	(2.48)*
Time since last dispute	-0.382	-0.385	-0.3 <b>é</b> 3	-0.388
	(19.00)**	(19.16)**	(19.07)**	(19.28)*
Cubic spline 1	-0.004	-0.004	`0.0Ó4	-0.004
	(8.75)**	(8.83)**	(8.77)**	(8.87)**
Cubic spline 2	0.002	0.002	`0.002	0.002
	(6.52)**	(6.62)**	(6.57)**	(6.66)**
Cubic spline 3	-0.001	-0.001	<u>~</u> 0.001	-0.001
_	(4.34)**	(4.47)**	(4.45)**	(4.54)**
Constant	-3.954	<b>-4.031</b>	~4.034	-4.090
	(52.58)**	(53.98)**	(53.96)**	(53.98)*
Observations  Vote: Absolute value of z-statistics	376728	`3767 <u>2</u> 8	376728	376728

Hayes (1997), however, especially in model 3, which substitutes the NoTaiwan variable for the single-party dummy. When Taiwan is taken out of the single-party category, the coefficient increases substantially.

The control variables help account for why the single-party regime variable is negative in the logit models when the simple bivariate test suggested a positive relationship. Consistent with previous research, the results in all models in Table 3 indicate that contiguous dyads and those containing a major power are significantly more likely to experience militarized disputes than noncontiguous dyads or those without a major power. Dyads with large disparities in relative power are less likely to experience disputes. Only the alliance variable was not significant.

Single-party dyads were more likely to be contiguous than the norm and two of the five major powers, the Soviet Union and China, were governed by single-party regimes, which should increase the likelihood of conflict among these dyads. Indeed, a substantial majority of militarized disputes among single-party regimes involved either China or the Soviet Union in disputes with contiguous states. Many of these disputes pitted the USSR and China against one another. Almost none

of the 90 disputes noted in Table 2 involved conflicts between two of the USSR's East European allies. The peaceful relationship among the Eastern European single-party regimes provides the strongest evidence for a separate peace among such regimes.

These results may mean that the high frequency of militarized disputes among single-party regimes is an artifact of the traditional great power behavior of China and the Soviet Union in their spheres of influence. The relative absence of conflicts among the smaller members of the Warsaw Pact could reflect Soviet hegemony. As Kennan suggested, however, conflicts between China and the Soviet Union and between the Soviet Union and its satellite states may have flowed directly from the character of their political regimes. At the core of the Sino-Soviet split was a struggle for ideological leadership in the socialist camp (Low 1976; Wich 1980; Kramer 1997a). Soviet interventions in the Eastern bloc reflected a desire, as suggested by the Brezhnev Doctrine, to enforce ideological unity in "conditions of unabating ideological war," to "preserve the indivisible socialist system," (LaFeber 1993, 258-9; Valenta 1991; Kramer 1997b). In any event, there may be a separate peace among single-party regimes, but the

TABLE 4. Logit Spline Regressions: Dependent Variable, MID (Various Hostility Levels)

Leveis)		
	Model 1	Model 2
	(Dep. Var.,	(Dep. var.,
	Display of Force	Use of Force
	or Higher	or Higher
	Hostility Level)	Hostility Level)
Personalist	0.203	0.191
	(0.87)	(0.74)
Military	-0.341	-0.132
•	(0.58)	(0.22)
Single-party	-0.740	-0.682
	(5.82)**	(5.04)**
Democracy	-1.244	-1.223
•	(9.08)**	(8.19)**
Contiguous	2.939	2.945
· ·	(46.33)**	(43.19)**
Major-power dyad	2.349	2.281
	(32.26)**	(29.16)**
Allied	0.082	-0.017
	(1.13)	(0.21)
Higher/lower	-0.332	-0.318
ratio	(15.06)**	(13.54)**
Economically	-0.237	-0.307
advanced	(2.40)*	(2.83)**
Time since last	<u> </u>	-0.365
display or use	(18.58)**	(16.69)**
Cubic spline 1	-0.003	-0.004
	(8.45)**	(8.59)**
Cubic spline 2	0.002	0.003
•	(6.37)**	(7.07)**
Cubic spline 3	<u>~</u> 0.0Ó1	<u>~</u> 0.001
	(4.40)**	(5.59)**
Constant	<u>~</u> 4.072	-4.277
	(53.91)**	(51.92)**
Observations	`37672́8	`3767 <u>2</u> 8
Note: Absolute value	of z-statistics in paren	theses. *Significan
	-1 -1 40/ 1-1-1	•

nt at 5% level; \*\*Significant at 1% level.

ambiguous roles of China and the USSR in the socialist world are cause for caution in the interpretation of these results.

Only joint democracy was consistently related to a lower frequency of militarized disputes. Democratic dyads were more peaceful despite the fact that they were more likely to be contiguous, as well as to include major powers and states of relatively equal power. The fact that only democratic dyads were consistently more peaceful than the norm, even at the lowest level of hostility where conflicts among transparent democracies are likely to be overrepresented in the MID data, adds further support for the empirical power of the democratic peace.

Furthermore, Model 4 provides some evidence that it is the greater war-fighting effectiveness of democracies that helps account for that peace. The variable for dyads that include a democracy and a personalist dictatorship is positive and significant. A focus on institutional constraints would have suggested that democraticpersonalist dictatorship dyads would be more peaceful than other types of dyads. The increased likelihood of conflict between these dyads noted in Model 4 suggests

that strong and capable democracies pick weak personalist regimes as targets.

While we have focused our analysis on authoritarian regimes, the finding that democracy-personalist dictatorship dyads are more likely to experience militarized disputes expands our knowledge of the broader relationship between regime type and conflict. Our findings support recent research on the democratic peace that it is the efficiency of democratic regimes in picking fights that they are likely to win and in fighting harder and better than their adversaries that accounts for the distinctive patterns found in the conflict behavior of democracies.

#### CONCLUSION

We found some evidence that suggests that there may be a dictatorial peace. No pair of personalist dictatorships fought wars in the post-World War II era. The same is true for military regimes. Authoritarian regimes in general were less likely to engage in militarized interstate disputes than were mixed dyads. Single-party regimes were less likely to conflict with one another than were mixed dyads when appropriate controls were included in the model. This was especially true when Taiwan was not counted as a homogeneous regime to the predominantly socialist regimes in the single-party category. All of these findings suggest that the separate peace among democracies may not be unique among political regimes.

We found no unambiguous evidence of a dictatorial peace, however. The rarity of war and of personalist and military regimes makes it difficult to ascertain whether the lack of war between these types of regimes reflects a causal relationship or random chance. While single-party dyads exhibited a strongly significant negative relationship with participation in militarized disputes, they are the only type of homogeneous dyad to have fought wars with one another in the post-World War II era. Furthermore, single-party regimes have been involved in numerous militarized disputes with one another. How one understands the conflict record of such regimes depends on how one interprets the role of the Soviet Union and China in the socialist world.

In the end, only shared democracy exhibits a clear and consistent negative impact on the incidence of wars and militarized interstate disputes. Furthermore, the increased possibilities for conflict found between personalist dictatorships and democracies provides evidence suggesting that it is the war-fighting capabilities of democracies that best explains the distinctive conflict behavior of democratic regimes.

While we may not have discovered an unambiguous dictatorial peace, we have shown that different types of authoritarian regimes exhibit varying patterns of conflict behavior. The analysis presented here demonstrates that studies of the impact of regime type on conflict behavior must work from a more sophisticated conception of authoritarianism. More broadly, efforts to integrate perspectives from comparative politics and international relations must concentrate as much on the impact of authoritarianism on foreign policy as they do on the impact of democracy.

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# On the Vote-Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments

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In this paper we investigate whether there are any tactical motives behind the distribution of grants from central to lower-level governments. We use a temporary grant program that is uniquely suitable for testing theories of vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. The temporary grant program differs from traditional intergovernmental grants in several aspects, most importantly in the sovereign decision-making power given to the incumbent central government. We find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government used the grant program under study to win votes. In particular, we find strong support for the Lindbeck—Weibull/Dixit—Londregan model, in which parties distribute transfers to regions where there are many swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. We do not, however, find any support for the model that predicts that the incumbent government transfers money to its own supporters.

re grants from central to lower-level governments tactical, in the sense that the incumbent government uses grants to enhance its reelection probabilities? According to several theoretical models that have evolved in the literature over the past 20 years, this question can be answered positively. Until now, thorough empirical tests of the theoretical models have been lacking, however, since suitable data have been rare. The fact is hence that we do not know whether or not grants are used tactically. It is important, however, to know this, both from a researcher's point of view and from a policy maker's point of view. Since we want to have appropriate models of the political process, researchers need to know whether or not the theoretical models of tactical allocation of grants are valid. A policy maker needs to know whether or not the incumbent government acts tactically when designing grant programs. In this paper, we have access to a data set that is uniquely suitable for use when investigating the vote purchasing behavior of incumbent

In the spring of 1998, a few months before the Swedish elections, 2285 million SEK was distributed to 42 of 115 applying Swedish municipalities. These grants were the first wave of a specially designed support program intended to support, by means of intergovernmental grants, local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development and at increasing municipal employment. The decision-making design for these "ecological" grants differs a lot from how the distribution of intergovernmental grants is traditionally performed: The preparation as well as the final decision is made by the incumbent government and there is no explicit formula describing how the grants should be distributed. Furthermore, the grants are not related

to the efficiency and equity goals otherwise typically attached to intergovernmental grants. Hence, the government has the opportunity to choose freely which municipalities to distribute money to, taking the effect on their reelection possibilities into account.

The purpose of the paper is to use these "ecological grants" to test two competing theories. The prediction from the first model, put forward by Lindbeck and Weibull (1993) and Dixit and Londregan (1996), is that the incumbent government purchases votes by distributing money to regions in which there are many swing voters. In contrast, the prediction from the other model, presented by Cox and McCubbins (1986), is that, due to risk aversion, the incumbent government purchases votes by investing in regions where it already has high support (for example, in regions where the party in power in the local government is the same as the party in power at the central level).

### A SUITABLE DATA SET

To test theories that claim that the incumbent central government uses intergovernmental grants for tactical purposes, we would ideally like to have a situation in which (1) the incumbent central government decides on its own whether or not a lower-level government shall be granted, (2) we may disentangle any possible strategic use of grants from the equity and efficiency purposes typically attached to intergovernmental grants, (3) the granting decisions are made in close connection to an election, and (4) voters know that their

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> One could argue that, since the money is already distributed, there is no need for voters to reelect the incumbent government and that what ought to matter for voters' decisions is election promises. There is, however, empirical evidence (see, e.g., Stein and Bickers 1994; Levitt and Snyder 1997) that increased spending in fact affects voters' behavior. This could have at least two explanations: One is that voters feel obliged to support those who have treated them well; the other is that voters believe that a party that has supported them in the past also will support them in the future and hence see the actions of the incumbent government before the election as an indicator of how it will act in the future. Whatever the reason is, what matters in the end is that the incumbent government believes that voters react positively if the municipality in which they live is granted. In this paper we assume that this is the case. See also footnote 6.

municipality has/has not been granted. In this study, we use data that we claim fulfills all four conditions, concerning the decision-making process, the aim, the timing, and the information. This has not been the case in any of the earlier empirical studies<sup>2</sup> since in most countries the systems for intergovernmental grants are prescribed by laws that cannot be changed overnight: condition 1 above has hence not been fulfilled. Furthermore, the prescribed formulas are typically linked to different need variables in the municipalities, implying that condition 2 has not been fulfilled. One way to separate political factors and equity and efficiency aspects of grants (and thereby try to fulfill condition 2) is to include a number of sociodemographic variables in the regressions and thereby try to control for redistributive motives of intergovernmental grants and federal spending. It is, however, far from obvious how to do this. The problem is well described by Levitt and Snyder (1997): If we do not control for equity and efficiency variables, we risk exaggerating the political impact of grants, but on the other hand, targeting grants to specific minorities might be a perfect way for politicians to buy support, and by including them we might fail to identify tactical aspects that actually are present. In fact, in many countries, for example, Sweden, the rules for intergovernmental grants are set up in such fashion that it is only through these demographic factors that regions can be targeted. Ideally, one would like to test the tactical theories on a grant program that is not intended to equalize income and that is free from specific formulas describing how the grants are to be distributed.3

The grant program we study in this paper was introduced in 1997, when it was decided that the Swedish central government should construct a specially designed support program to support, by means of intergovernmental grants, local investment programs aimed at an ecological sustainable development.4 These grants were supposed to be temporary and supplementary to the usual intergovernmental grants that are motivated by efficiency and equity reasons. The grants are economically important; 7.4 billion SEK was to be distributed during four years (1998-2001).5 Only municipalities could apply for these grants. For a municipality to be eligible for the grants, four main criteria had to be fulfilled: (i) the proposed investment project must be fully detailed and developed in the application, (ii) the estimated cost for the project must be given, (iii) the investment program must be designed for an ecological sustainable development, and (iv) the project must increase the employment in the municipality. The

applications were sent to the incumbent central government (ministry of environment), and the incumbent central government had the final say about which municipalities should be granted.

There are mainly four aspects that make this data set suitable for the purpose of this paper, besides its economic significance. First, and most importantly, the decision-making process on which of the municipalities are to receive grants differs from the traditional way of distributing grants to municipalities. The usual intergovernmental grants are distributed among the municipalities according to rather strict predefined rules based on equity and efficiency arguments and are handled by central authorities that are independent of the incumbent central government. But for the temporary grants for an ecological sustainable development, it is solely the incumbent central government that decides which municipalities are to be granted (after preparation at the ministry of environment). Furthermore, one of the important decision makers at the Ministry of Environment is a former member of the Swedish parliament for the incumbent government (the Social Democrats). Second, the grant program is not intended to fulfill equity and efficiency objectives but, rather, to "support an ecological sustainable development." It is, however, far from clear what exactly is meant by that phrase. In fact, there existed no predefined guidelines on how the "ecological" grants were supposed to be distributed (see Riksdagens Revisorer 1999). Third, the decisions were made five to six months before the 1998 elections.<sup>6</sup> Finally, the yes-or-no nature of the decision makes it easy to apprehend and the question has also attracted much attention in the local, as well as the central, press, giving us reason to expect voters to be aware of how their own municipality has been treated. The grants for an ecological sustainable development hence fulfill all four desirable conditions and are thus very well suited for use for studying the question of vote-purchasing behavior.

The applications for the grants designed for an ecological sustainable development will be made in several waves. We use data from the first wave of applications; hence the analysis in this paper is cross sectional. The final day for the first wave of applications was February 16, 1998. One hundred fifteen out of a total of 288 Swedish municipalities applied for the grants. Decisions were made during March and April. Forty-two of the 115 applying municipalities received grants amounting to a total of 2.3 billion SEK. Housing and construction constitute the largest part

ical Sustainable Development.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See, e.g., Bungey, Grossman and Kenyen (1991), Grossman (1994), and Johansson (2002).

Rich (1989) in fact shows that the structure of a grant program, not the specific purpose of the program, shapes the politics of how the grants are distributed. Further, he notes that political factors are more evident in project grant programs than in formula grant programs.
 The grant program was initiated by the Committee for an Ecolog-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In 1998, total grants to the municipalities in Sweden amounted to 57.7 billion SEK. Total grants constitute approximately 20% of the municipalities' total revenues. In 1998 1 USD was approximately equal to 8.5 SEK.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> We can also note that the grant program can be considered a repeated game: it is a four-year program in which the incumbent government distributes money in each of the years 1998–2001. Voters might hence consider the decision made before the election to be an indication of how the incumbent government will act in the future if they win the election (see footnote 1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> There are at least two reasons for concentrating on the first wave: First, the Swedish Election Survey which we use to estimate one important variable is not yet available for more recent elections; second, the rules for the distribution of ecological grants have been made more structured for the following waves, partly as a consequence of this paper.

of investment projects granted, followed by energy projects, sanitation, and nature and water conservation.

# TACTICAL REDISTRIBUTION: THEORIES AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

The idea that the incumbent government considers political strengths of regions when distributing resources across the country is old. Investigating New Deal spending, Arrington (1969) found the somewhat mysterious fact that spending did not seem to promote equity between states but rather to favor states with a high income. In fact, economic variables did a very bad job explaining New Deal spending. 8 Wright (1974) attacked this "oddity" by incorporating a number of political variables in the analysis. Starting out with a theoretical model where the president maximizes the probability of winning and where voters react positively to new spending programs, he predicted that spending will be higher in states with higher "political productivity," a measure depending on the electoral votes per capita, the variability in the vote share of the incumbent government in past elections, and the predicted closeness of the presidential elections. Running cross-section regressions for the period 1933-1940 on 48 states. Wright found a considerably higher  $R^2$  in the political regression than in the economic regression. He therefore concluded that interstate inequalities in federal spending, to a large extent, were consequences of vote maximizing behavior of politicians. Anderson and Tollison (1991) claimed that it was not the result of the presidential election alone that mattered; the congressional influence was important as well, perhaps even more important. Their idea was that states whose representative in the congress has great power (e.g., length of tenure, speaker in House or congress) would be favored. Using the same data as did Wright, they found that many of these congressional variables entered with the expected signs and statistical significance. Wallis (1996) examined the findings of Wright and of Anderson and Tollison closer using panel data. He found that economic variables did matter and that, excluding Nevada<sup>9</sup> from the sample, the impact of Anderson and Tollison's congressional variables disappeared, while Wright's presidential variables still entered significantly. Wallis further expanded the investigated period beyond the New Deal, using data on federal government grants to states for the years 1932, 1942, 1962, 1972, and 1982. He found that (i) the results change dramatically when controlling for fixed effects, (ii) taking the simultaneity between spending and grants into account, the result that high-income states are favored disappears and economic variables does matter, and (iii) while Wright's presidential

<sup>8</sup> Reading (1973) examines the political rhetoric behind the New Deal. There were three goals of the New Deal: relief, recovery, and reform. He finds no support for the hypothesis that spending and loans were directed to poorer regions, which he takes as evidence that the New Deal did not fulfill the reform goal.

<sup>9</sup> Nevada was the state receiving the largest per capita grants during that period. In addition, Nevada has a 1 in the dummy variable for Senate leadership during the whole period.


variables seem to matter much during the New Deal, congressional factors are more important in the long

Many of the early studies lack a strict theoretical ground and are rather ad hoc about which political variables to include. During recent years, some more stringent theoretical models have been developed. In this paper we concentrate on two competing theoretical models that yield quite different testable empirical implications. <sup>10</sup> The first model takes its roots in the papers by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987, 1993) and Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998) (hereafter LW/DL), and the second model is the one presented by Cox and McCubbins (1986).

The most commonly used theory today is perhaps the one originating from the papers by Lindbeck and Weibull and by Dixit and Londregan. They consider a two-party system where parties, facing an election, promise different groups of voters transfers to win their votes. Voters have preferences over the parties (hereafter ideological preferences) and decide which party to vote for taking these preferences into account, as well as the consumption levels promised by the two parties. In each region there is a distribution of ideological preferences, and given a certain level of regional transfers, there will be a critical value (cutpoint) that divides voters into those voting for one party and those voting for the other party. The parties try to move this cutpoint and thereby increase their vote shares, by using regional transfers. <sup>11</sup> Figure 1 illustrates an example

 $<sup>^{10}</sup>$  There are a number of additional hypotheses in the literature, more tailored to the U.S. system, that have been investigated empirically (see, e.g., Stein and Bickers 1994; Levitt and Snyder 1995). Stein and Bickers (1994) investigate the use of pork barrels by incumbent congressmen in the U.S. Congress in the 1988 election. They put forward and find support for the following hypotheses: (i) It is not the dollars spent that matters but, rather, the number of new projects initiated; (ii) not all incumbents need to use grants to improve their electoral fortune—only those in a vulnerable situation (vulnerable meaning that they got elected by a very small margin); (iii) it is not the number of projects per se that makes people like the incumbent but rather, the awareness of these new projects; (iv) awareness increases with the number of new projects; and (v) the electoral support of an incumbent increases with voters' awareness of new projects. Levitt and Snyder (1995) investigate the impact of political parties on federal spending. Underlying the analysis is the assumption that politicians would, if they could, support their own. Levitt and Snyder contrast three models: a "weak party" model, where parties play no role and what matters is whether the representatives of a district have powerful positions in the chamber; a "strong party" model, where parties play a crucial role and where the distribution of outlays changes quickly if the political identity of the district's representatives changes; and an intermediate model, where a party with a sufficiently strong position during a sufficiently long time period is able to favor its own districts. These models are tested empirically by using district-level data on election outcomes and federal assistance programs for the period 1984-1990. Dividing the sample according to geographical concentration, allocation rules, and initiation time, they find that (i) spending is an increasing function of the number of Democratic votes in the district, (ii) spending favors groups that are geographically concentrated being favored, (iii) programs that are allocated through formulas are more heavily skewed to democrats, and (iv) the pattern is strongest for programs initiated during the period 1975-1981, when the Democrats had a strong majority in both the House and the Senate.

<sup>11</sup> More formally, the theoretical model is as follows: Assume that all inhabitants in a region have identical income levels (these are,



with two regions, S and E, where X denotes the voters' preferences for the incumbent government. The vote share of the incumbent government is given by the proportion of voters with positive values on X, that is, the share to the right of the cutpoint. By giving a region grants, the incumbent government tries to move the cutpoint to the left and thereby increase its vote share. We see from Fig. 1 that a dollar spent in region S will yield a larger number of votes gained than the corresponding dollar spent in region E, since there is a higher density at the cutpoint (i.e., more swing voters) in region S than in region E.

The amount of transfers a region receives will hence be positively correlated with the density at the cutpoint. The theory further predicts grants to be targeted at regions with a low income, since voters with a low income have a higher marginal utility of income and thus can be more easily persuaded to vote for a party promising them high transfers than high-income earners can (i.e., the cutpoint moves more in a poor region). Note that the size of the population in the region does not matter. Under some assumptions about the distribution functions (i.e., symmetry and single peakedness) and parties' objective functions, there will be a one-to-one correspondence between the density at the cutpoint and the closeness of the last election. Johansson

however, allowed to differ between regions). There are two parties, A and B, maximizing the number of votes. An individual living in region i will vote for party B if  $U(C_{iB}) - U(C_{iA}) > X$ , where X is the voter's preference for party A over party B and C is the consumption level promised by party A (when indexed with an A) and party B (when indexed with a B), respectively. The cutpoint in region i is hence defined as  $X_i = U(C_{iB}) - U(C_{iA})$ . In each region, there is a distribution of X given by  $\Phi_i(X)$ , with density  $\phi_i(X)$ . The vote share for party B is then given by  $\sum_{i} N_{i} \Phi_{i}(X_{i})$ , where  $N_{i}$  is the share of the population living in region i. Parties maximize their vote shares by choosing  $T_{ip}$ , p = A, B (the amount of grants to distribute to each region), subject to  $\sum_{i} N_{i} T_{ipk} = R$ , where R is the available resources. At equilibrium both parties choose the same transfer promises, given by the condition  $U_C(C_{ip})\phi_i(X_i) = U_C(C_{jF})\phi_j(X_j)$ . Grants will hence be an increasing function of the density at the cutpoint  $[\phi_i(X_i)]$  and a decreasing function of income (since a higher income means a lower marginal utility of consumption). Since Sweden has proportional election rules, the same results emerge if we assume instead that parties maximize the probability of winning the election. See Dixit and Londregan (1996) for a more detailed description.

12 One main difference between the LW/DL theoretical model and the grant program we study is that the model describes monetary transfers directed directly to individuals, while, in our case, transfers are given to the municipalities to use in investments, which, in the end, affects individual utility positively. It is therefore not obvious how we should expect municipal income to affect the amount of grants the municipality receives.

<sup>13</sup> Note that the closeness proxy is not valid if the distribution functions deviate from the assumptions, for example, if the distribution functions are double-peaked or skewed.

(2002) uses this closeness proxy as well as an estimate<sup>14</sup> of the densities at the cutpoints and tests the model for Swedish municipalities. While she finds no statistically significant support for grants being used as a tactical instrument when using the closeness measure, she does find support for the tactical hypothesis when using the latter proxy. In this paper we use both the closeness proxy and the estimated density at the cutpoints. If both variables indicate the same result, we would be more inclined to believe these results, since the validity of both proxies rests on some underlying assumptions which we do not know are fulfilled.

The second theory tested is presented by Cox and McCubbins (1986). They divide voters into three groups: support groups, opposition groups, and swing groups. Parties invest in votes by promising redistribution to these groups. Assuming that parties are riskavert and that swing groups are riskier investments, they predict that politicians will invest little (if at all) in opposition groups, somewhat more in swing groups, and more still in their support groups. It is the assumption of risk aversion together with the assumption that investing in the support groups is the least risky investment which leads Cox and McCubbins to empirical implications different from those of LW/DL. These assumptions can of course be criticized, but they are the ones used by the authors. When testing this model, we use two variables, both assumed to capture the strength of the political support for the incumbent (socialist) government in each municipality. The first is a dummy indicating if there is a socialist majority in the municipal council. The other variable measures the share of inhabitants in each municipality that cast their votes in favor of the incumbent government (the Social Democrats) in the last election. 15

Our empirical strategy is as follows. First, we estimate the models developed by LW/DL and Cox-McCubbins

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> This estimate is obtained using survey data from the Swedish Election Studies. See the Appendix for a description.

<sup>15</sup> It can be noted that an alternative model exists that has been investigated somewhat in the empirical literature, namely, that of Grossman (1994). He takes as a starting point the fact that the same parties appear at both the state and the federal level, and therefore, some interaction between local and central politicians is likely to occur. In the model, federal politicians transfer money to the state level, making it possible for state politicians to raise public spending and thereby increase their reelection possibilities. In return, state politicians invest their political capital in efforts to increase the support of state voters for the federal politicians. The model hence predicts that states where politicians are effective in raising political support will receive large grants from the federal government. The problem, however, is that it is not obvious how to measure political effectiveness, a problem that is illustrated by the fact that the three studies testing this model (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyen 1991; Grossman 1994; Worthington and Dollery 1998) all use different sets of political variables and even predict different signs for some of them. As a consequence of the different views about how political variables influence grants, the empirical evidence is rather hard to interpret. However, the political variables used in these empirical studies closely resemble those implied by the two models discussed in this paper; the closeness of the local elections is very closely correlated with the closeness proxy from the LW/DL model, and two other variables are the same as used by us when testing the Cox-McCubbins model.

TABLE 1. Variables Used to Test the Different Models and Their Expected Signs					
Variable/Model	Lindbeck-Weibull/ Dixit-Londregan	Cox-McCubbins	Encompassing ("Sensitivity")		
Cutpoint density	+		+		
Distance between blocs	_		_		
Income	<del>-</del>		=		
Socialist majority in municipal council		+	+		
Share of votes for social democrats			+		

TABLE 2. Number of Municipalities Within Each Group that Applied for Grants and that Were Granted

	Applying Mu	Applying Municipalities		Granted Municipalities		
Group of Municipalities	No./Total		No./Total	%	No./Applying	%
Big cities	3/3	100	3/3	100	3/3	100
Suburbs	12/36	33.3	5/36	13.9	5/12	41.7
Larger cities	15/26	57.7	10/26	38.5	10/15	66.7
Middle-sized cities	19/40	47.5	6/40	15.0	6/19	31.6
Industry	19/53	35.8	5/53	9.4	5/19	26.3
Rural	13/30	43.3	3/30	10.0	3/13	23.1
Sparsely populated municipalities	11/29	37.9	0/29	0	0/11	0
Other larger municipalities	11/31	35.5	7/31	22.6	7/11	63.6
Other smaller municipalities	12/40	30.0	3/40	7.5	3/12	25.0

Note: Big cities: Municipalities with more than 200,000 inhabitants. Suburbs: More than 50% of the municipalities employed travel to another municipality to get to their work. Larger cities: Municipalities with more than 50,000 inhabitants and with less than 40% employed in industry. Middle-sized cities: Municipalities with 20,000 to 50,000 inhabitants and with less than 40% employed in industry. Industry: Municipalities with more than 40% employed in industry and which are not sparsely populated. Rural: Municipalities with more than 8.7% employed in agriculture and forestry and which are not sparsely populated. Sparsely populated municipalities: Municipalities with <5 inhabitants per km² and with less than 20,000 inhabitants. Other larger municipalities: Other municipalities with 15,000 to 50,000 inhabitants. Other smaller municipalities: Other municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants.

separately. 16 Thereafter, as a "sensitivity analysis," we estimate an encompassing model in which we include political variables from both these models. In constructing the variable "cutpoint density," we follow Johansson (2002). In short, the technique is the following: First, we use survey data from the 1994 Swedish Election Study to estimate the distributions of political preferences, and second, we decide the locus of the cutpoints using the 1994 elections to the parliament. In the 1994 Swedish election study, 2296 individuals answered a number of questions regarding their feelings and attitudes toward different Swedish parties and politicians. Using these answers, we construct, through factor analysis methods, a variable that measures voters' preferences for the conservative bloc over the socialist bloc. Since respondents in the election survey are observed at the level of constituency, we can then estimate the constituency-specific distributions of these preferences. Finally, we use the results from the 1994 election to the parliament in each municipality to define cutpoints and, thereafter, measure the densities at these cutpoints, yielding a variable for each municipality (except for Gotland, for which there are very few observations in the election survey).<sup>17</sup>

The variables used to test the models and their expected signs are summarized in Table 1.

### **DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS**

Before going into detail about the econometric specifications and the estimation results, we take a quick look at the data here. Is there any pattern that can be observed from data concerning which types of municipalities, on the one hand, apply for grants and, on the other, are granted?

In Table 2 we divide the municipalities into different types depending on their size and population. In the first two columns, we study the applying municipalities, and in the last four columns we study the granted municipalities. From Table 2, we note that all three of the big cities (Stockholm, Malmö, and Göteborg) have applied for grants. Otherwise, the fraction of municipalities applying within each group of municipalities ranges from 30% (for "other smaller municipalities") to 57.7% (for "larger cities"). Turning to the type of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> A difference between the theoretical models and our empirical specification is that the models discuss election promises, made by both parties (blocs), whereas we, in the empirical investigation, investigate actual decisions made by the incumbent government. This means that we are not able say anything about how the opposition bloc would have acted, had it been in the same position as the government. In addition, the theoretical models discuss a situation in which there are only two parties. Sweden, on the other hand, has a multiparty system. However, the political situation has been characterized by the parties divided into two blocs, and this division has been stable over time, meaning that we can consider Sweden a two-bloc system.

 $<sup>^{17}\,\</sup>mbox{For}$  a detailed description on how the variable is constructed, see the Appendix.

TABLE 3. Descriptive Statistics: A Comparison, on One Hand, Between Municipalities Applying for Grants (Applicants) and Municipalities Not Applying for Grants (Nonapplicants) and, on the Other Hand, Between Granted and Nongranted Municipalities

		Mean (Standard	Deviation)	
Variable	Applicants	Nonapplicants	Granted	Nongranted
Controls for "needs"				
Vacancy rate	0.160	0.153	0.144	0.169
	(0.126)	(0.095)	(0.072)	(0.148)
Social welfare spending	1.003	0.882	1.232	0.872
	(0.565)	(0.382)	(0.734)	(0.388)
Tax base	92737	91578	93978	92022
	(11862)	(11189)	(8933)	(13263)
Cash flow	5.10	4.95	5.12	`5.10 <i>´</i>
	(2.98)	(3.51)	(2.87)	(3.06)
Young	20.42	20.46	20.32	20.48
	(1.77)	(1.73)	(1.77)	(1.77)
Old	16.80	18.25	14.81	17.94
	(5.23)	(5.07)	(5.70)	(4.61)
Political	, ,	` '	, ,	( /
Cutpoint density	0.029	0.029	0.032	0.028
•	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.007)
Distance between blocs	`0.212 <sup>′</sup>	`0.221 <sup>′</sup>	0.143	0.252
	(0.160)	(0.163)	(0.105)	(0.172)
Socialist majority in municipal council	0.504	`0.509	0.452	0.534
	(0.502)	(0.501)	(0.504)	(0.502)
Share of votes for Social Democrats	`0.444	`0.451 <sup>′</sup>	0.431	0.452
	(0.091)	(0.094)	(0.059)	(0.105)
Environmental	,	(,	(/	(51.55)
Environmental rating in 1997	18.16	16.09	20.14	17.01
•	(5.67)	(4.85)	(6.29)	(4.97)
Share of votes for environmental party	0.045	0.047	0.054	0.039
[ <b>.,</b>	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.023)

municipalities that was granted, we see that the fraction of municipalities that was granted within each group of municipalities is more unevenly distributed over the different groups of municipalities than is the case for the applying municipalities. From the last four columns in Table 2, it seems that large municipalities (i.e., "big cities," "larger cities," and "other larger municipalities") have been favored, while the opposite seems to be true for "industry," "rural," "sparsely populated municipalities," and "other smaller municipalities." The most extreme case in the latter group is "sparsely populated municipalities," where none of the 11 applying municipalities was granted.

Next we turn to a comparison of the variables used in the empirical analysis. These summary statistics are listed in Table 3. We use the following variables: <sup>18</sup> As controls for the municipalities' socioeconomic, demographic, and financial needs we use the *vacancy rate* in the municipality (i.e., number of vacant jobs/number of unemployed persons in the municipality), *social welfare spending* in the municipality, the municipality's *tax base*, the municipality's financial result (*cash flow*), and the demographic structure in the municipality (fraction *young* and fraction *old*). These variables are the ones typically used when controlling for the

equity and/or efficiency purposes normally attached to intergovernmental grants. The vacancy rate, which is a measure of labor market tightness, gives the probability for a job searcher of finding a job in a given municipality (the higher the vacancy rate, the tighter is the labor market and the higher is the probability of finding a job) and is also motivated by the fact that one of the purposes of the grant program under study was to increase the employment rate in the municipalities. If the incumbent government uses this grant program to increase an unemployed person's chances of getting a job in municipalities characterized by "less tight" labor markets, we would expect a negative sign for the vacancy rate.<sup>19</sup> When testing the political models discussed in Section 3, we use the political variables presented in Table 1: the estimated cutpoint densities, the distance between the blocs at the election at the central government level, a dummy indicating whether there is a socialist majority in the municipal council, and the share of votes for the Social Democrats (in the election to the central government). Since the main purpose of the grant program under study was to enhance the environmental activities in the municipalities, we must somehow control for this. We have chosen to use

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The definitions of the variables are given in the Appendix (under Data Appendix). Summary statistics of the full sample and the raw correlations between the variables are available upon request.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> We have also experimented with the unemployment rate instead of the vacancy rate. The unemployment rate, however, had a low explanatory power (in a statistical as well as in an economical sense). In this paper, we report only the results using the vacancy rate.

two environmental variables: the municipality's environmental rating in 1997 and the share of votes for the environmental party in the last election to the municipal council.<sup>20</sup>

Starting with a comparison between municipalities applying for grants (applicants) and municipalities not applying for grants (nonapplicants), we note that there are very small differences in the means and standard deviations of the variables. The only variables that seem to differ somewhat are the welfare spending per capita in the municipality and the environmental rating.

Turning to a comparison between granted and nongranted municipalities, we see from the last two columns in Table 3 that several of the variables differ in mean values, notably the political and environmental variables. Starting with the political variables, we note that the granted municipalities are to a lesser extent ruled by a socialist majority (45.2 compared to 53.4%, respectively), a finding that contradicts the prediction derived from the Cox-McCubbins model. The granted municipalities also have a higher estimated cutpoint density (0.032 compared to 0.028) and witnessed closer races between the blocs in the last election (0.143 compared to 0.252 in the election to the central government). These differences are all in line with the predictions derived from the LW/DL model. For the environmental variables, the granted municipalities have a higher environmental rating (20.14 compared to 17.01) and a higher share of votes for the environmental party in the last election to the municipal council (0.054 compared to 0.039). Finally, looking at the "needs" variables, except for the social welfare spending variable, there seem to be no clear differences between the granted and the nongranted municipalities. This fact strengthens our belief that this grant program is free from the equity and efficiency considerations typically attached to traditional intergovernmental grants.

# ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS

#### Econometric Strategy

In the empirical analysis we concentrate on the 115 applying municipalities. That is, we investigate the determinants of whether a municipality receives any grants given that the municipality has applied (that is, in analogy with the program evaluation literature, we investigate the "treatment of the treated"). This is a suitable method to use when trying to determine whether the incumbent government used the specific grant program tactically, which is the main question of interest in this

paper.<sup>21</sup> As mentioned earlier, we concentrate on the first wave of applications and granting decisions.

There are, in principle, two questions that one could be interested in investigating: (i) What determines whether an applying municipality receives grants or not? and (ii) What determines how much the applying municipalities receive? The first question can be investigated by estimating a probit (or logit) model (0/1 variable on the left-hand side, 1 indicating that the municipality was granted and 0 that the municipality's application was rejected) on the 115 municipalities that have applied for grants.<sup>22</sup> When examining the second question, we must bear in mind that we have (left) censored data; of the 115 applying municipalities, 42 received grants, implying that we have 73 observations censored at 0. This can be taken into account by estimating a Tobit model, where the independent variable is received grants per capita. An assumption behind the Tobit model is, however, that the same model describes the decision of whether a municipality is to be granted and the decision of how much the municipality will receive. It is possible that these decisions differ, in which case the probability of a limit observation is independent of the regression model for the nonlimit observations (see, e.g., Lin and Schmidt, 1984). It turns out that when we test whether it is appropriate to use a Tobit specification, we reject the null that this is the case in all cases but one.<sup>23</sup> We therefore concentrate on the probit analysis, that is, on the first of the two questions stated above. This strategy is further strengthen by the findings of Rich (1989), who concludes that it is better to study which of a number of eligible jurisdictions are granted rather than studying the distribution of funds among recipient jurisdictions.

In the analysis, we use two sets of regressors. In the first, and most parsimonious, one (Model 1), we

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> We have also experimented with other specifications of the rating variable and with survey data, but this does not seem to affect the qualitative results. The survey data used are from the Swedish Election Survey, and from this survey we create variables capturing whether the respondents stated that environmental-related questions are important to them when making their election decisions, the respondents' attitudes to the environmental movement, the importance of a nonpolluting society to the respondents, and, finally, the respondents' worries about pollution.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> If, for some reason, we instead want *all* municipalities (whether or not they apply) to be the population of interest, we must make sure that the applying municipalities constitute a random sample. If they do not, we will end up with biased estimates. To investigate whether selection matters we have estimated the probit model with selection correction as well. The probit model is given by  $y_i = (\beta'x_i + \varepsilon_{1i} > 0)$ ; the selection equation, by  $y_i^{select} = (\gamma'z_i + \varepsilon_{2i} > 0)$ ; and the correlation between the two, by  $corr(\varepsilon_{1i}, \varepsilon_{2i}) = \rho$  [where  $\varepsilon_{1i}, \varepsilon_{2i} \approx N(0, 1)$ ]. When selection-correcting the model, we found that (i) we could never reject the null hypothesis that  $\rho = 0$ , implying that there seems to be no problems with selection bias, and (ii) the qualitative results were the same as those in Tables 4–6 when we selection-corrected the model.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> In this paper we present results obtained with the probit estimator. We have also estimated the model assuming that the error terms are logistically distributed (the logit model). This gave results that were very similar to the probit estimates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> We use a likelihood-ratio test (for a description see Lin and Schmidt 1984). The test statistic, which is distributed as  $\chi^2$  under the null, is given by  $\lambda = -2[lnL_T - (lnL_P + lnL_{TR})]$ , where  $L_T$  is the likelihood from the Tobit model and  $L_P$  and  $L_{TR}$  are the likelihoods from a probit model and a truncated regression, respectively. However, since we do not know how well the likelihood-ratio test works in samples of 115 observations and with a rather high degree of censoring (73 of 115, or 63%, of the observations are censored at 0), we have also estimated the models with the Tobit estimator. The qualitative results (in terms of which variables enter significantly and the signs of these variables) in the Tobit model are very similar to those in the probit specification. The Tobit results and the likelihood-ratio tests are available upon request.

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Vacancy rate	-2.502	-2.750	-3.127*	-3.688*
	(1.593)	(1.732)	(1.690)	(1.899)
Tax base.	1.61e-05	3.77e-06	2.22e-05	1.33e-05
	(1.39e-05)	(1.77e-05)	(1.43e-05)	(1.79e-05)
Social assistance		0.429	,	0.335
0 1 4		(0.368)		(0.355)
Cash flow		0.068		0.072
V		(0.051)		(0.050)
Young		-0.086		-0.145
Old		(0.095)		(0.101)
Old		-0.057		-0.050
Cutpoint density	07.040**	(0.043)		(0.043)
Outpoint density	87.618**	102.356**		
Distance between blocs	(29.063)	(32.886)	0.000**	4.50.4**
Distance between blocs			-3.902**	-4.584**
Environmental rating in 1997	0.057**	0.025	(1.078) 0.038	(1.247) 0.006
= 1007	(0.026)	0.023	(0.025)	(0.030)
Share of votes for environmental party	9.730	10.312*	10.576*	11.765*
- man of the same	(6.107)	(6.261)	(6.016)	(6.265)
	(/	(0.201)	(0.010)	(0.200)
Constant	-5.587**	-2.373	-2.358**	2.272
	(1.666)	(3.645)	(1.171)	(3.550)
No. of observations	`114 <i>´</i>	`114´	115	115
Pseudo- <i>R</i> <sup>2a</sup>	0.185	0.244	0.206	0.265
log-likelihood	-61.11	-56.73	-59.89	55.49

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*Significant at the 5% level. \*Significant at the 10% level.  ${}^aPseudo-R^2=1-(L_1/L_0)$ , where  $L_1$  and  $L_0$  are the constant-only and full-model log-likelihoods, respectively.

use the two variables that are predicted to matter in the LW/DL model (i.e., the municipality's tax base and the political variable) or the Cox-McCubbins model and control only for those variables that are supposed to be important for the grant program under study (i.e., the vacancy rate in the municipality, the municipality's environmental rating in 1997, and the fraction of votes for the environmental party in the last election to the municipal council). In the second one (Model 2), we also control for some different "municipality needs" (i.e., demographic structure, spending on social welfare, and financial result). As argued in the introduction, the setup of the grant program under investigation gives us no reason to suspect these variables to matter. It might, however, be the case that the incumbent government takes equity considerations into account anyway.

# Which Municipalities Are Granted? Results of Probit Estimates

In this section, we investigate the determinants of grant recipience. The probit results are given in Tables 4–6. When testing the LW/DL model, two variables are used to capture the density at the cutpoints: the cutpoint densities and the closeness proxy (i.e., the distance between the political blocs at the central government level).

The results for the LW/DL model are presented in Table 4. From the results in the first two columns, where we use the estimated cutpoint density variable, we note that this political variable is clearly significant in both

estimations and has the expected positive sign: the more swing voters there are at the cutpoint, the higher is the probability that a municipality receives money from the incumbent government. This conclusion does not change when we use the closeness proxy instead. From the last two columns in Table 4 we note that this variable, as is the cutpoint density variable, is significant, with the expected sign: the farther apart the two blocs were from each other in the last election (in the election to the central government), the lower is the probability that the municipality will receive any grants. In other words, the closer the race in the last election, the more swing voters there are, and the higher is the probability of getting money from the central government.

Among the other regressors, only the environmental variables and the vacancy rate seem to matter (in a statistical sense), even though none of them enters significantly in all models. Looking at the estimated coefficients, it turns out that the less tight a municipality's labor market (i.e., the lower the vacancy rate) is, the higher is the municipality's environmental rating (in 1997), and the more people there are voting for the environmental party in the municipal election, the higher is the probability that the municipality will get money from the "ecological" grant program. Since all the other control variables are insignificant in all four estimations, it seems that the grant program under study is not used for the equity and/or efficiency purposes that intergovernmental grants traditionally are. We consider the results in Table 4 to lend strong support for the LW/DL model.

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Vacancy rate	-1.674	-1.904	-1.865	-1.938
	(1.495)	(1.613)	(1.526)	(1.611)
Tax base	6.22e-06	-4.61e-06	2.62e-06	-8.82e-06
	(1.19e-05)	(1.52e-05)	(1.17e-05)	(1.44e-05)
Social assistance		0.556*		0.501
		(0.330)		(0.332)
Cash flow		0.061		0.062
		(0.046)		(0.046)
Young		-0.071		-0.063
		(0.093)		(0.092)
Old		-0.050 (0.007)		-0.049 (0.037)
	0.054	(0.037)		(0.037)
Socialist majority in municipal council	-0.351 (0.070)	-0.606**		
01	(0.270)	(0.306)	-2.649*	-3.548**
Share of votes for Social Democrats			-2.649° (1.551)	_3.546 (1.680)
For the control antique in 1007	0.052**	0.017	0.051**	0.017
Environmental rating in 1997		(0.028)	(0.024)	(0.028)
Chara of votas for anvironmental party	(0.024) 12.589**	12.492**	13.271**	13.639**
Share of votes for environmental party	(5.806)	(5.991)	(5.763)	(5.947)
	(5.666)	(0.001)	(0.700)	(0.017)
Constant	-2.031*	1.164	-0.685	2.659
Oonstant	(1.061)	(3.164)	(1.315)	(3.348)
No. of observations	115	115	115	115
Pseudo-R <sup>2a</sup>	0.117	0.182	0.125	0.185
log-likelihood	-66.68	-61. <del>7</del> 7	-66.06	-61.52

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*Significant at the 5% level. \*Significant at the 10% level.  $^aPseudo-R^2=1-(L_1/L_0)$ , where  $L_1$  and  $L_0$  are the constant-only and full-model log-likelihoods, respectively.

Variable	Model A	Model B	Model C	Model D
Vacancy rate	-2.511	-2.615	-3.111*	-3.063*
	(1.607)	(1.617)	(1.736)	(1.924)
Tax base	`1.60e-05	1.47e-05	2.59e-05*	2.73e-05*
	(1.39e-05)	(1.40e-05)	(1.54e-05)	(1.58e-05)
Cutpoint density	87.100**	81.850**		
,	(31.547)	(31.349)		
Distance between blocs	, ,	, ,	-5.994**	-5.226**
			(1.661)	(1.694)
Socialist majority in municipal council	0.013		0.760*	
, ,	(0.303)		(0.412)	
Share of votes for Social Democrats	, ,	-0.843		3.029
		(1.805)		(2.785)
Environmental rating in 1997	0.058**	0.058**	0.023	0.032
-	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.026)
Share of votes for environmental party	9.711	9.815	12.246**	11.059*
	(6.124)	(6.126)	(6.161)	(6.068)
Constant	<b>-5.564**</b>	-4.916 <b>**</b>	-2.507**	-3.874**
	(1.752)	(2.183)	(1.257)	(1.859)
No. of observations	`114 <i>´</i>	`114 <i>´</i>	`115 <i>´</i>	`115 <sup>^</sup>
Pseudo-R <sup>2a</sup>	0.185	0.187	0.230	0.215
log-likelihood	<b>–61.11</b>	<b>–61.00</b>	-58.11	-59.23

Next we turn to the results for the Cox-McCubbins model. We use two political variables, intended to capture the size of the support group, to test this model: "socialist majority in municipal council" (a variable indicating if the party in power in the central government

and  $L_0$  are the constant-only and full model log-likelihoods, respectively.

is also in power in the municipal government) and "share of votes for social democrats" (which measures the share of votes in each municipality that the social democrats got in the election to the central government). We see from the results, listed in Table 5, that

TABLE 7. The Change in the Probability of Being Granted Caused by a one-standard deviation Change in the Explanatory Variables and the Elasticities, for the Lindbeck–Weibull/Dixit–Londregan Model

viation change in	the explanatory vari	iables	
-0.098 0.221	0.106 0.255	-0.121	-0.140
		-0.225	-0.259
0.109	0.047	0.071	0.011
0.091	0.095	0.098	0.107
Elasticities	3		
-0.432	-0.482	-0.547	-0.660
2.827		0.0 11	0.000
	0.000	-0.953	-1.147
1.077	0.481		0.117
0.494	0.532	0.544	0.620
	0.221 0.109 0.091 Elasticities -0.432 2.827 1.077	0.221 0.255  0.109 0.047 0.091 0.095  Elasticities  -0.432 -0.482 2.827 3.355  1.077 0.481	0.221 0.255 -0.225 0.109 0.047 0.071 0.091 0.095 0.098  Elasticities -0.432 -0.482 -0.547 2.827 3.355 -0.953 1.077 0.481 0.714

these political variables have mixed success when it comes to explanatory power. While the variable "socialist majority in municipal council" is insignificant in Model 1 and significant at the 5% level in Model 2, the variable "share of votes for social democrats" is significant in both models: at the 10% significance level in Model 1 and at the 5% level in Model 2. The real problem for the Cox-McCubbins model is, however. that both variables enter negatively in all models, thus contradicting the hypothesis that the government gives money to its own supporters to a larger extent than to supporters of other parties. Among the other regressors, only the two environmental variables enter statistically significantly. Our reading of the results in Table 5 is hence that we do not find any support for the Cox-McCubbins model.

Finally, we turn to the encompassing models to investigate how sensitive the results for the LW/DL model are to the inclusion of other political variables (that is, political variables predicted by the Cox-McCubbins model). The results from the encompassing models are presented in Table 6.24 In the first two columns of Table 6 we test the robustness of the estimated cutpoint density variable to the inclusion of the variable measuring socialist majority in the municipal council (Models A) and the share of votes for the Social Democrats (Model B). The results in the first two columns, reveal that the political variable predicted by the LW/DL model, the estimated cutpoint density variable, is significant, with its expected sign, while the political variables predicted by the Cox-McCubbins model do not enter significantly. These results lend further support for the LW/DL model. In the last two columns in Table 6 we test the robustness of the other

political variable predicted by the LW/DL model (distance between the blocs). Also, this variable seems to be robust to the inclusion of other political variables; it enters with the expected negative sign and is highly significant in both Model C and Model D. For the included Cox–McCubbins variables, the share of votes for Social Democrats enters insignificantly, while the dummy capturing the socialist majorities in the municipal council is significant at the 10% significance level but has the wrong sign.

Given the outcome from this sensitivity analysis, we consider the results for the LW/DL model in Table 4 to be quite robust.

# Is the Tactical Use of the "Ecological" Grants of Any Economic Significance?

To investigate whether the tactical use of the intergovernmental grants is of any economic importance, we calculate the marginal effects for those variables that were significant in the LW/DL model (Table 4). More specifically, we calculate the change in probability of being granted caused by one-standard deviation changes in the explanatory variables, while the other variables are held at their sample means. In addition, we have calculated the elasticities for these explanatory variables. (These figures are listed in Table 7).

Starting with the results at the top of Table 7, we see that the political variables seem to be economically more important than the labor market and environmental variables; a one-standard deviation increase in the density at the cutpoint or a one-standard deviation decrease in the distance between the blocs yields an increase in the probability that a municipality will be granted with 22–25%. This is to be compared with the corresponding figures for the vacancy rate (which are 10–14%), the environmental rating (1–10%), and for the share of votes for the environmental party (approximately 10%).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> To save space, we present only the results for the parsimonious Model 1. When the control variables used in Model 2 were included, the political variables from the LW/DL model all entered significantly, with their expected signs, while the political variables from the Cox-McCubbins model were all insignificant.

TABLE 8. Questions Asked in the Swedish Election Study, 1994					
Variable	Question	Range			
VAR 88	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place the Center Party (C)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 89	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place the Conservative Party (M)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 90	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place the Leftist Party (V)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 91	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place the Liberal Party (Fp)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 92	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place the Social Democrats (S)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 93	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place the Green Party (Mp)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 94	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place the Christian Democratic Party (Kds)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 95	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place New Democracy (NyD)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 96	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place Olof Johansson (party leader C)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 97	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place Carl Bildt (party leader M)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 98	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place Gudrun Schyman (party leader Vp)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5			
VAR 99	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place Bengt Westerberg (party leader Fp)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,			
VAR 100	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place Ingvar Carlsson (party leader S)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,			
VAR 101	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place Birger Schlaug ("språkrör" Mp)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,			
VAR 102	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place Alf Svensson (party leader Kd)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,			
VAR 103	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place Vivianne Franzén (party leader NyD)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,			
VAR 104	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place Ann Wibble (Fp)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,			
VAR 105	On a scale from dislike strongly to like strongly, where would you place Mona Sahlin (S)?	-5, -4, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, 4,			
VAR 380	Comparing your own current economic situation to what is was two or three years ago, has it improved, remained about the same, or gotten worse?	<b>-1, 0, 1</b>			
VAR 381	How has, in you opinion, the Swedish economy changed in the last two or three years? Has it improved, remained about the same, or gotten worse?	<b>-1, 0, 1</b>			
VAR 510	Constituency, election to the parliament	There are 29 constituencies			

Turning to the elasticities in the lower part of Table 7, the same picture emerges. Given model; increasing the density at the cutpoint by 1% or decreasing the distance between the blocs by 1% increases the probability of being granted more than a 1% change in any of the other variables does. This difference is most pronounced for Model 2, where the cutpoint density variable is used, while increasing the density at the cutpoint with 1% increases the probability of being granted with 3.4%, a 1% increase in any of the environmental variables or a 1% decrease in the labor market variable only increases the probability of being granted with approximately 0.5%. When using the distance variable instead, the difference is smaller; a 1% decrease in the distance yields a 0.9% change in the probability of being granted, to be compared with a 0.55-0.7% changes caused by 1% changes in the other variables (Model 1).

### **CONCLUSIONS**

Despite the frequent use of theoretical models describing vote-purchasing behavior of political parties, and despite the common view held by many citizens that the government acts tactically, we have not, until now, been able to investigate empirically whether or not incumbent governments use grants to lower-level government tactically. In this paper a uniquely suitable grant program is used to study the vote-purchasing behavior of incumbent governments. Hence, for the first time we have been able to test theories that have been widely used by economists and political scientist empirically. The findings in this paper are of interest for both researchers and policy makers.

We find support for the hypothesis that the temporary "ecological" grants that we study are used tactically by the incumbent (socialist) government. In

	Factor Loading	Uniqueness	Score
M	0.86037	0.2597	0.29471
Fp	0.1744	0.96958	0.01602
C	0.20945	0.95613	0.0195
Kd	0.55457	0.69245	0.07127
S	-0.73679	0.45717	-0.14347
V	-0.67132	0.54934	-0.10876
Мр	-0.40985	0.83202	-0.04384
NyD	0.27807	0.92268	0.02683
Carl Bildt	0.79034	0.37533	0.18736
Olof Johansson	0.04423	0.99804	0.00394
Bengt Westerberg	0.04116	0.99831	0.00367
Ann Wibble	0.66908	0.55232	0.1078
Alf Svensson	0.54438	0.70365	0.06884
Ingvar Carlsson	-0.62202	0.6131	-0.09027
Mona Sahlin	-0.60318	0.63619	-0.08437
Birger Schlaug	-0.32923	0.89161	-0.03286
Vivianne Franzén	0.18573	0.96551	0.01712
Gudrun Schyman	-0.45721	0.79097	-0.05143
Private economy	0.13692	0.98125	0.01242
Swedish economy	0.1694	0.9713	0.01552
Variance	4.88332		
log-likelihood	-6206.096		

particular, we find strong support for the prediction derived from the LW/DL model saying that the incumbent government purchases votes by investing in those municipalities where there are a lot of swing voters. This result is statistically as well as economically significant. The conclusion is strengthened by a sensitivity analysis: It turns out that even though we extend the LW/DL model by political variables predicted by other models, the original variables are unaffected while the added variables enter insignificantly.

We do *not* find support for the hypothesis that the incumbent government purchases votes by investing in their own supporters (measured as socialist majority in the municipal council and fraction of votes cast for the Social Democrats in the municipality in the last election), a prediction derived from the model presented by Cox and McCubbins (1986).

A resulting question is, of course, Can we generalize our results in some way, or is the formulation of the grant program under study so atypical that no generalizations can be made? It turns out that grant programs similar to the one we study here exist, in Sweden as well as in other countries. It can, for example, be noted that in Sweden, the ecological grants have been followed by other grant programs (for example, to support municipalities that have run into financial problems as a consequence of a balanced-budget law that has recently been put into action) whose allocation principles are very similar to those of the grant program under study in this paper. We can hence expect our results to hold for these other programs as well. At the same time it might be worth stressing that a good way to test the robustness of our results is to investigate how they would fare under other, but similar, grant programs in different countries. If future studies would point in the same direction as ours, we would be more prone to generalize from our results.

Are there any policy implications to be drawn from this study? Well, even though our results strongly indicate that the incumbent government will, if it can, use available resources to win votes, we cannot, from this study, tell whether this leads to a less efficient distribution of grants than if the incumbent did not exhibit any vote-purchasing behavior. However, if one believes that an inefficient distribution of grants is the likely outcome of such behavior, the policy recommendation would be that one should be careful when designing grant programs. In particular, one should avoid programs with vague rules and where the incumbent government has sovereign decision-making power.

#### **APPENDIX**

#### Data Appendix

A description of the variables used in this paper is given below.

Controls for "Needs." Vacancy rate: The number of new and remaining vacancies divided by the number of unemployed persons.


Tax base: The municipality's tax base per capita.

Social welfare: Social welfare spending divided by the number of residents in the municipality.

Cash flow: The municipality's cash flow after financial and other costs have been paid.

Young: Share of the population younger than 16. Old: Share of the population older than 64.

**Political Variables.** Cutpoint density: The density at the cutpoint, where the distributions of bias in favor of the opposition are estimated at the constituency level using data from



the Swedish Election Studies and the cutpoints are given by the vote share of the winning bloc in the election. See Estimation of the Cutpoint Density, below, for a more detailed description.

Distance between blocs: The difference in vote shares between the socialist and the conservative bloc in the central election, expressed as absolute values. The socialist bloc consists of S, V, and Mp, and the conservative bloc of M, Fp, C, Kd, and NyD.

Socialist majority in municipal council: A dummy taking the value of 1 if S and V have more than 50% of the votes in the municipal council and 0 otherwise.

Share of votes for social democrats: The share of votes in each municipality for S in the central government election.

Environmental Variables. Environmental rating in 1997: The rating is conducted every year by the environmental journal Miljö Eko. The 1997 rating was presented in Miljö Eko No. 5, 1997. The higher the ratio is, the better is the municipality at environmental work.

Share of votes for environmental party: The share of votes in each municipality for Mp in the local government election.

### **Estimation of the Cutpoint Density**

Following Johansson (2002), the variable CUTPOINT DEN-SITY is estimated using data from the Swedish Election Study of 1994, which is a large survey performed in connection with the election. The data sets are handled and distributed by the Swedish Social Science Data Service (SSD) at Göteborg University. The 1994 study used in this paper was carried out by Mikael Gilliam and Sören Holmberg at the Department of Political Science, Göteborg University. Among the many questions available we picked out variables that we believe capture people's preferences. These variables are listed in Table 8. Respondents are observable at the level of constituency for the parliament. In 1994 there were 29 constituencies. The number of observations in the survey is 2296. These data are then used when estimating the bias in favor of the socialist bloc using factor analysis. All estimations are performed in STATA. The results of the factor analysis estimations are listed in Table 9. When calculating the scores, the regression method is used. Thereafter, constituency-specific distributions of the bias in favor of the socialist bloc are estimated using a univariate kernel density estimator. The bandwidth used is the STATA default, which is the width that would minimize the mean integrated square error if the data were in fact Gaussian and a Gaussian kernel were used. In our case this width is approximately 0.55-0.80. The resulting distributions are given in Fig. 2.

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# **Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in Young Adulthood**

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This paper reframes our inquiry into voter turnout by making aging the lens through which the traditional resource and cost measures of previous turnout research are viewed, thereby making three related contributions. (1) I offer a developmental theory of turnout. This framework follows from the observation that most citizens are habitual voters or habitual nonvoters (they display inertia). Most young citizens start their political lives as habitual nonvoters but they vary in how long it takes to develop into habitual voters. With this transition at the core of the framework, previous findings concerning costs and resources can easily be integrated into developmental theory. (2) I make a methodological contribution by applying latent growth curve models to panel data. (3) Finally, the empirical analyses provide the developmental theory with strong support and also provide a better understanding of the roles of aging, parenthood, partisanship, and geographic mobility.

very presidential election raises questions about voter turnout in the United States and, in particular, the very low turnout of young voters. Why is voter turnout so much lower among the youngest citizens? Can interventions addressed specifically toward young voters likely to have a lasting impact? Are some groups of young citizens especially cut off from the political system, and could this have consequences for their participation later in life?

How can we generate better answers to questions such as these? I argue that we need to reframe our approach to voter turnout by subsuming the familiar costs—resources framework within a developmental perspective. Doing so leads to more precise and qualified questions and spurs use of more appropriate models. I show that doing so can yield more valid and satisfying answers to questions about voting behavior.

# REFRAMING INQUIRY INTO VOTER TURNOUT

Turning out to vote is the most common and important act citizens take in a democracy and, therefore, is one of the most important behaviors for scholars of democratic politics to understand. And yet, it is not well understood. (Aldrich 1993, 246)

Our poor understanding of turnout does not stem from neglect. Rather, scholars have struggled to find a unify-

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ing framework that might integrate the many findings and explanations. Most research on turnout has been guided by a focus on resources that help voters overcome the costs of voting. Dozens of resources have been linked to turnout, including, most conspicuously, various aspects of socioeconomic status, especially education (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Miller and Shanks 1996). Scholars also have examined cognitive resources such as political knowledge (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), indicators of political engagement such as newspaper readership and political interest (Campbell et al. 1960; Strate et al. 1989), and indicators of community involvement and stake-holding such as home ownership (Milbrath 1965; Verba and Nie 1972), social networks (Zipp and Smith 1979; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), marriage (Stoker and Jennings 1995), and church and civic involvement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Scholars have also examined factors that increase the *costs* of voting. Geographic mobility, for example, can substantially increase the barriers to voter registration (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987). Others have explored the disruptive effects of severe hardship (Rosenstone 1982) and the exhaustion and time demands associated with raising young children (Plutzer 1998).

The twin foci of resources and costs have yielded a large number of research findings but not a good sense of how the many factors fit together or when and where variables will matter most. That is, the many findings do not yield a set of conditions and qualifications that marks a mature theory.

The many variables associated with turnout make much more sense when viewed through the lens of aging and the development of the habit of voting. Consistent with this idea, I offer a developmental framework for understanding turnout. Highlighted in this framework are the notions of starting level (the probability that citizens vote in their first eligible election) and inertia (the propensity for citizens to settle into habits of voting or nonvoting). The developmental framework distinguishes among factors influencing the starting level, factors that can shift a voter from one inertial state to another, and factors that interrupt established

habits. Methodologically, the developmental perspective lays bare many questionable assumptions and practices characterizing almost all previous research on life-cycle and life-experience explanations for turnout. To address these problems I apply *latent growth curve models* and explain their applicability to developmental processes more generally. I go on to test key assumptions of the developmental theory and to reassess conclusions drawn from cross-sectional analyses.

# AGING, INERTIA AND THE TWO HABITS OF VOTING

The distinctive relationship between age and voter turnout has intrigued students of electoral behavior since at least the early 1960s. Milbrath (1965, 134) cites eight early reports of steep rise in turnout in young adulthood followed by gradual increases until voters reach their sixties. Verba and Nie (1972) proposed a number of "life-cycle" explanations; this in turn spurred many others to consider how and why this rise-and-fall pattern occurs in virtually every survey of U.S. electoral behavior (e.g., Jennings and Markus 1988; Strate et al. 1989; Miller and Shanks 1996; Highton and Wolfinger 2001).

In fact, the effect of age is comparable to the strong effect of education. The 1998 Current Population Survey, for example, shows a 40-point turnout gap between those who completed less than ninth grade (24% turnout) and those with an advanced degree (64%). But the gap between those 18–24 years old and those older than 65 is 46 points (17 compared to 63%). More important, aging may come to the fore because as citizens get older, experience can compensate for low levels of education (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 60).

Nevertheless, scholars in the resource and SES tradition rarely pay much attention to age (exceptions include Strate et al. 1989; Jankowski 2001). Indeed, they sometimes leave the effect of age unreported along with those of other "control" variables. The developmental framework takes aging and development as the starting point rather than an afterthought. The framework complements and integrates previous research by focusing on factors that increase or decrease the costs of voting—placing them in a new and more informative light.

## Voting as a "Habit" and Path Dependence

Virtually all major works on turnout have concluded that voting behavior is, in part, a gradually acquired habit. Milbrath explicitly invokes psychological concepts of reinforcement and "habit strength" to characterize habitual voting (1965, 31; see also Verba and Nie 1972, 148; Miller and Shanks 1996, 17, 62). In short, although the terminology varies, there is a longstanding agreement that voting behavior is habitual. Thus, it is

useful to think about civic development as a largely path-dependent process.

The process begins as young citizens confront their very first election. Each has a latent probability of voting resulting from parental, demographic, and personal factors. Some will vote and become habitual voters, but most will not and are likely to remain nonvoters in subsequent elections. That is, most new citizens show evidence of *inertia*. Inertia is rather different from *persistence*, a central organizing concept in political socialization research (Sears 1990; Searing, Schwartz, and Lind 1973). The notion of persistence suggests that one can find the origins of adult attitudes and ideology in events and influences that occurred many years earlier. In contrast, inertia suggests that the roots of current turnout can be found in voting behavior in the previous one or two elections.

Almost all habitual nonvoters gradually increase their probability of voting and eventually make the transition to being habitual voters. Some do so almost immediately, but others remain habitual nonvoters for many elections. From this perspective, the key explanatory task is identifying the factors that influence how quickly different voters make the transition from one inertial state to another. Of course, habitual voters are sometimes thwarted from voting in a particular election. But failing to vote once does not shift them back to nonvoting. In most cases, the disruption is short-term and they return to their habitual behavior. Once voters are on the path of regular voting, factors that were once important (parental influences, educational attainment) diminish.

### A DEVELOPMENTAL THEORY OF TURNOUT

This simple framework allows a new and useful integration of prior research, as I now attempt to demonstrate.

### Starting Levels of Turnout

As young citizens confront their first election, all of the costs of voting are magnified: they have never gone through the process of registration, may not know the location of their polling place, and may not have yet developed an understanding of party differences and key issues. Moreover, their peer group consists almost entirely of other nonvoters: their friends cannot assure them that voting has been easy, enjoyable, or satisfying.

Young people also lack many of the resources that can promote participation. Because they have little disposable income, they are not attractive targets for parties seeking campaign contributions or for interest groups mounting direct mail campaigns. Few of them own homes, have stakes in community politics, or have completed college. Thus it is not surprising that few young citizens are registered to vote (Timpone 1998) and their turnout is relatively low.

Nevertheless, many young citizens do vote—presumably because "the start-up costs of voting are not borne equally by all young people" (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 60). A few have resources that allow them to overcome the high costs of first-time

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See, e.g., many tables of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, chaps. 12, 15). To be fair, the authors of *Voice and Inequality* acknowledge that "there is more to the impact of age than the analysis in this chapter can reveal—but that must wait for future research" (p. 423).

registration and first-time voting. These resources can come from their parents or from their own achievements. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, chap. 15) distinguish between parental socioeconomic status and parental political involvement. Parental education promotes offspring education and offspring political knowledge, including such mundane information as how to register and where to vote. Thus political knowledge is an asset that can directly offset costs of initial turnout. Parental political involvement can provide both behavior to model and campaign-relevant information that children rarely get from formal schooling.

Parental resources combine with young citizens' own achievements before their first election. Although they may not have yet completed their formal education, they may have acquired some political knowledge and may have developed an interest in public affairs (reflected, e.g., in reading newspapers or weekly news magazines). They may also have some partisan attachments, though these are likely to be malleable over the long term and may therefore have weak or transient effects (Jennings and Niemi 1981).

In sum, a variety of factors—all previously identified by other authors—should be expected to influence starting levels of turnout. However, it is unclear whether any of these factors will matter in the future or whether their effects will dissipate because of the inertia that typically follows.

# The Nature of Inertia and the Habits of Turnout

A citizen's voting history is a powerful predictor of future behavior. This is easily illustrated by using self-reports of turnout from those who completed the 1972–1976 National Election Studies (NES) panel study (Center for Political Studies 2000). Of the 516 respondents who reported voting in both 1968 and 1972, only 3% missed voting in both the 1974 and the 1976 elections. In contrast, of the 57 respondents who reported missing two consecutive elections (either 1968–72 or 1972–74), more than two-thirds did not vote in the next election.

Unfortunately, the nature of inertia is undertheorized. Here, I offer some speculations, the specifics of which will remain for future research to fill in. First, the two inertial states are very different. The stability of habitual nonvoting is one that most citizens "outgrow" and is, therefore, weaker. Citizens can outgrow the nonvoting habit if the costs of voting remain relatively constant over the life course but the resources available to overcome those costs increase. Income, for example, tends to increase in young adulthood, and this may gradually increase the likelihood of being recruited into electoral politics (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chap. 5). Second, cognitive resources—especially political knowledge-should increase with age (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Strate et al. 1989; delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Third, life events such as marriage, home ownership, and having children in school often increase community ties, enhance the relevance of local elections, and increase the perceived stakes of electoral outcomes (Verba and Nie 1972). Fourth, even constant activities can have cumulative impacts. For example, young voters who attend weekly religious services may gradually acquire politically relevant resources [information from politicized sermons, opportunities for leadership and public speaking, etc. (see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995)].

Overall, many resource (e.g., socioeconomic status, cognitive assets, political engagement, social networks) and life-cycle variables (e.g., marriage, home ownership) act on habitual nonvoters by increasing their probability of voting in subsequent elections. Each resource variable should be expected to speed the transition from nonvoter to habitual voter.

# The Inertia of Habitual Voters and Temporary Disruptions

Both habitual nonvoters and habitual voters display inertia, but the nature of that inertia differs. Nonvoters must overcome bureaucratic barriers (most notably registration) and costs of various types (e.g., information costs). These same factors, however, contribute to stability once a citizen has crossed the threshold and voted once. Although residential mobility is common, most voters do not move in a four-year period. So once they register and vote, the barrier of registration is unlikely to come into play in the next election or two. Similarly, once voters attain a certain degree of political knowledge—for example, finally understanding some key differences between the parties—they are unlikely to forget it or find that their knowledge has become obsolete in the next few elections.

Norms also contribute to inertia. Voting for the first time is likely to bring positive reenforcement from friends, family, and co-workers. As voters age, their peer cohort has increasingly higher participation rates and they eventually move out of age-homogeneous settings (e.g., college residences) and into others (work-places, community organizations) where the average levels of political knowledge and turnout are higher. Thus, as young citizens take on more adult roles, they are likely to be subject to more and more intense participation norms.

For all of these reasons, after young citizens vote once, they should only occasionally experience an increase in the costs of voting relative to their resources and social pressures. A reversal may occur as a result of a major life event that creates immediate demands for one's time and attention. For example unemployment has a noticeable effect on voter turnout but only if the onset of unemployment was very close to the election; if more than a few months pass, voters seem to rebound (Rosenstone 1982). This pattern of a "rebound" raises the question, "Rebound to what?"

A rebound implies that severe economic dislocations will show up as major factors discouraging habitual voters, but severe disruptions may be largely irrelevant to nonvoters because most would not vote anyway. At most, hardships are just one of many barriers facing habitual nonvoters or newly eligible citizens. Therefore,

smaller hardship effects should be evident among the very young because so few are habitual voters.

The central disruption factor that has been studied to date is residential mobility (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987). Habitual voters who move from one precinct to another usually must reregister to vote and discover the location of a new polling place. Thus, residential mobility may temporarily disrupt their regular pattern. Like other disruptive factors, residential mobility is primarily a factor affecting habitual voters, and its effects should be considerably less evident among younger citizens than their older counterparts.

To summarize, voter turnout is developmental and characterized by modest inertia for nonvoters and strong inertia for voters. Key explanatory variables from previous research can be characterized in terms of whether they affect starting levels or the speed of transition or whether they function primarily to disrupt established patterns. This relatively simple framework provides the basis for more precise hypotheses (e.g., that the effects of parental characteristics dissipate rather than persist and that disruptions such as mobility and parenthood are likely to have increasing explanatory power as citizens age).

Before moving putting these expectations to the test, it is useful to examine the methodological challenges involved in analyzing turnout via cross-sectional survey data and to introduce an analytic approach that has not previously been exploited in research on turnout.

# THE LIMITATIONS OF CROSS-SECTIONAL AND COHORT METHODS

Several scholars have focused specifically on understanding life-cycle effects. Yet previous efforts are characterized by data and models that do not correspond to each other. Using cross-sectional data to make inferences about the life-cycle or the life-experience process is risky for several reasons. First, it is extremely difficult to avoid the "fallacy of assumed reversibility." Lieberson (1985) observes that we tend to interpret a regression slope of +1 as meaning both that "a one unit increase in X is associated with a one unit increase in Y" and that "a one unit decrease in X is associated with a one unit decrease in Y." If the developmental theory is essentially correct in its core assertion of inertia, this may be theoretically implausible. For example, consider two individuals whose earnings at age 30 place them in the 99th percentile. Based on current research, each is expected to have higher than average political participation. Suppose that four years later, one's earnings plummet to the median. If voting is an acquired habit, it makes no sense to predict that her participation will fall to average levels. Nevertheless, this is exactly what most cross-sectional models force the researcher to assume. The degree of misspecification is directly proportional to the extent to which certain life events produce gains in participation that are more difficult to reverse than they were to acquire. This developmental asymmetry can be modeled cross sectionally if different variables are used to distinguish income gains from income losses (e.g., Plutzer and Wiefek 1998). However, a

developmental statistical model provides a much better fit between theory and method.

A second problem is endogeneity. If voting is an acquired habit, then the proximate causes of voting in election t are largely contained in the information represented by the turnout variable for election t-1, which in turn is largely determined by turnout in prior elections. The older the respondent, the longer the causal chain. If voting in the current election is an indicator of one's long-term probability of voting, then many "independent variables," such as income and marital status, are endogenous to the latent variable that cross-sectional turnout actually measures. Crosssectional studies could deal with this if turnout could be decomposed into a latent long-term probability and a short-term response to recent personal, macroeconomic, and political conditions. Yet this could be accomplished only with reliable and valid turnout histories for each respondent. Thus, the potential problems of irreversibility and ambiguous causal order in cross-sectional models make a developmental analysis preferable.

A third limitation in most cross-sectional studies is the confounding of age with generation. Even in the most careful analyses (e.g., Strate et al. 1989) it is never clear whether age is helping to explain life-cycle, lifeexperience, or generational effects.

Cohort analysis has complementary problems (e.g., Miller and Shanks 1996, chap. 4): they do not permit inferences about individual behavior and rarely contain enough cases to enable subgroup analysis. Moreover, subgroups based on changeable statuses (e.g., married, employed, childless, Southern, or home owner) cannot be studied at all (Riley 1973; see also Converse 1976). In short, cohort analysis cannot support reliable inferences concerning the effects of individual experiences that lie at the heart of the life-cycle and life-experience perspectives.

### THE LATENT GROWTH CURVE MODEL

A superior approach, when appropriate data are available, is provided by latent growth models. To build such a model, one first theorizes about a *single individual* who is first eligible to vote in election t and continues to be eligible to vote in subsequent elections, t+1, t+2, etc. At each election the citizen is observed to vote or not and this is conceived as an indicator of a latent probability of turnout. This can be modeled as

$$p(Y_t = 1) = f(\beta_0 + \beta_1 ELECTION),$$
 (1)

where Y is a dummy variable denoting whether the individual voted in election t, ELECTION is a variable coded  $0, 1, 2, \ldots T_1 - 1$ , and  $T_1$  is the number of elections observed for each individual. Two parameters describe an individual's *latent growth curve*, with  $\beta_0$  corresponding to the height of the curve as it crosses the y axis and  $\beta_1$  the steepness of the increase or decrease. Each respondent's first eligible election is coded as ELECTION = 0, so that the intercept,  $\beta_0$ , indicates the individual's starting level and the slope,  $\beta_1$ , estimates

the *growth* in the latent probability of voting—hence, the characterization of a "latent growth curve." This model can be estimated by logistic (or probit) regression. If the number of elections is three or more, the model will have a residual, which is designated r here. Therefore, the model for each individual is

$$logit(Y_t) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 ELECTION + r.$$
 (2)

A sample of N individuals is thus conceived of varying among themselves in two ways. First, citizens have varying probabilities of voting in their first eligible election, leading to N different values of  $\beta_0$ . Second, each has a unique developmental trajectory, leading to N different values of  $\beta_1$ . Thus, in a sample, the parameters for the *i*th individual,  $\beta_{0i}$  and  $\beta_{1i}$ , are conceived as random variables. In all past studies, these two components of turnout have been combined in cross-sectional turnout and predicted by the same set of variables. This failure to separate out starting level from growth (or decline) has both methodological and theoretical consequences. Methodologically, it means that part of turnout is exogenous to many independent variables (the starting level for most individuals is determined before most predictor variables are observed), reversing the usual assumptions of causal inference.

The developmental theory implies that variables determined before an individual reaches voting age, such as parent's education, will have a greater impact on the starting point than on subsequent growth. Most other factors will affect growth rates. This distinction is reflected in two equations that capture the effects of various independent variables on  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_1$ , respectively. The first equation predicts one's likelihood of voting in one's first eligible election:

$$\beta_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01} Z + u_{0i}, \qquad (3)$$

where  $\beta_{0i}$  is the intercept term from Eq. (2) (in units of logged odds),  $\gamma_{00}$  is an intercept term, Z is a variable that affects initial turnout and (potentially) long-term growth,  $\gamma_{01}$  is the effect of Z on initial turnout, and  $u_{0i}$  is the unexplained variance in person i's starting level. And the second model predicts each individual's rate of growth over time:

$$\beta_{1i} = \gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}Z + \gamma_{12}X + u_{1i}, \qquad (4)$$

where  $\beta_{1i}$  is the slope parameter from Eq. (2),  $\gamma_{10}$  is an intercept term, Z is a predictor of the rate of turnout growth that occurs before t = 0,  $\gamma_{11}$  is the effect of Z on the rate of turnout growth, X is a predictor of the rate of turnout growth that occurs after t = 0,  $\gamma_{12}$  is the effect of X on the rate of turnout growth, and  $u_{1i}$  is the unexplained variance in person i's growth rate.

Equations (3) and (4) comprise the essential model (sometimes called a hierarchical linear model; HLM), but they cannot be estimated separately. By substituting for  $\beta_0$  and  $\beta_1$ , and subscripting for the *i*th person, Eq. (2) can be written

$$logit(Y_{it}) = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}Z + u_{0i} + (\gamma_{10} + \gamma_{11}Z + \gamma_{12}X + u_{1i})ELECTION + r_i.$$
 (5)

Rearranging terms gives

$$logit(Y_{it}) = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{01}Z + \gamma_{10}ELECTION$$
$$+ \gamma_{11}Z * ELECTION + \gamma_{12}X * ELECTION$$
$$+ u_{1i} * ELECTION + u_{0i} + r_{i}.$$
(6)

This model cannot be estimated by OLS or traditional methods of maximum likelihood because of the multiplicative term between the disturbance from Eq. (4)  $(u_{1i})$  and ELECTION, because of the correlation between the two disturbance terms  $(u_{1i})$  and  $u_{0i}$ , and because of the need to estimate the variance of the disturbances prior to estimation of the slopes and their standard errors. However, several reliable solutions are available. These use a doubly iterative procedure in which MLE iterations are augmented by empirical Bayes estimates. The models reported here were estimated by MIXOR 2.0 (Hedeker and Gibbons 1996).<sup>2</sup>

# DESCRIPTION OF DATA AND SEQUENCE OF MODEL ESTIMATION

I employ data from Jennings and Niemi's three-wave Student-Parent Socialization Study (Jennings 1972; Jennings and Niemi 1991; Jennings, Markus, and Niemi 1991; remerged in order to include respondents who did not complete the panel). High school seniors and one or both of their parents were interviewed in 1965, 1973, and 1982. The 1973 interview included questions concerning turnout in the 1968 and 1972 elections and the 1982 survey asked about voting in 1976 and 1980, providing self-reported turnout in four consecutive presidential elections. Analysis is restricted to students who were 21 years old on or before election day in 1968. The 1968 election is coded as election 0, with 1972, 1976, and 1980 coded as 1, 2, and 3, respectively. A summary of the marginal distributions of turnout in each election and a detailed description of how I treated missing data is provided in the Appendix.<sup>3</sup>

Independent variables are in four blocks that lie at different points in a funnel of causality. These blocks correspond to the intergenerational transmission model of Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, chap. 15). This framework presumes that the effects of early events are partially mediated by later ones, and this suggests using a block recursive strategy in which the total effects of variables early in causal chain are

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) provide a thorough introduction containing detailed references for those interested in the evolution of estimation solutions. For a more detailed discussion of estimation issues unique to problems with binary dependent variables, see Hedeker and Gibbons (1994, 1996), who also provide helpful references to the technical statistical literature.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Timpone (1998) shows that a model's failure to distinguish between registration and turnout among the registered can lead to misleading interpretations. Unfortunately, the data include registration questions only for two of the four elections examined here, making it impossible to estimate a separate registration model or a two-stage selection model. However, it seems appropriate to assume that starting level is determined largely by the motivation to register and the resources to overcome registration hurdles. As citizens get older, registration becomes a smaller component of nonvoting.

compared to their net effects after the addition of variables from later blocks [see Miller and Shanks (1996) for a similar approach]. Next I provide a summary of the independent variables.<sup>4</sup>

# Block I. Demographic and Parental Characteristics

Block I variables include sex, race, and three indicators of parents' socioeconomic status: educational attainment, reported family income, and the Duncan Occupational Prestige score for the head of household.

Five additional variables measure the political environment created by the parents. The first is a standard question about the parents' interest in politics; the second is the parents' score on a political knowledge quiz consisting of six factual items. Additional measures are scores on a three-item scale of political trust, parents' strength of party identification, and parents' self-reported vote in the 1964 presidential election.<sup>5</sup>

Unless otherwise noted, all predictors that are numeric scales (e.g., family income and years of education) or have arbitrary metrics (attitude measures with agreedisagree responses) are *standardized* (mean of 0 and standard deviation of one), while dummy variables remain in their natural metric. This coding ensures that all predictors have a meaningful value of 0, aiding in interpretation of the intercept.

# Block II. Youth Characteristics at the Completion of High School

This block includes resource measures based on interviews three years before the seniors became eligible to vote. I use self-reported high school GPA as an indicator of educational achievement. An index of activity in student politics and student organizations addresses activities whose recall was found to be important by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, chap. 14); here they are measured as a scale composed of indicators of having run for student office and of a holding leadership role in any student organization. A measure of church attendance serves as an indicator of community-based resources.

Three variables tap into psychological resources and political engagement. The first is a three-item *engagement in politics scale*, which is a standardized composite of expressed interest in politics and the frequency of both newspaper and newsmagazine readership.<sup>6</sup> The second item is the same six-item political knowledge scale that was administered to the parents. Third is the student's strength of partisanship.

# Block III. Events and Achievements Between High School and the First Election

Although the youth were not interviewed between 1965 and the 1968 election, the 1973 interview was sufficiently detailed to enable construction of measures for four key life transitions during this period. Two are potential resources and two are presumed disruptions. Dummy variables indicate whether each young adult had attended college (63% of the sample did so), was married in 1968 (28%), or became a parent before the 1968 election (15%).

A simple measure of geographic mobility was impossible to construct because the questionnaire did not ask when each move between 1965 and 1973 occurred. However, respondents indicated if and when they moved to another state, permitting the computation of a dummy variable indicating if a respondent moved across state lines between 1965 and 1968.

# **Block IV. Life Events and Achievements After** the First Election

The last causal block includes a wide array of resources and disruptive factors. The resources include both events/achievements (reports of final educational level, economic status, marriage, parenthood, and community ties) and psychological/subjective measures (political engagement and political knowledge).

The reports of events and behaviors include most of the usual variables suggested in life-cycle research. All are measured as of 1973—less than a year after the 1972 election and prior to subsequent elections in 1976 and 1980. Thus, they capture events during the first five years of voting eligibility for each respondent. Three variables tap various aspects of socioeconomic status. An ordinal measure of "final" educational achievement is coded -1 for those who did not attend college, 0 for those with some college attendance, and +1 for those who completed a college degree. Family income is measured by an 18-category variable that has been standardized. Income differences tend to widen with age and may be a poor indicator of one's position in the stratification system at age 25. At that age, young attorneys and management trainees earn less than many skilled blue-collar workers even though the former understand that they are on a track toward an upper middle-class standard of living. I therefore include a dummy variable denoting whether the head of household has a professional, technical, or high managerial position.

Three variables tap aspects of community involvement and social ties: a dummy variable indicating home ownership, a four-category measure of frequency of church attendance (also standardized), and marital status (measured by two dummy variables indicating whether the respondent was married or divorced; never married is the omitted category). Divorce can be thought of as a disruption that can lower turnout.

Additional disruption measures include the number of residential changes since 1965 (standardized) and parenthood, as measured by two dummy variables. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Documentation of the exact question wording of all variables descriptions of how items were combined into composite measures of various kinds is available from the author upon request.

The maximum amount of information was extracted from the parent interview data. The mother was interviewed in one-third of the cases, the father in one-third, and both parents in one-third. In cases where both parents gave valid answers to questions about politics the answers were averaged.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Factor analysis yields loadings that range from 0.69 (magazine readership) to 0.79 (newspapers) for the three items with an estimated reliability (Cronbach's  $\alpha$ ) of 0.61.

first indicates the presence of school-age children (age six or older), and the second is coded 1 if the respondent has one or more children under six (but none older). Childless respondents are the omitted category.

### Limitations of the Data

The Jennings and Niemi study constitutes the best (perhaps the only) data set that will permit estimating latent growth models of turnout. However, certain features of the data set bear on generalizibility. Most obviously, the period between 1965 and 1973 encompasses the escalation of the Civil Rights, antiwar, and campus free speech movements, along with related movements and political events. Undoubtedly, some of the parameter estimates would differ if a different cohort of high school seniors were studied (although it is difficult to anticipate which these might be).

Second, the study's design eliminates those who dropped out of high school prior to their senior year. In 1965 this was roughly 27% of the cohort. Thus, the restricted range of education almost surely narrows the range of several variables including parent education and SES, parent and student turnout, and youth's 1973 income. These probably have the effect of attenuating some relationships, yielding fairly conservative hypothesis tests and downwardly biased slopes (and relatively high percentages of self-reported turnout). The restriction in range almost surely exaggerates the speed with which high-resource and low-resource segments of the population converge in their turnout rates as they age.

Finally, with only four elections observed for each respondent, the smooth curves suggested by latent growth curve models represent a simplification. With a longer series of observations, life events producing dramatic short-term increases or temporary disruptions could be modeled more precisely (indicators of shocks preceding particular elections could be added to equation two). In the analyses summarized below, shocks will be reflected in substantial changes in the steepness of estimated growth curves, but these curves will nevertheless be estimated as smooth, monotonic functions.

### **Issues of Model Specification**

Previous research suggests that all variables in Blocks I, II, and III are plausible predictors of turnout in the 1968 election. However, if these contribute to each individual's underlying probability of turnout in their first eligible election, it is not clear whether they should be expected to have additional impact on the rate of increase. Consider, for example, the impact of having parents with high levels of education, income, and political involvement. On the one hand, a rich cognitive environment could have a lasting legacy that provides an additional impetus toward political interest and participation, reflecting the idea that education provides the basis for further learning throughout the life course. Thus, a cognitively rich and politically engaged parental environment in childhood and adolescence might result in an acceleration turnout growth, reflected in a hypothesized positive effect on  $\beta_1$ . Such a growth hypothesis will be tested for each predictor.

However, the effect of parental resources could diminish over time as the young citizen leaves home and is exposed to more recent effects of community transitions, socioeconomic achievements, and family formation. Thus, in the absence of strong theory or previous research, hypotheses of no effect on growth are at least as plausible as hypotheses of positive effects. Thus, the question of whether the  $\beta_1$  side of the model is overspecified cannot be resolved on theoretical grounds.

The initial model, therefore, will start with all Block I variables modeled as predictors of  $\beta_0$  and of  $\beta_1$ . My standing expectation, however, is that all effects on  $\beta_1$  will be 0. For reasons of parsimony and to avoid potential problems of multicollinearity, insignificant predictors of  $\beta_1$  will not be retained when models add additional variables further along in the causal chain. This strategy strikes a balance between concerns about collinearity and the weak theoretical bases for hypotheses concerning long-term growth.

Table 1 lists the independent variables by temporal block and shows each variable's expected effect. The table has several notable features. First, the expected dissipation of effects of youth experiences is reflected in expected slopes of 0 for all pre-1968 measures on growth rate. Second, it is impossible for achievements occurring after 1968 to influence turnout in the 1968 election; therefore, all of these slopes are constrained to 0 a priori. Resources all have expected positive slopes. Disruptions occurring before the first eligible election are not expected to have any effects, but disruptions occurring later should lower turnout and this will be reflected in flatter growth rates (negative slopes).

# RESULTS I: PARENTAL INFLUENCE ON INITIAL TURNOUT AND GROWTH

The initial model, reported in Table 2, includes sex, race, three measures of parental socioeconomic status, and five measures of parental political involvement including self-reported vote in the 1964 election. For each regressor, there are two estimated slopes: on  $\beta_0$ (reflecting the impact on starting level) and on  $\beta_1$  (the impact on growth). The intercept in the  $\beta_0$  column corresponds to  $\gamma_{00}$  in Eq. (3) and represents the log-odds of initial election turnout for a white male whose parent did not vote in the 1964 election and has the mean value for all SES and political variables (i.e., coded 0 for all 10 regressors). Similarly, the intercept in the equation predicting  $\beta_1$  represents an increase in the log-odds of turnout associated with each subsequent election  $[\gamma_{10}]$ in Eq. (4)]. Thus the prediction equation for a white man (race and sex equal 0) from an average parental environment (all parental variables equal 0) with a nonvoting parent is

$$logit(Y_{it}) = -0.192 + 1.024 \times ELECTION.$$
 (7)


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> I also estimated a saturated model containing all possible main effects and interactions for variables in all four blocks. Comparing these results with those in Table 7 reveals no sign changes and only two changes in statistical significance; the saturated model is not reported because of space constraints but the results are available from the author upon request.

TABLE 1.	Summary of Independent Variables
and Their I	Hypothesized Effects

and Their Hypothesized Eff	ects	
	Predicting $\beta_0$	Predicting β <sub>1</sub>
Block I: Demographic and paren	tal character	istics
Demographic controls		
Sex (female $= 1$ )	NH	0
Race (black = 1)	NH	0
Parental SES		
Parental average education	+	Ō
Family income Head of household	+	0
occupational prestige	+	0
Politics at home		
Parental political interest	,	0
Parental political knowledge	+ +	0
Parental political trust	+	0
Parental strength of	+	0
partisanship	'	J
Parent voted in 1964	+	0
(voted = 1)	•	•
Block II: Youth factors in 1965		
Youth resources acquired before	re high coho	al.
graduation	e nign schol	וכ
High school GPA	+	0
High school activities	+	Ö
Church attendance	+	Ö
Engagement in politics	<u>.</u>	Ö
Political knowledge	+	Ö
Trust in government	+	0
Strength of partisanship	+	0
Block III: Factors occurring betwe election	en 1965 and	first
Resources acquired before first	election	
Attended college (yes $= 1$ )	+	0
Married in 1968 (yes $= 1$ )	+	0
Disruptions before first election		
Toddler in home in 1968	0	0
(yes = 1)		
Interstate move 1965–1968 (yes = 1)	0	0
Block IV: Factors occurring/compl	eted after fire	st election
Hesources aquired after first ele		
Educational achievement (-1 to +1)	Fixed = 0	+
Professional in 1973 (yes = 1	\ Fixed — 0	
Family income 1973	Fixed $= 0$	+
Home ownership in 1973	Fixed = 0	+
(yes = 1)	· ixou — o	-
Church attendence 1973	Fixed = 0	+
Married in 1973 (yes $= 1$ )	Fixed = 0	<u> </u>
Political knowledge 1973	Fixed = 0	<u>;</u>
Engagement in politics 1973	Fixed = 0	+
Disruptions after first election		-
Number of moves	Fixed = 0	-
1965-1973 Divorced/separated in 1973	Eivad 0	
Privorocuracparateu III 1973	Fixed = 0	- 1

Note: NH: no hypothesis. Fixed = 0: estimates constrained to 0 because future achievements/events cannot influence starting level.

Fixed = 0



That is, the predicted odds of turnout in one's first election (when ELECTION and all other independent variables = 0), is  $e^{-0.192}$  (or 0.83 to 1), corresponding to a probability of about 0.45. To aid in interpreting the magnitudes of growth curve estimates, Eq. (7) is plotted as the lower curve in Fig. 1. This shows an initial turnout rate (intercept) of 45% and the familiar rise in turnout associated with age. The estimated growth rate of 1.024 represents the average rate of increase (in logged odds) in the sample.

The estimates of  $\gamma$  in Table 2 show that neither sex, race, nor parental income achieve statistical significance. Parental education has a modest effect on their children's initial turnout, with a 1-unit change (i.e., one standard deviation) raising the intercept by about 0.28 so that the predicted probability of voting (for average youth with nonvoting parents) increases from 0.45 to 0.52.

The largest effect on initial turnout is parents' reported turnout. When all other variables are at the mean (or at 0 for sex and race), parents voting in 1964 increases the probability of initial turnout from 0.45 to 0.66. Thus, the 15% of parents who said that they did not vote leave their offspring substantially behind in the acquisition of the habit of voting. However, the convergence of the upper and lower curves in Fig. 1 shows that this disadvantage dissipates over time.

The estimates show that only one variable, parental strength of partisanship, has an impact on the slope  $\beta_1$ . The magnitude of this effect is illustrated in Fig. 2 (which, again, holds other measures at 0). The effect is relatively small and mirrors Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995, 449), who show that "politics in the home" at age 16 has a small direct effect on participation that is not explained away by a wide variety of SES, community, psychological, and resource measures. The finding

(yes = 1)

(yes = 1)

Has one or more children

	Predicting $\beta_0$		Predicting $\beta_1$	
	γ	SE	γ	SE
Controls				
Intercept	-0.192	0.211	1.024	0.168*
Sex (female $= 1$ )	-0.016	0.159	-0.119	0.122
Race (black = 1)	-0.070	0.314	0.418	0.279
Parental SES				
Parental average education	0.276	0.106**	0.113	0.083
Family income	-0.067	0.098	0.014	0.075
Head-of-household occ. prestige	0.171	0.103	-0.043	0.072
	0.171	0.100	0.0.10	
Politics at home	0.074	0.086	-0.043	0.064
Parental political interest	•	0.098*	0.077	0.074
Parental political knowledge	0.211		**-**	0.070
Parental political trust	-0.093	0.090	-0.016	
Parental strength of partisanship	-0.008	0.080	0.124	0.062*
Parent voted in 1964 (voted = 1)	0.862	0.234**	0.117	0.171
$N_1 = 1$ Note: $N_1$ refers to number of respondents; $N_1 = 1$		ihood ratio $= -1870.8$		

raises the question of why this is the only parental resource whose influence does not dissipate over time.

Independents.

To save space, this reported model includes both "structural" variables (demographics and status measures) and subjective/behavioral measures. A nested model including only structural variables shows that the total effect of education is about double the net effect ( $\gamma$  of 0.501 compared to 0.276). Thus half the total effect of parental education on initial turnout is mediated by parental political engagement, knowledge, and turnout.

To summarize the results so far, parental education and political knowledge each have modest effects

on the probability of voting. Complementing these are two distinctly political variables, with parents' reported vote having a large impact on 1968 turnout and strength of partisanship providing a longer-term boost to turnout's growth rate. Measures of political alienation and engagement had no impact of any kind.

# RESULTS II: HIGH SCHOOL INFLUENCES ON TURNOUT

This section explores achievements, activities, and psychological engagement in politics while respondents were high school seniors. The model reported in Table 3 retains from the first model both intercepts, all main effects, and one significant growth variable (parent's strength of partisanship) and adds the high school period measures. High school GPA is a rough measure of cognitive skill, work habits, and future socioeconomic success. It has a small and marginally significant (t=1.82) impact on initial turnout. Our measure of high school student activities fails to achieve significance in either portion of the model.

Church attendance is consistently found to be a predictor of turnout in cross-sectional studies (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Turnout scholars have never been entirely sure whether church involvement provides resources that have a causal impact on political participation or whether both are indicators of a general propensity to participate in community life. However, Table 3 shows that church attendance as a teenager in 1965 has no impact on turnout three years later or on the subsequent rate of growth.

The model also includes two measures of psychological engagement in politics. The first is a three-item engagement in politics scale, which is a standardized composite of expressed interest in politics and the frequency of both newspaper and newsmagazine readership. The second is the same six-item political knowledge scale that was administered to the parents.

TABLE 3.	The Effects of High School Resources and Accomplishments on Starting Level and
Growth	Sales and Accomplishments on Starting Level and

	Predicting $\beta_0$		Predicting $\beta_1$	
	γ	SE	γ	SE
Variables in previous model				
Intercept	-0.166	0.231	1.055	0.093**
Sex (female = 1)	-0.019	0.155	7.000	0.030
Race (black $= 1$ )	0.400	0.286		
Parental average education	0.246	0.097**		
Family income	-0.046	0.086		
Head-of-household occ. prestige	0.108 '	0.095		
Parental political interest	0.018	0.078		
Parental political knowledge	0.153	0.089*		
Parental political trust	-0.126	0.083		
Parental strength of partisanship	-0.053	0.084	0.135	0.065*
Parent voted in 1964 (voted = 1)	0.802	0.248**		0.000
Youth resources before HS graduation	•			
High school GPA	0.152	0.083*	-0.034	0.070
High school activities	0.061	0.105	-0.018	0.062
Church attendance 1965	0.057	0.083	0.059	0.063
Engagement in politics	0.269	0.088**	-0.015	0.067
Political knowledge	0.371	0.092**	0.101	0.072
Trust in government	0.085	0.078	-0.029	0.059
Strength of partisanship	0.031	0.083	-0.042	0.065
				0.000

 $N_1 = 1068$ ,  $N_2 = 3829$ , likelihood ratio = -1800.0Note:  $N_1$  refers to number of respondents;  $N_2$  refers to number of observations in the level 1 analysis. \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01 (one

Both are significant predictors of 1968 turnout (but not subsequent rate of growth), and together they can have a fairly large effect. Being one standard deviation above the mean on both increases the log odds by 0.64, nearly as much as having a voting parent (illustrated in Fig. 3). Table 3 also shows that the effect of parental political knowledge drops by about 25%—implying that knowledge

FIGURE 3. Effect of Engagement and Knowledge While in High School on Turnout

(----) Those 1 SD above the mean on political engagement and knowledge. (----) Those 1 SD below the mean on political engagement and knowledge.

Election

2.0

3.0

1.0

edgeable parents enhance turnout in part by fostering a similar attentiveness to public affairs in their children.

Although not reported here, I inspected an intermediate model that included high school grades but excluded the political engagement measures and found the effect of GPA to be about 60% larger ( $\gamma=0.244$  compared to 0.152). None of the other structural variables showed noticeable changes. Thus high school achievement seems to matter but mostly indirectly through knowledge and political engagement.

None of the Block II variables, however, are significant in the  $\beta_1$  (slope) portion of the model. To ensure against Type II errors due to overspecification, the effects on growth were explored serially, with each variable entered alone to minimize multicollinearity. None achieved statistical significance, providing additional confidence for the idea that none of the high school period variables have lasting effects throughout the life course.

# RESULTS III: LIFE EVENTS BETWEEN 1965 AND 1968

In this section, I examine the effects of four life transitions that occurred between the seniors' 1965 interview and their first eligible election. The next model adds dummy variables for having attended college (63% of the sample did so) and being married in 1968 (28%). The model also includes two variables hypothesized to have negative effects: being a parent in 1968 (15%) and whether or not the respondent made an interstate move between 1965 and 1968 (59%). Only two variables

0.0

tailed).

achieved statistical significance. Moving across state lines decreases the odds of voting by a small amount and is significant in a one-tailed test (t=-1.91). Attending college gives a substantial positive boost to initial turnout (about two thirds the size of the parental turnout effect illustrated in Fig. 1). The introduction of college attendance also causes the estimate for high school GPA to drop by more than 50% and its t value to drop below 1.00. Thus the small effect of high school grades appears to lead to a greater likelihood of college attendance, which directly affects turnout.

The model also shows that none of these variables achieves conventional levels of significance predicting growth. However, the lasting impact of being a parent is intriguing. The one-tailed probability is 0.07 and the coefficient estimate is negative and fairly large. In this sample, youth who became parents before the age of 22 start with no disadvantage but their rate of turnout growth is somewhat retarded.

### Pre-1968 Factors: A Summary

Many events and social characteristics occurred or were fixed before the class of 1965 confronted its first election. Among these, having highly educated parents who voted in the 1964 election, being psychologically engaged with politics as high school seniors, and attending college boosted initial turnout, while mobility between 1965 and 1968 depressed it.

These findings supporting and clarify recent scholarship about education's role in political participation. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 437-8) conclude that effects of parent's education are mediated largely by offspring's own socioeconomic status and interest in politics. Table 2 shows that parental education and political knowledge have no effect (neither direct nor indirect) on turnout growth. Their modest effects on initial turnout in the baseline model ( $\gamma$ 's of 0.276 and 0.211) drop by only 25% (to  $\gamma$ 's of 0.225 and 0.150, respectively) after accounting for offspring political engagement and college attendance (Table 4). Thus, the mechanism translating parental resources into children's initial political involvement is not captured by the variables in the model—perhaps because of poor specification (the transmission processes are captured by different variables entirely) or measurement error (high school grades and a simple indicator of college attendance may not adequately capture underlying variance in youth's educational achievements). One implication for cross-sectional studies, however, is that the effects of parental environment diminish over time and should, therefore, be modeled as interactions with age.

Among 21 pre-1968 variables, only parental strength of partisanship influenced turnout's rate of increase. Since partisanship is presumably a stable trait, the 1965 measure may be a reliable indicator of levels of partisanship many years in the future. Thus having partisan parents may accelerate the acquisition of knowledge and resources implicated in the lifelong learning process that underlies Rosenstone and Hansen's (1993) life experience approach.

### **RESULTS IV: LIFE EVENTS AFTER 1968**

The fourth block includes measures at the heart of the life-cycle and life-experience explanations for turnout growth. All of these occurred after the 1968 election and, therefore, cannot have any effect on the initial probability of voting. Thus the effects of all subsequent variables will be modeled only as predictors of  $\beta_1$ . We first model reports of events and behaviors and then add psychological measures to see if they mediate the effects of other variables.

Table 5 reports a model that adds 10 structural variables measured in 1973 (about half a year after the cohort's second eligible election in November 1972). By now, most members have completed their education and are forming families and careers. The effects of three socioeconomic resources are generally consistent with the extant literature on turnout, which points to education as the most powerful component of SES with respect to turnout. Neither holding a professional position nor having a high income is significant but education has a sizable effect above and beyond the effect college attendance had on starting levels.

It is useful to see how the impact of education cumulates over the life course. The prediction equation for someone who never attended college (coded 0 for the 1968 dummy and coded -1 for the 1973 ordinal measure) who has values of 0 on all other variables is

$$logit(Y_{it}) = -0.316 + (0.972 - 0.163) \times ELECTION$$
  
=  $-0.316 + 0.809 \times ELECTION$ .

For those who attained a college degree (coded 1 for both variables) the prediction equation is

$$logit(Y_{it}) = (-0.316 + 0.420) + (0.972 + 0.163)$$
  
  $\times ELECTION = 0.104 + 1.135 \times ELECTION.$ 

These two growth curves are plotted in Fig. 4 and show that college education contributes to both a headstart and a more rapid rate of increase. Extrapolating beyond the range of the data gives a projection of a turnout gap of only 1% in three additional elections, when the typical respondent was 45 years old. Thus, the steeper slope does not prevent, but substantially delays, the point at which the less educated catch up. This supports Wolfinger and Rosenstone's (1980, 60) characterization that life experience can, over time, become a substitute for school. However, because this sample includes no respondents who lack a high school diploma, it is possible that those who dropped out of the class of 1965 never catch up with the college educated.

The next three variables—home ownership, geographic mobility, and church attendance—have been interpreted as tapping citizens's ties to their communities. These ties provide motivation to be informed and involved, as well as opportunities to gain political knowledge that reduce participation costs. Mobility may also raise the costs of maintaining registration (Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987). Surprisingly, only frequency of church attendance in 1973 is a significant predictor of the growth rate. Unfortunately, this


TABLE 4. The Effects of Life Events Between High School and First Election on Starting Levels and Growth

	Predicting $\beta_0$		Predicting $\beta_1$	
	γ	SE	γ	SE
Variables in previous model	•			
Intercept	-0.438	0.277	1.097	0.152**
Sex (female $=$ 1)	-0.004	0.157		0.102
Race (black = 1)	0.243	0.286		
Parental average education	0.225	0.097*		
Family income	-0.080	0.086		
Head-of-household occ. prestige	0.078	0.094		
Parental political interest	-0.011	0.078		
Parental political knowledge	0.150	0.088*		
Parental political trust	-0.139	0.082*		
Parental strength of partisanship	-0.064	0.084	0.136	0.062*
Parent voted in 1964 (voted = 1)	0.869	0.247**	41.00	0.002
High school GPA	0.074	0.077		
High school activities	0.028	0.099		
Church attendance 1965	0.066	0.074		
Engagement in politics	0.249	0.076**		
Political knowledge	0.385	0.089**		
Trust in government	0.062	0.069		
Strength of partisanship	0.004	0.074		
Resources acquired before first election				
Attended college (yes = 1)	0.548	0.188**	0.071	0.137
Married in 1968 (yes = 1)	0.125	0.193	0.041	0.146
Disruptions before first election			0.0	0.140
Toddler in home in 1968 (yes = 1)	0.077	0.236	-0.281	0.183
Interstate move 1965–1968 (yes $= 1$ )	-0.312	0.163*	-0.084	0.125
<i>N</i> ₁ =1063	B, $N_2 = 3812$ , likeliho	od ratio = -1781.3		

= 38 12, likelinood ratio = -1/81.3 Note:  $N_1$  refers to number of respondents;  $N_2$  refers to number of observations in the level 1 analysis. \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01 (one

variable is measured right in the middle of the trajectories of most people. It is not possible to tell whether church involvement has a causal impact on turnout or whether both are indicators of a more general propen-

sity to be involved in community life. At the very least. church attendance is a part of a dynamic complex of community involvements that includes voting.



### Home Ownership and Mobility: **Additional Considerations**

Home ownership has long been regarded as an enhancer of turnout (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972, 139) and mobility a major barrier, but the estimates show that neither has an impact on growth rates. In each case the null findings could be (a) an artifact of the data and methods used here, (b) a peculiar characteristic of this particular cohort, or (c) a serious challenge to prior work.

The developmental model suggests that mobility effects will be greatest for habitual voters and, therefore, negligible for young voters and the estimates are consistent with that argument. Yet the possibility of an artifact is also high because the mobility measure is imprecise and stretches back to 1965. To get more leverage, I tried to replicate this finding using cross-sectional data from the American National Election Studies cumulative file (Miller and National Election Studies 1999). I pooled data from the same four presidential elections and estimated a model of turnout for four age groups. The youngest were 21-33 and correspond to the ages of those in the latent growth models. Table 6

tailed).

TABLE 5. The Effects of Life Events Aft	After the First Election on Turnout $\theta$ Predicting $\beta_0$		Predicting $\beta_1$	
	γ	SE	γ	SE
Variables in previous model			2.070	0.105**
Intercept	-0.316	0.272	0.972	0.135**
Sex (female = 1)	0.010	0.162		
Race (black = 1)	0.343	0.287		
Parental average education	0.246	0.097**		
Family income	0.083	0.086		
Head-of-household occ. prestige	0.087	0.094		
Parental political interest	0.000	0.078		
Parental political knowledge	0.145	0.087*		
Parental political trust	-0.149	0.082		
Parental strength of partisanship	-0.061	0.083	0.143	0.063*
Parent voted in 1964 (voted = 1)	0.840	0.247**		
High school GPA	0.063	0.078		
High school activities	0.033	0.100		
Church attendance 1965	0.042	0.074		
	0.260	0.077**		
Engagement in politics	0.395	0.090**		
Political knowledge	0.054	0.069		
Trust in government	-0.009	0.073		
Strength of partisanship	0.420	0.180**		
Attended college (yes = 1)		0.173		
Married in 1968 (yes = 1)	0.100			
Toddler in home in 1968 (yes = 1)	0.047	0.237		
Interstate move 1965–1968 (yes = 1)	-0.352	0.152*		
Resources/disruptipons after election			0.400	0.088*
Educational achievement $(-1 \text{ to } +1)$	_	_	0.163	
Professional in 1973 (yes $=$ 1)		_	-0.108	0.120
Family income 1973	<del></del>	_	0.038	0.057
Home ownership in 1973 (yes = 1)	_	_	-0.036	0.137
Church attendence 1973	_	_	0.177	0.055*
Number of moves 1965–1973	_	-	0.000	0.055
Marriage/family events				
Married in 1973 (yes = 1)	_		0.442	0.156
Divorced/separated in 1973 (yes = 1)	_	_	-0.266	0.264
Has toddler in home in 1973 (yes = 1)	_	_	-0.230	0.150
School-age child in home 1973 (yes = 1)	_		-0.312	0.197
$N_1 = 1061$ , Note: $N_1$ refers to number of respondents; $N_2$ refers	$N_2 = 3773$ , likelihoo	d ratio = $-1749.8$		

reports the estimated slopes for geographic mobility, controlling for the year surveyed, age, race, education, sex, home ownership, family income, children in household, married, and folded party identification. The effect of mobility is substantively small and insignificant for young citizens and is large and significant for voters over 33 years old. These striking results provide strong corroboration that disruptions from mobility have an increasing impact throughout the life course. This conclusion suggests that an interaction with age may be the best way to specify the effects of mobility with cross-sectional data.

In contrast, pooled NES data (analysis not reported here but available on request) casts doubt on my estimates for the effect of home ownership; it has a robust effect at all age groups. After some exploration, I have concluded that the null effects here are probably due to a combination of factors—both substantive and methodological. First, home ownership is largely

cumulative—most first time home owners continue to own homes for a long period thereafter—and therefore tracks closely with age and turnout. Thus, if unreliably measured, its true effects are likely to be absorbed by age or (in this research design) time.

Second, home ownership status changes very rapidly in the age range represented by our data. According to the Census's (1993) analysis of 1982 home ownership, only 19% of those under 25 owned a home but that number soars to 57% for those 30 to 34. Pooling Census data for a number of years (details available on request) shows the home ownership rate increases by 3.4% per year between age 21 and age 34. In 1973 38% of the sample reports owning a home and the Census data suggest that nearly 60% would own a home by the time of the 1980 election. Thus, the single measure has the benefit of being prior to voting outcomes but the corresponding disadvantage of being an extremely poor indicator of ownership status at the times of the last two elections.

TABLE 6. Effect of Geographic Mobility on Turnout in Presidential Elections, by Age Group (Subset of NES Cummulative File: 1968 through 1980, High School Graduates)

	Age Group		Effect of Mobility on Turnout: Logistic Regression Slopes		
Model	(Years)	β	SE	Ν	
1	21-33	0.242	0.195	576	
2	34–50	0.513	0.276*	518	
3	51–65	1.025	0.391**	324	
4	≥66	0.552	0.677	156	

Note: Other variables in each model: year of election, age, age2, race, education, sex, homeownership, family income, children in household, married, and folded party identification. \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01 (one tailed).

The null effects, combined with consistent and robust effects in cross-sectional studies, suggest that the positive impact of home ownership is probably immediate and therefore poorly captured by the developmental specification used here.

### **Family Life and Voter Turnout**

The final set of objective variables measure aspects of family life: two dummy variables measuring marital status in 1973 and indicators of whether there are young children or school-age children in the household. The distinction between younger and older children derives from the idea that school-age children get parents involved in secondary associations such as the PTA and that schools provide a personal link to government policy. This implies that while very young children drain time and energy and lead to lower turnout, older children enhance networks that would result in greater political knowledge, mobilization, and an interest in outcomes. Taken together, these four variables paint a complex picture of the relationship between family life and turnout.

Although marriage when very young (most respondents were 22 or younger in 1968) had no effect on initial turnout, the same measure in 1973 had a substantial positive impact on turnout growth. In contrast, those who were married and divorced by 1973 (eight years after graduating from high school) had distinctively low growth rates (although the divorce measure does not achieve statistical significance, the two variables as a set improve the fit of the model). These growth rates, however, are higher than those of the never married-so divorce reverses only a portion of the marriage benefit. Yet, as Milbrath speculated, marriage is a mixed blessing for turnout because marriage is most often accompanied by children that erode about half the gain in turnout associated with marriage. Neither measure of the presence of children achieves significance and the two estimates are similar in magnitude. Given the similarity in effect estimates, I substituted a summary measure that simply indicates the presence of children. This did achieve significance

( $\gamma = 0.253$ , one-tailed p = 0.035) and is included in results reported in Table 7.

### **Psychological Engagement in Politics**

Table 7 reports a model that adds the political engagement and political knowledge scales, both of which are significant predictors of turnout growth. Individually, the effects are modest but their combined impact can be substantial. Note also that the effect of education on growth is no longer statistically significant and the estimate has declined by about a third. Thus the two cognitive measures used here mediate about a third of the effect of higher education.

## **SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS**

The developmental framework provides a new way to understand how resources and disruptions influence turnout in U.S. elections. When a cohort of young citizens becomes eligible to vote for the first time, parental socioeconomic and political resources largely determine who votes. Inertia ensures that parental resources continue to distinguish voters from nonvoters in succeeding elections. The influence of the parental resources, however, diminishes gradually as young adults' own accomplishments and status come to the fore. As the cohort ages, more and more members become habitual voters and the differences between the high- and the low-resource groups shrink. Among habitual voters, major life disruptions can interrupt the voting habit but only temporarily.

Analyses employing latent growth curve models and panel data produced results that are consistent with the general contours of the developmental theory. Table 4, for example, identifies seven significant predictors of initial turnout and none of these had an additional impact beyond the inertia that they helped to create.

Substantively, the most intriguing finding may be the enduring effect of parental partisanship, which speaks to how declining partisanship may contribute to long-term declines in turnout. If adults in their 30s, 40s, or 50s become disenchanted with parties, they tend to continue voting if that was their habit. However, the results suggest that their children will be slightly less likely to vote (perhaps decades later) as a consequence. To be sure, this cannot be the only long-term mechanism accounting for turnout decline but it could be a major one.

The findings also speak indirectly to issues concerning class bias of the electorate. High-SES parents pass on advantages to their children (both political behavior that children learn from and indirect gains through children's educational attainment). In the absence of other factors, these would lead to class bias of one cohort being reproduced in the next. However, as life expectancy increases, the gradual erosion of inherited advantages means that class bias may decline somewhat [as it may have done in recent decades (see Leighley and Nagler 1992)] because a larger portion of the electorate is at a life stage in which socioeconomic status matters little for turnout.

Married in 1973 (yes = 1)

Political knowledge 1973

Engagement in politics 1973

Divorced/separated in 1973 (yes = 1)

Has one or more children (yes = 1)
Psychological resources after first election

TABLE 7. Final Model Predicting Starting Level and Turnout Growth, Including 1973 Political Knowledge and Engagement Predicting  $\beta_0$ Predicting  $\beta_1$ SE SE γ γ Variables in previous model 0.964 0.138\*\* 0.263 0.317 Intercept 0.157 0.045 Sex (female = 1) 0.278 0.315 Race (black = 1) 0.097\*\* 0.246 Parental average education 0.084 Family income -0.068 0.077 0.092 Head-of-household occ. prestige 0.007 0.076 Parental political interest Parental political knowledge 0.085 0.126 -0.1240.079 Parental political trust 0.062\* 0.080 0.143 -0.061 Parental strength of partisanship 0.242\*\* 0.810 Parent voted in 1964 (voted = 1) 0.076 0.061 High school GPA 0.098 0.039 High school activities 0.072 0.039 Church attendance 1965 0.076\*\* 0.201 **Engagement in politics** 0.090\*\* 0.350 Political knowledge 0.067 0.067 Trust in government Strength of partisanship -0.005 0.071 0.174\*\* Attended college (yes = 1) 0.437 0.096 0.170 Married in 1968 (yes = 1) 0.015 0.203 Toddler in home in 1968 (yes = 1) 0.147\*Interstate move 1965-1968 (yes = 1) -0.3180.112 0.089 Educational achievement (-1 to +1)0.124 -0.096Professional in 1973 (yes = 1) 0.015 0.060 Family income 1973 0.144 -0.047Home ownership in 1973 (yes = 1) 0.057\*\* 0.162 Church attendence 1973 -0.0490.058 Number of moves 1965-1973

 $N_1 = 1061$ ,  $N_2 = 3764$ , likelihood ratio = -1731.2

Note:  $N_1$  refers to number of respondents;  $N_2$  refers to number of observations in the level 1 analysis. \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01 (one tailed).

More generally, latent growth models should spur scholars toward better theories of the social bases of turnout. The simple conclusion that turnout is always a product of both starting level and growth rate (each with rather different predictors) is itself important and should lead to new questions about turnout, which, in turn, should produce better hypotheses and a cumulation of new findings. A major limitation, of course, is the dearth of appropriate longitudinal data. In this regard, the completion of a fourth wave of the Student-Parent Socialization Study and its release to the larger community in coming years can only mean good news for the study of political behavior over the life course. However, as illustrated in my supplemental analysis of geographic mobility, careful use of age × resource and  $age \times disruption$  interactions should allow tests of some developmental hypotheses with cross-sectional data.

Finally, latent growth curve models may have wider applicability in political science. Whenever theory or

previous research suggests a monotonic trend of growth or decline, this approach allows asking "time series questions" even when the number of time points is as few as three or four. As such, applications of this method may extend to such diverse phenomena as the life cycles of social movements, the escalation phase of arms races, economic growth in developing nations, transitions to democracy, and various diffusion processes. Thus, in many areas of inquiry, growth models have the potential to bring theory and empirical analysis into closer alignment.

0.511

-0.244

-0.226

0.162

0.238

0.165\*\*

0.282

0.146

0.064\*\*

0.062\*\*

## APPENDIX: FREQUENCIES AND TREATMENT OF MISSING DATA FOR THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Among all youth interviewed in 1965 this paper's analysis is based on those who were 21 years old at the time of the 1968

TABLE A1.	Distributio	n of Voter 1	urnout by	Year, With and	d Without Mis	sing Data		
		Including M	lissing Data			Excluding M	issing Data	
Voted Did not vote Missing data	58.6 40.3 1.0	71.4 28.4 0.2	67.1 14.3 18.6	66.3 10.8 22.9	59.2 40.8	71.5 28.5	82.4 17.6	85.9 14.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	1153	1153	1153	1153	1141	1151	939	889

general election. Among these, 1153 responded to at least one of the four turnout questions. The marginal distribution for the four turnout measures is presented in Table A1.

The Bayesian estimation method of random effects models means that "both the number of observations per person and the spacing of observations may vary" (Bryk and Raudenbush 1992, 133). That is, any respondent who has a valid turnout code for at least one election can be included in the analysis, maximizing the amount of information used in generating the parameter estimates. The nature of Bayesian estimators is such that individuals with more data points are weighted more heavily. As a result, the number of usable observations—designated as  $N_1$  in all tables—exceeds the 862 respondents who have valid data for all four elections.  $N_2$  in the tables refers to the total number of valid turnout codes, which is  $N_2 = \sum (k_i)$ , where  $k_i$  is the number of valid data points for the ith respondent.

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# The Social Calculus of Voting: Interpersonal, Media, and Organizational Influences on Presidential Choices

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Toting choices are a product of both personal attitudes and social contexts, of a personal and a social calculus. Research has illuminated the personal calculus of voting, but the social calculus has received little attention since the 1940s. This study expands our understanding of the social influences on individual choice by examining the relationship of partisan biases in media, organizational, and interpersonal intermediaries to the voting choices of Americans. Its results show that the traditional sources of social influence still dominate: Interpersonal discussion outweighs the media in affecting the vote. Media effects appear to be the product of newspaper editorial pages rather than television or newspaper reporting, which contain so little perceptible bias that they often are misperceived as hostile. Parties and secondary organizations also are influential, but only for less interested voters—who are more affected by social contexts in general. Overall, this study demonstrates that democratic citizens are embedded in social contexts that join with personal traits in shaping their voting decisions.

ow are political choices shaped by a decision maker's immediate social and informational context? This question has interested scholars of both elite and citizen decision making across many different political systems. The recognition that these contexts can vary to a considerable degree and that the cost of acquiring political information is high has created an appreciation for how much political choices are circumscribed by the social and informational contexts within which individuals reside.

These considerations apply to the occasional political decisions made by citizens just as much as they apply to the routine decisions of their leaders. At any given time, in any given place, citizens confront specific sources of political information: their own personal networks of social interaction and political communication, particular newspapers, a range of electronic media outlets, and a variety of organized efforts at political persuasion. Political choice takes on meaning within these contexts. Thus, theories of democracy and democratic citizenship increasingly focus on the sources and consequences of political information. These contexts are especially important because alternative sources of information typ-

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ically vary in the extent to which they carry distinctive political biases. By relying on one information source rather than another, citizens are more or less likely to encounter information that encourages some choices and outcomes while it discourages others.

These spatial and temporal variations in information would be less important if citizens were able and willing to undertake comprehensive searches for political information, but the willingness to undertake a comprehensive search is limited by the high costs of political information (Downs 1957). Indeed, the acquisition of information is perhaps the primary cost of political participation, and hence citizens regularly pursue informational alternatives that limit these costs, typically by relying on readily available information sources. Even among individuals who are willing to pay higher costs for a more comprehensive information search, cognitive limits circumscribe individual capacities (Lodge, Steenbergen, and Brau 1995). These inherent limitations on information processing abilities suggest that individual capacity is vulnerable to being swamped by readily available information sources in the immediate context. None of this suggests that individual preferences and capacities are unimportant but, rather, that limits on individual capacities and resources make the immediate contexts of political choice particularly important.

Most studies of voting behavior in the United States and other democracies have paid little attention to context, viewing vote choices as the product of a "personal" rather than a "social" calculus. Through application of social-psychological (Campbell et al. 1960) and rational-choice (Fiorina 1981) perspectives, scholars have developed a rich understanding of the role that individuals' personal characteristics, attitudes, and interests play in their voting decisions. The modern study of voting behavior did not begin this way. A social context perspective guided the first survey studies of voting, conducted at Columbia University in the 1940s

(Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). By the 1960s, however, this focus had given way to an almost-exclusive concentration on the voter as an autonomous actor independent of social context. Despite a revival of attention to social factors in recent decades, a comprehensive treatment of the social context for voting has not been attempted since the Columbia studies more than half a century ago.

The present study comprehensively addresses this social calculus of voting by drawing upon a unique collection of data on the 1992 American presidential election campaign. At its core is a nationwide survey of the adult electorate. Survey respondents were questioned about the variety of individual attitudes, perceptions, and characteristics that previous scholars have shown influence the vote decision. Our interest in the effects of social context led the survey beyond normal election-study questions to probe the nature of various social sources of political information, which we refer to as information "intermediaries" because they mediate messages from the parties, candidates, and campaigns to the voter (Bennett and Entman 2001).

The social context for the survey respondents was constructed from both their own perceptions of their various intermediaries and direct information on the intermediaries themselves. We asked respondents about messages coming from personal discussants, newspapers, television network news, secondary organizations, and political parties. The study also gathered information directly from all of these intermediaries except for secondary organizations. An innovative clustering of the citizen sample enabled us to examine the local social context in detail, yet still maintain a nationally representative study. We measured the presidential campaign coverage of the principal newspaper in each sample county and the presidential campaign activities of the county party and presidential campaign organizations. We also interviewed personal discussants identified by the main survey respondents. (See Appendix A for a more detailed description of the data collections.)

This paper addresses two specific research questions about voting behavior within the social context defined by these data. First, what candidates did the intermediaries to which voters were exposed in the 1992 presidential election campaign favor? This is an inquiry into variations in the partisan bias of political information—that is, the favorability of the intermediaries toward one presidential candidate or another. Second, what was the relationship between the biases of their intermediaries and voters' choices in 1992? If the flow of information coming to voters is skewed in favor of one candidate over another, we hypothesize that this will influence their electoral decisions, even after their own partisan orientations and other enduring personal influences on the vote are taken into account. In short,

ours is an inquiry into how a social calculus supplements the well-established personal calculus of voting.

### THE CHANGING SOCIAL CONTEXT OF CITIZEN DECISION MAKING

Our research agenda builds upon voting studies by Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues at Columbia University conducted in 1940 in Erie County, Ohio (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944), and in 1948 in Elmira, New York (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). After this auspicious beginning, research on the role of social context was largely neglected until recent times. Important recent studies have illuminated the influence on citizen attitudes and behavior of interpersonal networks (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz and Mondak 1998; Huckfeldt, Sprague, and Levine 2000b) and the mass media (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Just et al. 1996; Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998a). Some studies (e.g., Patterson 1980; Mutz and Martin 2001) even have analyzed social intermediaries in combination. Our study goes beyond recent research through its comprehensiveness and its depth in the coverage of multiple key intermediaries. Its national scope demonstrates the role of social context in contemporary times, fulfilling the research agenda initiated by the early Columbia studies.

Both political intermediaries and citizens have changed markedly since the 1940s. Television is now the principal mass medium for modern campaigns, displacing radio and newspapers, which were the twin foci of the Columbia studies. The competitive local newspaper markets of yesteryear have been replaced by newspaper monopolies in most locales and fewer partisan papers overall. Labor unions are not as strong as they were in that earlier era, but churches seem to be more involved in politics than they were then. With the increased presence of women in the workforce, more Americans now are likely to be exposed to political discussions outside of the family and intimate friends. Americans also seem to be less anchored by political party loyalties (Wattenberg 1998; but see Bartels 2000), less involved in organizational and political life (Putnam 2000), and less exposed to grass-roots party contacts (Gerber and Green 2000) than they were a half-century ago.

These and myriad other changes make it questionable that inferences about the relative influence of social intermediaries on voting behavior, founded upon studies conducted more than half a century ago in two communities, remain accurate today. In particular, the principal Columbia studies finding that interpersonal communications were more important than the media may well have been rendered obsolete by the rise of television and the decline of other intermediaries. As Austin Ranney (1983, 181) has observed,

... The advent of television is the most profound change that has occurred in all advanced industrial societies, including American, since the end of World War II. There is no going back to the old days when most people got their political cognitive maps mainly from newspapers and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This study of the 1992 presidential election in the United States was part of the five-nation Cross-National Election Project (CNEP). The CNEP employed the same intermediation framework and study design to examine the social intermediation process in the first national election of the 1990s in Britain, East and West Germany, Japan, and Spain as well as the United States.

magazines and from conversations with their families and friends.

The empirical evidence on which such a claim is based, however, is thin. A systematic examination of the influence of political intermediaries on citizen decision making is long overdue.

## CONCEPTUALIZING POLITICAL COMMUNICATIONS IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS

The first step in our research determines the content of the messages from various intermediaries during the 1992 campaign. Following John Zaller's (1992) theory of political communication, we submit that the most important characteristic of these messages is which candidate, if any, they favor. That is, what is the partisan "bias" of the communication?<sup>2</sup> Zaller distinguishes "one-message" from "two-message" political communications, with one-message models leading to consensus in public opinion and two-message models fostering dissensus and debate. Two (or multi-) message models naturally fit a competitive election setting, as each side makes its best case to the public. This does not mean, however, that the typical voter is necessarily exposed to competing messages about the candidates. Individual intermediaries may carry messages favorable to a single candidate or to no candidate at all, instead of favoring multiple candidates. Collectively, a voter's social intermediaries may convey reinforcing, competing, or no political messages. A study of the influence of social intermediaries on the vote decisions, therefore, must begin by assessing the partisan bias of their messages, both individually and collectively.

Evaluating the bias of political communications across a range of intermediaries is a challenging enterprise. Because of selective exposure and selective perception, the message sent is not necessarily the message received (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). First, the receiver has to be exposed to the intermediary and its messages. Voters can control exposure to political messages to some degree. They can, for example, refrain from reading the local paper or its political coverage, and they can avoid discussing politics with a relative or neighbor. Yet selective exposure is not always easy to accomplish. Receiving an intermediary's political message may be an inadvertent by-product of exposure for other purposes. It is difficult, for instance, to ignore the local paper and its political stories or to avoid personal discussions that turn to political topics. Second, people can selectively perceive the messages that are sent. Consciously or unconsciously, disagreeable political messages can be tuned out or interpreted in ways that render them compatible with one's own views.

These considerations raise the issue of whether political bias should be measured at the source or at the

receiver. On the one hand, measurement of the message should be done at its source because it is difficult to maintain that a message is influential if it is transformed upon its receipt. Except where there is an actual record (e.g., for newspapers and television), however, it is hard to know what signal was sent, and an individual's perceptions of the signal may not be reliable. Even where the exact message can be reproduced, moreover, we cannot know the receiver's degree of exposure to it. On the other hand, what matters is the message received rather than the message sent, so it may be better to know the partisan bias of the message as perceived by its recipients (Mutz and Martin 2001). Given the various ways in which messages can be mis- or selectively perceived, however, relying solely upon the receiver also can be problematic (Niemi 1974).

To understand better the influence of intermediaries, therefore, it is important to know the partisan nature of the messages emanating from various intermediaries as well as the voter's perception of them. The simultaneous assessment of these multiple factors enables us to see the information flows that provide the social and political context for vote choice.

#### **DATA SOURCES**


Our study of voters in context is based on an innovative sampling design that included five interconnected data collections. The full details of the design are described in Appendix A, but a brief summary will help to orient the reader. First, at the core of our analysis is a nationally representative telephone survey of the American electorate (N = 1318). An innovation was to cluster this sample in 39 counties, selected by stratified sampling to represent the American population. Second, we generated a "snowball" sample of discussants mentioned by the respondents in our main survey, which enables us to study personal discussion networks directly. Third, for each of these counties we coded news reports and editorials in the major daily newspaper read by county residents for a sample of days during the election campaign. Fourth, we conducted content analyses of the national network news programs during the same period. Fifth, in each county we surveyed county party and presidential organizations on their activities during the campaign. These data collections create the unique ability to examine voting choice in the context of the political intermediaries that surround the citizen.

### THE PARTISAN BIASES OF POLITICAL INTERMEDIARIES IN THE 1992 ELECTION

This study thus estimates the partisan bias of communications from political intermediaries by relying, in most instances, on reports from both sources and recipients. Figure 1 displays the distributions of partisan bias regarding the two major-party candidates<sup>3</sup> in 1992 for each intermediary and, except for secondary

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> By bias, we mean which party or candidate is directly favored by messages from a particular intermediary. This bias can be direct, as in Zaller's (1992) conceptualization, or it can be indirect through agenda setting, priming, and framing. Both direct and indirect biases are important, but our study focuses only on direct bias.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Perot voters are not the focus of this paper, but they are included in Fig. 1 and in the base of the Democratic and Republican vote columns in Table 1.



organizations, from both perspectives. The first column in each panel contains respondents who reported that they were not exposed to a particular intermediary. The remaining columns show respondents in various conditions of bias toward Bush and Clinton, employing reasonable rules for categorizing what in many cases were continuous variables.<sup>4</sup> (The coding of variables is fully described in Appendix B.)

#### **Interpersonal Discussion Networks**

Interpersonal discussion networks have been shown in previous research to be important influences on political behavior (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Huckfeldt et al. 1998, 2000b). People with whom we have close relationships, especially relatives, typically dominate these networks; but they also may contain regular contacts, such as co-workers (Mutz and Mondak 1998), who are not intimates. Discussants with whom ties of intimacy are weakest play an especially important role in discussion networks. Most likely to come from different backgrounds and thereby to have dissimilar political views, they become agents of change or deviation in one's political orientations (Granovetter 1973).

In constructing discussion networks, therefore, it is important to look beyond the most intimate discussants. For this reason, our respondents were asked to report which candidate each of up to *five* discussants supported in the 1992 presidential election. The first four were to be discussants "with whom they discussed important matters;" and the fifth-named discussant was prompted to be an explicitly political discussant who was not already mentioned. Sixty percent of the sample added the fifth discussant, and only a slight majority of them were relatives. The partisan biases reflected in both perceptions of discussants and actual discussants' voting preferences are reported in the top panel in Fig. 1.<sup>5</sup>

Whether measured by main respondent perceptions or discussant self reports, a substantial majority of Americans found themselves in either pro-Clinton or pro-Bush discussion networks, with Clinton enjoying an advantage comparable to his edge over Bush in the popular vote.<sup>6</sup> These networks met the conditions of

Zaller's (1992) one-message model, suggesting a surprising amount of embeddedness in partisan personal networks in this allegedly antipartisan age. It is noteworthy that networks remained so overwhelmingly partisan through five possible perceived discussants. No other intermediary was as one-sided in its candidate favoritism in 1992 as interpersonal discussant networks.

While more respondents were in discussion networks favorable to Clinton, a quarter of them were embedded in a homogeneously pro-Bush discussion network. These patterns show how discussion networks may insulate minorities from the prevailing climate of opinion (Finifter 1974; Huckfeldt et al. 1995). In a year when little seemed to be going their way, many Bush partisans found refuge in a protective environment of similarly minded discussants, who may have provided valuable support in resisting powerful forces arrayed against the Bush candidacy. Finally, about 30% of Americans in 1992 were not located in a discussion context noticeably favorable to a single candidate. This is a substantial share of the electorate to lack partisan anchoring through personal networks-more than found in the early Columbia studies (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954, 104-6).

#### The Mass Media

Although the media, especially television, are seen as the most important political intermediaries in contemporary America, there is little agreement regarding the partisan tone of their messages. Some analysts view the media as biased in favor of Democrats and liberals (Lichter, Rothman, and Lichter 1986), and this appears to be an article of faith among conservatives. Others conclude that the media pursue a probusiness and consequently a more mainstream agenda (Bennett 1996) or that the direction of partisan bias varies across outlets in line with their different ideological persuasions (Page 1996). Some of the most systematic studies of media content, in contrast, find little evidence of blatant partisanship in the contemporary media (Hofstetter 1976; Robinson and Sheehan 1983).<sup>7</sup>

To be sure, media partisanship was manifested in earlier times when the partisan press was little more than a propagandist for its favored party. That overtly partisan style seems to have given way in modern times to a media more concerned with expanding audience than political proselytizing and a press corps protective of its independence from any particular party or politician (Rubin 1981).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For presentation purposes, Fig. 1 breaks the mostly continuous bias variables used in Tables 1 and 2 into several discrete categories. In some cases, the categories are straightforward. In others, especially for media content and party activities, where there were no natural breaks, we had to establish our own cutting points (as described in Appendix B) to represent essential differences in intermediary bias. <sup>5</sup> The difference between actual and perceived discussant presidential preferences is modest, making reliance upon preferences less vulnerable to distortion than might be supposed. The correlations (r's) between voters' perceptions of their discussants' vote preferences among Bush, Clinton, and Perot (located in the center) and the discussants' own reports ranged from 0.70 to 0.78 across the five discussants. (Potential problems of multicollinearity are avoided, though, when we combine discussants to create our network measures.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> None of this is meant to suggest that the pervasive partisan biases within networks shield individuals from the frequent experience of political disagreement (see Huckfeldt et al. 1998, 1003–5). Based on respondent perceptions, approximately 70% of both Bush and Clinton voters were located in networks where 50% or more of their discussants shared the same vote preference. At the same time,

less than a majority of Bush and Clinton voters reported that *all* of their discussants shared the same vote preference. Hence, the modal condition among these respondents is to be located in networks that convey a clear but less than unanimous partisan bias. (See Huckfeldt, Johnson, and Sprague 2002.)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Rather than search for explicitly partisan favoritism, the most influential studies of the media have pursued more subtle and indirect effects (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Iyengar 1991). Researchers also find that media coverage of campaigns adopts a critical posture toward politics, parties, and politicians; focuses on the "horse race" and strategy rather than substance; concentrates on action and controversy; and elevates news bites over in-depth coverage (Ranney 1983; Robinson and Sheehan 1983; Patterson 1993). These tendencies have profound political consequences, but they are only indirectly partisan and are ignored in our study.

The middle panel in Fig. 1 reports the distributions of media bias in the 1992 presidential election. It contains survey respondents' perceptions of which candidate was favored by the principal newspaper they read and by the television network newscast they watched the most. It also reports the results of content analyses of the partisan leanings of newspaper stories, editorial page articles, and television network evening news to which the respondents were presumably exposed during the campaign.

At first glance, these data support the view of the media as a partisan actor in presidential elections. In terms of actual content, three-quarters of all Americans in 1992 read newspapers that on average favored one of the major-party candidates in their news reports and editorials, and over 40% watched television news programs that showed similar partisan bias. Most of these media favored Bill Clinton. Even many traditionally pro-GOP newspapers did not favor Bush in either their reporting or their editorial pages. In view of the pro-Republican advantage in newspaper presidential endorsements in every year since 1944 except 1964 (Stanley and Niemi 1998, 188-9), it is surprising that so many papers favored Clinton in editorial content and endorsements in 1992.8 We surmise that this media favorability toward Clinton is less attributable to any inherent anti-Republican bias than to the media joining the bandwagon of public opinion, horse-race results, and recognition of a failing Bush campaign.

This first glance at the actual content of media messages, though, proves to be highly misleading in two important ways (Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998a). First, where there was partisan favoritism in news reports and editorials, it was demonstrably small in most cases. A majority of those exposed to television received messages that were close to evenly balanced; similarly, biases in newspaper coverage were often slight. Averaged across their total content, none of the four television networks and only 3 of the 46 newspapers we coded were more than slightly critical of one candidate and more than slightly positive toward his major opponent. Consequently, even most respondents exposed to what we label as biased media coverage received information giving the candidate what we characterize as an "edge" rather than the "dominance" the one-message model requires.9

<sup>8</sup> Stanley and Niemi (1998), citing data from *Editor and Publisher* (October 24, 1992, p. 9) that weighted newspapers by their circulation, report that 27% of editorials in 1992 favored Clinton, 18% favored Bush, and 55% were uncommitted. Our measure includes these editorials as well as op-ed columns.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> At least 74% of the individual news stories and editorials on the major party candidates in 1992 were coded as balanced (4) or in its adjacent categories of either slightly critical or slightly positive (3 or 5) on a 7-point scale. The percentages in these categories for each media source coded were as follows.

		Television stories		Newspaper stories		Newspaper editorials	
	Bush	Clinton	Bush	Clinton	Bush	Clinton	
Balanced	33%	41%	33%	35%	35%	31%	
Slightly unbalanced	47%	34%	43%	40%	40%	43%	

Second, even where they showed net candidate favoritism, most newspapers and all television newscasts presented both favorable and unfavorable stories on each candidate during the campaign. Eleven of the 46 newspapers had only unfavorable editorials on one of the candidates, but only the pro-Clinton New York Daily News combined them with no unfavorable editorials on the other. Overall, even when the average bias ended up in the imbalanced category, this location was typically leavened by contrasting stories, either favorable to the other side or unfavorable to the apparently "favored" candidate. 10 Excluding the media outlets labeled as balanced, all but a handful of the remaining media disseminated mixed partisan messages over the course of the 1992 campaign, making them in Zaller's (1992) terminology "two-message" sources. This picture of a largely balanced, rather than biased, media squares with our respondents' perceptions of their newspapers and television news programs. 11 Over 60% of those watching television newscasts saw them as balanced, and almost 50% of those reading newspapers perceived theirs as balanced.

Our interpretation of the media as a largely unbiased source is further supported by a persistent curiosity in perceptions of the media among those who see it as biased. Previous research has shown that when media reporting of competing sides in a conflict is balanced, partisans often perceive the reporting as biased in favor of the side that they oppose (Vallone, Ross, and Lepper 1985). This so-called "hostile media phenomenon" appears when partisans view balanced coverage as bias against their side, which unquestionably (in their view) deserves highly favorable treatment. Partisans in our data were more likely to perceive their newspaper and television news as biased in favor of the candidate of the other party (Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998a). This is almost entirely a function of Republicans who saw their media sources as pro-Clinton. In many cases, of course, their perceptions were accurate, because content analysis showed pro-Clinton coverage in many newspapers and two of the network news shows. Even where the particular newspaper or television news program was either balanced or only slightly imbalanced. however, many Republicans (almost always a plurality of those using that source) saw it as favoring Clinton. Consequently, the operation of the hostile media phenomenon among Republicans in 1992 produced systematic misperceptions of bias where it did not, based on our content analysis, actually exist.

Compared to discussion networks, then, the media were considerably less likely to be sources of partisanbiased information during the 1992 presidential

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The standard deviations across stories in each specific source averaged 0.99 and 1.06 in newspaper reports, 1.17 and 1.18 in editorials, and 1.02 and 1.07 in television reports, for Bush and Clinton, respectively, on a 7-point scale. In virtually all of the media, these variations were large enough to place at least one-third of all coded stories on the other side of the scale's pure balance midpoint (=4).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Because we did not ask respondents to report the *extent* of perceived favoritism by their media and include only one source (because few use more than one), all perceived bias is coded as giving the candidate an "edge."

election campaign. They were less partisan overall, and their partisanship was inconsistent across their stories. Our respondents also were somewhat less exposed to the media than to personal discussants. Perhaps the only compensating factor in the potential for media influence on presidential choices in 1992 was the sizable Clinton advantage in media coverage, which was considerably more skewed than the bias in interpersonal networks. Whether that potential was realized is a question for later consideration.

#### **Organizations**

Party and secondary organizations often are credited with playing important roles for both turnout and vote choice during an election campaign. Groups serve as reference points in evaluating candidates (Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991) and are fundamental building blocks of the party coalitions. Formally organized groups also make explicit or implicit endorsements of candidates, which serve as valuable voting guides for their members and followers as well as for their opponents. Moreover, organizations often actively proselytize their members on behalf of candidates for office through normal channels of membership communication and by making personal contacts during the campaign.

The bottom panel in Fig. 1 reports the frequencies of perceived exposure to partisan bias from secondary organizations generally and also for the most politically specialized organizations, the political parties. In addition, Fig. 1 depicts relative party activity levels as reported by the parties operating in the respondent's county of residence.

Political parties are inherently partisan organizations. Mere contact from them in mobilizing voters to get to the polls and to vote for the right candidates necessarily exposes the voter to partisan influence. Such grass-roots party contacts were common in the 1992 election campaign. More than two-fifths of the respondents said that they had been contacted or had received literature in support of a presidential candidate. This contact corroborates earlier evidence of still-vibrant local parties (Gibson et al. 1985), yet it falls well short of the percentage of respondents who were exposed to partisan messages through personal discussion networks or the media. Moreover, over 40% of those perceiving party contacts in 1992 were reached by both parties, suggesting that the organizations may have moved away from the traditional strategy of concentrating their efforts on mobilizing their own supporters (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994). Where voters were exposed to grass-roots contact from only one of the major parties, alternatively, it was somewhat more likely to come from the Democrats.

The picture is different once we turn to party reports of activity. The Democratic and Republican parties each performed some activities in every county, yet one party outperformed the other in all but one county (also see Beck et al. 1997). Over the years, Democrats have been more active than Republicans at the local level (Gibson et al. 1985), and their activity advantage

was so substantial in 1992 that the Democrats enjoyed at least a clear edge in about three-quarters of all counties, dominating in close to a majority. Such a lopsided Democratic lead in grass-roots party activity provided another social context advantage for the 1992 Clinton campaign.

Many secondary organizations also actively support candidates for president. Labor unions, veterans' organizations, business associations, and, in recent years, religious groups, especially fundamentalist Christian organizations, are conspicuously active in attempting to mobilize their followers on behalf of presidential candidates (Asher et al. 2001; Leege and Kellstedt 1993). Our survey asked respondents about their membership in up to three organizations, including whether each supported a candidate in the election. The number of specific organizations named was very large, precluding direct measurement of each organization's partisan preferences, so we rely entirely upon perceptions of organizational bias.

The data on organizations tell a story of little organizational bias overall, but it generally favors the Democrats where it does appear. America is a nation of joiners, and 85% of the sample reported membership in at least one organization. The organizations Americans join are overwhelmingly nonpolitical, however; fewer than one-quarter of the respondents claimed that an organization to which they belonged supported one of the presidential candidates. Unions were perceived as most commonly exhibiting a candidate preference, with churches a distant second. In 1992, where there was organizational bias, it favored the Democrats by a two-to-one margin. Whether this represents a change from earlier years cannot be said for sure, but it is reasonable to suppose that, as politically conservative churches have joined unions in making presidential endorsements, a traditional Democratic advantage in organizational partisan activity may have been reduced.

### THE BIASES OF INTERMEDIARIES AND THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE

Our ultimate question is whether partisan biases in voters' information sources influence their vote choices. We believe that social context is important in giving content and meaning to the political issues and attitudinal orientations that are prominent in individual-actor theories of voting behavior. In addition, we have hypothesized that this context has a direct impact on voting choice by providing new information and voting cues to the individual. Thus, if the vote decision really is subject to social influence, then the partisan cues of intermediaries' messages should relate to the vote even after we have taken into account the enduring personal characteristics that normally predict voting behavior. Moreover, we can assess which intermediaries carried the greatest weight in the 1992 election.

We included several personal characteristics as baseline variables in our social calculus model. The most important is long-term party preference, which anchors the social-psychological perspective on voting behavior (Campbell et al. 1960). The rational-choice

perspective offers a second predisposition that is presumed to guide voting choices—the voters' political ideology. Although a role for highly developed ideologies is limited (Converse 1964), voters' self locations along a liberal-to-conservative continuum seem to be increasingly relevant for voting behavior (Miller and Shanks 1996, 289–94). Standard demographic characteristics also are causally antecedent to the vote decision and have been theoretically and empirically linked to the presidential vote in previous studies (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1998). We include race, education, income, religion (both denominational affiliation and evangelical Christian identification), and gender as additional baseline controls in our model.

Such important short-term components of the vote decision as evaluations of candidates, issues, and retrospective evaluations of party performance are excluded from our model on theoretical grounds. They typically are endogenous to the election campaign and are influenced by intermediaries and long-term baseline variables rather than influencing them. Moreover, the ideological liberal/conservative scale already represents broad and enduring issue orientations to some extent. Taking these considerations into account, our analysis gauges whether the partisan cues of intermediaries add explanatory power to a "baseline" model built around long-term forces in voting behavior.

Our social calculus model also includes the Clinton percentage of the major-party vote in each respondent's county. The political tendencies of geographical units such as a neighborhood or a county are staples of contextual analysis (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Huckfeldt et al. 1998). In a properly specified intermediation model, which includes the various carriers of this contextual influence, the effects of the aggregate contextual variable should be reduced to insignificance. The county presidential vote variable, therefore, performs a different function from the preceding "control" variables. Because our model includes many of the primary ingredients of the county context (i.e., the partisan biases of discussants, local newspapers, local party activities, and local organizations), we expect the county presidential vote variable to lack statistical significance in the full model.

### Estimating the Impact of Social Context in Voting

Table 1 presents logit equations for the various intermediaries and control variables in predicting the Clinton vote, the Bush vote, and the Clinton share of the two-party vote. The first column under each "vote" heading contains the logit coefficients and measures of fit; the second columns provide estimates of the impact of each variable across its range when other predictor variables are set at their mean values. <sup>12</sup> All voters, including Perot voters, are contained in the base category of the first two equations (columns 2–5). The final equation (columns 6 and 7) is restricted to Bush and Clinton voters only.

The results show a substantial relationship between the partisan cues provided by a number of intermediaries and the presidential vote in 1992, even after standard personal characteristics are considered. Our results also demonstrate that party identification and ideology, key explanatory variables in the social-psychological and rational-choice perspectives, respectively, and a few other fixed personal characteristics remain important even after taking the social context into account. Party identification, as expected, emerges as by far the most powerful predictor of the vote in each equation. Clearly, social considerations take their place alongside, rather than displace, personal considerations in voting.

Personal Discussants. Both actual and perceived presidential preferences of personal discussants are significantly related to the Democratic vote, the Republican vote, and the two-party vote. In each case, the candidate favored by the discussion network is advantaged. Of the two measures, perceived discussant preferences consistently turn out to be more important than actual discussant preferences, but each adds significantly to the account. It is theoretically understandable that both the message sent and the message received are consequential for voting choices. Given the potential for slippage between the original message and how it is received (Huckfeldt et al. 1998), moreover, it seems entirely reasonable that perceptions have a stronger relationship to the vote. Because four of five discussants were identified as people with whom "important matters" are discussed, not necessarily politics, the likelihood that respondents initially chose discussants to support their political views is minimized. This makes the relationships all the more impressive and signals an importance for personal discussants in the social calculus of voting that many analysts thought had eroded by the 1990s.

Newspapers and Television. Our research provides suggestive evidence of mass media influence that varies across media sources and measures in theoretically interesting ways. As we have shown in earlier analysis of media effects (Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998a), newspaper editorial content is significantly related to each of the vote variables. Neither actual newspaper news content nor voter perceptions of newspaper bias, on the other hand, comes close to having a significant relationship with the vote. These results make theoretical sense. Even though newspapers showed a persistently pro-Clinton bias in 1992, their partisan cues were so slight and inconsistent that many voters could come away with the sense that their paper was unbiasedand they did. However, newspapers still reserve their editorial pages for opinion taking as is reflected in our data.<sup>13</sup> This sharper partisan image of editorials, we surmise, makes possible their stronger, and significant,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> First differences are computed using the Tomz et al. (2000) CLARIFY routine.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> That editorials provide a sharper partisan image than news reports is demonstrated by a comparison of their standard deviations. Editorial page standard deviations are 0.55 for Bush, 0.55 for Clinton, and 0.82 for the difference between Bush and Clinton. News report standard deviations are 0.28 for Bush, 0.28 for Clinton, and 0.64 for their difference.

TABLE 1. The 1992 Presidential Vote by the Partisan Bias of Social Intermediaries, with Controls

for Personal Factors	Democr	atic Vote	Republi	can Vote	Two-Pa	rty Vote
		First		First		First
	В	Difference	В	Difference	В	Difference
Perceived discussants	1.021***	44.9	<u>-1.591***</u>	-55.4	1.631***	64.4
	(0.189)		(0.218)		(0.258)	
Actual discussants	0.475**	22.0	–`0.459́*	-16.8	0.886***	39.0
Actual discussarits	(0.207)		(0.215)		(0.287)	
Perceived paper	0.035	1.8	0.117	4.2	–0.145́	-6.2
Perceived paper	(0.159)	1.0	(0.166)	1.4	(0.222)	
A 1 1		16.3		-1.0	0.009	0.2
Actual news	0.223	10.3	-0.031	-1.0	(0.234)	0.2
	(0.168)		(0.177)	047		61.2
Actual editorials	0.338**	30.6	-0.289*	24.7	0.699***	61.2
	(0.127)		(0.143)		(0.193)	
Perceived TV	-0.337	<b>–15.9</b>	0.602**	19.9	-0.836**	-34.9
	(0.206)		(0.212)		(0.286)	
Actual TV	0.062	2.3	`0.315 <sup>°</sup>	8.5	<u>~</u> 0.318	-11.1
Actual IV	(0.186)	2.0	(0.206)	0.0	(0.265)	
B t d		27.2	0.012	0.9	0.212	17.5
Perceived party contacts	0.295*	27.2		0.9		17.5
	(0.170)		(0.177)		(0.240)	0.0
Actual party activities	0.022	11.3	0.009	3.7	0.004	2.3
	(0.018)		(0.020)		(0.028)	
Organizations	0.528**	61.0	-0.293	-32.0	0.587*	64.3
o.gaauo	(0.182)		(0.201)		(0.272)	
County vote	-0.010	0.0	-0.314	-5.0	`0.392	8.4
County vote	(0.495)	0.0	(0.533)	0.0	(0.672)	
Dt ID		-64.1	0.629***	62.6	-0.822***	-82.2
Party ID	-0.530***	-04.1		02.0		-02.2
	(0.055)	100	(0.064)	00.0	(0.083)	00.0
Ideology	-0.093*	-19.3	0.168***	26.6	-0.175**	-33.9
	(0.051)		(0.057)		(0.073)	
Black	1.057*	25.2	-0.599	<b>-</b> 7.9	0.973	17.9
	(0.492)		(0.672)		(0.748)	
Education	0.004	0.4	`0.005´	0.0	`0.007	0.1
Education	(0.099)	011	(0.106)	••	(0.143)	
lm a a ma a	-0.168**	<b>-19.5</b>	0.109	10.2	-0.272 <b>*</b> *	-30.0
Income		-19.5		10.2		-50.0
	(0.070)		(0.077)	0.7	(0.103)	40.4
Catholic	0.574**	14.1	0.027	0.7	0.474	10.4
	(0.239)		(0.267)		(0.340)	
Evangelical	0.010	0.5	0.234	. 4.6	-0.125	-3.2
. 3	(0.287)		(0.292)		(0.377)	
Female	0.209	4.8	0.116	2.1	–̀0.113́	-2.4
1 Onlaid	(0.198)		(0.217)		(0.285)	
			, ,		700	
Number	892		892	•	738	
% Predicted	82.3		85.5		90.1	
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.615		0.670		0.793	
% reduction in error	60.0		62.4		78.8	

Note: Columns 1, 3, and 5 present the logit coefficients (and their standard errors) for the probability of voting for Clinton, Bush, and Clinton (two-party vote only), respectively. Columns 2, 4, and 6 present the enhanced probability (in percentage terms) that a change from minimum to maximum value in the particular variable would have on a vote for Clinton or Bush while holding all other independent variables at their sample mean. \* $p \le 0.05$ ; \*\* $p \le 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p \le 0.001$  (one-tailed tests).

relationship to the vote. In contrast, news page biases, while present in most cases, are too faint to be consequential.

For television, perceptions rather than content are linked to the vote, albeit in a puzzling way. Perceptions of television bias are significantly related to both the Bush vote and the Clinton share of the two-party vote, but in the direction opposite that expected: As pro-Clinton bias increased across network news shows, the vote for Bush grew. We interpret this as a product of the hostile media phenomenon, with partisans tending to

see balanced television news and even news slightly favorable to their candidate as favoring the opposition. In 1992, this phenomenon was most prevalent among Republicans. These perceptions of television bias remain after controls for actual news content, while the ones for newspapers do not. Paradoxically, Republicans single out television as a more "hostile" medium than newspapers despite its objectively more balanced coverage of the 1992 presidential campaign. We suspect that Republicans' perceptions of network television news as especially unfriendly to their cause have been many

years in the making rather than an immediate product of the 1992 contest.

Party Activity. Given the concentration on media advertising rather than grass-roots activity by modern presidential campaigns, it may seem unsurprising that local party activity had a limited relationship to voting in 1992. The coefficients for perceived contacting and party activity attain significance for only one of six possibilities: the relationship of perceived contacts to the Democratic vote. The sign of this relationship is in the expected direction, with more contact perceived with a party increasing its electoral support. The actual level of party activity in a county relative to its opposition, in contrast, does not exhibit a significant relationship to the vote. This result may be attributable to the lack of residual influence for party activity once its contacting efforts are taken into account. The presence of significant party activity effects in even one case, though, is a tantalizing hint that there may be more payoff from grass-roots activities than presidential campaigns seem to assume, and we will explore the matter further in subsequent analysis.

Secondary Organizations. Membership in an organization that communicates a presidential preference is not common. When it occurs, though, it is significantly related to the Clinton and two-party votes for president, but not to the vote for Bush—an asymmetry that is investigated further below. Because secondary organization memberships are typically set well before the particular election campaign, we can interpret this relationship as evidence of organizational influence rather than vote preferences dictating what organizations to join, even if the latter can happen over the long run.

County Partisan Context. The remaining result of interest is a comforting null finding: County context is not significantly related to the vote in the multivariate model. The bivariate relationships between the Clinton share of the two-party countywide vote and respondents' votes for Clinton (r=0.19), Bush (r=-0.20), and Clinton in the two-party contest (r=0.23) are all significant. When the contextual variable is embedded in a multivariate model including direct agents of that context, however, its coefficients are reduced to insignificance. We have conceptualized discussion networks, secondary organizations, local parties, and newspapers as carriers of the county's social context. Our data support this hypothesis.

Theoretical Reflections. It is perilous to infer influence from relationships in cross-sectional surveys. Therefore, we have taken great pains to use temporally antecedent explanatory variables as much as possible and to measure them beyond the conventional reliance on perceptions. On the basis of our evidence, therefore, we feel that it is justifiable to conclude that the social context of individuals affects the vote choices of the contemporary electorate. The partisan cues of personal discussants, newspaper editorials, and secondary organizations seem most influential in presidential vote choices in 1992. Television and newspaper reporting

and party activity, in contrast, appear to have had no direct impact on the vote.

Why might discussants, organizations, and editorials exert such influence? The primary reasons may be the clarity and credibility of their messages (Lupia and McCubbins 1998). Some organizations and newspapers make candidate endorsements or other explicit attempts to influence the presidential vote. Typically sent as one-message communications in Zaller's (1992) terms, these cues are hard to mistake. Personal political communications may be more ambiguous, but their messages are often so repetitive and reinforced in such a variety of ways that our respondents had little difficulty in accurately detecting the presidential preferences of their discussants. Messages from these sources also have an aura of credibility. Secondary organizations' and newspaper editorials' endorsement are reasoned products of a process in which the different presidential candidates have been carefully evaluated. Organizations and newspapers also may be assumed to speak on behalf of the interests of their followers, which enhances their credibility, at least to those audiences. To the degree to which personal discussants come from the same backgrounds as the voter-and they typically do-the potency of their messages is similarly enhanced. Of course, it must not be forgotten that exposure is a necessary ingredient for influence. Personal discussants enjoy the advantage of having close and continuing relationships with the voter. No other intermediary can match the level of attention that discussants' political messages receive.

Why do television and newspaper reports and political parties, in contrast, seem to lack an influence on the vote? What is missing from the news reports, as we have suggested, is a clear partisan bias to their messages. Whatever their lineage, and for newspapers it is highly partisan, most newspapers and television are now "twomessage" communication sources in presidential politics, trying to balance their reporting so as not to unduly favor either candidate. As Fig. 1 shows, their coverage is often balanced, and where it is not, it is so mildly partisan that voters may have difficulty discerning any bias—or misperceive bias against their candidate from even supportive sources. Therefore, despite their nonpartisan credibility and wide (albeit shrinking) audiences, the direct influence of newspaper and television reporting is constrained. This leaves it to the more subtle and indirect processes of agenda setting, priming, and framing to carry the media's effects.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Incorporating these complex processes into a vote model is well beyond the scope of this paper (but see Dalton et al. 1998b). Moreover, newspapers and television hardly are the only media sources of information during election campaigns. Talk radio and television and the Internet (plus even MTV in 1992) have become increasingly important, and news magazines traditionally have been a source of campaign news. We asked our respondents about their exposure to such sources. While many reported relying upon each, the numbers fell far short of those reporting regularly reading newspapers or watching national network news about the campaign, and the specific sources they mentioned were so segmented that they defied systematic analysis. A fully comprehensive study of media effects in contemporary times, though, needs to find ways to take these sources and others into account.

The opposite situation prevails for political parties. Their messages are so clearly partisan that many voters may find them offensive or at least do not treat them as new information that updates their preferences. Consequently, party messages lack the credibility of less partisan sources, which acts as a counterbalance to their clarity. Even though we found an unexpected amount of presidential-campaign party activity at the grass roots in the counties we studied, moreover, only a minority of our respondents perceived direct contact from a political party. Perceived party contacting seems to have declined in recent decades (Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994), and the most efficacious of those contacts personal meetings rather than impersonal telephone contacts and literature drops—presumably has fallen off even more (Gerber and Green 2000). Party efforts also may be redundant, consequently adding nothing, when focused on the most committed and informed partisans.

#### The Special Role of Political Awareness

Americans vary in their awareness of politics, and numerous scholars have found that this variation profoundly affects political reasoning and choice. Yet, as Zaller (1992, 18) has observed, "Most of the time, when scholars attempt to explain public opinion and voting behavior..., they build models that ignore the effects of political awareness." We should not fail to look in our data, therefore, for differences by political awareness.

Although little previous work has addressed the role of political awareness in social influences on the vote, some theoretical expectations do emerge. Zaller's (1992) theory predicts that the influence of messages received from intermediaries will grow as political awareness declines, at least as long as the person is exposed to political messages. While inattentiveness makes reception of political messages less likely, once they are received people with little political information find them difficult to resist. Converse (1964) and Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991, 164-78) also posit that partisanship and ideology become more important guides for voting behavior as political awareness increases. This leaves less informed voters more open to influence by short-term considerations and other forces including, perhaps, their immediate social context.

We can test these theoretical expectations by reestimating the logit model for voters under contrasting conditions of campaign interest. The number of low-interest respondents is already depleted by the removal of nonvoters, so we combined them with moderate-interest respondents to yield a sufficient number of cases for analysis. While using campaign interest rather than factual information to measure political awareness is not ideal (Zaller 1992, 333–7), it is the best alternative our study offers. The results of this analysis are presented in Table 2 for the two-party vote.

Differentiation by campaign interest yields parallel coefficients for most intermediation variables, but two differences of special theoretical importance emerge. First, though the differences are small and our inferences necessarily tentative, the social context variables

have more substantial relationships to the vote for less interested than for more interested respondents. For every intermediary measure except actual discussants, the relationship between the bias of the intermediary and the vote of less interested voters is stronger. Based on these results, one can conclude that the social context is more important for less politicized than for more politicized members of the American electorate.

Second, the largest differences under political interest conditions appear for political parties and organizations. Among less interested voters, the candidate bias of secondary organizations was significantly and positively related to the vote. What was a significant relationship for the Clinton vote in Table 1 proves to be solely the effect of organizational support among lower-interest voters in Table 2. Similarly, the party that enjoyed the advantage in contacting voters and in overall activity countywide won relatively more votes among the politically inattentive, whereas the relationship was insignificant and negative among those who were interested in the campaign. These relationships for perceived party contacts and actual party activities among less interested voters (at p = 0.070 and p = 0.065, respectively) fall just short of significance at the 0.05 level. Suspecting that they may be competing against one another as indicators of local party effort, we held each out of our logit analysis in turn and reestimated the parameters. In each case, the party coefficient attained significance at the 0.04 level for lowerinterest voters—and was far short of being significant for higher interest voters. Party and secondary organization efforts appear to matter, but only for those who are less attentive to politics!

These results signal a persistence into modern times of the important role organizations have been found to play in providing political motivation and direction to less politicized citizens (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Politically aware voters may be immersed in so rich a milieu of political information that party and organizational efforts are redundant. Even in an era when political campaigns are waged largely through the airways and restricted attention is given to grass-roots voter contacts, though, there are citizens who still respond to messages from a local party organization. Similar influence from secondary organizations is perhaps less surprising, although its pro-Democratic skew may be. That most voters apparently did not receive or heed party and organization directions, though, may be as much the result of lesser effort, and a consequently shrunken electorate, than of a citizenry that has become more adept at processing political information.

#### SOCIAL CONTEXT AND VOTING CHOICE

In the mid-20th century, electoral researchers thought of voters in terms of their social characteristics and social context. In subsequent decades, researchers developed a more atomistic model of voting choice in which long-standing partisan loyalties and interests, as well as short-term attitudes and perceptions, were seen to influence voting choices and less emphasis was placed on social forces. Our research has attempted to reposition

TABLE 2. The 1992 Presidential Vote by the Partisan Bias of Social Intermediaries, with Controls for Personal Factors: High Interest vs. Medium/Low Interest

	Hig	h Interest	Medium	/Low Interest
		First Difference	В	First Difference
Perceived discussants	1.640***	59.8	2.002***	73.9
	(0.367)		(0.439)	, 0.0
Actual discussants	ì.050**	41.1	0.611	28.4
	(0.382)		(0.500)	20.4
Perceived paper	-0.015	-0.5	-0.486	-20.9
	(0.273)	0.0	(0.471)	-20.3
Actual news	-0.146	-8.8	0.668	38.3
	(0.320)	5.5	(0.427)	30.3
Actual editorials	0.680**	56.3	0.872**	64.8
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	(0.286)	30.0	(0.327)	04.0
Perceived TV	-0.660*	-23.3	(0.327) -1.497**	<b>50.0</b>
1 0/00/100 1 1	(0.376)	-23.3		-59.2
Actual TV	-0.159	4.6	(0.559)	447
Actual IV		-4.6	-0.446	-14.7
Perceived party contacts	(0.367)	0.0	(0.439)	
reiceived party contacts	-0.006	-2.0	0.831	57.6
Actual posts activities	(0.280)	<del></del>	(0.562)	
Actual party activities	-0.038	-16.7	0.083	39.3
O	(0.036)		(0.055)	
Organizations	0.410	42.2	1.136*	79.5
•	(0.362)		(0.540)	
County vote	0.872	15.9	-1.586	30.2
	(0.891)		(1.302)	
Party ID	-0.920***	-83.3	-0.822***	-82.7
	(0.116)		(0.150)	
Ideology	-0.182*	-30.9	<u>-0.256</u>	-46.2
	(0.090)		(0.163)	
Black	1.017	12.5	2.245*	39.9
	(1.102)		(1.214)	
Education	0.086	5.2	_0.38 <del>9</del>	-25.8
	(0.189)		(0.272)	
Income	_0.291 <sup>*</sup>	-27.7	-0.242	-26.4
	(0.138)		(0.186)	2011
Catholic	0.503	9.4	-0.506	-11.8
	(0.442)		(0.660)	71.0
Evangelical	-0.339	<b>-</b> 7.9	261	-5.7
<b>3</b>	(0.499)	7.0	(0.660)	-5.7
Female	0.081	2.1	-0.422	-9.8
	(0.396)	2.1	(.499)	-9.0
Number	463		275	
% predicted	90.7		89.8	
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.815		0.802	
% reduction in error	78.9		80.0	
Note: Columns 1 and 3 present th				01-1 (1

Note: Columns 1 and 3 present the logit coefficients (and their standard errors) for the probability of voting for Clinton (two-party vote only) for high interest and medium/low interest respectively. Columns 3 and 5 present the enhanced probability (in percentage terms) that a change from minimum to maximum value in the particular variable would have on a vote for Clinton while holding all other independent variables at their sample mean.  $p \le 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p \le 0.01$ ; \*\*\*  $p \le 0.001$  (one-tailed tests).

this image of the voter as an autonomous decision maker by examining the role of social intermediaries in contemporary presidential voting.

Our major research contributions have been to show that, first, Americans vary considerably in the partisan nature of the political messages to which they are exposed. If voters look for party cues in their environments, they will find no shortage of such cues. The primary sources of these cues are personal networks and groups, not the modern mass media, which has often been ceded greater electoral significance. Second, these partisan cues have a direct influence on voting

behavior. To be sure, personal characteristics are key factors in voting: partisanship, ideologies, and fixed personal characteristics play powerful roles in determining the vote. Our evidence indicates, however, that these personal forces are only part of the voting calculus.

Because the intermediaries we have considered serve as the major channels through which information flows in American elections, they are the relevant influences to consider in establishing a social "calculus" of voting. The mass media, of course, have become paramount in modern times as carriers of candidates' messages. In 1992, the partisan bias in newspaper editorial pages

seemed to directly affect the vote, but the bias of newspaper and television news reports appeared to be unimportant. The primary reason for this failure of influence, where one might most expect it, we think lies in the subtlety and inconsistency of media biases in straight news reporting. In effect, the media appear to most voters to fit Zaller's (1992) "two-message model"—even in a year when they gave more favorable coverage overall to one of the candidates. Viewed from this perspective, then, the media are promoting deliberation in the electoral process rather than playing the partisan role sometimes ascribed to them.

Organizations and personal discussants serve as more consequential carriers of partisan messages than the media. Although many Americans receive balanced partisan messages from them, for many others organizational and personal messages favor one of the candidates, and our evidence suggests that voters tend to be responsive to this bias. The powerful effect of personal networks is one of the most significant findings of this study. It signals the continuing influence of an important traditional source of political communication and reaffirms in modern times the message of the Columbia studies half a century ago. Secondary organizations and political parties, on the other hand, are less important across the entire electorate because their effects are restricted to the Americans who are least attentive to politics, which confirms a continuing role for mobilization in contemporary society.

While the social forces we have examined do not tell the complete story of voting behavior in presidential elections, they add an important chapter. American voters do not operate in the social vacuum that much of the contemporary voting literature seems to assume. Rather, voters' enduring personal characteristics interact with the messages they are receiving from the established social context in which they operate. This context cannot be ignored in trying to understand voting and electoral outcomes in any election. Moreover, the social context can have a cumulative impact across elections in shifting standing party preferences and ideological positions. Over the long run, then, we expect that consistent messages from intermediaries may contribute to the social learning process, just as new voting preferences can weaken old partisan predispositions (Fiorina 1981).

How the context in 1992 compares with other elections, in the United States and elsewhere, particularly where political cleavages are deeper and social contexts more biased, also needs to be understood in building a general theory of voting that includes both personal and social factors. For right now, it seems reasonable to conclude that the outcome of the 1992 election was rooted, in part, in the pro-Clinton skew of the social intermediation process. The media had given a strong advantage to the Democratic challenger by the campaign's end, not because they are naturally Democratic but rather because they were candidly reporting a faltering presidency and a failing GOP campaign. Secondary organizations and grass-roots party activity too were more supportive of the eventual winner. Given the positions of the other intermediaries, the advantage in personal discussions of Clinton over Bush seems surprisingly modest, but it added to the Democrat's edge nonetheless. Whether the operation of this intermediation process in 1992 was customary or unique, though, necessarily awaits a continuation of research on the social calculus of voting.

Finally, our study affirms, for citizens playing their fundamental role in the democratic political process, that political choices are affected to a significant degree by the flow of information from the decisionmaker's immediate social context. Hence, even within one particular democratic system, the United States in 1992, the analysis of democratic political behavior is inherently comparative—not only across individuals and their personal characteristics, but also among the settings in which these individuals reside (Przeworski and Teune 1970). By identifying these ties between individuals and their environments—by bringing into perspective the social calculus of voter choice—we move closer to a better understanding of citizenship and political choice within, and potentially among, democratic political systems (Huckfeldt, Ikeda, and Pappi 2000a; Ikeda and Huckfeldt 2001).

#### **APPENDIX A**

#### **Design of Data Collections**

Citizen Survey. Respondents for the survey of citizens (main respondents) were chosen by a stratified cluster sample. Forty counties were drawn with replacement by probabilities proportionate to population size from strata defined by population size, mean educational level, and population change. (Los Angeles County was randomly drawn twice, so it had double the number of interviews.) Within counties. Survey Sampling, Inc., identified sample phone numbers through random-digit-dialing methods. At each residential phone number, we chose respondents by a modified version of the Kish (1949) method. In all, we interviewed 1318 main respondents, an average of 33 per county, from the day after the election through the end of January. The interviews averaged more than an hour in length and were conducted using the CATI facilities of the Center for Survey Research at Indiana University. The response rate for the survey was 48%, calculated as the ratio of completions to the sum of completions, refusals, and partial completions. The resulting sample overestimates voters and educated adults compared to census figures, but the estimated vote percentages are within 1.6% of the official vote.

Discussant Identification and Selection. Each of the 1318 main respondents was asked to identify four people with whom they had "talked with about matters that are important to you" in the last 6 months and a fifth person they had "talked with most about the events of the recent presidential election ... aside from anyone ... already mentioned." We asked these main respondents to specify key personal characteristics and political views of each of the discussants they identified and to provide phone numbers or addresses so that their discussants themselves could be interviewed. We drew a random "snowball" sample of spouse and nonspouse discussants from the named discussants for whom contact information was available. From this pool, we interviewed 271 spouses and 841 nonspouse discussion partners. These interviews were conducted by the Center for Survey Research

at Indiana University and the Polimetrics Laboratory of the Department of Political Science at Ohio State University.

Newspaper Content Analysis. We performed a content analysis of the largest circulation newspaper in each county (and a second newspaper in a few counties). The first step was to identify all campaign stories in the first half of the news section, the editorial and op-ed pages, and any special election coverage section. We selected articles on every third day plus Sundays from Labor Day through election day, coding a total of 6537 articles in 46 newspapers. See Appendix B for specific coding instructions.

Television Content Analysis. This study relies upon Holli Semetko's (1995) content analysis of coverage of the presidential campaign and its candidates by the ABC, CBS, CNN, and NBC evening news using the same coding scheme as for the newspapers. Nightly news coverage was coded for every third day (plus Sundays) between Labor Day and election day on the same schedule as the newspapers. See Appendix B for specific coding instructions.

County Party and Campaign Chairs Surveys. We gathered information through mail questionnaires and telephone interviews from the county party chairs and the local leaders of the presidential campaign organizations for the Democrats in all 39 counties and for the Republicans in 38 of the 39 counties, for a response rate of 99.5%. For the county party organizations, our questions focused solely on activities conducted on behalf of the presidential campaign or the generic party campaign, as permitted under Federal Election Commission guidelines. For the local presidential campaign organizations, we asked about all activities.

Organizational Membership Reports. We asked respondents in the citizen survey if they belonged to each of 14 types of organizations. Respondents were then asked to name the three specific organizations from their memberships that were most important to them, and questions (see Appendix B) were asked about the candidate favored by each.

#### **APPENDIX B**

#### Coding of Variables

**Perceived Discussant Bias.** The percentage of up to five named discussants perceived to support Clinton minus the percentage supporting Bush, with those having no major-party discussants coded as 0 and refusals eliminated as missing data. Fig. 1 combines the resulting scores as follows: 100 = Clinton dominant, 1 to 99 = Clinton edge, -1 to -99 = Bush edge, -100 = Bush dominant, and 0 = no net bias (or balanced). For Fig. 1, respondents without discussants were coded as "no exposure," and those with no discussants supporting a major-party candidate were coded as "no net bias."

QUESTION: "Which candidate do you think [discussant name] supported in the presidential election this year?"

Actual Discussant Bias. The percentage of up to four interviewed discussants supporting Clinton minus the percentage supporting Bush, with no discussants and no majorparty discussants coded as 0 and respondents with discussants who were not interviewed eliminated as missing data. (In most cases, because no discussants or only one discussant were interviewed, the scores were -100, 0, or +100.) Support includes votes as well as preferences for nonvoters. Fig. 1 combines the resulting scores as described above for Perceived Discussant Bias.

QUESTIONS: "Would you please tell me which candidate you voted for in the presidential election?" [For nonvoters] "In the presidential election, which one of the candidates did you prefer?"

Actual Newspaper Bias. The net favoritism of the mean bias of news articles in respondent's main newspaper, Clinton minus Bush, with respondents who read no newspaper coded as 0 and those whose newspaper was not content analyzed eliminated as missing data. For Fig. 1, 2.0 or more = Clinton dominant, 0.01 to 1.99 = Clinton edge, -0.01 to -1.99 = Bush edge, -2.0 or less = Bush dominant, and 0 = no net bias. A net advantage of 2.0 or more was required for the "dominant" category because it put the difference in treatment of the major-party candidates beyond the "slightly positive" versus "slightly critical" thresholds, which was necessary for clearcut bias to emerge. Respondents who read no newspapers were coded as "no exposure" in Fig. 1.

CODING INSTRUCTIONS: "Code the overall content of the article that involves Bush, Quayle, or the Bush/Quayle campaign in terms of its favorability or unfavorability to the Bush campaign. Evaluate the article from the perspective of the Bush campaign and assess the content of the article from this perspective. In other words, would the Bush campaign like seeing this article in print? If an article focuses only on Clinton (or other actors), then do not evaluate the Bush/Republican bias. If both candidates/campaigns are mentioned in the same article, then treat these as separate coding judgments; that is, an article might be negative to both candidates, positive to both, or a mix." Parallel instructions were given for the coding of Clinton stories. Each story was scored on a 7-point scale as extremely critical (or negative), critical, slightly critical, balanced, slightly positive, positive, or extremely positive.

Actual Editorial Bias. The net favoritism of the mean bias of editorials and op/ed articles in the respondent's main newspaper, Clinton minus Bush, based on content analysis. The same procedures were followed as for Actual News Bias above, except this variable is based on the editorial content of each newspaper.

Actual Television Bias. The net favoritism of the mean bias of stories on the main television network that the respondent watched for news, Clinton minus Bush, based on content analysis. The same procedures were followed as for Actual News Bias above, except this variable is based on the content of each story on the evening network news.

**Perceived Newspaper Bias.** The perceived bias of respondent's main newspaper, coded as Clinton = 1, Bush = -1, and no bias or balance between Bush and Clinton = 0. Respondents who said "don't know," perceived another candidate as favored, or read no newspaper are coded as 0; refusals are excluded as missing data. For Fig. 1, because only one newspaper was included, 1 = Clinton edge, -1 = Bush edge, and 0 = no net bias. Perceived bias for nonmajor-party candidates and "don't know" were coded as no net bias (regarding Bush and Clinton), and respondents not reading a newspaper as no exposure.

QUESTIONS: "I'll begin by asking about various ways you might have kept informed about the elections and other political matters during the recent presidential campaign. Please base your responses on what you did in a normal week during the campaign. In a normal week, did you read one or more daily newspapers? What is the name of the daily newspaper you read most often? Which presidential candidate do you think the (name of newspaper) favored during the campaign, or didn't it favor any candidate?"

**Perceived Television News Bias.** The same procedures were followed as for Perceived Newspaper Bias above, except that this variable is based on perceptions of television network news, and those who watched another evening news program are excluded as missing data.

Actual Party Activities. The number of party activities conducted by the Democratic party and campaign organizations minus the number conducted by the Republicans, with the one county lacking full reports excluded as missing data. Each organization could report up to 14 activities, for a total of 28 for each party. Fig. 1 combines the resulting scores as follows: 6 or more = Clinton dominant, 1 to 5 = Clinton edge, -1to -5 = Bush edge, -6 or less = Bush dominant, and 0 = nonet bias. Because the standard deviation of the original scores was between 5 and 6, we chose to dichotomize pro-Clinton and pro-Bush activity levels at 6 and -6, respectively. The activities for county party chairs were as follows: 1, contacted people to encourage them to register; 2, transported voters to the polls; 3, arranged events where presidential or vicepresidential candidates could meet voters; 4, organized campaign events such as rallies, parades, drive-throughs; 5, mailed literature to potential voters; 6, distributed literature doorto-door to potential voters; 7, telephoned potential voters to encourage them to support party candidates; 8, arranged for billboard advertisements; 9, arranged television advertisements on broadcast stations; 10, arranged television advertisements on cable stations; 11, arranged newspaper ads; 12, arranged radio ads; 13, distributed news releases; 14, arranged for endorsements from local people; 15, distributed yard or window signs; and 16, distributed slate cards or sample ballots for voters to use. In asking local party organization chairs about each activity, we always specified "for the party ticket including the presidential and vice-presidential candidates" or "for the presidential and vice-presidential candidates" to focus their attention solely on activities performed for that race.

**Perceived Party Contacts.** The number of contacts perceived on behalf of Clinton minus contacts on behalf of Bush, with respondents perceiving only third-party or independent-candidate contacts coded as 0. Fig. 1 combines the resulting scores as follows: 2 or more = Clinton dominant, 1 = Clinton edge, -1 = Bush edge, -2 or less = Bush dominant, and 0 = no net bias (or balanced). Respondents reporting no party contacts were coded as "no exposure."

QUESTIONS: "Now I'd like to ask about any contact you have had with the political parties or candidates during the recent election campaign. Were you contacted either by phone or in person by a political party or candidate...on behalf of a candidate running for president? For which candidates?...Did you receive any materials, such as letters, flyers or brochures,...on behalf of a candidate for president? For which candidate?"

Organizational Influence. The net number of up to three organizations to which respondent belonged that favored a major-party candidate, Clinton minus Bush, with no organizations favoring a candidate coded as 0 and refusals eliminated as missing data. Fig. 1 combines the resulting scores as follows: 2 or more = Clinton dominant, 1 = Clinton edge, -1 = Bush edge, -2 = Bush dominant, and 0 = no net bias, with respondents who belonged to no organizations coded as "no exposure."

QUESTIONS: "I am going to mention various types of groups and organizations that people might belong to. For each type, please tell me whether or not you belong to any organization like it...labor unions? business or professional associations? farmers' associations? women's rights groups?

church groups or religious organizations? environmental groups? public interest groups? fraternal organizations, lodges, or sororities? sports or gun clubs? neighborhood associations? veterans' organizations? civic groups? ethnic, racial, or nationality associations? support groups? any other type of organization I have not mentioned? . . . We have been talking about general types of groups and organizations rather than any one specific group or organization. . . . (Among the organizations you had in mind), please tell me the name of the one specific group or organization that is most important to you? . . . next most important to you? . . . any other specific group or organization that is particularly important to you? . . . I'd like to ask you about each organization you said is important to you. . . . Did (it) support a candidate in the presidential election? Which candidate?"

**Presidential Vote.** Responses to the question were coded to yield three variables, with nonvoters and refusals eliminated as missing data: **Democratic vote**—1 if voted for Clinton, 0 if voted for another candidate; **Republican vote**—1 if voted for Bush, 0 if voted for another candidate; and **two-party vote**—1 if voted for Clinton, 0 if voted for Bush, with other voters excluded.

QUESTION: "Would you please tell me which candidate you voted for in the presidential election?"

**County Vote.** The percentage of the vote for Clinton minus percentage of the vote for Bush in respondent's county (source: official vote returns for 1992).

**Party Identification.** Measured on a 7-point scale with strong Democrat at 7 and strong Republican at 1, "don't know" coded as independent and "other party" and refusals eliminated as missing data.

For comparability with the other nations in the crossnational research project that included our study, a variant of the standard National Election Study party identification question was used: "Some people lean toward a particular political party for a long time, although they may occasionally vote for a different party. Do you generally lean toward a particular party? Which one? [If independent, don't lean, or don't know] If you had to choose, do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or to the Democratic party? [If named party] Taken altogether, how strongly or weakly do you lean toward the party?

**Ideology.** Location on a 10-point scale from most liberal (1) to most conservative (10), with (volunteered) "don't think along those lines" (N=12), "don't know" (N=14), "depends" (N=7), or "refused" (N=3) eliminated as missing data.

QUESTION: "Many people use the terms 'liberal' and 'conservative' to recognize different political opinions. I have a scale that runs from 1 to 10, where 1 is the most liberal position and 10 is the most conservative position. Using any number between 1 and 10, where do you place yourself on this scale when you think of your own political views?"

**Black.** Coded 1 if black, 0 otherwise, with refusals eliminated as missing data.

QUESTION: "Are you white, black, American Indian, Asian, or some other race?"

**Education.** Highest degree of education received, from grade 4 (=4) through Ph.D./M.D. (=18).

QUESTION: "What is the highest grade of school or level of education you have completed?"

Income. Annual household income on a six-category scale from low to high (<\$15K, \$15K to <25K, \$25K to \$35K. >\$35K to \$50K, >\$50K to \$75K, >\$75K), with "don't know" and refusals eliminated as missing data.

QUESTION: "Considering all sources of income and all salaries, was your household's total income last year, before taxes and other deductions, less than \$25,000, or \$25,000 or more? [If less] Is it less than \$15,000? [If more] Is it more than \$35,000? [If yes] Is it more than \$50,000? [If yes] Is it more than \$75,000?

Catholic. Coded 1 if Catholic, 0 otherwise, with refusals eliminated as missing data.

QUESTION: "Do you currently consider yourself Protestant, Roman Catholic, Jewish, or something else?"

**Evangelical.** Coded 1 if born-again, 0 otherwise, with refusals eliminated as missing data.

QUESTION: [Asked of all Protestants and Roman Catholics] "Some Christians consider themselves to be "bornagain" because they have had a personal conversion experience. Do you consider yourself to be "born-again"?

Gender. Coded 1 for female, 0 for male.

Interest. Coded high [1] if "very interested," and medium/low [0] if respondent indicated "somewhat interested" or "not very interested," with "don't know" eliminated as missing data.

QUESTION: "Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. During this recent election, were you very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in the political campaign?"

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## **Cues that Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns**

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Recent evidence suggests that elites can capitalize on preexisting linkages between issues and social groups to alter the criteria citizens use to make political decisions. In particular, studies have shown that subtle racial cues in campaign communications may activate racial attitudes, thereby altering the foundations of mass political decision making. However, the precise psychological mechanism by which such attitudes are activated has not been empirically demonstrated, and the range of implicit cues powerful enough to produce this effect is still unknown. In an experiment, we tested whether subtle racial cues embedded in political advertisements prime racial attitudes as predictors of candidate preference by making them more accessible in memory. Results show that a wide range of implicit race cues can prime racial attitudes and that cognitive accessibility mediates the effect. Furthermore, counter-stereotypic cues—especially those implying blacks are deserving of government resources—dampen racial priming, suggesting that the meaning drawn from the visual/narrative pairing in an advertisement, and not simply the presence of black images, triggers the effect.

he public expression of racist attitudes has dramatically declined over the last several decades (Schuman et al. 1997). Racial issues have also been approached rather obliquely in most federal and state election campaigns since 1968 (Mendelberg 2001). Still, there are indications that contemporary mainstream media reinforce negative stereotypes about minorities (Coltrane and Messineo 2000; Entman 1990, 1992; Entman and Rojecki 2000; Gray 1995). For example, crime news coverage often employs racial imagery, reinforcing linkages between blacks and violence (Dixon and Linz 2000; Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Peffley, Shields, and Williams 1996). Reporting about poverty and social welfare has also become racialized, even though African Americans remain a minority of those in poverty or on government assistance (Gilens 1999; Mendelberg 2001).

The racial "coding" of crime and welfare in the minds of many Americans leads to the possibility that invoking these concepts, even without explicitly referring to race, can activate racial thinking (Gilens 1996, 1998; Jamieson 1992; Mendelberg 1997, 2001; Valentino 1999). Some have argued that elites foster and reinforce

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these connections to gain a strategic political advantage. For example, Edsall and Edsall (1991) argue that Ronald Reagan nurtured the linkages among "special interests," "big government," and particular minority groups during the 1980s. The result, they claim, was that Americans perceived unpopular groups such as trade unionists, blacks, Hispanics, feminists, and homosexuals, to be united in making unreasonable demands for rights and resources they did not deserve (p. 203). These requests for "special preferences" were repeatedly juxtaposed against the interests of "ordinary" Americans. According to this argument, opinions about certain policies and programs became linked to attitudes about minority groups, thereby creating a powerful tool for strategic communicators to exploit during campaigns.

Coded language, understood by large segments of the public, affords elites the opportunity and incentive to activate racial thinking without explicitly "playing the race card." Obvious examples are the 1988 "Willie Horton" appeal and its next of kin, the "Turnstile" ad that invoked the same issue (Massachusetts' prison furlough program under Governor Dukakis) without mentioning Horton specifically. The Horton ad paired nonracial narratives with racial imagery to produce an "implicitly" racial message (Jamieson 1992), and news about the ad primed racial attitudes in opinions about various policies (Mendelberg 1997).

Mendelberg (2001) has outlined a theoretical approach for understanding the impact of racialized campaign messages. This argument has four components. First, white Americans are torn between the "norm of equality" and resentment toward blacks for their perceived failure to abide by the American creed of individualism and hard work. Second, racial priming works because certain cues make racial schemas more accessible in memory so that they are automatically employed during subsequent political decision making. Third, becoming aware of the racial content of a message would lead most people to reject it because they would not want to violate the norm of equality. Therefore,

fourth, racial appeals are effective only if they are not recognized as such by the audience. Mendelberg argues that "implicit" (i.e., visual but not verbal) cues rather than "explicit" (i.e., visual plus verbal) ones are likely to meet this fourth requirement. Experimental and survey data support her claim that implicitly racial messages can powerfully prime racial attitudes during campaigns.

Underlying Mendelberg's approach is the assumption that racial attitudes are still a potent force in American politics, a claim supported by research linking such attitudes to opposition to racially redistributive policies (e.g., Bobo and Kluegel 1997; Bobo. Kluegel, and Smith 1997; Sears 1988; Kinder and Sanders 1996) and to ideological transformations in general (Carmines and Stimson 1989). But the precise nature and extent of the role of racial attitudes in mass political preferences are still hotly debated (Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). Some argue that a fundamental change in the politics of race in America has taken place over the last four decades, such that most Americans now evaluate policies and candidates according to their resonance with basic nonracial values such as individualism (Sniderman and Hagen 1985; Sniderman and Piazza 1993), egalitarianism, and the ideal size of government (Hurwitz and Peffley 1998; Sniderman and Carmines 1997). If so, one might predict that standard political appeals involving government spending or taxation activate more global values. and not attitudes about race in particular, even if racial cues are present. Or, finally, exposure to political messages might simply activate existing predispositions. such as party identification, bringing candidate preferences into line with these attachments (Campbell et al. 1960; Finkel 1993).

We find Mendelberg's theoretical approach convincing, and her findings persuasive, but additional conceptual clarity and more precise testing of the fundamental assumptions of the model are necessary to understand fully the nature and extent of racial priming in modern American politics. We explore three related questions here. First, do subtle racial cues in standard political appeals actually prime racial attitudes? Much of the research demonstrating race priming via political advertisements focuses on the issue of crime or welfare spending (Gilens 1999; Jamieson 1992; Mendelberg 1997, 2001), indicating some of the ways racial attitudes can be brought to bear on political judgments. We further explore the race priming effect by testing the impact of racial cues embedded within appeals involving references to wasteful government spending and taxation, not crime or welfare.

Second, which types of cues most powerfully prime racial attitudes? Current research draws a distinction between "implicit" and "explicit" racial messages, with the Horton ad exemplifying the former because the narrator never uttered a noun such as "black" or "race" (Mendelberg 2000). We agree that explicit and implicit racial appeals should have different effects, but also suspect that variation among implicit cues is important. The set of racial cues that one might consider to be "implicit" might vary widely along several dimensions.

Some advertisements make only oblique narrative references to racialized issues, such as crime, welfare, or government spending, without presenting images of blacks or other minorities at all. For example, an advertisement run by Bob Dole's campaign in 1996 criticized Bill Clinton for sponsoring several "wasteful spending proposals" such as "midnight basketball" and "alpine slides in Puerto Rico," but contained no visual images of blacks. Other appeals might emphasize racial or ethnic group comparisons with regard to access to jobs or other resources, with the goal of implying that one group is disadvantaged relative to another. An advertisement sponsored by the California Democratic Party in 1996, for example, highlighted Clinton's efforts to stop illegal immigration. The ad was filled with images of Hispanics coming across the Mexican/American border, while the narrator claimed that these "foreign workers" were stealing jobs from "American workers." When the narrator claimed that Clinton was working to halt the flow of illegal immigrants in order to protect "our jobs and our values." a white family appeared on screen. Finally, advertisements could contain narrative references to these same issues accompanied by racial imagery that simply make one-sided, negative attributions about blacks without comparisons with any other group. Each of these appeals is "implicitly" racial, because none makes direct verbal reference to race. Yet the size of the priming effect they produce might vary considerably because the cues they employ differ in the perceptual salience of race or the type of racial problem invoked. In this paper, we compare three types of implicit racial cues (narrative only, visual race comparisons, and visual onesided negative cues) to determine which produces the largest racial priming effect. We expect more salient. yet still implicit, racial cues to produce larger priming effects, thus the latter two types of cues should be strongest.2

Third, what is the psychological mechanism underlying racial priming? Previous work has assumed that cognitive accessibility moderates media-based priming effects (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 2001; Price and Tewksbury 1997; Valentino 1999). In other words, ideas and considerations that have been activated recently or often, those at the "top-of-the-head," are more likely to be used automatically in subsequent decision-making tasks (Taylor and Fiske 1978). No study to date, however, has demonstrated that news or political advertising primes concepts in memory via this automatic process.3 In fact, recent evidence suggests a much more intentioned psychological mediator: inferences about the importance of a given criterion for the decision at hand (Miller and Krosnick 2000; Nelson,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> With this type of appeal, one could presume that it was racialized only by observing its effects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For reasons we delineate below, we do not make a directional prediction with regard to whether group comparisons or one-sided negative depictions of blacks will produce the largest effects

negative depictions of blacks will produce the largest effects.

<sup>3</sup> Fazio and Williams (1986) show that more accessible attitudes have a larger impact on preferences for the 1984 presidential candidates, but they do not manipulate the accessibility of these attitudes.

Clawson, and Oxley 1997). We argue, however, that racial priming *must* be mediated by the cognitive accessibility of racial attitudes in memory. The reason is that people are motivated to suppress the outward expression of racist attitudes and behaviors (Gaertner and Dovidio 1986). When people pay close attention to a racial message, they are better able to identify and suppress priming effects (Blair and Banaji 1996). For most people, the theory goes, negative racial attitudes affect political thinking automatically or not at all.

Additional evidence about the psychological mechanism underlying race priming can be gathered by examining whether the effect is always triggered by images of blacks or if it depends upon whether the ad resonates with negative stereotypes in particular. It has been suggested that exposure to stereotype-discrepant information boosts attention to the stimulus, so that the information can be explained and either incorporated into the existing cognitive structure or rejected entirely (Brewer, Dull, and Lui 1981; Hastie 1981). If racial priming takes place automatically, the added thought stimulated by a stereotype-inconsistent cue might reduce priming (Mendelberg 2001).4 Therefore, we expect that appeals that violate the stereotype of blacks as undeserving beneficiaries of government spending, or those that challenge the notion that whites deserve those same benefits, will diminish the priming effect.

To summarize, we predict that racial cues embedded in standard political appeals prime racial attitudes during campaigns. This effect should manifest itself as an increase in the impact of racial attitudes on candidate preference. Since racial cues activate primarily racial attitudes, the power of nonracial global values such as egalitarianism and individualism, or predispositions such as party identification, should not be affected as strongly. Second, we attempt to determine which types of implicit cues—those in which the narrative alone invokes racialized issues, those wherein a comparison of racial group access to valued resources is visually presented (with whites apparently disadvantaged), or those that visually imply that blacks are undeservingmost powerfully prime attitudes toward blacks. Third, we investigate whether racial priming is mediated by the cognitive accessibility of racial considerations in memory. We expect racially counter-stereotypical cues to undermine priming, ostensibly by stimulating conscious processing of the racial content of the

Determining the scope of racial priming, and the mechanism by which it occurs, is important for several reasons. First, if such a phenomenon exists, it suggests that racial attitudes continue to exert a powerful influence on American politics and, at least to some extent, this role is dependent on elite communication strate-

gies. Furthermore, it would indicate that racial attitudes can be activated by basic appeals about government spending, not just issues that touch directly on negative stereotypes about blacks (e.g., welfare and crime). In other words, such findings would undermine the current perception among most whites that the power of racism in American politics has largely disappeared (Schuman et al. 1997).

Second, implicit racial priming is inherently manipulative, as it encourages voters to evaluate candidates based on criteria they would likely ignore if they were aware of the intent of the appeal. Finally, implicitly racial messages may heighten social group conflicts not only by propagating negative stereotypes about racial minorities, but by reinforcing their political relevance. If we are ever to resolve the "American dilemma" (Mrydal 1944), therefore, we must understand whether and how elite communication strategies activate racial considerations in contemporary American politics. If implicit racial priming is rare or relatively weak in its effects, then our continued focus on the phenomenon would be at best a waste of intellectual energy. At worst, it might distract us from the damage that obvious and blatant racism produces.

#### **METHODS AND PROCEDURES**

Experiments are now widely accepted as a valid method for studying political communication processes and effects such as agenda setting, priming, and framing (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Nelson and Kinder, 1996; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Iyengar 1991; Mendelberg 1997, 2001; Domke, McCoy, and Torres 1999; Valentino 1999). The method's greatest strength is its ability to isolate the causal impact of communication factors on political attitudes and behavior. The direct manipulation of media content, coupled with random assignment of subjects to treatment and control conditions, produces strong inferences about specific elements of a message that alter citizens' decision-making criteria. This methodology is especially useful for studying the psychological processes underlying media effects. We therefore employ an experiment to test our hypotheses about the extent and nature of implicit racial priming.

Several experimental studies of media-based priming rely on undergraduate student samples [(Miller and Krosnick 2000; Mendelberg 1997; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997); but see Iyengar and Kinder (1987); Iyengar (1991); and Mendelberg (2000) for examples of experiments employing adult samples]. The use of such samples raises concerns about the generalizability of results, since undergraduates usually have limited personal experience with the political process and therefore may be especially vulnerable to persuasive campaign communication. Therefore nonstudent adult subjects are desirable in studying the impact of political advertising on candidate evaluations.

Most racial priming studies focus exclusively on white Americans. One justification for the decision to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Mendelberg (2001) also examines the effects of counter-stereotypic images on racial priming. However, she examines only the effects of negative portrayals of whites rather than positive portrayals of African Americans. As described more fully below, we test both

restrict such analyses to whites is the particular interest in the impact of white racial attitudes on race-relevant policy opinion. The concept of symbolic racism (Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 1988), in particular, was designed solely with white Americans in mind. Subsequent studies that utilize this concept, or its next-of-kin racial resentment, analyze exclusively nonblack respondents (Kinder and Sanders 1996; Mendelberg 1997, 2001). In keeping with this practice, we too focus on nonblacks. though we do so reluctantly. We believe that the theory of implicit communication applies to blacks as well as whites, though individual differences will certainly moderate the size of the effect (Lau 1988; Devine 1989). Indeed, when we run our analyses with blacks included. our results are essentially identical. We do not, unfortunately, have enough African American respondents to test adequately the theory on different racial groups separately. Ultimately, however, the theory of racial priming must be extended to include and understand the reactions of all audience members.

Our study was conducted in a computer lab at the Marsh Center for Journalistic Performance at the University of Michigan, with a total of 346 adult, nonstudent subjects in late June through early July of 2000.<sup>5</sup> Subjects were recruited with flyers in a downtown area, at local businesses, and in university office buildings. Our convenience sample is not perfectly representative of the nation as a whole: it contains too many college-educated respondents (42%) and too few Republicans (19%). The sample does, however, contain reasonable variation along several important demographic and attitudinal dimensions.<sup>6</sup>

Respondents were told they would receive \$15 for watching several television advertisements and answering questions about "current events." As subjects entered the lab they were randomly assigned to one of several advertising conditions, which are described below, and then escorted to a computer terminal. To minimize interviewer biases, subjects interacted solely with the computer throughout the interview. Once the subjects completed a demographic questionnaire, the computer instructed them to don a pair of headphones and watch a series of television advertisements. Each subject viewed three advertisements. The control group viewed three common product commercials.<sup>7</sup> Those in the treatment conditions viewed two product ads and a political spot that we constructed. After viewing the ads, subjects immediately performed a lexical task designed to measure the accessibility of racial attitudes in memory. Following this task, respondents answered an extensive posttest questionnaire that included candidate evaluations, issue importance ratings, and racial

and political attitudes.<sup>8</sup> Subjects were then debriefed, paid, and dismissed.<sup>9</sup>

#### THE EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATION

One limitation of many experimental media effects studies is the absence of realistic stimuli. Producing and manipulating realistic political advertisements is technically challenging and resource intensive. As a result, most priming studies utilize news coverage, which is plentiful and easy to edit, as stimulus material (Gilliam and Iyengar 2000; Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Mendelberg 1997, 2001; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997). Since political advertisements and campaign news coverage are likely to differ in terms of the source's perceived credibility and motivation, we decided that it was critical to manipulate particular racial cues embedded in standard political appeals. The only way to achieve this kind of control is to construct the advertisements from the ground up. We first produced a narrative focusing on general government spending, taxes, and funding for health care. We chose George W. Bush as the sponsoring candidate because Republicans are typically viewed as most competent on economic and spending issues (Petrocik 1996). Furthermore, the Republican Party has targeted government spending on "wasteful" programs that benefited particular groups in society (Edsall and Edsall 1991). The narrative plays into these assumptions intentionally.10

A complete description of the experimental treatments used in the first part of the study is presented in Table 1. After invoking Bush's "dedication to an America with strong values," the male narrator contrasts Bush with Democrats who would "spend your tax dollars on wasteful government programs." Bush, the narrator continues, pledges to cut taxes because "you know best how to spend the money you earn." The second half of the narrative focuses on health care, with the claim that Bush will reform an "unfair system"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> After excluding black subjects, our sample size drops to 293.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Women also made up about half of our sample, and conservatives represented about 30%. There were no significant differences across cells of the design in the proportions of these sociodemographic and partisan variables. Therefore, differences we observe between conditions can be attributed to the stimuli.

These were Distributed to the stimuli.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> These were Duralast Batteries, Staples Office Supplies, and Wallside Windows, in that order. In the treatment conditions, those who viewed the political spot did not see the Staples commercial.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> We treat political and racial attitudes as independent variables in our analyses. Technically, then, we should have placed all these items in the pretest. Unfortunately, we would then run the risk of priming respondents to think about race and politics before exposure to the advertisement, thereby confounding the potential effects of the cues we manipulated. We decided, therefore, to place these measures in the posttest. We were concerned that what we describe as "priming" effects (where candidate evaluations are brought into line with attitudes about race) might in fact be "projection" effects (where attitudes about race are brought into line with candidate evaluations). Given that racial attitudes and other political predispositions are acquired at an early age and stable throughout the life span, we felt that this was unlikely. This is also the standard procedure in many priming studies (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; Mendelberg 1997; 2001; Valentino 1999). Mean levels of racial and political predispositions did not change substantially as a function of exposure.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Since we expose subjects to fictitious ads sponsored by an actual candidate, we provided an extensive debriefing interview to ensure that no one left with the mistaken impression that the advertisement they saw was authentic.

We do not assume that only George W. Bush or only Republican candidates in general are capable of or motivated to prime racial attitudes. Either party may have incentives, depending on the circumstances, to activate racial or other group dimensions.

Narrative	Neutral Visuals	Race Comparison	Undeserving Blacks
George W. Bush, dedicated to building an America with strong values	George Bush in crowd shaking hands	George Bush in crowd shaking hands	George Bush in crowd shaking hands
Democrats want to spend your tax dollars on wasteful government programs, but George W. Bush will cut taxes because you know best how to spend the money you earn.	Image of Statue of Liberty, Treasury building Bush sitting on couch, residential street (no people)	Black person counting money, black mother and child in office Bush sitting on couch, white person writing check, white person counting money, white teacher	Black person counting money, black mother and child in office Bush sitting on couch, residential street (no people)
Governor Bush cares about families.	Laboratory workers (race unclear) looking into microscopes	White parents walking with child	Residential street (shot continued as above)
He'll reform an unfair system that only provides health care for some, while others go without proper treatment because their employer can't afford it.	Medical files	White nurse assisting black mother, child White mother holding child	White nurse assisting black mother, child Medical files
When he's president, every hard-working American will have affordable, high- quality health care.	X-rays against lit background	Bush talking to white family, Bush talking to white child, Bush kissing white girl	X-rays against lit background
George W. Bush, a fresh start for America	Bush, arm around wife. Screen reads "George W. Bush" and "A Fresh Start"	Bush, arm around wife. Screen reads "George W. Bush" and "A Fresh Start"	Bush, arm around wife. Screen reads "George W. Bush" and "A Fresh Start"

that only provides health care for some, while others go without proper treatment because their employer can't afford it." The narrator closes the 30-sec spot with the refrain, "George W. Bush, a fresh start for America."

By itself, the advertisement's narrative carries no obvious racial significance. Only if the language of wasteful government, unfair allocation of government resources, and taxation carries racial connotations for some viewers could this appeal prime attitudes about blacks. In the neutral visuals condition, presented in Table 1, we insert racially neutral visuals such as the Statue of Liberty, the Treasury building, and residential neighborhoods (devoid of people) over this narrative. When health care is invoked, racially ambiguous images of the medical profession appear. 11 The resulting ad contains no visual race cues but delivers the "wasteful government spending" message quite clearly.

racial cues are substituted for some of the neutral symbolism overlaying the basic narrative. In what we call the race comparison condition, an image of a black

In the second and third versions of the ad, visual

person counting money is followed by that of a black woman and child in an office setting. At this point, the narrator says, "Democrats want to spend your tax dollars on wasteful government programs." As the narrator notes that Bush supports tax cuts "because you know best how to spend the money you earn," white images appear. Further, as the narrator highlights Bush's intention to "reform an unfair system that only provides health care for some ...," an image of a black mother and child in a hospital bed are on screen. When the narrator refers to other Americans going without proper medical treatment "because their employer can't afford it," a white mother and child appear. The other visuals in the ad remain identical to those in the neutral version. Finally, in what we refer to as the undeserving blacks condition, the white images in the racial comparison cell are removed, so that only black images with negative connotations remain. These three versions of the ad all carry implicit racial cues: the first simply refers to issues that might carry racial significance; the second visually highlights racial comparisons, with the implication that whites are receiving fewer resources than blacks; and the third visually depicts blacks as undeserving.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The individuals shown are wearing full-body lab coats and masks that obscure racial characteristics.

Narrative	Deserving Blacks	Deserving Whites	Undeserving Whites
George W. Bush, dedicated to building an America with strong values	George Bush in crowd shaking hands, black woman with American flag in the background, black veteran smiling	George Bush in crowd shaking hands	George Bush in crowd shaking hands Image of Statue of Liberty
Democrats want to spend your tax dollars on wasteful government	Treasury building	Treasury building	White person counting money, white mother and child in office
programs, but George W. Bush will cut taxes because you know best how to spend the money you earn.	Bush sitting on couch, black person laying money on a counter	Bush sitting on couch, white person writing a check, white person counting money	Bush sitting on couch, residential street (no people)
Governor Bush cares about families.	Black family using a computer, black family eating at a restaurant	White teacher, white parents walking with child	Residential street (shot continued as above)
He'll reform an unfair system that only provides health care for some, while others go without proper treatment because their employer can't afford it.	Laboratory workers (race unclear) looking into microscopes Black women holding baby	Laboratory workers (race unclear) looking into microscopes White mother holding child	White mother holding newborn receiving care in hospital Medical files
When he's president, every hard-working American will have affordable, high- quality health care.	Bush shaking hands with black children, black kids sitting in school yard, Bush sitting in classroom reading with black kids	Bush talking to white family, Bush talking to white child, Bush kissing white girl	X-rays against lit background
George W. Bush, a fresh start for America	Bush, arm around wife. Screen reads "George W. Bush" and "A Fresh Start"	Bush, arm around wife. Screen reads "George W. Bush" and "A Fresh Start"	Bush, arm around wife. Screen reads "George V Bush" and "A Fresh Start"

To test the impact of stereotype-inconsistent cues, three additional versions of the ad are constructed by rearranging the timing of the visual race cues. Transcriptions of these versions are detailed in Table 2. First, we attempt to produce positive connotations about blacks by inserting images of blacks at the point when the narrator claims, "You know best how to spend the money you earn." Blacks are also shown when the narrator mentions that Bush "cares about families" and when he states that under Bush "every hardworking American will receive affordable, high-quality health care." We call this condition the deserving blacks condition, it provides a direct, counter-stereotypical comparison to the cell involving blacks as undeserving beneficiaries of government spending. The final two versions of the ad depict whites as either deserving (labeled deserving whites, in column 3) or undeserving (labeled undeserving whites, in column 4) beneficiaries of government spending. These additional cells create a comparison between stereotype consistent versus inconsistent cues that target either whites or blacks.

#### **RESULTS**

Our first hypothesis predicts racially coded appeals will boost the explanatory power of racial attitudes on candidate evaluations. To test this, we estimate the impact of racial attitudes on vote choice across the conditions of the design. The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater support for Bush relative to Gore. We examine three measures of racial attitudes: racial resentment, laissez-faire racism, and perceived influence of blacks. Though they are composed of different survey items, these indicators are conceptually interrelated. The racial resentment scale is based on the contention that "blacks do not try hard enough to overcome the difficulties they face and that they take what they have not earned" (Kinder and Sanders 1996, 106). The concept of laissez-faire racism springs from the idea that maintenance of racial

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See the Appendix for exact question wordings. Cronbach's  $\alpha$  for the racial resentment scale was 0.78.

TABLE 3. Predicting Candidate Preference with Racial Attitudes and Racialized Issue Opinions, by Condition

		Racial Attitudes		Racialized Is	sue Opinions
Dependent Variable Is Candidate Preference (Bush = High)	Racial Resentment	Laissez-Faire Racism	Blacks Have Too Much Influence	Opposition to Affirmative Action	Opposition to Welfare Spending
Attitude or opinion					
(see column heading)	0.0 <b>1</b>	-0.30	-0.12	-0.19	-0.09
	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.19)
Neutral visuals	_0.18	-0.23	-11	-0.23	-0.10
	(0.17)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.14)
Race comparison	_0.11 <sup>′</sup>	_`0.26 <sup>´</sup>	_0.18´	_0.03 <sup>°</sup>	-0.01
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.17)	(0.15)
Undeserving blacks	-0.22	-0.31*	_0.27*	_`0.25 <sup>´</sup>	_0.18´
	(0.19)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.14)
Attitude or opinion $\times$ neutral visuals	0.41	0.49*	`0.25 <sup>°</sup>	`0.45*	`0.24 <sup>´</sup>
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.24)	(0.27)
Attitude or opinion $\times$ race comparison	0.35	0.61*	0.46*	0.18	`0.17 <sup>′</sup>
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.30)
Attitude or opinion $\times$ undeserving blacks	0.61*	0.77**	0.60**	0.51*	`0.53 <sup>*</sup>
	(0.37)	(0.31)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.28)
Number of cases	156	156	156	156	156
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.21	0.20

Note: Entries are ordinary least-squares regression coefficients. The dependent variable is the 5-point candidate preference item, running from strong support for Gore to strong support for Bush. This variable has been recoded to run from 0 to 1. The impact of each attitude scale is estimated separately. Baseline effect corresponds to the main effect of racial attitude/issue opinion in the control condition. Incremental effects are estimated with interactions between treatment dummy variables and the attitude/issue. Controls in each analysis, not shown here, include political ideology, gender, and educational attainment. Sample sizes for each cell were as controls: control = 49; Neutral visuals cell = 43; race comparison cell = 31; undeserving blacks cell = 35. \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01. Predictions are unidirectional; significance tests are one-tailed.

hierarchies no longer requires widespread endorsement of the idea that blacks are genetically inferior to whites (Bobo, Kluegel, and Smith 1997). Instead, it presumes only that all major obstacles facing blacks as a group have been removed. As a result, governmentsponsored efforts to address racial inequality are unnecessary.<sup>13</sup> A third indicator focuses more narrowly on perceived racial conflict: the extent to which blacks have "too much influence in American life and politics." We include results for all three of these indicators in part to check the robustness of the priming effect across measures of similar concepts. However, one might expect that the last two concepts, which tap into competition between whites and blacks for societal resources, should be primed most powerfully by the race comparison cues, while racial resentment may be activated most powerfully by the undeserving blacks condition.

Table 3 displays the results of our first test. Each column represents a separate OLS regression equation where the candidate preference scale is regressed upon a given racial attitude or issue opinion measure (listed in the column head), dummy variables for each treatment condition (with the control group as the excluded category), and interactions between the racial attitude measure and each dummy variable to capture the slope shift associated with exposure to each ad. With this specification, we can compare the baseline

Candidate Preference =  $B_1$ (Racial Attitude)

- $+ B_2$ (Neutral Visuals)
- $+ B_5$ (Neutral Visuals \* Racial Attitude)
- $+ B_3$ (Race Comparison)
- $+ B_6$ (Race Comparison \* Racial Attitude)
- $+ B_4$ (Undeserving Blacks)
- $+ B_7$ (Undeserving Blacks \* Racial Attitude)
- $+ B_{8-10}(Controls) + Constant$

Our hypotheses hinge most directly on the direction and magnitude of coefficients  $B_1$ ,  $B_5$ ,  $B_6$  and  $B_7$ . Tables 3 and 4 present all the coefficients in the model

effect of racial attitudes with the impact of those same attitudes in the presence of various primes. To guard against the possibility that differences in the distribution of sociodemographic or political variables across cells of the design might account for differences we observe, controls for global ideology, gender, and education are included. The functional form of the model is as follows:

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>$  See the Appendix for exact question wordings. Cronbach's  $\alpha$  for the laissez-faire racism scale was 0.79.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> There are no significant differences in the distributions of these variables across cells, and excluding these controls does not alter the direction or magnitude of the results.

TABLE 4.	The Impact of Partisan Identification and Global Values on Candidate Preference, by
Condition	•

Dependent Variable Is Candidate Preference (Bush = High)	Party Identification	Individualism	Egalitarianism
Attitude (see column heading)	0.91**	0.20	0.06
	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.15)
Neutral visuals	0.19	0.03	0.10
	(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.11)
Race comparison	0.25*	0.08	`0.14 <sup>´</sup>
	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.11)
Undeserving blacks	0.05	-0.08	`0.11
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.11)
Attitude $\times$ neutral visuals	-0.27	-0.03	_`0.17 <sup>´</sup>
	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.20)
Attitude × race comparison	-0.30	_`0.05 <sup>´</sup>	_`0.15 <sup>´</sup>
	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.21)
Attitude × undeserving blacks	-0.02	0.16	_`0.17 <sup>´</sup>
·-	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.20)
Number of cases	156	156	156
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.32	0.04	0.05

Note: Entries are ordinary least-squares regression coefficients. The dependent variable is the 5-point candidate preference item, running from strong support for Gore to strong support for Bush. This variable has been recoded to run from 0 to 1. The impact of each attitude scale was estimated separately. Baseline effect in first row corresponds to the main effect of racial attitude in the control condition. Incremental effects are estimated with interactions between treatment dummy variables and the attitude/issue opinion listed in the column head. Controls in each analysis include gender and educational attainment. Sample sizes for each cell were as follows: control = 49; neutral visuals cell = 43; race comparison cell = 31; undeserving blacks cell = 35. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01. Significance tests are one-tailed.

except for the controls.<sup>15</sup> Our predictions are directional: If racial attitudes are primed, the interactions will be positive.

Entries in the first row in Table 3 are estimates of the baseline effect of each racial attitude/issue measure on the candidate preference scale. The intercept shifts associated with exposure to each advertising condition are located in the second, third, and fourth rows. All of these coefficients, across all attitudinal dimensions, are negative. This means that for those very low in racial resentment or other forms of racial conservatism, seeing any of our ads boosts support for Gore. These main effects make sense intuitively, since subjects these subjects are perhaps prone to vote for Gore to begin with. However, these coefficients are rarely statistically significant. More important for our hypothesis are the slope shifts between the control group and each treatment group, presented in rows 5 through 7. To calculate the overall effect of a given attitude among those exposed to a particular ad, one must combine the baseline effect in the first row with the slope shift represented by the interaction coefficient of interest in that same column.

Reading down the rows in the first column, we see that *racial resentment* has little effect on support for Bush among those subjects who did not view a political advertisement. The interaction in the fourth row indicates that, among those who saw an ad with neutral visual cues, the impact of racial resentment is boosted.

The resulting association between this racial attitude and preference for Bush over Gore in this condition is  $0.42\,(0.01+0.41)$ . In the fifth row, we see that the priming effect of the race comparison cues is substantively similar to that of the neutral version (0.35). Neither of these slope shifts is statistically significant, but their direction is consistent with the first hypothesis. Finally, in the undeserving blacks condition, the impact of racial resentment reaches its zenith, at  $0.62\,(0.01+0.61)$ . This statistically significant shift indicates a large substantive effect: In the presence of the undeserving blacks cue, moving from the lowest to the highest level of racial resentment produces a shift across more than half of the entire candidate preference scale running from Gore to Bush.

The basic pattern of results is strongly replicated when our attention shifts to other measures of racial attitudes. The impacts of *laissez-faire racism* and *blacks have too much influence* are statistically indistinguishable from 0 in the control group but grow large and positive for respondents who see ads containing implicit racial primes. The racial comparison condition strongly primes both of these attitude dimensions. Across all three measures, however, the race priming effect is largest in the undeserving blacks condition.

The last two columns in Table 3 examine whether implicit race cues prime racialized policy opinions as predictors of candidate preference. Opposition to affirmative action is statistically unrelated to candidate preference among those who saw no political advertisement. All three versions of the advertisement, however, produce a positive relationship between these

 $<sup>^{\</sup>rm 15}$  Results for the full model are available upon request from the first author.

variables, and the difference reaches statistical significance for the neutral visuals and undeserving blacks conditions. The same basic pattern is replicated for opposition to welfare spending for the poor. In other words, the impact of the race comparison cues is somewhat weak as a prime for opinions about these racialized policies, while the undeserving blacks condition produces a large effect.

These results confirm our suspicion about the power of subtle racial cues. However, it is possible that some other set of predispositions or values is actually activated by these appeals and that our indicators of racial attitudes simply covary with those other dimensions. Next, therefore, we focus on partisanship and global values such as individualism and egalitarianism. If our ads prime these dimensions, the pattern of relationships between them and candidate preference should be similar to that observed for racial attitudes across the cells of the design. The evidence presented in Table 4, however, suggests that this is not the case. The results for party identification are presented in the first column. In the first row, we see that party identification is a powerful predictor of candidate preference in the baseline condition. Exposure to racial cues, however, does nothing to boost this relationship.<sup>16</sup> In fact, the impact of partisanship declines slightly, though not significantly, in the presence of race cues.

These ads may also activate nonracial values such as individualism and egalitarianism.<sup>17</sup> Indeed, the narrator invokes the size of government, taxation, and fairness in the distribution of health care resources. However, the results in the second and third columns in Table 4 do not provide much support for these alternative hypotheses. Individualism is never very strongly or significantly related to vote preference. The impact of individualism is smaller in the neutral visuals and race comparison visuals cells, and slightly larger in the undeserving blacks condition, but none of these differences approaches statistical significance. The case for egalitarianism is also weak. If the our ads primed that dimension, then egalitarians should be more likely to support Bush after seeing it because he makes a special plea for equal treatment. In fact, the relationship is negative in the control group and is more negative in each of the ad conditions, as the interactions in the fifth through seventh rows suggest. In other words, these cues make egalitarians slightly less likely to support Bush. None of these differences is statistically significant, however, and the overall pattern suggests that nonracial political orientations were not primed at all.18

scale running from strong Democrat to strong Republican.

17 These concepts are measured with standard National Election Study items. For question wording, see the Appendix.

would have produced a large and unwieldy model to present. We therefore tested each of these dimensions separately, assuming that the absence of changes in the bivariate relationship indicates an absence of priming. It is difficult to imagine how these nonracial

## THE PSYCHOLOGICAL MEDIATOR OF RACIAL PRIMING: ACCESSIBILITY OR IMPORTANCE?

The results presented thus far suggest that a variety of implicit racial cues, embedded in appeals about nonracial issues, can serve as racial primes, especially those implying that blacks are undeserving recipients of government spending. However, we still know little about the particular psychological process underlying these effects. The theory proposed by Mendelberg (2001) identifies accessibility as the mediator: racial attitudes are made more accessible in memory such that they are automatically employed in subsequent decisions. We tested for accessibility affects in the standard way, using a lexical task identical to the one employed by Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997), who in turn draws on a technique developed by Fazio (1990). Immediately after viewing the ads, subjects were told that they would need to discriminate between words and nonsense letter strings flashed on the computer screen by pressing keys marked on the keyboard. 19 Subjects were asked to perform this task "as quickly and accurately as possible" and were given several trial letter strings for practice. A randomized series of letter strings was then flashed on the screen, one at a time. Five words were intended to be race-relevant, including "black," "white," "lazy," "drug," and "crime." Nonracial filler words ("cars," "yellow," and "blue") were also shown as distractors. Nonsense letter strings included "awor." "clipr," "dryck," "fsapt," "gammr," "poprq," "seltf," and "lramp." The length of time between the appearance of the letter string and the pressing of a key was measured by the computer. The time to respond to the letter string was transformed via natural log to normalize the distribution, and extreme outliers were removed. The basic assumption underlying this task is that respondents will take less time to identify racerelevant words when race has been primed. Previous research has shown this technique to be a valid measure of cognitive accessibility (Fazio 1990).


Figure 1 suggests that racial cues increased the accessibility of racial schemas in memory. Compared to the control group, each of the three advertising conditions records faster response times to race relevant words (neutral visuals, t = 2.17, p < 0.05; racial comparison visuals, t = 2.12, p < 0.05; undeserving blacks visuals, t = 3.01, p < 0.01). An analysis of variance reveals the significance of the overall trend (F = 3.36, 3 df,

attitudes could be primed in the omnibus model if effects are absent using the bivariate setup.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> Party identification is measured in the standard way, drawn directly from the National Election Studies, and collapsed to form a 7-point scale running from strong Democrat to strong Republican.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> We could have tested these alternatives with a saturated model containing all condition dummies, each attitude dimension, and interactions between condition dummies and attitudinal measures. This would have produced a large and unwieldy model to present. We therefore tested each of these dimensions separately, assuming that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> We choose to measure accessibility immediately after the stimulus for all subjects. Other studies, including those by Nelson et al. (1997) and Miller and Krosnick (2001), do not measure accessibility and importance for every subject, because of the concern that the accessibility task might signal what the experimenters deem important, thereby creating a demand that might affect importance ratings appearing later in the questionnaire. We find this implausible in the current study, because the judgment made (word versus nonsense string) is unrelated to racial attitudes, the advertising stimuli, or politics in general. Still, if such demands exist, this test is a conservative one because they should depress differences between control and treatment groups.



Note: Bars represent mean log milleseconds of response time for race-relevant word probes. Race-relevant word probes included "white," "black," "drug," "lazy," and "crime." The analysis of variance used to estimate the significance of differences between conditions included controls for education, gender, and ideology.

p < 0.01). These results corroborate the previous evidence that racial cues prime viewers' attitudes about blacks, but they also illuminate the psychological mechanism: the accessibility of those attitudes in memory. The narrative alone did much of the work, but adding visual racial cues boosted the accessibility of these attitudes even further. Finally, to control for individual differences in reading speed, the response time to filler words was subtracted from the response time to race-relevant words. The pattern of results across the cells is unchanged for this relative response time measure, with the undeserving blacks and racial comparison conditions producing the fastest scores (F = 2.91, 3 df, p < 0.05).

Extending the work of Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997) and Miller and Krosnick (2001), we hypothesize that these ads may alter the level of *importance* viewers assign to group representation in candidate evaluations. Their results suggest that this difference in importance, and not simply the increased accessibility of racial schemas in memory, could drive the slope shifts displayed in Table 3. We examine this possibility by asking respondents to rate the importance of various criteria in their own voting calculus. One item read, "When you evaluate a candidate for president, how important

are the groups in society the candidate cares about?" Racial cues might boost the mean score on this item if the importance of group representation mediates the impact of the appeal. There is some evidence that this occurs. The importance of group concerns is slightly higher in the neutral and racial comparison cells (5.23) and 5.13, respectively, on a 1-7 scale) than in the control (4.82), though neither of these differences reaches statistical significance. However, the mean importance of groups in the undeserving blacks condition is even higher (5.71), and this difference is significant (t = 2.46, p < 0.01). The overall trend, however, falls short of statistical significance (F = 1.44, 3 df, p = 0.23). In sum, the undeserving blacks condition seems to boost the importance of groups as a voting criterion, while the neutral and racial comparison cues do not.

These results suggest that exposure to implicit racial cues, especially the undeserving blacks cues, makes racial attitudes more accessible and makes group concerns more important in the voting calculus. Therefore, we need another test to determine whether accessibility or importance ratings actually mediates the racial priming effect. According to the technique employed by Miller and Krosnick (2000), accessibility will be determined to mediate priming if the interaction between

TABLE 5.	Accessibility Versus Importance as Mediators of Priming Effects of Ads on Candidate
Preference	

Dependent Variable Is Candidate Preference	Model					
(Bush = High)	Racial Accessibility	Group Importance	Joint			
Racial resentment	-0.07	0.49	0.24			
	(0.17)	(0.39)	(0.41)			
Accessibility of race	_`0.23 <sup>*</sup>	` <b>—</b>	0.23*			
	(0.12)		(0.12)			
Group importance		0.04	`0.04			
		(0.04)	(0.04)			
Racial resentment × accessibility of race	0.44*	`_ ′	`0.44*			
, adda , odd mineria , addada ani, a , raida	(0.22)		(0.22)			
Racial resentment × group importance		-0.04	—`0.05 <sup>°</sup>			
The state of the s		(0.07)	(0.07)			
Number of cases	153	156	153			
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.23	0.21	0.22			

Note: Entries are unstandardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients. The dependent variable is the 5-point candidate preference item, running from strong support for Gore to strong support for Bush. This variable has been recoded to run from 0 to 1. Controls in these analyses include gender, education, and political ideology. \*p < 0.05. Significance tests are one-tailed.

accessibility and racial resentment is positive and statistically significant. In our study, this would mean that racial resentment would be boosted as a predictor of candidate evaluations primarily among those for whom race is accessible in memory. The alternative hypothesis is that citizens employ a more intentioned psychological process when evaluating candidates, such that racial resentment plays a larger role among those who decide that "the groups in society that the candidate cares about" is an important vote criterion. The results of these analyses appear in Table 5.

In the first column in the table, we estimate the effects of accessibility, racial resentment, and the interaction between the two on candidate evaluations.<sup>20</sup> For ease of interpretation, we split the response time difference scores at the median.<sup>21</sup> The coefficient in the second row corresponds to the effect of race accessibility on candidate preference when the racial resentment score is 0. This term is negative, suggesting that among those lowest in racial resentment, making race accessible leads to support for Gore. The interaction term captures the difference in the impact of accessibility as racial resentment grows. This interaction is positive and significant, implying that at higher levels of racial resentment, the accessibility of race boosts support for Bush.<sup>22</sup> The second column tests the alternative hypothesis, that inferences about the importance of group concerns mediates racial priming. If so, racial attitudes should be a better predictor of candidate evaluations among those for whom group concerns are considered

important. This does not appear to be the case. The interaction between group importance and racial attitudes is small and in the wrong direction. The third column presents the estimates for the joint model and finds accessibility undiminished as a mediator of racial priming. Overall, these results suggest that racial cues make racial concerns more accessible in memory, subsequently boosting the impact of these concerns on candidate evaluations.<sup>23</sup>

To this point, the analyses focus on stimuli that conform to racial stereotypes. Blacks are depicted as undeserving beneficiaries of, and whites are shown bearing the tax burden for, "wasteful government programs." In the second set of experimental conditions, we compare the power of stereotype consistent versus inconsistent cues as racial primes. Remember from Table 2 that we create a "deserving blacks" condition that implies that blacks are hardworking Americans supporting unidentified "others." Next we replace images of blacks in the undeserving blacks condition with whites, thereby producing an "undeserving whites" condition. Finally, we create a condition that places whites in a positive light, without any images of blacks, as a baseline against which to compare the undeserving whites cell. These additional three cells contain a total of 135 subjects beyond those analyzed above.

The prediction is that stereotype inconsistent cues might lead to more intentioned thought, thereby suppressing racial priming effects. Table 6 replicates the basic analyses from Table 3, with regard to the strength of racial attitudes as predictors of candidate preference when the black stereotype is violated. In the first row we import the previous results from the undeserving blacks condition. Recall that this cell produced powerful race priming effects, as indicated by the positive relationship

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> The constant and controls for ideology, gender, and education are not presented here.

Results are substantively equivalent and remain statistically significant when the full linear measure is employed.
 Note that this effect is pooled across all the cells of the design. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Note that this effect is pooled across all the cells of the design. The three-way interaction, accessibility  $\times$  racial attitudes  $\times$  exposure to ad, would test the hypothesis that accessibility would mediate priming differentially, depending on the salience of race in the ad. This is possible, but not predicted by the theory of implicit communication.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> We also ran these analyses for the other two racial attitude measures (laissez-faire racism and "blacks have too much influence"). The results are almost-identical in direction and magnitude.

TABLE 6. Violating Negative Black Stereotypes and the Effect of Racial Attitudes on Candidate Preference

Dependent Variable Is Candidate Preference (Bush = High)	Racial Resentment	Laissez-Faire Racism	Blacks Have Too Much Influence
Racial attitude (see column head)	0.67*	0.45	0.46*
	(0.38)	(0.29)	(0.21)
Deserving blacks	`0.35´	`0.35 <sup>*</sup>	0.02
	(0.22)	(0.18)	(0.17)
Deserving blacks × racial attitude	_`0.80 <sup>*</sup>	–`0.83 <sup>*</sup>	-0.09
	(0.43)	(0.35)	(0.28)
<i>N</i> .	79	79	79
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.11	0.13	0.17

Note: The dependent variable is the 5-point candidate preference item, running from strong support for Gore to strong support for Bush. The impact of each attitude scale on candidate preference is estimated separately. Controls in each analysis, not shown here, include gender, educational attainment, and ideology. Cell sizes are as follows: negative black visuals = 35; positive black visuals = 45. \*p < 0.05. Significance tests are one-tailed.

TABLE 7. Violating Positive White Stereotypes and the Effect of Racial Attitudes on Candidate Preference

Dependent Variable Is Candidate Preference (Bush = High)	Racial Resentment	Laissez-Faire Racism	Blacks Have Too Much Influence
Racial attitude (see column head)	0.22	-0.04	0.02
	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.16)
Undeserving white visuals	_`0.12 <sup>′</sup>	_0.14 <sup>′</sup>	-0.19
	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.16)
Undeserving white visuals × racial attitude	`0.22´	`0.27 <sup>′</sup>	0.35
	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.27)
Number of cases	88	88	88
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.20	0.17	0.19

Note: The dependent variable is the 5-point candidate preference item, running from strong support for Gore to strong support for Bush. The impact of each attitude scale on candidate preference is estimated separately. Controls in each analysis, not shown here, include gender, educational attainment, and ideology. Cell sizes are as follows: positive white cue = 57; negative white cue = 33. \*p < 0.05. Significance tests are one-tailed.

between all three racial attitude measures and the vote. When the black racial cues are stereotype-inconsistent, however, the relationship between racial attitudes and the vote disappears, as indicated by the large negative interaction term in the third row. Violating racial stereotypes with positive images of blacks dramatically undermines racial priming. The presence of black images alone, therefore, does not prime negative racial attitudes. The effect emerges only when the pairing of the visuals with the narrative subtly reinforces negative stereotypes in the mind of the viewer.

Table 7 compares the impact of white stereotypeconsistent versus inconsistent cues, and a somewhat different pattern emerges. First, none of the coefficients in the deserving white condition is very large, suggesting that this cue did not produce a strong relationship between racial attitudes and candidate preference. However, cues implying that whites are the undeserving beneficiaries of government spending *boost* the impact of racial attitudes on the vote. Only the increase in the impact of the *blacks have too much influence* item even approaches statistical significance (p = 0.09, onetailed), but the overall pattern implies that violating positive stereotypes of whites is not the same as violating negative stereotypes of blacks in terms of racial priming.<sup>24</sup>

Violating the negative black stereotype did not make racial considerations more accessible in memory relative to the control group (mean difference = 0.04 log msec, p = 0.87). Violating the white stereotype did produce slightly faster response times to race relevant words, but the difference was not statistically significant (mean difference = 0.30 log msec, p = 0.19). On the other hand, the deserving blacks condition boosted

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> These findings also allay our concern that the lexical task, and not simply our ads, primed respondents to think about race in the visually neutral condition. If such a task were powerful enough to racialize the neutral stimulus, we would expect that it might also racialize the versions of the ads with positive or negative depictions of whites. This does not happen. The impact of racial attitudes is not significantly different in the control condition compared to the positive or negative white conditions. The absence of visual race cues in the neutral cell must permit viewers to "fill in" the stereotypical group, blacks.

the self-reported importance of group considerations in the vote calculus relative to the control (mean difference = 0.65 on a 1–7 scale, p=0.03). The undeserving whites condition also significantly boosted the importance of group considerations compared to the control (mean difference = 0.91, p=0.01). This pattern suggests that counter-stereotypical cues do not make racial attitudes more accessible but, instead, may induce conscious processing of the racial content of the message, thereby increasing the self-reported importance of groups. We speculate about the explanation for this last set of results in the discussion.

#### DISCUSSION

We set out to explore how standard political appeals alter the criteria citizens use to select candidates. Three major findings emerge. First, our evidence is consistent with Edsall and Edsall's (1991) claim that the language of government spending and taxation has become racially "coded," such that its invocation in political appeals primes racial considerations even in the absence of racial imagery. More powerful effects emerge, however, when the imagery in political ads links blacks to the narrator's comments about undeserving groups. Ads that visually compare the interests of whites and blacks are slightly less powerful racial primes. Furthermore, none of the cues we manipulate prime individualism, egalitarianism, or partisan identification. We also find that racial priming is mediated by the accessibility of race in memory, not the self-reported importance of group representation. Finally, counter-stereotypic black cues suppress racial priming, while violating positive stereotypes of whites has, if anything, a positive racial priming effect.

Though the differences are small, the particular effects of the racial comparison versus the undeserving black cues conditions warrant further attention. One somewhat subtle pattern emerges from the finding that racial comparison cues primed racial attitudes that tapped the notion of resource competition in society (laissez-faire racism and "blacks have too much influence") more powerfully than they primed direct resentment toward blacks or opinions about affirmative action or welfare. The undeserving blacks cues, however, powerfully primed all three racial attitude dimensions, as well as opinions about redistributive policies such as affirmative action and welfare. This pattern suggests that raising negative attributions about blacks, without referring to implications for whites, is a powerful political strategy. Highlighting resource competition is a somewhat weaker priming agent. Why might this be the case? Two explanations seem plausible. First, the salience of the racial stimulus in the comparison condition may have been diluted by the presence of white images. On the other hand, the salience of the racial stimulus in that condition may have been so high that subjects became conscious of it and consequently suppressed racial criteria in evaluating candidates. Given that the salience of the racial stimulus and the specific problem that it raised are confounded in these two conditions, we must reserve judgment with regard to which explanation is correct.

Interesting differences in priming effects appear when racial stereotypes are violated in different ways. Although neither the black nor the white counterstereotypic cells significantly boosted the accessibility of race compared to the control group, both significantly raised the self-reported importance of group representation as a voting criterion. However, violating black stereotypes produces far weaker associations between racial attitudes and candidate evaluations than conforming to them did. Finally, violating the white stereotype slightly boosted the impact of racial attitudes compared to reinforcing the white stereotype. This pattern suggests that violating stereotypes may trigger increased attention and conscious processing of the stimulus, but the result for racial priming depends on the group involved. When the violated stereotype involves blacks, white respondents who wish to avoid race-based decision making suppress race as a criterion in their vote, even as they claim that group representation is important. When the white stereotype is violated, however, racial criteria are not suppressed because there is no obvious way that responding one way or another could be considered racist. Ironically, then, the increased importance of groups slightly boosts the association between racial attitudes and candidate evaluations in that instance.

The above speculation about the overall pattern of findings presented here is consistent with research demonstrating that priming is more powerful when subjects do not attend closely to the stimulus (Lombardi, Higgins, and Bargh 1987; Strack et al. 1993). Research on social categorization and group stereotyping also suggests that these processes operate mostly below the level of conscious awareness (Banaji and Hardin 1996; Bargh and Pietromonaco 1982). Mendelberg (2001) finds support for this as well, though she draws a dichotomous distinction between "implicit" appeals whose narratives do not mention racial groups and "explicit" ones that do. We think that it would be more useful to think of the underlying racial salience dimension as continuous: As the salience of race increases, the power of racial priming grows, until some point at which each viewer becomes conscious of the prime and begins to suppress race as a criterion. Our present findings merely provide a hint of evidence to support this claim: Some implicit cues seem more powerful than others in priming racial attitudes.

Our central finding, that subtle racial cues in political advertising can prime racial attitudes, should encourage investigations of racial priming effects beyond the classic instances of the 1988 Willie Horton ads, the Helms "White Hands" ad, and other racial appeals. It seems reasonable to expect that candidates will attempt to infuse particular group cues into the political debate, to shape the criteria that citizens use when evaluating candidates. If, as many suggest, attitudes about groups help voters organize the political world (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Conover 1984), then priming those attitudes should comprise an effective communication strategy for candidates when they expect a

large proportion of the "activated" group to vote for them.

Our results are consistent with Mendelberg's (2001). but we do not agree with all of her conclusions. Highly salient, or explicit, racial appeals may be less effective than more subtle or implicit ones, because some voters might intentionally avoid racial criteria when they become aware of them. Similarly, stereotypeinconsistent cues may also suppress priming by making people spend time thinking about how to reconcile the new information with prior beliefs. However, this does not necessarily mean that a different candidate will be preferred. Sensitizing people to the racial content of an appeal may undermine its persuasive impact, or it may lead to a more involved set of rationalizations to justify support for a prior choice. Individuals might suppress the expression of racial conservatism while leaving their candidate preference unchanged, thereby reducing the correlation between racial attitudes and vote choice. Further research on the behavioral consequences of long-term exposure to racial cues, varied across a wide range of perceptual salience, is needed.

These results leave several questions unanswered. First, further exploration is needed to determine the message characteristics that drive automatic, versus intentioned, priming effects. Prior work has found little evidence that accessibility mediates the impact of media exposure. Why do we get such strong and consistent results in this regard? One speculation is that the stimuli and the judgment tasks used in previous studies demand more conscious thought, thereby overwhelming subtler, automatic effects. Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley (1997), for example, had subjects view news stories about a Ku Klux Klan rally, framed in terms of either free speech or public order. The dependent variable in their analysis was tolerance for racist groups. Perhaps these stimuli, and the judgments they were designed to affect, required more careful consideration than was present in the political appeals and judgments we are concerned with in this paper. When either the priming stimulus or the target decision requires a great deal of conscious attention, we expect racial priming to be diminished. In the case of exposure to 30-sec advertisements and candidate preference formation, however, racial priming may exhibit quite pervasive effects.

Our results are based on a disproportionately educated and Democratic sample compared to the nation as a whole. We are somewhat reluctant, therefore, to generalize our findings to all citizens. However, studies employing entirely different samples have discovered similar effects (Mendelberg 2001; Reeves 1997; Valentino 1999). Further, by exposing a largely Democratic audience to a Republican message, ours is probably a conservative test of the theory, because priming may be more powerful when the party of the sponsor matches the partisan leanings of the viewer (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1995). Nevertheless, studies that vary source characteristics and test racial priming hypotheses across a wider demographic and partisan range are warranted.

#### CONCLUSION

The evidence provided here, in combination with recent theoretical and empirical advances, suggests that a broadening of the debate about race in American politics is necessary. Far from being a spent force, the impact of race and racism in America can emerge from some of the most common political messages that mainstream candidates rely upon as their stock-in-trade. But this force is not overwhelming and constant, nor is it beyond the power of elites and masses to control. When campaigns emphasize policies that have been linked previously to blacks, they boost the impact of racial attitudes on candidate evaluations. When they reinforce negative stereotypes, the impact of racial attitudes grows. But when they violate those stereotypes by presenting blacks in a favorable light, or present images of nonstereotyped groups in these negative roles, that impact declines. When citizens are aware of the racial cues in a particular message, they seem to suppress racial thinking.

Unfortunately, the potential remedies for race priming we can offer-violating negative stereotypes, avoiding overemphasis on racialized issues—are meager, short-term fixes for a larger problem. By priming group attitudes, candidates take advantage of the ways citizens store political information in memory and attempt to simplify decision making. How, then, might one control some of the more pernicious effects of implicit racial priming during campaigns? A start would be to reduce elite incentives to prime racial attitudes in the first place, by breaking down invalid linkages between groups and social problems from which stereotypes spring. For example, the public's misperception of the proportion of welfare recipients who are African American could perhaps be remedied if news organizations took a proactive stance against perpetuating these inaccurate, negative stereotypes (Gilens 1999). Subsequently, invoking welfare issues, even coupled with images of blacks, might not pack the same punch when it comes to priming racial attitudes. The more general version of this plea is as controversial in some circles as it is commonsensical in others: We must engage in honest public discussion of the ways in which race, gender, and other group cleavages affect policymaking, election outcomes, and day-to-day living conditions in America. To begin this dialogue, we must recognize that implicit racial cues have been, and continue to be, cues that matter.

#### APPENDIX: SCALE/INDEX CONSTRUCTION

Racial resentment consisted of four items, agree strongly to disagree strongly, recoded so that high values mean more racially conservative responses. Four items were additively scaled. (1) "The Irish, Italians, Jews and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors." (2) "Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work there way out of the lower class." (3) "It is really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites." (4) "Over the past few

years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve." Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.78$ .

Laissez-faire racism consisted of the three items, coded so that higher values indicate denial of discrimination, and additively scaled. The battery began with the statement, "Some people think that discrimination against blacks is a big problem in this country, while others think that it is not a big problem. We would like to know what you think about it." (1) "How much discrimination would you say there is that hurts the chances of blacks to get good-paying jobs?" (1 = a lot through 5 = none at all). (2) "How much discrimination would you say there is that makes it hard for blacks to buy or rent housing wherever they want?" (1 = a lot through 5 = none at all). (3) "On average blacks have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to discrimination?" (1 = yes, 3 = don't know, 5 = no). Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.79$ .

For blacks have too much influence, the following single item was used: "Some people think that certain groups have too much influence in American life and politics, while others feel that they don't have enough influence. You will see three statements about how much influence a group might have (1 = not enough to 3 = too much).

Individualism consisted of three agree—disagree items, coded so that high values correspond to stronger endorsement of individualism, were additively scaled. (1) "Most people who do not get ahead should not blame the system. They have only themselves to blame" (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree). (2) "Any person who is willing to work hard has a good chance of succeeding" (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree). (3) "Even if people try hard they often cannot reach their goals" (1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree). Cronbach's  $\alpha = 0.51$ .

Egalitarianism consisted of three agree–disagree items, coded so that higher values mean higher endorsement of egalitarianism, were additively scaled. (1) "Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed" (1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree). (2) "The country would be better off if we worried less about how equal people are" (1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree). (3) "If people were treated more equally in this country, we would have many fewer problems" (1=strongly agree to 5=strongly disagree). Cronbach's  $\alpha=0.58$ .

For party identification the standard 7-point party identification scale as measured in the National Election Studies, with a three-item, skip pattern design, was used: (1) "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and Independent, or what?" (2) [If R answers Rep or Dem] "Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very strong Republican/Democrat?" [3] [If R answers Independent] "Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?

The candidate preference measure was based on a five-item sequence with skip patterns. (1) "So far as you know now, do you expect to vote in the national election this coming November or not?" (1 = yes, 5 = no, 8 = don't know). (2) [If R plans to vote] "We all know the election is some time away and people are not certain at this point who they will vote for. Still, who do you think you will vote for in the election for President?" (Bush, Gore, Nader, other, don't know, undecided). (3) "Would you say that your preference for (candidate specified in item 2) is strong or not strong?" (4) [If R plans not to vote] "If you were going to vote, who do you think you would vote for in the election for president?" (same response options as in item 2). (5) [For those who answered item 4] "Would you say that your preference for (candidate specified

in item 4) is strong or not strong?" An index was constructed, running from 1 (strong support for Gore) to 5 (strong support for Bush). Those preferring a third-party candidate (Nader, Buchanan, or other) were placed at the midpoint (3). Several versions of this variable were tested, including ones that discarded subjects with non-major-party candidate preferences and one which employed a three-level variable (1 = support for Gore; 2 = neither, other, 3 = support for Bush). Results were nearly identical for these alternative specifications.

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## Sex, Lies, and War: How Soft News Brings Foreign Policy to the Inattentive Public

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This study argues that, due to selective political coverage by the entertainment-oriented, soft news media, many otherwise politically inattentive individuals are exposed to information about high-profile political issues, most prominently foreign policy crises, as an incidental by-product of seeking entertainment. I conduct a series of statistical investigations examining the relationship between individual media consumption and attentiveness to several recent high-profile foreign policy crisis issues. For purposes of comparison, I also investigate several non-foreign crisis issues, some of which possess characteristics appealing to soft news programs and others of which lack such characteristics. I find that information about foreign crises, and other issues possessing similar characteristics, presented in a soft news context, has indeed attracted the attention of politically uninvolved Americans. The net effect is a reduced disparity in attentiveness to select high-profile political issues across different segments of the public.

eople who are not interested in politics often get their news from sources quite different from those of their politically engaged counterparts (Chaffee and Kanihan 1997; Key 1961). While alternative news sources for the politically uninvolved have long been available, the last two decades have witnessed a dramatic expansion in the number and diversity of entertainment-oriented, quasi-news media outlets, sometimes referred to collectively as the soft news media.

Political scientists, including public opinion scholars, have mostly ignored the soft news media. And, indeed, most of the time these media eschew discussion of politics and public policy, in favor of more "down-market" topics, such as celebrity gossip, crime dramas, disasters, or other dramatic human-interest stories (Patterson 2000; Kalb 1998b). Yet, as I shall demonstrate, on occasion, the soft news media do convey substantive information concerning a select few high-profile political issues, prominently among them foreign policy crises. This suggests the proliferation of soft news may have meaningful implications for politics, including foreign policy.

Scholars have long pondered the barriers to information and political participation confronting democratic citizens. The traditional scholarly consensus has held that the mass public is woefully ignorant about politics and foreign affairs (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Converse 1964; Almond 1950), and hence, with rare exceptions, only relatively narrow segments of the public—the so-called "attentive public" or "issue publics"—pay attention to public policy or wield any

meaningful influence on policymakers (Graebner 1983; Cohen 1973; Rosenau 1961; Key 1961). By, in effect, broadening access to information about *some* political issues, soft news coverage of politics may challenge this perspective, at least in part. If a substantial portion of the public that would otherwise remain aloof from politics is able to learn about high-profile political issues, such as foreign crises, from the soft news media, this may expand the size of the attentive public, at least in times of crisis. And a great deal of research has shown that intense public scrutiny, when it arises, can influence policymakers, both in Congress and the White House (Baum 2000; Powlick 1995; Bosso 1989; Rosenau 1961; Key 1961).

This possibility raises a number of questions. First, to what extent and in what circumstances do the entertainment-oriented, soft news media convey information about serious political issues? Second, what types of political topics appeal to such media outlets? Third, how might their coverage differ from that found in traditional news sources? Finally, who is likely to consume political news presented in this entertainment-oriented media environment, and why? These are the primary questions motivating the present study.

I argue that for many individuals who are not interested in politics or foreign policy, soft news increasingly serves as an alternative to the traditional news media as a source of information about a select few political issues, including foreign policy crises. This is because the soft news media are in the business of packaging human drama as entertainment. And, like celebrity murder trials and sex scandals—the usual fare of soft news outlets—some political issues, prominently among them foreign crises, are easily framed as compelling human dramas.<sup>1</sup> As a result, the soft

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Gamson and Modigliani (1987, 143) offer the following operational definition of a frame: "a central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a connection among them. The frame suggests what the controversy is about, the essence of the issue." This definition adequately captures my use of the term in this study [but see Druckman (2002) for a discussion of differing definitions and uses of the term].

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news media have increased many politically inattentive individuals' exposure to information about select high-profile political issues, primarily those involving scandal, violence, heroism, or other forms of human drama. Yet public opinion scholars have largely failed to consider how this might influence public views of politics.

This study focuses primarily on foreign policy crises. My argument, however, is general, and so not unique to foreign policy. Indeed, it also applies to a fairly narrow range of domestic political issues. Nonetheless, I focus on foreign crises for three reasons. First, ceteris paribus, foreign crises are more likely than most issues to transcend traditional partisan boundaries. Hence, public attention to foreign crises is relatively less likely to be affected by heightened public cynicism regarding partisan politics (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997; Dionne 1991). Second, beyond celebrity murder trials and sex scandals, few issues are as likely to capture the public's imagination as the prospect of large-scale violence and the potential death of large numbers of Americans at the hands of a clearly identifiable villain. Combined, these two factors make foreign crises an appealing subject matter for the largely apolitical, entertainmentoriented soft news media. Third, Americans know and care less about foreign than domestic affairs (Kegley and Wittkopf 1996; Reilly 1995; Sobel 1989; Graber 1984), especially in the post-Cold War era (Moisy 1997; Holsti 1996), and most foreign policy news is typically ignored entirely by the soft news media. Hence, while my argument extends beyond foreign policy, I nonetheless focus on foreign crises as, in effect, a "most difficult" test of the argument.

The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. In the next section, I introduce and define my key independent variable, soft news. I also discuss my dependent variable, attentiveness to foreign crises (or other similarly accessible political issues). I begin the section by considering the distinguishing characteristics of a soft news outlet, and the propensity of the soft news media to cover select political issues, including foreign crises. I then consider the types of political issues covered by soft news programs and the manner in which such programs frame those political issues they elect to cover. Finally, building on previous theories of passive learning (Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Zukin with Snyder 1984), I develop an "incidental by-product" model of information consumption (e.g., Popkin 1994). I argue that by repackaging news about select political issues, including foreign crises, as entertainment, soft news dramatically reduces the cognitive costs of paying attention. As a result, even individuals who are not interested in politics may be willing to pay attention to such information.

To test my hypotheses, in the third section I conduct a series of statistical investigations into the correlates of attentiveness to a series of foreign crisis issues, plus, for purposes of comparison, several noncrisis issues. Across each test, my results strongly support the incidental by-product model. Finally, the Conclusion summarizes my findings and considers several implications for politics, public policy, and democracy.

## POLITICS, FOREIGN POLICY, AND SOFT NEWS

### The Soft News Media

Since the early 1980s, the growth of cable—and, more recently, satellite television and the internet—has created a highly competitive media environment, especially in television (Patterson 2000; Baum and Kernell 1999; Webster and Lichty 1991). Rising competition for viewers has forced broadcasters to find new ways to raise their profit margins, such as increasing the audience for news (Grossman 2000; Zaller 1999; Kalb 1998a, 1998b; Hess 1998; Auletta 1993; Hallin 1991) and lowering production costs. To do so, they have, in part, repackaged certain types of news into inexpensively produced forms of entertainment (Davis and Owen 1998; Kalb 1998b), sometimes referred to as soft news.<sup>2</sup> This is because soft news is far less expensive to produce, and in many cases far more profitable, than original entertainment programming (Baum 2000; Davis and Owen 1998).

Though the term soft news is widely employed by media scholars (e.g., Patterson 2000; Kalb 1998b; Scott and Gobetz 1992), no commonly accepted definition exists. Patterson (2000, 3) observes that soft news has been defined, variously, as a residual category for all news that is not "hard," as a particular vocabulary in presenting the news (e.g., more personal and familiar and less distant or institutional), and as a set of story characteristics, including the absence of a public policy component, sensationalized presentation, human-interest themes, and emphasis on dramatic subject matter, such as crime and disaster. Though admittedly imprecise, for my purposes, the latter definition—based on the aforementioned story characteristics—appears most useful for distinguishing the soft news media from traditional news outlets.

While virtually all news- or information-oriented media present at least *some* stories possessing some or all of the above characteristics, only a subset fócuses *primarily* on such material, largely (though not necessarily entirely) to the exclusion of traditional—local, national, or international—political or public policy topics and themes. And it is the latter media outlets with which I am concerned. Clearly, in at least some instances, the difference between soft and hard news is one of *degree* rather than *kind*. And a few media outlets (several of which I discuss below) are not easily categorized as belonging unambiguously in either category.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> While I focus primarily on television, similar trends toward the blending of news and entertainment have also occurred in elements of the radio and print media (Patterson 2000; Davis and Owen 1998). I focus on television because, in addition to being the primary source of news for most Americans, as noted by Neuman et al. (1992, 114), television "can break the attention barrier for issues of low salience...newspapers and magazines are better sources for new information when the audience is already motivated to pay attention" (see also Patterson 1980). Nonetheless, in the statistical analyses that follow, I also account for the effects of the print and radio soft and hard news media.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Because the dividing line between the soft and the hard news media is not in every instance entirely clear, in my statistical analyses I

Still, with a few notable exceptions, the differences are fairly stark.

Two examples of the dramatic proliferation of the soft news media on television are daytime and latenight talk shows and entertainment and tabloid news programs.<sup>4</sup> On the talk show circuit, where Johnny Carson once enjoyed a virtual monopoly in late-night TV talk, in recent years the late-night airwaves have grown cluttered with such competitors as David Letterman, Conan O'Brien, and Bill Maher. Even popular "shock" radio hosts, such as Howard Stern and Don Imus, have their own TV talk shows. And in the daytime, the genre pioneered by Phil Donahue in the 1980s has proliferated to the point where in 2002, over a dozen talk shows, ranging from Jenny Jones to Oprah Winfrey, air on broadcast television each day. Entertainment and tabloid news shows, in turn, pioneered in the late 1980s by A Current Affair, now dominate the early evening hours. Some of these programs (e.g., Extra, Access Hollywood) air several times per day.

One example of an arguably less clear-cut program format, in turn, is network news magazines. While such programs do cover hard news topics, particularly when major events arise, recent content analysis studies [Zaller 1999; Kalb 1998a; Committee of Concerned Journalists (CCJ) 1998] have found that they focus primarily on soft news topics, such as celebrity profiles and crime dramas.<sup>5</sup> And this genre has expanded dramatically. Prior to 1980, 60 Minutes was the only-primetime network news magazine on television. Since that time, particularly over the past decade, 60 Minutes has attracted increasing competition. Indeed, in recent years, the major networks have routinely featured news magazines in prime time virtually every evening. In Fall 1998, the three primary broadcast networks, combined, offered 10 prime-time hours per week of news magazines and CNN added 4 additional hours per week of news magazines (Weinstein 1998).

rely on empirical testing to determine the appropriate placement of several relatively ambiguous cases, such as local TV news.

TABLE 1. Nielsen Ratings for Select Soft and Hard News Programs

Program	Rating/Households
Entertainment Tonight	5.9/5,864,000
Extra	3.8/3,751,000
Oprah Winfrey	6.5/6,460,000
Live with Regis and Kathy Lee	3.6/3,624,000
Rosie O'Donnell	3.6/3,596,000
60 Minutes	12.0/11,928,000
20/20	9.8/9,692,000
Dateline	9.3/9,195,000
NBC Nightly News	6.9/6,859,000
ABC World News Tonight	6.7/6,660,000
CBS Evening News	6.0/5,964,000
CNN	0.40/376,000
Mater Detines for notwork power are for	the week of June 20 July

Note: Ratings for network news are for the week of June 28–July 4, 1999. Ratings for CNN are for 1998.

Equally important, large numbers of Americans consume soft news. Table 1 presents the average Nielsen ratings for several soft news television programs during the first 6 months of 1999.6 These are contrasted with ratings for network evening newscasts and CNN. According to these data, Entertainment Tonight and Oprah Winfrey are watched by about as many households as the evening newscasts of the major networks. And CBS's 60 Minutes, NBC's Dateline, and ABC's 20/20 typically attract substantially larger audiences than any of the network newscasts. The typical audience for CNN is tiny in comparison. Moreover, though my focus is primarily on television, these consumption patterns extend to elements of the radio (e.g., talk radio) and print (e.g., celebrity news magazines) media as well.8

Soft News Coverage of Foreign Crises. The preceding discussion begs the question of why social scientists should care about the rise of soft news. In fact, any political relevance of soft news depends on the extent to which such programs actually cover political issues, such as foreign crises. And, indeed, soft news programs have covered every major U.S. foreign military crisis since 1990. I searched program transcripts, using Lexis-Nexis, and TV Guide listings for a variety of soft news programs to determine whether and to what extent they covered the Persian Gulf War, the ongoing series of post-Gulf War crises with Iraq, and four other highprofile U.S. foreign crises of the past decade—Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. Where such transcripts were inaccessible (e.g., Oprah Winfrey), I contacted several programs directly. For purposes of comparison, I also searched Lexis-Nexis for soft news coverage of several more traditional and less dramatic political

<sup>6</sup> Ratings for Network News Magazines are averages for the period September 21, 1998 to September 20, 1999.

<sup>7</sup> CNN's ratings trained to the control of the period of th

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> While the talk show format differs from the traditional news format, it is nonetheless similarly geared toward providing information to viewers about real-world personalities, issues, and events.

A content analysis of stories on 60 Minutes between January and June 1998 revealed that 60% of the 62 segments aired addressed soft news topics (i.e., celebrity profiles, "Can you believe?" investigative reports, and lifestyle pieces), while only 13% dealt with traditional hard news topics (Kalb 1998a). Zaller (1999) finds that between 1968 and 1998, 60 Minutes' score on a news quality index fell by over half. And the news quality score for 60 Minutes greatly exceeded those of its competitors. Finally, a 1998 study (CCJ 1998) found that five prime-time network news magazines (20/20, 48 Hours, 60 Minutes, Prime Time Live, and Dateline) devoted a combined total average of just 5.5% of their coverage during Fall 1997 to topics relating to either government, military/national security policy, foreign affairs, education, or the economy. In sharp contrast, they devoted nearly half of their total airtime to stories pertaining to entertainment/celebrities, personality/profiles, crime, or human-interest topics. During the same period, the corresponding averages for network news stories (ABC CBS, and NBC) were 35% of airtime devoted to the aforementioned hard news topics and just 12% devoted to the above soft news topics. Overall, government and foreign affairs were the two most common topics on network evening newscasts, while the top topics on network news magazines were crime, human interest, and personality/profile.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> CNN's ratings typically spike during international crises. Yet the single largest audience in CNN's history, 5.4 million households (January 17, 1991), was smaller than the *average* audience for the *lowest*-rated network news program (Noah 1997).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> For instance, the largest circulation newspaper in America is not the *Wall Street Journal* but, rather, *The National Enquirer*.

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issues (the later results are discussed below, under Statistical Investigations). Table 2 presents the results of these inquiries. These figures—which represent the number of *separate broadcasts* of each program that addressed a given issue—are extremely conservative, due to limited availability of transcripts, sporadic program listings, and unwillingness of some programs to provide the requested information, as well as recent start-dates or cancellation of several of the programs.

To determine whether these raw figures constitute "significant" coverage, I compared soft news coverage of four foreign crises in the 1990s with coverage of those crises on ABC's World News Tonight. The results indicated that, taken together, the number of separate broadcasts of the TV talk shows listed in Table 2 mentioning the U.S. interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo, combined, was equivalent to 73% of the total number of separate broadcasts of World News Tonight which mentioned those conflicts.<sup>9</sup> The corresponding figure for Somalia and Haiti, combined, was over half (52%) as many broadcasts. Indeed, the number of separate broadcasts mentioning Bosnia presented on one tabloid news program, Extra, is equivalent to nearly half (46%) of the total number of World News Tonight broadcasts mentioning Bosnia. While soft news programs predictably offered significantly less coverage of these crises than the network news-for instance, network newscasts more frequently present multiple stories on a given topic within a single broadcast and tend to offer greater depth of coverage—these figures nonetheless appear far from trivial.<sup>10</sup>

How Soft News Programs Cover Foreign Crises. While, like traditional news outlets, soft news programs do appear to cover foreign crises regularly, they do not necessarily do so in the same manner. Where traditional news outlets typically cover political stories in manners unappealing—either too complex or too arcane—to individuals who are not intrinsically interested in politics, the soft news media self-consciously frame issues in highly accessible terms—which I call "cheap framing"—emphasizing dramatic and sensational human-interest stories, intended primarily to appeal to an entertainment-seeking audience.

Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992) identify five common frames readily recognized and understood by most individuals. These include "us vs. them," "human impact," "powerlessness," "economic," and "morality." To this list, Powlick and Katz (1998) add an "injustice" frame. Graber (1984) found that several of these frames—"human impact," "morality,"

9 The TV talk show figures represent the sum of between seven and

and "injustice"—resonated strongly with her interview subjects.11 Not surprisingly, these are the prevalent themes found in the soft news media. For instance, a recent content analysis of tabloid TV news shows (Media Monitor 1997a) found that such programs emphasize widely accessible "morality" and "justice" frames. Overall, over half of the tabloid stories examined were framed in *moralistic* terms, passing judgment on the central actors. And a 1998 study by the Committee of Concerned Journalists (1998), concluded that celebrity, scandal, gossip and other "human-interest" stories have increased as a share of the total media coverage over the past 20 years from 15 to 43%. 12 By making news about foreign crises, or other high-profile political issues, accessible, soft news programs increase the likelihood that politically uninterested individuals will pay attention to, and learn about, them (Eveland and Scheufele 2000).

A review of the content of soft news coverage of several 1990s foreign crises offers support for the findings of the aforementioned studies. In each case, rather than focus on the more arcane aspects of these crises, such as military tactics or geopolitical ramifications, the soft news media tended to focus on highly accessible themes likely to appeal to viewers who were not necessarily watching to learn about military strategy or international diplomacy. For instance, during the Persian Gulf War, while CNN and the major networks filled the airwaves with graphic images of precision bombs and interviews with military experts, the daytime talk shows hosted by Oprah Winfrey, Geraldo Rivera, and Sally Jesse Raphael, as well as A Current Affair, focused on the personal hardships faced by spouses of soldiers serving in the Gulf and on the psychological trauma suffered by families of Americans being held prisoner in Iraq as "human shields."

Similarly, in mid-1995, in covering the escalating U.S. military involvement in Bosnia, a review of the nightly news broadcasts of the three major networks indicates that they addressed a broad range of issues—including international diplomacy, military tactics, the role of NATO, "nation building," and ethnic cleansing, to name only a few. In contrast, the soft news media devoted most of their coverage to a single dramatic story: the travails of U.S. fighter pilot Scott O'Grady, who was shot down over enemy territory on June 2, 1995. Captain O'Grady's heroic story of surviving behind enemy lines for 5 days on a diet of insects and grass.

nine programs (depending on the year).

10 If one counts the total number of stories on World News Tonight, soft news coverage still appears to be nontrivial. In the case of Bosnia and Kosovo, the number of TV talk show broadcasts is equivalent to over half (56%) of the total number of stories on World News Tonight. The corresponding figure for Somalia and Haiti is 40% as many stories as ABC network news broadcasts. Finally, the number of Extra broadcasts mentioning Bosnia is equivalent to 40% of the total number of Bosnia stories on World News Tonight.

<sup>11</sup> These findings complement a large literature in social psychology on individual media uses and gratification. This literature (e.g., Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch 1973–1974; Katzman 1972; McQuail et al. 1972; Katz and Foulkes 1962) argues that individuals use the media to fulfill various social and psychological needs, including diversion, easing social tension and conflict, establishing substitute personal relationships, reinforcing personal identity and values, gaining comfort through familiarity, learning about social problems, and surveillance. In fact, the frames most frequently employed by typical individuals are directly linked to several of the predominant uses of the media identified by psychologists.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> In a separate content analysis, Patterson (2000) reaches conclusions similar to those of the CCJ study. He also found substantial increases in sensationalism in news reporting and in the proportion of news stories lacking any public policy component.

			Nulliber	5	Separate broadcasis	S AUUI ESSIII U	anig issue					
Program	Gulf War	Somalia	Haiti	Bosnia	lraq (1992–1999)	Kosovo	1996 Primaries	1998 Elections	Regulate Tobacco	NAFTA	WTO	Lewinsky Scandal
Network news magazines												
Dateline NBC	1	4	œ	17	25	13	4	4	<b>-</b> -	-	0	16
20/20	42	. თ	4	: ∞	202	우	0	-	0	0	0	4
Primetime Live	36	ω	4	7	16	1	က	0	0	-	0	က
48 Hours	, ca	က	4	က	80	-	8	2	0	0	0	α
60 Minutes	4	4	ω	17	51	16	8	<del></del>	-	7	7	7
Average	23.5	4.4	5.6	11.2	29.4	29.0	2.2	1.6	0.40	0.80	0.40	5.4
Late-night TV talk shows												
Jay Leno	1	1	33	25	102	14	48	0	0	15	0	45
David Letterman	l	4	8	32	88	7	32	-	0	27	0	37
Conan O'Brien	J	ო	52	4	53	4	33	0	0	25	0	90
Politically Incorrect	l	ł	1	19	52	15	31	τ-	2	0	-	34
Average	1	3.5	27.0	22.5	74.5	13.5	34.3	0.50	1.3	16.8	0.25	36.5
Daytime TV talk shows												
Óprah Winfrey	က	9	ω	ω	4		l	I		l	1	l
Rosie O'Donnell	l	1	1	ო	4	우	l	-	0	0	0	-
Regis and Kathie Lee	1	2	7	10	13	7	0	0	0	4	0	9
Geraldo Rivera	9	ო	Ŋ	40	13	1	0	0	0	0	0	දි
Phil Donahue	[	37	56	29	28		ည		l	0	0	1
Average	4.5	12.8	11.5	24	18.4	8.5	1.67	0.33	0.0	1.0	0.0	12.0
Network TV soft news					,	1			,	,	•	į
Extra		[	16	116	62	ω	-	<del></del> .	0	0	0	24
Entertainment Tonight	1	1	4	16	7	0	0	<del>.</del> ·	0	o ·	0 -	<del>ડ</del> ડ
Inside Edition	l	1	4	-	24	ო	α	<del>-</del>	0	<b>,</b>		<b>58</b>
A Current Affair	4	4	-	ω	7	l	Ø	]	'	0	0	1
Average	4.0	4.0	6.3	37.8	22	4.3	1.3	1.0	0	0.25	0.25	22.3
Cable TV soft news				;	,	,	(	(	(	,	(	ć
E! Network		ო	က	5 <u>8</u>	φ	n	N	<b>o</b>	<b>.</b>	<b>)</b>	Э.	ဗို
Black Entertainment Television	1		33	ო	12	ဖ	0	0	ο.	N (	- (	Σ .
Comedy Central's Daily Show	1	1	I	ო	7	16	l	,-		ო	0	-
MTV News	1	l	7	7	4	7	19	•	0	N	0	2
Average	]	3.0	11.0	10.8	10.8	8.0	7.0	0.50	0.25	1.75	0.25	15.0
Talk radio									,	,		,
Howard Stern Show			1	18	47	35	<del>.</del> 5	0	-	0	0	58

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before being rescued by NATO forces, represented an ideal made-for-soft news human drama. To determine the nature and extent of soft news coverage of Bosnia in June 1995, I reviewed Lexis—Nexis transcripts from 12 soft news programs for which the appropriate data were accessible. If found that of 35 total broadcasts on these 12 shows addressing the conflict in Bosnia, 30 (or 86%) featured the O'Grady story. Of course, traditional news programs also covered the story. Yet, in the latter case, this was merely one of *many* storylines. The three major networks, combined, covered the O'Grady story in only 13 of 57 (or 23%) June 1995 national news broadcasts in which Bosnia was addressed.

More recently, when, on August 20, 1998—3 days after President Clinton's grand jury testimony regarding his relationship with Monica Lewinsky—the United States launched cruise missile strikes against suspected terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan, coverage by the soft and hard news media once again differed dramatically. Whereas traditional news coverage encompassed a variety of themes—ranging from describing circumstances "on the ground" in Afghanistan and Sudan, to profiling Osama bin Laden, to reviewing military tactics, to calculating likely effects on international terrorism—that of the soft news media focused primarily on a single dramatic and highly accessible theme: the uncanny parallels between real-world events and a (until then) relatively obscure movie, called Wag the Dog. In the film, a fictional president hires a Hollywood producer to "produce" a phony war to distract the public from his involvement in a sex scandal.

Once again, using Lexis-Nexis, I reviewed transcripts from 12 soft news programs. <sup>14</sup> I found that, in the week following the attacks, 35 of 46 soft news stories on the subject (or 76%) addressed the *Wag the Dog* theme, repeatedly raising the question of whether the President might have launched the missile strikes to distract the nation from the Lewinsky scandal. In contrast, during that same period, the three network evening news programs, combined, mentioned *Wag the Dog* or Monica Lewinsky in only 11 of 69 (16%) stories on the missile strikes. <sup>15</sup>

More than ever before, consumers have a choice of consuming soft or hard news. And substantial numbers have opted primarily, if not exclusively, for the former, entertainment-oriented variety of programming. This raises the question of whether these developments have any meaningful implications for who is becoming informed about foreign crises.

<sup>13</sup> The programs I reviewed included Extra, Dateline, Jay Leno, David Letterman, Conan O'Brien, A Current Affair, Live with Regis and Kathy Lee, Entertainment Tonight, Howard Stern, E! News Daily, The E! Gossip Show, and The Geraldo Rivera Show.

### **Incidental Attention**

The American people know little about politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Converse 1964) and, over time, have grown less politically engaged (Niemi et al. 1989; Bennett 1986) and more cynical about all things political (Nye et al. 1997; Dionne 1991; Miller 1974). Moreover, for the past decade, Americans have been less concerned with foreign affairs than at any time since World War II (Moisy 1997; Holsti 1996). For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s, when asked by Gallup to name the most urgent problem facing the nation, about half of the public regularly mentioned issues relating to foreign affairs; in the past decade, the corresponding average fell to a postwar low of less than 8% (Baum 2000). These data suggest that, for many Americans, politics, including foreign policy, is of little interest.

Those who consider politics a waste of time are unlikely to pay attention to political information unless the time and effort required to do so (i.e., the expected costs) are extremely small, thereby removing any incentive to ignore it (Salomon 1984). One means of minimizing the costs associated with paying attention to low-benefit political information might be to attach or "piggyback" it to low-cost entertainment-oriented information. This would allow individuals to learn about politics passively (Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992; Zukin with Snyder 1984), even if they are neither interested in the subject matter nor motivated to learn about it (Zukin with Snyder 1984; Robinson 1974; Wamsley and Pride 1972; Blumler and McQuail 1969; Fitzsimmons and Osburn 1968; Krugman 1965). Political information might thus become a free bonus, or incidental by-product, of paying attention to entertainment-oriented information. 16 In effect, piggybacking might, on occasion, render any trade-off between being entertained and learning about politics moot by, in effect, transforming a select few of the major political issues of the day into the entertainment that people seek.<sup>17</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The programs I reviewed included Entertainment Tonight, Access Hollywood, Extra, The Daily Show, E! News Daily, Jay Leno, Conan O'Brien, Politically Incorrect, Howard Stern, 60 Minutes, 20/20, and Dateline. In those cases where I could not determine from the soft news program abstracts whether the Wag the Dog theme was addressed in a given story, I counted the story as non-Wag the Dogrelated coverage of the missile strikes. Hence, the figures reported below are conservative.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Because of the narrower (1-week) time frame in the latter comparison, in this instance I compared *stories* rather than *broadcasts*.

<sup>16</sup> Passive learning is possible because individuals are more likely to accept information presented in a nonconflictual manner, which does not arouse excitement (Krugman and Hartley 1970). Individuals learn passively by first *choosing* to expose themselves to a particular type of information (e.g., political news), say by watching the network news, but then surrendering control of the *specific* information to which they are exposed (Zukin and Snyder 1984). For instance, individuals unwilling to *read* about a political issue in the newspaper may be willing to *watch* a news story about the issue, even if they are not particularly interested in the subject matter, simply because watching television requires less effort (Eveland and Scheufele 2000). Incidental learning is merely an extreme form of passive learning, whereby the individual actively seeks one variety of information, say entertainment, and is unwittingly exposed to and accepts information of another sort entirely (e.g., political news).

This does not imply that the distinction between traditional and soft news has disappeared or that politically apathetic individuals have come to anticipate heightened benefits from consuming political news. Along these lines, Lutz (1975) points out an important distinction between first- and second-order cognitive effects in influencing attitude change. The former concerns information that directly addresses a given attitude object, such as an advertisement intended to convince a viewer to buy a particular brand of toothpaste. The

This does not imply that transforming news into entertainment will affect all viewers similarly. Indeed, survey evidence (e.g., Pew Center Media Consumption poll, May 1998; Media Monitor 1997b,) indicates that most people who consume traditional news do so primarily (albeit not exclusively) to learn about the issues of the day. 18 This suggests that increasing the entertainment value of news is unlikely to affect significantly these individuals' attentiveness to political news. Indeed, such individuals have already determined that political news is worth their time and effort. Watching soft news programs is unlikely to affect this calculus, even if they occasionally cover political issues. Rather, only individuals who would not otherwise be exposed to politics are likely to be affected by encountering political coverage in the soft news media, or by piggybacking.

Yet, even for the latter, politically uninterested individuals, piggybacking is possible only if information about a political issue can be attached to entertainment-oriented information without increasing the costs of paying attention. And this requires framing the information in terms accessible to even politically disengaged individuals (i.e., cheap framing).<sup>19</sup> Paying attention to news that employs highly accessible frames requires less cognitive energy than paying attention to traditional news formats, which might provoke greater cognitive conflict (Krugman and Hartley 1970). Such information is cheap. Indeed, absent cheap framing, piggybacking would almost certainly fail. In fact, for many individuals, if information about a political issue can be piggybacked to low-cost and high benefit, entertainment-oriented information, the associated costs of paying attention are virtually

This discussion suggests that by engaging in cheap framing and piggybacking, the soft news media may substantially reduce the expected costs of paying attention to those issues that lend themselves to these practices, such as political sex scandals, celebrity murder trials, and foreign policy crises. This, in turn, might induce individuals who do not normally seek information about politics or foreign affairs to attend to *some* 

latter concerns the effects of such new information, or attributes, on attitudes that are *not* the overt object of the information. In other words, the effects of information on attitudes tend to diffuse beyond the immediate object of attention, through a sort of cognitive branching process. So the toothpaste commercial may inadvertently trigger a change in a viewer's attitudes about other, seemingly unrelated objects. This suggests that information attended to by a viewer due to its entertainment value may have the unintended effect of influencing that individual's attitudes toward other things, such as, say, a foreign policy crisis.

policy crisis.

18 Though broadcasters have sought to make traditional news more accessible, continued falling ratings (e.g., Lichty and Gomery 1992) suggest that the audience for *traditional* news has not broadened.

information about such issues, even if their intrinsic interest, per se, remains low.

### **Summary and Hypotheses**

Most of the time, the soft news media avoid politics entirely, in favor of more sensational issues, such as crime dramas, scandals, and celebrity gossip. Many entertainment-seeking television viewers may therefore remain largely uninformed about the day-to-day political issues facing the nation. When, however, an issue crosses over, via piggybacking, from network newscasts to the soft news media, a far broader audience will likely confront it. And unlike the relatively mundane or arcane presentation of political information offered by network newscasts, soft news programs employ cheap framing to appeal to entertainment-seeking audiences. Hence, for many individuals, the expected benefit of learning about politics, per se, is quite small. Yet the cognitive costs of paying attention to information about select political issues, including foreign crises, may, on occasion, be smaller still, due in no small measure to the efforts of soft news programmers to exploit such issues' previously untapped entertainment value and resulting suitability for piggybacking. A number of hypotheses follow from the theory. Four of these, which I test in the next section, are as follows

H<sub>1</sub>: People watch soft news programs to be entertained, not to learn about politics or foreign affairs.

H<sub>2</sub>: Ceteris paribus, people who are uninterested in foreign affairs and consume soft news should be more attentive to foreign crises (and other similarly accessible issues) than their counterparts who are similarly uninterested in foreign affairs but do not consume soft news.

H<sub>3</sub>: Ceteris paribus, soft news consumption should be most strongly positively related to foreign crisis attentiveness among the least politically engaged members of society and least strongly positively related to attentiveness among the most politically engaged members of the public.

H<sub>4</sub>: Ceteris paribus, other less accessible or dramatic, or more partisan, political issues are less likely to be covered by the soft news media, and hence, attentiveness to such issues should not be significantly related to consumption of soft news.

### STATISTICAL INVESTIGATIONS

In this section, I conduct a series of statistical tests of each of the above hypotheses. Rather than rely on a single test or data set, I conduct multiple tests, employing five dependent variables, two data sets, and two distinct indicators of attentiveness: (1) the extent to which a respondent "followed" an issue and (2) a response of "don't know" or "not familiar" when asked about a specific issue. Both of these indicators, while differing in some respects, share a common underlying relationship with attentiveness. In other words, I argue that individuals who are attentive to a given issue are, relative to their inattentive counterparts, more likely

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> While there are many potential sources of accessibility, none approach the overwhelming predominance of the mass media in determining which issues command public attention, at least temporarily (Iyengar 1990; Krugman and Hartley 1970). Krugman and Hartley (1970) note that, as an ideal vehicle for passive learning, television has allowed many people to develop opinions on serious issues about which they would previously have replied "don't know" if queried (because they would have avoided learning about such issues).

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to indicate that they have "followed" the issue and less likely to respond "don't know" or "not familiar" when asked about it. Given the difficulty in precisely measuring psychological constructs, such as attentiveness, if my hypotheses are supported across all five dependent variables, in both operationalizations of attentiveness, and in the two distinct data sets, this will represent far stronger evidence than would be possible using any single indicator or survey. (See Appendix B for a discussion of reliability and validity testing regarding the second indicator.) I begin, however, by testing the first hypothesis, concerning viewers' motivations for consuming soft news.

### Why People Watch Soft News

While the preceding evidence showed that large numbers of Americans watch soft news, it did not explain why. Might some individuals tune in to soft news programs with the explicit intent of learning about foreign crises or other political issues? Such individuals may reason that, when a crisis or other major issue arises, the soft news media will offer more interesting coverage than network newscasts or newspapers. If so, the incidental by-product model would be irrelevant. Hypothesis 1, however, predicts that soft news viewers watch such programs for their entertainment value, not to learn about politics. To test this hypothesis, I employ a 1996 survey (Pew Center Media Consumption poll, May 1996), which asked respondents the extent to which they prefer news about entertainment, famous people, crime, national politics, or international affairs (among other topics), as well as to what extent they consume a variety of soft news media.<sup>20</sup>

I created an entertainment news interest index, based on the first three items mentioned above and a soft news consumption index based upon the latter series of questions.<sup>21</sup> If information about foreign crises, or other political issues, is being piggybacked to entertainment programming, primarily as an incidental by-product, then we should observe a strong positive correlation between interest in entertainment-oriented news and consumption of soft news media, but not between interest in news about international affairs or national politics and soft news consumption. In fact, this is just what I find. The entertainment news interest index correlates with the soft news consumption index at an impressive 0.40. The corresponding correlations with interest in international affairs and interest in national politics are nearly zero (-0.01 and -0.03, respectively). This strongly suggests that to the extent that individuals are receiving information about foreign crises, or other national political issues, in the soft news media, they are doing so not by design but, rather, as an incidental by-product of seeking entertainment. Any information about foreign crises or national politics appears in these data to be piggybacked to entertainment-oriented news. This result clearly supports Hypothesis 1.

## Soft News Consumption and Following Foreign Crises

For the next investigation, my data are drawn from the aforementioned 1996 Pew Center survey of public media consumption habits. In addition to asking respondents which types of television and radio programming, magazines, and newspapers they watch, listen to, and read, the survey also asked if respondents had followed several foreign crisis issues.

As dependent variables, I focus on three questions, asking respondents how closely they had followed three foreign crisis-related issues: Bosnia, the Israel-Lebanon conflict, and a congressional debate on terrorism. In each case, responses fell into one of four categories: "not at all closely," "not too closely," "fairly closely," or "very closely." (Because the response categories form a reasonably symmetric ordinal scale, ordered logit is an appropriate estimator.) The independent variables, in turn, fall into three categories: socioeconomic status (age, education, family income, married, white gender), interest in and knowledge about politics (political knowledge, voted in 1992, political partisanship, approve Clinton, party Identification), and media consumption habits (cable subscriber, soft news index, hard news index). The latter two variables consist of a broad range of questions concerning respondents' interest in and attention to news and entertainment programming on television, on radio, in magazines, and in newspapers. I collapsed these variables into two indexes, the first representing the extent of respondents' exposure to a series of "hard" news sources and topics and the second capturing respondents' exposure to the soft news media. In addition to the two indexes, I separately control for respondents' level of interest in international affairs. Table 3 lists the components of each index (see Appendix A for variable coding and definitions).

Most of the items in the respective indexes fall fairly unambiguously into either the "hard" or the "soft" category. Yet several are less clear-cut. In particular, some readers might argue that network news magazines belong in the hard news category, while local television news is more appropriately characterized as soft news. Yet, as noted, recent studies have found that network news magazines cover primarily soft news topics. And local TV news, while it certainly offers large doses of soft news—and is clearly "softer" than, say, network newscasts—routinely covers traditional local, national, and international political and policy issues. In fact, according to a study of 49 stations in 15 cities (Rosenstiel, Gottlieb, and Brady 2000), "politics and government" is second only to "crime and law" as the most prevalent

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> The topical news interest scales run from 1 (minimum) to 4 (maximum) (see Appendix A).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The previously cited *Media Monitor* (1997a) study indicated that the first three items are among the primary topics of the soft news media. Five types of soft news programs are included in this additive scale, including entertainment news magazines, network news magazines, daytime television talk shows, MTV, and tabloid newspapers (i.e., *The National Enquirer*, *The Sun*, and *The Star*). Importantly, testing revealed that the reported results persist even when any single item is dropped from the scale.

## TABLE 3. Items Included in Pew Survey Soft and Hard News Indexes

Hard News Index Items Soft News Index Items Watch network national Watch tabloid news news programs Watch local news Watch daytime talk shows Watch network news Watch business news Watch CNN magazines Watch C-SPAN Watch MTV Read tabloid newspapers Watch PBS News Hour with Jim Lehrer Follow news about entertainment Listen to National Public Radio Follow news about famous people Listen to news on radio Follow news about crime Read business magazines Read news magazines Read daily newspaper Follow news about national politics Follow news about business & finance Follow news/public affairs on Internet

Note: In the Hard News Index, newspapers and radio are dichotomous, coded 1 if the respondent reads newspapers or listens to news on the radio and 0 otherwise.

topic on local TV newscasts. Hence, at least by my definition, local TV news seems to be more appropriately characterized as "hard" news.

Nonetheless, rather than prejudge the proper location of these items, I conducted a variety of tests to determine their appropriate placement in, or exclusion from, my indexes. First, I compared  $\alpha$  reliability scores with and without the suspect items and with each item moved to the opposing category. In each case, the reliability scores were highest when the items were located as in Table 3. (In fact, the hard and soft news indexes in Table 3 produce fairly strong  $\alpha$  reliability scores of 0.72 and 0.66, respectively, and correlate only modestly, at 0.19.) Next, I reran all of my models with one or both of the suspect items excluded or placed in the opposing index. The results indicated that excluding local news or network news magazines had only a modest effect on the reported results, while placing either item in the opposing index consistently weakened the results. Further testing also revealed that the results reported below persist in the absence of any single item from either index and, hence, are in no way artifacts of a particular index construction or item.<sup>22</sup>

Turning to my findings, in Table 4 I report the results from a series of ordered logit analyses employing the three dependent variables.<sup>23</sup> As one might anticipate, consumption of hard news is strongly positively associated with attentiveness to each foreign crisis (p < 0.001), as is political knowledge in the terrorism and Lebanon models. Interest in international affairs

<sup>22</sup> For instance, the hard news index performed similarly when national news local news or internet news was removed.

national news, local news, or internet news was removed.

23 I employ probability weighting ("pweight" in Stata) in all models.

is also positively and significantly related to respondents' attentiveness to the three issues (p < 0.001).<sup>24</sup> Most importantly for my purposes, however, exposure to the soft news media is positively and significantly associated with attentiveness to each crisis, thereby, in each instance, supporting Hypothesis 2.

To determine whether exposure to soft news exerts differing effects on respondents with varying levels of overall interest in international affairs, I interact the latter variable with the soft news index. The results strongly support Hypothesis 3.25 The interaction term is significant, or nearly so, and correctly signed, in all three models (p < 0.01, p < 0.056, and p < 0.073). Because logit coefficients are difficult to interpret, I translate the coefficients on the key variables into probabilities, with all controls held constant at their mean values. The results indicate that, for individuals who report following international affairs "very" or "fairly" closely, exposure to soft news matters little for attentiveness to any of the three foreign crisis issues. Yet individuals who follow international affairs less closely (representing over one-third of the respondents) do appear to learn about each issue through the soft news media. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the relationships are strongest for respondents who claim to follow international affairs "not at all" closely. Hence, I focus on this group.<sup>26</sup> Figure 1 presents three graphics showing the influence of exposure to the soft news media on the probability of following more than "not at all" closely, respectively, the Israel-Lebanon conflict (upper-right quadrant), the terrorism debate (lower-left quadrant), and Bosnia (lower-right quadrant).27

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Many of the political interest and participation variables, however, are insignificant in some or all of the models. In several instances, this is attributable in part to multicollinearity among the control variables. For example, approval of President Clinton and party ID are correlated at 0.43. Nonetheless, for three reasons, this is not a major concern for my analyses. First, multicollinearity weakens, rather than strengthening, coefficients on collinear variables. Second, all of the suspect variables are included in my models only as controls, and hence, their substantive interpretations are not important for testing my hypotheses. Third, and most important, additional testing revealed that including or excluding these controls does not materially affect the coefficients or significance levels for the key causal variables.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> The coefficients on the soft news index are also significant at p < 0.05 or better in all three models when the interaction terms are omitted (not shown).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> The corresponding effects on respondents' probability of following the three issues "not very" closely, though not insignificant, are somewhat smaller in magnitude. Overall, the magnitude of the effects of increased soft news consumption declines as respondents' self-reported interest in news about international affairs increases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> One potential problem with my approach concerns the possibility of reverse causality between interest in international affairs and interest in the three foreign crisis issues. It is possible that respondents interested in these issues report systematically greater interest in international affairs because of their interest in those issues. (Indeed, the "interest in news about international affairs" question was asked after the foreign crisis questions, thereby perhaps increasing the possibility that the former may have influenced responses to the latter.) To investigate this, I constructed a system of two equations (not shown), simultaneously estimating the influence of attentiveness to a foreign crisis on interest in news about international affairs and the influence of the latter on the former. I then estimated the system, employing three-stage least squares ("reg3" in Stata). I repeated this

Independent Variable   Lebanon <sup>a</sup>   Terrorism <sup>a</sup>   Media usage   Soft News Index   0.097 (0.049)**   0.148 (0.047)**   0.090 (0.012)***   0.109 (0.013)***   0.090 (0.012)***   0.0972 (0.037)***   0.090 (0.013)***   0.090 (0.013)***   0.090 (0.013)***   0.090 (0.013)***   0.090 (0.013)***   0.090 (0.013)   0.090 (0.013)   0.090 (0.041)***   0.090 (0.041)***   0.090 (0.041)   0.090 (0.033)   0.090 (0.033)   0.090 (0.033)   0.090 (0.033)   0.090 (0.033)   0.090 (0.033)   0.090 (0.033)   0.090 (0.033)   0.090 (0.033)   0.090 (0.033)   0.090 (0.090)**   0.090 (0.060)	* *	1996 Primaries <sup>a</sup> 0.062 (0.044) 0.081 (0.014)*** 0.990 (0.342)**	1998 Elections <sup>b</sup> 0.005 (0.016) 0.949 (0.158)***	Tobacco <sup>b</sup>	Lewinsky <sup>b</sup>
0.097 (0.049)* 0.090 (0.012)*** 1.465 (0.334)*** 0.246 (0.137) 0.015 (0.004)** 0.015 (0.040)* 0.024 (0.033) 0.012 (0.115) 0.012 (0.115)	* *	0.062 (0.044) 0.081 (0.014)*** 0.990 (0.342)** 0.074 (0.140)	0.005 (0.016) 0.949 (0.158)***	0 000 (0 045)	
1.465 (0.334)***  0.246 (0.137)  0.015 (0.004)***  -0.096 (0.040)*  -0.024 (0.033)  -0.122 (0.115)  -0.023 (0.038)	*	0.990 (0.342)** 0.074 (0.140)		1.059 (0.164)***	0.054 (0.016)*** 0.227 (0.163)
0.246 (0.137) 0.015 (0.004)*** -0.096 (0.040)* -0.024 (0.033) -0.122 (0.115) -0.023 (0.038) -0.073 (0.167)		0.074 (0.140)	- CO CO CO	——————————————————————————————————————	
0.015 (0.004)*** -0.096 (0.040)* -0.024 (0.033) -0.122 (0.115) -0.023 (0.038)			0.502 (0.081)*** -0.138 (0.143)	0.000 (0.144)	0.832 (0.088)*** -0.045 (0.148)
-0.096 (0.040)* -0.096 (0.040)* -0.024 (0.033) - -0.122 (0.115) -0.023 (0.038) - -0.173 (0.167)		(1000)			
-0.024 (0.033) -0.056 -0.122 (0.115) 0.117 -0.023 (0.038) -0.081 -0.173 (0.167) -0.330	-0.043 (0.041)	0.003 (0.004) 0.060 (0.040)	0.008 (0.004)* 0.033 (0.046)	0.003 (0.005) 0.024 (0.047)	0.006 (0.005)
-0.122 (0.115) 0.117 -0.023 (0.038) -0.081 -0.173 (0.167) -0.330	-0.019 (0.034)	0.004 (0.032)	0.054 (0.037)	-0.005 (0.037)	0.004 (0.036)
-0.023 (0.038) -0.081 -0.173 (0.167) -0.330	-0.138 (0.118)	0.178 (0.119)	-0.211 (0.128)	-0.105 (0.128)	0.117 (0.126)
	0.004 (0.038)	0.019 (0.036)	-0.041 (0.041)	0.041 (0.043)	0.048 (0.040)
Political interest & knowledge			-0.013 (0.131)	0.459 (0.192)	0.102 (0.130)
0.151 (0.063)*	0.078 (0.064)	0.122 (.063)*	l	i	I
0.109 (0.148)		0.253 (0.138)	0.546 (0.153)***	-0.146(0.155)	-0.273(0.154)
np —0.093 (0.110)		0.205 (0.112)	0.215 (0.081)**	0.122 (0.079)	0.153(0.085)
Failty   U.C.45	-0.043 (0.039) 0.026 (0.106)	0.172 (0.038)***	0.047 (0.042)	-0.023(0.042)	-0.031 (0.043)
(00:0)	0.053 (0.100)	0.000 (0.104)	-0.203 (0.13 <i>t</i> )	-0.021 (0.130)	-0.442 (0.151)***
Soft News Index ×					
International Affairs —0.031 (0.017) —0.032 (0.017)	-0.048 (0.018)**	ľ	1	I	I
National Politics — — — — —	l	-0.016 (0.017)	I	i	I
5.217 (1.059)	4.621 (1.105)	5.019 (0.957)	3.769 (0.558)	2.514 (0.544)	1.755 (0.517)
Constant 2 6.932 (1.069) 7.662 (1.060)	6.459 (1.119)	6.559 (0.971)	5.088 (0.572)	3.833 (0.547)	3.197 (0.524)
0.13  (N = 1319)	8.624 (1.126) 0.10 (N=1322)	8.561 (0.984) 0.11 ( $N = 1322$ )	7.013 (0.591) 0 11 (N – 1048)	5.896 (0.563) 0.08 / N=1049)	5.182 (0.538)

100




Figure 1 indicates that, among respondents who follow international affairs "not at all closely," as attentiveness to the soft news media increases from its lowest to its highest levels, the probability of following the Israel–Lebanon conflict *more* than "not at all closely" increases by 38 percentage points (from 0.40 to 0.78). The corresponding increases for the congressional antiterrorism debate and Bosnia are 58 percentage points (from 0.34 to 0.92) and 47 percentage points (from 0.46 to 0.93), respectively.<sup>28</sup>

Figure 1 does not reveal *how much* attention respondents paid to the three issues. To estimate the mag-

nitude of the effect of soft news, we can observe the extent of self-declared attentiveness as soft news consumption increases. In fact, a majority of respondents whose likelihood of following the three issues "not at all closely" declined as their soft news consumption increased appear, in these data, to have instead followed them "fairly closely." This suggests that the soft news effect is substantial. As soft news consumption increases, the corresponding probabilities of following the Israel-Lebanon conflict, antiterrorism debate, and Bosnia intervention "fairly closely" increase by 19 (from 0.09 to 0.28), 34 (from 0.08 to 0.42), and 41 (from 0.10 to 0.51) percentage points, respectively.<sup>29</sup> Each of these results clearly supports Hypothesis 3, suggesting that respondents who are uninterested in international affairs are nonetheless exposed to information about all three crisis issues through the soft news media.30

process for each of the three crisis attention variables. In each case, the results—which were robust across numerous specifications of the exogenous variables—indicated that interest in international affairs increased the likelihood of being attentive to foreign crises, while being attentive had no effect on interest in international affairs. Such results are, of course, only as good as the instruments created for the endogenous variables. In this case, the  $R^2$  values for the various models suggest that the instruments for interest in international affairs (0.40 for Bosnia, 0.29 for Lebanon, and 0.38 for terrorism) were superior to those for attentiveness to the three crisis issues (0.23, 0.26, and 0.20, respectively). Hence, these results must be interpreted with caution.

<sup>29</sup> Variations in soft news consumption produce somewhat weaker effects on the probability of following the three issues "not too closely" or "very closely" (not shown).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Among the highest soft news consumers, those *most* interested in international affairs are modestly *less* likely to have followed the terrorism debate than their less intrinsically interested counterparts. This suggests that for politically engaged individuals, soft news represents something of a distraction. These differences, however, are extremely small and thus are most likely substantively meaningless.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> The relationships are strongest for the antiterrorism debate (which is clearly linked by the public to international terrorism). This is most likely due, in large measure, to the national trauma produced by the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings. Millions of Americans perceived themselves as holding a personal stake in the terrorism debate, and so it was a more immediate concern (and thus more accessible) than Bosnia or the Israel–Lebanon conflict.

The question remains whether, as predicted by Hypothesis 4, the above interaction disappears if the respondents are asked about an issue covered intensely by the traditional news media but not by the soft news media. If the interaction persists, this would suggest that the above relationships may be artifacts of some omitted variable(s), such as, perhaps, greater overall media exposure by soft news consumers. One appropriate political issue for addressing this question is a presidential primary election. Primaries are highly partisan events and, hence, less appealing to a politically cynical populace. They ought therefore to be less amenable than foreign crises to cheap framing and piggybacking.<sup>31</sup> In fact, a content analysis of soft news coverage of the Republican presidential candidates during the 1996 primaries, shown in Table 2, found, with several exceptions, far less coverage of the primaries than of any of the foreign crises included in that table.32

Fortunately, the same survey asked whether respondents had followed news about the Republican presidential candidates during the 1996 primary election campaign. As with the previous models, the dependent variable is a four-category scale, measuring the extent to which respondents followed the Republican primaries. I tested this dependent variable against three distinct models. The first, shown in the fifth column in Table 4, includes an interaction between the soft news index and interest in national politics.<sup>33</sup> The others (not shown) include interactions between the soft news index and political partisanship or political knowledge.

The theoretical distinction between foreign crises and presidential primaries rests upon the differing degrees to which each is amenable to cheap framing and piggybacking.<sup>34</sup> Issues that are not so amenable

<sup>31</sup> Primary elections involving major scandals or celebrities may not follow this general pattern. Examples here include Gary Hart's affair with Donna Rice, which derailed his campaign in 1988, Bill Clinton's various scandals during the 1992 primary (e.g., Gennifer Flowers and marijuana use), and the involvement of Warren Beatty and Donald Trump in the 2000 primaries. Each of these candidates attracted some

soft news media coverage, due either to their personal foibles or to their personal notoriety.

plus at least one of the other key words.)

33 Here, I replaced interest in national politics with interest in international affairs in the hard news index.

are unlikely to attract significant soft news coverage. As noted, while I focus on foreign crises as a "most difficult" test, this distinction is general. If it is valid, we should find positive relationships between exposure to soft news and attentiveness to any political issue easily framed in highly accessible terms and therefore covered by the soft news media. In contrast, most typical political issues, which tend not to possess these characteristics, are unlikely to be covered by the soft news media, and hence, we should not find statistically significant relationships. In fact, consistent with Hypothesis 4, soft news proved highly insignificant across all three specifications, and as anticipated, the interactions did not emerge. Hence, the soft news media appear in these relationships to contribute to attentiveness to foreign crises but not to the 1996 presidential primaries.

A second survey (Pew Center, Believability of Media/People poll, May 1998) allows a more general test of this distinction. Respondents were asked the same media exposure questions employed in the 1996 survey (plus questions regarding several newer programs). They were also asked how closely they had followed several high-profile issues, including the Monica Lewinsky scandal, tobacco regulation, and the 1998 election campaigns. (See Appendix A for question wording.)

As a further test of Hypothesis 4, I conducted a series of ordered logit analyses, employing, as dependent variables, respondents' self-reported extent of following each of these issues. I also constructed hard and soft news indexes similar to those presented in Table 2 and included a similar set of control variables. (The coding of all variables is identical to that in the 1996 Pew survey. See Appendix A for a listing of the items included in the hard and soft news indexes.<sup>35</sup>) If Hypothesis 4 is valid, we should find a statistically significant positive relationship between exposure to soft news and attentiveness to the Lewinsky scandal, particularly, per Hypothesis 3, among respondents who do not normally follow politics, but not to either the tobacco debate or the 1998 election campaigns. The former issue represents the classic material of soft news: a sex scandal involving a high-profile public figure. The latter issues, in contrast, are far more complex and (intrinsically) partisan and, thus, less amenable to cheap framing and piggybacking.<sup>36</sup> In fact, as anticipated,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> The exceptions were late-night talk shows and MTV. The former programs, which were not included in the Pew survey, have a long tradition of political humor. And in 1996, MTV continued its "Rock the Vote" campaign, intended to bring young voters into the political process. These figures cover the period January through April 1996. Because the Pew Center survey was concluded in early May, this was an appropriate cutoff point. Moreover, by May, the primary season was largely concluded and the nomination wrapped up. Hence, adding May and June to the figures in Table 2 changes the overall tallies only marginally. (Key words employed in this search included Bob Dole, Steve Forbes, Lamar Alexander, Phil Gramm, Pat Buchanan, Alan Keyes, primary, campaign, candidate, election, caucus, and Republican. All "hits" mentioned at least one candidate, plus at least one of the other key words.)

<sup>34</sup> This distinction may not always hold for general presidential elections, which are much higher profile and geared less toward appealing to party loyalists. Having won their party's nomination, candidates typically seek to broaden their appeal to the center of the political

spectrum. This makes general election campaigns potentially more amenable to cheap framing and piggybacking. For instance, the 2000 presidential election attracted substantial soft news media coverage, especially among daytime and late-night talk shows. Indeed, talk shows have always offered occasional coverage of presidential politics. During the 1960 presidential campaign, for instance, Richard Nixon sought to "humanize" himself by playing piano on *The Tonight Show* (Rosenberg 2000). And in 1992, Bill Clinton courted young voters by playing his saxophone on the *Arsenio Hall Show* and appearing on MTV. Yet, prior to 2000, such instances were relatively rare and arguably of limited political consequence.

 $<sup>^{35}</sup>$  The  $\alpha$  reliability scores for the new soft and hard news indexes are 0.70 and 0.75, respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Though the Lewinsky scandal became intensely partisan, soft news media coverage focused primarily on the more sensationalistic, sexually oriented aspects, rather than on partisan politics in Washington.

additional content analyses indicated that, to an even greater extent than the 1996 Republican primaries, the soft news programs listed in Table 2 appear hardly to have noticed the 1998 elections, while soft news coverage of the tobacco debate approached zero. In sharp contrast, most of the soft news programs listed in Table 2 provided substantial coverage of the Lewinsky scandal.<sup>37</sup>

Not surprisingly, the results, shown in Table 4 indicate that attentiveness to neither the tobacco debate nor to the 1998 election campaigns is significantly related to soft news exposure, while both are strongly related to hard news exposure. In contrast, attentiveness to the Lewinsky scandal, which received substantial soft news coverage, is strongly related to soft news exposure (p < 0.01). This further suggests that the relationships identified in Fig. 1 are not mere artifacts of overall greater media or news exposure among soft news consumers.

Finally, to see if the distinction I have drawn between foreign crises and other foreign policy issues is valid, I also conducted content analyses of soft news coverage of NAFTA and the World Trade Organization (January 1, 1992, to February 29, 2000).<sup>39</sup> With the sole exception of NAFTA-related humor on three late-night talk shows (almost exclusively presidential humor), the soft news programs all but ignored NAFTA and the WTO.<sup>40</sup>

Indeed, a key word search of three soft news programs (Access Hollywood, Entertainment Tonight, and Extra), using Lexis-Nexis (Baum n.d.), revealed that, while covering the scandal—including the House and Senate impeachment hearings and trial—in literally hundreds of broadcasts, the three programs, in sharp contrast to the network news, mentioned the word "Democrat" or "Republican" a combined total of twice in their scandal coverage (both of which were incidental to the stories).

<sup>37</sup> The time frames for these content analyses were as follows: (1) 1998 elections, January 1, 1998–November 3, 1998; (2) tobacco debate, January 1, 1998–December 31, 1998; and (3) Lewinsky scandal, January 21, 1998–April 30, 1998. One news content monitoring report found that in the week following the January 21, 1998, breaking of the Lewinsky story, tabloid TV news magazines accounted for about one-third of all coverage of the scandal (Lowry 1998, F1).

<sup>38</sup> Consistent with Hypothesis 3, all of these patterns persist when an interaction with interest in news about national politics is included (not shown).

<sup>39</sup> Key words for the latter analyses included NA FTA. World Trade

<sup>39</sup> Key words for the latter analyses included NAFTA, World Trade Organization or WTO, and Monica Lewinsky. Key words for the 1998 elections included election or campaign and Congress, or governor or legislature. Key words for the tobacco debate included Congress and tobacco (all hits included both terms). Traditional news programs covered these issues extensively. The identical search terms produced 58 stories related to the 1998 elections on ABC's World News Tonight. The corresponding figures for the CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, and Jim Lehrer News Hour were 36, 45, and 56 stories, respectively. The tobacco search terms returned 30 related stories on ABC's World News Tonight. The corresponding figures for the CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, and Jim Lehrer News Hour were 22, 29, and 30 stories, respectively.

<sup>40</sup> Due to their relatively greater complexity and the absence of easily identifiable moral "heroes" or "villains," these two foreign affairs issues seem relatively unlikely to appeal to the soft news media. All WTO coverage focused on the protests at a December 1999 WTO meeting in Seattle. Perhaps due to the absence of serious injuries or fatalities, even the protests failed to attract substantial soft news media coverage of the WTO. Not surprisingly,

Taken together, these results offer substantial support for the theory.

## Soft News Consumption and Familiarity with Foreign Crises

It remains possible that the relationships identified in the prior analysis are artifacts of either the survey instrument or my operationalization of attentiveness. As noted, attentiveness is difficult to precisely measure. Hence, in this section I replicate the results from the prior investigations, using an additional, distinct yet conceptually related, operational indicator of attentiveness: respondents' familiarity with the Northern Ireland conflict and peace process. For this analysis, I employ a July 1998 poll (Gallup Media/Social Security poll, July 1998) addressing several major public policy issues, including the peace process in Northern Ireland. The United States has been intimately involved for many years in efforts to resolve the civil war in Northern Ireland. Moreover, the Clinton Administration played a central role in drafting the Good Friday peace agreement ending the conflict and in convincing the various parties to sign it. Additionally, the conflict has attracted the attention of high-profile celebrities, such as the Irish rock band U2, whose efforts to promote the peace process were widely reported by the soft news media. Hence, while the Northern Ireland peace process is not the archetypal U.S. foreign crisis, I believe that it is an appropriate issue for further testing Hypotheses 2 and 3.4

As dependent variables, I focus on two questions concerning respondents' sympathies in the conflict and their estimation of the prospects for a peaceful settlement. I transformed the responses into binary variables, coded 0 for responses of "don't know/not familiar (with)" and 1 otherwise. In this instance, I employ respondents' willingness to offer an opinion about an issue as an indicator of attentiveness to the issue (Page and Shapiro 1983). The independent variables are similar to the prior analyses, including hard and soft news indexes constructed from a variety of media

coverage of NAFTA and the WTO was far greater in network news. For instance, during the same time periods, the CBS *Evening News* covered NAFTA and WTO in 67 and 23 separate broadcasts, respectively, and the figures for the other major networks are comparable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> A review of Lexis-Nexis transcripts revealed that many soft news programs covered the issue, often on numerous occasions. A partial list of soft news programs covering Northern Ireland includes A Current Affair, The View, Live with Regis and Kathy Lee, 20/20, 48 Hours, 60 Minutes, David Letterman, and Comedy Central's The Daily Show. Interestingly, exposure to hard news is here unrelated to familiarity with Northern Ireland. This most likely reflects the overwhelming domestic orientation of most traditional news programs in 1998, which were heavily focused on the politics of the Lewinsky scandal. While the soft news media also focused on the scandal, they were more likely to highlight possible relationships between the president's domestic difficulties and his foreign policy initiatives

initiatives. <sup>42</sup> Overall, 22 and 15% of respondents, respectively, chose "don't know/not familiar with."

TABLE 5.	Logit Analysis of Attentiveness to Northern Ireland, as Soft News Consumption and
Education	Level Vary

		Coeffic	cient (SE)	
Independent Variable	Ireland (A1)	Ireland (A2)	Ireland (B1)	Ireland (B2)
Media usage			<del></del>	<del></del>
Soft News Index	0.656 (0.331)*	1.576 (0.804)*	0.850 (0.374)*	2.003 (1.019)*
Hard News Index	-0.270 (0.349)	-0.285 (0.343)	0.179 (0.490)	0.198 (0.482)
SES characteristics	, ,	( - /	(	(51.100)
Age	-0.008 (0.043)	-0.004 (0.043)	0.033 (0.051)	0.038 (0.051)
Age <sup>2</sup>	-0.000(0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Education	0.225 (0.093)*	0.526 (0.281)	0.506 (0.135)***	0.917 (0.355)**
Family Income	0.099 (0.087)	0.100 (0.088)	0.076 (0.117)	0.074 (0.119)
Female	-0.485 (0.285)	-0.474 (0.286)	-0.434 (0.411)	-0.442 (0.414)
African American	-0.414 (0.452)	-0.458 (0.445)	-2.072 (0.500)***	-2.154 (0.501)***
Hispanic	0.206 (0.591)	0.209 (0.591)	0.489 (0.781)	0.517 (0.785)
Unemployed	-0.223 (0.401)	-0.324 (0.406)	-1.307 (0.503)**	-1.425 (0.501)**
Political partisanship	, ,	, ,	, ,	(5.55.)
Liberal-Conservative	-0.131 (0.150)	-0.141 (0.152)	-0.531 (0.208)**	-0.550 (0.210)**
Party Identification	-0.033 (0.098)	-0.031 (0.098)	0.258 (0.139)	0.262 (0.140)
Approve Clinton	0.446 (0.321)	0.440 (0.325)	0.033 (0.453)	0.029 (0.464)
Interaction term	, ,	, ,	, ,	(,
Soft News Index X Education	_	-0.154 (0.136)	_	-0.217 (0.174)
Constant	-0.205 (1.426)	-2.034 (1.944)	-1.760 (1.522)	-3.983 (2.457)
Pseudo-R <sup>2</sup>	0.06 (N = 496)	$0.06  (\dot{N} = 496)$	$0.20 \ (\hat{N} = 503)$	0.21 (N = 503)

Note: All models employ White's heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors and probability weighting. \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\*p < 0.001.

consumption items.<sup>43</sup> (See Appendix A for variable coding and question wording.<sup>44</sup>)

Results from logit analyses of the two dependent variables are reported in the second and fourth columns in Table 5. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, in both models, exposure to soft news is positively associated with attentiveness to Northern Ireland (p < 0.05). Once again, I translate the coefficient on soft news index into probabilities of offering an opinion as exposure to soft news varies. The results indicate that, as exposure to soft news increases from its minimum to its maximum values, the probability of having an opinion about the Northern Ireland peace process increases by 25 and 13 percentage points, for the first and second dependent variables (Questions A and B), respectively. Among these respondents, soft news programs were indeed a source of information about the Northern Ireland peace process.

To test Hypothesis 3, it is necessary to identify an appropriate indicator for respondents' propensity to follow politics or international affairs. While this survey does not include such direct questions, research

has shown education to be closely related to political knowledge and engagement (Krause 1997; Bennett 1995; MacKuen 1984; Converse 1964). Hence, I employ education as an indicator of respondents' political engagement. I therefore interact education and the soft news index to capture the differing effects of exposure to soft news on respondents at differing levels of education.


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The results, shown in the third and fifth columns in Table 5, once again support my hypothesis. For both dependent variables, exposure to soft news exerts a far stronger effect on attentiveness to Northern Ireland among less educated respondents. Indeed, the effects of exposure to soft news diminish in a stepwise fashion as respondents move up the education ladder. In the two graphics in Figure 2, I again translate the key coefficients into probabilities.

Among respondents who completed only primary school, as exposure to soft news increases from its lowest to its highest values, the probability of having an opinion about Northern Ireland increases by 55 and 54 percentage points, respectively, for the two dependent variables (Questions A and B). In contrast, among respondents possessing a graduate degree, a maximum increase in exposure to soft news is associated with modest increases of 5 and 0.3 percentage points, respectively. Despite differences in survey organization, dates, items available for inclusion in the hard and soft news indexes, control variables, and operationalizations of attentiveness across the two data sets, the curves in Figures 1 and 2 are strikingly similar. Combined, the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> The hard and soft news index items produced  $\alpha$  reliability scores of 0.60 and 0.59, respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Due to differences in question availability, format, and performance, four controls not included in Table 4 are added (age<sup>2</sup>, African American, Hispanic, unemployed, liberal-conservative) and three that were present in Table 4 are excluded (political knowledge, political partisanship, and white). Once again, variations in model specification produce only marginal changes in the reported results.



results from these several analyses represent substantial additional support for the theory.

### CONCLUSION

Beginning in the 1980s, news broadcasters, facing unprecedented competitive pressures, came to recognize that real-life human drama could attract a large audience and could be produced at a far lower cost than fictional drama. According to Danny Schechter, a former producer for CNN and ABC's news magazine 20/20, the Persian Gulf War drove home for news executives the huge ratings potential of military conflicts, which could be realized by transforming war reporting into a made-for-television soap opera:

It started with the Gulf War—the packaging of news, the graphics, the music, the classification of stories.... Everybody benefited by saturation coverage. The more channels,

the more a sedated public will respond to this.... If you can get an audience hooked, breathlessly awaiting every fresh disclosure with a recognizable cast of characters they can either love or hate, with a dramatic arc and a certain coming down to a deadline, you have a winner in terms of building audience. (Scott 1998)

Through cheap framing, the soft news media have successfully piggybacked information about foreign crises (and other highly accessible issues, such as the Lewinsky scandal) to entertainment-oriented information. Soft news consumers thereby gain information about such issues as an incidental by-product of seeking entertainment. My statistical investigations demonstrated that individuals do learn about these types of issues—but not other, less accessible or dramatic issues—from the soft news media, without necessarily tuning in with the intention of doing so.

Substantial scholarly research has shown that public opinion can, at least sometimes, influence policy outcomes, including in foreign policy (Kernell 1997; Powlick 1995; Bartels 1991; Ostrom and Job 1986; Page and Shapiro 1983). And even minimal attention to politics through the mass media disproportionately increases partisan stability in voting (Zukin 1977). This suggests that soft news media coverage of foreign policy may have significant practical consequences for American politics. Indeed, while viewers of many of these programs are not among the most politically engaged Americans (Davis and Owen 1998), low-attention individuals do vote in significant numbers. According to the Pew Center surveys employed in this study (1996 and 1998), over 60% of respondents who consumed more than one standard deviation above the mean quantity of soft news and were eligible to vote in 1992 and 1996, respectively, indicated that they had done so. While self-declared voting rates in surveys are typically inflated [by about 10%, according to Kelly and Mirer (1974)], the difference between these respondents and the self-declared voting rates for frequent hard news viewers is less than 18 percentage points in both surveys. And, in the same surveys, individuals who did not attend college were 22 and 26 percentage points less likely to have voted in 1992 and 1996, respectively, than their college-educated counterparts; substantial differences to be sure, but hardly overwhelming. Clearly, many soft news viewers and politically inattentive individuals vote. While determining the precise policy effects of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this project, in a democratic political system, in which leaders are directly accountable to the public, it seems unlikely that heightened awareness of policy decision making by a previously disengaged segment of the population would be entirely without consequence.

Indeed, I have presented some evidence suggesting that the soft news media may not necessarily cover political issues in the same way that traditional news programs do. And research has shown that the *nature* of the political information people consume can influence the substance of the opinions they express (Iyengar and

Kinder 1987; Key 1961). This, in turn, raises the possibility that, at least in some instances, and regarding some issues, the opinions of individuals whose primary source of political information is the soft news media might differ materially from those of their more politically attentive counterparts. Along these lines, elsewhere (Baum n.d.) I report evidence that, among individuals who are not highly educated or politically aware, increased soft news consumption—net of demographic and political characteristics and hard news consumption patterns—is associated with substantially reduced support for America's overseas commitments as well as an increase in the propensity to view those issues and themes most prevalent in the soft news media (e.g., crime, morality, scandal, or foreign crisis issues), relative to other policy areas, as the nation's most urgent problems.45

My findings further suggest that some of the barriers to information and political participation confronting democratic citizens may be falling. Where America's foreign policy was once the domain of a fairly small "foreign policy elite," the soft news media appear to have, to some extent, "democratized" foreign policy. This represents both a challenge and an opportunity for America's political leaders. It is a challenge because leaders can no longer count on communicating effectively with the American people solely through traditional news outlets (Baum and Kernell 1999; Hess 1998). To reach those segments of the public who eagerly reach for their remotes any time traditional political news appears on the screen, leaders must reformulate their messages in terms that appeal to programs preferred by these politically uninterested individuals.

The rise of the soft news media also offers an opportunity, because, to the extent that they are able to adapt their messages accordingly, soft news outlets allow leaders to communicate with segments of the population that have traditionally tuned out politics and foreign affairs entirely. This may allow future leaders to expand their support coalitions beyond the traditionally attentive segments of the population. Broader support coalitions, in turn, may translate into more effective leadership, particularly in difficult times.

Finally, from the citizens' perspective, one might be tempted to take heart from the apparent leveling-off of attentiveness to foreign policy across differing groups of Americans. After all, a more broadly attentive public might yield more broad-based participation in the political process. Many democratic theorists would likely consider this a desirable outcome. Yet it is unclear whether more information necessarily makes better citizens, particularly if the quality or diversity of that information is suspect. Indeed, one might also be tempted to wonder about the implications of a citizenry learning about the world through the relatively narrow lens of the entertainment-oriented soft news media.

### APPENDIX A: SURVEY QUESTION WORDING AND CODING

Pew Center May 1996 and May 1998 Media Consumption Poll Variables (Telephone Surveys; N = 1751 and N = 3002, Respectively)

All Pew survey data can be downloaded at http://www.people-press.org.

Dependent Variables. "Now I will read a list of some stories covered by news organizations this past month. As I read each item, tell me if you happened to follow this news story very closely, fairly closely, not too closely, or not at all closely": (1) "the military conflict between Israel and the pro-Iranian Muslims in Lebanon" (1996), (2) "the passage in Congress of a new law dealing with domestic terrorism" (1996), (3) "the situation in Bosnia" (1996), (4) "allegations of sexual misconduct against Bill Clinton" (1998), (5) "the debate in Washington over legislation to regulate the tobacco industry" (1998), and (6) "candidates and election campaigns in your state" (1998). Coding: 1 = "not at all closely," 2 = "not very closely," 3 = "fairly closely," and 4 = "very closely."

**Political Interest and Knowledge.** Voted in 1992 (or 1996): Dummy variable, coded 1 if respondent voted in 1992 (or 1996, in 1998 survey) and 0 otherwise.

Political Knowledge (1996 only): Respondents' levels of political knowledge were estimated through construction of a scale, derived from three knowledge-based questions. Respondents were asked if they knew (a) "who the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives is," (b) "which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives," and (c) "what the federal minimum wage is today." (For the minimum wage question, answers within one category of the correct answer, on a seven-category scale, were coded as correct responses.) Respondents were given 1 point for each correct response, resulting in a 3-point scale, with a score of 3 representing those most politically knowledgeable. Responses of "Don't know/refused" were coded as incorrect.

Partisanship: Three-point scale estimating the extent of the respondent's partisanship (from party ID question). Coding: 1 = no preference; 2 = Independent or other; 3 = Democrat or Republican.

Party Identification: Five-point scale. Coding: 1 = Democrat; 2 = Independent, leaning Democratic; 3 = Independent, no preference, or other; 4 = Independent, leaning Republican; 5 = Republican.

1996 Media Consumption (Questions Employed in Soft and Hard News Indexes). Note: All media indexes are ordinal scales, based on the sum of all individual items.

(A) "Now I'd like to know how often you watch or listen to certain TV and radio programs. For each that I read, tell me if you watch or listen to it regularly, sometimes, hardly ever, or never. Network Newscasts; Local Newscasts; CNN; CSPAN; NPR; TV News Magazines; PBS News Hour with Jim Lehrer;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> For instance, in one March 1998 Gallup Poll, among respondents with less than a 12th-grade education, greater soft news consumption was associated with significantly reduced support for NATO. And in the 2000 National Election Study (NES), increased exposure to day-time talk shows was associated with significantly reduced approval of President Clinton's handling of foreign policy (VAR 000515) and reduced support for U.S. overseas commitments (VAR 000513a). Finally, in a May 1998 Pew Center poll asking respondents to name the nation's most important problems, greater exposure to soft news, but *not* hard news consumption, was associated with an increased propensity to mention issues pertaining to foreign crises (including terrorism), crime, morality, or scandal and a *reduced* propensity to mention other, less dramatic policy issues, such as the state of the economy and education. In each instance, these effects weaken as respondents move up the political awareness or education ladders.

MTV; Tabloid TV Shows; Daytime TV Talk Shows." Coding: 1 = never; 2 = hardly ever; 3 = sometimes; 4 = regularly.

(B) "I'm going to read you a list of different types of news. Please tell me how closely you follow this type of news either in the newspaper, on television, or on radio...very closely, somewhat closely, not very closely, or not at all closely. International Affairs; Political News; Business News; News About Crime; News About Famous People; News About Entertainment." Coding: 1 = not at all closely; 2 = not very closely; 3 = somewhat closely; 4 = very closely.

(C) "Now I'd like to know how often you read certain types of publications. As I read each, tell me if you read them regularly, sometimes, hardly ever, or never. [First,] how about: Tabloid Newspapers (i.e., The National Enquirer, The Sun or The Star); News Magazines; Business Magazines." Coding: 1 = never: 2 = hardly ever; 3 = sometimes; 4 = regularly.

(D) Daily Newspaper: Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent reads a newspaper regularly and 0 otherwise.

(E) News on Internet: "Do you ever go on-line to get information on current events, public issues and politics? If yes, how often do you go on-line for this type of information ... every day, 3 to 5 days per week, 1 or 2 days per week, once every few weeks, or never?" Coding: 1 = never; 2 = less than once every few weeks; 3 = every few weeks or 1-2 days per week; 4 = 3-5 days per week or every day.

Cable Subscriber: Dummy variable coded 1 if the respondent currently subscribes to cable and 0 otherwise. (This question is included as a separate control.)

1998 Soft and Hard News Index Components. Soft News Index: Ten-item scale constructed from the identical general question format as in the 1996 Survey, and including the following items: MTV, Tabloid TV News Magazines, Daytime Talk Shows, Court TV, Morning News/Variety Shows, News Magazine Shows, Entertainment Tonight, The National Enquirer, Howard Stern, and People Magazine.

Hard News Index: Thirteen-item scale constructed from the same question format as the soft news index and including the following items: Nightly Network News Programs, Local Television News Programs, CNN, C-SPAN, National Public Radio, The Newshour with Jim Lehrer, CNBC, MSNBC, Fox News, News Magazines, Business Magazines, Harpers Magazine, and Daily Newspapers. (The Daily Newspapers item is a 6-point scale, with respondents receiving one point each for indicating that they read the following newspapers: New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Herald Tribune, and Boston Globe.)

## July 1998 Gallup Media/Social Security Poll Variables (Telephone Survey; *N* = 619)

Dependent Variables. (A) "In the situation in Northern Ireland, are your sympathies—(1) more with the Irish Catholics, or (2) more with the Irish Protestants, (3) both, (4) neither, (5) don't know/not familiar." (B) "As you may know, the leaders of the two opposing sides in Northern Ireland have reached a new compromise agreement concerning the governance of Northern Ireland. Are you generally optimistic or pessimistic that this agreement will lead to lasting peace in Northern Ireland?—(1) optimistic, (2) pessimistic, (3) don't know/not familiar with." Coding: 0="don't know/not familiar with"; 1= all other responses.

Media Consumption (Questions Employed in Soft and Hard News Indexes). (A) "Now, I would like to ask you some questions about the media. As you know, people get their news and information from many different sources, and I would like to ask you where you get YOUR news and infor-

mation. I will read a list of sources, and for each one, please tell me how often you get your news from that source: every day, several times a week, occasionally, or never. First, how often do you get your news from \_\_\_\_\_? Newspapers, National Newspapers, Nightly Network News Programs, Morning News and Interview Programs, CNN News or CNN Headline News, Cable News other than CNN, C-SPAN, Public Television News, Local Television News, National Public Radio, National Network News on Radio (cther than NPR), Radio Talk Shows, Television Talk Shows, Half-Hour TV Entertainment News Programs." Coding: 1 = never; 2 = occasionally; 3 = several times a week; 4 = every day. ("Don't know/refused" responses were coded as missing.)

(B) "And how often do you get your news from each of the following WEEKLY sources of news: every week, several times a month, occasionally, or never? First, how often do you get your news from \_\_\_\_? Weekly News Magazines, Television News Programs on Sunday Mornings, TV News Magazine Shows during the Evenings." Coding: 1 = never; 2 = occasionally; 3 = several times a month; 4 = every week. ("Don't know/refused" responses were coded as missing.)

**Political Partisanship.** Liberal-Conservative: "How would you describe your political views?" Coding: 1 = very conservative; 2 = conservative; 3 = moderate; 4 = liberal; 5 = very liberal. ("Don't know/refused" responses were coded as missing.)

Party Identification: Coding: 1 = Republican; 2=Independent, leaning Republican; 3 = Independent; 4 = Independent, leaning Democratic; 5 = Democrat. ("Don't know/refused" responses were coded as missing.)

Soft and Hard News Index Components. Soft News Index: TV Entertainment News Shows, Television Talk Shows, Radio Talk Shows, TV News Magazine Shows, Morning News and Interview Shows (e.g., Good Morning America).

Hard News Index: Nightly Network News Programs, Local Television News Programs, CNN, C-SPAN, Public Television News, Cable News other than CNN, Sunday Morning Television News Shows, National Public Radio, National Network News on Radio, Weekly News Magazines, Newspapers or National Newspapers.

## APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY TESTS

Substantial evidence indicates that responding "don't know" reflects primarily inattentiveness or unfamiliarity, rather than ambivalence about how to respond. For instance, the 1996 and 1998 NES surveys each included 19 "feeling thermometer" questions regarding politically prominent individuals and groups. Respondents who answered "don't know" were asked a follow-up question regarding whether they were unfamiliar with the individual/group or ambivalent about the appropriate response. Overall, 76 and 75%, in 1996 and 1998, respectively, indicated that their "don't know" response meant that they were unfamiliar with the individual or group.

I also conducted a series of additional validity and reliability tests. Across a wide range of data sets, including every NES survey conducted during the Vietnam and the Persian Gulf wars (1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1990/1991), "don't know" responses to questions about the wars were inversely and significantly related to political knowledge, education, interest in politics, and political partisanship, as well as to the number of mentions of foreign policy issues in open-ended "most important problems facing the nation" questions. These findings are consistent with Zaller (1991), who found a strong positive relationship between "don't know" responses and

political awareness. Similarly, Page and Shapiro (1983) argue that public attentiveness to an issue can be most directly, though not perfectly, measured by the proportion of respondents answering "don't know" to survey questions pertaining to the issue.

Additionally, a principal-component factor analysis indicated that, in two surveys (Gallup; August 12, 1997, and CBS, September 18, 1978), respondents' self-declared attention to the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt load fairly strongly (at 0.61 and 0.51, respectively) on the same underlying factor as the propensity to respond "don't know" to a second question asking respondents their opinions of the two issues. [For additional arguments and evidence substantiating the use of "don't know" responses as indicating low attentiveness, see Powlick and Katz (1998), Zaller (1992), Zaller and Feldman (1992), Edwards (1990), Shapiro and Mahajan (1986), and Krugman and Hartley (1970). For additional reliability and validity testing, see Baum (n.d., 2000).]

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# **Cross-cutting Social Networks: Testing Democratic Theory in Practice**

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Exposure to conflicting political viewpoints is widely assumed to benefit the citizens of a democratic polity. Nonetheless, the benefits of exposure to heterogeneous political viewpoints have yet to be demonstrated empirically. Drawing on national survey data that tap characteristics of people's political discussion networks, I examine the impact of heterogeneous networks of political discussion on individuals' awareness of legitimate rationales for oppositional viewpoints, on their awareness of rationales for their own viewpoints, and on levels of political tolerance. Finally, utilizing a laboratory experiment manipulating exposure to dissonant and consonant political views, I further substantiate the causal role of cross-cutting exposure in fostering political tolerance.

ecent social and political theory has elevated political conversation among democratic citizens to new heights. Political talk is central to most current conceptions of how democracy functions (Schudson 1997). According to many prominent social theorists, democracy has a future only if "citizens come back out of their bunkers and start talking" (Gray 1995, 1; see also Elshtain 1995; Lasch 1995). The quantity and quality of political conversation have become "a standard for the accomplishment of democracy" (Sanders 1997, 347). Theorists extol the virtues of political talk, foundations spend millions of dollars to encourage it, and civic journalists and others plan special meetings to foster more of it. Yet what do we really know about beneficial outcomes of political talk as it occurs in day to day life?

For the most part, arguments for the centrality of political discussion among ordinary Americans have been highly theoretical in nature. In other words, the contributions to democratic ends that political conversations are supposed to make depend critically on whether such talk reaches the standards necessary to be deemed "deliberation," "discourse," or, in Habermas' (1989) terms, an "ideal speech situation." It is one thing to claim that political conversation has the potential to produce beneficial outcomes if it meets a whole variety of as yet unrealized criteria, and yet another to argue that political conversations, as they actually occur, produce meaningful benefits for citizens (Conover and Searing 1998). Because the list of requirements for deliberation tends to be quite lengthy, it is difficult, if not impossible, to test theories of this kind empirically.

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<sup>1</sup> For example, to qualify, political discussion must take place among citizens of equal status who offer reasonable, carefully constructed, and morally justifiable arguments to one another in a context of mutual respect (Gutmann and Thompson 1996). Such interactions must exclude no one or, at least, provide "free and equal access to all" (Knight and Johnson 1994). In addition, the opinions of participants in deliberative encounters must all weigh equally (e.g., Fishkin 1991), and all participants must be free of the kinds of material deprivations that hinder participation, such as a lack of income or education.

If one limits the political communication phenomena worthy of study to those conversations that meet the necessary and sufficient conditions invoked by democratic theorists, then one is left with a near-empty set of social interactions to study. Instead, the goal of this research is to examine a very minimalist conception of political discussion, but one that may, nonetheless, have significant consequences for the citizens who engage in it. For these purposes I relax many of the requirements invoked in discussions of deliberation and focus strictly on the extent to which political conversations expose people to dissimilar political views. My results suggest that although cross-cutting exposure is disappointingly infrequent in the contemporary United States, it may—even in its highly imperfect manifestationshold some beneficial consequences for democratic citizens.

## THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT THE CONSEQUENCES OF CROSS-CUTTING EXPOSURE

Perhaps the most often cited proponent of communication across lines of difference is John Stuart Mill (1859, 21), who pointed out how a lack of contact with oppositional viewpoints diminishes the prospects for a public sphere: "If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, they lose what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with error." Likewise, Habermas (1989) assumes that exposure to dissimilar views will benefit the inhabitants of a public sphere by encouraging greater interpersonal deliberation and intrapersonal reflection.

Exposure to conflicting political views is also said to play an integral role in encouraging "enlarged mentality," that is, the capacity to form an opinion "by considering a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of those who are absent.... The more people's standpoints I have present in my mind while I am pondering a given issue, and the better I can imagine how I would feel and think if I were in their place, the stronger will be my capacity for representative thinking and the more valid my final conclusions, my opinion" (Arendt 1968, 241). Interactions with others of differing views is assumed

to be "essential for us to comprehend and to come to appreciate the perspective of others" (Benhabib 1992, 140).

Cross-cutting exposure also is assumed to promote greater awareness of oppositional views because no individual person thinking in isolation can foresee the variety of perspectives through which political issues may be perceived (Manin 1987). Thus political deliberation "teaches citizens to see things they had previously overlooked, including the views of others ... " (p. 351). Awareness of rationales for oppositional views is a particularly important type of political knowledge because of its close ties to legitimacy. One purpose served by conveying rationales for oppositional views is to help render the ultimate decision or policy legitimate in the eyes of others (Manin 1987). If rationales are not made public, the losers in a given controversy will not know what reasons or arguments the winners judged to be stronger in deciding the merits of the case: "Hence discussion rather than private deliberation would be necessary to 'put on the table' the various reasons and arguments that different individuals had in mind, and thus to ensure that no one could see the end result as arbitrary rather than reasonable and justifiable, even if not what he or she happened to see as most justifiable" (Fearon 1998, 62).

Exposure to diverse political views is obviously tied to a wide range of outcomes that are valued in democratic systems. But it would be quite naive to suggest that only good can flow from cross-cutting interactions; conversations among those of differing views also have the capacity to result in bitter arguments, violence, and/or a hostile and uneasy silence (Scorza 1998). Thus Kingwell (1995) has stressed the importance of civility or politeness in maintaining conversations across lines of political difference. To sustain relationships that make cross-cutting discourse possible, discussants must at times refrain from saying all they could say in the interests of smooth social interaction. This type of civility via "not-saying" ... "contributes to smooth social interaction, makes for tolerance of diversity and conditions a regard for the claims and interests of others" (Kingwell 1995, 219). In this view, exposure to differing views holds the potential for tremendous benefits, but only if it occurs in a context in which the collective project of getting along with one another in society is primary and the elucidation of differences secondary.

## THE ROLE OF CROSS-CUTTING EXPOSURE IN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

In addition to the assumptions of political theory, many empirical relationships have been credited to exposure to dissonant views. For example, in his classic study of tolerance, Stouffer (1955, 127) suggested that exposure to conflicting views was the main reason that education and tolerance were so closely connected:

... Schooling puts a person in touch with people whose ideas and values are different from one's own. And this

tends to carry on, after formal schooling is finished, through reading and personal contacts. . . . To be tolerant, one has to learn further not only that people with different ideas are not necessarily bad people but also that it is vital to America to preserve this free market place. . . . The first step in learning this may be merely to encounter the strange and the different. (original italics)

Although other explanations for the education—tolerance relationship have been proposed in subsequent research, most later studies also reference the idea that education "increase(s) awareness of the varieties of human experience that legitimize wide variation in ... values" (Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978, 61). The extent to which people are exposed to differing views also has been invoked in explanations for why women tend to be less tolerant than men and why those in urban environments may be more tolerant than those in rural areas (Stouffer 1955; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1982; Nunn, Crockett, and Williams 1978).

Interpretations of tolerance levels have stressed the diversity of people's contacts, but this concept has seldom been directly measured. Nonetheless, closely related concepts support the likelihood of such an impact. For example, a personality dimension known as "openness to experience" is strongly positively related to tolerance (Marcus et al. 1995), and authoritarians have been found to live relatively sheltered lives with little exposure to alternative lifestyles and beliefs (Altemeyer 1997). In a recent study of Russian social networks, Gibson (1999) also found that support for democratic institutions was correlated with the number of "weak ties" (i.e., nonrelatives) in a person's social network.

Finally, the popularity of specially organized deliberative forums also rests on the assumption that crosscutting exposure is particularly beneficial. Although such events may successfully educate people on public policy issues (for a review, see Gastil and Dillard 1999; Cook et al. 1999), it is unclear from research to date whether learning is influenced by the cross-cutting interactions themselves or some other aspect of the forums such as the educational materials given to participants by organizers. Americans report that they are very unlikely to talk about politics at public meetings (Conover and Searing 1998) so the generalizability of findings from specially orchestrated forums to everyday political life is also an open question.<sup>2</sup>

The most important point to be gleaned from analyzing the role that the political diversity of social networks has played in political science research to date is that outside of work on persuasion, cross-cutting exposure typically has been an *unmeasured* concept, one offered in post hoc explanations for other relationships rather than as the central focus of research. Despite

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Experimental studies using small groups in contexts outside of political decision-making have suggested that an emphasis on controversy over concurrence-seeking promotes greater mastery and retention of information (Lowry and Johnson 1981; Smith et al. 1981) and greater epistemic curiosity, that is, interest in and commitment to the immediate search for more information about a problem (Smith et al. 1992; Lowry and Johnson 1981; Smith et al. 1981).

the important role that cross-cutting exposure plays in political theory, little empirical research has examined its consequences.

## THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PLAUSIBILITY OF BENEFICIAL CONSEQUENCES

Embedded in these assertions are hypotheses about at least three potential beneficial effects of cross-cutting networks. Communication environments that expose people to non-like-minded political views have been assumed to promote (1) greater awareness of rationales for one's own viewpoints, (2) greater awareness of rationales for oppositional viewpoints, and (3) greater tolerance. How plausible are such benefits from the perspective of what is known about the social psychology of human interaction?

The first hypothesis rests on the assumption that confronting differences prompts people to reflect on the reasons for their own beliefs. This process is assumed to occur either in preparation for defending one's own positions or as a result of an internal need to rationalize or explain why one's own views differ from others'. Studies of cognitive response generally support the plausibility of such a reaction; exposure to counter-attitudinal advocacy enhances the production of counter-arguments, particularly for highly involving topics (e.g., Petty and Cacioppo 1977, 1979).<sup>3</sup>


The second hypothesis, that cross-cutting exposure promotes greater awareness of oppositional viewpoints, simply assumes that exposure to dissimilar views imparts new information. Psychologically this hypothesis demands nothing more than a straightforward learning process whereby rationales are transmitted from one person to another. The greatest limitation on its plausibility is the infrequency with which political conversations are likely to reach the level of depth in which rationales are articulated. But a good deal of this process may occur at the intrapersonal rather than the interpersonal level. In other words, when exposed interpersonally to political views noticeably different from their own, people may be prompted to think intrapersonally about the reasons that may have led those others to hold such views (Mutz 1998). This mental rehearsal of thoughts and search for rationales may occur even when the discussants do not explicitly articulate such reasons themselves (Burnstein and Sentis 1981; Burnstein, Vinokur, and Trope 1973).

The third hypothesis embedded in arguments about the importance of cross-cutting exposure is that it should lead to greater political tolerance. On initial consideration, this assertion sounds very similar to Allport's (1954) classic intergroup contact hypothesis. which suggests that face-to-face interaction among members of different groups can, under certain conditions, reduce prejudice. Although the contact hypothesis has been known for producing mixed evidence at best (see, e.g., Amir 1969, 1976), more recent assessments suggest that intergroup contact usually does have positive effects, even when the situation does not meet all of the conditions enumerated by Allport and subsequent researchers (see Pettigrew 1998, Pettigrew and Tropp 2000). Moreover, among the various types of "groups" that one might consider, contact among those of differing political views is ideally situated to produce beneficial effects from cross-cutting exposure. The best sequence of events for purposes of promoting beneficial effects is one in which people first get to know one another as individuals, then only later recognize each other as representatives of disliked groups (Pettigrew 1997). People's political views are seldom obvious upon first meeting, and conversations about politics do not occur with sufficient regularity so that people always know when they are in the company of people holding cross-cutting views. Thus a person may easily develop a liking for another person long before discovering their differences of political opinion.

On the other hand, the kind of people or groups one is asked to tolerate on civil libertarian grounds are seldom exactly the same as the people of opposing views that one encounters at work or in the neighborhood. Nonetheless, within the large literature on intergroup contact, a smaller group of studies of "generalized intergroup contact" confirms that contact across group lines can generalize to reduce prejudice even toward outgroups that are not part of the intergroup contact (e.g., Reich and Purbhoo 1975; Cook 1984; Pettigrew 1997; Weigert 1976). In other words, these findings support the possibility that exposure to everyday differences of political opinion may translate to an appreciation of the need to tolerate differences of political opinion among disparate groups within the larger society. People who have had to learn how to "agree to disagree" in their daily lives better understand the need to do so as a matter of public policy. For example, in support of the generalizability of contact effects, the extent of interpersonal contact across lines of religion, race, social class, culture, and nationality predicted nonprejudicial attitudes toward groups not involved in the contact, even when taking into account potential reciprocal influences (Pettigrew 1997). Moreover, the extent of contact across lines of difference also generalized to immigration policy preferences, a more policy-oriented outcome similar to tolerance measures. Although studies of intergroup contact have tended to use prejudicial attitudes as their dependent variables, their findings also appear to generalize to perspective-taking ability (see Reich and Purbhoo 1975); that is, cross-cutting contact improves people's abilities to see issues from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Consistent with this argument, Green, Visser, and Tetlock (1999) found that people became more aware of and able to balance valid arguments on both sides of an issue when they were exposed to strong arguments on both sides of an issue and anticipated having to justify their views to opinionated representatives of the conflicting sides, an experimental condition that simulates a cross-cutting personal network.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Moreover, many of the additional necessary conditions tacked on in subsequent research turn out to be facilitating but not essential conditions (Pettigrew 1998; Pettigrew and Tropp 2000).



the perspectives of others, even when they personally do not agree.<sup>5</sup>

As illustrated in Fig. 1, there are at least two mechanisms by which exposure to oppositional political viewpoints might lead to political tolerance.<sup>6</sup> First, as suggested by the second hypothesis, cross-cutting interactions may convey information. Through what psychologists call the process of "deprovincialization," people learn that their norms, customs, and lifestyles are not the only ways to deal with the social world (Pettigrew 1997, 174). To the extent that cross-cutting exposure leads to greater awareness of legitimate rationales for oppositional views, such awareness should give people good reasons for upholding the civil liberties of those with whom they personally disagree; one sees that there are at least legitimate reasons for such views, even if one personally finds them uncompelling. The top half of Fig. 1 illustrates this proposed chain of events whereby exposure to people of differing political views increases awareness of rationales for differing viewpoints and thus increases political tolerance. This link is further supported by theorists such as Mead (1934) and Piaget (1932), who stressed the importance of perspective-taking ability to attitudes and behaviors that subordinate the self's perspective to the larger society—as does political tolerance.

In addition to this cognitive mechanism for translating cross-cutting exposure to political tolerance, a second potential mechanism emphasizes affect over cognition. To paraphrase Stouffer (1955), one could learn from personal experience that those different from one's self are not necessarily bad people. According to this mechanism, the content and extent of people's political discussions are less important than the quality of the personal relationships that develop. It is not important that they learn about the rationales for one another's political views, but it is important that they develop close relationships with those they know to hold quite different political viewpoints. Once formed, these cross-cutting relationships make it less likely that people will support restrictions of the civil liberties of those of differing views. The bottom half of Fig. 1 illustrates how exposure to people of differing political views may lead to more intimate cross-cutting associations, and thus greater tolerance.

To summarize, interactions involving exposure to conflicting views have been assumed to benefit people largely (1) by encouraging a deeper understanding of one's own viewpoint, (2) by producing greater awareness of rationales for opposing views, and (3) by contributing to greater tolerance. With respect to the third hypothesis, if exposure to cross-cutting political views increases tolerance via its effects on awareness of rationales for oppositional points of view, then this would lend credibility to the cognitive interpretation of the benefits of cross-cutting contact. If close personal relationships across lines of political difference influence tolerance levels, then this provides support for the affective mechanism.

#### SURVEY DESIGN

To examine these hypotheses, I utilized data from a representative national telephone survey sponsored by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Changing prejudice is clearly not the same thing as altering levels of tolerance, because the former involves altering negative attitudes toward groups and the latter involves support for civil liberties in spite of ongoing negative attitudes toward groups. Nonetheless, there is sufficient conceptual overlap for these literatures to be relevant to one another.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Kuklinski and colleagues (1991) and Theiss-Morse and colleagues (1993) identify a similar distinction between "cognitive and affective bases of political tolerance judgments," but in their experiments the cognitive basis means that people are induced to think about tolerance judgments, as opposed to thinking specifically about rationales for the opposite view as suggested by the cognitive mechanism in this study.

the Spencer Foundation and executed by the University of Wisconsin Survey Center in the fall of 1996, immediately preceding the presidential election in November.<sup>7</sup> This survey included a battery of items tapping the frequency with which respondents talked about politics with up to three political discussants and the frequency with which respondents agreed or disagreed with the views of the political discussants that were named. In addition, all respondents were asked about whether they perceived their views to be generally the same as or different from their discussants' and whether the discussant generally shared or opposed their political views. The survey also included questions tapping whether each of the respondent's discussants favored Republicans or Democrats, and which presidential candidate they preferred. By combining the latter two questions with information on the respondent's own partisanship and candidate preference, it was possible to create additional measures of the extent to which the discussants held political views similar to or different from the respondent's views. Since the extent of discussion with politically dissonant and consonant discussion partners is not a zero-sum situation whereby more discussion with agreeable partners must lead to less discussion with partners who disagree, I used these five items to create separate measures of the frequency of discussion with politically consonant and dissonant partners (see Appendix A for details on the wording of survey items and construction of measures).8

Although the impact of discussions with like-minded others is not the central focus of this study, I include this variable in the analyses to sort out effects that may be attributed to political discussion in general, as opposed to discussions that cross lines of political difference in particular. Moreover, since political discussion of all types is likely to characterize those more politically interested, knowledgeable, and involved, controls are included for these predispositions. To the extent that the effects of exposure to dissonant views are unique and not attributable to contact that involves political agreement or to political interest and involvement more generally, then the benefits suggested by so many theorists gain support. In addition to the frequency of consonant and dissonant contact, the survey also included items that made it possible to tap the level of intimacy within dyads (see Appendix A). For each respondent, separate measures were created to represent levels of intimacy with consonant, dissonant and politically neutral discussion partners.9

To tap the dependent variables for the first and second hypotheses, awareness of legitimate rationales for own and for opposing views, open-ended questions were used to solicit issue-specific rationales for three separate controversies including preferences among the 1996 presidential candidates, opinions about affirmative action for women and minorities, and opinions about state versus federal control of the welfare system.<sup>10</sup> Randomizing the order in which own and opposing view questions appeared,11 respondents were asked what reasons they could think of for the various viewpoints. The open-ended responses were coded into individual rationales by two independent coders. To produce an indicator of awareness of rationales for opposing viewpoints, respondents were asked, "Regardless of your own views, what reasons can you think of for. ..."12 In other words, they were asked to view the issues through the eyes of the opposition.

As expected, the number of rationales that people could give for their own positions were, on average, significantly higher than those they could give for why someone might hold an opposing view (p < 0.001 in all three cases). As shown in Table 1, the measures of

<sup>9</sup> Consistent with previous research on social and political networks (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), the political discussants in this sample may be characterized as fairly homogeneous. For example, respondents reported that only 14% of their discussants were of a different political party, and only 13% favored a different presidential candidate than the main respondent. Only 11% of discussants held views "very different" from the respondent's own, compared to 61% whose views were described as "much the same." Finally, 60% of discussants were said to share most of the main respondents' views, while only 10% were opposed to their views. The relationships among the independent variables also were as expected based on past research: close relationships and frequent interactions tended to be among those who agreed, while crosscutting exposure characterized weak ties and less frequent political discussion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Based on a pretest, these issues were chosen because they were current at the time the survey was done, and formed a likely basis for tapping awareness that could result from recent political discussions. They are also issues for which substantial controversy exists, so respondents with differing views on both sides of the issues were available.

Analyses showed no significant difference between the two orderings in the number of rationales offered for either own or opposing positions, and thus the order variables were dropped from further

analyses.

12 Volunteered rationales for own and opposing views were taken at face value and not evaluated by any external standards of sophistication. But coders did eliminate from their counts rationales that served to delegitimize the other viewpoint. For example, if a respondent explained why others supported Clinton with reference to negative personal traits of the opinion holder ("Other people might vote for him because they are stupid") or negative traits of Clinton ("He's so slippery and slick and a good puppet"), then these were not counted as acknowledgments of a legitimate basis for the oppositional viewpoint. To test the reliability of coding, two independent coders both coded a subsample of 105 of respondents' answers to the openended awareness of rationales for own and opposing views questions. The correlation between the measures produced by the two coders ranged from 0.74 to 0.89 across the six open-ended questions, with an average of 0.80. For respondents who held no opinion on a given issue, their rationales for the two questions were divided equally between awareness of own and oppositional views.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Each number was screened to verify that it was associated with a household. The person selected for the interview was randomly chosen from among household members at least 18 years old, with no substitutions allowed. The response rate was 47% when calculated as the proportion of completed interviews divided by the total sample (which includes those who never answered and all other nonresponses and refusals) minus the nonsample numbers. This is virtually identical to the rate obtained in similar telephone surveys (see, e.g., Huckfeldt et al. 1995). Interviews averaged 25 minutes. A maximum of 30 calls was made to each unresolved telephone number.

<sup>8</sup> For each of the three political discussants named, these items scaled relatively well, with Cronbach's a's for Exposure to dissonant views of 0.77, 0.80, and 0.81, for the first, second, and third named discussants, respectively, and for Exposure to consonant views,  $\alpha$ 's of 0.73, 0.83, and 0.85, respectively.

TABLE 1. Awareness of Rationales for Own and Opposing Political Views

Issue	Mean	Range	Correlation	t Value
State versus federal				
Own view	0.89	0-4	0.21***	15.31***
Opposing view	0.41	0–3		
Affirmative action				
Own view	0.65	0–5	0.32***	9.90***
Opposing view	0.38	0–3		
Presidential candida	ate			
Own view	1.36	0–9	0.26***	13.06***
Opposing view	0.67	0–7		
Combined measure				
Own view	2.90	0-14	0.48***	19.77***
Opposing view	1.46	0-11		

Note: t values are based on paired t tests comparing the number of rationales given for own and oppositional views. \*\*\* p < 0.001.

rationales for the two sides of a given issue were, also not surprisingly, significantly correlated with one another, thus indicating general knowledge of or interest in politics or in these specific issues. Three issues were used to get a broader sense of a given person's knowledge of dissimilar viewpoints than one issue alone would make possible and were then combined into two additive indices representing a person's overall awareness of rationales for oppositional views and overall awareness of rationales for their own viewpoints.

Political tolerance was measured using Sullivan Piereson and Marcus's (1982) content-controlled method whereby respondents first volunteer their "least-liked" group and are then asked a series of six questions about extending civil liberties to these particular groups, including the extent to which they should be banned or outlawed, be allowed to hold rallies in their city, be allowed to teach in public schools, and be subject to government phone tapping. 13

## EFFECTS ON AWARENESS OF RATIONALES FOR OWN AND OPPOSITIONAL VIEWS

The first hope of advocates of greater network diversity is that exposure to conflicting views will benefit citizens either by familiarizing them with legitimate reasons for holding opposing viewpoints or by deepening their understanding of their own views by having to defend them to others and/or to themselves. The first 2 columns of data in Table 2 show regression equations examining these two questions, <sup>14</sup> one predicting awareness of rationales for one's own side of the issues and the second predicting awareness of rationales for the opposing viewpoints. In addition to the variables included

For purposes of evaluating the first two hypotheses, what is important in Table 2 is the coefficient corresponding to exposure to dissonant political views. As shown in column 1, counter to the first hypothesis, exposure to dissonant views does *not* appear to have a significant impact on awareness of rationales for people's own political views. Even when examined among the most likely subgroups within the population (such as those with strongly held views or high levels of education), there is no evidence that those with crosscutting political networks have more rationales in mind in support of their viewpoints.

However, consistent with the second hypothesis, column 2 shows that exposure to oppositional viewpoints increases awareness of legitimate rationales for opposing views. The highly significant positive coefficient supports the hypothesis that exposure to oppositional viewpoints is particularly important for purposes of familiarizing people with legitimate reasons for viewpoints that differ from their own. Nonetheless, to make a solid case for this hypothesis, it is essential to determine that it is exposure to dissonant views, and not just political discussion in general, that is driving awareness of rationales for oppositional views. Comparing the coefficients for exposure to consonant and dissonant views lends additional support to this hypothesis because the consonant coefficient is negative and significantly different from the coefficient for exposure to dissonant views.

With cross-sectional data how confident can one be that exposure to conflicting political views actually brings about greater awareness of rationales for opposing views? Because a person knows a lot about politics, he/she may be more confident of defending his/her own views, and thus be more willing to engage in cross-cutting interactions (see Conover and Searing

to control for general levels of political interest, knowledge, and extremity of opinions, in each equation I have included the variable representing awareness of rationales on the other side of these same issues. Those with high interest in these three particular issues are obviously likely to score high on both measures. Thus in analyses predicting awareness of rationales for oppositional views, awareness of rationales for one's own views also was included, and vice versa for the analysis predicting rationales for own views.<sup>15</sup> As evidenced by the large size of these coefficients, each served as a powerful control for the equation in which the other was the dependent variable. Also as expected, political knowledge was a significant positive predictor of political awareness of either variety, and extremity of political views had predictable effects, increasing awareness of rationales for one's own views, while reducing the number of rationales that could be offered for others'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> The index produced a Cronbach's  $\alpha$  of 0.83.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> To prevent loss of cases due to listwise deletion in the multivariate analyses (i.e., Tables 2 and 3), *Amelia* was used to impute missing values for several variables. In no analysis did this procedure change the substantive findings of the study. For details on this procedure, see King et al. (2001) and Honaker et al. (1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> For these variables, one need not assume a specific causal direction between awareness of rationales for own and others' views. The purpose is to conduct a stringent test of the key hypothesis but to avoid confounding results with characteristics that may be specific to the three issues used to create measures of awareness of rationales for own and others' views.

TABLE 2. The Influence of Exposure to Consonant and Dissonant Political Views on Awareness of Rationales for Own and Opposing Political Views

		Awareness of Rationales	s for
	Own Views	Opposing Views	Opposing Views with Interaction
Network characteristics			
Exposure to dissonant views	0.125 (1.198)	0.242** (3.384)	0.155* (2.048)
Exposure to consonant views	0.182 (1.727)	_0.045´ (0.624)	_`0.032 <sup>´</sup> (0.441)
Intimacy within dissonant dyads	0.096 (0.344)	-0.302 (1.571)	-0.328* (1.715)
Intimacy within consonant dyads	0.032 (0.262)	0.081 (0.979)	0.087 (1.049)
Density of network	0.006 (0.094)	-0.042 (0.883)	-0.037 (0.789)
Number of discussants	0.037 (0.341)	-0.026 (0.350)	-0.026 (0.351)
Issue-specific awareness	(0.01.)	(0.000)	(5.55.)
Awareness of rationales for own views	_	0.342*** (15.696)	0.339*** (15.607)
Awareness of rationales for opposing views	0.721*** (15.705)		,
Political involvement	, ,		
Political knowledge	0.192*** (3.464)	0.099* (2.581)	0.091* (2.401)
Political interest	0.118 (1.521)	0.093 (1.734)	0.082 (1.526)
Extremity of issue opinions	0.840*** (5.679)	-0.333** (3.215)	-0.345** (3.358)
Education	-0.072 (1.032)	0.240*** (5.192)	0.245*** (5.358)
Partisanship	(1.002)	(3.132)	(3.000)
Republican	-0.361***	-0.067	-0.078
Topabiloan	(4.321)	(1.153)	(1.353)
Democrat	0.028	-0.018	-0.018
Domodia	(0.339)	(0.327)	(0.323)
Conservative	0.011	-0.023	-0.023
o one or valino	(0.164)	(0.497)	(0.496)
Liberal	0.069	0.008	0.012
A	(0.861)	(0.152)	(0.221)
Orientation to conflict	(0.00.)	(51152)	(/
Orientation to conflict			0.158
Orientation × Exposure to dissonant views			(1.614) 0.333** (3.444)
Constant	0.484 (1.172)	-0.355 (1.249)	-0.429 (1.512)
Sample size	780	780	780
R <sup>2</sup>	0.497	0.463	0.474

*Note*: Entries are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients, with t values in parentheses. Gender, race, age, income, marital status, and underage children also were included in the equations estimated above. \*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \* p < 0.05.

1998). I have attempted to rule out the most obvious spurious influences by including controls for general political knowledge, interest, and awareness specific to these issues, but reverse causation remains a possibility. The problem with this rival interpretation is that, if true, it ought to apply equally well, if not more so, to knowledge of rationales for one's own views; the more deeply committed one is to his/her

position, and the more rationales in one's arsenal, the less threatened one should be by oppositional viewpoints. Table 2 shows that awareness of rationales for one's own views is not related to exposure to conflicting views in one's personal network. Although this represents a null finding with respect to the first hypothesis, ultimately this pattern strengthens the case for the idea that exposure to conflicting views contributes to

greater awareness of legitimate rationales for opposing views.

How large is the effect of exposure to dissimilar views on awareness of legitimate rationales for oppositional views? To provide a general idea, I calculated the predicted values of awareness of legitimate rationales for oppositional views for those with the highest and lowest levels of exposure to dissonant political views. On average, those with high levels of exposure to dissonant views should be expected to be familiar with just over two additional rationales compared to a similar person with a homogeneous network. Given that the mean number of oppositional rationales that people in this sample could generate was 1.46, the increase due to cross-cutting networks could have quite significant consequences for the perceived legitimacy of political outcomes.

Finally, in the third column in Table 2, I test Kingwell's suggestion about the importance of civility in generating beneficial outcomes from cross-cutting political dialogue. Drawing on a scale widely used to classify patterns of communication within families, I operationalized the "civil" orientation to conflict as one that combines acknowledgment of the importance of expressing dissenting views with an emphasis on social harmony. In other words, a civil orientation is one that does not duck conflict but that simultaneously acknowledges the importance of maintaining harmonious social relationships.

As shown in the third column in Table 2, people with a civil orientation toward conflict are particularly likely to benefit from exposure to dissonant views. Although the inclusion of an interaction between Orientation to conflict and exposure to dissonant views slightly reduces the size of the original coefficient corresponding to exposure to dissonant views, the interaction significantly strengthens the overall model (p < 0.05), thus indicating that those who value both frank opinion expression and social harmony learn the most from their cross-cutting interactions. The size of the effect among members of this group is more than twice the size of the effect on the population as a whole.

To summarize, exposure to cross-cutting views does not appear to play a significant role in deepening people's knowledge of their own issue positions, but it does have an important impact by familiarizing them with legitimate rationales for opposing viewpoints. This impact is particularly pronounced among people who value the expression of dissenting opinions, but simultaneously care about social harmony; in other words, those who would engage in cross-cutting conversations but who would remain silent rather than risk conflict that might end a cross-cutting association altogether.

TABLE 3. The Cognitive and Affective Influence of Discussant Networks on Political Tolerance

	Orietanal	
	Original Data	2SLS Model
Exposure to dissonant views	0.019	Wiodoi
Exposure to dissortant views	(0.534)	_
Exposure to consonant views	0.024	_
	(0.648)	
Intimacy within dissonant dyads	`0.150 <del>*</del>	0.116*
•	(2.208)	(2.352)
Intimacy within consonant dyads		0.029
	(1.632)	(1.050)
Density of network	-0.043	0.038
Number of discussants	(1.303)	(1.1250)
Number of discussants	-0.062 (1.529)	-0.016 (0.482)
Awareness of rationales	0.061**	0.061**
for opposing views	(3.194)	(3.236)
Awareness of rationales	-0.012	-0.011
for own views	(0.957)	(0.900)
Political knowledge	0.122***	
	(5.105)	(4.754)
Political interest	0.058*	0.058*
Extramity of ignue opinions	(2.015) 0.109*	(2.050) 0.096
Extremity of issue opinions	(1.998)	_0.096 (1.758)
Education	0.068*	0.065*
	(2.305)	(2.215)
Parents' education	`0.022	`0.024
	(0.853)	(0.963)
Mean education in county	0.098*	0.099*
Liberal	(2.466) 0.040	(2.507) 0.039
Liberal	(1.485)	(1.452)
Conservative	-0.004	-0.005
3033343	(0.174)	(0.208)
Republican	_`0.051 <sup>´</sup>	_`0.048´
_	(1.709)	(1.772)
Democrat	-0.046	-0.037
	(1.629)	(1.413)
Constant	1.259***	1.233***
Constant	(6.144)	(6.691)
	(3.1.7)	(0.001)
Sample size	780	780
$R^2$	0.298	0.293

Note: Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients, with t values in parentheses. Tolerance ranges from 1 to 4 based on an average of responses to all tolerance items. The equations in both columns also included gender, race, marital status, age, and the presence of underage children. The second column uses two-stage least squares and treats awareness of rationales for oppositional views and Intimacy within dissonant dyads as endogenous. First-stage  $R^2$  values were 0.46 and 0.49 for awareness of rationales for oppositional views and Intimacy within dissonant dyads, respectively. See Table 2, column 3, and Appendix B for details on first-stage regression. \*\*\* p< 0.001; \*p< 0.01; \*p< 0.05.

### CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE

The first column in Table 3 takes a first pass at evaluating Fig. 1's proposed mechanisms for translating

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> In this study as in many previous studies using these items (see McLeod and Chaffee 1972; McLeod et al. 1982), the two dimensions of communication patterns within the family (known as the social harmony and concept orientations) were independent (r = 0.03, p = 0.46), thus it was possible to identify a quarter of the sample in which differences of opinion were valued *along with* the need for social harmony; in other words, those with a civil orientation toward conflict (see the Appendix A for wording).

exposure to dissonant views into political tolerance. If the affective ties between people are what is important for purposes of translating cross-cutting ties into political tolerance, then one would expect closeness within dissonant relationships to be particularly important to political tolerance. If the cognitive benefits are primary, then people's awareness of rationales for those views should be most predictive of political tolerance.

Consistent with the expectations in Fig. 1, exposure to dissonant views has no direct effects on political tolerance, but awareness of rationales for oppositional views and intimacy within dissonant dyads are both significantly related to tolerance. Closer relationships across lines of difference and greater knowledge of rationales for these differences both predict tolerance, even after controlling for political knowledge, political interest, extremity of issue opinions, and so forth. Notice, in contrast, that awareness of rationales for own views does not contribute significantly to political tolerance. Despite the fact that the two measures are highly correlated (see Table 1), awareness of rationales for own and opposing views represent distinctly different types of knowledge with very different consequences.

The problem with a causal interpretation of these relationships is that tolerance may have reciprocal effects on these variables. More tolerant people may be more likely to form close relationships with those of differing political views and/or may be more likely, as a result of their tolerance, to be open to learning about reasons for others' views. Although I do not carry out an analysis of the full simultaneous system, 2SLS provides a useful means of obtaining less biased estimates of the strength of the key causal relationships examined here. Fortunately, there are variables available that predict awareness of rationales for oppositional views and that predict Intimacy within dissonant dyads but that do not predict tolerance, thus making them ideal as instrumental variables in a 2SLS analysis. For example, as shown in Table 2, awareness of rationales for oppositional views is predicted by exposure to dissonant views and by awareness of rationales for own views, but they are unrelated to tolerance. Likewise, intimacy within dissonant dyads is predicted by exposure to dissonant views, exposure to consonant views, and Number of discussants in the network, but none of these variables is significantly related to tolerance judgments (see Appendix B).<sup>17</sup> These two equations produced first-stage  $R^2$  values for awareness of rationales for opposing views and intimacy within dissonant dyads of 0.46 and 0.49, respectively.18

In the second column in Table 3, the endogenous variables produced by the first-stage estimations are used in a 2SLS model treating both intimacy within dissonant dyads and awareness of rationales for opposing views as endogenous. As shown in the second column, the coefficients are virtually identical when taking potential reciprocal causation into account, thus lending additional support to the proposed pathways in Fig. 1. Most interestingly, they confirm that both cognitive and affective mechanisms are at work simultaneously in translating exposure to dissonant views to greater political tolerance. If one generally perceives those opposed to one's own views to have some legitimate, if not compelling, reasons for doing so, then one also will be more likely to extend to disliked groups the rights of speech, assembly, and so forth. Likewise, close ties with those who hold differing political views can increase tolerance. It should also be noted that this effect is not a mere function of attitude extremity or general or issue-specific forms of political knowledge, as variables of this kind are already included in the model.

Given that these findings only indirectly relate exposure to dissonant political views to political tolerance, what is the size of the net impact of cross-cutting exposure in the network on political tolerance? Using the coefficients in Tables 2 and 3 as a basis for estimating the size of the impact of the cognitive mechanism suggests that, if all else remained constant, a person at the high end of the exposure to dissonant views index would score just over 4% higher on the tolerance scale than someone with the lowest levels of exposure to dissonant views.<sup>19</sup> Thus the magnitude of the cognitive mechanism is small by most standards. Using the size of the coefficients in Table 3 and Appendix B, we can estimate the corresponding size of the affective mechanism as just over an 11% increase in tolerance from those least to most exposed to people with cross-cutting political views.

From a technical standpoint, there are two ways one might view the strength of these findings. On the one hand, two of the three hypotheses have sustained extensive controls for plausible rival interpretations, the implementation of instrumental variables to take into account simultaneity bias, and a relatively small sample size. On the other hand, the effects that emerge are modest, though they are clearly statistically significant and thus lend some credibility to the many claims of democratic theorists about the benefits of cross-cutting exposure.

The relationships may be viewed in a more impressive light if one takes into consideration the crudeness of some of the operational measures relative to the concepts they represent. For example, ideally one would like a measure of awareness of legitimate rationales for oppositional views that takes into account *all* potential controversies. Instead this larger concept is represented

<sup>17</sup> Exposure to dissonant views turned out to be a stubbornly exogenous independent variable, predicted by virtually nothing within the data set except two structural characteristics that alter a person's supply of available discussion partners—whether they work outside the home and if their parents were of differing political parties.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The first-stage equations are shown in Table A1 (Appendix B) for Intimacy within dissonant dyads and are almost identical to the third column in Table 2 for awareness of rationales for opposing views. The

analysis used for the first-stage 2SLS is different only in that it omits the intimacy variables to avoid potential endogeneity problems.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> The range for the index of exposure to dissonant views was from -1.97 to 6.73.

in this study by only three political controversies. Likewise, the measure of the extent to which people's networks involve cross-cutting exposure has been limited by constraining respondents to only three discussants, when a more extensive network battery might generate a more valid measure including a greater number of weak ties, people with whom politics is discussed very seldom but who are politically dissimilar to the main respondent. The type of contact I examine in this study is by its very nature infrequent and often fleeting and, thus, difficult to measure. In addition, if better first-stage predictors of the endogenous variables were available, then a stronger pattern of relationships might be visible.

From a theoretical perspective, it is also worth noting that I do not make stringent assumptions about the kind of exposure to cross-cutting views that is tapped by these items. When exposed to conflicting views, I do not assume that people are truly "deliberating" according to any particular theoretical definition, nor is it assumed that when people are exposed to conflicting views the context is one in which people have equal status, reciprocity, and so forth. In this study exposure to dissonant political views requires only that people talk politics with someone who has political views that are, to some recognizable degree, different from their own (and vice versa for exposure to consonant views). Even though this is a far cry from what theorists and others envision as ultimately the *most* beneficial, exposure to conflicting views—even at the level defined here—appears to have the capacity to produce some beneficial effects. In short, there is undoubtedly a great deal of noise in these measures, and this needs to be taken into account in evaluating the more general theories these relationships represent. Although replication of these analyses on other data sets would be a natural next step to increase confidence in these findings, unfortunately there are few, if any, additional national surveys addressing the constitution of Americans' political networks that also measure political tolerance.20

### AN EXPERIMENTAL CONFIRMATION

Recognizing that statistical techniques can only go so far in strengthening causal inferences in survey data, I subjected part of this model to an experimental test. Ideally, one could test all of the relationships shown in Fig. 1 in a controlled laboratory environment, manipulating exposure to cross-cutting political views and observing the consequences. However, for the bottom

half of Fig. 1, that is, the affective mechanism translating cross-cutting exposure into political tolerance, an experimental design is not feasible. At least within the context of a short-term laboratory experiment, one cannot forge cross-cutting friendships and evaluate the effects of their intimacy.

Nonetheless, the cognitive mechanism shown in the top half of Fig. 1 is amenable to experimentation. Although it is not possible to simulate the effects of ongoing, accumulated exposure to cross-cutting political viewpoints in a lab, even a large, one-time exposure to the rationales behind multiple views different from one's own could be adequate. If one learns from such an experience that those with views different from one's own have their reasons, despite the fact that one may disagree with them, such exposure should promote support for the general principle of tolerance.

Using a simple, three-group design in which 82 student subjects<sup>21</sup> were randomly assigned to a control group or to political views that were either consonant with or contrary to their preexisting views, I evaluated the impact of cross-cutting exposure on political tolerance. All subjects filled out a pretest questionnaire that asked basic demographic and political information as well as opinions on eight controversial issues.<sup>22</sup> In addition, scales were included to tap personality characteristics including perspective-taking ability (see Davis 1983) and dogmatism (see Altemeyer 1997). Dogmatism is a stable personality trait known to predict political tolerance. Although perspective-taking ability has not been studied in relation to political tolerance, it makes sense to measure in this theoretical context because it represents the capacity to entertain others' points of view, as proposed by the purely cognitive mechanism in the upper half of Fig. 1.23 This capacity should condition people's ability to appreciate the legitimacy of conflicting political perspectives. Exposure to cross-cutting political perspectives combined with perspective-taking ability should give subjects a particularly good reason for upholding others' rights to speech, assembly, and so forth.

After the pretest, each subject was exposed to rationales for dissonant or consonant views or to nothing at all. Because the cognitive mechanism in Fig. 1 hypothesizes a purely *informational* effect from cross-cutting exposure on tolerance, the manipulation was limited to simply conveying information about arguments behind oppositional positions, without any face to face contact with another human being. Further, because this hypothesis is about the effects of *generalized* exposure to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> The General Social Surveys have at times included both tolerance measures and network measures, but there is no information available about political agreement or disagreement among discussion partners. Several data sets make it possible to examine political agreement within networks (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998), but they do not make it possible to conect these network characteristics to tolerance judgments. Although data on U.S. networks and tolerance are lacking, see Gibson (1999) for similar data on Russia.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Students were undergraduates attending classes in the political science department at Ohio State University.

<sup>22</sup> These included the death populty same say marriage, the use of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> These included the death penalty, same sex marriage, the use of mammals in medical research, affirmative action for women and minorities, the emphasis in sex education programs on abstinence versus birth control/STD prevention, vouchers for private and parochial schools, stricter environmental policies, and hate crime laws.

schools, stricter environmental policies, and hate crime laws.

23 The perspective-taking scale represents a cognitive, nonemotional form of empathy and is not related to empathy's emotional components (Davis 1983).

contradictory views on tolerance, and not about effects from exposure to any one topic or area of controversy, each subject was exposed either to multiple rationales for multiple political viewpoints that matched their own, rationales for views they were known to oppose, or no new information. To strengthen the manipulation, exposure to consonant or dissonant views was carried out by exposing respondents to consistently agreeable or disagreeable arguments for three separate issues. A randomized schedule dictated for which of eight pretest issue controversies each subject received stimuli and in which order.<sup>24</sup>

In the dissonant and consonant exposure conditions, three brief "assignments" provided a context for exposing people to rationales in support of, or in opposition to, their own views. For each assignment, subjects were given a stack of five cards, each bearing a rationale in support of an issue position. The first assignment asked subjects to order the cards by strength of argument from strongest to weakest and then copy them onto a separate sheet of paper; the second asked the subject to imagine him or herself as a speechwriter for a political candidate endorsing that issue position, and to embed the arguments into a speech they write for him; the third assignment simply replicated the first one but with a third issue. So in total each experimental subject not in the control condition was exposed to

<sup>24</sup> If a subject chose the midpoint on the scale, another issue was substituted according to a random schedule.
<sup>25</sup> A sample of what the stacks of cards were like is as follows for two

15 arguments concerning three issue positions, all of which were either systematically consistent with or inconsistent with some of the many political views the subject had expressed in the pretest. The goal of the assignments was to encourage subjects to fully process all of the rationales on the cards. After completing the assignments, a posttest was administered that included a "content-controlled" measure of political tolerance virtually identical to the one administered by telephone in the survey.<sup>27</sup>

The raw mean comparisons resulting from this experiment were in the expected direction with lower tolerance in the control condition ( $\bar{x} = 2.73$ ) relative to the dissonant views condition ( $\bar{x} = 2.81$ ), but these differences were not statistically significant among any of the three groups. However, when the efficiency of the model was improved by including covariates and taking into account subjects' perspective-taking ability and dogmatism, significant effects on tolerance were evident among those respondents with high perspectivetaking ability. As predicted, perspective-taking ability was directly related to political tolerance, but it also served as an important contingent condition for the effects of cross-cutting exposure. In contrast, analyses revealed no significant differences or interactions in analyses comparing the control condition to subjects exposed to rationales for consonant views.<sup>28</sup>


As Fig. 2 demonstrates, among those high in perspective-taking ability, mean levels of tolerance were higher when subjects were exposed to rationales for dissonant views. However, among those low in perspective-taking ability, tolerance levels were lower when subjects were exposed to dissonant views, although the higher variance among this group makes this a suggestive, though not significant difference.<sup>29</sup>

To assess the size of this effect while taking other variables into account, Table 4 presents these results as regression equations. Column 1 in Table 4 shows that among those with high perspective-taking ability, those receiving exposure to rationales for dissonant views on three issues scored about 14% higher on the tolerance scale. Although the small, relatively homogeneous student sample used in this experiment is by no means a

different sides of just one of the 8 issues. Death Penalty, Pro: 1) The death penalty is a fair and appropriate form of justice for the most severe crimes against human lives. 2) The death penalty sometimes provides grieving families with the closure they need after the death of a loved one. 3) Most violent criminals can't be rehabilitated and the costs of life imprisonment are higher per year than the costs of many colleges. 4) It is unfair to expect the American public to pay higher taxes out of their own pockets in order to pay the costs of building more prisons and feeding, clothing, and providing medical care for criminals who make no useful contribution to society. 5) Most Americans support the use of the death penalty in some situations, so it should continue to be legal. Death Penalty, Con: 1) It is immoral to take a human life, no matter what the circumstances. 2) Sometimes innocent people are convicted, and there is no way mistakes can ever be corrected when innocent people are put to death. 3) Most studies show that the death penalty does not reduce crime rates. 4) Because death sentences are usually appealed many times in court, it ends up being more expensive than life imprisonment. 5) Government should not condone violence against human life under any circumstances. It makes us as bad as the criminals we want to stop.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> The assignments read as follows. Assignment 1/3: "Please take the stack of cards supporting a particular issue position and read them carefully. Next sort them by how strong an argument for the issue position you think each reason is. After you have sorted them into a pile from strongest argument to weakest argument, start with the strongest reason, and copy it onto line 1 below. Continue ranking the arguments from 1 to 5 with the strongest argument at the top, the weakest at the bottom of the page." Assignment 2: "You work for a member of congress and have been asked to write part of his speech for a talk he will give to a large group of people, some of whom support his issue positions and many who do not. Use the stack of arguments for the issue position that you have been given in order to write a few paragraphs of the speech justifying his position on this one controversial issue. All the facts have already been checked by your staff for accuracy. We realize this may or may not be your personal position. Nonetheless, please make the speech as convincing as possible!"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Cronbach's  $\alpha$  for the six-item index of political tolerance was 0.80. <sup>28</sup> The significant differences between subjects in the dissonant condition and the control condition were confirmed using an analysis of variance with two between-subject factors (experimental condition and high or low perspective-taking ability), plus covariates for strength of Republican/Democratic party identification, income, parental education levels, ideology, and dogmatism. Dogmatism was a significant predictor of tolerance levels (F = 2.99, p < 0.05), as was perspective-taking ability (F = 5.39, p < 0.05). Those accustomed to thinking about controversies from more than one perspective also tended to be more tolerant. But the interaction between experimental condition (control versus exposure to dissonant views) and perspective-taking ability (low versus high) also confirmed that those with high perspective-taking ability benefited significantly from exposure to rationales for cross-cutting views (F = 2.96, p < 0.05). <sup>29</sup> This may result from the fact that exposing people to counterattitudinal arguments when they are not able to see things through another's eves causes them to counter-argue and strengthen their resolve, believing perhaps even more ardently that those who disagree with them are unworthy opponents.



representative one, it is impressive that an effect of this size was generated by one single disembodied exposure to cross-cutting political views. As the second column in Table 4 shows, exposure to viewpoints consonant with the subject's own views produced no such effects, thus confirming that it is exposure to dissonant views that is encouraging tolerance rather than simply exposure to political viewpoints more generally.

### DISCUSSION

Exposure to dissimilar views has been deemed a central element—if not the sine qua non—of the kind of political dialogue that is needed to maintain a democratic citizenry: "Democratic public discourse does not depend on preexisting harmony or similarity among citizens . . . but rather on the ability to create meaningful discourses across lines of difference" (Calhoun 1988, 220). The extent to which people are exposed to crosscutting political viewpoints has become of increasing concern to observers of American politics as a result of trends toward increasing residential balkanization (e.g., Harrison and Bennett 1995; Frey 1995). If people self select into lifestyle enclaves with similar-minded others, their exposure to dissimilar political views should suffer.

To the extent that residential balkanization and other trends translate to a decline in communication across lines of political difference, one of its adverse effects may include fewer opportunities for people to learn about legitimate rationales for oppositional viewpoints. Particularly when policies or candidates other than one's own top preferences carry the day, the findings of this study suggest that the perceived legitimacy of the winning people and policies may be hindered by a lack of awareness of legitimate reasons for opposing views. If people are surrounded by people who think much like they do, they will be less aware of the legitimate arguments on the other side of contemporary political controversies.

Beyond legitimacy, the extent of exposure to dissonant political views may also be important for its

TABLE 4. Experimental Effects of Exposure to Rationales for Consonant and Dissonant Political Views on Political Tolerance

TOTALICAL VICAS OIL FOILLICAL	Tolerance	
	Dissonant	Consonant
	Views	Views
	Versus	Versus
	Control	Control
Experimental treatment	-0.44	0.13
	(1.11)	(0.34)
Perspective-taking ability	0.13	0.03
	(0.38)	(0.09)
Experimental treatment	1.01*	-0.30
by perspective-taking ability	(1.99)	(0.53)
Dogmatism-	-0.32	-0.27
	(1.68)	(1.36)
Ideology (conservative)	-0.19	-0.12
	(1.42)	(0.85)
Republican (strength of)	0.34	-0.00
	(1.32)	(0.02)
Democrat (strength of)	-0.10	<u>-</u> 0.15
	(0.46)	(0.69)
Income	-0.06	_0.08 <sup>°</sup>
	(1.13)	(1.36)
Parents' educational	-0.07	_0.02 <sup>^</sup>
attainment	(0.86)	(0.26)
Constant	4.24***	4.12***
	(5.79)	(5.53)
$R^2$	0.27	0.18
Sample size	57	50

*Note*: Entries are ordinary least-squares coefficients, with t values in parentheses. The change in  $R^2$  due to the addition of the interaction in column 2 is significant (F change = 4.31, p < 0.05). \*\*\* p < 0.001; \*\* p < 0.01; \*\* p < 0.05 (one-tailed test).

indirect contributions to political tolerance. The capacity to see that there is more than one side to an issue, that a political conflict is, in fact, a *legitimate* controversy with rationales on both sides, translates to greater willingness to extend civil liberties to even those groups whose political views one dislikes a great deal.

This cognitive mechanism is augmented by influence that flows through the affective ties that people maintain across lines of political difference. Close personal ties with those of differing political views contribute to greater political tolerance. It is interesting to note that, from this perspective, the fact that Americans so seldom discuss politics in any depth is probably a feature, not a liability. Because politics is such a small part of people's day-to-day lives, when they come into contact with people of opposing views, it is relatively easy for them to ignore this dimension of difference or to discover it late enough that a friendship of some kind has already been initiated or established. Political views need not be at the forefront of daily life or daily conversation to produce beneficial consequences.

Moreover, the positive role played by affective ties to politically dissimilar others suggests a need to reconsider the role of emotion in democratic judgment. Particularly in research on political tolerance, there is a tendency to think of emotion as something that promotes intolerance and prejudicial reactions to others (cf. Kuklinski et al. 1991; Theiss-Morse, Marcus and Sullivan 1993). Although evidence on this point remains unresolved, the emotional versus deliberative citizen dichotomy often fails to acknowledge that through social interaction people form relationships with affective components as well as judgments based on the information that is conveyed.

Although in this study I have attempted to separate network characteristics such as intimacy, frequency, and agreement for analytic purposes, it should be acknowledged that in the real world they are inextricably intertwined. People generally feel closer to those who share their values, political and otherwise, and they talk more frequently with those to whom they are close. Thus it is important to note that efforts to increase exposure to disagreement may necessitate trade-offs in other network characteristics that are also generally valued. For example, to increase levels of exposure to oppositional views in the population, people will need to have a greater number of weak ties and probably less intimacy on average within their networks. And although trust is not directly examined in this study, it also goes hand in hand with homogeneity of views (e.g., Gibson 1999; Baldassare 1985); thus dense networks of tight-knit social relationships and their characteristic high levels of trust may come only at the expense of exposure to cross-cutting views. Close relationships obviously have their virtues, but large pluralistic societies such as the United States undoubtedly need citizens with a good number of weak ties in their social networks to sustain support for democratic freedoms in the midst of great heterogeneity (e.g., Simmel 1955; Karatnycky 1999).

Ultimately, political tolerance is about formalized ways in which people agree to disagree. It is primarily about restraint and not doing, rather than political action. Thus people's capacity to carry on conversations across lines of political difference, conversations in which one must agree to disagree at a micro level, may teach important lessons about the necessity of political tolerance, the public policy rendition of agreeing to disagree at the macro level.

These findings also have implications for the burgeoning empirical literature on deliberative democracy. A spate of recent studies, primarily experimental or quasi-experimental in nature, has attempted to manipulate deliberation by bringing people together to talk in small groups (see, e.g., Morrell 2000; Muhlberger and Butts 1998; Price and Cappella 2001; Simon and Sulkin 2000; Weber 1998). While such studies have provided many new insights on what happens when people are compelled to talk to one another about controversial issues, the broad and variable nature of their interactions also makes it difficult to determine which aspects of the experience are producing the observed effects. Moreover, because every small group exchange is somewhat different from the next, causal arguments have been more difficult to make than in most experimental studies. For example, it is difficult to know if effects are due to information gains through social interaction, the camaraderie of social interaction, group dynamics, and so forth. In reality, deliberation is a conglomeration of many variables, and it is often impossible to disentangle their effects when they are all varied simultaneously. From a social—psychological perspective, the advantage of this study is that it isolates one particular aspect of the deliberative encounter, the extent of cross-cutting exposure, and examines its consequences using both survey and experimental evidence. While advantageous for methodological reasons, and for purposes of understanding underlying processes of influence, this narrowness also limits the scope of the conclusions that should be drawn from it.

Does the composition of people's social networks have meaningful consequences for political tolerance and democratic legitimacy? My tentative answer to this question is yes, though they are relatively modest ones based on this survey and experimental evidence. Although these findings do not support the argument that more deliberation per se is what contemporary American politics need most, they do lend supporting evidence to arguments about the benefits of cross-cutting networks of political communication.

### **APPENDIX A: WORDING OF SURVEY ITEMS**

Discussant Generator. "From time to time, people discuss government, elections and politics with other people. We'd like to know the first names or just the initials of people you talk with about these matters. These people might be from your family, from work, from the neighborhood, from some other organization you belong to, or they might be from somewhere else. Who is the person you've talked with most about politics? [Discussant 1] Aside from this person, who is the person you've talked with most about politics? [Discussant 2] Aside from anyone you've already mentioned, is there anyone else you've talked with about politics? [Discussant 3]." If at any point the respondent could not give a name: "Well then, can you give the first name of the person with whom you were most likely to have informal conversations during the course of the past few months?"

Frequency of Political Discussion. When you talk with [discussant], do you discuss politics a lot, some, a little, or very rarely? (Coded 0 if no discussant was named or R reports no political discussion with the discussant, 1 if very rarely, 2 if a little, 3 if some, and 4 if a lot.)

Exposure to Dissonant Political Views. The following five items were coded as indicated below, standardized, and then combined into an additive index representing the extent to which each discussion partner held differing views. To produce an indicator of the respondent's overall extent of exposure to dissonant political views, these three measures were weighted by the frequency of the respondent's interactions with that particular discussant, and then combined across each of the three discussants for a summary measure. To facilitate interpretation of coefficients, the summary measure across discussants also was standardized.

 "Compared with [discussant], would you say that your political views are much the same, somewhat different,

- or very different?" (Coded 2 if very different, 1 if somewhat different, 0 if else.)
- (2) "Do you think [discussant] normally favors Republicans or Democrats, or both, or neither?" (Coded 2 if discussant and respondent clearly favor opposing parties, 1 if the respondent leans toward an opposing party, and 0 if else.)
- (3) "Which presidential candidate, if any, does [discussant] favor? Clinton, Dole, Perot, or some other candidate?" (Coded 1 if discussant and respondent disagree on choice of candidate, 0 if else.)
- (4) "Overall, do you feel [discussant] shares most of your views on political issues, opposes them, or doesn't [person's name] do either one?" (Coded 1 if opposes views, 0 if else.)
- (5) "When you discuss politics with [discussant], do you disagree often, sometimes, rarely, or never?" (Coded 0 if never disagrees (or never talks), 1 if rarely, 2 if sometimes, and 3 if often.)

Exposure to Consonant Political Views. The same procedure as for Exposure to Dissonant Views was followed, but items were coded so as to award higher scores for greater agreement between respondents and their discussants. (1) Coded 1 if much the same, 0 if else. (2) Coded 2 if discussant and respondent clearly favor the same party, 1 if the respondent leans toward the same party, and 0 if else. (3) Coded 1 if discussant and respondent are in agreement on choice of candidate, 0 if else. (4) Coded 1 if shares views, 0 if else.

Intimacy Within Dissonant and Consonant Dyads. Question 4 above was used to sort discussants into categories of consonant, dissonant, and politically neutral relationships. For discussants within each of these categories, an indicator of the level of intimacy in the relationship was based on answers to the question, "Is [discussant] a close friend, just a friend, or just someone that you regularly come into contact with?" (Coded 0 if no discussant, 1 if acquaintance only, 2 if a friend, 3 if a close friend, 4 if a spouse/family member.) The mean level of closeness was calculated across the 0 to 3 dyads that were consonant, dissonant, or neutral, thus producing three separate measures of Intimacy.

**Political Interest.** "Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?" (Coded 1 if hardly at all, 2 if only now and then, 3 if some of the time, 4 if most of the time.)

Issue Opinions. (1) Until recently, welfare programs like food stamps and aid to families with dependent children were funded and run by the federal government. Do you favor transferring most of the responsibility for welfare programs to the individual state governments or keeping most of the responsibility for welfare programs with the federal government? (2) Do you favor or oppose affirmative action programs for women and minorities? (3) I'd like to get your feelings toward the major candidates for president by asking you to rate each one on a scale that runs from 0 to 10. Zero means you feel most unfavorable toward the candidate, 10 means you feel most favorable, and 5 means you feel neutral toward the candidate. Using any number from 0 to 10, overall

how do you feel toward BOB DOLE/BILL CLINTON? Coded by taking the difference (DOLE-CLINTON) and trichotomizing the sum into pro-Dole, pro-Clinton, and neutral scores.

Awareness of Rationales for Own and Opposing Views. "We are interested in hearing about the reasons people have for [supporting different presidential candidates/ favoring different sides of this issue] Regardless of your own views, what reasons can you think of for [supporting Bill Clinton/Bob Dole for President] [keeping responsibility with the federal government/transferring responsibility to the individual state governments] [favoring/opposing affirmative action programs]?"

Tolerance. Average of responses to six questions asked with respect to the group named by the respondent. "I'm going to read you a list of groups in politics. As I read it please follow along and think about which of these groups you like the least. If there is some other group you like even less than the groups I read, please tell me the name of that group. Communists, white supremacists, homosexuals, militia groups, abortion rights activists, pro-life activists, neo-Nazis, religious fundamentalists, atheists, the Ku Klux Klan, and feminists. Which of these groups do you like the least, or is there some other group you like even less?" All items were answered on a 4-point agree–disagree scale: [Named group] should be banned from being president of the United States/should be outlawed/should be allowed to make a speech in your town/city./should be allowed to hold public rallies in your town/city./should be allowed to teach in the public schools./should have their phones tapped by our government.

**Political Knowledge.** Additive index of the number of correct responses to the five items recommended by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996, 305-6).

Extremity of Political Opinions. This is the average of how strongly respondents favored or opposed the three opinion questions. "Do you strongly or only somewhat favor (opinion given)?" For presidential candidates, those for whom the absolute value of the thermometer difference score (Dole–Clinton) was greater than 5 were coded as high extremity (2), those for whom it was less than 5 were coded 1, and those who rated the candidates equally were coded 0.

**Liberal/Conservative.** For each variable (liberal/conservative), respondents were coded 0 if the respondent reported no partisanship, 1 if the respondent only leaned in a partisan direction, 2 if a not very strong partisan, and 3 if the respondent reported strong partisanship.

**Republican/Democrat.** Coded 1 if Republican/Democrat and 0 otherwise.

Civil Orientation Toward Conflict. Scored 1 for respondents over the median on both social harmony and conflict scales, otherwise 0: Social harmony orientation: (a) "When you were growing up, about how often did your parents take the position that certain topics are better left undiscussed?" (b) "How often did they encourage you to give in on arguments rather than risk antagonizing people?" Concept orientation: (a) "When you were growing up, how often did your parents emphasize that getting your point across is important even if others don't like it?" (b) How often did they have spirited discussions of controversial matters like politics or religion"

### **APPENDIX B**

TABLE A1.	First-Stage	<b>Predictors</b>	of Intimacy
Within Disso	onant Dyads		

Within Dissonant Dyads	
Network characteristics	
Exposure to dissonant views	0.32***
	(19.49)
Exposure to consonant views	0.04
	(1.96)
Intimacy within consonant dyads	-0.07***
	(4.15)
Density of network	-0.01
	(0.81)
Number of discussants	0.08***
	(4.74)
Political involvement	0.00
Political knowledge	-0.00 (0.00)
D-listlinterest	(0.26)
Political interest	-0.01 (0.04)
Cutromity of issue eniniana	(0.34) 0.08**
Extremity of issue opinions	(2.65)
Education	(2.03) 0.01
Education	(0.82)
   Partisanship	(0.02)
Republican	-0.02
riopublicari	(0.97)
Democrat	-0.02
Bomodiat	(0.97)
Conservative	0.02
	(1.52)
Liberal	0.02
	(1.25)
	` ,
Constant	0.06
	(0.68)
Sample size	780
R <sup>2</sup>	0.49

Note: Entries are unstandardized ordinary least-squares regression coefficients with t values in parentheses below. Gender, race, age, income, marital status, and the presence of underage children also were included in the equation estimated above.

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# Out of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members' Voting

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oes a typical House member need to worry about the electoral ramifications of his roll-call decisions? We investigate the relationship between incumbents' electoral performance and roll-call support for their party—controlling for district ideology, challenger quality, and campaign spending, among other factors—through a series of tests of the 1956–1996 elections. The tests produce three key findings indicating that members are indeed accountable for their legislative voting. First, in each election, an incumbent receives a lower vote share the more he supports his party. Second, this effect is comparable in size to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants. Third, a member's probability of retaining office decreases as he offers increased support for his party, and this relationship holds for not only marginal, but also safe members.

You can only go so far in Texas...there's nothing more useless [to the Democrats] than a dead liberal.

Spoken by Representative (and future President) Lyndon B. Johnson to Jim Rowe, a White House assistant under Franklin D. Roosevelt, when Rowe asked Johnson to vote for an administration proposal on civil rights (Dallek 1991, 168–9)

fundamental issue of American politics, as well as democratic theory, is whether the public holds elected officials accountable for their policy decisions. The founders of the United States clearly desired such accountability, and for no institution more so than the House of Representatives. As Madison ([1788] 1987, 323–4) argued in Federalist 52, "As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common interest with the people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it under consideration [the House of Representatives] should have an immediate dependence on, and intimate sympathy with, the people." He continued by surmising, "Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence sympathy can be effectively secured."

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Of course, frequent House elections achieve Madison's desired common interest only to the extent that electoral outcomes depend upon officials' policy decisions, and research in political science calls into question whether in fact voters hold members accountable for their policy choices. Perhaps most indicative of a lack of accountability is the plethora of studies that suggest that individual voters are fairly ignorant about members' policy actions (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991; Miller and Stokes 1962; Smith 1989). Moreover, as Downs (1957) argued nearly half a century ago, such ignorance is rational for the typical citizen, who has little incentive to expend effort to gather political information given the extremely low probability that he is pivotal in an election. Thus the typical representative might be able to vote on legislative matters as she pleases without fearing that she could lose reelection.

In contrast to this body of work, research on congressional behavior suggests that House members believe that roll-call voting affects their probability of reelection, causing them to consider constituent ideology in deciding upon roll-call positions. This concern with the electoral effect of legislative voting is a standard component of theories of Congress<sup>1</sup> and a consistent finding of surveys of members.<sup>2</sup> Even research that emphasizes other influences on roll-call decisions, such as Matthews and Stimson (1975), still acknowledges members' attention to the potential electoral ramifications of the decisions. For example, Matthews and Stimson (1975, 30) highlight the following observation of a member:

I've found out this much. When you are voting right, you build up points on a cumulative basis. You lose them on a geometric basis; you can lose all your points on one vote.

 $<sup>^{1}</sup>$  For example, see Arnold (1990), Fiorina (1974), and Mayhew (1974a).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Clausen (1973), Kingdon (1981), and Sullivan et al. (1993) among others. Collie (1985) provides an excellent review of this literature.

Studies that focus explicitly on electoral results do not resolve whether a typical member should be concerned with the potential electoral ramifications of legislative voting. Several studies find no evidence of an electoral impact (e.g., Gaines and Nokken 1999), while those uncovering one have generally focused on members' vote shares for specific elections (e.g., Jacobson 1996) or samples of legislators (e.g., Ansolabehere, Stewart and Snyder 2001). Notably, even the positive evidence does not establish that a member who has won with at least 60% of the two-party vote, a criterion applying to the majority of incumbents between 1956 and 1996, need fear that roll-call voting could affect his probability of defeat. Results on vote shares and seat loss are not in general equivalent, and moreover, the existing evidence suggests that a large shift in a member's voting, such as from a perfectly moderate record to one at his party extreme, decreases his two-party vote share by less than 10 percentage points.

In the following, we conduct three tests on the elections of 1956-1996 to analyze whether in fact House members should be concerned with the electoral impact of legislative voting. In each of the tests, we estimate the effect of an incumbent's increased support for the extreme of his party. The first test employs a standard model from previous work to assess whether such legislative voting had a significant effect on members' vote shares in each election. The second test then pools across the elections, estimating how the average impact of legislative voting compares to that of other factors, such as challenger quality and campaign spending. The third test proceeds to examine directly the relationship between members' voting and their probability of reelection. To incorporate that this probability may differ between "safe" members who have previously won with at least 60% of the vote and the remaining "marginal" members, the test distinguishes between them. In addition, it accounts for the fact that a member's safety may depend upon his prior voting record.

## EXISTING EVIDENCE ON THE ELECTORAL EFFECT OF HOUSE MEMBERS' VOTING

Almost every existing study that finds an electoral effect of legislative voting focuses on a small set of elections. These include the studies by Schoenberger (1969) for 1964, Erikson (1971) for Republicans in the 1950s–1960s, Bernstein (1989) for 1978 and 1980, Johannes and McAdams (1981) for 1978, Erikson and Wright (1993) for 1990, and Brady et al. (1996) and Jacobson (1996) for 1994.<sup>3</sup> While details vary across the works, they generally establish that, holding district ideology constant, Republican incumbents' vote shares were lower the more conservative their roll-call voting and Democratic incumbents' vote shares

lower the more liberal their roll-call voting.<sup>4</sup> In other words, members lost electoral support from increasing the extent to which they voted with the extreme of their party.

This research provides a critical basis for considering the importance of legislative voting in affecting electoral outcomes but, as a whole, does not establish that members' actual probability of seat loss is affected by their roll-call decisions, particularly for so-called safe members. In general, results on electoral margins are not equivalent to results on seat loss because, among other reasons, members behave differently if they are minimizing their probability of defeat rather than seeking the largest number of votes.<sup>5</sup> Even ignoring this nonequivalence, however, the existing results do not imply a conclusive impact. For example, Erikson and Wright (1993) find that a Democrat who shifted from perfectly moderate to perfectly liberal voting decreased his two-party vote share by only 5 percentage points in 1990, and Bernstein (1989) estimates that among Democratic incumbents who lost in 1980, only those receiving at least 46% of the vote could have conceivably altered the outcome by moderating their roll-call voting. Given such findings, one might conclude that a typical incumbent need not fear that roll-call voting could ever cost him reelection, and Bernstein explicitly makes this claim. After reviewing the existing evidence, he surmises that "members can generally afford to vote for what they think is right without expecting that their votes will cost them a seat in Congress... (Bernstein 1989, 100). The other cited studies on electoral margins do not offer such a bold claim, but neither do they establish a systematic relationship between members' voting and their probability of retaining office.

Even the contention that legislative voting systematically affects electoral margins is put into question by work that analyzes elections across several decades. For example, political economics research on members' ideological "shirking" from 1960 through 1990 has produced inconsistent findings. In studies that estimate shirking as the absolute difference between interest-group voting scores and the predicted values from these scores regressed on constituency characteristics, some evidence has suggested that shirking is correlated with electoral defeat (e.g., Wright 1993), while other evidence has suggested that the factors are uncorrelated (e.g., Goff and Grier 1993). One possible reason for the discrepancy is that these studies equate shirking with noise that could result from omitted variables; to the extent that the constituency characteristics included in a particular analysis do not fully capture district preferences, shirking is overestimated

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In related work, Wright (1978) and Erikson and Wright (1989, 1997) show that members' publicly stated campaign positions affected their electoral margins in 1966, 1982, and 1994, respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The two exceptions are Johannes and McAdams (1981) and Brady et al. (1996). In the former, the authors construct a measure of ideological discrepancy that allows any member, regardless of partisan affiliation, to be out of step with district ideology in either a conservative or a liberal direction. In the latter, the authors analyze the relationship between incumbents' presidential support and their probability of reelection.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Aranson, Hinich and Ordeshook (1974).

and the effects of it underestimated.<sup>6</sup> To avoid this problem, Lott and Bronars (1993) equate shirking with change in a member's voting pattern. They find some evidence of a positive correlation between such change and electoral defeat, but this result is not robust across the various econometric specifications employed.

Other research that examines elections over time, but that does not characterize itself as studying shirking, also produces inconclusive results as to whether legislative voting systematically affects elections. Gaines and Nokken (1999) analyze all midterm elections between 1958 and 1994 and find that in almost every year, an incumbent's roll-call support for the president did not significantly affect his probability of reelection. Brady, Canes-Wrone and Cogan (2000) find more evidence of an impact, showing that for the 1954–1994 elections, winning incumbents tended to have more moderate voting records than losing incumbents. This difference, however, is significant for only about one-third of the elections.

The most compelling evidence of an electoral effect over time comes from Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001) and Erikson and Wright (2000). Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart pool the elections of 1952-1974 and 1976-1996 to compare candidates' voting records in races in which a sitting incumbent was defeated and find that a candidate's vote share was lower the more she supported the extreme of her party. The key limitation of the analysis is that it does not examine the roll-call voting of members who are never unseated, and therefore, as the authors acknowledge, it remains possible that most House races are not affected by legislative voting. Erikson and Wright do examine all incumbents for the elections of 1976-1996 and similarly find that voting with the ideological extreme of one's party decreases one's vote share. Their analysis does not, however, control for standard electoral determinants such as challenger quality and campaign spending, and thus it remains possible that the effect of legislative voting would disappear once such controls were added to the analysis. In addition, as with other analyses of electoral margins, the results do not establish a significant probability of seat loss, particularly for safe members.

In sum, the literature is far from conclusive that legislative voting systematically affects House electoral outcomes. It offers some evidence that roll-call voting, particularly voting with the extreme of one's party, affects electoral margins, but this relationship has not been established across time and members. Moreover, even the existing support does not show that legislative voting affects the probability of reelection, particularly for safe members. What is needed, therefore, is a study that examines the relationship between vote shares and roll-call decisions across elections for all districts and

that explicitly analyzes the effect of the decisions on the probability of winning for safe as well as marginal members.

## LEGISLATIVE VOTING AND ELECTORAL MARGINS

Building on previous research, we estimate the electoral impact of legislative voting by analyzing the effect of voting with the extreme of one's party, a phenomenon we refer to as roll-call ideological extremity. We hypothesize that controlling for district ideology, Democrats lose electoral support by voting more liberally and Republicans by voting more conservatively. Thus for two Democratic (Republican) incumbents from districts with identical voter preferences, the Democrat (Republican) with the more liberal (conservative) voting record should have a lower electoral vote share, holding all else equal. We refer to this prediction as the *Roll-Call Ideological Extremity Hypothesis*.

While much of the previously discussed work on electoral margins details the theoretical framework underlying the Roll-Call Ideological Extremity Hypothesis (in particular, see Erikson 1971), we briefly review the logic here. Arguably the most critical assumption is that the Republican and Democratic candidates of each district diverge ideologically, with the Democrat being more liberal than the Republican. Evidence of such divergence is provided by Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart (2001), and other studies justify this phenomenon by describing the long-run career benefits a member may obtain from voting with his or her party (e.g., Aldrich 1995; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Rohde 1991; Snyder and Groseclose 2000). Thus even on rollcalls for which a member's electoral incentive is to vote against her party, she can have long-term career incentives to vote with it.

Applying Downsian (1957) logic to this stylized fact of ideological divergence between the Republican and the Democratic candidates in a district, ideological moderation should increase an incumbent's vote share. Given Downs' assumptions that voters can order the candidates on an ideological spectrum, that voters have positions on the spectrum, and that electoral choices depend upon candidates' positions, either candidate can increase her vote share by moderating towards the other. Thus if voters' assessment of the incumbent's ideology is not independent of her legislative voting, her electoral margin is higher the less she votes with the ideological extreme of her party.<sup>8</sup>

Notably, while this framework assumes that voters select candidates on the basis of ideology, the Roll-Call

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> For other problems with the two-stage residual approach, see Bender and Lott (1996).

<sup>7</sup> Notably most of the other side.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Notably, most of the other cited analyses also do not control for these electoral determinants.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The directional theory of issue voting (Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989) suggests that a candidate may increase his vote share by moving toward his party extreme. While we base our theoretical prediction on Downsian logic, our empirical analysis allows for this alternative hypothesis (and in fact tests for it). Moreover, we are careful to use two-tailed significance tests in evaluating the Roll-Call Ideological Extremity Hypothesis given the alternative prediction of the directional theory.

Ideological Extremity Hypothesis does not require voters to be fully informed about all details of an incumbent's legislative record. The literature identifies several mechanisms by which roll-call voting should affect constituents' assessments of an incumbent's ideology absent their complete knowledge of his or her record. As Erikson (1971) discusses, one such mechanism is a diffusion model in which elites pay attention to the legislative voting of members, and voters take cues from elites that share their policy positions.<sup>10</sup> A second mechanism, suggested by the analysis of Bailey (2001), is that challengers are likely to inform constituents about the policy positions of a member when he votes out of step with district preferences. In fact, Miller and Stokes (1963), while finding that constituents are not fully informed about representatives' positions, actually provide some support for Bailey's analysis; specifically, Miller and Stokes show that when an incumbent had voted out of step with his district on the issue of race, all interviewed voters could identify his and his challenger's positions on the issue.<sup>11</sup> We do not take a stance on whether one of these informational mechanisms predominates but merely emphasize that any observed relationship between electoral outcomes and roll-call decisions does not depend upon the assumption that voters are fully informed about the details of representatives' voting records.12

### Model, Data, and Measurement for Analysis of Electoral Margins

To test the Roll-Call Ideological Extremity Hypothesis, we employ an econometric model that is similar to those adopted in previous studies of the relationship between legislative voting and electoral margins. In particular, we regress each incumbent's vote share on a measure of roll-call ideological extremity, controlling for a range of factors.<sup>13</sup> Formally, we estimate the following model for each incumbent i who faces a major party challenger in election t:

Incumbent's Vote Share;

- $= \beta_0 + \beta_1$  Roll-Call Ideological Extremity<sub>it</sub>
- $+\beta_2$  Presidential Vote<sub>it</sub>  $+\beta_3$  Challenger Quality<sub>it</sub>
- $+\beta_4$  (In (Challenger Spending)
- In (Incumbent Spending));
- $+\beta_5$  Freshman<sub>it</sub>  $+\beta_6$  In Party<sub>it</sub>
- $+ [\beta_7 \Delta Personal Income_{it} (coded by In Party)]$
- $+\beta_8$  Presidential Popularity; (coded by In Party)
- +  $\beta_9$  Midterm Loss<sub>it</sub> (coded by In Party)] +  $\varepsilon_{it}$  (1)

where the variables in brackets are naturally included only in tests that pool across elections. Because the Roll-Call Ideological Extremity Hypothesis does not imply asymmetric effects across parties, we analyze Democratic and Republican incumbents jointly, with the parties in a given year separated by the factor In Party. The substantive results still hold, however, if the effect of roll-call ideological extremity or the entire model is estimated separately for each party.<sup>14</sup> We analyze contested races only because otherwise, unnecessary error may be introduced by assigning an uncontested member a vote share of 100%. The substantive results hold, however, if such races are included. 15

The measurement of each variable in the model is as follows.

Incumbent's Vote Share. As is common in studies of electoral margins (e.g., Jacobson 1996), the dependent variable equals the incumbent's percentage of the two-party vote. 16

Roll-Call Ideological Extremity. We base our measure of legislative voting on Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores, which reflect the proportion of liberal positions taken by a member in a given year on votes selected by the Americans for Democratic Action. These votes generally encompass the key policy issues of a session. For example, the scores include the major tax and budget votes of the 1980s and 1990s,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Even Downs (1957, 80) explicitly states that his framework assumes that voters "may be completely unaware of certain actions being carried out by the government, or of alternatives the government could have undertaken, or of both."

10 Among others, see Kuklinski, Metlay and Kay (1982) and Lupia

<sup>(1994)</sup> for evidence of citizen cue-taking from elites.

11 Jacobson and Kernell (1983) identify a related mechanism, arguing that a high-quality challenger is more likely to enter the electoral race if an incumbent has voted out of step with district preferences. This mechanism still presumes that there exists some relationship between an incumbent's voting record and voters' assessment of the incumbent; otherwise, potential challengers' decisions on whether to enter the race would not be based on the incumbent's record.

<sup>12</sup> Complementing these mechanisms is the "running tally" or "online" cognitive model of voters' evaluations of candidates. In this cognitive model, voters update their judgment of a candidate with each new piece of information received and, when they produce an overall evaluation, retrieve the tally without reviewing the contents upon which it has been formed. See, for example, Lodge, McGraw and Stroh (1989)

Snyder (1996b) formally derives the conditions under which a linear factor structure can be employed to analyze aggregated voting data, and Snyder (1996a) employs such a model.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> When we estimate the effect of roll-call ideological extremity separately by party, but the remainder of the model jointly, the null that the coefficients for the two parties are equivalent cannot be rejected. Specifically, for the time series as a whole, the coefficient on Roll-Call Ideological Extremity for Democrats is 0.067 (with a standard error of 0.006) and the analogous coefficient for Republicans is 0.055 (with a standard error of 0.008). The difference between these two coefficients, 0.012, is not significant at conventional levels (F=1.13, p>0.2). Estimating only the elections for which we have data on candidates' spending, we again cannot reject the null that the two coefficients are identical (F = 2.41, p > 0.1).

<sup>15</sup> The main difference when uncontested elections are included is that if separate coefficients are estimated for Democratic and Republican incumbents, the magnitude of the difference between Democrats and Republicans becomes relatively large, with roll-call ideological extremity having approximately three times the impact on the former than the latter. (Each coefficient remains significant, however.) Consistent with this result, Democrats held 82% of uncontested seats during the time period of our analysis.

The independents Dale Alford (AR), John Moakley (MA), Thomas Foglietta (PA), and Bernie Sanders (VT) have been coded as Democrats since each caucused with this party.

the abortion and school prayer votes of the 1970s and 1980s, and the Civil Rights votes of the 1960s. The ADA ratings are widely known among members and often publicized in their districts. Therefore, to the extent that legislative voting affects members' electoral fate, the scores should have this effect. The specific measure that we adopt provides a consistent ranking of ideological extremity across the parties and is based on a member's ADA score in the year prior to the election if the member is Democratic and 100 minus this score if the member is Republican. Thus for a Democrat, a higher value indicates a more liberal member, while for a Republican, it reflects a more conservative one.<sup>17</sup> So that the factor is on the same scale as the dependent variable, we divide the raw score by 100 for purposes of presentation.

Although we focus on the ADA ratings, we have also analyzed the model with Roll-Call Ideological Extremity based on Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scores. These scores, which are a similar, more recent version of Poole and Rosenthal's (1991) D-NOMINATE scores, utilize a wider selection of members' votes than the interest group ratings. The results, which are available upon request, are substantively similar to those presented.

Presidential Vote. Following Erikson and Wright (1989, 1993, 1997) and Brady et al. (1996), among others, we use the presidential vote to control for district ideology. Specifically, Presidential Vote equals the average proportion of the two-party vote received by the presidential candidate of the incumbent's party in the two most recent elections in his or her district, with each combination of presidential elections normalized around its mean. Thus for Democratic incumbents, the variable is based on the vote for the Democratic presidential candidate, and for Republican incumbents, on the vote for the Republican presidential candidate. We average across the two most recent elections and normalize each of these averages, to mitigate the impact of factors that may be specific to individual presidential races.

Challenger Quality. Research suggests that an incumbent's vote share is lower when she faces a challenger who has previously won an elected position (e.g. Jacobson and Kernell 1983). We therefore control for challenger quality with a variable that equals 1 if the challenger has held elective office and 0 otherwise.

 $ln(Challenger\ Spending) - ln(Incumbent\ Spending).$  A great deal of work has examined the electoral effects of candidates' spending, and while the findings vary, the literature as a whole suggests that a candidate's spending increases his vote share. As in some

previous research (e.g., Erikson and Wright 1993), we control for this effect with a variable reflecting the difference between challenger and incumbent spending, taking the natural log of each. Our data are from Federal Elections Commission (FEC) Reports. Because these reports were not edited by the FEC until 1980, we include the control for spending only in the 1980 through 1996 elections. <sup>19</sup> To account for the fact that candidates are not required to report expenditures below \$5000, we adopt Jacobson's (1990) practice of assuming that each spent at least this amount.

Freshman. This dummy variable equals 1 if the House term was the incumbent's first and 0 otherwise. Research suggests that there exists an incumbency advantage due to, among other factors, members' capacity to bring home pork and perform constituency service (Mayhew 1974a). Because freshmen generally have less political clout than more senior members, for example, less influential committee assignments (Munger 1988), freshmen should have a lower incumbency advantage and thus a lower average vote share.

ΔPersonal Income (coded by In Party), Presidential Popularity (coded by In Party), Midterm Loss (coded by In Party), and In Party. We include several factors that vary over time<sup>20</sup> and that research suggests have a differential effect according to whether a member is in the president's party. The first factor is based on Tufte's (1975) standard control for the economy and reflects his argument that a good economy will help the in party at the expense of the out party. Specifically, the variable equals the change in real income per capita in the year prior to the election for members of the president's party and -1 times this value for other members. The second factor accounts for his contention that a president's public approval should be positively correlated with his fellow partisans' electoral fortunes. Like Tufte, we measure presidential popularity with the percentage of positive responses to the long-standing Gallup Poll asking "Do you approve or disapprove of the way [the current president] is handling his job as president?" using the poll taken most recently prior to the election. As with income, this value is multiplied by -1 for members of the out party. The third factor, which we call midterm loss, controls for the so-called midterm loss tendency of the president's party to lose seats in off-year elections. Previous work provides a variety of explanations for the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> We are aware of the limitations of pooling interest group scores over time (Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder 1999), but the available corrections constrain the way in which members' scores can change over time, and we do not want to eliminate the possibility that a member could vote moderately for a number of sessions and then more extremely in a particular session. Still, we have analyzed our model with the Groseclose, Levitt and Snyder adjusted scores, and our substantive results hold.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> In conducting this analysis, we used the average of each member's first- and second-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> As Souraf (1992, 248, note 10) writes, "Since the Federal Election Commission did not begin to operate at full power until the 1978 elections, complete data on congressional campaign finance are not available before that election. Even then, the FEC never had the resources to edit and reconcile the data for the receipts and spending of congressional candidates in 1978; one must use a final preliminary report and its data. Worse than that, FEC data for 1976 are sketchy and for 1974 one has to rely on the much smaller volume of data that Common Cause assembled."

We have also conducted the analysis with a set of election indicators. However, because the controls for presidential popularity, midterm loss, and the macroeconomy already account for a good deal of inter temporal variation, multicollinearity prevents including a full set of election effects. For example, in the 1980–1996 test, only five election effects can be included without creating perfect multicollinearity among some of the controls. The results are substantively similar with the effects.

	Roll-Call Ideological Extremity with Controls of Presidential Vote, In Party, Challenger Quality, Candidates' Spending, Freshman		Roll-Call Ideological Extremity with Controls of Presidential Vote, In Party, Challenger Quality, Freshman
1996 ( <i>n</i> =362)	-0.082*** (0.023)	1978 (n=311)	-0.114*** (0.022)
1994 ( <i>n</i> =330)	-0.074*** (0.019)	1976 (n=329)	-0.109*** (0.021)
1992 ( <i>n</i> =311)	_0.107*** (0.021)	1974 (n=311)	-0.087*** (0.024)
1990 (n=315)	-0.113*** (0.021)	1972 (n=313)	-0.110*** (0.018)
1988 (n=327)	-0.101*** (0.022)	1970 (n=325)	-0.090*** (0.019)
1986 (n=319)	-0.095*** (0.020)	1968 (n=347)	-0.130*** (0.024)
1984 (n=340)	-0.067** (0.021)	1966 (n=342)	(0.024) 0.046* (0.020)
1982 (n=309)	-0.032* (0.016)	1964 (n=346)	-0.119*** (0.017)
1980 (n=337)	-0.033* (0.016)	1962	(0.017) —
	(2.2.2)	1960 (n=321)	-0.108*** (0.019)
		1958 (n=292)	-0.058* (0.016)
		1956 (n=336)	-0.092*** (0.021)

Note: Robust standard errors given in parentheses below OLS coefficients. \*p<0.05; \*\*p<0.01; \*\*\*p<0.001. All significance levels in the tables are two-tailed.

trend, ranging from voters' dissatisfaction with presidential performance (Kramer 1971) to voters' desire for a greater balance of power between the executive and legislative branches (Erikson 1988).<sup>21</sup> As with the previous two factors, we code midterm loss on the basis of whether a member is in the president's party.

We include each of these factors as a single term that is coded by affiliation with the in party rather than without this coding but with interaction terms according to affiliation with the in party because the latter approach would create a high degree of multicollinearity.<sup>22</sup> For example, the correlation is 0.93 between a main effect for whether a member is in the president's party and an interaction of this term with the president's popularity entered without differentiating across members. In our analysis, we still include the main effect In Party, which equals 1 if a member is in the president's party and 0 otherwise, given that our coding is based on this differentiation.<sup>23</sup>

### Results on Electoral Margins

We first analyze Eq. (1) for each election of 1956 through 1996.<sup>24</sup> Given that previous work has focused on more limited subsets of elections and/or members, the individual-election analysis allows us to discern whether legislative voting affects electoral margins only in certain years or more consistently across time. The only year that we do not analyze is 1962, which is excluded because the extensive reapportionment following the Supreme Court decision in Baker v. Carr hinders mapping the 1960 presidential vote onto the 1962 districts.<sup>25</sup> Also because of this reapportionment, for the 1964 and 1966 elections, *Presiden*tial Vote is based only on the most recent presidential election.

Table 1 presents the central results. In particular, the table describes the parameter estimates on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Other rationales include the macroeconomy and presidential popularity, which are controlled for directly.

22 Our approach is akin to that of Jacobson (2000).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> An additional control variable with which we have conducted the analysis is the incumbent's prior vote, and the results from this analysis are substantively similar to those presented. Disagreement exists in the literature over whether to include lagged vote share as an explanatory variable of current vote share. For example, in the previous studies of roll-call voting cited, some do not control for lagged vote (e.g., Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart 2001; Eriskon and Wright

<sup>2000)</sup> while others do (e.g., Jacobson 1996). Our main rationale for not including the variable derives from Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart's (2000), which shows that it does a poor job of measuring the normal vote, which is the traditional reason for including lagged vote. We therefore do not include the variable in our analysis. <sup>24</sup> We conducted all analyses regarding electoral margins with

STATA version 6.0.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> We have also analyzed an alternative specification that excludes any observation for which redistricting occurred in the previous 2 years or since the most recent presidential election and that bases Presidential Vote only on this most recent presidential election. The results are substantively similar to those presented.

the key variable Roll-Call Ideological Extremity, reporting White's robust standard errors because the Cook and Weisberg (1983) test rejects the null of homoskedasticity in almost every election. We have chosen to make the parameter estimates on the control variables and the regression diagnostics available upon request to conserve space, particularly because these findings largely replicate those presented subsequently (and more succinctly) for the pooled-election analyses.

As Table 1 shows, the results of the individualelection analysis strongly support the Roll-Call Ideological Extremity Hypothesis. In all of the elections, an incumbent receives a significantly lower electoral margin the more he votes with the extreme of his party holding constant the range of control variables listed in the table. Thus comparing two Republican members who have identical district ideologies, who are running against the same quality of challenger, who are not freshmen, and who face the same distribution of spending between themselves and their challengers, the member with the more conservative voting record obtains a lower vote share. Similarly, the results suggest that between two otherwise equivalent Democratic incumbents, the one with the more liberal voting record will receive the lower vote share. In each year, this effect is statistically significant at the conventional level of p = 0.05 (two-tailed).<sup>26</sup>

To interpret the size of this effect, we consider a 25-point shift in a member's ADA score toward the extreme of his party, a shift that approximates one standard deviation of the data, or 3 to 4 highprofile votes.<sup>27</sup> The coefficients indicate that such a shift decreases a member's vote share by 1 to 3 percentage points. Thus, in every election between 1956 and 1996, the typical variation that occurs in roll-call behavior had a noticeable effect on incumbents' vote shares. Moreover, these estimates are arguably conservative since we have controlled for challenger quality and campaign spending; to the extent that roll-call voting works through these factors, controlling for them as we do will provide a conservative estimate of the impact of roll-call ideological extremity.<sup>28</sup>

Given the consistent significance of the relationship between roll-call decisions and vote margins, we proceed to estimate the average impact of this relationship. Pooling the data, we control not only for factors that

The standard deviation in members. ADA scores equals 24.43 points.
 Analyzing our model without controlling for challenger quality

TABLE 2. House Incumbents' Legislative Voting and Electoral Vote Share: Pooled Analysis, 1956–1996

Allalyolo, 1000 1000		
	1980–1996	1956–1996
Roll-Call Ideological	-0.085***	-0.070***
Extremity	(0.007)	(0.005)
Presidential Vote	0.466***	0.454***
	(0.015)	(0.011)
Challenger Quality	-0.025***	-0.053***
	(0.003)	(0.002)
In (Challenger Spending)	-0.030***	_
<ul><li>In(Incumbent Spending)</li></ul>	(0.001)	
Freshman	0.008**	-0.020***
	(0.003)	(0.003)
∆Personal Income	0.013**	0.042***
(coded by In Party)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Presidential Popularity	-0.089***	-0.044***
(coded by In Party)	(0.019)	(0.010)
Midterm Loss	-0.033***	-0.015***
(coded by In Party)	(0.004)	(0.003)
In Party	0.045**	-0.040***
	(0.017)	(0.011)
Constant	0.656***	0.739***
	(0.010)	(0.007)
Number of observations	2950	6521
R <sup>2</sup>	0.594	0.365
Root MSE	0.063	0.079
	0.000	0.079

*Note*: Robust standard errors given in parentheses below OLS coefficients. \*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001.

vary only within an election but also ones that vary across time, as specified in Eq. (1). Because the control for candidate spending exists only for 1980–1996, we conduct two tests. The first examines these later years with the control, and the second all years without it.

Table 2 presents the results. As with the individualelection analysis, the Cook and Weisberg (1983) test suggests evidence of heteroskedasticity, and White's robust standard errors are therefore reported.<sup>29</sup> Table 2 provides further support for the Roll-Call Ideological Extremity Hypothesis. Holding constant a variety of factors that are commonly presumed to determine elections, the effect of roll-call ideology is positive and statistically significant for each sample of the data.

Moreover, this effect has a magnitude comparable to that of other commonly recognized electoral determinants. To interpret the average impact of ideologically extreme voting, we again focus on a 25-point shift in a member's ADA score toward the extreme of his party, which, as mentioned previously, approximates a standard deviation. The coefficients for each

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> These results, in supporting the Roll-Call Ideological Extremity Hypothesis, also support the Downsian logic of elections over the directional theory of issue voting, which allows that candidates may increase their electoral margins by voting more extremely.

<sup>27</sup> The standard deviation in results of the standard deviation in results of the standard deviation in results of the standard deviation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Analyzing our model without controlling for challenger quality or campaign spending, a 25-point shift in roll-call extremity is estimated to decrease a member's vote share by 1.5 to 4 percentage points. Another reason that our estimate is arguably conservative is that we have excluded uncontested elections, which many previous studies include (e.g., Brady, Canes-Wrone and Cogan 2000; Erikson and Wright 2000). Analyzing our model with contested elections, a standard deviation increase in roll-call extremity is estimated to decrease a member's vote share by 2 to 7 percentage points.

 $<sup>^{29}</sup>$  Specifically,  $\chi^2(9)=36.77$  (p<0.05) for the 1980–1996 sample and  $\chi^2(8)=168.03$  (p<0.05) for the 1956–1996 sample. We have also tested for autocorrelation and found that it is not significant. The lack of significant autocorrelation is not terribly surprising since open seats are excluded; in fact, less than 10% of the observations are in a district that has an uninterrupted time series. The DW statistic (calculated as if each observation may be correlated with the most recent previous election in which an incumbent ran in that district) equals 1.89 for the 1980–1996 sample and 1.90 for the 1956–1996 sample.

sample indicate that such a shift would decrease a member's vote share by approximately 2 percentage points. In comparison, the 1980-1996 results suggest that an incumbent's vote share is lower by 2.5 percentage points when she faces a high-quality challenger, by 1 percentage point if the ratio between the challenger's and the incumbent's spending increases by 25 percentage points, and by 1 percentage point if she is a freshman. Even the coefficient on the midterm loss phenomenon has a comparable impact; off-year elections are estimated to lower the vote share of members of the president's party by 3 percentage points. The 1956–1996 coefficients are similar, with a high-quality challenger lowering a member's vote share by approximately 5 percentage points, a freshman receiving a lower vote share of 2 percentage points, and off-year elections lowering the vote shares of members of the president's party by 2 percentage points.

As these results suggest, the effects of the control variables are generally consistent with our expectations. The coefficients on challenger quality, presidential vote, candidates' spending, freshmen, personal income, and the midterm loss phenomenon all have the predicted signs with statistical significance (p < 0.05, two-tailed). The only control variable that has an unexpected effect is presidential popularity, and even though the factor was included merely to prevent overestimating any impact of legislative voting, we still investigated why the variable did not have the same effect as in the study by Tufte (1975). Employing Tufte's specification, which regresses seat change across the parties (rather than individual members' vote shares) on presidential popularity and personal income, we found presidential popularity to have the predicted impact, suggesting our finding derives from differences across the specifications. Specifically, the Tufte effect does not hold once the control for spending is added or if the dependent variable represents vote share rather than seat loss; our subsequent analysis on the probability of reelection demonstrates this variation in the impact.

Before moving on to this analysis, however, we first summarize the key findings in Tables 1 and 2. The results are important because previous work had left open the possibility that legislative voting affects members' electoral margins only for particular elections. By establishing a consistent effect in every year, we have foreclosed this possibility. Moreover, we have shown that the magnitude of the effect is not insubstantial but rather comparable to that of other widely recognized electoral determinants such as campaign spending, challenger quality, and the midterm loss phenomenon.

# LEGISLATIVE VOTING AND THE PROBABILITY OF REELECTION BY DISTRICT SAFETY

The previous section still leaves open whether most members should be concerned that legislative voting might affect their probability of defeat. On the one

hand, a majority of incumbents win by the so-called safe margin of at least 60% of the two-party vote, and the findings indicate that a shift from perfectly moderate to perfectly extreme voting alters a member's vote share by only 4 percentage points. On the other hand, the findings indicate that safety itself is likely to be dependent upon members' prior legislative records, and this relationship would suggest that even safe members might need to fear the electoral ramifications of legislative voting. For example, the results on electoral margins would lead us to expect that between two otherwise similar incumbents, the one with the more moderate record should be likelier to win by a safe margin, yet if that member were subsequently to shift toward her party's extreme, then her probability of winning reelection could significantly decrease. In fact, to the extent that a member is safe due to the moderation of her prior voting, a change toward more ideologically extreme voting could have as large of an effect as for a marginal member, whose lack of safety may derive from having voted ideologically extremely.

To assess whether members should indeed fear that roll-call voting might affect their prospects for reelection, we conduct a final test that estimates the relationship between legislative voting and the probability of reelection directly. In the test, we account for the possibility that safe members may not need to be concerned with the electoral ramifications of legislative voting even if marginal members do. Moreover, we incorporate that safety itself may depend upon members' prior voting records.

### Model and Data for Analysis of the Probability of Reelection

The model that we employ is an endogenous switching regime regression, which has been utilized previously in political science (e.g., Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988; McCarty and Poole 1995). The model has similarities to the instrumental variables approach that has long been used to analyze congressional elections (e.g., Ferejohn and Calvert 1984) and consists of two equations. In the first-stage equation the binary indicator Safety, which equals 1 if the incumbent won at least 60% of the twoparty vote in the previous election and equals 0 otherwise, is regressed via probit analysis on determinants of the previous election.<sup>30</sup> The second-stage equation, regresses Incumbent Won, which equals 1 if the incumbent won reelection as 0 otherwise, on determinants of the current election. In this equation, the independent variables are separated into regimes based on the probability the member is safe as estimated by the first-stage equation.

The regime-switching specification of the secondstage equation is important because if we estimated a single coefficient for roll-call voting, the effect could

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> We use the cutpoint of 60% rather than the other, often employed cutpoint of 55% (e.g., Mayhew 1974b) to bias *against* a finding that safe members face a higher probability of electoral defeat from ideologically extreme voting. We have conducted the analysis with this alternative cutpoint and found substantively similar results.

be significant (in magnitude and standard error) even if the impact for safe members were negligible. Our specification allows that the effect may be negligible for these members. The first-stage equation is also important; it is necessary from an econometric standpoint because if the factors influencing safety are correlated with those determining the probability of reelection, then modeling safety as exogenous could bias the results in favor of finding a significant effect of roll-call voting (see Maddala 1983, 283–4). By modeling safety as endogenous, we avoid this problem.<sup>31</sup>

Equations (2) and (3) formally state the model.

Pr[Incumbent Won<sub>it</sub> = 1] = 
$$\Phi$$
(Pr[Safety<sub>it</sub> = 1]\*\*
$$\times (\kappa_0 + \kappa_1 \text{ Roll-Call Ideological Extremity}_{it}$$

$$+ \kappa_{2-8} \text{ Control Variables}_{it})$$

$$+ (1 - \text{Pr}[\text{Safety}_{it} = 1]^{**})$$

$$\times (\delta_0 + \delta_1 \text{ Roll-Call Ideological Extremity}_{it}$$

$$+ \delta_{2-8} \text{ Control Variables}_{it})$$
(2)

where  $Pr[Safety_{it} = 1]^{**}$  equals the predicted values from

$$\begin{aligned} &\Pr[\text{Safety}_{it} = 1] \\ &= \Phi(\gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \text{ Roll-Call Ideological Extremity}_{it-1} \\ &+ \gamma_{2-8} \text{ Control Variables}_{it-1} + \gamma_9 \text{ Freshman}_{it-1}) \end{aligned}$$

and where the Control Variables include *Presidential Vote*, *Challenger Quality*, *In(Challenger Spending)-In(Incumbent Spending)*,  $\Delta Personal Income$  (coded by *In Party*), *Presidential Popularity* (coded by *In Party*), *Midterm Loss* (coded by *In Party*), and *In Party*.

Because we are interested in capturing the degree to which prior legislative voting affects safety, we include only members who in election t have a voting record in the Congress preceding election t-1, a sample that includes only nonfreshmen. Notably, this exclusion biases against finding that legislative voting significantly affects the probability of reelection; because freshmen tend to have a lower ability to bring home pork, perform constituency service, and otherwise serve their district in nonvoting capacities (Munger 1988), any effect of roll-call voting should be greater for these members. The control variable *Freshman* is thus not included in Eq. (2), but the lag is still included in Eq. (3) because sophomore members running in election t ran as freshmen in election t-1.

The model is identified by this necessary exclusion of Freshman from Eq. (2) and, more generally, the

fact that all other variables in Eq. (3) are lags of the regressors in Eq. (2). Thus for a given observation, *Incumbent Won* is predicted by right-hand-side components distinct from those predicting *Safety*. For example, if an incumbent faces a high-quality challenger in election t but did not face one in election t-1, the value of *Challenger Quality*<sub>t</sub> equals 1, while *Challenger Quality*<sub>t-1</sub> equals 0.32

Our predictions for Eqs. (2) and (3) are similar to those we made regarding electoral margins. In terms of the incumbent's estimated safety, we predict that, holding district ideology constant, a member's likelihood of holding a safe seat will decrease as she shifts her voting toward the extreme of her party. In terms of the probability of reelection, we predict a negative effect of Roll-Call Ideological Extremity, expecting this effect to be significant for not only marginal but also safe members. We do not predict whether the impact should be greater for safe or marginal members because, as explained above, a significant relationship between safety and roll call voting would indicate that the impact could be similar for each type of member.

### Results on the Probability of Reelection

We estimate the two-equation system by maximum likelihood and, following our previous tests, employ robust standard errors.<sup>33</sup> Although the equations are estimated jointly, we describe the results separately for presentation purposes, beginning with the first-stage equation that estimates the safety of the incumbent. Table 3 states these results. It is immediately apparent from the table that safety is a function of the factors we previously found to determine incremental changes in vote shares. In other words, when a member is described as safe, this descriptor refers not to an exogenously imposed invulnerability but, instead, to an outcome based on political conditions, some of which are in the member's control.

Most importantly for our purposes, the results indicate that a member is significantly more likely to be designated safe the more moderate is his legislative voting holding other factors equal. Interpreting the probit coefficients at the means of the independent variables, we focus as before on a 25-point shift in an incumbent's ADA score toward the extreme of his party, a shift that approximates a standard deviation.<sup>34</sup> Specifically, such a change decreases a member's probability of holding a safe seat by 6% for each sample of the data. So-called safety is therefore not independent of legislative voting, suggesting that safe members may well need to fear the electoral ramifications of roll-call decisions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> We have, however, estimated a one-equation probit model of the probability of winning regressed on roll-call ideological extremity, the control variables, and a control for the incumbent's vote share last year and found a significant effect of roll-call ideological extremity. These results are presented in Table A1 (Appendix).

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$  We do not include in Eq. (3) the determinants of election t because of the intertemporal inconsistency that would result from doing so.  $^{33}$  We used the package TSP 4.5 to maximize the likelihood function, which Kimhi (1999) defines.

 $<sup>^{34}</sup>$  The standard deviation in members' ADA scores is 24.96 points. This standard deviation is close but not identical to that of the data in Table 2 since the current analysis excludes freshmen running in election t.

	1980–1996	1956–1996
Roll-Call Ideological Extremity $in t - 1$	-1.320***	0.806***
·	(0.181)	(0.090)
Presidential Vote $in t - 1$	5.799***	4.668***
	(0.488)	(0.242)
Challenger Quality $in t-1$	-0.446***	-0.729***
	(0.082)	(0.046)
$\ln(\text{Challenger Spending}) - \ln(\text{Incumbent Spending}) \ in \ t-1$	0.556***	· — ·
	(0.039)	
Freshman $in t-1$	-0.131	-0.253***
	(0.083)	(0.051)
$\Delta$ Personal Income (coded by In Party) in $t-1$	0.635***	0.505***
	(0.133)	(0.064)
Presidential Popularity (coded by In Party) $in t - 1$	<i>-</i> 2.797***	-0.701***
	(0.622)	(0.103)
Midterm Loss (coded by In Party) $in t - 1$	-0.038	-0.165**
	(0.110)	(0.057)
In Party in t – 1	1.595**	0.311**
	(0.518)	(0.102)
Constant	0.373	1.697***
	(0.310)	(0.090)
Number of observations	2446	5460
$\chi^2$ test of joint significance of coefficients	669.865***	1727.650***

The control variables generally have the same effect on safety as they did on marginal changes in vote share. The most notable difference is in the 1980–1996 sample: the coefficients on *Midterm Loss* and *Freshman* are no longer significant at p = 0.05 (two-tailed) in this sample. These effects are still in the expected direction, however, and that on freshman remains marginally significant (p = 0.06, one-tailed).

Turning to the main results, those on the probability of reelection, Table 4 presents them by the estimated regime of seat safety. In particular, the table describes the parameter estimates of each electoral determinant for a safe member versus a marginal one. The findings show that even safe members face a significantly lower probability of reelection when they increase the extent to which they vote with the extreme of their party. For both safe and marginal members and in each sample of the data, an incumbent's likelihood of retaining her seat decreases the more ideologically extreme is her voting.

These results support the long-standing findings that members view legislative voting as an important component of the electoral connection and consider constituency cues in roll-call decisions. Perhaps most notably, the results show why such legislative behavior is consistent with the fact that most incumbents win reelection by safe margins. Even safe legislators' roll-call voting affects their risk of electoral defeat. Thus members are correct in assuming that legislative votes have an impact on the probability of reelection.

Comparing the coefficients on Roll-Call Ideological Extremity across regimes, the one for marginal members is higher than that for safe members in the test with

the control for campaign spending, while the reverse occurs in the other test. Neither difference, however, is statistically significant (p > 0.4 in each case). This result is consistent with the first-stage findings that safety is a function of members' prior voting records. As we argued at the outset, to the extent that safety depends upon roll-call decisions, they may have a similar impact on the probability of winning for safe and marginal members.

In terms of the magnitude of the coefficients, interpretation is less straightforward than for even a typical probit analysis because the means of the variables differ across the regimes of safety. To describe the magnitudes similarly by regime, we interpret the probit coefficients at specified parameter values, beginning with the following ones, which were chosen for their moderate values: 0.75 for roll-call ideological extremity (an ADA of 75 for a Democrat, 25 for a Republican); a difference of 0 between the district vote for the presidential candidate of the incumbent's party and the average vote for that candidate across the districts; 1 for challenger quality, midterm loss, and in party; 50% for presidential popularity; and 0 for the other variables. At these values, a member who shifts his ADA score 25 points toward the extreme of his party decreases his probability of reelection by 11% in the marginal regime of the 1980-1996 test, 9% in the safe regime of that test, and 4% in each regime of the 1956-1996 test. Altering the values such that the incumbent does not face a high-quality challenger, the magnitudes stay relatively constant, with such a shift in an incumbent's roll-call voting decreasing his probability of reelection by 9% in the marginal regime of the 1980–1996 test,

	1980-	1980–1996		1996
	Marginal	Safe	Marginal	Safe
Roll-Call Ideological Extremity	-1.306**	-0.868*	-0.422*	-0.602**
,	(0.461)	(0.379)	(0.212)	(0.215)
Presidential Vote	`4.940***	5.237***	1.295	4.266***
	(1.302)	(1.035)	(0.666)	(0.605)
Challenger Quality	_`0.241 <sup>´</sup>	_`0.417 <del>**</del>	_0.466 <sup>*</sup> **	-0.556***
- Tamongor Lacamy	(0.164)	(0.157)	(0.094)	(0.102)
In(Challenger Spending) - In(Incumbent Spending)	_`0.696 <sup>*</sup> **	_`0.794 <sup>*</sup> **	` ′	` — <i>'</i>
(ontainenger openians)(internation openials)	(0.127)	(0.089)		
ΔPersonal Income (coded by In Party)	_`0.042 <sup>´</sup>	`0.563	0.690***	0.872***
Zi. Bibbilai moomo (Bodod Zi) mir aniji	(0.340)	(0.307)	(0.186)	(0.178)
Presidential Popularity (coded by In Party)	0.451	_`2.326 <sup>´</sup>	`1.919 <sup>*</sup> **	`0.686
Trobladinian repetating (content by the carry)	(1.330)	(1.508)	(0.530)	(0.620)
Midterm Loss (coded by In Party)	-0.584*	`0.043	_0.729 <sup>*</sup> **	_`0.103 <sup>´</sup>
	(0.227)	(0.221)	(0.125)	(0.131)
In Party	_`0.910 <sup>´</sup>	`1.042	_`2.501***	_`0.515 <sup>°</sup>
	(1.157)	(1.252)	(0.548)	(0.625)
Constant	`3.097***	`1.192 <sup>´</sup>	`3.276 <sup>*</sup> **	`2.951 <sup>*</sup> **
	(0.663)	(0.672)	(0.367)	(0.368)
Number of observations	24	46	540	60
$\chi^2$ test of joint significance of coefficients	483.867***		766.939***	
log likelihood of system of equations	-1091.703		-3498.372	

*Note*: Robust standard errors given in parentheses below probit coefficients. \*p < 0.05; \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*\* p < 0.001. The regime of whether a member is classified as safe or marginal is derived endogenously from Eq. (3) in the text, the results of which are given in Table 3.

8% in the safe regime of this test, 3% in the marginal regime of the 1956–1996 test, and 2% in the remaining regime. Likewise, reducing the initial value of roll-call ideological extremity does not substantially alter the results. For example, at 0.50 (an ADA of 50 for each member) a 25-point shift in a member's ADA toward his party's extreme decreases his likelihood of reelection by 8% in each regime of the 1980–1996 test and by 3 to 4% in each regime of the 1956–1996 test.

As with the results on vote shares, the impact of roll-call voting is comparable to that for other electoral determinants. For example, at the initial parameter values of the previous paragraph, the 1980–1996 test suggests that an incumbent's probability of winning would decline by 5 to 7% if the ratio of challenger to incumbent spending increased by 25%. Similarly, each test indicates that a high-quality challenger decreases an incumbent's probability of reelection by 6 to 15%. The impact of legislative voting on the probability of reelection is thus not only statistically significant for safe as well as marginal members, but also similar to the effect of factors that are commonly recognized to be important determinants of electoral outcomes.

In general, the results on the control variables comport with our expectations. The effects of campaign spending and district ideology are consistently in the expected direction and statistically significant. Those on challenger quality also have the correct sign in each regime and sample and are significant with the exception of the marginal regime of the 1980–1996 test. In addition, the coefficients for the remaining variables

that are not included as a main effect typically have the predicted sign, and they are significant only with the expected sign. Specifically, the effect of the economy is significant in each regime of the 1956–1996 test, the effect of the midterm loss is significant in the marginal regime of each test, and the effect of presidential popularity is significant in the marginal regime of the 1956–1996 test.

Overall, the results in Tables 3 and 4 are important because they show that a typical member should rationally be concerned with the electoral impact of legislative voting. Controlling for a wide range of other electoral determinants, roll-call voting has a significant effect on the probability of reelection. Notably, this effect holds for not only marginal but also safe members. These results are consistent with our finding that safety itself is a function of members' voting. That is, safe members are "safe" partially as a consequence of their roll-call decisions. Consequently, when such members change their voting pattern toward their party's extreme, they face a significantly higher probability of defeat, just as other members do.

#### CONCLUSION

While surveys of members have consistently found that they are concerned with the potential electoral ramifications of legislative voting, previous work had not established that this concern is necessarily rational. Surveys of the mass public have suggested that the typical voter is fairly ignorant of her representative's policy decisions, and studies of elections themselves

have provided mixed results as to whether legislative voting affects electoral margins. Moreover, even the positive evidence has left open the possibility that roll-call decisions may not affect the likelihood of defeat for the majority of incumbents. The literature has thus failed to provide evidence that a typical member should believe that he is accountable to voters with regard to his roll-call decisions.

Our study presents three types of evidence to this end. First, we show that, holding district ideology constant, in every election between 1956 and 1996 an incumbent's vote share decreased the more he voted with the extreme of his party. Second, pooling across the years, we establish that the average impact of this effect is comparable to that of commonly recognized electoral determinants such as challenger quality. Third, by directly examining the probability of reelection, we demonstrate that the probability decreases significantly as an incumbent's voting support for his party increases, with this effect holding not only for marginal but also safe incumbents. The vulnerability of the safe members occurs in part because moderate voting increases the probability of holding a safe seat or, in other words, because safety itself derives from a member's roll-call positions.

Notably, while we find evidence of House members' electoral accountability for their policy actions, we certainly do not conclude that voters are highly knowledgeable about all such actions. Earlier we noted several rationales for the seemingly distinct states of the world. For example, "uninformed" voters may take cues from informed elites or, alternatively, may become informed by challengers when an incumbent votes out of step with her district. Accordingly, future work might examine how elites' and challengers' behaviors influence the degree to which legislative voting affects electoral outcomes.

Our analysis also provokes a number of other issues for future research. One question is the extent to which the effect of legislative voting varies according to the salience of the policy issue. Research on legislative behavior finds that members are more likely to enact legislation reflecting public opinion when the policy issue is salient (Canes-Wrone 2001; Hutchings 1998; Kollman 1998). In combination with our findings, this research suggests that members' legislative votes regarding relatively salient issues may have larger electoral effects than votes on less salient matters.

A second extension would be to examine whether changes in the number of marginal seats derive in part from variation in party discipline. Standard explanations for the "vanishing marginals" of the 1960s–1980s emphasize member activities other than legislative voting, such as constituency service (Fiorina 1989). Meanwhile, research has found substantial variation in the influence of parties over members' voting throughout these decades (e.g., Snyder and Groseclose 2000). The evidence presented in this paper suggests that these phenomena of party discipline and the vanishing marginals could be related.

#### **APPENDIX**

	Alternative S		ı of		
Analysis of Probability of Reelection					
		1980-1996	1956		

	1980–1996	1956–1996
Roll-Call Ideological	-0.678*	-0.363**
Extremity	(0.263)	(0.126)
Incumbent's Previous	`1.105 <sup>°</sup>	3.671***
Vote Share	(0.707)	(0.622)
Presidential Vote	`4.354***	3.299***
	(0.760)	(0.439)
Challenger Quality	_`0.367 <sup>*</sup> **	_0.491 <sup>*</sup> **
-	(0.099)	(0.059)
In(ChallengerSpending) -	-0.769***	· — ·
In(Incumbent Spending)	(0.078)	
Freshman	0.058	0.080
	(0.118)	(0.072)
△Personal Income	0.300	0.521***
(coded by In Party)	(0.197)	(0.098)
Presidential Popularity	-1.020	1.181**
(coded by In Party)	(0.955)	(0.366)
Midterm Loss	-0.565***	-0.610 <b>***</b>
(coded by In Party)	(0.141)	(0.085)
In Party	0.325	-1.851***
	(0.831)	(0.376)
Constant	1.043	1.016*
	(0.651)	(0.420)
Number of observations	2912	6462
$\chi^2$ test of joint significance	205.830***	421.352***
log likelihood	-1191.507	-406.619

*Note*: Robust standard errors given in parentheses below probit coefficients. \* p < 0.05; \*\*\* p < 0.01; \*\*\*\* p < 0.001.

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### **Coordination and Policy Moderation at Midterm**

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Eligible voters have been coordinating their turnout and vote decisions for the House of Representatives in midterm elections. Coordination is a noncooperative rational expectations equilibrium. Stochastic choice models estimated using individual-level data from U.S. National Election Studies surveys of the years 1978–1998 support the coordinating model and reject a nonstrategic model. The coordinating model shows that many voters have incentives to change their votes between the presidential year and midterm after learning the outcome of the presidential election. But this mechanism alone does not explain the size of midterm cycles. The largest source of loss of support for the president's party at midterm is a regular pattern in which the median differences between the voters' ideal points and the parties' policy positions have become less favorable for the president's party than they were at the time of the presidential election (nonvoters show the same pattern). The interelection changes are not consistent with the theory of surge and decline.

o Americans coordinate their electoral choices in midterm congressional elections? We use coordination to describe a situation in which two conditions hold for everyone who is eligible to vote (i.e., every elector). Each elector combines information that each elector has privately with information that everyone has in common to make the best possible prediction of the election outcome, and each elector makes the choice—consistent with the elector's prediction—that is most likely to produce the best possible result for the elector. Each elector's prediction takes into account what all electors' best strategies would be given the information they have in common, a condition described by saying that each elector has rational expectations. The choice each elector makes is part of the elector's private information. When every elector makes choices according to a strategy that is consistent with the elector's rational expectations, and no elector can produce a personally better outcome by using a different strategy, then there is a noncooperative equilibrium. Coordination is defined as the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium that is based on everyone having rational expectations.

Beyond implications for the regularity with which the president's party loses vote share in midterm elections, which we discuss below, the existence of coordination is important because coordination implies that electors take one another into account in a constitutionally

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significant way. In American elections, coordination is based on the separation of powers between the president and the Congress. Coordination occurs when electors anticipate how election outcomes will affect bargaining about policy within the legislature and between the legislature and the executive. By instituting the constitutional separation of powers, Madison believed that elected officials' pursuit of their selfish interests and ambitions would lead them to act with regard to one another in ways that would prevent governmental tyranny (Carey 1978, 159-60). Even electors who did not coordinate might hope, with Madison, that the separation of powers would affect officials in that way. But if coordination exists, electors are not mere observers of consequences the constitutional provisions may produce but instead are agents who are led to counteract one another by the constitutional incentives. Coordinating electors are as wary of one another as they are of officials.

Coordination produces policy moderation. An elector is acting to moderate policy when the elector chooses what to do based on the idea that, via the institutional structure, the policy outcome will be intermediate between the parties' positions. With coordination it is not that electors individually prefer to have government produce moderate policy. Indeed, no elector prefers moderation or divided government per se. Rather, the separation of powers and the institutions that create public information together channel each elector's selfish efforts in such a way that collectively there is a moderated result.

In the strategic theory of policy moderation introduced by Alesina and Rosenthal (1989, 1995, 1996), which motivates our analysis, each voter's rational expectation about the midterm outcome is part of a noncooperative equilibrium that encompasses the presidential and midterm elections. Based on empirical tests of a rational expectations noncooperative equilibrium model of voters' choices among candidates for president and for the House of Representatives, Mebane (2000) argues that there is coordination among voters in presidential elections. We use an extension of Mebane's (2000) fixed-point methods to develop an

equilibrium model for turnout and vote choice decisions by midterm electors. We test the model using National Election Studies (NES) survey data from the six midterm elections of years 1978 through 1998. We also compare the coordinating model explicitly to an institutional balancing model that asserts that electors do not act strategically. Finally, we examine how well the coordinating model explains midterm loss (Erikson 1988), taking into account the alternative theory of surge and decline (Born 1990; Angus Campbell 1966; James E. Campbell 1987, 1991).

Our analysis is a counterexample to Green and Shapiro's (1994, 195) claim that "rational choice theory fares best in environments that are evidence poor." Indeed, we sharply test the strategic theory using exactly the kind of survey data with which Green and Shapiro (1994, 195) assert that "rational choice theories have been refuted or domesticated." Our analysis is not subject to the pathologies that Green and Shapiro show have generally afflicted rational choice theory. The statistical model we use to confront the survey data is isomorphic to the formal equilibrium theory. We test the parameters of the estimated model for internal coherence and the model as a whole against a relevant alternative, namely the nonstrategic model.

It may be surprising to many, including some formal theorists, that voters are able to behave in the strategic fashion our model posits. No one disputes the longestablished fact that most voters are politically ignorant (e.g., Adams [1805] 1973; Bryce [1888] 1995; Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). What widespread voter ignorance implies is controversial, however. Even though individuals are poorly informed, political and electoral institutions may allow voters to make decisions that are much the same as they would make if they had better information. For instance, McKelvey and Ordeshook (1985a,b) suggest that polls and interest group endorsements may perform such cuing functions. Mebane (2000) regards such institutions as implicitly providing foundations for coordination, and so do we. It is clear, however, that neither such cues nor the aggregate cancellation of individual voter errors is sufficient to produce election results that fully match what would happen if all electors were better informed (Bartels 1996).

That electors interact strategically does not imply that they live up to the democratic ideal of being active participants in a rational-critical discourse on public issues (Ĥabermas [1964] 1989, [1981] 1984, [1981] 1987). The noncooperative framework takes preferences as given, and when assessing the efficacy and desirability of possible actions, strategic electors know that they are interacting with others who are similarly rational. In discourse, individuals may modify their preferences in response to arguments, and if engaged in communicative action, they are "coordinated not through egocentric calculations of success but through acts of reaching understanding" (Habermas [1981] 1984, 285-6). Communicative reasoning is about individuals together reflecting on background assumptions about the world and bringing shared basic norms to the fore to be questioned and negotiated. Even if strategic electors might be thought to be Madisonian because the constitutional separation of powers causes them collectively to moderate policy, instrumental rationality has individuals taking background assumptions and norms for granted, as common knowledge, and focusing on pursuit of gains.

#### **OVERVIEW**

We assume that each elector has the same basic institutional understanding that is attributed to voters in the theories of Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, 1996) and Mebane (2000). Each elector knows that postelection policy outcomes are compromises between the positions taken by the president and the Congress, and each elector believes that the two political parties push for distinct policy alternatives. In our theory different electors have different beliefs about what the parties' policy positions are, and not all electors care about the policy outcomes. An elector may vote for one of the parties or not vote.

The equilibrium concept in our model is similar to Mebane's (2000): each elector is able to make an equilibrium strategic choice that is based on accurate expectations regarding the aggregate results of other electors' intended choices. Different electors have beliefs about the upcoming election results that are similar because of common knowledge all electors have but differ because of private information each elector has. Our equilibrium includes the level of turnout along with the two-party split of votes for House candidates. The fixed-point values determined in the empirical analysis estimate the aggregate values that are common knowledge in equilibrium in the theoretical model.

We compare the coordinating model to an empirical model derived from the nonstrategic theory that Fiorina (1988, 1992, 73–81) introduced to describe institutional balancing by voters in elections during presidential years. Mebane (2000) finds the nonstrategic model to be significantly inferior to his coordinating model in NES data from presidential election years 1976–1996. Our findings for the midterms data are similar.

One of the most important implications of Alesina and Rosenthal's theory is an explanation of midterm loss. According to their theory, some who voted for a congressional candidate of the president's party when the presidential outcome was uncertain would have voted for the other party had they known which presidential candidate would win. At midterm such voters change their votes, so the president's party loses congressional vote share. Alesina and Rosenthal (1989, 1995; Alesina et al. 1993) show patterns in aggregate data that in several respects match the kind of midterm cycle their theory implies, but, as they observe, the midterm cycle occurs too frequently to be fully consistent with their theoretical model (Alesina and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Mebane's (2000) analysis of presidential and House candidate choices in presidential election years considers only voters.

Rosenthal 1995, 207).<sup>2</sup> We use the data and parameter estimates from our model and from Mebane (2000) to confirm that the disappearing uncertainty of Alesina and Rosenthal's theory accounts for only a small part of the midterm cycles that occurred between 1976 and 1998. The predominant part of the explanation for the frequency and magnitude of the midterm cycles is a regular pattern of interelection changes in the relationship between voters' policy ideal points and the policy positions they attribute to the parties. Usually the changes work against candidates of the president's party, but in 1998 the changes helped Democrats achieve a midterm gain.

An alternative explanation for midterm loss is the theory of surge and decline. The details of the theory vary somewhat in different accounts (Born 1990; Angus Campbell 1966; James E. Campbell 1987, 1991; Kernell 1977), but there are two central ideas. First, there are people who turn out in the presidential election and vote for House candidates of the party that wins the presidency but who do not vote at midterm. Second, presidential coattails cause many voters to choose House candidates of the president's party, but at midterm, absent presidential coattails, the president's party suffers a predictable and regular midterm loss proportional to the party's prior presidential vote margin (Campbell 1991).

One formulation of the surge and decline argument highlights the claim that Independents are more likely to vote in the presidential election than at midterm, so that the midterm electorate consists of a higher proportion of party identifiers whose vote choices are relatively unmoved by short-run concerns (Campbell 1966). Using NES data, Born (1990) finds little support for that or related claims about turnout variations. We find that policy evaluations change systematically between the presidential election and midterm in ways that do not match the theory. Consistent with surge and decline, Born (1990) finds that short-run concerns matter more during the presidential election than at midterm. We explain that this asymmetry arises because retrospective economic evaluations significantly affect House votes in presidential years, but these evaluations do not significantly affect House votes at midterm.

A negative voting variant of the surge and decline theory argues that voters weigh negative aspects of a president's performance more heavily than positive aspects (Bloom and Price 1975; Kernell 1977). Several studies find mixed support for various interpretations of the negative voting idea (Abramowitz 1985; Cover 1986), but Fiorina and Shepsle (1989) show that evidence of negative voting reflects nothing more than a technical artifact. Born (1990) rejects the idea based on NES data from several elections. Because of the lack

of evidence for asymmetric negative voting, we do not directly engage this variant of surge and decline.

The negative voting variant claims to explain an interesting regularity that surge and decline otherwise does not. A party consistently receives a higher vote proportion in midterm House elections when the other party controls the White House than when they themselves control it. Surge and decline compares midterm election returns to the previous presidential election but usually ignores the distribution of returns across midterms. Our moderation theory explains that distribution and, unlike negative voting, has strong individual-level support.

# A MODEL OF COORDINATION IN TURNOUT AND VOTE CHOICES AT MIDTERM

In a manner similar to that of Mebane (2000), the model of coordination we develop is based on a fixed-point theorem that defines the common knowledge belief that all electors have about the upcoming election results. The values of two aggregate statistics summarize the election results: (i) the proportion of the two-party vote to be cast nationally for Republican candidates for the House and (ii) the proportion of electors who will vote. Our theory differs from Mebane's by including electors whose election-time preferences and hence strategies do not depend on expected postelection policies. Each elector who does care about the policies responds to the belief each has about the aggregate values, because the values affect the loss each expects.

The election is a game among everyone who is eligible to vote, that is, among all the electors, assumed to be a large number. Electors act noncooperatively and simultaneously, each choosing whether to vote for a Democratic or a Republican candidate for a House seat or not to vote. In some House districts a candidate may be unopposed. Every elector's expectations about the election outcome depend on the strategies other electors are expected to use. Equilibrium occurs when every elector uses all available information to form such expectations and, given everything each elector knows, no elector expects to gain by using a different strategy. In the following discussion we sketch the main features of the model. Further details, including the extension to include unopposed candidates in some districts, are given in the Appendix.

Elector i expects that after the election Democrats will try to implement policy position  $\theta_{Di}$  and Republicans position  $\theta_{Ri}$ . Given expectations that a proportion  $\bar{V}_i$  of the N electors will vote and a proportion  $\bar{H}_i$  of the vote will go to Republicans, i expects postelection policy to be

$$\tilde{\theta}_i = \begin{cases} \alpha\theta_{Di} + (1-\alpha)[\bar{H}_i\theta_{Ri} + (1-\bar{H}_i)\theta_{Di}], \\ \text{if Democrat is president,} \\ \alpha\theta_{Ri} + (1-\alpha)[\bar{H}_i\theta_{Ri} + (1-\bar{H}_i)\theta_{Di}], \\ \text{if Republican is president,} \end{cases}$$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Scheve and Tomz (1999) use NES panel data to study the relationship between surprise about the presidential election outcome and midterm loss. As a test of Alesina and Rosenthal's theory their analysis is limited because they do not distinguish policy preferences from party identification and do not impose equilibrium conditions on voters' beliefs or strategies.

where  $\alpha$ ,  $0 \le \alpha \le 1$ , represents the president's strength in comparison to the House, and  $\bar{H}_i\theta_{Ri} + (1 - \bar{H}_i)\theta_{Di}$  is the position i expects the House to take. If elector i's preferences depend on policy, then i's expected loss from  $\tilde{\theta}_i$ , denoted  $\lambda_i$ , depends on i's ideal point  $\theta_i$ , according to  $\lambda_i = |\theta_i - \tilde{\theta}_i|^q$ , where  $0 < q < +\infty$ , and we set an indicator variable  $\gamma_i = 1$ . If i does not care about policy, then  $\lambda_i = 0$  and we set  $\gamma_i = 0$ .

Every elector's choice—whether to vote for the Republican, to vote for the Democrat, or not to vote—affects  $\bar{H}_i$  and hence affects  $\bar{\theta}_i$ . We write  $\bar{H}_i = \bar{H}_{i,R}$  if i votes Republican and  $\bar{H}_i = \bar{H}_{i,D}$  if i votes Democrat, with  $\bar{H}_{i,R} > \bar{H}_{i,D}$ . The effect an increase in  $\bar{H}_i$  has on  $\lambda_i$  is

$$w_{Ci} = \begin{cases} q(\theta_{Di} - \theta_{Ri})(1 - \alpha)|\theta_i - \tilde{\theta}_i|^{q-1} \operatorname{sgn}(\theta_i - \tilde{\theta}_i), & \text{if } \gamma_i = 1, \\ 0, & \text{if } \gamma_i = 0, \end{cases}$$

where sgn(x) = -1 if x < 0, sgn(x) = 0 if x = 0, and sgn(x) = 1 if x > 0. Each choice also involves additional gains and losses, such that the total loss for i is

$$\tilde{\lambda}_i = \begin{cases} \lambda_{i,D} + z_{i,D} + \epsilon_{i,D}, & \text{if } i \text{ votes for the Democrat,} \\ \lambda_{i,R} + z_{i,R} + \epsilon_{i,R}, & \text{if } i \text{ votes for the Republican,} \\ \lambda_{i,A} + z_{i,A} + \epsilon_{i,A}, & \text{if } i \text{ does not vote.} \end{cases}$$

To minimize  $\tilde{\lambda}_i$ , i chooses the value from the set  $K = \{D, R, A\}$  that minimizes  $x_{i,h} + \epsilon_{i,h}$ ,  $h \in K$ , where D denotes voting for the Democrat, R voting for the Republican, and A not voting, and, using  $\bar{V}_{i,A}$  to denote the value of  $\bar{V}_i$  if i does not vote,

$$x_{i,D} = -(N\bar{V}_{i,A})^{-1}\bar{H}_{i,D}w_{Ci} + z_{i,D},$$
 (1a)

$$x_{i,R} = (N\bar{V}_{i,A})^{-1}(1 - \bar{H}_{i,R})w_{Ci} + z_{i,R},$$
 (1b)

$$x_{i,A} = z_{i,A}. (1c)$$

Variable  $Y_i$  denotes i's choice from K. Because  $Y_i$  depends on  $\bar{V}_i$  and  $\bar{H}_i$ , the best choice for each elector who has  $\gamma_i = 1$  depends on what i expects others to do.  $Y_i$  is an equilibrium only if it minimizes  $\tilde{\lambda}_i$  when each i assumes that everyone else is using the same rule and only if it is supported by every i believing "mutually consistent" (Mebane 2000, 41) values for  $\bar{H}_i$  and  $\bar{V}_i$ . The definition of  $Y_i$  and assumptions we make about the probability distribution of  $w_{Ci}$ ,  $z_{i,h}$ , and  $\epsilon_{i,h}$  imply choice probabilities  $\mu_{i,D}$ ,  $\mu_{i,R}$ , and  $\mu_{i,A}$ .

We use Mebane's (2000) method to characterize each mutually consistent pair  $(\bar{H}_i, \bar{V}_i)$  as a deviation

from common knowledge expections  $(\bar{H}, \bar{V})$  that all electors have when each elector i knows only the distribution of  $w_{Ci}$ ,  $z_{i,h}$ , and  $\epsilon_{i,h}$ . In that case, the proportions of electors expected to vote Republican and Democratic are, respectively,  $\bar{R}$  and  $\bar{D}$  such that  $\bar{V} = \bar{R} + \bar{D}$ ,  $\bar{H} = \bar{R}/\bar{V}$  and, in (1a) and (1b),  $\bar{V}_{i,A} = \bar{V}$  and  $\bar{H}_{i,D} = \bar{H}_{i,R} = \bar{H}$ , and i's choice probabilities are  $\bar{\mu}_{k_i,h} = \bar{\mu}_{k,h}$  (same for all i in a set indexed by k). The difference between  $(\bar{H}_i, \bar{V}_i)$  and  $(\bar{H}, \bar{V})$  reflects i's private information, which is the actual values of  $w_{Ci}$ ,  $z_{i,h}$ , and  $\epsilon_{i,h}$ . Let  $y_{i,h}$  indicate the value of  $Y_i$  when i knows  $w_{Ci}$ ,  $z_{i,h}$ , and  $\epsilon_{i,h}$ ,  $h \in K$ , but for other electors has only the common knowledge:  $y_{i,h} = 1$  if  $Y_i = h$ ,  $y_{i,h} = 0$  if  $Y_i \neq h$ ,  $h \in K$ . Define  $\bar{R}_{iy_{i,R}} = \bar{R} + (y_{i,R} - \bar{\mu}_{k_i,R})/N$ ,  $\bar{D}_{iy_{i,D}} = \bar{D} + (y_{i,D} - \bar{\mu}_{k_i,D})/N$ ,  $\bar{V}_{iy_{i,R}y_{i,D}} = \bar{R}_{iy_{i,R}} + \bar{D}_{iy_{i,D}}$ , and  $\bar{H}_{iy_{i,R}y_{i,D}} = \bar{R}_{iy_{i,R}}/\bar{V}_{iy_{i,R}y_{i,D}}$ . A set of equilibrium choices  $Y_i$  and expectations  $(\bar{H}_i, \bar{V}_i)$ ,  $i = 1, \ldots, N$ , is given by the following theorem.

Theorem 1. There is a coordinating elector equilibrium if, with all electors using the same fixed point  $(\bar{H}, \bar{V})$  computed from common knowledge, each elector i has  $(\bar{H}_i, \bar{V}_i) = (\bar{H}_{iy_i,R}y_{i,D}, \bar{V}_{iy_i,R}y_{i,D})$  and  $Y_i = h$ ,  $h \in K$ , for whichever of the three possible pairs of values  $(\bar{H}_{iy_i,R}y_{i,D}, \bar{V}_{iy_i,R}y_{i,D})$  corresponds to the smallest value of  $\tilde{\lambda}_i$ : either  $\bar{H}_i = \bar{H}_{i01}$ ,  $\bar{V}_i = \bar{V}_{i01}$ , and  $Y_i = D$ ;  $\bar{H}_i = \bar{H}_{i10}$ ,  $\bar{V}_i = \bar{V}_{i10}$ , and  $Y_i = R$ ; or  $\bar{H}_i = \bar{H}_{i00}$ ,  $\bar{V}_i = \bar{V}_{i00}$ , and  $Y_i = A$ .

# A COORDINATING MODEL FOR SURVEY DATA

With survey data we observe choices  $Y_i \in K$  reported by each elector i in a sample S of size  $n, i = 1, \ldots, n$ , and a set of variables  $Z_i$  that affect electoral choices. Given  $Z_i$  and a set of parameter values, we adapt Mebane's (2000) method to compute values  $(\hat{H}, \hat{V})$ . In (1a)–(1c) we set  $\bar{H}_i = \hat{H}$  and  $\bar{V}_i = \hat{V}$  and substitute  $b_C \hat{V}^{-1}$  for  $(N\bar{V})^{-1}$ , where  $b_C > 0$  is a constant parameter:

$$x_{i,D} = -b_C \hat{V}^{-1} \hat{H} w_{Ci} + z_{i,D},$$
 (2a)

$$x_{i,R} = b_C \hat{V}^{-1} (1 - \hat{H}) w_{Ci} + z_{i,R},$$
 (2b)

$$x_{i,A} = z_{i,A}. (2c)$$

Further details, including the definition of the loglikelihood, are given in the Appendix.

We test whether the parameters satisfy conditions necessary for coordination to exist. If  $\alpha=1$ , then  $w_{Ci}=0$  so that electors' strategies depend on neither  $\hat{H}$  nor  $\hat{V}$  and there is no coordination. We use confidence intervals and likelihood-ratio (LR) tests to check whether  $\alpha=1$  can be rejected for each year of our data. We use Davies's (1987, 36, Eq. 3.4) method to adjust the LR test significance probabilities for a nonregularity that arises because the model does not depend on  $\rho$  when  $\alpha=1$ . Also necessary for the model to describe coordination are that q>0 and that  $b_C>0$ : q=0 implies that  $w_{Ci}=0$ , and  $b_C=0$  implies that  $w_{Ci}$ ,  $\hat{H}$  and  $\hat{V}$  do not affect i's choice.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> In Mebane's (2000) coordinating model, the weight each voter places on the expected policy-related loss from each party depends on the voter's retrospective evaluation of the national economy (see Mebane's Eqs. 3 and 16). In alternative specifications, not reported here, estimation of the stochastic choice model [see Eqs. (2a)–(2c) and (A7) and (A8) in the Appendix] showed no evidence of such dependence in the expected policy-related losses of midterm electors. Hence we have simplified the definition of the midterm theoretical model.

#### A NONSTRATEGIC MODERATING MODEL

To test further whether electors coordinate, we define an empirical model that applies to midterm elections the core idea in Fiorina's (1988, 1992, 73–81) non-strategic theory of institutional balancing by voters in presidential-year elections. The theory considers a situation in which each voter has a choice between two candidates for president and two candidates for the legislature, one from each of two parties. Each voter chooses the mix of party control of the presidency and the legislature, either unified or divided government, that would produce a policy outcome nearest the elector's ideal point. The voter ignores the expected election outcome. The theory is nonstrategic because no voter's choice depends on the likely choice of any other voter.

We apply the nonstrategic theory by assuming that at midterm each elector i treats the party of the president as fixed in forming a preference between unified or divided government but ignores the expected election outcome. The postelection policies that i expects if there is a Democratic majority in the House are<sup>4</sup>

$$\tilde{\theta}_{Di} = \begin{cases} \theta_{Di}, & \text{if Democrat is president} \\ \alpha \theta_{Ri} + (1 - \alpha)\theta_{Di}, & \text{if Republican is president} \end{cases}$$
(3)

and the postelection policies that i expects if there is a Republican majority are

$$\tilde{\theta}_{Ri} = \begin{cases} \alpha \theta_{Di} + (1 - \alpha)\theta_{Ri}, \\ & \text{if Democrat is president} \\ \theta_{Ri}, & \text{if Republican is president} \end{cases}$$
 (4)

with  $0 \le \alpha \le 1$ . The nonstrategic theory says that, other things equal, i votes for the Democrat instead of the Republican if i's ideal point is closer to the policy expected with a Democratic majority than to the policy expected with a Republican majority, i.e., if  $|\theta_i - \tilde{\theta}_{Di}| < |\theta_i - \tilde{\theta}_{Ri}|$ . If  $|\theta_i - \tilde{\theta}_{Di}| > |\theta_i - \tilde{\theta}_{Ri}|$ , then i votes for the Republican instead of the Democrat.

In the nonstrategic model there is policy moderation only if  $0 < \alpha < 1$ . If  $\alpha = 1$ , then the president's party's position is the expected policy, hence  $\tilde{\theta}_{Di} = \tilde{\theta}_{Ri}$ , and policy comparisons do not affect midterm vote choices. If  $\alpha = 0$ , then  $\tilde{\theta}_{Di} = \theta_{Di}$  and  $\tilde{\theta}_{Ri} = \theta_{Ri}$  regardless of who is president. There is no moderation but rather a simple choice between the parties' alternative policies.

To include the possibility of not voting, we use the same log-likelihood function as with the coordinating model, except based on modified definitions of  $x_{i,h}$ ,  $h \in K$ . Defining

$$w_{NSi} = \begin{cases} |\theta_i - \tilde{\theta}_{Ri}|^q - |\theta_i - \tilde{\theta}_{Di}|^q, & \text{if} & \gamma_i = 1\\ 0, & \text{if} & \gamma_i = 0 \end{cases}$$

with  $0 < q < +\infty$ , we define

$$x_{i,D} = -b_{NS}w_{NSi} + z_{i,D} \tag{5a}$$

$$x_{i,R} = b_{NS} w_{NSi} + z_{i,R}$$
 (5b)

$$x_{i,A} = z_{i,A} \tag{5c}$$

with  $b_{NS} \ge 0$ . If  $b_{NS} > 0$ , then  $\partial \mu_{i,D} / \partial w_{NSi} > 0$  and  $\partial \mu_{i,R} / \partial w_{NSi} < 0$ .

The coordinating and nonstrategic models differ only in that the former uses  $\hat{V}^{-1}\hat{H}w_{Ci}$  and  $\hat{V}^{-1}(1-\hat{H})w_{Ci}$  to define  $x_{i,D}$  and  $x_{i,R}$ , while the latter uses  $w_{NSi}$ . We use Vuong's (1989, 320) test to compare them, first testing separately whether  $b_C > 0$  and  $b_{NS} > 0$ . The models may fit the data about equally well because  $w_{Ci}$  and  $w_{NSi}$  have the same sign if  $\tilde{\theta}_i = (\tilde{\theta}_{Di} + \tilde{\theta}_{Ri})/2$ .

# DEFINITIONS OF EMPIRICAL CHOICE ATTRIBUTES

To estimate the models we pool NES Survey data from the years 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998 (Miller and National Election Studies 1979, 1983, 1987; Miller et al. 1992; Rosenstone et al. 1995; Sapiro, Rosenstone, and National Election Studies 1999). Some parameters vary by year.

We use NES 7-point scales and the method described by Mebane (2000, 55) to determine the values of  $\theta_i$ ,  $\vartheta_{Di}$ ,  $\vartheta_{Ri}$ , and  $\vartheta_{PDi}$  or  $\vartheta_{PRi}$  for each i. If an elector i does not provide values for the policy position variables ( $\theta_i$ ,  $\vartheta_{Di}$ ,  $\vartheta_{Ri}$ , and  $\vartheta_{PDi}$  or  $\vartheta_{PRi}$ ), we assume that i does not experience policy-related losses, so that such losses do not affect the choices i makes. We set  $\gamma_i = 0$  if there is not at least one complete set of policy position variable values for i and  $\gamma_i = 1$  if at least one complete set exists. We include  $\gamma_i$  in  $z_{i,A}$ . To allow for the possibility of ideologically based mobilization, we also include each elector's ideal point in  $z_{i,A}$ , using the form  $\gamma_i \theta_i$  to switch the effect off when i lacks a complete set of policy position values.

Evidence that retrospective economic evaluations matter in presidential elections is strong, but systematic direct effects seem not to exist for candidate choices in House elections at midterm (Alesina and Rosenthal 1989; Born 1991; Erikson 1990; Jacobson 1989). Effects on turnout decisions also have been found to be weak

<sup>6</sup> There is a "complete set" if i placed all four of the referents for any single scale topic, e.g., placing self, the parties, and the president on the scale for Rights of the Accused (variables 365–368) in 1978. Among the cases used to compute the estimates reported in Table 1, the percentage with  $\gamma_i = 0$  is, by year, 14.2, 10.9, 10.9, 12.2, 4.8, and 5.0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>  $\theta_{D_i}$  and  $\theta_{R_i}$  are as defined in the Appendix, Eqs. (A1) and (A2).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The NES variables for each set of scales for each year are given here. "Reversed" indicates an item for which we reversed the original 1–7 ordering. In years 1982–1998 respondents who initially declined to place themselves on the Liberal/Conservative scale, or who initially described themselves as "moderate" on the scale, were asked a follow-up question; we used those responses to categorize them as either "slightly liberal," "moderate," or "slightly conservative." 1978: 357–360; 365–368; 373–376; 381–384; 389–392; 399–402. 1982: 393, 394, 404–406; 407–410; 415–418; 425–428; 435–438; reversed 443–446. 1986: 385–387, 393, 394; 405, 406, 412, 413; 428, 429, 435, 436; reversed 448, 449, 455, 456. 1990: 406–408, 413, 414; 439, 440, 443, 444; 447–450; reversed 452, 453, 456, 457. 1994: 839–841, 847, 848; 930, 931, 934, 935; 936–939; reversed 940, 941, 944, 945; 950, 951, 954, 955. 1998 (omitting the prefix "980"): 399, 401, 403, 411, 412; 448, 449, 453, 454; 457, 458, 460, 461; reversed 463, 464, 468, 469.

(Arcelus and Meltzer 1975; Fiorina 1978). To measure retrospective evaluations we use responses to a question asking whether the national economy has gotten worse or better over the past year. In  $z_{i,D}$ ,  $z_{i,R}$ , and  $z_{i,A}$  we include the variable,  $EC_i$ , multiplied by  $PP_i = 1$  if the president is Republican;  $PP_i = -1$  if Democrat.

Party identification has long been known to affect vote choices (e.g., Campbell and Miller 1957) and to be associated both with varying rates of voter turnout (Campbell 1966; Converse 1966; Miller 1979) and with policy preferences and perceptions (Brady and Sniderman 1985). We measure party identification with six dummy variables that correspond to the levels of the NES 7-point scale, using "Strong Democrat" as the reference category:  $PID_{Di}$ ,  $PID_{IDi}$ ,  $PID_{II}$ ,  $PID_{IRi}$ ,  $PID_{Ri}$ , and  $PID_{SRi}$ . We include the variables in  $z_{i,D}$ ,  $z_{i,R}$ , and  $z_{i,A}$ .

To take incumbent-related effects into account, we use a pair of dummy variables that indicate whether a Democratic or Republican incumbent is running for reelection in elector i's congressional district.  $DEM_i = 1$  if a Democratic incumbent is running, otherwise  $DEM_i = 0$ , and likewise for  $REP_i$  and a Republican incumbent. In the choice between candidates we expect to see an incumbency advantage. Decause the presence of an incumbent usually means the absence of a vigorous campaign, the probability of not voting should be higher when an incumbent is running than when there is an open seat.

We include in  $z_{i,A}$  a measure of subjective political efficacy (EFF<sub>i</sub>), defined as the average of responses to two survey items (Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Balch 1974), <sup>12</sup> and four demographic variables that are frequently observed to have strong effects on voter turnout (Born 1990): education, age, marital status, and time at current residence. Three dummy variables measure education: high school diploma, 12+ years of school, no higher degree (ED1<sub>i</sub>); AA- or BA-level degrees or 17+ years of school and no higher degree

(ED2<sub>i</sub>); and advanced degree, including LLB (ED3<sub>i</sub>). The reference category for the dummy variables is 11 grades or less, no diploma, or equivalency. Age we measure as time in year minus  $40 \, (AGE_i)$ . Marital status is a dummy variable (MAR<sub>i</sub>) coded 1 for "married and living with spouse (or spouse in service)" and 0 otherwise. Time at current residence (RES<sub>i</sub>) is measured in whole years for durations of between 3 and 9 years; otherwise it is coded using the same values used by Born (1990): less than 6 months, 0.25; 6–12 months, or 1 year, 0.75; 13–24 months, or 2 years, 1.5; and 10 years or more, 10.13

The definitions of the attributes of the choices are

$$z_{i,D} = c_0 - c_{DEM} DEM_i + c_{EC} PP_i EC_i + c_D PID_{Di}$$

$$+ c_{ID} PID_{IDi} + c_I PID_{Ii} + c_{IR} PID_{IRi}$$

$$+ c_R PID_{Ri} + c_{SR} PID_{SRi}, \qquad (6a)$$

$$z_{i,R} = -c_0 - c_{REP} REP_i - c_{EC} PP_i EC_i - c_D PID_{Di}$$

$$- c_{ID} PID_{IDi} - c_I PID_{Ii} - c_{IR} PID_{IRi}$$

$$- c_R PID_{Ri} - c_{SR} PID_{SRi}, \qquad (6b)$$

$$z_{i,A} = d_0 + d_{EFF} EFF_i + d_{ED1} ED1_i + d_{ED2} ED2_i$$

$$+ d_{ED3} ED3_i + d_{AGE} AGE_i + d_{MAR} MAR_i$$

$$+ d_{RES} RES_i + d_{\gamma} (1 - \gamma_i) + d_{\theta} \gamma_i \theta_i$$

$$+ d_{REP} REP_i + d_{DEM} DEM_i + d_{EC} PP_i EC_i$$

$$+ d_D PID_{Di} + d_{ID} PID_{IDi} + d_I PID_{Ii}$$

$$+ d_{IR} PID_{IRi} + d_R PID_{Ri} + d_{SR} PID_{SRi}, \qquad (6c)$$

where the parameters  $c_0$ ,  $c_{EC}$ ,  $d_0$ ,  $d_{EC}$ , and  $d_\theta$  are constant in each year, and the remaining parameters are constant over all years. A variable that increases the probability of choosing  $h \in K$  will have a negative coefficient. The effects measured by the c parameters primarily contrast the candidate alternatives to one another, while the d parameters measure effects that contrast the choice not to vote to the choice to vote. For the attributes of the candidates, the parameter signs should be  $c_0 < 0$  and  $c_{EC}$ ,  $c_{DEM}$ ,  $c_{REP}$ ,  $c_D$ ,  $c_{ID}$ ,  $c_I$ ,  $c_{IR}$ ,  $c_R$ ,  $c_{SR} > 0$ . For the attributes of not voting, the parameter signs should be  $d_\gamma$ ,  $d_{REP}$ ,  $d_{DEM}$ ,  $d_D$ ,  $d_{ID}$ ,  $d_I$ ,  $d_{IR}$ ,  $d_R < 0$  and  $d_{EFF}$ ,  $d_{ED1}$ ,  $d_{ED2}$ ,  $d_{ED3}$ ,  $d_{AGE}$ ,  $d_{MAR}$ ,  $d_{RES} > 0$ . The signs of  $d_0$ ,  $d_0$ , and  $d_{EC}$  are indeterminate.

To measure choices  $y_{i,h}$  we use individuals' self reports. <sup>15</sup> The sample size of electors used, pooled over the six NES surveys, is 9639 (by year, 1978–1998, the sizes are 1814, 1226, 1972, 1833, 1648, and 1146, respectively.). Only those who did not vote or who voted for either a Democrat or a Republican are included. Of

 $<sup>^{7}</sup>$  By year, the NES variables are 338, 328, 373, 423, 909, and 980419. Codes are as given by Mebane (2000, 55).

By year, the NES variables are 433, 291, 300, 320, 655, and 980339.
 By year, the NES variables are 4, 6, 43, 58, 17, and 980065.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Eubank and Gow (1983) and Gow and Eubank (1984) document proincumbent biases in 1978 and 1982 NES data. Estimated incumbency effects may be exaggerated (cf. Eubank 1985).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Including dummy variables based on Jacobson's (1989) candidate quality measure improves the fit to the data but does not change any of the results of primary interest in the analysis.

<sup>12</sup> The items are "have say" and "don't care much." By year, the NES variables are as follows: 351, 354; 531, 532; 549 ("don't care"); 509, 508; 1038, 1037; and 980525, 980524. In 1978, 1982, and 1986, the response codes are —1 for "agree" and 1 for "disagree." In 1990, 1994, and 1998, five responses range from "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly," coded —1, —0.5, 0, 0.5 and 1. In 1986 only the "don't care" item is available, and only for half the sample. We use a proxy variable to replace missing values for variable 549, constructed by summing the values of four variables: 62, 64, and 66, each being coded 1 if yes and 0 otherwise; and 59, coded 1 if "very interested" or "somewhat interested" and 0 otherwise. Respondents with INDEX = 4 are assigned the value 1; those with INDEX < 4 are assigned —1. Support for the proxy comes from a logistic regression model for the binary responses to variable 549 in the half-sample that was asked that question, with INDEX as the regressor: the MLEs give Pr(variable 549 = disagree) >0.5 only if INDEX = 4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> By year, the NES variables for education, age, marital status, and residency are as follows: 513, 504, 505, 628; 542, 535, 536, 760; 602, 595, 598, 753; 557, 552, 553, 684; 1209, 1203, 1204, 1426; and 980577, 980572, 980573, 980662.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> In the Appendix, Eq. (A4):  $\partial v_{i,h}/\partial z_{i,h} < 0$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> By year, the NES variables are as follows: 470, 473, 474; 501, 505, 506; 261, 265, 267; 279, 287, 289; 601, 612, 614; and 980303, 980311, 980313.

TABLE 1.	Coordi		Nonstr		dinating and Nonstrategic Models  Coordinating Nonstrategic				ategic
	-		•						
Parameter	MLE	SE	MLE	SE	Parameter	MLE	SE	MLE	SE
$\overline{q}$	1.557	0.137	1.433	0.208	τ	0.769	0.068	0.732	0.068
$b_C$	1.491	0.217	_		$d_{0.78}$	-1.184	0.185	-1.249	0.187
$b_{NS}$			1.390	0.387	$d_{0,82}$	-1.256	0.215	-1.318	0.218
$\alpha_{78}$	0.463	0.167	, 0.359	0.176	$d_{0,86}$	-1.518	0.187	-1.594	0.190
$\alpha_{82}$	0.143	0.141	0*	0.192	$d_{0,90}$	-1.630	0.200	-1.706	0.203
$\alpha_{86}$	0.570	0.111	0.408	0.125	$d_{0,94}$	-1.790	0.212	-1.827	0.211
$\alpha_{90}$	0*	0.118	0*	0.189	$d_{0,98}$	-2.048	0.227	-2.095	0.229
$\alpha_{94}$	0*	0.072	0*	0.154	$d_{EFF}$	0.292	0.033	0.292	0.033
$\alpha_{98}$	0.272	0.140	0*	0.177	$d_{ED1}$	1.099	0.071	1.098	0.071
$ ho_{78}$	0*	0.353	0*	0.373	$d_{ED2}$	1.773	0.087	1.770	0.087
$ ho_{82}$	0.780	0.434	0.086	0.515	$d_{ED3}$	2.029	0.119	2.026	0.119
$ ho_{86}$	1*	0.424	1*	0.393	$d_{AGE}$	0.031	0.002	0.031	0.002
$ ho_{90}$	1*	0.386	1*	0.402	$d_{MAR}$	0.423	0.051	0.425	0.051
$ ho_{94}$	0.752	0.430	0.641	0.423	$d_{RES}$	0.117	0.007	0.117	0.007
$ ho_{98}$	1*	0.467	1*	0.523	$d_{\gamma}$	-0.605	0.115	-0.585	0.115
C <sub>0,78</sub>	-1.018	0.093	-0.990	0.093	$d_{ heta,78}$	-0.057	0.222	-0.024	0.223
C <sub>0,82</sub>	-0.898	0.114	-0.923	0.119	$d_{ heta,82}$	0.245	0.312	0.282	0.313
C <sub>0,86</sub>	-0.772	0.097	0.744	0.097	$d_{ heta,86}$	0.381	0.295	0.427	0.295
C <sub>0,90</sub>	-0.864	0.124	-0.775	0.124	$d_{ heta,90}$	-0.169	0.260	-0.107	0.262
C <sub>0,94</sub>	-0.871	0.091	-0.871	0.092	$d_{ heta,94}$	0.961	0.280	0.934	0.280
C <sub>0,98</sub>	-1.063	0.110	-0.992	0.118	$d_{ heta,98}$	0.881	0.347	0.881	0.349
C <sub>EC,78</sub>	0.078	0.112	0.080	0.111	$d_{EC,78}$	-0.023	0.117	-0.023	0.117
C <sub>EC,82</sub>	0.096	0.109	0.107	0.109	$d_{EC,82}$	0.015	0.132	0.015	0.133
C <sub>EC,86</sub>	0.066	0.094	0.048	0.094	$d_{EC,86}$	-0.146	0.110	-0.146	0.110
CEC,90	0.284	0.143	0.285	0.143	$d_{EC,90}$	-0.156	0.131	-0.149	0.131
CEC,94	0.023	0.101	0.031	0.101	$d_{EC,94}$	-0.404	0.121	<b>−</b> .0.408	0.121
C <sub>EC,98</sub>	-0.061	0.144	0.067	0.141	$d_{EC,98}$	0.152	0.156	0.153	0.156
$c_D$	0.493	0.074	0.485	0.074	$d_D$	-0.833	0.081	-0.816	0.081
CID	0.603	0.083	0.604	0.083	$d_{ID}$	-0.880	0.094	-0.860	0.094
$C_l$	0.946	0.093	0.931	0.093	$d_l$	-1.265	0.104	-1.242	0.105
CIR	1.408	0.087	1.386	0.086	$d_{lR}$	-0.712	0.099	0.691	0.100
CR	1.433	0.082	1.418	0.082	$d_R$	-0.780	0.091	-0.760	0.091
CSR	1.892	0.094	1.862	0.094	$d_{SR}$	-0.114	0.103	-0.103	0.103
C <sub>DEM</sub>	0.683	0.066	0.685	0.066	$d_{DEM}$	-0.260	0.085	-0.269	0.085
CREP	0.636	0.067	0.631	0.067	$d_{REP}$	-0.343	0.087	-0.348	0.087

Note: Maximum-likelihood estimates and standard errors. \*A boundary-constrained parameter. Pooled NES Post-Election Survey data, 1978–1998; n= 9639 cases. Log-likelihood values: coordinating model, -6824.7; nonstrategic model, -6825.4.

the 10,954 respondents in all the NES data, 1315 were omitted due to missing or invalid data. 16

## MODEL ESTIMATES AND RESULTS OF TESTS OF COORDINATION

The coordinating and nonstrategic models produce similar results. Maximum-likelihood estimates (MLE) and standard errors (SE) for the parameters of the models, using observed attribute specifications (2a)–(2c), (5a)–(5c), and (6a)–(6c) are listed in Table 1.<sup>17</sup>

 $^{16}$  In the NES data,  $\zeta_i$  is the number of eligible adults in each household, multiplied by a time-series weight in 1994. We rescaled each number of adults and time-series weight variable to give each a mean of 1.0 over the whole of each survey sample. By year, the NES variables are as follows: 38; 53; 14; 29; 6, 58; and 980035.

All the parameters that have the same interpretation in both models have statistically indistinguishable estimates. The MLEs for  $c_{EC}$  are near zero for every year except 1990, suggesting that for the most part retrospective economic evaluations do not affect choices between candidates. 18 Except for 1994, the MLEs for  $d_{EC}$ are statistically insignificant, so that retrospective evaluations also have no systematic effect on the choice not to vote. The MLEs for the party identification dummy variables show the familiar effects of party identification on candidate choices and turnout. The MLEs for  $c_{DEM}$  and  $c_{REP}$  point to a substantial incumbent advantage, while the MLEs for  $d_{DEM}$  and  $d_{REP}$  show that the probability of voting is lower when an incumbent is running for reelection. Greater subjective political efficacy, higher education, greater age, being married, and having lived longer at one's current residence all increase the loss from not voting and so increase the probability of voting. An elector who does not report at

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Over all years for the coordinating model, the percentage correctly classified by "predicting" for each observation the choice that has the highest probability using the parameter MLEs is 67.3% (by year, 64.2, 66.4, 68.2, 68.7, 66.7, and 70.1%), and the average probability of the choice actually made is 0.57 (by year, 0.54, 0.56, 0.58, 0.59, 0.56, and 0.59).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> The 95% confidence interval for  $c_{EC,90}$ , computed as in Table 2, is (-0.001, 0.558).

TABLE 2. Ninety-Five Percent Confidence Intervals for  $\alpha$ 

	Lower	Upper	
Parameter	Bound	Bound	
$\alpha_{78}$	0.157	0.787	
$\alpha_{82}$	0*	0.423	
$\alpha_{86}$	0.348	0.775	
$\alpha_{90}$	0*	0.196	
$\alpha_{94}$	0*	0.127	
α98	0.007	0.541	

*Note*: Estimates are based on tabulation of an asymptotic mixture distribution of the kind derived by Self and Liang (1987), under the hypothesis that  $\alpha_{90} = \alpha_{94} = \rho_{78} = 0$  and  $\rho_{86} = \rho_{90} = \rho_{98} = 1$ . \*A boundary-constrained value.

least one complete set of policy position values ( $\gamma_i = 0$ ) is significantly more likely not to vote than an elector who does report policy positions. For 1994 and 1998, electors who have higher values of  $\theta_i$  are significantly more likely to vote than electors who have lower values of  $\theta_i$ : conservative electors were especially mobilized in those elections.

The coordinating model passes the tests of the conditions necessary for coordinating behavior. The LR test statistics for the constraint  $\alpha=1$ , imposed separately for each year, reject the constraint in every year. <sup>19</sup> The 95% confidence intervals listed in Table 2 support the same conclusions. <sup>20</sup> Regarding the other conditions, 95% confidence intervals computed as in Table 2 show q (1.28, 1.81) and  $b_C$  (1.10, 1.90) to be positive and bounded well away from zero.

The MLEs for the nonstrategic model do not support the theory of nonstrategic institutional balancing. Only two of the six MLEs for  $\alpha$  ( $\hat{\alpha}_{78}$  and  $\hat{\alpha}_{86}$ ) are statistically distinguishable from zero;  $\hat{\alpha}_{82} = \hat{\alpha}_{90} = \hat{\alpha}_{94} = \hat{\alpha}_{98} = 0$ . Rather than moderating, the estimates suggest that in most years electors are making direct choices between the parties' alternative policies.

While the log-likelihood of the coordinating model (-6824.7) is not much greater than that of the non-strategic model (-6825.4), Vuong's (1989) overlapping models test nonetheless rejects the nonstrategic model as an alternative to the coordinating model. The MLEs and SEs in Table 1 clearly reject both  $b_C = 0$  and  $b_{NS} = 0$ . Using the distribution of Vuong (1989, Eq. 6.4), the test statistic is  $n^{-1/2}LR_n/\hat{\omega}_n = 4.3$  (p < .0001).<sup>21</sup>

# MODERATION, INSTITUTIONAL BALANCING, AND THE MIDTERM CYCLE

In the coordinating model, every elector anticipates a postelection policy that is intermediate between the parties' positions, unless  $\alpha=1$ . The coordinating model MLEs for  $\alpha$  are less than 0.5 in every year except 1986 (see Table 1), suggesting that electors expected the president to be weaker than the House in determining postmidterm policy. The estimates for  $\hat{H}$  show that the position of the House was expected to be closer to the Democratic position in 1978, 1982, 1986, and 1990 and closer to the Republican position in 1994 and 1998.<sup>22</sup>

The systematic foundation for a midterm cycle in the coordinating model is that the equilibrium Republican House vote share each elector expects at the time of the presidential election is no longer an equilibrium once the identity of the president becomes known. The postelection disequilibrium decreases the probability that each elector votes for a House candidate of the president's party. The aggregation of such changes is the cycle-generating mechanism.

Does the coordinating model's moderating mechanism, which is based on  $\lambda_i$ , generate a midterm cycle? For a baseline measure of the effect policy-related incentives have on choices in the presidential election year preceding each midterm, we use Mebane's (2000, Table 7) estimates of the proportion of presidentialyear voters for whom each combination of presidential and House choices would minimize expected policyrelated losses.<sup>23</sup> Consider the proportion of voters in a presidential election who would minimize their expected policy-related losses by voting for a House candidate of the same party as the new president. There is a policy-related foundation for a midterm cycle if that proportion is greater than the proportion of voters in the subsequent midterm who would minimize their policy-related losses by voting for a candidate of the same party as the president. Table 3 shows that such a pattern occurs for all six midterm elections, although the decline from 1996 to 1998 is considerably smaller than for the other years.<sup>24</sup>

It is doubtful, however, whether most of the change in votes from presidential election to midterm is due purely to the postelection disequilibrium that the disappearance of uncertainty about the identity of the president brings about. Simulation using presidential-year NES data and Mebane's (2000) coordinating voting model suggests that immediately after the presidential election, due solely to the identity of the new president having become known, the equilibrium proportion of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> By year, the LR statistics  $-2(L_{\rm constrained}-L)$  and associated significance probabilities are 13.2 (p<0.001), 35.2 (p<0.0001), 12.0 (p<0.01), 28.6 (p<0.0001), 53.3 (p<0.0001), and 26.7 (p<0.0001). The significance probability is the upper-tail probability for the  $\chi_1^2$  distribution under the null hypothesis  $\alpha=1$ , using the method of Davies (1987, Eq. 3.4) to adjust for the nuisance parameter  $\rho$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Table 1 shows  $\alpha_{90}$ ,  $\alpha_{94}$ ,  $\rho_{78}$ ,  $\rho_{86}$ ,  $\rho_{90}$ , and  $\rho_{98}$  to have MLEs equal to either 0.0 or 1.0, on boundaries of the parameter space. We bootstrap (20,000 resamples) the score vectors of the MLEs in Table 1 to estimate the quantiles of the asymptotic distribution implied by the hypothesis that  $\alpha_{90} = \alpha_{94} = \rho_{78} = 0$  and  $\rho_{86} = \rho_{90} = \rho_{98} = 1$ , which is a mixture of 64 censored multivariate normal distributions (Self and Liang 1987) and, hence, estimate the confidence intervals in Table 2. <sup>21</sup>  $LR_n = 16.50197$  (Vuong 1989, Eq. 3.1) and  $\hat{\omega}_n^2 = 0.0014981 - 0.0017120^2 = 0.0014952$  (Vuong 1989, Eq. 4.2). We compute both  $LR_n$  and  $\hat{\omega}_n^2$  with adjustments for sampling weights.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> By year,  $\hat{H}$  and  $\hat{V}$  computed using the parameter MLEs in Table 1 and 1978–1998 NES data are as follows: 0.393, 0.477; 0.437, 0.550; 0.418, 0.481; 0.373, 0.439; 0.544, 0.558; 0.524, and 0.455.

 $<sup>^{23}</sup>$  From Mebane's (2000) Table 7 coordinating model results we sum the percentages with choices RR and DR to get the percentage for whom choosing a Republican House candidate minimizes the expected policy-related loss, and we sum the percentages with choices DD and RD to get the percentages for whom choosing a Democrat minimizes the loss.

 $<sup>^{24}</sup>$  By midterm year, the decreases shown in Table 3 are 0.167, 0.229, 0.206, 0.124, 0.278, and 0.028.

TABLE 3. House Vote Choices that Minimize Policy-Related Losses, by Year

Midtorm	President's	Presi	Preceding Presidential Year <sup>a</sup>		dterm dinating odel <sup>b</sup>
Year	Party	D	<u> </u>	U	
1978	D	0.500	0.500	0.333	0.667
1982	R	0.337	0.663	0.566	0.434
1986	R	0.593	0.407	0.799	0.201
1990	R	0.337	0.663	0.461	0.539
1994	D	0.635	0.365	0.357	0.643
1998	D	0.544	0.456	0.516	0.484

*Note*: Entries show the proportion of voters in each year for whom a vote for a House candidate of the indicated party is associated with a smaller policy-related loss than is a vote for the other party. Midterm entries are computed using the parameter MLEs in Table 1 and 1978–1998 NES data. Each observation is weighted by the sampling weight  $1/\zeta_i$ .

<sup>a</sup> Proportion of voters in the preceding presidential election year for whom the indicated House candidate choice minimizes the expected policy-related loss according to the coordinating voting model estimates of Mebane (2000, Table 7).

<sup>b</sup> Of voters with  $\gamma_i = 1$  and  $w_{Ci} \neq 0$ , the proportion under D have  $w_{Ci} > 0$  and the proportion under R have  $w_{Ci} < 0$ .

House votes for the new president's party typically falls by values ranging from about 0.01 to about 0.06.<sup>25</sup> The simulated loss is substantially smaller than the corresponding decrease in policy-related support for the president's party shown in Table 3 for each midterm year except 1998. Other factors that change between the presidential and the midterm elections are modulating the magnitude of the policy-related midterm losses. Such factors include the fact that the president is usually expected to have less influence on policy after midterm than after the preceding presidential election.<sup>26</sup> The form of each elector's evaluation of the policy-related losses also changes: at midterm an elector's evaluation of  $\lambda_i$  does not depend on the elector's retrospective evaluation of the economy, as it does in presidential election years.<sup>27</sup> And between elections parties may change their policy positions, or voters may change their ideal points, and substantively different policies come into play.

#### SURGE AND DECLINE

The theory of surge and decline suggests a possible reason for the relationship between voters' most preferred

 $^{25}$  The simulation consists of recomputing the choice probabilities of Mebane's (2000) empirical coordinating model with  $\bar{P}$  set equal to 0 or 1 depending on which party actually won the presidency in each election. By presidential year, 1976–1996, the losses for the new president's party are 0.011, 0.060, 0.015, 0.035, 0.043, and 0.058.

<sup>27</sup> Recall footnote 3.

policies and the policy positions they attribute to the parties to change in a systematic way between the presidential and the midterm elections. According to the theory, during the heightened mobilization of presidential elections more electors with marginal political involvement turn out to vote than during midterm elections, and this group disproportionately votes for the party of the winning presidential candidate (Campbell 1966). Campbell's (1987) revised theory treats midterm as a return to a normal partisan vote, less influenced by short-run concerns than the presidential election. He writes, "Surge of interest and information in presidential elections will affect the turnout of peripheral partisans and the vote choice of independents" (p. 968). Born (1990, 642, note 30) raises serious doubts about those revisions.

Perhaps the surge of marginal electors who, according to the theory, vote for House candidates of the same party as the presidential winner do so because they like that party's policy position better than the other party's policy position. The posited midterm decline in their turnout should have two major effects. On average, midterm voters should tend to have policy ideal points that are farther from the president's party than presidential-year voters do, and midterm nonvoters should tend to have policy ideal points that are closer to the president's party than presidential-year nonvoters do. We show that NES data from the elections of 1976 through 1998 do not support the existence of such a surge and decline mechanism.

For most electors, turnout at midterm is only weakly related to expected policy-related losses. In the empirical coordinating model, the policy-related loss expected by elector i affects the probability that i does not vote  $(\mu_{i,A})$  via  $w_{Ci}$ . We assess the effect that policy-related losses have on midterm turnout by computing the effect on  $\mu_{i,A}$  of setting  $w_{Ci} = 0$  for each i in the midterm NES data. By midterm year, 1978–1998, the median differences between  $\mu_{i,A}$  using the original  $w_{Ci}$  value and  $\mu_{i,A}$  with  $w_{Ci} = 0$  are -0.0000017, -0.0017, -0.00047, -0.0014, -0.0018, and -0.0011. The median differences always have a smaller magnitude for Independents than for other electors. Such small effects will usually be dominated by other factors, such as partisanship per se, that much more strongly affect the probability of not voting.

Nonetheless it may be that midterm voters see themselves as farther from the president's party on policy than presidential-year voters do, while midterm nonvoters see themselves as closer to the policy of the presidential winner's party than do presidential-year nonvoters. To compare the policy proximities, we use the coordinating model parameter estimates of Mebane (2000) to compute ideal points ( $\theta_i$ ) and party policy positions ( $\theta_{Di}$  and  $\theta_{Ri}$ ) for both voters and nonvoters in the NES data for each presidential election year from 1976 through 1996. We define a voter to be anyone who reports having voted for either the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> The upper bounds of the 95% confidence intervals for  $\alpha$ , in Table 2, are smaller than the lower bounds of the 95% confidence intervals that Mebane (2000, Table 4) reports for  $\alpha_D$  or  $\alpha_R$  for the winning presidential candidate for all years except 1984. The interval for  $\alpha_{R,84}$ , (0.34, 0.79), is virtually the same as the interval for  $\alpha_{86}$  in Table 2, suggesting that voters believed that Reagan's influence on policy remained about the same throughout his second term.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> The medians include only observations that have  $\gamma_i = 1$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> For Independent Independents the medians are 0, -0.00003, 0, 0, -0.00002, and -0.00041.

Democrat or the Republican in the House race and a nonvoter to be anyone who does not report such a vote. We include only those who report at least one complete set of policy position values. For each elector i we compute the absolute difference between i's ideal point and the position of the party that won the presidential election. The absolute difference is  $|\theta_i - \theta_{Di}|$  if the Democrat won the election and  $|\theta_i - \theta_{Ri}|$  if the Republican won.

Each panel in Fig. 1 displays for each year the median of the absolute differences for a different set of electors. Figure 1a shows the medians for all voters and nonvoters, and the remaining panels show the medians for each of the seven NES types of party identifiers. Among all voters (Fig. 1a) the median absolute difference between each voter's ideal point and the position the voter attributes to the presidential winner's party is always greater at midterm than it is during the preceding presidential election year. But in every case except 1992–1994, the median absolute difference is also greater at midterm among all nonvoters. The pattern among nonvoters does not match what surge and decline theory predicts.

The closest match to the pattern predicted by the surge and decline theory occurs among Independent Independents (Fig. 1b), but even there the support for surge and decline is weak at best. In 1978, 1990, and 1994 there are decreases at midterm in the median absolute difference among nonvoters. But in the remaining three midterms the median absolute difference increases from the preceding presidential year among nonvoters. Moreover, in 1990 the median absolute difference decreases among voters. There is hardly any support for surge and decline in the data for Independent Democrats and Independent Republicans (Figs. 1e and 1f). Among nonvoters there are nine instances where the median absolute difference increases at midterm and only three instances where it decreases at midterm. Moreover, among Independent Democrats there are two instances (1990 and 1998) where the median absolute difference for voters decreases at midterm and among Independent Republicans there is one instance (1998).

Instead of the pattern that the surge and decline theory predicts, what we see is that typically both voters and nonvoters are farther from the policy of the president's party at midterm than they were at the time that the party won the presidency in the preceding election. Nonvoters are somewhat more likely than voters are to be closer to the president's party at midterm, but the difference is not regular enough for surge and decline to be a compelling explanation.

Surge and decline theory also asserts that some regular voters deviate from their partisan affiliation during the presidential elections and vote for House candidates of the presidential winner's party, but return to their normal partisan vote at midterm (Born 1990, 635). The insignificant effects ( $c_{EC}$ ) we estimate

retrospective economic evaluations have on choices between candidates may partly account for that. In Mebane (2000), the corresponding parameters  $(c_{H1})$  are significant in four of the six presidential years. Presidential-year deviations prompted by economic evaluations tend to disappear at midterm.


# MODERATION BY CHANGES IN POLICY POSITIONS

Figure 1 shows that the absolute difference between electors' ideal points and the policy positions of the party that won the presidential election usually increases at midterm. Figure 1 is a bit one-sided, however, because it summarizes the relationship between electors' ideal points and only one party's policy positions, but the expected policy-related losses that affect vote choices depend on both parties' policies.

To assess the components of change it is important to consider not merely the magnitudes but also the directions in which the aggregate of voters moves with respect to the parties. Consider a situation in which all voters think the Democratic party policy position is left of the Republican party position, i.e.,  $\theta_{Di} < \theta_{Ri}$ for all voters i. We may characterize the aggregate movement across elections in terms of two median statistics: the median difference between ideal points and Democratic positions, denoted  $med_i(\theta_i - \theta_{Di})$ , and Republican positions, denoted  $med_i(\theta_i - \theta_{Ri})$ . Let  $\Delta_D = \operatorname{med}_i^M(\theta_i - \theta_{Di}) - \operatorname{med}_i^P(\theta_i - \theta_{Di})$  denote the difference between the median policy difference with respect to the Democratic party at midterm and the median difference in the preceding presidential year. If  $\Delta_D < 0$ , then at midterm voters have ideal points more to the left of the positions they attribute to the Democratic party than in the preceding presidential year and, other things equal, a greater proportion vote for Democratic candidates at midterm than in the preceding presidential year. If  $\Delta_D > 0$ , then midterm voters have ideal points more to the right of Democratic party positions, and a smaller proportion vote for Democratic candidates at midterm. Analogously let  $\Delta_R = \operatorname{med}_i^M(\theta_i - \theta_{Ri}) - \operatorname{med}_i^P(\theta_i - \theta_{Ri})$  denote the difference between midterm and the preceding presidential year of the policy differences with respect to the Republican party. If  $\Delta_R > 0$ , then midterm voters have ideal points more to the right of Republican party positions, and Republican candidates receive a greater proportion of votes at midterm than in the preceding presidential year. If  $\Delta_R < 0$ , then Republican candidates receive a smaller proportion of votes at midterm. Because  $\theta_i$ ,  $\theta_{D_i}$ , and  $\theta_{Ri}$  vary independently, all combinations of positive and negative values for  $\Delta_D$  and  $\Delta_R$ are possible.

Of particular interest are circumstances in which  $\Delta_D$  and  $\Delta_R$  are either both positive or both negative. If  $\Delta_D > 0$  and  $\Delta_R > 0$ , then between elections the distribution of voters' ideal points has moved to the right relative to both parties' positions. Other things equal, Republican House vote share  $\bar{H}$  increases. If a Democrat is president, the result is a kind of policy moderation: policy outcomes are expected to be closer to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> Voters and nonvoters by year are as follows: 982, 887; 802, 551; 1,099, 617; 940, 725; 1,244, 841; and 996, 600.



midterm Republican position.<sup>31</sup> If  $\Delta_D < 0$  and  $\Delta_R < 0$ , then between elections the distribution of voters' ideal points has moved to the left relative to both parties' positions, the Republican House vote share decreases, and if a Republican is president, there is moderation of expected policy toward the midterm Democratic position.

Moderation via such a pattern of changes occurs in five of the six midterm elections from 1978 through 1998, according to NES data. Using NES data to compute the median differences between ideal points and the parties' positions, it is necessary to adjust for the fact that some voters place the Democratic party policy position to the right of the Republican party position: for some voters,  $\theta_{Di} > \theta_{Ri}$ . Because moderation refers to movement from one party toward the other and does not depend on the orientation with which each voter interprets its ideal point and the parties' positions, we use the sign of the difference between  $\theta_{Ri}$  and  $\theta_{Di}$  to orient all voters the same way. We compute  $\operatorname{med}_{i}^{M}[(\theta_{i}-\theta_{Di})\operatorname{sgn}(\theta_{Ri}-\theta_{Di})]$  and  $\operatorname{med}_{i}^{M}[(\theta_{i}-\theta_{Ri})\operatorname{sgn}(\theta_{Ri}-\theta_{Di})]$  for each midterm year and analogous quantities for each presidential year. In Fig. 2 we plot the values for all voters who report at least one complete set of policy position values (as in Fig. 1) and, in separate panels, for party identifier subsets. The interelection differences are now:

$$\Delta_D = \operatorname{med}_i^M[(\theta_i - \theta_{Di})\operatorname{sgn}(\theta_{Ri} - \theta_{Di})] - \operatorname{med}_i^P[(\theta_i - \theta_{Di})\operatorname{sgn}(\theta_{Ri} - \theta_{Di})],$$

$$\Delta_R = \operatorname{med}_i^M[(\theta_i - \theta_{Ri})\operatorname{sgn}(\theta_{Ri} - \theta_{Di})] - \operatorname{med}_i^P[(\theta_i - \theta_{Ri})\operatorname{sgn}(\theta_{Ri} - \theta_{Di})].$$

The sign of each  $\Delta_D$  and  $\Delta_R$  value is indicated by the slope of the line that joins each presidential-year median to the succeeding midterm median.

Figure 2a shows that among all voters, in every midterm except 1998 there is moderation based on interelection changes in the location of voters' ideal points relative to the parties' positions.<sup>32</sup> In 1978 and 1994, with Democratic presidents, we have  $\Delta_D > 0$  and  $\Delta_R > 0$ , and in 1982, 1986, and 1990, with Republican presidents, we have  $\Delta_D < 0$  and  $\Delta_R < 0$ . In 1998 there is a Democratic president but nonetheless  $\Delta_D < 0$  and  $\Delta_R < 0$ : Democrats' House vote share was pushed up, because between 1996 and 1998 the distribution of voters' ideal points shifted to the left relative to both parties' positions. The pattern of interelection changes is similar across all of the partisan subsets and within each subset is by and large similar to the pattern among all voters, except for 1988-1990. Between 1988 and 1990 we have  $\Delta_R < 0$  among all voters but within each partisan subset  $\Delta_R > 0$ . The reason for the difference is that a higher proportion of voters identified as Democrats and a lower proportion as Republicans in 1990 than

in 1988,<sup>33</sup> and  $(\theta_i - \theta_{Ri}) \operatorname{sgn}(\theta_{Ri} - \theta_{Di})$  is more negative among Democratic voters than among Republican voters.

The moderating pattern associated with having either a Democratic president,  $\Delta_D > 0$  and  $\Delta_R > 0$ , or a Republican president,  $\Delta_D < 0$  and  $\Delta_R < 0$ , differs from the mechanism of disappearing uncertainty, but the fluctuations in policy positions may relate to the idea that parties may commit to policies different from their ideal policies. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995, 127–36) report that in such an extension of their model parties often announce policies that are more polarized than their ideal policies are. Polarization increases as the president's power  $(\alpha)$  falls. As we mentioned previously, voters usually believe that the president will be more powerful before midterm than afterward. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) do not examine models in which α changes at midterm, but we may speculate that with the parties possibly changing their positions at midterm—there would be a tendency for polarization to increase at midterm.

The NES data from 1976 through 1998 support the idea that polarization is greater at midterm. Among voters, the median absolute difference between the parties' positions is smaller in the presidential election than at midterm in five of the six pairs of elections (the exception is 1988–1990).<sup>34</sup> The interelection changes in the median absolute differences are, however, small compared to the observed magnitudes of  $\Delta_D$  and  $\Delta_R$ . These results are only suggestive because by construction our measures of party positions are within the unit interval [0, 1] in every year.

The changes  $\Delta_D$  and  $\Delta_R$  may also arise because voters learn something after the presidential election. They may learn more about what a party's true policy position is, about a policy position's consequences. or about elected officials' competence to implement the policy. Any of these may be a reason for a voter to update the relationship between the voter's ideal point and the positions the voter attributes to the parties. A party's actions either in the presidency or in Congress may be informative. Perhaps, for instance, the Democrat-favoring changes shown in Fig. 2 for 1996 to 1998 stem from judgments that Republicans in the House were especially incompetent or extreme.<sup>35</sup> The unanswered question is, Why are movements away from the president's party more typical. Why do electors not learn more often that the president's party is more competent or less extreme than they previously thought?


 $<sup>^{31}</sup>$  This assumes that  $\alpha$  does not increase after midterm (recall footnote 26).

<sup>32</sup> The pattern of changes is similar among nonvoters.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> In 1988 the proportions identifying as Strong Democrats, Democrats, Republicans, and Strong Republicans were 0.20, 0.16, 0.14, and 0.20. In 1990 the proportions were 0.28, 0.18, 0.14, and 0.14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> By pairs of elections, the  $\text{med}_i | \theta_{Ri} - \theta_{Di} |$  values are as follows: 1976–1978, 0.20 and 0.21; 1980–1982, 0.33 and 0.39; 1984–1986, 0.36 and 0.45; 1988–1990, 0.33 and 0.29; 1992–1994, 0.37 and 0.41; and 1996–1998, 0.34 and 0.36.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> The July 1997 plot to remove Newt Gingrich as Speaker revealed disarray among the Republican House leadership. Gingrich resigned shortly after the 1998 election. Polls during 1998 showed that most voters disliked the Republican effort to impeach the president (e.g., Pew Research Center 1998).



One of the difficulties of explaining why moderation by policy position changes occurs is that our policy position measures are based on the gaps between electors' ideal points and the perceived positions of the two major parties. Across elections, we cannot distinguish between movement in electors' ideal points and movement in the positions of the political parties. For example, notwithstanding the polarization argument, it is possible that a party in office follows policies more extreme than it proposed at election time. Electors may learn this and consequently the gap between the president's party and the electors increases at midterm because electors' perceptions of the parties change. With our data we cannot distinguish such a pattern from one in which electors change their ideal points because they learn more about policies' consequences.

Moderation by policy position changes may explain the pattern that was the original focus of the negative voting variant of surge and decline. Beyond turnout and coattails effects, there is an additional midterm loss apparently due to "public disappointments with the incumbent presidential party's performance" (Campbell 1991, 483). Tufte (1975) measures this phenomenon by a decline in presidential approval that usually occurs in the first two years of an administration. Born (1990, Table 4) measures the same phenomenon by changes in feeling thermometer scores. The usual pattern of interelection changes in policy positions would cause such changes in approval and in feeling thermometers.

#### CONCLUSION

The NES data strongly confirm the strategic theory of policy moderation. The estimated parameters of the coordinating model satisfy all of the conditions necessary to describe coordinating behavior. The nonstrategic model fails to describe policy-moderating behavior and fits the data significantly worse than does the coordinating model. Coordination also affects decisions whether to vote, but the effects on turnout probabilities are typically small.

Midterm loss is in part caused by policy moderation that occurs because uncertainty about which party will control the presidency disappears after the presidential election. But the mechanism of disappearing uncertainty does not itself explain why midterm losses are as large as they are nor why midterm losses occur as frequently as they do.

The largest source of loss of support for the president's party at midterm is a regularly repeated pattern in which by midterm the median differences between voters' ideal points and the parties' policy positions have become less favorable for the president's party than they were at the time of the presidential election (the same pattern occurs among nonvoters). Such a pattern occurs in all five of the interelection periods during 1976–1998 after which the president's party suffered a midterm loss. Between 1996 and 1998 the pattern reverses: The distribution of voters' ideal points and party positions becomes more favorable to the Democratic party notwithstanding the fact that Democrat Bill Clinton is president, to such an extent that on the

whole the Democrats enjoyed a small midterm gain in 1998

The policies involved in the interelection changes are not limited to macroeconomic policy. Indeed, only in 1980 do the NES survey items we use to measure ideal points and party positions include scales that refer to macroeconomic policy. The interelection changes we document involve a wide range of policies, and the composition of the set of policies changes over time. Nonetheless, changes go in the same direction—away from the president's party—during five of the six interelection periods our data cover. Why the changes typically cut against the president's party is not clear. The dynamic is not explained by variations in turnout.

Our finding that strategic coordination exists shows that the reach of the incentives the constitutional separation of powers creates extends beyond officials to electors. The separation of powers causes electors to attend to one another and make choices that help produce moderate policy outcomes. It is important to keep clear that in moderation via noncooperative coordinating equilibrium, no one has a taste for moderation per se. It is not that coordinating electors are committed to divided government because of a sincere commitment to "cognitive Madisonianism" (Ladd 1990, 67; Sigelman et al. 1997). Each elector always most prefers his or her own ideal point. Moderation occurs only as a collective outcome due to electors' mutual strategic adjustments.

#### **APPENDIX**

### **Coordinating Model Details**

Let  $\vartheta_{Di}$ ,  $\vartheta_{Ri}$ ,  $\vartheta_{PDi}$ , and  $\vartheta_{PRi}$  denote values in the interval [0,1] that elector  $i,i=1,\ldots,N$ , believes are the positions of the Democratic party  $(\vartheta_{Di})$ , Republican party  $(\vartheta_{Ri})$ , and, as relevant, Democratic president  $(\vartheta_{PDi})$  or Republican president  $(\vartheta_{PRi})$ , where 0 represents the extreme liberal position and 1 represents the extreme conservative. Likewise i's ideal point  $\theta_i \in [0,1]$ . We define

$$\theta_{Di} = \begin{cases} \rho \vartheta_{PDi} + (1 - \rho) \vartheta_{Di}, \\ & \text{if Democrat is president,} \\ \vartheta_{Di}, & \text{if Republican is president,} \end{cases}$$
(A1)

$$\theta_{Ri} = \begin{cases} \vartheta_{Ri}, & \text{if Democrat is president,} \\ \rho \vartheta_{PRi} + (1 - \rho) \vartheta_{Ri}, & \text{if Republican is president,} \end{cases}$$
(A2)

with  $0 \le \rho \le 1$ . Using  $\bar{R}_i$  to denote the proportion of electors i expects to vote nationally for Republicans and  $\bar{D}_i$  the proportion for Democrats, we have  $\bar{V}_i = \bar{R}_i + \bar{D}_i$  and  $\bar{H}_i = \bar{R}_i / \bar{V}_i$ . If  $\gamma_i = 1$ , then  $\bar{R}_i$ ,  $\bar{H}_i$ , and  $\lambda_i$  each has one of three

If  $\gamma_i=1$ , then  $R_i$ ,  $H_i$ , and  $\lambda_i$  each has one of three values, depending on whether i chooses the Republican  $(\bar{R}_{i,R}, \bar{H}_{i,R}, \lambda_{i,R})$ , chooses the Democrat  $(\bar{R}_{i,D}, \bar{H}_{i,D}, \lambda_{i,D})$ , or does not vote  $(\bar{R}_{i,A}, \bar{H}_{i,A}, \lambda_{i,A})$ . In particular,  $\bar{R}_{i,R}=\bar{R}_{i,D}+1/N=\bar{R}_{i,A}+1/N$  and, using  $\bar{V}_{i,V}=\bar{V}_{i,A}+1/N$  to denote the proportion of electors i expects to vote, including i,  $\bar{H}_{i,R}=\bar{R}_{i,R}/\bar{V}_{i,V}$ ,  $\bar{H}_{i,D}=\bar{R}_{i,D}/\bar{V}_{i,V}$ , and  $\bar{H}_{i,A}=\bar{R}_{i,A}/\bar{V}_{i,A}$ , so  $\bar{H}_{i,D}<\bar{H}_{i,A}<\bar{H}_{i,R}$ . If  $\gamma_i=0$ , then  $\lambda_{i,R}=\lambda_{i,D}=\lambda_{i,A}=0$ .

Based on  $\lambda_i$ , elector i prefers the Democrat to the Republican if  $\lambda_{i,R} - \lambda_{i,D} > 0$  and prefers not to vote if  $\lambda_{i,R} - \lambda_{i,A} > 0$  and  $\lambda_{i,D} - \lambda_{i,A} > 0$ . For N large and  $\bar{V}_{i,V}$  not near zero, we have the approximations  $\lambda_{i,R} - \lambda_{i,D} \approx (N\bar{V}_{i,V})^{-1} d\lambda_i/d\bar{H}_i$ ,  $\lambda_{i,R} - \lambda_{i,A} \approx (N\bar{V}_{i,A})^{-1} (1 - \bar{H}_{i,R}) d\lambda_i/d\bar{H}_i$ , and  $\lambda_{i,D} - \lambda_{i,A} \approx -(N\bar{V}_{i,A})^{-1} \bar{H}_{i,D} d\lambda_i/d\bar{H}_i$ , with  $d\lambda_i/d\bar{H}_i = w_{Ci}$ . The statement of i's strategy as

$$Y_i = \arg\min_{h \in K} (x_{i,h} + \epsilon_{i,h})$$
 (A3)

uses 
$$(N\bar{V}_{i,A})^{-1}$$
  $(1 - \bar{H}_{i,R} + \bar{H}_{i,D}) = (N\bar{V}_{i,A})^{-1}$   $[1 - (N\bar{V}_{i,V})^{-1}] = (N\bar{V}_{i,V})^{-1}$ .

We make common knowledge assumptions similar to those of Mebane (2000). The parameters and the joint probability distribution of the variables in  $\tilde{\lambda}_i$ ,  $i=1,\ldots,N$ , are common knowledge. It is common knowledge that the distribution is all each i knows about the variables for every other elector  $j \neq i$  and that every i acts to minimize  $\tilde{\lambda}_i$  knowing the values of i's own variables. Consequently it is common knowledge that (A3) is every elector's choice rule.

For every elector i there is an ordered set  $Z_i$  that includes  $\gamma_i, \theta_i, \vartheta_{Di}, \vartheta_{Ri}, \vartheta_{PDi}$  or  $\vartheta_{PRi}, z_{i,D}, z_{i,R}$ , and  $z_{i,A}$ .  $Z_i$  takes values in a set  $\bar{Z}$ . The vector  $\epsilon_i = (\epsilon_{i,D}, \epsilon_{i,R}, \epsilon_{i,A})'$  is independent of  $Z_i$  and identically and independently distributed across electors with a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution denoted  $F_H$ . Each elector is in one of  $M \ll N$  sets  $E_k, k=1,\ldots,M$ ; set  $E_k$  has  $M_k$  electors and  $\sum_{k=1}^M M_k = N$ .  $Z_i$  is distributed independently across i, and for every  $i \in E_k, Z_i$  has probability measure  $f_k$  with  $\int_Z df_k(Z_i) = 1$  and  $\int_Z Z_i df_k(Z_i)$  finite.  $\bar{Z}$ ,  $F_H$ , M, and all  $M_k$  and  $f_k$  are common knowledge.

Because many of the costs (or benefits) of voting are the same regardless of which candidate an elector prefers, we assume that  $\epsilon_{i,R}$  and  $\epsilon_{i,D}$  covary but are independent of  $\epsilon_{i,A}$ . Using

$$G_i = \left(v_{i,D}^{1/1-\tau} + v_{i,R}^{1/1-\tau}\right)^{1-\tau} + v_{i,A}, \qquad 0 \le \tau < 1,$$
 (A4)

where  $v_{i,h} = \exp\{-x_{i,h}\}$ , we define  $F_H(x_{i,D}, x_{i,R}, x_{i,A}) = \exp\{-G_i\}$ . If  $\epsilon_{i,R}$  and  $\epsilon_{i,D}$  are independent, then  $\tau = 0$ . If  $\bar{H}_{i,D}$ ,  $\bar{H}_{i,R}$ ,  $\bar{V}_{i,A}$ , and  $Z_i$  are known but  $\epsilon_i$  is known only to have distribution  $\exp\{-G_i\}$ , then (A3) implies choice probabilities

$$\mu_{i,h} \equiv \Pr(Y_i = h \mid \bar{H}_{i,D}, \bar{H}_{i,R}, \bar{V}_{i,A}, Z_i) = \frac{v_{i,h}}{G_i} \frac{\partial G_i}{\partial v_{i,h}},$$

$$h \in K, \qquad (A5)$$

(McFadden 1978; Resnick and Roy 1990). The common knowledge probabilities for  $i \in E_k$  are

$$\bar{\mu}_{k,h} \equiv \Pr(Y_i = h \mid i \in E_k, \bar{H}_{i,D} = \bar{H}_{i,R} = \bar{H}, \bar{V}_{i,A} = \bar{V})$$

$$= \int_{\mathcal{Z}} \mu_{i,h} df_k(Z_i), \qquad h \in K. \tag{A6}$$

Using  $\bar{\mu}_{k,h}$ , the proportions of electors expected to vote for Republican and Democratic candidates given only the common knowledge are  $\bar{R} = N^{-1} \sum_{k=1}^{M} M_k \bar{\mu}_{k,R}$  and  $\bar{D} = N^{-1} \sum_{k=1}^{M} M_k \bar{\mu}_{k,D}$ . An argument similar to Mebane's (2000) Theorem 2 proves the existence of a fixed point  $(\bar{H}, \bar{V})$ .  $\bar{\mu}_{k,h}$  denotes  $\bar{\mu}_{k,h}$  for k such that  $i \in E_k$ . Theorem 1 holds when N and each  $M_k$  are large. Proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 of Mebane (2000).

When a candidate runs unopposed, we assume that each elector in the affected district uses the strategy defined by (A3), except conditioning on the pair of choices that are available. Elector i conditions on the choice set  $\{D, A\}$  if a Democrat is running unopposed and on  $\{R, A\}$  if a Republican is running unopposed. The respective choice probabilities are

$$\mu_{i,h|\{D,A\}} \equiv \Pr(Y_i = h \mid \bar{H}_{i,D}, \bar{V}_{i,A}, Z_i, K = \{D, A\})$$

$$= \begin{cases} \frac{\mu_{i,A}}{\mu_{i,A} + \mu_{i,D}}, & h = A, \\ \frac{\mu_{i,D}}{\mu_{i,A} + \mu_{i,D}}, & h = D, \\ 0, & h = R, \end{cases}$$

$$\mu_{i,h|\{R,A\}} \equiv \Pr(Y_i = h \mid \bar{H}_{i,R}, \bar{V}_{i,A}, Z_i, K = \{R, A\})$$

$$= \begin{cases} \frac{\mu_{i,A}}{\mu_{i,A} + \mu_{i,R}}, & h = A, \\ \frac{\mu_{i,R}}{\mu_{i,A} + \mu_{i,R}}, & h = R, \\ 0, & h = D \end{cases}$$

where  $\mu_{i,h}$  is defined by (A5). Integrating over unknown data as in (A6), it is straightforward to redefine  $\bar{R}$  and  $\bar{D}$  and characterize equilibrium as in Theorem 1, with only minor changes.

### **Survey Data Model Details**

Given  $Z_i$  and parameter values, we use (A5) to compute choice probabilities  $\hat{\mu}_{i,\hat{n}}$ . Let  $S_{\{D,R,A\}}$  denote the subsample in districts with a fully contested race,  $S_{\{D,A\}}$  the subsample with an unopposed Democrat, and  $S_{\{R,A\}}$  the subsample with an unopposed Republican. Given sampling weights  $1/\zeta_i$  and values  $\hat{\mu}_{i,h}$ , we compute

$$\hat{R} = \left(\sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_{[D,R,A]}} \frac{\hat{\mu}_{i,R}}{\zeta_i} + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_{[R,A]}} \frac{\hat{\mu}_{i,R[\{R,A]}}{\zeta_i}\right) / \left(\sum_{i=1}^n 1/\zeta_i\right),$$

$$\hat{D} = \left(\sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_{[D,R,A]}} \frac{\hat{\mu}_{i,D}}{\zeta_i} + \sum_{i \in \mathcal{S}_{[D,A]}} \frac{\hat{\mu}_{i,D[\{D,A]}}{\zeta_i}\right) / \left(\sum_{i=1}^n 1/\zeta_i\right)$$

$$\hat{V} = \hat{R} + \hat{D}, \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{H} = \hat{R}/\hat{V}.$$

In (2a)–(2c),  $b_C$  equals  $N^{-1}$  divided by the standard deviation of the elements of the unstandardized GEV disturbance.<sup>37</sup> We reparameterize (A4) to decrease the correlation between the estimate  $\hat{\tau}$  and the estimates of the parameters of  $x_{i,D}$  and  $x_{i,R}$ :<sup>38</sup>

$$G_i = (v_{i,D} + v_{i,R})^{1-\tau} + v_{i,A}, \qquad 0 \le \tau < 1.$$
 (A7)

Given  $T \ge 1$  samples  $S_t$  with subsets  $S_{\{D,R,A\}t}$ ,  $S_{\{D,A\}t}$ , and  $S_{\{R,A\}t}$ , the log-likelihood function is

Because  $\vec{H}_{i,R}$ ,  $-\vec{H}_{i,D} = (N\vec{V}_{i,V})^{-1} > 0$  and  $N\vec{V}_{i,V}$  is large,  $\lambda_{i,R} - \lambda_{i,D} = (\vec{H}_{i,R} - \vec{H}_{i,D})(\lambda_{i,R} - \lambda_{i,D})/(\vec{H}_{i,R} - \vec{H}_{i,D}) \approx (N\vec{V}_{i,V})^{-1}d\lambda_i/d\vec{H}_i$ . The other two approximations follow from  $\vec{H}_{i,R} - \vec{H}_{i,A} = (1 - \vec{H}_{i,R})/(N\vec{V}_{i,A})$  and  $\vec{H}_{i,D} - \vec{H}_{i,A} = -\vec{H}_{i,D}/(N\vec{V}_{i,A})$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> NES survey respondents may overreport the frequency with which they vote. Slight inflation in  $\hat{V}$  should induce slight inflation in  $\hat{b}_C$ , via the ratio  $\hat{b}_C/\hat{V}$ .

 $b_C$ , via the ratio  $b_C/\hat{V}$ .

38 Using (A4), correlations between  $\hat{\tau}$  and parameter estimates in  $z_{i,D}$  and  $z_{i,R}$  approach -1 as  $\tau \to 1$  for parameters that have positive values and 1 for parameters that are negative.

$$L = \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left( \sum_{t \in S_{[D,R,A]t}} \sum_{h \in K} y_{i,h} \log \mu_{i,h} + \sum_{i \in S_{[D,A]t}} \sum_{h \in [D,A]} y_{i,h} \log \mu_{i,h|\{D,A\}} + \sum_{t \in S_{[R,A]t}} \sum_{h \in [R,A]} y_{i,h} \log \mu_{i,h|\{R,A\}} \right),$$

$$(A8)$$

where  $y_{i,h} = 1$  if  $Y_i = h$  and  $y_{i,h} = 0$  if  $Y_i \neq h$ ,  $h \in K$ . The estimation algorithm is similar to that of Mebane (2000), with each year's  $(\hat{H}, \hat{V})$  values recomputed at each iteration. If the model is correct and a stability condition (Mebane 2000, 43–4) is satisfied, the algorithm converges to parameter estimates and  $(\hat{H}, \hat{V})$  values that characterize the choices electors make in equilibrium.

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# Political Regimes and International Trade: The Democratic Difference Revisited

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And the aggregate trade barriers agreed upon by a democratic pair lower than those by a pair composed of a democracy and an autocracy? I revisit these important questions by highlighting some problematic aspect of the analysis by Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2000). Contrary to their central conclusion, I find that whether the aggregate trade barriers are lower for a democratic pair than those for a mixed pair depends on the preferences of the decision makers involved. Thus, although domestic political institutions are important, they alone are insufficient to predict a higher level of cooperation among democracies.

trade policy? In particular, are groups of democracies better able to liberalize trade than groups of autocracies or groups composed of both democracies and autocracies? To address these questions, Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2000) analyze a take-it-or-leave-it (TILI) bargaining game, in which they compare the aggregate trade barriers agreed upon by democratic pairs with those by autocratic pairs and by mixed pairs.

To distinguish democracies from autocracies, Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2000) (hereafter MMR) argue that the chief executive in a democracy needs the approval of a legislative majority to enact a trade policy, while an autocrat does not. MMR accordingly solve the TILI games played by democratic pairs, by autocratic pairs, and by mixed pairs. Their central proposition is that, due to the institutional difference between democracies and autocracies, democratic pairs tend to agree upon lower trade barriers than mixed pairs regardless of the preferences of the decision makers.

I highlight some problematic aspect of MMR's analysis. When considering a TILI offer to a democracy (by either a democracy or an autocracy), MMR's solution is not optimal for the executive making the offer. I revise MMR's solutions for the TILI offers made to democracies and, accordingly, recalculate the aggregate trade barriers within democratic pairs, within autocratic pairs, and between a democracy and an autocracy. I find that the aggregate trade barriers within democratic pairs are always higher than what MMR predict. Accordingly, whether the aggregate trade barriers are lower for democratic pairs than those for mixed pairs depends on the preferences of the decision makers involved. This result contrasts with MMR's central proposition that, regardless of the preferences of the decision makers, democracies agree upon lower trade barriers than mixed pairs.

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I begin by summarizing the setup of the MMR model. I then explain how MMR's solutions for TILI offers to democracies are not best replies and I provide alternative solutions. Based on these solutions, I recalculate the aggregate trade barriers and conclude that no clearcut comparison can be drawn without considering the preferences of the decision makers involved.

### **ASSUMPTIONS IN THE MMR MODEL**

MMR consider the setting of trade barriers between two countries, "home" and "foreign." Either country can be an autocracy, with only an executive A, or a democracy, with both an executive P and a legislature C. The notation \* refers to the foreign country. The ideal level of trade barriers at home and abroad for each actor i is denoted  $(t_i, t_i^*)$ . All actors in one country prefer the elimination of trade barriers in the other country; that is,  $t_i^* = 0$  for i = P, C, A, and  $t_i = 0$  for  $i = P^*$ ,  $C^*$ ,  $A^*$ . Each actor's utility function is assumed to be a simple loss function, and thus the actors aim to minimize the distance between the TILI solution  $(t, t^*)$  and their own ideal point  $(t_i, t_i^*)$ .

$$U_i(t, t^*) = -(t - t_i)^2 - t^{*2},$$
  
for  $i = P, A, C$  in the home country; (1)  
 $U_i(t, t^*) = -t^2 - (t^* - t_i^*)^2,$   
for  $i = P^*, C^*, A^*$  in the foreign country.

When there is no trade agreement, each country is free to set the trade barriers in its own country. In an autocracy, the executive sets the level of domestic trade barriers. In a democracy, the legislature is assumed to have the final say on the level of domestic trade barriers. Each actor simply maximizes his or her utility function as in Eqs. (1) and (1\*). The no-agreement equilibria are  $N_{AA^*} = (t_A, t_{A^*}^*)$ ,  $N_{DA^*} = (t_C, t_{A^*}^*)$ ,  $N_{A^*D} = (t_{A^*}^*, t_C)$ , and  $N_{DD^*} = (t_C, t_{C^*}^*)$ , respectively.

These no-agreement equilibria are not welfare maximizing. MMR thus consider a perfect information bargaining game in which countries coordinate their trade policies. MMR analyze two bargaining structures. In one, the home country makes a TILI offer to the foreign

country; in the other, the foreign country makes a TILI offer to the home country.

In the TILI game—suppose that the home country is the first mover—the sequence of moves is assumed to be as follows. First, the home executive makes an offer that specifies reduced levels of home and foreign trade barriers. Second, all relevant decision makers either accept the offer or reject it. If all relevant decision makers accept the offer, it becomes policy. If any relevant decision maker rejects the offer, policy remains at the no-agreement point.

Who are the relevant decision makers, after a TILI offer is made? Again, suppose that the home executive makes the TILI offer. If both countries are autocracies. the foreign executive alone decides whether to take the offer or not. If the home country is a democracy and the foreign country an autocracy, then both the home legislature and the foreign executive must decide whether or not to accept the offer. If the home country is an autocracy and the foreign country a democracy, then both the executive and the legislature in the foreign country must decide either to take the offer or to leave it. If both the home and the foreign countries are democracies, then the offer must be acceptable to the foreign executive as well as the two legislatures to avoid a trade war. All decision makers are assumed never to take any dominated strategy.

MMR further assume that the structure of preferences in countries with similar political regimes is symmetric. That is,  $t_A = t_{A^*}^*$ ,  $t_P = t_{P^*}^*$ , and  $t_C = t_{C^*}^*$ . Furthermore, in a democracy, the legislature is assumed to be more protectionist than the executive, i.e.,  $t_P < t_C$  and  $t_{P^*}^* < t_{C^*}^*$ .


# SOLUTIONS FOR TILI OFFERS TO DEMOCRACIES

MMR's solution for a TILI offer to a democracy is not the optimal strategy for the executive making the offer. MMR's Figures 2 and 3, reproduced here as Figures 1 and 2, illustrate their key solutions. In these figures,  $I_C$ ,  $I_C$ ,  $I_A$ , and  $I_{A^*}$  are the indifference curves through the no-agreement points for actors C,  $C^*$ , A, and  $A^*$ , while  $I_P$  and  $I_{P^*}$  are the indifference curves through the no-agreement points for actors P and  $P^*$ .

In Figure 1, when the home democratic executive P makes a TILI offer to the foreign autocracy, MMR identify the optimal solutions. However, when the foreign autocrat  $A^*$  makes a TILI offer to the home democracy, MMR's solution  $m^*$  is not optimal for the foreign autocrat. Rather, a TILI offer at  $M^*$  maximizes the utility of the foreign autocrat. Explanations follow.

Because both the home executive P and the home legislature C can veto an offer, an acceptable offer must lie within the win set formed by the indifference curves


FIGURE 1. Trade Barriers Set by an Autocracy and a Democracy. (A) A protectionist autocracy: I<sub>A\*</sub> binds. (B) A moderate autocracy. (C) A liberal autocracy: I<sub>C</sub> binds.



 $I_P$  and  $I_C$  through the no-agreement point  $N_{DA^*}$ . The optimal strategy for the foreign autocrat  $A^*$  is thus to propose the point in the win set closest to his or her own ideal point  $(0, t_{A^*}^*)$ . This point is  $M^*$ , not  $m^*$ . At point  $M^*$ , the binding indifference curve  $I_C$  is tangent to the foreign autocrat's indifference curve through  $M^*$ . Thus the distance from  $M^*$  to the foreign executive's ideal point  $(0, t_{A^*}^*)$  is smaller than that from any other point in the win set (including point  $m^*$ ) to  $(0, t_{A^*}^*)$ . In other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> To prove their propositions, MMR also require that  $t_C > 2t_P$  and  $t_{C^*}^* > 2t_{P^*}^*$ . I keep all their assumptions except these, because they are more constraining than necessary. Note, just the same, that the fact that my conclusion differs from MMR's cannot be attributed to the relaxation of these assumptions. It is, rather, due to a mistake in MMR that I identify in the next section.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Graphically,  $m^*$  is outside of the circle going through  $M^*$  with  $(0, t_{A^*}^*)$  as the center. Thus the distance from  $m^*$  to  $(0, t_{A^*}^*)$  is longer than the radius, which is the distance from  $M^*$  to  $(0, t_{A^*}^*)$ .



words, a rational foreign autocrat can achieve a higher utility by proposing  $M^*$  rather than MMR's solution  $m^*$ . Note also that a TILI offer at  $M^*$  is acceptable to both the home executive and the home legislature, for it provides both higher utilities than would no agreement.

Likewise, MMR's solution for the TILI offer from a democracy to a democracy is not optimal for the democratic executive making the offer. In Figure 2, MMR's solutions d and  $d^*$  for the TILI offers between democracies are both suboptimal for the executives making the offers, because alternative TILI offers at D and  $D^*$  actually maximize the executives' utilities.

In sum, MMR's solutions d and  $d^*$  in Figure 2 as well as  $m^*$  in Figure 1 are not best replies to the executive's and legislature's strategies of accepting any offer that gives at least as much as the status quo. A rational executive making the TILI offer to a democracy is in fact better off proposing D,  $D^*$ , and  $M^*$ , respectively. Furthermore, the latter revised solutions will be accepted because all actors fare at least as well with them as with no agreement.

#### TRADE BARRIER COMPARISONS

How does this revision affect the main result in MMR? The most striking result in MMR is that, although the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for the autocratic pair and those for either the democratic or the mixed pair depends on the preferences of the decision makers, the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair and those for the mixed pair does not. In contrast, I find that the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair and those for the mixed pair also depends on the preferences of the decision makers. That is, when the problematic aspect of MMR's analysis is revised, their central proposition—that aggregate trade

barriers are lower within democratic pairs than within mixed pairs—no longer holds.


PROPOSITION. Under TILI, whether the aggregate trade barriers are lower for the democratic pair than those for the mixed pair depends on the preferences of the decision makers involved.

Figure 3 intuitively shows why this is the case. D and  $D^*$  mark the TILI solutions for two democracies.  $M_{prot}$ ,  $M_{mod}$ , and  $M_{lib}$  mark the solutions when a home democracy makes a TILI offer to a protectionist, a moderate, and a liberal foreign autocracy.  $M_{prot}^*$ ,  $M_{mod}^*$ , and  $M_{lib}^*$ mark the solutions when a protectionist, a moderate, and a liberal foreign autocracy make a TILI offer to a home democracy. Clearly, the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair at  $D^*$  are lower than those for the mixed pair at  $\hat{M}_{prot}^*$ , because  $t + t^*$  at  $D^* < t + t^*$  at  $M_{prot}^*$ . On the other hand, the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair at D are higher than those for the mixed pair at  $M_{mcd}$ , because  $t + t^*$  at  $D > t + t^* = t_P$ at  $M_{mod}$ . In short, the aggregate trade barriers for a democratic dyad are sometimes lower but sometimes higher than those for a mixed pair.

The reason that this result differs from MMR's central proposition is as follows. Because the legislature is assumed to be more protectionist than the executive in a democracy, the optimal solution for the TILI offer made to a democracy lies on the contract curve between the executive making the offer and the legislature (not the executive) in the democracy receiving the offer. By stipulating, instead, that the TILI solution be on the contract curve between the two executives, MMR understimate the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair invariably to be  $t_P$ . As I show in Lemma 2, the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair at either D or  $D^*$  are always higher than  $t_P$ .

I present a proof in the Appendix. Propositions 1 and 2 correspond to Propositions 1 and 2 in MMR's Appendix. These propositions compare the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair and those for the mixed pair, with a home offer and a foreign offer, respectively. For both bargaining structures I identify the conditions under which the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair are higher than those for the mixed pair, and the conditions vice versa.

In Proposition 1, I compare the aggregate trade barriers reached by a pair of countries in two situations: when a home democracy makes a TILI offer to a foreign democracy (democratic pair) and when a home democracy makes a TILI offer to a foreign autocracy (mixed pair). I find that, only when the autocrat is either extremely protectionist (i.e.,  $t_{A^{\bullet}}^* \geq t_C$ ) or extremely liberal (i.e.,  $t_{A^{\bullet}}^* \leq [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ ) are the aggregate trade barriers for the mixed pair as high as or higher than those for the democratic pair. Under all other conditions (i.e.,  $t_C > t_{A^{\bullet}}^* > [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ ), including when the autocrat is moderately protectionist, moderate, or moderately liberal, the aggregate trade



barriers for the democratic pair are actually higher than those for the mixed pair.

In Proposition 2, I compare the aggregate trade barriers reached by a pair of countries in the following two situations: when a foreign democracy makes a TILI offer to a home democracy (democratic pair) and when a foreign autocracy makes a TILI offer to a home democracy (mixed pair). The results are the following. When the autocrat is more protectionist than the democratic executive, the aggregate trade barriers for the mixed pair are higher than those for the democratic pair. However, when the autocrat is less protectionist than the democratic executive, the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair can be higher than those for the mixed pair.

Therefore, it is incorrect that "[a] democracy lowers its trade barriers more when it seeks mutually acceptable concessions with another democracy than when it deals with an autocracy, no matter what the relative preferences of the two leaders" (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000, 310). As in Figure 3, the home democratic executive proposes D to a foreign democracy but  $M_{prot}$  to a protectionist autocracy. In this case, the trade barriers for the home democracy are lower at  $M_{prot}$  with a foreign autocracy than at D with a foreign democracy. As the foreign autocracy gets more protectionist, the home democracy must lower its trade barriers even more in order to achieve a trade agreement. The preferences of the decision makers thus matter. Similarly, it is not true that "a protectionist legislature forces democracies to lower their trade barriers more than otherwise" (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000, 311). Assuming for a moment that two democratic executives bargain as if they were autocrats without protectionist legislatures, then the level of aggregate trade barriers they can agree on is  $t_P$ , which is always lower than the actual trade barriers between two democracies with protectionist legislatures.

Of course, the protectionist legislature matters. For instance, it enables a democracy to resist the pressure to overcompromise and thus enables it to get more favorable deals. This is consistent with the key insight in the two-level games (Putnam 1988) where domestic constraints can be beneficial in international bargaining.

In general, democracies can extract better deals with autocracies than autocracies can with democracies. As in Figure 3, when the home democratic executive makes a TILI offer to the foreign autocrat, the home democracy can drive the foreign trade barriers very low. In fact, except when the foreign autocrat is sufficiently protectionist that his or her indifference curve through the no-agreement point binds, the level of foreign trade barriers is  $t^* = 0$ . Of course, this has to do with the first-move advantage, but there is more to it. When the foreign autocracy has the first-move advantage, it does not fare nearly as well. In fact, the foreign autocrat must compromise sufficiently for not only the home democratic executive but also the home democratic legislature to accept an offer. As the foreign autocrat gets less protectionist, the offer he or she makes is more favorable to the home democracy.

This democratic advantage in the sense of extracting favorable deals can also be understood from another perspective. Compare  $M_{mod}^*$  and  $D^*$ , as in Figure 3, the TILI offer from the foreign moderate autocracy to the home democracy and the TILI offer from the foreign democracy to the home democracy. The former is much more compromising than the latter, because the existence of a protectionist legislature in the foreign democracy prevents it from over compromising.

The ability of a protectionist legislature to extract favorable deals, however, does not mean that the aggregate trade barriers for a democratic pair are necessarily lower than those for a mixed pair. Simply compare  $M_{mod}$  with D, as in Figure 3, the TILI offer from a home democracy to a foreign moderate autocracy and the TILI offer from a home democracy to a foreign democracy. Given certain preferences, the home democracy can much more effectively drive down the trade barriers of the foreign autocracy than those of the foreign democracy. At times, the home democracy can drive the foreign autocracy's trade barriers so low that their joint trade barriers are lower than what two democracies can agree upon. The comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for democracies and for mixed pairs is thus sensitive to preferences.

Also contingent on perferences are the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers between the autocratic pair and the democratic pair as well as the comparison between the autocratic pair and the mixed pair, as MMR acknowledge. My Proposition 3 differs from the corresponding result of MMR in that the autocrats can be more protectionist than the democratic executives, up to a certain level, before the level of the aggregate trade barriers for the autocrats exceeds that for the democrats. In particular, when the autocrats are as protectionist as the democratic executives, the aggregate trade barriers for the autocrats are lower than those for the democrats. Compared to the corresponding result in MMR, Proposition 4 holds that, for a wider range of preferences, the aggregate trade barriers for the autocratic pair are lower than those for the mixed pair.

MMR also explore whether a more or less divided government affects the level of trade barriers among democracies. Contrary to MMR, I find that the trade barriers within a democratic pair depend on the preferences of the legislatures.

In sum, given the current setup of the model, regime types do exert an important influence on the level of trade barriers negotiated internationally. But regime types alone are insufficient to claim that pairs of democracies should trade more freely than mixed pairs regardles of preferences. Just as the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for autocratic pairs and those for either democratic or mixed pairs is inconclusive, the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for democratic pairs and those for mixed pairs, too, depends on the preferences of the decision makers.

#### CONCLUSION

The central proposition derived by Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff (2000) from a TILI bargaining model is

striking. Regardless of the preferences of the decision makers, pairs of democracies tend to agree upon lower trade barriers than pairs comprised of a democracy and an autocracy. My analysis shows that the important impact that MMR identify regarding the institutional arrangements also depends on the preferences of the political leaders within these institutions. Specifically, whether the aggregate trade barriers are lower for a democratic pair than for a mixed pair depends on the preferences of the decision makers, just as the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for the autocratic pair and for either the democratic or the mixed pair.<sup>3</sup>

This reformulation contributes to the fascinating debate on "democratic difference," which is emerging from the sprawling literature on democratic peace. Although the theme of a "democratic difference" is increasingly being extended to a wide range of issue areas beyond international security, it is in some cases being sharply contested; for some interesting studies, see those by Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares (1998), Gowa (1999), Busch (2000), and Reinhardt (2000) on trade, Simmons (2000) on monetary commitments, Raustiala and Victor (1998) on environmental policies, and Slaughter (1995) and Alvarez (2001) on international law. The implication of this study is that domestic political institutions are important, but they alone are insufficient to predict a higher level of cooperation among democracies. To predict the impact of political institutions, it is also important to understand the preferences that go into the institutions.

#### **APPENDIX**

Here I list my results that differ from MMR's. Each corresponds to the result in MMR's Appendix with the same label. More detailed proofs can be obtained directly from the author.

LEMMA 2. When the home democracy makes a TILI offer to the foreign democracy, the agreement point is  $(t_C t_P / \sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}, t_C - t_C^2 / \sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2})$ , and the aggregate trade barriers are  $t_C - [(t_C - t_P) / \sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ . Furthermore, the level of the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair is higher than what MMR predict, i.e.,  $t_C - [(t_C - t_P) / \sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C > t_P$ .

*Proof.* In Figure 3, the home democratic executive P makes a TILI offer at D to the foreign democracy. To solve for the levels of trade barriers at D, we solve  $U_{C^*}(t,t^*)=U_{C^*}(t_C,t_{C^*}^*)$ , given  $t^*=-t(t_{C^*}^*/t_P)+t_{C^*}^*$ , and t,  $t^*\geq 0$ . Given  $t_P=t_{P^*}^*$  and  $t_C=t_{C^*}^*$ , we get the solution above. Note that  $t_C-[(t_C-t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2+t_P^2}]t_C>t_P$ , given  $t_C>t_P$ .  $\square$ 

PROPOSITION 1. Under TILI (when home makes the offer), the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair and those for the mixed pair depends on the preferences of the decision makers involved. Except for extreme

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> MMR also provide an empirical test for their central proposition. The present paper does not directly address their test. Rather, it only demonstrates that the proposition that they support empirically does not hold analytically given their specified model.

cases, the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair are higher than those for the mixed pair.

Proof. Let  $B^D$  and  $B^M$  denote the aggregate barriers for the democratic pair and the mixed pair, respectively. With a home offer, from Lemma 2,  $B^D = t_C - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ ; and from MMR's Lemma 3,  $B^M = t_A^* - [(t_A^* - t_P)/\sqrt{t_A^{**} + t_P^2}]t_C$  if  $t_C^2 - t_P^2 < t_A^{**}$ ,  $B^M = t_P$  if  $t_C^2 - t_P^2 \ge t_A^{**} \ge (t_C - t_P)^2$ , and  $B^M = t_C - t_A^*$ , if  $t_A^{**} < (t_C - t_P)^2$ .

(1) If  $t_C^2 - t_P^2 < t_A^{**}$ ,  $B^D - B^M = t_C - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C - t_A^* + [(t_A^* - t_P)/\sqrt{t_A^{**} + t_P^2}]t_C$ . There are two cases. When  $t_A^* \ge t_C$ , and accordingly  $t_A^* > t_P$ , then  $t_A^* \ge t_C$ , and from  $t_C^2 - t_P^2 < t_A^{**}$  we have  $t_C < \sqrt{t_A^{**} + t_P^2}$ , then  $t_A^* > t_C$ .

(2) If  $t_C^2 - t_P^2 \ge t_{A^*}^{*2} \ge (t_C - t_P)^2$ , then  $B^D - B^M = t_C - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C - t_P > 0$ .

(3) If  $t_{A^*}^{*2} < (t_C - t_P)^2$ ,  $B^D - B^M = t_C - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]$   $t_C - t_C + t_{A^*}^*$ . There are again two possibilities. When  $t_{A^*}^* > [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ , then  $B^D - B^M > 0$ . When  $t_{A^*}^* \le [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ , then  $B^D - B^M \le 0$ .

PROPOSITION 2. Under TILI (when foreign makes the offer), the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for the democratic pair and those for the mixed pair again depends on the preferences of the decision makers involved.

*Proof.* We first calculate  $B^D$  and  $B^M$ , respectively. Then we compare them.

Part 1. When the foreign democracy makes a TILI offer to the home democracy, the agreement point is  $(t_C - t_C^2/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}, t_C t_P/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2})$ , and the aggregate trade barriers are  $B^D = t_C - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ .

As in Figure 3, the solution with the foreign offer is at point  $D^*$ . The trade barriers for home and foreign at  $D^*$  are reversed from those at D. By Lemma 2, this yields the result as in Part 1.

Part 2. When the foreign autocracy makes a TILI offer to the home democracy, the agreement point is  $(t_C - t_C t_{A^*}^* / \sqrt{t_C^2 + t_{A^*}^{*2}}, t_{A^*}^{*2} / \sqrt{t_C^2 + t_{A^*}^{*2}})$ , and the aggregate trade barriers are  $B^M = t_C - [(t_C - t_{A^*}^*) / \sqrt{t_C^2 + t_{A^*}^{*2}}]t_{A^*}^*$ .

As in Figures 2A–C, to solve for the levels of trade barriers at  $M^*$ , we solve  $U_C(t,t^*)=U_C(t_C,t^*_{A^*})$ , given that  $t^*=-t(t^*_{A^*}/t_C)+t^*_{A^*}$ , and  $t,t^*\geq 0$ . This yields the result as in Part 2

Part 3. With  $B^D$  and  $B^M$  both solved,  $B^D - B^M = [(t_C - t_{A^*}^*)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_{A^*}^{*2}}]t_{A^*}^* - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ . First, suppose that  $t_{A^*}^* \ge t_P$ . Accordingly,  $[(t_C - t_{A^*}^*)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ .

First, suppose that  $t_{A^*}^* \ge t_P$ . Accordingly,  $[(t_C - t_{A^*}^*)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_{A^*}^{*2}}]t_{A^*}^* \le \sqrt{\frac{1}{2}}(t_C - t_{A^*}^*)$ . Furthermore,  $t_P < t_C \Longrightarrow [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C < -\sqrt{\frac{1}{2}}(t_C - t_P)$ . Therefore,  $B^D - B^M < 0$ .

Second, suppose that  $t_{A^*}^* < t_P$ . The sign of  $B^D - B^M$  is indeterminant. It is possible that  $B^D > B^M$ , when the democratic executive gets sufficiently protectionist and/or the autocrat gets sufficiently liberal. For an example, let  $t_{A^*}^* = 5$ ,  $t_P = 10$ , and  $t_C = 13$ ; then  $B^D - B^M = 0.49 > 0$ .

PROPOSITION 3. Under TILI (regardless of foreign or home offer), the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for the autocratic dyad and those for the democratic dyad depends on the preferences of the decision makers involved. When

the autocrats are equally protectionist as the democratic executives, the aggregate trade barriers for the autocrats are lower than those for the democrats.

Proof. Let  $B^D$  and  $B^A$  denote the aggregate barriers for the democratic dyad and the autocratic dyad, respectively. From Lemma 2 and Proposition 2,  $B^D = t_C - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ . Given that  $t_A = t_A^*$ , it is straightforward that  $B^A = t_A$  as in MMR's Figure 1. Formally,  $B^A \leq B^D \iff t_A \leq t_C - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ . Note that  $t_P < t_C - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C$ . It is thus possible that  $t_A \in (t_P, t_C - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]t_C)$ . That is,  $B^A < B^D$  for some  $t_A > t_P$ . In particular, when  $t_A = t_P$ ,  $B^A < B^D$ .

COROLLARY. The aggregate trade barriers for the democratic dyad change as the legislatures become more (or less) protectionist.

*Proof.* By Proposition 2,  $B^D = t_C - [(t_C - t_P)/\sqrt{t_C^2 + t_P^2}]$   $t_C$ .  $B^D$  is a function of  $t_C$  and depends on  $t_C$ .

Proposition 4. Under TILI, the comparison of the aggregate trade barriers for the autocratic pair and those for the mixed pair depends on the preferences of the decision makers involved.

*Proof.* From Proposition 3,  $B^A=t_{A^*}^*$ . When a home democracy makes a TILI offer to a foreign autocracy, from MMR's Lemma 3,  $B^M=t_{A^*}^*-[(t_{A^*}^*-t_P)/\sqrt{t_{A^*}^{*2}+t_P^2}]t_C$ , if  $t_C^2-t_P^2< t_{A^*}^{*2}$ ,  $B^M=t_P$  if  $t_C^2-t_P^2\geq t_{A^*}^{*2}\geq (t_C-t_P)^2$ , and  $B^M=t_C-t_{A^*}^*$  if  $t_{A^*}^{*2}< (t_C-t_P)^2$ . When the foreign autocracy makes a TILI offer to the home democracy, by Proposition 2,  $B^M=t_C-[(t_C-t_{A^*}^*)/\sqrt{t_C^2+t_{A^*}^{*2}}]t_{A^*}^*$ .

Part 1. With a home offer,  $B^A \leq B^M \iff t_{A^*}^* \leq t_P$ , if either  $t_C^2 - t_P^2 < t_{A^*}^{*2}$  or  $t_C^2 - t_P^2 \geq t_{A^*}^{*2} \geq (t_C - t_P)^2$ , and  $B^A \leq B^M \iff 2t_{A^*}^* \leq t_C$  if  $t_{A^*}^{*2} < (t_C - t_P)^2$ . This contrasts with MMR's corresponding result that  $B^A - B^M \leq 0 \iff 2t_{A^*}^* \leq t_C$ , which is sufficient but not necessary.

Part 2. With a foreign offer,  $B^A \leq B^M \iff t_{A^*}^* \leq t_C$ . This differs from MMR's corresponding result that  $B^A \leq B^M \iff t_{A^*}^* \leq t_C - t_p$ , which is again sufficient but not necessary.

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# Replication, Realism, and Robustness: Analyzing Political Regimes and International Trade

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ur earlier article established that pairs of democracies trade more freely than country-pairs composed of a democracy and an autocracy (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000). Xinyuan Dai (2002) incorrectly asserts that our conclusion depends on the preferences of the decision makers who formulate trade policy. We show that Dai fails to accurately replicate our model, and hence erroneously claims that the new equilibria she deduces are consistent with it. In addition, we demonstrate that in altering one of our assumptions, Dai offers a model that is less realistic as well as inconsistent with the substantive literature on international bargaining. Finally, we question the robustness of her approach. Due to these problems of replication, realism, and robustness, we conclude that Dai's model is of limited utility.

ur article established that pairs of democracies trade more freely than (mixed) country pairs composed of a democracy and an autocracy (Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2000; hereafter MMR). Xinyuan Dai (2002) asserts that our conclusion depends on the preferences of the decision makers who formulate trade policy. Dai is incorrect. Her results differ from ours solely because she has changed a key assumption of the model. Given the stated assumptions of our model, each player's behavior in equilibrium is optimal and is a best reply.

It is often useful to debate the merits of a model's assumptions, and it is not surprising that altering the assumptions can affect a model's results. Dai, however, ignores one of our explicitly stated assumptions and fails to acknowledge that her results differ from ours as a consequence. Moreover, she never touches upon the relative merits of her assumption. But when choosing a modeling strategy, it is important to be attentive to the assumptions one uses, preferring those that are more realistic and result in more general conclusions. Dai's model suffers from serious problems in this regard, particularly because of its unrealistic assumptions about international economic negotiations. Furthermore, Dai offers no evidence about the robustness of her claims in contrast to our model. Finally, the empirical record lends greater support to our argument than Dai's, since we found strong evidence that democratic pairs have had more open trade relations than mixed pairs, irrespective of policy makers' preferences.

In the following sections, we elaborate on these problems of replication, realism, and robustness. First, we show that Dai fails to replicate our model faithfully and hence erroneously claims that the new equilibria she deduces are consistent with it. Second, we show that altering our assumption as Dai does yields a model that is less realistic and less consistent with the substantive literature on international bargaining. Third, we question the robustness of her approach. We conclude that her model is of limited utility. Not only does our model capture an important element of international economic negotiations missing in Dai's approach, but

also it yields results that are robust and have empirical support.

#### CHANGING A KEY ASSUMPTION


Dai begins by attempting to replicate our model. Her effort, however, is seriously flawed because she fails to adopt one of our stated assumptions. Consequently, she produces a different model with some new equilibria that are inconsistent with our original approach.

Our purpose was to investigate the effects of regime type on international trade negotiations, conceived of as a "two-level game." In such situations, the international negotiators strike an agreement that may, depending on the nature of the regime, require domestic ratification before it can be implemented. As a first cut, we employed a take-it-or-leave-it (TILI) bargaining structure (which was relaxed later in the article) in which either the home or the foreign executive makes an offer that must be accepted or rejected by the other executive. Once accepted, and if necessary, the offer is brought home for domestic ratification by a player we called the legislature. If rejected, the players adopt their noncooperative Nash strategies. The preferences of the players are common knowledge and there is no private information.

The extensive form of our game was explicit. We specifically limited the action spaces of the international negotiators by assumption. Since the actors' indifference curves are circles around their ideal points, the Pareto frontier for the internatinal negotiators (i.e., the executives) is the straight line between their ideal points in tariff space (the straight line  $t_{p*}^*t_P$  in Figure 1 in the case of two democracies). In each game that we studied, the TILI offer must—by assumption—lie on the contract curve between the ideal points of the international negotiators. Dai, in contrast, makes no such assumption and so permits the action space to be the entire quadrant in (home and foreign) tariff space.

It is difficult to understand how there could be any confusion about our assumptions. In describing the

FIGURE 1. The Equilibria and the Pareto Frontier Between the International Negotiators



TILI game, we explicitly stated that "we require that the international negotiators choose a ratifiable offer that lies on their Pareto frontier when such an agreement exists" (MMR, 308, fn. 9; emphasis added). We reiterated this point in our discussion of negotiations between a democratic executive, P, and a foreign autocrat.  $A^*$ : "Recall that P is required to offer to  $A^*$  a point on their Pareto frontier" (MMR 310, fn. 11; emphasis added). In the Appendix, the assumption was given high prominence throughout. Indeed, we began the section on "The TILI Game with Home Offers" by reminding the reader that "we require the home executive to offer the foreign executive an agreement that lies on their Pareto frontier" (MMR, 319). The assumption is also referred to elsewhere in the article (e.g., p. 311, fn. 13, and p. 319).

Given our assumptions, all of our conclusions follow logically. Dai is incorrect in asserting that our "solution is not optimal for the executive making the offer" (e.g., Dai 2002, 159-61) and that they "are not best replies" (Dai 2002, 160-1). Given the stated assumptions in our model, each player's behavior in equilibrium is optimal and is a best reply. Dai's results, however, do not follow from the model we presented. In Figure 1 (which is drawn for a pair of democracies and for a mixed pair composed of a democracy and an autocracy with moderate trade policy preferences), we show this point graphically. The bargaining outcomes in our model must, by assumption, lie on the Pareto frontier between the international negotiators—i.e., either on the line  $t_P^* t_P$  in the case of the democratic pair or on  $t_{A^*}^*t_P$  in the case of the mixed pair. The equilibrium strategy of any executive making a proposal must be the element of the action space lying on this Pareto frontier that maximizes that player's expected utility. The TILI offer for each player, as indicated in our article, is optimal for the executive making the offer under the conditions specified and is indicated by  $d, d^*$ ,  $m, m^*$ , or  $t_P$  in Figure 1 (depending on the case and the identity of the proposer).

Dai, however, ignores our assumption. Consequently, the outcomes that emerge from her approach—i.e.,  $M^*$ , D,  $D^*$ —lie off the Pareto frontier of the executives. At  $M^*$ , D, or  $D^*$ , it is as if the foreign executive has bypassed the international negotiation entirely and bargained solely with the other country's legislature. These are not equilibrium outcomes in our model. Furthermore, as we indicate in the next section, the behavior that would generate such equilibria is at odds with the usual construction of a "two-level game."

In fact, Dai (2002, 161) acknowledges the accuracy of our results when our assumptions are used. She simply chooses to disregard our assumption that the offer must lie on the Pareto frontier between the international negotiators. It is therefore important to consider whether our assumption is reasonable. Dai offers no explicit discussion of this issue, perhaps because our assumption is more defensible than hers.

# **MODELING A TWO-LEVEL GAME**

Our model derives from an attempt to present parsimoniously but realistically the complex bargaining among domestic and foreign actors that is central to the literature on two-level games. These games posit two, sequential negotiating phases; hence their name. The first phase involves bargaining between the home and the foreign executives to arrive at an international agreement. The second phase requires ratification of the agreement by domestic actors if the country is a democracy. Such international bargaining implies that both executives influence the agreement. We could have modeled a full-fledged bargaining game at the international stage, complete with offers and counteroffers. In the interests of simplicity and parsimony, however, we reduced the bargaining structure to this modified TILI game in which one executive makes an offer drawn from the set of Pareto efficient agreements. Hence while the executive making the offer has most of the "bargaining power," the other executive has some influence on the bargain by virtue of the restriction on the agreement space. Pure TILI is an extreme bargaining structure for international politics since there are no international constitutions or conventions that give one state the right to impose such a framework on its interactions with other states.

By changing our assumption, Dai effectively removes one of the executives from the international stage of the game. This agent has no impact on the trade agreement. In every two-level game of which we are aware, however, the actors involved in making the bargain are the countries' chief executives, not their legislatures (or any other domestic actors). Executives bargain first, and then other domestic actors choose whether to ratify the international agreement. As Putnam (1988, 436) wrote in his seminal article on two-level games, "It is convenient analytically to decompose the process into two stages: 1.) bargaining between the [international] negotiators, leading to a

tentative agreement... 2.) separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement." Such sequential bargaining is similar to that used by other studies of two-level games (e.g., Iida 1993; Mo 1995).

Dai's model is inconsistent with the mainstream literature on two-level games. In most models of this sort, the domestic ratifiers act as a constraint but their preferences do not directly affect the outcome of the international negotiations. Legislatures cannot bargain internationally, and executives, when bargaining with each other, select their most preferred agreement first among all of those that their legislatures would ratify. The two-level nature of the game is eliminated in Dai's model. What remains is effectively a single bargaining game, which at times (i.e., where her results differ from ours) involves only the home legislature and the foreign executive. Dai's approach provides an unrealistic depiction of international economic negotiations, since it is very unusual for foreign leaders to bargain directly with another country's legislature.

# THE CONSEQUENCES OF RELAXING THE ASSUMPTION

The benefits of Dai's change to our assumption are not apparent. Not only does this change degrade the model's realism, but also it reduces the model's generality. Dai admits that her central result is not general and must be qualified by the preferences of the agents. No such qualification is required by our model.

Furthermore, the model presented in our article is robust to alternative bargaining structures. The second part of our model investigated the consequences of relaxing the TILI restriction on the bargaining game. We considered a more realistic bargaining structure where the gains from any agreement were evenly split between the international negotiators (which we denoted the SPLIT game). We showed that our results are robust to this shift in bargaining structure; moreover, our results hold for *any* division of bargaining power among the international negotiators (MMR, 311).

Dai neglects to conduct this robustness check. Moreover, it is far from obvious how to go about doing so given her bargaining structure. Our analysis, on the other hand, yields clear and unqualified predictions independent of the rules governing bargaining between international negotiators.

## **CONCLUSION**

The results of our original model hold regardless of the preferences of countries' chief executives. Contrary to the claims of Dai (2002, 159, 161–3), aggregate trade barriers between democratic pairs are lower than those between mixed pairs. Our assertion that "[a] democracy lowers its trade barriers more when it seeks mutually acceptable concessions with another democracy than when it deals with an autocracy, no matter what the relative preferences of the two leaders" is correct (MMR, 310). Equally correct is our argument that "a protectionist legislature forces democracies to lower their trade barriers more than otherwise" (MMR, 311; Dai 2002, 162). There is no "mistake" in our analysis (Dai, 2002, 160, fn. 1).

Dai has failed to replicate our model and has changed one of its key assumptions. Consequently, it is not surprising that she arrives at different conclusions. Changing this assumption, however, creates serious problems. First, Dai's model is not consistent with either the influential literature on two-level games or the reality of international trade negotiations. In contrast, our model is consistent with this literature and is more faithful to reality than the alternative model that she presents. Second, our model generates results that are robust to variations in the bargaining structure. Dai's model does not. Third, our results are clearly consistent with the data we present. Dai again makes no attempt to show that her model fits the data better than does ours. In sum, then, Dai's model is much less useful than ours for the purpose of explaining how domestic politics influences international trade.

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#### **BOOK REVIEWS**

### **Political Theory**

**The Future of Teledemocracy.** By Ted Becker and Christa Daryl Slaton. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 248p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Darin Barney, University of Ottawa

As Ted Becker and Christa Slaton affirm in their introduction to *The Future of Teledemocracy*, this is not "just another book" of scholarly reflection but, rather, an account of "a way of life" (p. xii) in which they have played a central role. Consequently, instead of a detached, critical investigation of the dynamic encounter among technology, communication, and democratic politics, or even a dispassionate appraisal of the implications of a particular aspect of this encounter, what we receive in this book is an intimate digest of Becker and Slaton's 23-year "odyssey" on behalf of their own vision of teledemocracy—complete with "true blue allies" and powerful enemies "who opposed our ideology and had the means to halt our experiments" (p. xi)—framed by a futurist manifesto that unfortunately diminishes the contribution made by the chronicle of the authors' crusade.

The argument driving the book is relatively straightforward: The dawn of the third millennium has brought with it an array of "uniquely menacing dilemmas" (p. 7)—civil war, poverty, environmental degradation, Third World debt, disaffected youth, etc.—with which representative democracy, dominated by "tiny cliques of economically powerful and well-organized interests who are, by and large, sexist, racist and Social Darwinists at heart" (p. 6), is ill equipped to deal. The solution to these "threats to human viability" is teledemocracy: a "purer, future democracy" (p. 7) that makes liberal use of direct democratic instruments and new information and communication technologies, preferably on the model developed by Becker and Slaton in the course of more than two decades of experimentation. In their view, this "New Democratic Paradigm" is imminent, especially in America, the progressive center of the "one continent on this globe generating a series of impulses that contain the best way for humankind to work together, live together, grow together and govern together" (p. 8). This "wave of the future" (p. 9) is the political analog of the quantum revolution in physics (highlighting randomness, uncertainty, and unpredictability), its progress hindered only by political, economic, and media elites whose interests are wedded to the current representative system and the outmoded "Newtonian paradigm" (emphasizing reason, causality and hierarchy) upon which it is based and legitimated. The realization of teledemocracy requires a leap to "quantum politics" (p. 36), to which Becker and Slaton see their work as making a contribution.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I traces the lineage of teledemocracy in the ideas of a selection of "democratic visionaries of the 20th century" (p. 11), including Buckminster Fuller, Erich Fromm, and Abbie Hoffman. It also presents the case linking the failure of contemporary representative institutions to the Newtonian thinking which informed their founding, and for how a "political-scientific quantum correction" (p. 28) will "reinform our political thinking and processes in order to ameliorate some of the most debilitating and most lethal crises all modern governments face" (p. 21). Part II recounts the history of Becker and Slaton's experiments in "quantum politics": Deliberative polling and televoting; electronic town meetings (ETMs) mediated by television, telephone, and computer technology; and the integration of Internet utilities into these models. This part also

includes an interesting discussion of the authors' experience developing "a commercial enterprise devoted to producing ETMs for a profit" (p. 119). Part III imagines the future of teledemocracy in the quantum age. Drawing on Benjamin Barber's idea of strong democracy and the futurism of Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Becker and Slaton forecast the proliferation of a global direct democracy movement, expansive implementation of technologically mediated direct democracy initiatives, the establishment of mediation as the core of "non-hierarchical, quantum-style conflict resolution" (p. 191), and the transformation of political organizations and institutions by the Internet. In other words, the future of teledemocracy will bear a marked resemblance to precisely what Becker and Slaton have been doing over the past 20 years.

There are sections of this book that are informative. The authors' recollection of their journey of social experimentation aimed at transformation holds lessons for those embarking on a similar trajectory, and their expertise undoubtedly will help identify best practices in the execution of teledemocracy exercises. Additionally, the section on the global direct democracy movement (pp. 158-78) provides a useful, if selective and uncritical, catalog of electronically mediated democratic activism around the world. Becker and Slaton do well to point out that political and economic elites who continue to benefit from the current configuration of power and technology have little to gain from real democratization and will use their existing advantage to preserve the status quo. Unfortunately, they assert rather than argue this point, typically at a level of rhetorical excess that undermines its persuasiveness. To their credit, they also seem aware that the combination of direct democratic and technological instruments is open to manipulation by these same elites in ways that undermine efforts at fundamental democratization. However-with the exception of a brief critique of Ross Perot's presidential campaign, apparently inspired by the candidate's rejection of the authors' offer of expertise in designing ETMs (p. 103)—this possibility is not adequately explored.

Chief among the book's shortcomings as a piece of research writing is its parochial stance relative to the broader scholarly discourses in which it might otherwise have been profitably situated. While Becker and Slaton do refer to fellow travelers on the experimental road to teledemocracy, with the exception of brief references to Barber, Amitai Etzioni, and James Fishkin's work on deliberative polling, there is little engagement with the theoretical or social science literatures that examine a number of issues with which Becker and Slaton ought to be concerned. Thus, the book suffers from a lack of sustained conversation with prominent contemporary theories of democracy, participation, deliberation, representation, technology, or citizenship and from minimal reference to the extensive mainstream social science research on direct democracy, the political economy of media, or the emerging political dynamics of digital technology. The result is that complex critical concerns about the potential pathologies of direct democracy and the Internet are glossed over, possibly because these instruments are inextricable from the 'quantum democracy" to which the authors declare themselves committed on a personal level. How else are we to explain, in the age of Microsoft and Time-Warner/AOL, the authors' claim that the "New Internet" is a system of mass telecommunications with "no owners," "no gatekeepers," and under which "all Web sites are equal" (pp. 136-7)? Becker and Slaton refer extensively to their own previous work, and to that of their close circle of colleagues. However, more systematic attention to issues raised by theorists and scholars outside the fraternity of "friends of the ETM process" (p. 106) may have made the authors' case in favor of electronically

mediated direct democracy more persuasive, and less exhortative.

Becker and Slaton are correct in their conviction that American democracy bears a name it does not deserve, and there is no reason to doubt their commitment to radical democratization or to dismiss out of hand the contribution teledemocracy might make to its realization. It is entirely plausible that televotes, technologically mediated deliberative polling, and electronic town meetings will become a more prominent element of public life, and it is certain that activists will struggle creatively to ensure that these processes reflect the best, rather than the worst, face of democracy. The counsel of intellectuals such as Becker and Slaton will contribute mightily to this struggle. That being said, this book disappoints as a revolutionary manifesto, primarily because it is utopian in precisely the sense in which Marx and Engels understood that word. There is nothing wrong with imagining and working toward a better, more democratic future. However, to assume that its achievement awaits "a correction of the underlying theory of all our social, economic and political structures" (p. 3) rather than an upheaval in the material conditions which support prevailing configurations of power serves only to misdirect the energies of genuine change. To paraphrase Marx on wage labor, we cannot do away with domination and inequality simply by eliminating the thought of them. To suggest the persistence of "Newtonian thinking" is the chief obstacle to a substantial democratization of liberal capitalism, or that "a quantum correction to the Newtonian political thought" (p. 153) will achieve this, is ultimately disempowering. Equally utopian are the authors' concluding projections that teledemocracy will reverse "the forces of rampant, market-based globalization," yield "a fairer allotment of wealth and social services... reverse the severe degradation to the planet's ecology in the 20th century...[and] work some positive healing of the human psyche and spirit..." (pp. 211-2). It remains to be seen what the broad impact of technologically mediated direct democracy will be. Becker and Slaton succeed neither in establishing that the most important variable determining this outcome will be the prevailing theory of the nature of the cosmos, nor in adequately investigating what some of the other, more significant variables might be.

Sexual Identities, Queer Politics. Edited by Mark Blasius. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 382p. \$60.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Sexual Strangers: Gays, Lesbians, and the Dilemmas of Citizenship. By Shane Phelan. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001. 232p. \$59.50 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Anna Marie Smith, Cornell University

Shane Phelan and Mark Blasius have played a leading role in the development of a lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transgender (LBGT) literature within political science, and their most recent texts enrich both this specialized field and the study of politics as a whole. Phelan's investigation of citizenship begins with the claim that LBGT people are "strangers" in American society. According to Zygmunt Bauman (Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence, 1991), the Jews in European history were strangers. Neither friend nor enemy, they were treated as an ambiguous and shifting figure of otherness that marked the boundary between us and them, but at the same time calling into question the very possibility of such a clear exclusionary division. Critical readings of anti-Semitic discourse can be quite fruitful for the study of homophobia because the demonized subject in both cases is an enemy within who is simultaneously excessively present but

invisible; powerful and threatening but harmless and effeminate; physically close but spiritually remote; embodying the highest intellectual and aesthetic values but expressing modern urban decadence and decay, circulating in "mainstream" society and seductively corrupting the innocent, but shunning "mainstream" society and remaining an unassimilated difference within its own separatist cultural enclave. Phelan puts Bauman's stranger trope to good use as she explores the complex positioning of LBGT people in American official discourse and culture.

Drawing from both the liberal republican and feminist traditions, Phelan defines citizenship in terms of legal status, meaningful participation, and recognition. Progressive liberals might be content to argue solely for the extension of basic civil and political rights to LBGT people, but Phelan complicates matters by pointing to the symbolic and discursive dimensions of participation. To have one's voice heard in a public debate, there must be some shared understanding that one deserves respect as a valued member of the community. Working in a similar vein, Nancy Fraser has explored the importance of combining redistribution and pluralistic recognition strategies in her work. Phelan's specific contribution consists in her discussion of the complex ambiguities that homophobia presents for democratic citizenship theory. LBGT people are not singled out for apartheid-style treatment-access to the vote, public office, public accommodation, and residential property ownership is not organized according to sexual classes in a systematic manner. Yet, Bowers v. Hardwick establishes that gays do not have a right to privacy; the "don't ask, don't tell" military policy bans self-affirming lesbians and gays from the military; the criminal justice system usually fails to address antigay violence; and laws protecting LBGT people from discrimination are weak, few, and far between. Phelan contends that although LBGT people do have access to many fundamental rights on a formal basis, the denial of other rights and symbolic recognition tends to diminish the political effectiveness of our citizenship.

Phelan concludes that democratic activists must work to introduce an antihomophobia and/or proqueer ethos of solidarity into American society. From this perspective, she urges conservative homosexual leaders to abandon their assimilatory attempts to depict lesbians and gays as just another middle-class suburban ethnic group. She contends that their tactics have become particularly offensive insofar as they have borrowed a typical ethnic group normalization tactic and have positioned "normal" homosexuals as "mainstream" citizens by attacking the marginal figures in our own community—the transsexual, the gender nonconformist, and the bisexual. This mainstreaming approach will inevitably fall short and backfire. Even if the conservative homosexuals secure small reforms, unless the deeply engrained systems of antigay bigotry and discrimination are addressed, many LBGT people will remain in the closet and will not exercise their rights. Furthermore, heterosexuals will not be pressed to examine their assumptions about sexuality, sex roles, the family, and the community, and the support from opinionsensitive politicians and judges will remain so shallow that many of them will abandon the reforms as soon as they are pressured by the religious Right.

Although Phelan is entirely convincing on these points, she could have engaged more substantially with radical queer theory, which has much to offer to any critique of assimilation. Phelan's analogy between the exclusion of LBGT people and racism and ethnic discrimination is quite interesting, but she also could have given more consideration to the ways in which homophobia remains somewhat unique. The expulsion of LBGT people from their birth families, for example, is a

distinct feature of homophobia. Although families in some fundamentalist religious communities systematically expel their children if they reject their faith, this sort of deep-seated intrafamily antagonism is generally quite rare within racial and ethnic groups.

The Blasius anthology deals with the politics of sexuality. The chapters span the entire political science spectrum in terms of research paradigms. Some of the essays were first presented as papers at a 1996 conference, and the high quality of the work is such that even the oldest pieces have stood the test of time. Blasius nicely situates the various chapters so that interesting contrasts emerge. Rayside's overview of LBGT social movement politics in the institutional contexts of the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States sets up Duyvendak's treatment of gay organizing in the French republican political culture and centralized political system, as well as Diaz-Cotto's analysis of Latin American lesbian-feminist activists' negotiations of the uneven organizing opportunities created by a series of feminist conferences.

The comparative politics chapter by Altman addresses international cultural politics. He demonstrates that in some Southeast Asian gay male communities, Western LBGT ways of thinking about sexuality have been enthusiastically taken up by new generations of bar queens, but Western-style activism has generally not taken root in the difficult economic and political conditions of the developing world. Petchesky, by contrast, emphasizes deliberate coalition-building tactics that have brought feminists together from both the north and the south. Her chapter discusses the progress that feminists have made in institutionalizing sexual rights within official international human rights discourse.

Blasius, Currah, and Bailey call into question popular approaches to LBGT subjectivity. Blasius argues that the effect of an LBGT presence should be theorized in terms of our community-based production of a specific form of emergent subjectivity—the dialogical process of self-constitution or "coming out"—rather than social movement or interest group analyses. Currah argues that lesbian and gay advocates ought to abandon the conservative tactic of constructing sexual orientation discrimination as simply a type of sex discrimination (e.g., Mitchell Y would have been able to marry Juan X if Juan had been a woman) but should instead struggle against any attempt by the state to regulate or punish those who deviate from traditional gender roles, inhabit transsexual bodies, or express unconventional sexualities. Bailey's analysis of lesbian and gay households in urban settings suggests that the LBGT presence should not be depicted as easily defined and homogeneous neighborhoods—the "gay ghettos"-but as highly differentiated, transitional, and shifting urban spaces in which LBGT people from all economic brackets coexist with seniors, female-headed households, and racial/ethnic minorities.

Several authors explore questions related to political strategy. The Cook and Hartnett analysis of television news coverage traces the ambiguous representations of lesbians and gays as worthy individuals and as a dangerous collective movement, thereby revealing the unevenness of strategic media opportunities. Harris deploys a key LBGT studies tactic by championing the work of a neglected gay African-American philosopher, Alain Locke. Yang rejects an elitist approach to mass opinion change, which suggests that "experts" always play a leading role in changing popular attitudes, and demonstrates that the privileging of "experts" depends on the precise issue in question. LBGT activists influenced the American Psychiatric Association's decision to remove homosexuality from its list of pathological disorders but were unable to shape the military's "don't ask, don't tell" policy.

Echoing Foucault, Yang points out that democratic struggles always involve struggles for the authority to determine truth and morality. Salokar urges LBGT activists to maximize the opportunities presented by the federal and multibranch nature of American government by working at all levels and in all areas of politics, while Badgett underlines the importance of LBGT think tanks.

The Blasius collection includes one of the most important pieces published in the entire LBGT literature during the 1990s (given the size, breadth, and quality of this body of texts, that achievement is no small feat), namely, Cohen's critique of radical queer theory. Whereas queer theory has constructed the political as a single struggle—LBGT people versus heterosexuals—Cohen points out that such a construction fails to capture the complex nature of the sexuality-oriented relations of domination that are central to contemporary American politics. Poor women of color have been attacked as sexual deviants and subjected to increasingly punitive welfare programs precisely because of their heterosexual fertility. Cohen affirms that homophobia remains a serious obstacle to progressive social change, but she urges LBGT activists to abandon the single-issue approach to politics. She concludes that the radical promise of apparently transgressive queer activism will only bear fruit to the extent that we grasp the intersections among homophobia, institutional racism, class exploitation, and the patriarchy and situate a radical, antiassimilationist struggle for LBGT rights within a broadly based leftist, feminist, and antiracist coalition.

It can be argued that both books are significant because they transcend the "narrowness" of LBGT politics and address much broader and universal questions of ethnic group politics, democracy, and citizenship. These texts are in fact significant, but we should not have to judge their importance in this manner. It is true that Phelan moves deftly back and forth across LBGT, feminist, multicultural, and democratic theory literatures with ease and to great effect, and the Blasius collection features first-rate works drawn from every corner of the entire political science discipline. These texts should find appreciative audiences not only in LBGT studies but also in the fields of feminist theory, social and political theory, and political science.

But such an assessment would implicitly accept the premise that LBGT politics is an inherently specialized and narrow field of inquiry, and that mainstream scholars should only value LBGT studies when we translate our work into mainstream terms. Literature departments, for the most part, have demonstrated that they welcome the very best humanistic scholarship, and the fact that some of it addresses problems related to gender, sexuality, and race has not interfered with their assessments. If our humanities colleagues have been more open to LBGT studies, our social science colleagues have, for the most part, failed to value this field of inquiry. The latter have often used the "particularism"/"universalism" code to conceal their exclusionary attitudes. Ultimately, the claim that a given knowledge project is particularistic instead of universal can only be defended in political terms; indeed, the charge of particularistic and narrow against LBGT studies is nothing more than the latest version of homophobic pathologization and erasure.

As Phelan and contributors to the Blasius book demonstrate so well, LBGT politics is not a narrow, special interest group, minority concern; it is a field of struggle that brings the very foundational architecture of American citizenship to light. In the words of Salokar:

To study the LGBT movement, scholars will need to move beyond a narrow definition of politics and entertain the notion of "political" as encompassing the social, cultural, ethical, and moral issues of society. What is sought by many LGBT activists is not simply political equality, equal protection of the laws, or the legal recognition of their relationships, but a wholesale examination and retooling of the most basic power relationships among individuals, social institutions (e.g., the family), and the regulatory capabilities of the state in order to shape a more just society. Ultimately, the LGBT movement is seeking-broad-based change that is "political" in all sense of the word (Sexual Identities, p. 260).

At the Heart of Freedom: Feminism, Sex, and Equality. By Drucilla Cornell. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 254p. \$14.95 paper.

Gayle Binion, University of California, Santa Barbara

Drucilla Cornell has two goals: Pinpoint equal freedom as the core of sexual equality and make the case for the equal rights of gays and lesbians. Interwoven within these themes is a case for sexual freedom itself, for men and women. With erudite references to a wide multidisciplinary swath of literature, she succeeds in hammering home these concerns and in demanding that the sociolegal order reform its policies affecting sexuality, reproduction, and definitions of family. In these respects, this is a valuable study of how the United States specifically and other societies referentially fall short of what Christine Littleton calls making sex "cost free." Cornell's book, which in the subjects and issues it analyzes covers very familiar territory, is intriguing for a very different reason. It is one of a very few works in radical feminist thought that is fundamentally about employing the tenets of classical liberalism, if not libertarianism, in the service of progressive social change. In contrast with the paradigms of modal feminism, which address social structures and connectedness, and which are concerned predominantly with equality, this work unabashedly focuses on the individual and stresses the freedom of each as a sexual being.

Despite Cornell's creativity, extensive research, and erudite references, the book is not entirely satisfactory. Most immediately, it builds broad general theory from stated but largely unproven premises: (1) One's "sexuate being," defining and representing one's sexual self, is a/the critical foundation of personhood, and (2) the state is largely responsible for our exclusionary views of normalcy in the "imaginary domain." Each premise is repeated throughout and functions as the framework within which Cornell offers legal analyses and suggestions for reform of public policy concerning primarily pregnancy and parenting, but they are not effectively explored as to their centrality, and some readers will remain unpersuaded.

Although it is nearly axiomatic that feminist theory, of which Cornell is self-consciously a major source, serves to challenge sex role orthodoxy, it is rather less clear that the enterprise of feminist jurisprudence is advanced by defining the essence of individuals as inherent in their sexuate natures. By this I mean to separate and applaud the very critical case that must be made, and is made by Cornell, for full freedom and equality whatever one's sexual orientation. It might be noted that a fair application of strict scrutiny analysis to sexual orientation would render unconstitutional all forms of governmental discrimination on the basis of this criterion. Few classifications better fit a test designed to address characteristics that are immutable, historically the basis of arbitrary exclusion, and unrelated to one's ability to contribute to society. But is this case against what is, in my mind, purely and simply bigotry necessarily advanced by an argument that one's sexuate being is the essence of the person from which

principles of freedom, generally, do themselves flow? Perhaps this is but a quibble as to how critical sexuality is to freedom in social and political spheres of life, which is arguably a case apart from equal acceptance and integration of people of all sexual orientations into the fabric of society. The former case is not made particularly effectively by Cornell.

I have more problems with the excessive reliance on the proposition that the state is the source of the exclusionary social norms that all but heterosexual men and heterosexual women who are deferential to men are understood to experience. There is a general axiom in law and society research that, "awaiting contrary proof," public policy is more often than not presumed to be a dependent variable, a phenomenon to be explained by other social institutions and forces. Law is seen not as the source of social norms but as a reflection of these values, buttressing and reinforcing them. Cornell's analysis of patriarchy demonstrates the weakness of viewing the state as the problem. "For my purposes, the word patriarchy indicates the manner in which a woman's legal identity remains bound up with her duties to the state as wife and mother within the traditional heterosexual family. Our feminist demand must be for the full release of women from this legal identity that is wholly inconsistent with the recognition of each of us as a free and equal person" (pp. 101-2).

Arguably, patriarchy, which long predates the development of formal institutions of government and law, would continue to exist even if there were no state policies enforcing its strictures. It is, therefore, difficult to understand not only which policy changes will undo patriarchal institutions but also how any changes in contemporary law would necessarily effect positive social change in this arena. The case that is seriously in need of being made is how and under what circumstances the state can effectively intervene and undo the conditions of disempowerment and exclusion that are endemic in the social order. This may be a Herculean task, if not a fool's errand. Carol Smart, in Feminism and the Power of Law (1989), suggests that the law is unreformably patriarchal and that women must look elsewhere to further their interests. The danger, Smart (p. 3) notes, is to buy into the law's "overinflated view of itself.'

Cornell's work would have benefited from more effective copy editing. Some statements, such as that Congress "overturn[ed]" Geduldig v. Aiello (1974) in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (p. 66), are not accurate. (By statutory law, Congress could not undo the constitutional doctrine of the case denying that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex discrimination under the fourteenth Amendment.) Other debatable observations would have been aided by documentation, for example: "There is widespread agreement among psychologists and psychoanalysts that addiction is inseparable from a blocked longing to be a person" (p. 81).

Cultural Studies and Political Theory. Edited by Jodi Dean. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. 362p. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

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Film, painting, disease, nationalism, mass media, literature, family values, capital punishment, music lyrics, theater, UFOs, the Statue of Liberty, and Appalachian hollers are some of the cultural texts subject to political analysis in this impressive volume of sixteen essays. Neither are these cultural sites presumed to be transparent nor are their investments fully known. They are problematized, pluralized, specified, and contextualized in terms of such political categories as liberalism, communitarianism, privacy, civility, nationhood,

citizenship, community, the will, responsibility, the common, revolution, public sphere(s), and the political itself (p. 19). This approach, which Jodi Dean terms an "interface" between cultural studies and political theory, captures how cultural forms such as film and literature cannot be decoupled from their political moorings, just as a political concept like citizenship is always embedded with cultural meanings.

All the essays unpack and rethink the political entanglements, investments, and effects of cultural artifacts, narratives, and sentiments. Some contributors approach this interface expressly; others take its power and validity as givens and proceed by example. In the first mode, Judith Grant and Paul Apostolidis establish criteria for determining whether cultural work has political purchase. Grant examines the turn toward art and culture in the tradition of critical theory as a positive expansion of politics and meaning-making spaces that turns away from economics. But Grant also warns that, without consciousness, cultural work is not emancipating, and its commentary is not political action. Apostolidis argues that criticism on its own is not political without a commitment to democratic leadership, which he defines as "the task of forging alliances between political intellectuals and groups of ordinary people" (p. 144).

The majority of contributors fall in the second mode, sitting more easily with the cultural studies/political theory interface. Mark Reinhardt concludes that even the most generous incarnations of communitarian thought (represented in his essay by Daniel Bell) still fail to conceptualize and therefore obfuscate myriad forms of "cultural struggle" (p. 108). Priscilla Wald reads "carrier narratives" from Typhoid Mary to Robin Cook's Invasion to show how communicative disease renders us "all related" and therefore consolidates and decimates community (p. 201). Linda Zerilli examines the U.S. investment in seeing itself as the "real" democracy vis-àvis national narratives about the Statue of the Liberty as the referent for the Goddess of Democracy held up in Tiananmen Square. She chronicles the history of the statue from its beginnings, as the "gift that nobody wanted," to the miniatures produced for tourist consumption today. Dean's concluding essay celebrates conspiracy theory, typically debunked as paranoid fanaticism, as part of the American tradition of political resistance present in the Declaration of Independence, whose conspiratorial tone unsettled the certainty of who held legitimate power.

Because these essays embrace, without regret, the pluralization of politics, they are meaningful contributions to debates about the expanding or shrinking public and political. Such debates are often played out in terms of a geography of public and private wherein certain concerns are considered essentially public, others indubitably private, artistic, cultural, economic, and so on. Hannah Arendt (On Revolution, 1963; The Human Condition, 1958), Sheldon Wolin ("Political Theory as a Vocation," American Political Science Review 63:4 [December 1969]: 1062-1082 and "What Time is It?" Theory & Event 1 [No. 1, 1997]), Michael Walzer (Spheres of Justice, 1993), Jean Bethke Elshtain (Democracy on Trial, 1995), their commentators, and others have been engaged in debates about this kind of political mapping. Even contemporary feminist scholarship has become uncertain about its stake in making the personal and cultural political.

These essays neither police what counts as political nor make everything so. They detail the workings of power that proliferate beyond the so-called public sphere (and are often constitutive of it) and affect our politics and our culture, and they show us the political failures in working to keep the two distinct. Thomas Dumm discusses the ostensibly mundane act of a group of people in a bar singing the lyrics to "Wild Thing." He examines the political meaning of how the audience (all

but Jean Baudrillard, whom Dumm explains was quite baffled by the singing delirium) knew that the opening chords signaled "Wild Thing" and not its chordic sibling, "Louie, Louie." Michael Shapiro juxtaposies the story of his grandfather with the movie *Dead Man*, an approach well outside the domain of mainstream political theory, as he invokes not only film but also family history and personal experience to show the "radical contingency of the family" (p. 270, emphasis in original). It is not that everything is now political in this interface of political theory and cultural studies, but nothing is essentially not political either. To equate the political with everything would have a paradoxically depoliticizing effect. But to show how political meaning is configured and reconfigured through cultural phenomena is to work in the spirit of the essays collected here.

This book challenges political theorists to be more capacious in their treatment of the political, more attuned to cultural work that untidies their precious categories. It calls on cultural studies scholars to be more deliberate about the political potential of their insights into the subtle cultural feedback that they so convincingly deconstruct. Given that global capitalism lurks as a persona non grata throughout the text, its entailments could be illuminated more directly. Specific attention to the flow of global capital, examination of the economic and cultural imperatives that fashion the global citizen as global consumer, and closer engagement with non-American culture on its own terms would have expanded this volume's already inspiring effort to problematize, pluralize, specify, and contextualize the production, meaning, and circulation of politics. As individual essays and as a collection, however, this book will reach far into the bookshelves and classrooms of critical legal theory, democratic theory, American studies, feminist theory, critical race theory, and other untapped resources for political/cultural imagination.

A Politics of the Ordinary. By Thomas L. Dumm. New York: New York University Press, 1999. 240p. \$55.00 cloth, \$18.50 paper.

Fred M. Frohock, Syracuse University

Exploring the ordinary is a reasonable and fun way to get through the day. Thomas Dumm takes the exploration along a cart path toward democratic politics, dramatizing the intersections and reciprocal influences of everyday life and political events and the forces of conformity and normalcy that shackle the ordinary. The working technique is juxtaposition, the kind of display that one finds in the store windows of, well, ordinary life in towns and cities. The pantheon of familiar figures and texts includes Emerson, Thoreau, Nixon, Disney, alien depictions, Lowi, Wolin, Cavell, the King's Two Bodies, Baudrillard, and many more, all offered as showcase for the book's main claim that the ordinary is the primary source of the democratic imagination.

There is an early gesture toward methods. Dumm acknowledges a distinction between proof as "an illustration of form" and a "showing to be true" (p. 7). The former is a proof through exemplification; the latter, an effort to fix a definite meaning through placement. It should come as no surprise that Dumm embraces illustration and example and, in doing so, tries to preserve the ordinary with an approach traceable to classical philosophy. The book that follows this method is a presentation of the forms of ordinary life, an inventory of events, anecdotes, narratives, film, and fiction, in general a set of portraits that represents the private, common, personal stuff that we recognize as ordinary life. For Dumm this tentative and spontaneous life world expresses and mediates politics "understood as a capacity and a yearning" (p. 5).

Theory, understood as an explicit attention to the rival forms of understanding, explanation, argument, rules of evidence, and inference used to explain human experience, is no part of this book. Instead we have a collection of insights that draws upon the actual texts at hand and elsewhere to provide smart observations on unexpected connections and meanings. Dumm confesses that he finds theorists such as Habermas and Rawls, and debates about items such as liberalism and communitarianism, of little use as inspiration, in helping us to breathe, preferring instead the leads found in popular culture. The result is a book that reads like a collection of film reviews, biting, funny, enlightening in concrete ways, and leaving us with a wish to have a beer and a conversation with the author.

But so much is missing and missed in a work like this. Saul Bellow once said that he could not bear to read "The Adventures of Augie March" because he saw too many missed opportunities. Here are some opportunities and distinctions that fly away when Dumm puts pen to paper (or fingers on the computer keyboard). First, Dumm often writes as if the ordinary is in some earth chamber under siege, sealed off from flights of speculation and conjecture. But there is no required hostility between ordinary life and the larger forces of hegemony, codification, and controlling power that Dumm sets against the ordinary as both concept and event. The most ordinary event in the world is the slide from event to abstraction, from the quotidian to the generalizable account, from ambiguity to provisional certainty. The child's repetitive Why? question, as ordinary as any item in human experience, leads to infinite regresses and halting games at wonderful levels of pure abstraction, a domain of the ordinary that can easily examine (and dismember) the heavy theories of mass thinking. Remember that the search for timeless, permanent, transcendent truths is the most commonplace occurrence in history. Some of the best political arguments are street discussions of justice and the public good. Or, the counterplots of the ordinary have their own benign origins in the ordinary. Only a very few hints of these curious mergers are found in Dumm's presentations of ordinary life. Explore them and demarcations between the ordinary and its various antitheses may vanish.

Second, much of contemporary social theory is indeed turgid, unreadable and unthinkable, and (I would add) intellectually dishonest. But current failures of thought and expression are not indictments of abstract thought. They are just poor instances of theory. Good theory is usually elegant and beautiful. Read again Watson and Crick on discovering the double helix as the form of DNA. Third, without some work in theory, explorations even of the ordinary have as little use as last year's film reviews. There are rewarding ways to employ theory and avoid the ghastly trappings of bad social theory. Look at Roy Rappaport's magisterial *Ritual and Religion in the Making of Humanity* (1999), a work that combines rigorous anthropological research into types of ordinary life with analytic philosophy, to the benefit of both.

The oddest thing about Dumm's book is that he follows the lead of most sociologists today in rendering experiences from the outside, never discussing their internal meanings or truths, and Dumm himself seems always in a state of readiness to identify patterns and symbols that actors and authors almost never intend or recognize. For example, he presents the film *Independence Day* as a "reflection on the crisis of American national politics that is precipitated by the decline in confidence in our system of representation generally..." (p. 146). The 1978 remake of *Invasion of the Body Snatchers*, Dumm asserts, "was directed at Jimmy Carter" (p. 152). *The Exorcist* is "a Watergate scandal film" (p. 153). And so on, with one thick imposed connection following another in a book that celebrates the ordinary.

One of my colleagues once asked the director Stephen Frears what he meant by the high shot of the action at a crucial point in the film My Beautiful Launderette. Frears said that on the day of the shot another crew had left a crane on the set so, what the hell, let's use it, and the famous scene was shot. Accidental to the core. Conceded, the author's intentions are not privileged in understanding a text, and if something is there it doesn't matter a lot whether or why the author put it there. The question is whether any bridge theory is privileged in accounts of the ordinary. I finished reading Dumm's book the day after the director in charge of Eastenders, the most popular program on English television, spoke to my London seminar. In response to questions about symbolic space he said what I have heard so often: that kind of stuff is the business of the literary critics. What I do, he said, is just present popular culture: wise, because, as Dumm recognizes, the ordinary is indeterminant at its center, which is one source of its life blood. But then one cannot just do bad and misleading literary theory, imposing patterns from the outside in place of fieldwork into ordinary life and the popular culture in which

In the last chapter ("Wild Things") Dumm raises the question at the center of an intersection between the practical sides of ordinary life and philosophy: Why exist? He is right that contemporary theory is not much help in negotiating this primordial inquiry. But then consider Dumm as guide on the welcome contingency of language: "It requires a particular valorization of ordinary experiences, an attempt to emphasize the powers of experience while avoiding the temptation to make experience into a force for normalizing the ordinary" (p. 168). Thank you, but I prefer the less trendy languages of good anthropology and the insights that sound research can provide on ordinary life.

The Cunning of Unreason: Making Sense of Politics. By John Dunn. New York: Basic Books, 2000. 401p. \$20.00.

Nadia Urbinati, Columbia University

If I had to talk about this book to my students, I would begin by describing its cover. The image of the upside down Capitol with the cupola hanging over the key word of the title (Cunning) invites the reader to peruse this fascinating and melancholic book as a species of inverted Hegelianism. This is a book about regret. It regrets what seems out of reach—politics as "something...uniquely courageous, direct, and even potentially effective in its assault on the misery and injustice of the great bulk of collective human life" (pp. ix-x). Its perspective is realistic but contains a glimmer of hope. Dunn's realism is ateleological and open to a moderate voluntarism; it conveys a disillusioned pessimism along with the belief that our politics can be less corrupt and cynical. Hope counterbalances the inexorable fatalism of reason. Its source is acceptance of the limits of human rationality, an endogenous fact unamendable to History's infallibility. Hope is the daughter of judgmental fallibility, the hunch that there is "room for maneuver" (pp. 347-8).

Written for a cultured public as well as for political scientists and theorists, this is a book about what politics were, are, and could be. Dunn makes politics an object of knowledge (the first question he asks is: "What exactly is politics?") (p. ix) because he believes that knowledge can make human agency "potentially effective" and "a locus of value" (p. 111). In order to understand modern politics, we must analyze how the classical political categories have changed. In order to solve the problem of contemporary political science, we must keep the general norm and the specificity of the actual context together. Thus, although he acknowledges, realistically, that

interests are powerful factors in human agency and a limit to politics, Dunn wants to preserve the leading role of politics. The goal of modern representative democracy is to keep "a polity in good order" by "the selection as rulers of those with the intelligence, moral commitment and strength of character to rule as they should" (p. 268). To attain this goal, politics needs the "great imaginative force" of the ideal of impartiality to rectify the partial in political judgment stemming from economic interests (p. 357).

The Cunning of Unreason is divided into three parts and combines historical, empirical, and analytical approaches. The first part discusses the transformation of the classical political categories. Paraphrasing Benedetto Croce, Dunn asks: "What is dead and what is alive of Aristotle's vision?" His conclusion leaves no room for doubt: "Whatever we may in the end choose to agree with Aristotle, we can hardly hope to see eye to eye with him" on many ideas (pp. 16-7). Aristotle's conception is no longer viable because it demands that the city be "virtually self-sufficient" and makes women, slaves, and manual workers into pariahs. We live in a globalized economy and have a more comprehensive view of political inclusion. To be sure, Aristotle's world was also global, albeit in a limited way. Greek city-states were engaged in a network of commercial relations with other Mediterranean populations and were familiar with imperialism. Aristotle conceived of "self-sufficiency" as political autonomy, the basic condition for public decisions. Perhaps this general criterion can still be useful, at least to evaluate the character of our democracies, whose scope of action, as Dunn notes, is on many occasions defined by a nonpolitical (thus, free from political control) domain such as the market.

Nonetheless, Dunn is right to trace modern politics back to the less noble and more instrumental view of politics that sprang from Christianity. Starting with the original sin meant to give politics both a coercive and a salvationist role, Christianity promoted both realistic and eschatological perspectives. Predictably, Dunn endorses the former: Hobbes not Marx. Hobbes, Dunn says, was right to treat cruelty and vainglory as "ordinary vices" reason can control (but not eradicate) by transforming them into the cornerstones of a secure social environment. Hobbess' legacy is to have conceptualized the content of the kind of politics we deal with today: interests, instrumental rationality, and the individual potential for good and evil. These are the foundations of the main characteristics of modern politics: the juridification of state authority and the depersonalization of economic relations

The second part of the book is a critical analysis of an empirical case of modern politics: the "structure of domination" of the Thatcher regime, which was a unique mix of "free economy" "protected by and in the last instance enforced by a 'strong state'" and "belligerent chauvinism" (p. 144). What can possibly explain the longevity and popular support of a political program that was clearly not in the interests of that majority? As an Italian compelled to obey Silvio Berlusconi's government, I sympathize instinctively with Dunn's skepticism about the voters' ability to make rational decisions. Yet, citizen "incompetence" is an artifact that begs other questions about how private interests control and manipulate information as well as about the role of ideology, rhetoric, and passion in politics.

In the third part of the book, Dunn outlines the theoretical bases of his reasonable hope. He singles out two possible explanations for the "unimpressive" performance of modern democracy: the Platonist (which "attributes the misdirection essentially to incomprehension" of both ordinary citizens and career politicians) and the sociological (which "attributes the performance of politicians, above all, to the cognitive facili-

ties and distortions which result from, and the more or less perverse incentives which are offered by, the institutional settings and social milieu") (pp. 300–1). Dunn declares his preference for the latter and proposes a vision of democratic politics that is anti-Habermasian, realistic, and contextual in its value. This is a Shumpeterian view of politics, consistent with Dunn's previous choice of Hobbes over Aristotle. Electoral competition is vulnerable to corruption, creates a "gap" between "enfranchised citizens and career politicians," and suffers "the sheer difficulty of forming and implementing rational strategies" (p. 285). Yet, it is all we have if we are to make government democratic and "do the best we now can to modify the consequences of our action and inaction for the better" (p. 341).

Dunn endorses Benjamin Constant's paradigm: The moderns have to cope with the constraints that private liberty imposes on participation. Representative democracy, like capitalism, is our only choice, but dropping the Enlightenment's grand vision does not imply abandoning "the strategy of rectification" modern rationalism has perfected (p. 360). Modern politics is a complex concoction of "fatalism" and "voluntarism," "routine" and "crisis," realism and hope. It demands that reality be accepted, not glorified or demonized.

The Moral of the Story: Literature and Public Ethics. Edited by Henry T. Edmondson III. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000. 272p. \$75.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Shakespeare's Political Realism: The English History Plays. By Tim Spiekerman. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 208p. \$16.95 paper.

Ethan Fishman, University of South Alabama

As their scholarship indicates, Henry Edmondson and Tim Spiekerman share two basic assumptions: There exist certain enduring issues of politics, such as the nature of social justice and the legitimacy of power, and authors of fiction, drama, and poetry who write with knowledge and sensitivity about the human condition often will have something significant to say about them.

Spiekerman searches the English history plays of Shakespeare, which involve King John, Richard II, Henry IV, and Henry V, for the Bard's treatment of these enduring issues. In doing so, Spiekerman rejects historicist claims by influential contemporary literary critics that his search is implausible because the era in which Shakespeare wrote was so different from our own. Along the way Spiekerman offers some provocative insights. Among them is that Shakespeare does not completely accept or reject Machiavellianism. On the one hand, the author argues, Shakespeare shares Machiavelli's position that the thirst for power is more central to politics than the desire for justice. He points out that none of the historical English kings treated by Shakespeare comes close to being a genuinely moral person. At the same time Spiekerman contends that, unlike Machiavelli, Shakespeare feels there are important moral aspects to politics as well. According to Spiekerman, the subjects of these historical monarchs exhibit a deeply held passion to be governed by morally superior rulers, even if such rulers are rarely

Less illuminating is the analogy chosen by Spiekerman to explain the relationship of subjects to rulers who claim that their power and legitimacy derive from divine right. He favorably compares that relationship to the mystical bond connecting children to their biological father. Spiekerman apparently wants readers to understand that the question of political legitimacy sometimes incorporates extrarational qualities. Yet, one can only wonder why he lends any credence whatsoever

to the paternalistic mentality that tyrants habitually exploit to sanction their oppressive regimes.

In his anthology of eighteen generally thoughtful essays. Edmondson describes Shakespeare's Henry V as a virtuous leader, a statesman, and the ideal Christian king. By Edmondson's estimation, it is during his famous soliloquy on the eve of Agincourt that Shakespeare most clearly portrays the depths of Henry's ethical character. In contrast, Spiekerman considers the soliloquy to be unremarkable ethically because it fails to include a moral justification for the invasion of France, which is a patriotic ruse to support his family's controversial right to rule.

Another essay in The Moral of the Story, by Alan Levine, investigates the novels of Chinua Achebe in an attempt to understand the personal and political consequences of moral idealism. In Achebe's Things Fall Apart (1958) and No Longer at Ease (1960), Levine discovers persuasive evidence that expecting persons, cultures, and governments to be too rational and moral can be just as destructive as a more cynical view. Politics has the potential for executing some important public functions, but it certainly is not a panacea for our ills, Levine interprets Achebe as saying. The most profound success we can achieve in combating ignorance, superstition, and injustice must come from education and from within ourselves, if it is to come at all.

Also in the Edmondson volume is an essay by Michael Platt, whose otherwise excellent treatment of prudential leadership in Joseph Conrad's "The Secret Sharer" employs an unfortunate illustration. Platt notes the crucial role of vision in prudence and argues that certain self-proclaimed freedomloving Texas officials acted imprudently when they balked at providing local hospitality for injured Afghan Mujahadeem they had helped transport to Dallas hospitals in the early 1980s. Platt wonders why the officials hesitated to support those then engaged in the active struggle against Soviet totalitarianism. Yet, even if we recoil with Platt from their hypocrisy, is it not acutely shortsighted of the author to advocate unconditional acceptance of a group that twenty years later is guilty of providing financial and military support for international terrorism?

Despite such relatively minor difficulties, these volumes represent noteworthy additions to the growing literature on the relationship between art and politics. By depicting human beings as complex, three-dimensional figures, Spiekerman and Edmondson suggest, great artists can remind political scientists to avoid reductionism in their empirical research. By providing compelling examples of how abstract philosophical concepts influence the daily lives of citizens, the authors contend, great artists can enhance our understanding of political theory. In his contributions to the Edmondson anthology, Gregory R. Johnson thus consults the novels of Jane Austen and Flannery O'Connor in order to gain a deeper appreciation of Aristotle's ideal of magnanimity or greatness of soul.

The Next Religious Establishment: National Identity and Political Theology in Post-Protestant America. By Eldon J. Eisenach. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. 167 p. \$75.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Peter Dennis Bathory, Rutgers University

Animated by an "American identity crisis," Eldon Eisenach seeks to comprehend a "deep disjunction in political culture and values between elite national institutions and the aggregate of local cultures and values." National elites, in particular, many in the "American university," offer Americain-crisis "a highly abstract democratic Universalism" which "denies American nationality." At the same time national representatives of "local cultures and values" attempt to "ground national identity and national policy in a 'conservative Restoration' by bringing back to prominence and honor the value-sustaining institutions of civil society" (p. 99). Both "Universalists" and "Restorationists" fail in their respective tasks, and American identity, Eisenach argues, is threatened in the process. While "Universalism," often couched in the "neutral" language of "juridical democracy," is in some ways built upon the New Deal "liberal establishment," it has, he insists, not been able to articulate policies that speak to this "older, ruling coalition" and so poses "above the battle" (pp. 102-3). Restorationists suffer from another malady. Though winning elections, they have proved incapable of establishing "national authority" and so equally incapable of reestablishing an American national identity.

Eisenach joins the fray. Sharing with both Universalists and Restorationists a sense of impending disorder, he develops the case for a new "National Political Theology," another in a series which, he insists, has identified and dominated American political life from its beginnings. A new "Religious Establishment," however, requires something that neither of the alternative formulations he explores can provide. Universalists, seeking to be "free from nationalism, racism, sexism (and every other contingent boundary they happen to reject) that stands in the way of full equality" (p. 101), developed a rhetoric that was increasingly abstract "while the concrete interests and groups they in fact represented appeared increasingly fragmented, particularistic, and demanding." They fail to understand that their "standards of equality are historically articulated" and, in the process, prove incapable of developing the "narrative" of American life necessary to the establishment of a new American identity. Though much of this provided an easy target for conservative Restorationists, they also have failed, Eisenach argues, to take their complete case to the American people. Successful in implementing economic and tax policies, with their emphases on deregulation and cost benefit analysis, efficiency, and social cost measures, Restorationists have had far less success "in the areas of social values, intellectual culture and education" (p. 103). Insightfully, Eisenach reminds us that "economic conservatives, insofar as they adhere to neo-classical or libertarian values, do not share with moral conservatives an inner imperative to reform culture" (p. 104). But, the intramural conflict does not end here, as "some moral conservatives fear that the positive Restorationist projects led by the national government (e.g., national school standards, media censorship or control, the funding of religiously committed academics) require the active assistance of the federal bureaucracy and other national institutions dominated by their opponents" (p. 104).

For Eisenach, however, all is not lost. The moral vacuum left by these multiply-contending forces has produced "Third Way" alternatives, both "Liberal Nationalism" and "Pluralist Communitarian" in substance. From Richard Rorty and E. J. Dionne, Jr., on the Liberal Nationalist front to Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel among the pluralist communitarians, he finds the beginnings of a more satisfactory encounter with our contemporary dilemmas—an unwitting reconstruction of a national political theology. However, in the absence of "a common faith," even these alternatives will founder in contemporary America. Though he finds the bases of that faith, in a "common democratic faith" of Liberal Nationalists and Communitarians, Eisenach seeks to anchor that "faith" in the American political tradition, in Western political thought beyond America, and to recover in the process an American "experiential foundationalism" (p. 130). Looking to the Progressive Era, Eisenach echoes Herbert

Croly's "promise of American life" and its "national cohesion

... dependent ... upon fidelity to democratic principle" (p. 8). While cautious not to elide intervening American history, Eisenach finds much to recommend in this era and its "pragmatism." Indeed, the writings of John Dewey serve not only to define an earlier "religious establishment" (pp. 89–92) but to mark boundaries of the new regime of "civility and citizenship" that Eisenach propounds in his conclusion (p. 148). Likewise, "the shared German or Hegelian or historicist spirit [that], he claims, pervaded the American university well before the Civil War" (p. 86) is revived in Eisenach's call for "a new American narrative" (p. 138). Closing with a plea for toleration, civility, and citizenship embedded in a new American political story, Eisenach's own story ends with a reshaping of "the legacy of American pragmatism into the beginnings of ... a political theology for the next American establishment" (p. 149).

In its critical spirit, Eisenach's argument is reminiscent of Elshtain's Democracy on Trial (1995), but his self-proclaimed "prophecy" places a faith in the American university past and present that is more in the spirit of Dewey. He trumpets "the success of the American university as a powerful and unified set of national institutions independent of both church and state" and explores the possibility that it "might be understood as the authentic national church of voluntary religious establishments" (p. 75). At the same time he understands the dangers of abstraction, distance, and arrogance: The antidemocratic temptations of the academy. Much as Tocqueville did, he attempts to comprehend the essence of politics as theory and its relation to political action. He knows. as Tocqueville taught us, that "the political sciences form a sort of intellectual atmosphere breathed by both governors and governed in society, and [that] both unwittingly derive from it the principles of their actions" (See Alexis de Tocqueville, 1852, "The Art and Science of Politics," Encounter XXXVI, 6 [January 1971]: 27–35).

Still, there is something puzzling about his reliance on American intellectuals and the university. He seems to understand with Tocqueville that the political sciences (Tocqueville's use of the term is closer to our understanding of political theory) are not always clearly understood, that the "intellectual atmosphere" may become polluted, leading to unintended consequences, even to the contradiction of stated goals. Tocqueville's warnings here about the intellectuals in politics may be more apposite than Dewey's principles, for though Tocqueville admired the pragmatic spirit of Americans, he knew first-hand of both the importance and the difficulties of integrating "political art" and political theory. "Authors," he thought, had been responsible for the selfconsuming ideology of the French revolution. Democracy was fragile for Tocqueville, requiring attention to both theory and practice and the endlessly complex relation between them. Eisenach's turn to Dewey, Rorty, Taylor, and others suggests less than a full appreciation of the complexities of the very problem he addresses. It may be that more attention to Tocqueville on both France and America would have helped shape this argument.

Eisenach's reliance on the university, furthermore, confronts dangers beyond those of which Tocqueville could imagine. While our interest in "service learning," for example, seems to harken back to Dewey, our fascination with "distance learning," in particular, as a source of revenue, should give us pause. Within our discipline the spirit of "economism," alive and well despite the contrary signals of the "perestroika" exchanges, suggests yet another problem for Eisenach's "prophetic" message. The reestablishment of a "national political theology" may be responsive to his twin demons, but it is important to recognize that there are aspects of the "atmosphere" he hopes to freshen, quite apart from

Universalism and Restorationism, in need of careful attention as well. This said, Eisenach's jeremiad is both provocative and useful for our time and may well stir the fruitful controversy he admittedly seeks.

Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How It Can Succeed Again. By Bent Flyvbjerg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 201p. \$54.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Stephen K. White, University of Virginia

The 2001 American Political Science Association meeting was alive with the Perestroika controversy. It has been more than a quarter-century since the profession last saw such ferment. If one compares the two episodes, there is strong similarity in the level of organizational activity; but when it comes to methodological issues, the differences are pronounced. The earlier period was characterized by a rich discussion; today there is comparatively little. And this relative silence has been the norm for a good number of years.

What explains this state of affairs? The decline of methodological talk may have reflected a general exhaustion or a dampening of enthusiasm for positivism and the strong behavioralist program of the 1960s. Many political scientists have been content in the last couple of decades to settle down quietly under labels such as postpositivism, postempiricism, and pragmatism, without much sustained analysis as to what such labels actually amount to. And political theorists, with few exceptions, have seemed uninterested in probing these questions.

Perhaps such quiescence is to be expected when there exists widespread consensus about the nature of political inquiry. But with the emergence of Perestroika, no one can pretend that this is the case. Perestroikans charge that certain methodological approaches have established a "hegemonic" position. If that is true, then what becomes most striking about the current state of political science is the stark contrast between the force of this expansionist strategy and the paucity of sustained methodological reflection bearing on its intellectual respectability.

What might we expect from a reinvigoration of methodological talk? One thing we shouldn't expect is any quick fix. Instant therapies were already making their appearance at the 2001 meeting. But such proposals are likely to be perceived either as new power grabs or as too amorphous to have much real purchase on our problems. An example of the former was David Laitin's conference paper that asserted categorically that we already have "impressive intellectual coherence" in our discipline; the real problem is institutional "anarchy" and "indiscipline" that just needs to be cleaned up ("The Political Science Discipline," p. 3). An example of the latter was Elinor Ostrom's well-intended proposal to gather all political inquiry under a big-tent description: the systematic study of "all human activities guided by norms" (Roundtable on "Shaking Things Up? Future Directions in Political Science"). Upon hearing this proposal, a person in the audience behind me mumbled, "I'll study bass fishing."

Given this situation, Bent Flyvbjerg's Making Social Science Matter is a welcome intervention. Flyvbjerg is a Danish social scientist who recently published an excellent case study of the city of Aalborg—essentially what used to be called a "community power" analysis—only this one persuasively incorporated a Foucaultian dimension to its understanding of power. The author's new book projects a general vision of how social science should reimagine itself. A key issue in this regard remains, of course, what one thinks about the unity of science thesis. My guess is that there are relatively

few political scientists today who believe that natural and social science are exactly alike; but many still think that some kind of progress on a naturalistic model is possible, and thus the profession should adhere to a clear-cut research program like rational choice. But, despite the many real insights and limited-range generalizations generated by that program, the fact remains that there is no general consensus that political science over the last quarter-century looks like an emerging science on the naturalistic model. Critics of such a research program increasingly find its adherents to be like die-hard Marxists: absolutely convinced the revolution will come and full of an unending supply of reasons why it has failed so far.

Flyvbjerg shares this familiar skepticism about the naturalistic model. A useful way to engage his arguments is to compare and contrast them with ones that were developed in the earlier period of ferment in political science. From this angle, one can see better both what is distinctive and persuasive in Flyvbjerg and what is more problematic. Like earlier critics, he contends that the naturalistic model does not adequately account for the irreducible centrality of "context and judgment" in human action (p. 4). But Flyvbjerg differs from many critics in his construal of the grounds for such centrality. The more familiar approach runs something like this: Because judgment and behavior in political life reflect actors' interpretations of common meanings embedded in particular contexts, and because these meanings and contexts cannot be grasped by abstract, universalistic models of behavior, we cannot expect such models to do very well in predicting political action. This line of argument is perhaps most closely associated today with Charles Taylor. Flyvbjerg finds this kind of hermeneutic account to be inadequate. The problem with this approach is that it amounts only to "a more complex form of determinism"; in effect, if you know the rules governing common meanings, you can determine which actions will occur. But, Flyvbjerg contends, this is surely wrong: "The rules for chess are not chess," and the rules governing common meanings are not a determinate map of expected action (p. 43). Flyvbjerg is, of course, right about this point. The problem is that he never indicates who actually ever believed that rules strictly determine the playing of a game. Wittgenstein certainly didn't; and Taylor doesn't either. Strangely, Flyvbjerg does not include any reference whatsoever to Taylor.

Flyvbjerg contends that we must turn to the work of Hubert Dreyfus as our main resource for showing why action is generally too open-ended to be successfully modeled. Dreyfus's research has shown that the knowledge and skill of a competent actor—whether a paramedic or a politician—is too intuitive, holistic, and context-dependent to be "externalized into rules and explanations" (p. 21). Flyvbjerg's discussion of Dreyfus is generally quite good in drawing out the latter's significance for social scientists. But I do have some reservations. It strikes me as unwarranted to make the case for a nonnaturalistic model depend primarily on Dreyfus's particular theory of human skill and judgment. Given Flyvbjerg's denigration of the hermeneutic account, he forces us to place all our bets on Dreyfus. I would rather reverse the weighting, with the heaviest bets put on a (correctly understood) Taylor-like account that can be combined (easily, I think) with Dreyfus-like insights. Moreover, we would do well to remember that Dreyfus's work actually fits into an existing tradition of reflection on the character of political inquiry. In his much discussed essay of 1969, Sheldon Wolin characterized political insight as involving "tacit political knowledge" ("The Vocation of Political Theory," American Political Science Review 63:4 [December 1969]: 1070-4).

Flyvbjerg's heavy reliance on Dreyfus is related to the Aristotelian orientation he envisions for social science. Aristotle's phronesis, with its focus on the quality of judgment and

practical wisdom exhibited by political actors, is the key concept. Flyvbjerg aims to "restore social science to its classical position as a practical, intellectual activity aimed at clarifying the problems, risks and possibilities" that are faced by "the communities in which we live" (pp. 4, 166). To his credit, Flyvbjerg is quite concrete in spelling out methodologically what this vision implies. Thus, for example, he includes a chapter on the importance of case studies (which tend to be denigrated somewhat within the naturalistic model) and a chapter elucidating his own research on Aalborg. Flyvbierg's "phronetic social science" does make one sharp departure from Aristotle, in that it self-consciously attends to how conflict and power are constitutive of political life and inquiry (pp. 3, 129). Although much of what Flyvbjerg says about Foucault on this theme is persuasive, some familiar questions about the latter's perspective on power in general, as well as its relation to domination, remain unanswered. For example, Flyvbjerg unpacks Foucault's notion of power as "a multiplicity of force relations" and "the strategies in which the force relations obtain effects" (pp. 116, 120). But what, then, are "force relations"? Similarly, one thing a contemporary phronetic science is supposed to do is unmask relations of domination; but the normative criteria for picking out instances of domination remain unclear (p. 104). Flyvbjerg, like Foucault, wants to avoid using universalistic normative frames for addressing this issue. He contends that we need only appeal to the normative frames of "the communities in which we live." Without further explanation, however, this would seem to move us toward a position like Richard Rorty's, wherein political inquiries aim at clarifying the implications of authoritative traditions (p. 140). Flyvbjerg seems unaware of the potential tension here: Rorty castigates inquiry that busies itself with just the sort of systematic unmasking operations a phronetic social science undertakes.

Although I have difficulties with some of Flyvbjerg's claims, the book does an excellent job of bringing a whole range of timely methodological issues onto the table and of projecting a thoughtful vision of social science that runs counter to the hegemonic one. Proponents of the latter owe the discipline careful responses to proposals such as Flyvbjerg's. Failure to do so merely feeds the growing suspicion that what is at issue is not a justifiable hegemony but, rather, simply a coercive occupation of intellectual terrain.

The Vocations of Political Theory. Edited by Jason A. Frank and John Tambornino. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000. 400p. \$57.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

John G. Gunnell, State University of New York at Albany

A generation ago, Sheldon Wolin evoked an image of the vocation of political theory as an alternative to the behavioral program of theory and scientific inquiry that had come to dominate political science. His call also summoned those who believed that, in the midst of the political turmoil of the 1960s, the mainstream of the discipline had become politically quiescent and, at least by its inaction, even implicated in the political crises of the time. Intellectual and ideological choices were, indeed, involved, but Wolin was implicitly also giving voice to a professional identity for a large segment of the academic subfield of political theory that had been evolving for at least three decades. His articulation of the vocation was, however, as mythical as the method of science to which much of political science had subscribed, and these hegemonic legitimating myths ultimately could neither withstand critical scrutiny nor suppress the latent differences within each

The editors of this volume ask what has become of this vocation, and they are sometimes ambivalent about whether

they are referring to Wolin's epic image or to the character and condition of political theory as a professional university activity. Whatever their assumptions about the relationship between the two, their principal focus is on the latter. Although the editors state that the concerns "animating" the volume are "the character and status of contemporary political theory, its place in the academy and its role in public life,"(p. x) these matters are not explored very fully, either analytically or empirically, and the essays have difficulty staying on message.

With respect to the issue of the relationship between political theory and political science, the editors characterize their approach as "primarily theoretical and metatheoretical." (p. xxv) They claim that political theory should be relevant. but they point to the value of detachment and "question the assumption that political theory should avoid straying from direct engagement with current events." (p. xv) They stress the existence of "vocations" of political theory as well as the pluralistic and changing character of the field, which they believe warrants yet another assessment of its current state. This pluralism is attributed in part to the nature of the field but particularly to the contemporary diversity and flux within the domain of politics and to the proliferation of the political. Although the editors warily celebrate how eclecticism has enlivened political theory and contributed to its flourishing, they worry about dissolution of identity and about "our ability to speak of a vocation at all" (p. xiii-xiv). As with most credos of pluralism, there is an attempt to indicate some sense of unity and continuity, but they claim little more than an unspecified "family resemblance" among the many modes of theorizing.

The lead essay is by Wolin and focuses on this loss of identity. It also notes that the conference from which this volume derived was devoted to future political theorists and to the future of political theory and was a response to the "perennial uncertainty and controversy about political theory's relationship to political and social science, to philosophy, to history, as well as its relationship, if any, to the 'real' political world." The essay, which Wolin labels an "invocation" or "a response to a certain kind of loss," is not optimistic. (p. 5) He claims there is a danger that the vocation is about either "to lapse into dilettantism" or "to harden into professionalism" (p. 618). He viewed his original essay as partly a response to a political "crisis" and to a condition of undertheoretization and conformism, whereas we now face a situation marked by "overtheoretization."

According to Wolin, in a world in which "both theory and politics are ubiquitous and indeterminate" and "freed of the constraints of an overarching political," we have a "politics of multiplicity" and a concomitant "proliferation of theory" and diverse identities for "disjointed theorists" (pp. 9,11). As a consequence, political theory makes reference to real-world controversies, but "its engagement is with the conditions, or the politics, of the theoretical that it seeks to settle rather than with the political that is being contested.... It is postpolitical" (p. 15). Although the situation seems to be a classic case of overproduction and underconsumption, Wolin attributes these problems, as he has in earlier essays, less to the faults and failings of theorists than to the chaos and speed of modern life, to a "society without a paradigm," to a "utopian" era that paradoxically depends on the "perpetuation of dystopia" for the many. Can an invocation of the vocation of political theory aid us? Wolin suggests, "besides being fatuous, that call may be too late in the day." In the space and time between his two essays, "the academic intellectual has undergone a dizzying series of intellectual permutations." Varieties of political theory have "replicated the pace of technological change" and become a segment of the "brainy classes," who ultimately

perpetuate and benefit from the present and undemocratic condition of society (p. 21).

Wolin's image of the vocation was the theme on which the conference pivoted, but the other twelve essays—half by establishment scholars and half by ABDs and recent Ph.Ds—seldom directly engage his account. There is much discussion of theory, but it is often very abstract and reflects the very diversity of issues and perspectives that the editors and Wolin consider problematical.

Wendy Brown discusses Derrida and Benjamin while addressing the relationship between political thinking and forms of historical consciousness. J. Peter Euben, picking up on the more general dimension of Wolin's essay, speaks about the relationship between political theory and the sense of loss. Thomas Dumm explores the significance of loss in a more private or ordinary sense. David Mandell considers the relevance of the study of the history of political theory for thinking about contemporary issues. Linda Zerilli criticizes, from a Wittgensteinian perspective, the craving of feminist thought for generality and its neglect of the ordinary. Mark Brown examines the often contradictory ways in which political theorists have viewed natural science. Lon Troyer urges an ethos of political theory based less on any particular approach than on an attitude of provocation. Shane Gunster argues that political theory must aim at achieving the status of Gramscian "organic intellectuals." Samantha Frost discusses Hobbes as a vehicle for engaging contemporary issues regarding the embodied subject. Jill Locke attempts to bring political theory to bear on the public policy issue of using chain gangs. William Connolly seeks to extract democratic insight from the work of Nietzsche.

These are all lucid and credible essays, but the volume as a whole demonstrates that political theorists live lives of persistent and sometimes desperate cognitive dissonance as they seek to relate to both political science and politics and to come to grips with the disparity between their actual professional position and extravagant images of their vocation.

Public Reason: Mediated Authority in the Liberal State. By Fred M. Frohock. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 234p. \$35.00.

Albert W. Dzur, Western Michigan University

The hope of ordering collective purposes through rational speech stretches back to the earliest historical attempts at theorizing political practice. Public reason has been a particularly prominent theme in political theory for the last decade and is central to discussions of deliberative democracy. Recent work on public reason is motivated by the belief that contemporary political procedures lack adequate norms and spaces for public engagement in intelligent, informative civic debate sensitive to deep differences in values. Fred Frohock's thought-provoking book covers much familiar ground, yet it also contributes a number of key ideas and a dose of realism to a research program now in a stage of self-criticism.

John Rawls's *Political Liberalism* (1993) is in the background throughout this book as the best available theory of the liberal state and as the natural starting point for any critique and reconstruction of contemporary liberalism. Like Rawls, Frohock believes that liberal states must face up to the demands of pluralism and accommodate, in their "governing language," the multiple interpretations of the good that thrive in liberal societies. Unlike Rawls, Frohock rejects procedural solutions to the problem of pluralism. "Merit" forms of public reason that attempt to pare away from deliberation everything but what can be considered the "merit" of the particular political issue under debate fail because political

disputes under conditions of pluralism are indeterminant. Some disputes, such as those between prochoice and prolife in the abortion controversy, stem from different ways of legitimately interpreting key terms such as "person," "life," and "harm." Even advocates on both sides who wish to reach an agreement and who share the same moral and political language differ irreconcilably on their interpretations of these terms because of their different life experiences. Deliberative breakdowns are even more dramatic in cases where advocates do not even share the same conceptual language, as in the dispute between health-care professionals committed to biomedical models of thought and Christian Scientists who reject that model in favor of religious healing. Neither debate will be resolved by carefully sifting evidence and weighing the merits of competing arguments.

One of Frohock's targets is Rawls's attempt to distinguish, for the purposes of state action, comprehensive moral arguments from political claims. Like Gutmann and Thompson, whose very closely related work, Democracy and Disagreement (1996), he unfortunately does not engage, Frohock believes that moral disagreement is a legitimate feature of politics. In the abortion and religious healing cases there is no feasible way to distinguish the moral from the political, so suffused are the political issues in the moral experience of the disputants. Frohock is right to remark, "It is hard to see where the moral and political can be demarcated as these matters enter public space. Bracketing moral beliefs in these cases seems to remove the political dimensions also" (pp. 58-9). And he is right to point out the historically close connections between the languages of law, politics, and morality. It is probably necessary to admit, as Frohock encourages, that the state is "clearly a kind of moral undertaking" (p. 57). Harder to reach, at least without more argument, is Frohock's conclusion that when the state steps in to mandate lifesaving medical treatment for a child of Christian Scientist parents, it is rejecting the idea that prayer is a form of healing, and that when it permits the parents to decline such treatment the state is endorsing prayer as healing. Because officials and citizens in liberal states recognize the complicated trade-offs in cases like these, policy settlements simply do not place the state in one moral corner or another.

Under what conditions, then, can we expect legitimate resolution, if only temporary, for the long-term moral disagreements that mark our sharpest political debates? Frohock believes that closer attention to the narratives that shape individual lives is part of the answer. "Narrative conceptions of the self can also provide stories that summon common human experiences, and these stories may mediate the strong pluralism of liberal settings" (p. 100). Stories help unify selves and link people together through overarching themes. Frohock points out that the "great narratives of political experience can forge unity in describing and identifying the roles of persons in a universal political culture," even though they often "relax literal truth in favor of metaphor, symbols of various types, myths even" (p. 105). This emphasis on narratives, and how they integrate the social and the highly personal, is an important addition to the literature on deliberative democracy, which tends to overemphasize the power of rational discourse in forging agreement between persons with divergent interests or values. Frohock leaves open many important questions about how, exactly, narratives challenge our "understandings of evidence, inference and public space" (p. 106). The ideal of public reason seeks the "peculiar merger of self and process" found in a good conversation and hopes to absorb individuals "into the talk that uses and crafts collective arrangements" (p. 113). This formulation is suggestive and warrants closer analysis of the constraints on and the risks of such an ideal under conditions of normal politics, where some narratives have

been historically marginalized and others given unchosen and unreflective dominance.

Another solution to the problem of moral disagreement is mediation: "Connections among persons and outcomes in deliberative procedures often require third parties, figures who are to some degree outside of the relationships among persons seeking a collective outcome but are vital to a successful outcome" (p. 203). Mediators can "move the conversation to a deeper inquiry" that may motivate personal changes and help resolve disputes (p. 203). Mediation, therefore, can be "a powerful source of collective experience" (p. 204). The ideal of context-oriented, nonadversarial, minimally hierarchical mediation is the book's strongest positive contribution to research on public deliberation, which has much to learn from the role mediators play in actual contexts of conflict resolution. Frohock exemplifies mediation with the bioethics deliberations of hospital ethics committees, which seek to resolve disputes over treatment plans between patients and health-care workers. This well-chosen example shows how complex mediation is, however, and how vulnerable to the institutional context in which it is embedded. Frohock notes that bioethics mediation is limited by the traditional purposes of medicine—keeping people alive—and by legal constraints, but he pays less attention to the fact that this mediation is also limited by an institutional context that privileges the biomedical model above other "narratives" and grants the physician far more discretionary power than any other participant in mediation. Further, Frohock might have gone farther in discussing the great demands placed on mediators. In the case of medicine the bioethics consultant must be familiar with the language of medicine and the pluralistic languages of patients, must be attentive to the highly personal elements of patient care as well as their social dimensions, and must be aware of legal constraints on patient and physician decision. Such demands are not unique to mediators in medicine. Very similar demands are faced by mediators in the criminal justice domain, such as those who work in victim-offender mediation. Such complexity suggests that mediation may best be seen not as an individual role, as Frohock implies, but rather as something that requires a good deal of structural support.

A methodological merit of this work is its attention to ground-level cases of moral disagreement. Especially attractive is the use of examples drawn from the medical domain, with which Frohock is exceptionally well acquainted. This domain has had a flourishing normative discourse for more than three decades. Political theorists can gain much from paying more attention to the role of ethics consulation and the many political aspects of bioethics discourse in hospitals, clinics, and wider public arenas. Methodological merits and suggestive discussions of narrative and mediation aside, however, the book is difficult to recommend to someone with only a general interest in political theory because Frohock begins in media res with intricate discussions that demand a strong background in contemporary debates over liberalism. The book offers more to those with particular interests in liberalism and in public deliberation, though the latter audience will miss the wide and deep engagement with both critics and advocates of deliberative democracy that is needed at this stage of the research program.

The Enemy with a Thousand Faces: The Tradition of the Other in Western Political Thought and History. By Vilho Harle. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 232p. \$59.95.

David Boucher, Cardiff University

This book is part of a much larger collaborative project devoted to "Otherness, Identity, and Politics." It explores an

aspect of identity theory, about which the author makes two uncontentious claims: first, that identity is socially and politically constituted and, second, that identity politics predate 1989. By delimiting a theme in Western political thought and history that constructs the "I" and the "thou" in terms of good and evil, the book identifies and delimits a tendency to portray the Other as an enemy, evil incarnate, and dehumanized by a combination of religious and political ideas. The tradition of understanding the Self and the Other as the vehicles of good and evil is reproduced in thought, speech, and action and constitutes a continuous tradition from ancient Iranian Zoroastrianism, through Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

The book is a work of synthesis, constructed largely from a wide variety of secondary sources, with little evidence of a familiarity with the primary works, with the notable exception of the chapter on Carl Schmitt. The assumption throughout is that we know more about a particular thought or action by pointing out that similar thoughts and actions happen elsewhere. It is a construction based on resemblances at the level of conclusions, without any serious attempt, and deliberately excludes any serious attempt, to explore the reasons for arriving at the conclusions, in order to avoid the "mere description of the unique case" (p. 10). It is interesting, for example, to know that Cicero did not justify war, especially on religious grounds, unlike ancient Hebrew thought and Zoroastrianism. Politics, and not war, was central in his idea of national identity. Why Cicero held these views is left unexplored, and unless you already know, it remains a mystery.

As the author presents it, he has constituted a tradition based upon coincidences, rather than substantive connections. The continuity of the tradition is not demonstrated, but assumed from the soundings taken in different historical periods, considerable distances apart in both space and time. The Middle Ages gets particularly cursory treatment on the eccentric and idiosyncratic grounds that it is an elusive period between the ancient and the contemporary worlds, stretching from the early Christians to Edmund Burke, as the first "modern" representative of the tradition. There is a great body of literature on what constitutes a tradition, and the criteria that have to be met before one can talk in terms of authors belonging to such traditions (see John Gunnell, Political Theory: Tradition and Interpretation, 1979; C. Condren, The Status and Appraisal of Classic Texts, 1985). For Harle, the existence of a tradition is unproblematic. A resemblance between the thought of one period and that of another, or the thought in one geographical location and that in another, is sufficient evidence of the "use" or "application" (p. 53) of the tradition, or of the influence of one set of ideas upon another. Is, for example, self-consciousness, or self-awareness, a criterion of belonging to a tradition? If so, authors have to be shown to be, at least in principle, conscious of their use of the vocabulary and concepts. Even in making such connections, to follow Ricoeur, are we doing no more than constructing a quasi-world of texts, distanced from their authors and the contexts in which they were produced? Indeed, Harle deliberately distances the ideas he reiterates by presenting them at a high level of generality, in order to highlight their similarities. Take just one example as illustrative of what is lost in dealing with generalities abstracted from their contexts. The author suggests that the rhetoric surrounding the conquest of the American Indians "reproduces the tradition" he is discussing (p. 72). What is important for Harle is the dehumanisation of the Indians, the representation of the Other as alien and inferior. What is of significance, however, is how a complete adjustment of the European cosmology had to be changed as a result of the discovery of the Americas, and how it generated modern theories of property, such as those of Grotius and Locke, which justified the appropriation of land in the

Americas. First, the discovery of a fourth race of people was contrary to the teachings of the Bible, which taught that Africans, Asians, and Europeans were the descendants of the three sons of Noah. The question of whether the Indians were human was a real theological dilemma. Given that their lands were being conquered, to constitute a legitimate claim to appropriation, and to have that claim respected in international law, or the law of nation, the question of land ownership became paramount. On this question is was claimed that Indians were not human, or that they were children, heathen, or insane, all of which would disqualify them from land ownership. The Spanish theologian Vitoria denied all of these grounds for the appropriation of Indian land but allowed appropriation on the grounds of just war. Practically, this had the same effect as allowing appropriation on the other grounds. To prevent free passage through one's land was a violation of the law of nature and constituted an act of war, which allows combatants to seize lands. It is true, then, that the Indians as Other were constituted as the enemy, but we could hardly claim to have understood why without knowing that it was in order to justify the appropriation of their lands.

Harle's book is not without illuminating insights, and interesting pieces of information that give an indication of different ways of thinking from the West, such as that of Islam. At a time when Jihad has become so thoroughly part of the lingua franca of the age, it is important to be reminded that it does not simply mean holy war. The great Jihad in Islam represents the religious quest for righteousness and goodness in all aspects of life. The small Jihad is the duty to defend Islam with weapons and is related to the idea of just war. War between Islamic countries (harb) is regulated by strict ethical considerations, whereas between an Islamic state and a nonbeliever state (razzia) ethical rules are suspended and any methods for defeating the enemy are permissible.

As an interesting catalog of ideas on the ways in which evil is represented in a variety of cultures, as manifest in the enemy, or Other, the book serves a useful purpose and is a valuable resource. It is, however, methodologically and theoretically naïve.

Natural Law Theories in the Early Enlightenment. By T. J. Hochstrasser. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 246p. \$54.95.

Michael J. Seidler, Western Kentucky University

This detailed historical study focuses on Protestant natural law theories in the early German Enlightenment (explicitly excluding the French and British sectors) and traces their influence, or fate, through Kant. Despite its title, it is more than a specialist tome devoted to an historically isolable development, and it is not merely a subsidiary, underlaborer's attempt to recount the prehistory of Kant's achievement. Rather, by tracing several important background currents through the period concerned, Hochstrasser illuminates the odd historical fact that German enlighteners at the end of this span knew or thought so little of those at its beginning. The central topics are eclecticism; the so-called "histories of morality" that were part of its self-conscious legitimation method; the rationalism-voluntarism split in early modern natural law; and the associated distinction among moral philosophy (ethics), natural (positive) law, and international law (ius gentium) that developed out of these debates.

Some of these topics have been treated before, but others remain nearly unknown, at least in the Anglo-American realm. There is a growing literature on so-called early modern natural law theory, but eclecticism as a philosophical method has received little attention in English. Moreover, the many

histories of morality that appeared (mainly in Latin) during the late Seventeenth and early Eighteenth centuries are even less familiar, both individually and as a pervasive intellectual phenomenon sui generis. Hochstrasser is the first to tackle this body of work and to expound its historical and philosophical significance.

The book contains six chapters whose rich detail might have been better reflected in an expanded table of contents. Chapter 1 establishes the connections among the main themes: natural law, eclecticism, history and theory, and the influence of debates about these topics on university reform and the politics of enlightened absolutism. It ends with an appendix listing the main "histories of morality" consulted. Chapter 2 examines Pufendorf's intellectual method and intentions, particularly his Specimen controversiarum (1678), which was the first and, indeed, paradigmatic instance of moral historiography in the service of philosophical argument. The third chapter compares Leibniz and Pufendorf, not merely their famous disagreement about the nature of obligation but also the underlying moral epistemologies that determined their respective intellectualist and voluntarist approaches.

In chapter 4, Hochstrasser details the metamorphosis of Pufendorfian jurisprudence in Christian Thomasius and his school, including the formal commitment to eclecticism as a self-critical intellectual method most suited for practical reforms. Chapter 5 shows how Wolff and his followers (including Vattel) transmuted voluntarist natural law into rationalist, metaphysical forms directly opposed by its founders. It also describes how the melding of rationalist and voluntarist traditions in Brucker's influential history of philosophy began, already, to obscure the important role of Pufendorf and Thomasius. The final chapter traces eclecticism into the Popularphilosophie of Meiners and Garve, explores Kant's understanding of the history of philosophy, and clarifies the inhospitality of pure reason to natural law as such. Moreover, it iterates the continuing linkage between these abstract discussions and more worldly contestation over academic disciplinary status and, indirectly, social policy. The chapter ends with a look at the Kantianized histories of moral philosophy by Stäudlin, Buhle, and Tennemann, in which natural lawyers and eclectics are barely noted and, ironically, their work is mistaken for the neoscholastic, quasitheological orthodoxies that they opposed.

The sheer range of this book and its ability to fold such a variety of intellectual developments into a coherent account are its chief recommendation. Several features deserve specific mention as notable contributions to the scholarly literature. One is Hochstrasser's careful analysis of the so-called Boineburg correspondence. This important epistolary exchange in the early 1660s—among the German constitutional lawyer Hermann Conring, Baron von Boineburg (Leibniz's patron at Mainz), the Grotian expositor J. H. Böcler, and Pufendorf-resulted in the latter's abandonment of a formal, quasimathematical method for one argumentatively more engaged with historical predecessors. There is nothing as detailed and informative in the English literature, and Hochstrasser's treatment sets a high standard for such background studies, which are so necessary for understanding the evolution of ideas.

Another feature is Hochstrasser's excellent articulation of Pufendorf's sociality principle in terms of his empirical account of language acquisition and the associated development of human rationality through a socialized cultura animi. This, too, is an unusual and powerful focus that shows Pufendorf to be about twenty years ahead of Locke (in his opposition to innatism and his analysis of complex, abstract ideas), and it rightly exhibits the contingency at the heart of Pufendorfian natural law that so irritated his theological,

rationalist, and (later) even transcendental opponents (i.e., Kant), who were all absolutists in their own way. By noting the dependence of (even) language and rationality upon a kind of double contract (consistency, veracity) similar to that grounding the state (association, submission), it exhibits well the experience-based conventionalism, or controlled voluntarism, that elaborates the meaning of sociality at different levels of Pufendorf's natural law framework.

Some of Hochstrasser's concepts and distinctions still need sharpening. The notion of "imposition" in Alberti and Pufendorf, and in the divine and human instances (even among humans), is not quite the same. The claimed divergence of ethics from natural law and international law—a result of these debates—also depends on particular interpretive commitments whose potential divergence is not always noted. Even the central notion of voluntarism seems philosophically underdetermined at times, as Hochstrasser moves from the voluntarism "excluded" (p. 104) from Pufendorf's moral epistemology to Kant's "frontal assault" (p. 198) on the voluntarist moral histories in which Pufendorf was central. Ironically, this problem arises because Hochstrasser, unlike the histories he canvasses, may be too historical and insufficiently philosophical. That is, he sometimes takes thinkers or ideas too much on their own or their respective expositors' terms. Yet, without a stronger interpretative or philosophical preference, also reflected in a consistent terminology, the narrative gets redefined too often, and the reader winds up conceptually stranded, without a general vantage point.

The problem is occasional, however, and does not undermine the intelligibility brought by this excellent study to an historical period still lacking in plausible panoptic perspectives. The work rests on a wide and deep scholarship conversant with the primary and secondary literature in many languages. It is well written and carefully produced, and it will become an important tool in the field.

Encountering Tragedy: Rousseau and the Project of Democratic Order. By Steven Johnston. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 189p. \$29.95.

Lori Jo Marso, Union College

Rousseau is known as both exalted democrat and father of totalitarianism. Steven Johnston's book demonstrates that the two interpretations cannot be separated. Johnston evaluates Rousseau's texts hoping that the "costs of Rousseau's virtuous republic, many of them hidden or muted, can be reckoned alongside its accomplishments" (p. x.). Not surprisingly, Rousseau's accomplishments are called into question. This elegantly written and forcefully argued book claims that order is the essential ingredient in Rousseau's recipe for democracy. Developing the argument via Nietzsche's tragic perspective, Johnston wonders aloud whether all attempts at democracy will collapse under the weight of their internal contradictions.

Resisting the urge to simply "upbraid Rousseau," Johnston promises to "rethink and radicalize certain aspects of his thought" (p. 3). His focus highlights tragic elements inherent in Rousseau's theorization of the state of nature, the politics of the founding, the role of government, and the existence of enmity. Describing the "phantasmic life" tragedy enjoys in the "interstices" of Rousseau's work, Johnston claims that tragedy manifests itself at "untimely moments" (p. ix). Marginalization ensues from promises of freedom, domination springs from equality, difference rears its ugly head in the quest for identity, arbitrariness haunts legitimacy, cruelty accompanies virtue, and on these dilemmas continue (p. ix). To characterize this sequence as loss, failure, or unfulfilled promise, however, misses Johnston's point. He argues that tragedy is "inescapable, inevitable, inexorable, and—what is

more—commonplace, even banal.... Tragedy lies in wait, an inevitable concomitant to human exertions and projects" (p. 9). If the tragic is all too human, as it were, Rousseau could not do otherwise than to manifest tragic elements in his thought. How, then, does Johnston, radicalize Rousseau? Can he, as he claims, "enlist Rousseau as an ally against himself?" (p. 3).

Johnston's chapter "On Government" aptly illustrates his method. Johnston does well to employ Letter to D'Alembert, Political Economy, Considerations on the Government of Poland, and Constitutional Project for Corsica to "think about the political dicta of The Social Contract in terms of the principles and practices of governmentality that permeate these works" (p. 76). Here he moves from Rousseau's specific examples to consider again his general theoretical exposition. Johnston claims that this approach will "tame the seductive rhetorical powers of The Social Contract" (p. 77). Indeed it does. The way Johnston constructs his argument, with help from a 1978 lecture by Foucault titled "Governmentality," one might think that Rousseau's dictates on sovereignty and the art and role of government were written expressly to illustrate the dangers governing oneself poses in this newly exposed Foucaultian universe. As Johnston puts it, "Rousseauian practices of government presuppose and engender relations of reciprocal subjugation more than autonomous determination" (p. 89).

How could this happen? Isn't government, in Rousseau's formulation, intrinsically dangerous, mandated to operate merely at the behest and in the service of sovereignty? Were we to read only The Social Contract, we might conclude that Rousseau recognizes the dangers of government and the constant power struggle between the forces of government and sovereignty. Yet even within these pages Rousseau hints at an "algebra of order" in claiming that the "modern age, with its humongous states, does not lend itself to the pursuit of republicanism" (p. 83). The government must be "relatively stronger in proportion as the people is more numerous" (The Social Contract, p. 80; cited by Johnston, p. 84). Political activity in such large states fails to mold citizen behavior and government steps in to fill the void. Johnston's attention to the 'specific, the contemporary, the local, the empirical" (p. 100), as Rousseau explores in the essays on Poland and Corsica and Letter to D'Alembert, reveals that the citizen is not formed through the political activity of enacting and engaging in sovereignty. Instead, the citizen is produced "through disciplinary processes centering on the regulation of bodies in public space" (p. 98). Military discipline takes the lead in Considerations on the Government of Poland; in the essay on Corsica, citizens are created through service in the corvée; Letter to D'Alembert illustrates the "panoptical architecture" of the marriage festival (p. 103). "Here the subject-citizen is disclosed as the contrivance of power—an artifice to be constructed more than an essence to be realized.... The art of government rather than the exercise of sovereignty is responsible for its manufacture" (p. 87).

Johnston's argument that Rousseau accomplishes what he

Johnston's argument that Rousseau accomplishes what he appears to least desire is convincing. In the chapter "On Enmity" we discover that the enemy is always within; the "republic's enemies seem to be proliferating at an alarming rate" (p. 139). Thus while Rousseau rightfully fears the encroaching arm of government, he reproduces its tactics in creating and encouraging the art of government to form his citizens. Though he desires a virtuous republic, the battle each citizen must fight within himself (against individual will), against women (effeminacy), and against all signifiers of difference yields an uncompromising totality where freedom requires total submission.

But must the analysis end here? Johnston hints that a "full-bodied democratic politics" may be "newly capable of finess-

ing" the "tragedies of social and political life" (p. 24). Yet the reader is never offered as much as a nod in the direction toward creating this new politics. In fact, we are told the contrary: Any political community is "an arbitrary, contingent artifact;" we are not meant "to live one way rather than another, ruled by this set of values rather than that one" (p. 5). We have learned here that violence, cruelty, and enmity are at the heart of democratic politics. How, then, and why might we be moved to take any political action whatsoever? The intellectual exercise performed by Johnston is a treat to read. Yet this reader wonders where we go from here politically. Rousseau, above all else, insists that we demand attention and commitment to the ways in which a more democratic politics might be theorized and the spaces in which it might be enacted. Despite the valuable insights into Rousseau that Johnston reveals, the limitations of this form of theorizing also lie exposed. A Social Contract completely purged of its seductive power doesn't leave us any space for imagining and enacting new forms of community.

The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies. By Robert E. Lane. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. 466p. \$42.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.

Conrad P. Waligorski, University of Arkansas

Happiness, unhappiness, and depression are not the usual foci of political science or economics, but Robert Lane demonstrates their importance. The Loss of Happiness in Market Democracies is a worthy companion to and extension of Lane's earlier work, especially The Market Experience (1991). Lane employs psychology, genetics, evolutionary theory, and medical research to convince economists and democratic theorists that biological and psychological research can enrich their often unrealistic assumptions about well-being and behavior. He argues that in affluent societies there is growing unhappiness, growing depression, and declining marginal utility of income to produce happiness. These are accompanied by mistrust and increasing political negativity, which further undermine happiness. The dominant Western image of individualism ignores that people often do not know what makes them happy, which undermines prevailing market and democratic premises (p. 284).

What has caused this? Lane's discussion of genetics and evolved needs is speculative but plausible, in part because the author is careful to ascribe no more than 40% to 60% of behavior to genetics. He emphasizes instead the mutual influence of endowment and environment. "We have violated evolutionary instructions and we have devalued our children" (p. 37). Affluent, market-democratic humanity has subordinated the need for companionship to acquisition, and the result is insufficient and declining companionship and a "social, occupational, and internally generated" (p. 47) stress response with which we cannot cope. Money and economic growth cannot buy happiness, are not substitutes for intimacy, and do not relieve loneliness. In the process, we have subjected children to increased depression and unhappiness.

Lane effectively argues that neither an ever more compulsive pursuit of market rewards nor, unfortunately, what he calls market (parliamentary) democracy provide an answer. Rather, as presently constituted, they exacerbate our difficulties. Markets make people unhappy (p. 139, pp. 159–92). Democracy is difficult and often painful (pp. 220–45), although some of its pains are true of all political systems, and it does not provide effective self-determination or the close companionship needed to deal with unhappiness and depression. Beyond the [ever shifting?] poverty level, satisfaction with one's family life and interpersonal relations contributes more to subjective well-being than added income,

the market, or democracy. Democracy, however, is still relevant to individuals. It can support the behavior that generates companionship, intimacy, and a sense of control over one's life. In itself, this is a great deal.

Lane's "purpose... is to diagnose the problem and not to offer remedies" (p. 335), but his many suggestions lead one to hope that his next book will examine remedies. Lane believes that the "decline in happiness... is likely to be ephemeral" (p. 321). Several times he analyzes "Companionship or Income" and felicity versus income (pp. 77, 125), arguing people must trade some income to create conditions conducive to happiness, but he does not discuss the institutional and ideological changes necessary to support this trade-off. His goal is a "companionable society" (p. 332) in which people realize that there are multiple goods, all of which contribute to democracy and happiness. Democratic government cannot create companionship but can do other things that support such a society, including the creation of "lifeframes" that sustain the "microworlds" of experience, perhaps something like the traditional liberal distinction between state and society.

Although strongly recommend this book, it would have been strengthened if Lane had explored alternatives to current market democracy, had more fully examined the relation between macrophenomena and the "microworlds" of daily experience, and had expanded his analysis of market thinking as ideology and influence.

Perhaps democracies directly contribute little to subjective well-being because the dominant model is limited and often perceived as unresponsive. Although it is not his purpose, beyond a few comments Lane does not address the participatory current in democratic theory—including Aristotle, Jefferson, Mill, Dewey, and Benjamin Barber—that claims democracy can educate and train the citizen. Lane agrees that education is a primary government duty and contribution to happiness, but he slights the participatory heritage and the possibility that small group democracy, even if all will not participate, can expand one's sense of control and companionship.

Lane contends that the microworlds of experience are the locus in which we experience satisfaction. Yet, in numerous places he examines large-scale phenomena that also have an effect. These include unemployment and especially its effect on children, the Great Depression (p. 52), severe economic reversals (p. 62), economic insecurity (pp. 71, 112), "anxiety about the future" (p. 108), and "individualistic doctrine" (pp. 283, 111). Thus, Lane recognizes the larger environment, but he could fully incorporate it into his analysis by examining in detail the interaction between macro and micro levels. This is crucial because, despite popular claims that citizen and consumer are sovereign, everyone is immersed—born, educated, work, and die—in large-scale institutions that individuals are more or less powerless to affect.

Lane is fully cognizant of the often detrimental influence of economic thinking on political analysis, and he criticizes the economistic fallacy that happiness is "proportionate to income" (p. 64), but he does not systematically examine the market ideology that dominates how many people perceive and seek to shape the world. This theory assumes an acquisitive human nature; justifies distribution and differential rewards; encourages self-interest; claims individuals are powerful; defines freedom, equality, and democracy; shapes what we perceive as problems and acceptable solutions to them; and frequently denigrates government and politics. Its popular form teaches joy through consumption: This car or toothpaste bring sexual fulfillment; your children will be happy and love you if you take them to that hamburger place. As Lane repeatedly states, this is not so; more income or goods do not bring happiness or relieve depression. Yet, constant messages

that consumption brings happiness may affect satisfaction, depression, and the intimate relations that Lane emphasizes. To paraphrase John Kenneth Galbraith (Affluent Society, 1958, 1998), there is no systematic propaganda for friendship, companionship, or trading income for time to promote closeness.

This is a balanced, nuanced book that blends normative and empirical theory. It leaves much room for active government and interventionist policy, and it reminds us that political and economic ideas are not autonomous. This imaginative, multidisciplinary contribution questions almost everyone's presuppositions about a decent life.

**The Multiculturalism of Fear.** By Jacob T. Levy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 268p. \$29.95.

Jeff Spinner-Halev, University of Nebraska

Jacob Levy argues that the multiculturalism of fear is meant to supplement, not displace, the multiculturalism of rights. Running against many recent celebrations of ethnic identity, Levy is wary of the effects that ethnic (which includes national) identity can have. Too often ethnic politics are cruel and conflictual. Levy is skeptical that a world where everyone's ethnic identity is politically recognized can be peaceful and harmonious. Yet neither can we simply wish ethnic identity away. While cultural identities are socially constructed, they are very much part of our world and so they must be dealt with. "The multiculturalism of fear," Levy writes, "does see ethnic communities as morally important and distinctive, not because of what they provide for individuals, but because of what they risk doing to common social and political life" (p. 33).

Ethnic groups are dangerous, yet they are a part of our world. The result is that we should try to minimize the harm they do. A multiculturalism of fear, directly inspired by the late Judith Shklar's liberalism of fear, focuses our attention on the ways in which groups are victims of cruelty and humiliation because of their ethnicity. For example, Levy argues that when India changed the name of Bombay to Mumbai, it was done to reassert the city's Hindu identity in a way that was meant to taunt the city's many non-Hindu residents. A multiculturalism of rights may have little to say about name changes like this, since this change of names did not violate anyone's rights. The multiculturalism of fear, however, is attentive to the tensions between ethnic groups and can tell us why seemingly innocuous name changes should be resisted. This is an important insight on the usefulness of a multiculturalism of fear.

Related to the multiculturalism of fear (though exactly how is never spelled out) is Levy's negative consequentionalist argument. Levy cites Montesquieu as teaching us that laws are often a bad way to change customs; that rewards and incentives are better ways to do so. Outlawing a long-standing custom may have worse consequences than allowing it unaltered or perhaps in a modified form. For example, some immigrant women from Africa recently asked their doctors in the Seattle area to perform a mild version of female circumcision on their daughters. Levy argues that the doctors were right to agree to do so (though they changed their minds under public pressure), because this incision would not have harmed sexual intercourse, sexual pleasure, or childbirth. In a perfect world the question of such an incision would never arise. But we must, Levy warns us, deal with the cultural and religious realities as they do exist. The alternative to the incision performed in the Seattle hospital was, for many of these families, to return to their country of origin to have the cutting under the control of their traditional grandmothers.

Surely it is better to have the cutting performed by the Seattle doctors.

This is an insightful argument, but it is underdeveloped. Levy is not willing to allow all cultural practices to exist. When the rights of women are violated, then direct intervention is called for. This leaves the reader wanting to hear more. What if stopping these rights violations has terrible consequences? Or if we can successfully stop the violations of women's rights in certain cultures, why not also directly stop patriarchal norms?

Just as the negative consequentionalist argument is not spelled out enough, so too the contours of the multiculturalism of fear are left unfilled. Levy's argument on name changes is one of few examples of how the multiculturalism of fear works. In fact, Levy's fear argument is prominent only in the first two chapters and then a little in the last one; it is rarely mentioned in the five chapters in between. While the theoretical framework tying the book together is uneven, this book has considerable insights into multicultural arguments. Levy is an incisive critic, with an extraordinary command of cases from throughout the world and a firm grasp on the many arguments for nationalism and cultural rights. Levy is a fox, not a hedgehog. The reader will not learn one big thing from this book, but she will learn many smaller (and worthwhile) things. Levy's book travels through arguments against liberal nationalism and liberal arguments for cultural rights, land, indigenous law, and official apologies.

Levy is particularly insightful when he dissects the categories used in a variety of cultural rights arguments. His description of the different kinds of indigenous laws, and their uses and abuses, and his discussion of the several possible approaches to ethnic symbolism are first rate; so too is the powerful chapter on classifying cultural rights. This chapter, already well known in a previously published form, is a grand tour through the different kinds of cultural rights available and can be used a basic starting point in the cultural rights debates. Yet the normative implications of this chapter are too briefly discussed, and its relationship to the multiculturalism of fear is left unclear.

The relationship between theories of rights and theories of fear is also underexplored. In Levy's well-argued chapters against liberal nationalism and cultural rights, he appears to be against the multiculturalism of rights. Levy is willing to allow group rights only when the alternative is worse; he does not think that cultural membership in itself has much moral worth. Yet sometimes it seem like the liberalism of rights trumps the multiculturalism of fear. Levy gently argues that giving territorial self-government rights to indigenous peoples causes a problem with local minorities, raises concerns about the individual rights of tribal members, creates boundaries problems, and restricts the mobility of nonmembers (which Levy counts as a liberal right). While Levy briefly invokes the multiculturalism of fear argument to justify this position, one might think that the fear argument works the other way: That it is cruel and humiliating to take away or withhold territorial self-government from indigenous peoples. And there is, of course, substantial evidence that doing so has negative consequences for indigenous peoples.

Nonetheless, Levy's chapter on indigenous law, like his chapter on land, pushes political theorists in directions in which we normally do not go. Land, in particular, is a difficult subject that few political theorists have tackled, and Levy's argument provides an excellent juxtaposition of liberal and nationalist views on territory. Here and elsewhere, Levy's willingness to take on a broad range of subjects and arguments will provide readers with many occasions to pause and ponder as they read this richly rewarding book.

Community, Solidarity, and Belonging: Levels of Community and Their Normative Significance. By Andrew Mason. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 246p. \$59.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

#### Russell Muirhead, Harvard University

Communitarianism has long suffered from vagueness: what is community? What about it, if anything, is necessary or good? What are the boundaries of morally relevant communities? Often those who attend to the claims of community tender these questions with too little rigor. Not so Andrew Mason. His new book has three main purposes: to map the meaning of community, to assess the claims of political community in relation to communities below the level of the state, and to evaluate the claims of political communities with respect to the global community. In addition to a number of rigorous and thoughtful clarifications and a comprehensive overview of recent debates between liberalism and its critics, the book offers arguments of its own which are often more bold than its judicious manner suggests. It deserves careful attention by all who have attempted to sort through the tensions between liberalism and community.

As those who are familiar with his work know, Mason wields a sharp analytic knife (Explaining Political Disagreement, 1993; Ideals of Equality, 1998). In the first part of Community, Solidarity, and Belonging, he uses this to advantage by clarifying the distinction between ordinary and moralized conceptions of community. Ordinary community refers to a group of individuals who share some values, possess a way of life in common, identify with the group, and recognize each other as members of the group. The moralized concept contains all of these but adds solidarity or mutual concern. In a moral community, individuals "give each other's interests non-instrumental weight" (p. 27). Mason also distinguishes among different levels of community, including those below the level of the state (such as minority cultures), those at the level of the state (political communities), and those at a global level (a community of states). These inform the questions at the center of the book: What community should government encourage at the level of the state? and How should political community accommodate communities below and above it?

Aiming to balance the protection of rights with a sense of belonging among citizens, Mason advocates what he calls the "inclusive political community." This is meant to be a practical model, not an impossible ideal. It squarely faces the practical difficulty that arises when liberal states contain communities within them that endorse illiberal views. Perhaps it would be ideal if citizens converged on one (liberal) concept of justice, if their togetherness came from something like moral reasoning. But a workable model of political community must take people much as they are—divided, not only by interest but also by cultural affiliation, and therefore unlikely to agree about either principles of right or conceptions of the good. These divisions are the real matter of politics.

Amid such disagreement, Mason aims not for principles of justice that all can accept but, rather, for a policy of accommodating communities below the level of the state. He claims that recognizing and including groups, often on their own terms, would cultivate a widespread sense of belonging. The policy Mason has in mind comes into sharp focus in matters of education. In a tempered endorsement of multicultural education, Mason recommends a "pluralist" school system where schools are permitted to endorse particular cultures. He says, "the pluralist model maintains that it is legitimate for teachers to evaluate the ideas of different cultures from some particular perspective, find them wanting and dismiss them" (p. 151). While subject to some constraint (such as a bar on propagating racist or sexist notions in the classroom), Mason

would go a long way to accommodate specific cultural groups. "In certain circumstances," Mason writes, "there may be a strong case for stopping schools from teaching that the holocaust never happened because this would undermine a sense of belonging, but it is less clear that there could be similar reasons for preventing schools from teaching that creationism is true" (p. 161; italics added). Yet the standard for education should not be a sense belonging, but truth. Against Mason, one might insist that in no circumstances should schools teach what is obviously false—and that those, for instance, who cannot abide by the fact that the Holocaust never happened do not merit a sense of belonging.

Indeed, the extent of accommodation Mason recommends gives a fragile cast to his liberal commitment to protect rights. He argues, for instance, that the content and meaning of rights should come from citizens, not lawyers and judges (pp. 81-2, 90). Fair enough, politics has its place, one which philosophy and jurisprudence are often too ready to usurp. Yet in practice this can be a slippery distinction. Although Mason has in mind a kind of dialogue (not the tussle of interest groups), real politics rarely resembles the openness or reflection of nice discussions. To render rights the prey of political dialogue may denude rights of their symbolic and institutional force. It's an open question whether the broad "liberal perspective" Mason affirms can survive the degree of accommodation that he calls for and continue to count as a liberal doctrine (p. 9). A more direct argument on behalf of maintaining a sense of belonging is needed if we are to fully grasp why, when rights and the claims of cultural minorities conflict, we should relax a commitment to enforcing rights.

Why should liberals care whether nonliberal minorities "feel at home" in the liberal state? One reason might be strategic: The demands of holding polities together might require some condescension from liberal principles. Yet the hand of necessity is not always so near, and in fact Mason's argument is motivated not only by empirical concerns about political unity, but also by a principled commitment to inclusion. This, in turn, would seem to reflect a particular interpretation of moral equality. Since the consequences of these commitments are profound, their justification needs to be made more visible.

The scope of accommodation, for instance, will depend on the way inclusion is justified. If the argument for accommodation is simply strategic, it might apply only where liberalism has a real fight on its hands and thus needs to accommodate. In other places, where liberalism is dominant, liberals may have the luxury of indulging illiberal groups in their midst. Yet to persuade them to grant such indulgences—or further, to persuade readers that protecting rights can be an act of cultural imperialism (pp. 85, 90)—will take a more principled argument about rights and justice than Mason offers. Indeed, Mason raises vital doubts about "the notion of public justifiability" on which many liberals lean so hard (p. 69). Following these doubts through to the full arguments that underlie them would lend stronger support to the book's provocative recommendations. As it stands, this work subtly nudges liberalism's self-image while reminding readers that the politics of protecting liberal rights while accommodating nonliberal groups remains a vexing mix.

Justice and Punishment: The Rationale of Coercion. By Matt Matravers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 286p. \$70.00.

Jean Bethke Elshtain, University of Chicago

Justice and Punishment begins promisingly. Matt Matravers notes that the question—"Why and by what right, do some

people punish others?"—is "not a new question. The problem of punishment is one of the most enduring in political theory" (p. 1). But over the years, punishment theory has been separated from moral and political philosophy more generally. The upshot is that both punishment theory and moral and political philosophy have suffered. To put things right, Matravers avers, any adequate theory of punishment "must be rooted in a broader moral theory, and that broader moral theory will be ... constructivist" (p. 1). It is the task of his book to explore why and how this is so.

It is undeniably the case, as Matravers insists, that normative political philosophy has been dominated for three decades or more by theories of justice. But these theories, including John Rawls's signal achievement, have concentrated on distributive justice and questions of retributive justice have been excluded. Why is this the case? Matravers has an answer: The separation occurred because "contemporary theories of justice cannot explain the relationship of justice and morality more broadly conceived" (p. 2). This seems a way to restate the problem rather than to offer an answer. But the problem itself is stated clearly: Absent an overall moral context within which to situate both distributive and retributive accounts, such accounts become less connected to, or intelligible to, one another. Going their own separate ways impoverishes each.

Matravers builds his case by exploring, first, what is at stake in the debate between consequentialism and retributivism—the dominant ways of construing the punishment task as an autonomous enterprise. But must one choose one or the other? Are these approaches mutually exclusively? Matravers argues that, no, they are not and that each captures insights that any comprehensive theory must take into consideration. Indeed, second, any account, to be compelling, must incorporate what he calls a "correct understanding" of what is due to responsible moral agents. Is there something like what Simone Weil would call a right to punishment? (Surprisingly, Matravers does not reference Weil, this despite the fact that punishment features centrally in her major treatise, *The Need for Roots*.)

Contemporary punishment theory is a failure because, no matter how the question is refracted, the need to integrate and to justify an account of punishment within a larger overall theory is ignored. Matravers' first five chapters are devoted to the critical task of showing the internal weaknesses and flaws in current accounts, whether consequentialist or retributivist; whether justice is construed as impartial or mutually self-interested. Chapters 6 through 9 offer his constructivist theory of moral norms, going on to locate coercion and punishment within the framework of what he calls a comprehensive account of the moral community.

This is a very tall order and Matravers hasn't quite met his goal. His meticulous unpacking of the accounts he finds wanting is carefully done. But his arguments suffer from a fair bit of repetition as he states and restates the central dilemma and his assessment of that dilemma. Moving to what he calls "constructivism" rather than "contractualism," and it is less clear than it ought to be precisely what hangs on his rather idiosyncratic use of the term "constructivism," Matravers builds up a moral context within which punishment theory can be located. The elements of such an account must be complex and multiple. Any such account must not only take seriously questions of reciprocity, fair play, and mutual advantage, but also incorporate matters of "sufficient security" and "justified coercion," else punishment theory will wither on the vine.

Especially important here is Matravers' explicit recognition of "the educative function of punishment" whereby a community "expresses its abhorrence at the offender's

action" and reaffirms the choice all persons must make between the requirements of membership and the yearning for some hypothetically independent existence. Despite the importance and complexity of its many parts, Justice and Punishment doesn't add up to the compelling, comprehensive moral theory within which Matravers claims, rightly, any account of punishment must be imbedded. His conclusions restate the problem, this time as a claimed accomplishment. But a few quite essential ingredients are missing-including a clearer articulation of precisely what Matravers means by "the moral community" in light of the fact that the conditions of contemporary pluralistic societies are such that we find ourselves members of a number of overlapping moral communities whose requirements for membership in good standing and standards of what counts as an infraction and what as acceptable punishment may conflict with, rather than reinforce, one another.

One minor note: In his determination to right the wrongs of male pronouns, "she" becomes the new universal in Matravers book. The upshot is that all murderers are "shes." This is a bit unsettling.

**Suffering and Moral Responsibility.** By Jamie Mayerfeld. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 237p. \$45.00.

Joan C. Tronto, Hunter College, CUNY

Jamie Mayerfeld has written a wise and morally sensitive book that he hopes will compel readers to take seriously their "prima facie duty to relieve suffering" (p. 9). Insofar as "attention to suffering has been a casualty of a long series of attacks on hedonistic utilitarianism" (p. 3), Mayerfeld offers a thorough account of the nature of suffering and argues for the view that its badness imposes a universal prima facie duty for people to try to avoid suffering. Since the purpose of moral inquiry is "to identify wrong kinds of behavior so that we can avoid them" (p. 7), Mayerfeld, not himself a utilitarian, follows a catholic approach and skillfully draws upon arguments from utilitarians, deontologists, Aristotelians, hedonists, psychologists, and philosophers to support his moral intuitions.

The book begins with a detailed account of the nature of suffering and how to measure it. In the fifth chapter, Mayerfeld provides his justification for the prima facie duty to relieve suffering: "because suffering is bad and ought not to occur.... Its occurrence makes the world that much worse" (p. 111). In the last several chapters he discusses limits to the prima facie duty to end suffering, but he concludes in the end that, "at a modest sacrifice, fortunate individuals can prevent an enormous amount of suffering.... Failure to do this is unjustifiable" (p. 224).

Mayerfeld's treatment leaves a number of interesting features of this topic unexplored. The book is not so much about political theory as it is about identifying a moral duty. The political questions that arise from recognizing the existence of such a duty remain unconsidered.

First, we might inquire about the origins of suffering, a topic that is not much discussed here. Mayerfeld is eager that we not focus too much upon evil doing as the source of suffering lest we will think that if we have not committed the evil, then we are not responsible for the suffering or its prevention. Mayerfeld suggests that our failure to follow the precept to prevent and reduce suffering "results largely from a mixture of inattention and indifference. Partly, it results from ignorance or confusion about the meaning and moral significance of suffering" (p. 224). He does not care to pursue the natural, economic, personal, or political causes of suffering any farther. It does not matter to him why there is suffering; the fact

that it exists is enough for us to try to prevent or reduce it. As do so many liberal theorists, Mayerfeld seems to think that ignorance alone is responsible for what is wrong in the world; that there might be evil doers who are responsible for this suffering is not the issue. That people obviously also find reasons for inflicting suffering on others, or for ignoring it, cannot be accounted for. Mayerfeld also does not imagine that human actions, even those designed to eliminate suffering, can have harmful unintended consequences. Postmodernists might see in his approach a return to an Enlightenment optimism about the possibility of the mitigation of suffering.

Second, Mayerfeld is so eager for us to recognize suffering per se that a reticence to make judgments about the topic creeps into his writing. The discussion is fairly abstract, and his examples (ranging from slamming one's finger in a door to torture) are not richly described. Such distance is undoubtedly calculated, as it avoids the harm of using others' suffering for exoticism or titillation. Mayerfeld provides ways to compare different kinds and amounts of suffering, but he refrains from making any broad judgments. He stresses the importance of torture, but he is willing to grant that each of us will decide what form of suffering matters the most to us, that for each of us, relieving suffering "will soon take on the character of a personal project" (p. 208). This overall view seems to be that if enough people (all people?) are willing to accept their duty to relieve suffering, then the burden will not be too onerous for any one person in particular (pp. 206-7). Mayerfeld allows that "we would need some mechanism to insure that the appropriate division of labor was actually observed, but I assume that in a world where every one was committed to the prevention of the worst cumulative suffering, this would not be an insurmountable problem" (p. 206). He makes this claim as if this political process could be taken for granted.

Mayerfeld's argument begins from moral intuitions and ends up being able to do little else except try to convince each, individually, to accept this moral starting point for how we might live our lives. Yet, Mayerfeld also shows that two complications make it unlikely that, short of political action. there is any way to achieve this result. First, it is almost impossible for people to perceive the suffering of others and remain focused on it. Second, the duty to relieve suffering is "not as transparent as, say, the prohibition against killing," so that the duty to relieve suffering requires that "we need to calculate what would actually be required to prevent the worst possible suffering" (p. 120). For both of these tasks, to keep focused on suffering and to make calculations about what is required to prevent it, some forms of political institutions and processes are necessary, but Mayerfeld does not want to consider such questions here.

Mayerfeld has done a great service by drawing our attention to suffering. His arguments are careful and thoughtful, and this book should become the standard work on the topic. If only the problem of human suffering were as susceptible to human reason as Mayerfeld thinks it is.

Bodies of Meaning: Studies on Language, Labor, and Liberation. By David McNally. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 277p. \$72.50 cloth, \$23.95 paper.

Nicholas Xenos, University of Massachusetts at Amherst

David McNally styles this book as beginning in a polemic and ending in a "materialist approach to language" much indebted to the German critic Walter Benjamin. The charge is that "postmodernist theory, whether it calls itself poststructuralism, deconstruction or post-Marxism, is constituted by a radical attempt to banish the real human body—the sensate,

biocultural, laboring body—from the sphere of language and social life" (p. 1). By treating language as an abstraction, McNally argues, postmodernism constitutes a form of idealism. More than that, it succumbs to and perpetuates the fetishism of commodities disclosed by Marx insofar as it treats the products of human laboring bodies as entities independently of them. Clearly irritated by the claims to radicalism made by those he labels postmodern, McNally thinks he has found their Achilles' heel: "The extra-discursive body, the body that exceeds language and discourse, is the 'other' of the new idealism, the entity it seeks to efface in order to bestow absolute sovereignty on language. To acknowledge the centrality of the sensate body to language and society is thus to threaten the whole edifice of postmodernist theory" (p. 2).

Famously, and somewhat ambiguously, Marx dedicated Capital to Charles Darwin. Darwin figures prominently for McNally, too, and he starts out with a chapter on Nietzsche's relationship to him. McNally finds it curious that there is little contemporary discussion of that relationship: "For here I detect something of a symptomatic silence, an avoidance that hints at a resistance. Read Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, and their followers when they discuss Nietzsche. The near-total absence of Darwin's name is striking" (p. 15). McNally argues that while Darwin provided the inspiration for Nietzsche's attack on the transcendental philosophy of Kant, he later rebelled against the egalitarian implications of Darwinism and produced an idealist reaction against his own early "materialist impulse." This reaction is entailed in the imperative of self-overcoming, the desire to free oneself of the physical and psychic limitations of the body. It also entails a struggle with language, since for Nietzsche language encapsulates the consciousness of the herd in its universalizing concepts. Thus for true experience to be revealed, it must somehow find expression through the language that conceals it. This antidemocratic, disembodied Nietzsche, he claims, is the inspiration to Heidegger and the darling of postmodernism (p. 38).

McNally's approach runs the risk of forcing his concerns onto the vaguely defined "school" he seeks to undermine rather than engaging with the substance of any particular theorist. For example, McNally notes that Deleuze does mention Darwin in his Nietzsche and Philosophy, but only to point out Nietzsche's preference for Lamarck's more active, transformative notion of evolution. He chides Deleuze for not pursuing the significance of Lamarckianism for Nietzsche and claims that it is to be found in Beyond Good and Evil, where McNally sees an effort to create an "aristocratic biology" (p. 27). However, McNally ignores the main focus of Deleuze's book, which is on Nietzsche's critique of nihilism and of dialectical philosophy. Since McNally's project is to validate some form of dialectical thinking, dealing with Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche at that level would seem more productive than projecting an overriding concern with language onto his text.

One theorist McNally does engage in a fairly systematic, albeit brief, way is Derrida. McNally argues that Derrida takes over the worst elements of the theory of language of Ferdinand de Saussure; namely, the notion that linguistic meaning is a product of differentiation within language systems, that meaning is constituted out of the difference between signs within a system. For McNally, this notion of language is an exact replica of the functioning of commodities within capitalism, wherein the value of a thing is determined by its relationship to other things rather than in relation to some intrinsic value or usefulness. Saussure's theory of language is modeled on an economic system, but that system is taken as timeless and universal, whereas in truth it is historically specific. If anything, Derrida is more consis-

tent than Saussure in following this model, McNally claims, a consistency that is best illustrated in Derrida's Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money. There, Derrida is said to construct a notion of the subject as capitalist, as a calculator of identity through debt and exchange, "[a]nd since subjects are constituted in and through language for Derrida, language too must be a system of calculation, a capitalist system" (p. 61). In such a system, there is no discerning between the real and the counterfeit, between cash and credit. McNally then links Derrida to Jean Baudrillard's writings on simulacra to establish the point that postmodernists have reproduced the contemporary world of financial markets and consumer sovereignty, and thus fallen prey to the phantasms of a commodified society.

The phantasm theme and a notion of language that originates in a prelinguistic material world is the principal subject of McNally's largest chapter, on Walter Benjamin. But before he gets there, McNally turns first to contemporary work in evolutionary biology, then to the literary studies of the Russian writers Valentin Voloshinov and Mikhail Bakhtin. Neither are necessary. The survey of Darwinism, paleontology, and anthropology is there to prove a few things: that bodies "speak" through gesture and mimesis, that the capacity to think and to cooperate therefore precedes language, and that the body is historical. All of this may be true, perhaps even more than trivially true, but McNally's confidence will not be shared by everyone, since he is selectively synthesizing a wide variety of theories that support his polemical purposes. His effort here might be reminiscent of Rousseau's use of the materials available in his time to construct a hypothetical evolution of human beings and society in his Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, but McNally lacks Rousseau's sense of irony.

Voloshinov is enlisted to provide a theory of language that is attentive to a "diverse range of socially structured contexts in which people live their lives," which are in turn products of specific relations of production (p. 117). However, McNally finds that Voloshinov cannot transcend such undialectical oppositions as between the natural and the social and the biological and the historical. Bakhtin has the merit of bringing the body back into language and McNally emphasizes his interpretation of carnival as an occasion not only for the inversion of dominant notions of the body in the carnivalesque celebration of the body's "lower stratum" (genitals, bellies, excretory functions, etc.), but also for the expression of unrealized communal aspirations. But McNally also criticizes Bakhtin's interpretation for failing to place the carnival within the context of developing capitalist markets and to see the role carnivals also played in legitimating various social hierarchies through the exclusion or parodying of oppressed

McNally's interpretation of Benjamin's theory of language emphasizes the notion of mimesis, "the act of imaginatively entering into material things" (p. 185). This concept figures in Benjamin's understanding of childhood play as an entering into the physical world. Happiness is this oneness with the world, a relationship that is occluded in adulthood, and the mimetic faculty "takes refuge in language." Thus there emerges "a sort of linguistic unconscious" that is the repository of our sensuous relationship to the world of things (p. 187). McNally rightly emphasizes that Benjamin increasingly came to identify the relationship between people and between people and things in terms of the fetishism of commodities. The task, politically and intellectually, thus becomes to liberate the happiness that is repressed in language and to realize a nonfetishistic relationship to the world of things. McNally notes that Benjamin's notion mirrors Freud's concept of the unconscious and that Benjamin tried to work out on a collective basis Freud's idea of shock. Dialectical images played this role for Benjamin, images that would disrupt the fetishized world of experience and release the repressed memory of happiness. The key move here is to reproduce Freud's notion of the individual unconscious as a collective unconscious, individual memory as collective memory, which is particularly prevalent in Benjamin's unfinished *Arcades Project*. This is a dubious move in Benjamin's theory, at best, but McNally reads Benjamin as maintaining that, in the era of mass consumption, "[b]ourgeois society produces ... a tremendous uniformity of desires and wishes, its inhabitants really do dream the same collective dreams" (p. 199). This notion is never demonstrated by McNally with any concreteness, and its general character effaces the language of class and gender he is otherwise at pains to deploy.

McNally's polemical intentions thus undermine the parts out of which this book is fashioned. He is determined to find commonalities among theorists as divergent as Deleuze. Derrida, and Baudrillard and begs the question by labeling them all postmodernist. The specific texture and concerns of these writers and others are thus lost to view, and the very real challenges they pose, in turn, to McNally's "materialist" categories are ignored or glossed over. The chapter on Benjamin, in many ways the most interesting, comes up short when Benjamin's concepts prove to be less orthodox than McNally's. It is also noteworthy that in attempting to reclaim Benjamin from those whom he classes as postmodernists, McNally ignores the engagement with Benjamin's notion of language by Derrida or Paul De Man. McNally's book thus not only begins but also ends in a polemic that leaves everything standing as it was before.

Citizenship and National Identity. By David Miller. Cambridge, MA: Polity, 2000. 216p. \$29.95.

Jacob T. Levy, University of Chicago

From the title one might expect a sequel of sorts to the author's highly regarded *On Nationality* (1995). The volume is both less and more than that, although mostly more. David Miller has long been critical of the Anglo-American liberal approach to political theory and has advanced his criticism along a number of fronts. To oversimplify, Miller is not a liberal, he is a civic republican; he is not a universalist liberal, he is a nationalist; he is not a liberal democratic, he is a deliberative democrat; he is not an economic liberal, he is a social democrat.

Some North American critics of liberalism eventually become concerned to show that, really, they are liberals, too, and they are only concerned to debunk certain metaphysical or rhetorical moves made by certain liberal theorists. Miller does not go in for that sort of backsliding. (The now common references to the theory of On Nationality as a species of the genus "liberal nationalism" therefore does him something of an injustice.) He advances serious, careful, civil criticisms of what he takes to be the standard liberal approaches to fundamental questions of political order. He does not blur the distinctions between liberalism and his own views. Liberalism seems to him too individualistic and too universalistic, insufficiently attuned to the collective political, economic, and social projects that take place and ought to take place at the level of the nation-state. In this book he draws those themes together. This makes for a work that, instead of developing much farther the nationalist argument in On Nationality, shows the links between that work and the theories Miller has elsewhere (e.g. Market, State, and Community, 1989; Principles of Social Justice, 2000) developed regarding social justice and citizenship.

Eight of the ten chapters have been previously and separately published, but they hang together quite well. The oldest, written nine years ago, is a piece on deliberative democracy and social choice theory that does feel somewhat dated. It advances what has become the standard view: Deliberation about the common good diminishes the force of social choice theory concerns regarding the coherence of democratic outcomes. But it sets the stage for subsequent chapters in which Miller argues for the close tie between an ideal of deliberative democracy and his understandings of republicanism and nationalism. The balance of the book is largely concerned with demonstrating the value of citizenship in a democratic-republican nation-state and defending it against both more local and more global claims.

Miller argues that "nationality answers one of the most pressing needs of the modern world, namely, how to maintain solidarity among the populations of states that are large and anonymous, such that their citizens cannot possibly enjoy the kind of community that relies on kinship or face-to-face interaction" (pp. 31–2). His is a nationalism stripped of much of the pretense that national sentiment is somehow an extension of the desire for a homogeneous, local, immediate community. Indeed, Miller is acutely concerned to defend the extended community of the nation-state against the claims of ethnic and cultural communities that might more closely approximate a face-to-face ideal. Roughly half the book consists of arguments against various forms of multiculturalism, the politics of difference, and pluralism that might shift citizens' primary loyalties downward from the nation-state.

Miller suggests that liberal and libertarian understandings of citizenship and pluralism are too fragmentary, and a robust republican conception of citizenship is necessary to overcome the centrifugal forces of modern pluralism. He thinks there are genuine national identities attached to the British, Spanish, and Canadian states, and not only to the Scottish, Catalan, and Quebecois subunits; and where nationality takes this nested form, secession by the national minority is not only imprudent but also unfair and actually contrary to the principle of national self-determination. (The British nation has to have a voice; the decision cannot be made by the Scottish nation alone.) He defends the shared project of deliberative democracy against those who say that it disadvantages minorities.

Some parts of this argument are more persuasive than others. In the chapter on liberal, libertarian, and republican responses to pluralism, Miller makes the familiar point that Rawlsian liberal citizenship is supposed to be justified in terms of respect for pluralism, but it excludes those whose religious or other primary identities are incompatible with the liberal polity. He argues that republicanism is more inclusive because it "places no limits on what sort of demand may be put forward in the political forum," and the success of any particular claim depends only on "how far it can be expressed in terms that are close to, or distant from, the general political ethos of the community" (p. 57). But the apparently greater inclusiveness at the level of political argument is bought at the very high price of a shared commitment to a unified political project, regardless of its outcomes. The (in Rawls's terms) unreasonable believers may be brought into common political life, but they must agree to make the common political project more important than their private religious lives. Miller thinks liberal and republican citizenship will converge in practice, for instance, because the republican polity will adopt the usual liberal rights. But it is by no means clear that the subordination in principle of private rights to public outcomes ought to be more preferable to religious or other minorities than the exclusions in principle of liberal public reason.

In addition to arguing against giving priority to subnational groups and identities, Miller engages with partisans of supranational politics. Pieties about cosmopolitan citizenship may jeopardize the reality and real importance of "bounded" citizenship within a finite state; we should not interpret the demands of global justice so broadly as to forget that social justice is primarily an attribute of political communities with shared histories and social understandings. "Global justice" sometimes seems to be one of those topics that attracts writers only after they have a fairly expansive understanding of it. Miller's intervention in this literature is welcome, and I hope he will develop his arguments on this front further.

In so few pages Miller cannot and does not try to restate the separate positive cases for his theories of nationality, social justice, and republicanism. Instead, the book makes the case that those theories mesh, and the combined whole is able to respond to a variety of criticisms. The reader looking for refinements to Miller's previously stated views may be frustrated; other than the (quite important) chapters on secession and nested nationalities, there is little that decisively adds to On Nationality or Principles of Social Justice. To those unfamiliar with Miller's earlier works, this volume may seem like a collection of skeptical review essays on multiculturalism, social choice theory, global justice, communitarianism, and so on, with not much argument for Miller's own preferred alternatives. Moreover, the author's ethical position in general is founded on a Humean deference to received sentiment that, even when fully developed and laid out, can be difficult to engage with. Critical argumentative steps are filled by the appeal to sentiment. Liberal citizenship provides insufficient unity for the pursuit of social justice in the nationstate. Multiculturalism undermines that pursuit; appeals to cosmopolitanism weaken it; and so forth. But the defenses of both nationality and social democracy depends on the existence of sentiments in their favor. Those whose sentiments, or principles, do not incline them toward the social democratic nation-state will sometimes find no point of intellectual entry.

All of that said, this is a valuable addition to Miller's valuable corpus. His complex but generally unified theory of politics has genuine differences with most others on the academic scene. In *Citizenship and National Identity* Miller makes the case for the theory's unity and politely but vigorously engages with its rivals. Both aspects of the collection help clarify the shape and scope of his intellectual project.

Hannah Arendt and the Politics of Tragedy. By Robert C. Pirro. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000. 224p. \$38.00.

Annabel Herzog, University of Haifa

Hannah Arendt's so-called nostalgia for the Greek polis stands at the core of most readings of her work, especially in debates between proponents of her concept of action as agonistic and interpreters of this concept as associational or communicative. Many feminist theorists, participatory democrats, and liberals share an aversion to Arendt's philhellenism and criticize her machismo, her apparent neglect of Athenian injustice, and her "republicanism," with its potential for endangering individual autonomy. Similarly, Arendt's emphasis on the political relevance of stories and her self-acknowledged storytelling have also given rise to extensive interpretations. Arendt scholars, in line with many contemporary political theorists, reject the totalizing and universalizing power of theory and argue that human plurality is better expressed in stories than in abstract homogeneous theory. According to them, by exemplifying or illuminating general intuitions and propositions, storytelling concretizes the understanding of politics. They suggest that stories allow the political thinker to be critical and situated. Moreover, stories take into account forgotten parts of history, or forgotten parts of the political sphere, often denied in theories that cannot accept difference and contingency.

As Robert Pirro rightly argues, no one has really studied the link between these two sides of Arendt's thought, that is, her use of the Greek tradition and her storytelling. In his carefully argued and well-documented book, Pirro attempts to "compensate for this neglect by indicating how an unacknowledged theory of Greek tragedy... shaped her understanding of storytelling" (p. 9). He patiently analyzes the distinct foundations and intuitions of Arendt's thought and brings them together toward the discovery of a "theory of tragedy," which, by analyzing the relation between her narrative method and her admiration for Greek political culture, sheds new light on her work. In so doing, Pirro affirms the relevance of such a theory in promoting contemporary democratic participation, challenging opponents to Arendt's philhellenism, and revealing the task of the political theorist.

The book starts nicely with an analysis of the themes and narrative strategy of Arendt's early article "We Refugees," which, as Pirro demonstrates, already sets "the basic terms she would use to theorize for the next thirty years about the nature and meaning of politics in the modern world" (p. 5). "We Refugees" reveals two major issues of Arendt's thought. The first is her "struggle both to be a part of and to stand apart from a group of people with whom one identifies," which is aimed at promoting a "form of public- and critical-minded democratic citizenship" (p. 7). The second is her elaboration of a narrative "that both conveys the shocking novelty of the experiences it recounts and asserts a claim for their exemplary significance" (p. 6).

In chapters 3 and 4 we are shown how Arendt's focus on tragedy follows from these issues. Pirro emphasizes that, according to Arendt, action and freedom need to be limited, or shaped by a stable framework. In other words, contingency appears only in a predetermined structure (pp. 52–3), the lack of which characterizes our modern times. He shows that Arendt distinguishes among three historical periods: a Greek period, during which the stable structures of political freedom were provided by tragedy; a period starting with pagan Rome through to the nineteenth century, defined by authority; and postauthority, contemporary times. In our world, so long as a substitute for authority is lacking, there can be no real practice of political freedom. In ancient tragedy, Arendt finds examples of a political life with a stable framework but without authority, which help her elaborate a postauthority alternative.

Indeed, Pirro's opposition to the widespread view that Arendt is no stalgic for authority is a major quality of his book. Yet, to say that tragedy offers an image of a nonauthoritarian public life does not necessarily imply that the polis was managed in such a nonauthoritarian way. Moreover, Pirro suggests not only that tragedy was, for Arendt, a faithful image of the Athenian polis way of life (p. 75) but also that it promoted such a way of life, that is, a life without authority (pp. 78-9). He is therefore led to the conclusion that Arendt was a pure product of a "predominantly German tradition of thought, which contends explicitly that Greek tragedy acted as the foremost institution of political education" (p. 78). This would be only of historical relevance were not Pirro to suggest that Arendt recommended some "equivalent of tragedy as a contemporary replacement for ... authority" (p. 79). This equivalent is storytelling, which serves "to promote political freedom as a mode of being that is accessible, continuous and durable" (p. 76).

To understand how storytelling achieves such a purpose, Pirro turns (in chap. 4) to Arendt's notion of judgment and its corollary, the political spectator. He shows that, again, Arendt finds her examples in Greece, namely, in the Athenian tragic spectator (p. 99). Thus, what seems to interest Arendt in tragedy is not only its educative political content but also a way of listening and looking at the world that tragedy induces in its spectators (p. 139). Pirro then formulates the theory of tragedy implicit in Arendt's work, a theory of "reconciliation and initiative-taking" (p. 142) based on the identification of the audience "with the hero in his twofold role as immortal and as member of the dead" (p. 141).

This formulation of Arendt's understanding of Greek tragedy is highly plausible, as is Pirro's suggestion that her storytelling was intended to replace authority in modern times. Some other claims are less persuasive. Pirro provides many examples of Arendt's analysis of Greek tragedy but almost no examples of her own method of writing. This lack has two main consequences. First, one may still feel entitled to wonder about the modern political relevance of a theory of Ancient Greek tragedy. In other words, Pirro does not evoke the original and new features of Arendt's storytelling and portrays her as focused on preauthority times. Hence, we are still given a "nostalgic Arendt" and find it difficult to understand her contribution to contemporary times.

Second, Pirro provides a lengthy description of the significance for Arendt of tragedy in politics but virtually ignores the tragic features of her own narrative. In other words, he shows what Arendt has to say about tragedy but not what she told tragically. This results in a contradiction. On the one hand, Pirro's emphasis on the importance of storytelling as against or complementary to theory leaves us with a convincing theory of tragedy but fails to provide an account of the political function of storytelling in our times. On the other hand, his exhaustive account of how tragic storytelling worked on Athenian citizens fails to show how a theory of tragedy works on modern citizens. Hence, Pirro fails to contribute to our understanding of how Arendt's theory of tragedy might help resolve modern political problems.

**Total Freedom: Toward A Dialectical Libertarianism.** By Chris Matthew Sciabarra. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000. 390p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.50 paper.

Peter G. Stillman, Vassar College

Sciabarra's book attempts to conjoin dialectics with libertarianism to produce total freedom. He is led to this seemingly odd conjunction by a concatenation of concerns. He sees dialectics as the logic or method most attentive to contexts and libertarianism as a radical political ideology of freedom. He sees the opportunity to free dialectics of its totalitarian (including Marxist) overtones and libertarianism of its apparent irrelevance, which is the more galling now that once-popular Marxism has failed as radical social theory. He wishes to combine his own academic appreciation of the dialectical elements of Marx's method with his long-standing love of libertarian ideas. Primarily, he hopes to expand libertarian thought from a narrow concentration on economic self-interest and the state as repressive to a broader concern with the cultural, social, and historical preconditions of freedom, and he sees dialectics, with its emphasis on contexts, dynamism, and relations, as a method that can be appropriated by libertarians to realize these broader concerns and to propound a comprehensive and radical social theory. No longer need libertarian thought be seen as atomic individualism struggling for freedom against state violence; building on dialectical thinking shorn of its Marxist content, libertarians can embrace whole individuals living in rich social environments that can carry

out, without violence, the social powers that the state has illegitimately appropriated.

The result is a long book divided into two almost-equal parts: "Dialectics: History and Meaning" and "Libertarian Crossroads: The Case of Murray Rothbard." The book ends with a brief chapter surveying recent exemplars of dialectical libertarianism and a briefer epilogue expressing the hope of continuing this new way of thinking. Sciabarra's approach in both parts verges on the encyclopedic: He presents a topic or thinker by encompassing a wide range of secondary sources or alternative positions (or both). Whether the topic is Marx on the dialectic or Rothbard on the origins of the state, he wishes to report almost every possible opinion that might be germane, and his bibliography (48 pages) shows it. He responds to critics of his past two books on points relevant to this one; he appends explanatory or exploratory footnotes that mention interesting, significant, or tangential issues; and he includes many footnotes thanking colleagues for helpful comments or communications, implying a community of scholars and interested parties working together on a novel but important political undertaking. No one can doubt the amount of his scholarship, his commitment to his topic, his generosity of spirit, and his desire to encompass as many opinions as possible.

The result is a hefty book. But I kept wishing that the book were twice as long, so that Sciabarra could have made informative arguments about every issue he mentions, or—and better—half as long, so that he could have focused on the central points and developed them with careful analysis and examples. I also kept thinking that Sciabarra has written two books—one scholarly, the other hoping to influence libertarian ideas—that are melded uneasily into one volume.

In Part One, his first three chapters present a history of dialectical thinkers and his fourth ends with a definition of dialectics (p. 173) and a 15-page "unpacking" of the definition: the chapters are a treasure trove of statements about dialectical methodology. How readers evaluate these chapters will probably vary widely; I do not find them illuminating. In his treatment of Hegel, for instance, Sciabarra uses all sorts of secondary sources—late Victorian Hegel scholars, contemporary ones, those who use Hegel for their own ends such as Fukuyama, and economic historians such as Heilbronertreating their remarks with equal weight. On the other hand, he does not touch on the masterful discussions of Hegelian dialectic in Michael Forster's Hegel and Stepticism (1989). Charles Taylor's Hegel (1975), or George Armstrong Kelly's Hegel's Retreat from Eleusis (1978). Moreover, most of what Sciabarra says derives from what others say about Hegel's dialectic, not from analysis of what Hegel himself says; and when Sciabarra does refer to Hegel's famous dialectics of master-slave (pp. 71-2) and the opening triad of the Logic [being, nothing, becoming (pp. 67–8)], his brevity means that he necessarily omits what many would see as crucial: He mentions only work and satisfaction in the master-slave relation and, oddly, labels "becoming" as a "halfway-house" between being and nothing. Hegel's stress on the dialectic as concrete, his emphasis on negation and, especially, "determinate negation" (mentioned in passing on p. 64, note 26), his refusal to speculate about the future and his argument that freedom can only be comprehended as existent in the present (not posited in some future)—all these are almost completely ignored. As with Hegel, so throughout Part One: many sources, used (or ignored) without apparent discrimination, few references to (and little analysis of) original texts, and even fewer examples of the dialectic at work. The result, however, is mixed: While I find the resulting definition disconnected from the history and too general and vague (so that many thinkers are dialecticians

by Sciabarra's definition without knowing it), some might find the sheer volume of information useful, and Sciabarra himself might well reply that he wishes to present a workable sense of dialectics for libertarian thought and so gives statements that lead to defining it in terms that can be readily understood and easily applied, even if unsatisfactory for scholars.

I have the same types of problems with Part Two. Sciabarra's wide-ranging and extensive presentation of Rothbard's libertarianism is doubtless the best secondary treatment of the subject, including both sympathetic understanding and severe critique—though much of the critique focuses on Rothbard's (nondialectical) dualism. Reading Sciabarra raised for me a further set of questions. Can a philosophy of origins, like Rothbard's, which presents a hypothetical original condition containing central continuing norms, ever be effectively dialectical (because the central norms are historically unchanging from the original condition)? Can a philosophy built on a Manichean dualism between the good market and the evil state be dialectical? Following Hegel's insights (Philosophy of Right, Sections 242-6), does the libertarian tendency to talk about a free market without mentioning wage labor or poverty involve ignoring essential contexts or aspects of the market? Of these three queries, Sciabarra does not address the first; he spells out dualism (pp. 344-6) and asserts that for Rothbard the state will be replaced by voluntary cooperation, but does not show the dynamics or logic for this change (see pp. 346-7); and he mentions and buries wage labor in a two-sentence footnote (p. 259, note 34). Since especially my last query addresses dialectics as "context-keeping," Sciabarra's informal core definition of dialectics, his refusal to address the issue is as disconcerting as his willingness to mention it.

In short, this book is not a scholarly or analytic discussion of dialectics or a complete dialectical critique of Rothbard's libertarianism. But perhaps it was meant to be not a scholarly work but a book dedicated to reshaping libertarian theory and ideology. *Total Freedom* suggests that relational, contextual, and dynamic (i.e., dialectical) methods might strengthen some of the weak points of libertarian theory and might overcome some of the unpopular gaps in libertarian ideology. So it should be read by libertarians and by those who study Rothbard's thought. Even beyond the project of dialectical libertarianism, Sciabarra's book might provoke some thinkers to look again at dialectics—but they will have to go beyond his book if they wish to make sense of dialectical thinking.

Cinematic Political Thought: Narrating Race, Nation, and Gender. By Michael J. Shapiro. New York: New York University Press, 1999. 176p. \$55.00 cloth, \$18.50 paper.

John Seery, Pomona College

Writing on the outskirts of Hollywood, where my college campus episodically turns into a set location for the filming of West Wing or, most recently, Pearl Harbor, I have picked up a few pointers about the biz just by keeping my ears perked. "Talk to me, babe! Luv ya. My agent will get back to you on that. What's my motivation?" And so on. Clichés and formulas do matter, however, in such a large-scale collaborative enterprise because often they provide the underlying rules of the game. The first rule of screenwriting, any insider knows, is that you must hook your reader on page one. If you do not grab your audience right from the start, even before the opening credits roll, the rest of the spec script will surely get tossed, and the movie will never get made.

Michael Shapiro begins his Cinematic Political Thought: Narrating Race, Nation and Gender thus: This book is both a series of investigations into aspects of contemporary politics and a more general attempt to articulate a critical philosophical perspective with politically disposed treatments of contemporary cinema.... What I offer is a politics of critique, which, in a Kantian spirit, specifies an attitude rather than a particular destination. My investigations treat various aspects of the present, but they are anti-diegetic and non-hermeneutic; I attribute no clear historical direction to the temporal differences with which I deal and I do not seek to attract a particular interpretation of contemporary life-worlds.

The second stock rule of screenwriting is that plot and dialogue should adhere to Aristotle's *Poetics*. Rewrite coaches often cite Aristotle's line: "Character and thought are merely obscured by a diction that is overbrilliant" (*Poetics 25*). Applying that advice to the above passage, I would have bluelined at least *anti-diegetic*.

To be fair, perhaps Shapiro's text should not be assessed as a potential script, but he invites such a direct comparison by stating explicitly that he is attempting to write much of the book cinematically (pp. 6–7). Gilles Deleuze, moreover, served as Shapiro's Muse (his "sustained inspiration") for this project:

By directing a series of engagements and juxtapositions among different thought models and different historical moments, I seek to make the present surprising and contingent rather than simply a refinement of certain widely accepted chronologies of historical political trends. In addition to engaging in critical interventions that make use of genealogical and deconstructive modes of interpretation (among others), I make use of the radical temporality of cinematic composition, which, by its mode of presentation, resists the perspectives of the characters and groups whose actions it portrays.

By "cinematic" writing Shapiro means poststructuralism by other means. He wants to deploy jump-cuts, flash-backs, montages, and voice-overs in order to disrupt a more linear or bounded narrative and exemplify an alternative politics of shifting and unsettled identities. Cinematic presentations both show and tell, but the former can undercut the latter. The question we might pose about Shapiro's overall aspiration toward filmic creativity is: Should we regard this particular production, departing as it does from industry standards, as an indie flick, an art-house experiment, or a mockumentary?

Shapiro assembles and directs an ensemble cast of Deleuze, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Guattari, Benjamin-and even Carl Schmitt makes an important cameo appearance—but Kant is the star of the show. Some might question booking Kant as a headliner (hardly the show-stopper with his humorless penchant for talking-head monologue), but Shapiro insists that Kant has been unfairly typecast as a mere method actor posing as high-minded aesthete. Indeed, that is the high concept for the book as a whole: Kant, whose dramatic range allegedly extends from cognitive philosophizing to protopoststructuralist performativity, can be enlisted to illuminate the real-world effects of several off-beat and low-budget films, which in turn allegedly confirm his cross-over appeal. Does the stretch work? Will Shapiro be able to attract financial backing to get the idea off the ground? If not, what is the point? Why not call a book a book and title it simply and aptly, Kantian Political Thought? (The third time-tested rule of screenwriting is, know your genre; keep within it; avoid

As a work of political theory, Cinematic Political Thought makes many bold, intelligent, and impressive moves. It is

not the first book to move toward a confluence of political theory and film studies; one recalls Stanley Cavell's landmark The World Viewed (1980) or, more recently, Michael Rogin's Blackface, White Noise (1998), Mary Nichols's Reconstructing Woody (1998), Hanna Pitkin's The Attack of the Blob (1998), and others. Shapiro's eclectic appropriation of Kant, on reflection, makes perfectly good sense, even if the presentation is polemically pushed and rushed. Shapiro contends that Kant's legacy ought to be understood not only in philosophically stabilizing terms but also in critically political, even radical ways. Kant constructed personhood not just as an apprehending structure of cognition but as a judging intellect that emerges in a political context.

Scratch at the transcendentalist overlay and right below the surface you will always find a Kantian acknowledgment of untamed contingency. Kant moves toward enlightenment neither initially nor even ultimately to introduce unquestionable universalist truths but, rather, to resist ongoing closed-mindedness. He mobilizes a global citizenship that opposes parochial allegiances. In the Kantian scheme of things, the world cannot be understood and experienced without mediation, and any mediating structure betrays some kind of productive human intervention. Shapiro is ambivalent about many of Kant's contributions but finally views him as a critical healer, not as a polarizing dogmatist, which is why he deserves star billing.

The purported connection between Kant and cinema is that both produce an enlarged subject that assumes communicability to a wide audience. The unspoken trick is that such a hyperbolic fantasy can in turn condition and shape further experience, which is to say that in the modern mass-mediated world, the mass media are not simply reflective but also implicitly productive of our cultural meta-narratives; and those backlighted productions often provide arrested, entrenched, occluded, and invidious forms of identity. Kant's formal critique of modernity, invoking a sensus communis, is instructive, according to Shapiro, but at the same time is insufficient to resist institutionalized forms of intelligibility.

To decode even further the circulatory politics informing modern movies and vice versa, Shapiro turns from Kant to post-Kantian Nietzscheans Foucault and Deleuze. In order to exhibit rival notions of time (à la Deleuze) in order to expose racialized narratives involving sports disciplines (à la Foucault), Shapiro compares two movies, *Hoop Dreams* and *Barry Lyndon*. In short, one is frenetically fast, and the other is painfully slow (trust me, do not assign *Barry Lyndon* to undergraduates as much as you might respect Shapiro's viewer picks); and the separate pacing evinces and reinforces separate epistemes of temporality.

Subsequent chapters take on globalization (and its discontents) and masculinity (and its discontents), respectively. According to Shapiro, many of our nationalist and globalist narratives are based on identity stories that become fix-framed in a collective imaginary. Puritans, Zionists, CPAs, Christian ecumenicals, and security analysts such as Sam Huntington are all prone to such exclusionary conjurations. Shapiro draws upon the movies Father of the Bride II and Lone Star to make his case. Anxiously heteronormative notions of masculinity and whiteness, prominent in the 1980s and 1990s and bound up with statist and capitalist concerns, can be teased out through a close screening of To Live and Die in LA, aided by Shapiro's astute commentary. Since a copy of this film may not be available in your neighborhood Blockbuster, one has to wonder about it, Father of the Bride II, and some of Shapiro's other citations: How representative or influentially performative have such films been?

The erudite is situated right next to the kitschy, and Shapiro foregrounds his jarring juxtapositions by calling them cin-

ematic. I see them instead as elegiac, or as another kind of jeremiad, in either case symptomatic of another possible anxiety, namely, that bookish political theory increasingly is being displaced by multimedial modalities in the late-modern world. Our filmic eye candy probably stands in some need of heavy-handed contestation, but somehow I doubt that many movie-goers will be running out of the theaters to pick up a copy of Kant's *Third Critique* as a result of this book. From my armchair perspective, I give *Cinematic Political Theory* a thumbs up for learned decency, a thumbs down for prolixity, and a "PG" rating overall (recommended for postgraduates only).

**Rethinking State Theory.** By Mark J. Smith, New York: Routledge, 2000. 281p. \$100.00.

Bob Jessop, Lancaster University

Mark Smith has written a dense, challenging, and provocative analysis of three contrasting approaches to power and how they are shaped by different philosophies of social science. This is not a book for the theoretically faint-hearted or metatheoretically challenged. Indeed, those who pick it up expecting to find a simple guide to recent state theory will be badly disappointed. For it does not provide a survey or critique of state theory as such. Nor does it provide a new theory based on self-evident assumptions about the nature of the state and politics. Instead its author offers a sustained meta-theoretical commentary on the intellectual conditions of possibility of serious engagement with the state and state power from a broader, societal perspective. Smith attempts this because he discerns a crisis in the taken-for-grantedness of the typical objects of inquiry of such disciplines as economics, politics, and sociology. He claims that their respective objects are increasingly seen as complex, uncertain, and contested spaces and that these disciplines themselves have become disoriented. Inter alia, this requires a rethinking of the state as an analytical object. In pursuing this meta-theoretical project, Smith draws heavily on the "critical realist" position (initially known as "transcendental realism" or "critical naturalism") of the British-based philosopher of science, Roy Bhaskar. Thus his analysis begins with some crucial distinctions among empiricism, idealism, and realism and explores their different ontological, epistemological, methodological, and substantive implications for the analysis of social relations. It then addresses the philosophical and theoretical development of three very different theorists of power, who are taken as interesting if not wholly representative exemplars of empiricism, idealism, and a mixture of idealism and realism, respectively. Smith concludes with some of his own meta-theoretical comments on state theory.

The three theorists chosen for dissection are, according to Smith's own labels, the neopluralist Robert Dahl, the interdisciplinary neoliberal Friedrich von Hayek, and the neo-Marxist Bob Jessop. Smith justifies his choice on three grounds: their relevance for contemporary discussions about the state and the good polity, their distinctive focus on the relationship between the state and cultural and economic institutional forms, and their distinctive ontological and epistemological standpoints. He also claims that each advances "an account of the 'sociality of politics,' i.e., the embedding of politics within a broader social order. This takes the form 'polyarchic civility" (a distinctive form of citizenship enabling citizens to exercise full autonomy) in Dahl's mature work, "intersubjective catallaxy" (enabling knowledgeable economic actors to engage in the realization of plans and motives in market economy—in part through what they learn observing the effects of their actions) in Hayek's writings,

and the relationship between the state and "societalization" (or the production of society effects) in Jessop's work. In exploring the foundational assumptions of these three theorists' reflections on power, their different intellectual trajectories, and the limitations in their mature theoretical and political positions, Smith hopes both to generate new insights into their respective analytical objects and to develop his own guidelines for rethinking the nature of the state.

Based on his distinctions among empiricism, idealism, and critical realism, Smith provides an extended analysis of Dahl's movement from an empirical realist, one-dimensional analysis of power to an idealist (in ontological and epistemological terms) account of the structural preconditions and subjective requirements of polyarchic civility. He emphasizes that Dahl shifted toward a normative commitment to democratizing the economy as well as the polity and suggests that this shift is rooted in Dahl's adoption of a neo-Kantian idealist epistemology. Nonetheless, Dahl continues to neglect the complexities of the state's internal structures and mechanisms, of the public-private distinction, and the circuits of formal and informal power that shape policy making and implementation. However, it is only by exploring these issues, Smith claims, that can one fully understand the link between political institutions and their cultural conditions.

He then examines Hayek's social and political thought. He argues that, in addressing the problematic standing of time and the social distribution of knowledge within economic theory, Hayek forges a creative synthesiis between the Kantian critique of rationalism and phenomenological explanations of social action. In this context, Hayek develops the notion of catallaxy (a self-generating economic order) and then extends it to a particular account of the "constitution of liberty" based on the rule of law and a nightwatchman state as a matrix for the exercise of individual free choice.

Smith then explores the present reviewer's work. He provides a very detailed analysis of my work from its earliest presentation in 1979 through work published in 1997. I learned much about my own intellectual development from this, even though I do not fully recognize some aspects of his interpretation. Smith correctly identifies the major turning points in my work and, in particular, its concern with synthesizing the regulation approach in political economy, a neo-Gramscian interpretation of Poulantzas's state theory, and critical discourse analysis and the catalytic role of my "coquetting" with ideas from the German systems theorist, Niklas Luhmann. Whether or not Smith is correct to argue that my work in 1997 still retained strong elements of idealism (in its ontological and epistemological senses) as well as moving toward critical realism is best left to others to decide. For no theorist is ever completely contemporary with his or her intellectual development.

The book concludes with some critical comments on the recent popularity (described as "me too-ism") of critical realism because it encourages theoretical complacency. Thus Smith rejects Jeffrey Isaac's recent description of the later Dahl as a critical realist, Tony Lawson's critical realist appropriation of Hayek, and my own claim to have embraced critical realism. Above all, he suggests that all three theoretical approaches tend to miss the importance of ontological depth of the real world (i.e., the stratification of the real world and its associated causal mechanisms, capacities, and liabilities) and that they are insufficiently sensitive to the complexities of representing that world both in everyday practice and in scientific observation. This leads him to present in the final pages of the book a new critical realist model of concept formation and empirical inquiry that would be adequate to the sociality of the political, i.e., its embedding in the economy, political institutions, and civil society.

This book is not an easy read for those without a solid grounding in the philosophy of the social sciences and a ready familiarity with the works of the theorists investigated. Indeed it places demands even on those with such background understanding. But it certainly merits close attention by those who want an intellectual challenge and, like this reviewer, are interested in the meta-theoretical foundations of social inquiry. The summaries of the work of Dahl, Hayek, and Jessop are full and fair, the criticisms are well developed and well defended against alternative interpretations, and the theoretical agenda presented by way of conclusion merits attention. This is a book that can be recommended to specialists and for library purchase rather than for course use. It will prove valuable to those interested in exploring the hidden philosophical assumptions of other currents in social theory and in developing a well-founded postdisciplinary analysis of the sociality of state power and the conditions for effective political participation.

Civic Liberalism: Reflections on Our Democratic Ideals. By Thomas A. Spragens, Jr. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999. 271p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Stanley C. Brubaker, Colgate University

Of the many endeavors in the last three decades to restate the central aspirations of liberalism, this important work is one of the most balanced, nuanced, and cogent. Part of its success lies in its willingness to stretch the boundaries of what we call liberalism, but in doing so, Spragens only brings liberal theory into better alignment with intuitions and sensibilities underlying liberal practice.

His argument is divided into two parts. The first assesses the state of contemporary liberal thought; the second offers his own "civic" alternative. Spragens groups theorists of liberalism into four broad schools, each characterized by a tendency to mistake a central but partial truth for the whole. Thus, "Liberal Realists"—a motley group that includes Hobbes, Rorty, and Shklar—teach us to respect the sober and somewhat fragile achievements of security and civil peace, which safeguard us from our worst fears but neglect our best hopes. "Libertarians" stress moral reality and integrity of individual lives and the economic and political benefits of a market economy but exaggerate the absolutism of self-ownership as well as the tendency for government regulation to set us on "the road to serfdom." "Liberal Egalitarians"—Rawls and company—remind us of the role of chance in the allocation and development of natural talent, but fail to take seriously our separateness as distinct and morally responsible individuals. "Difference Liberals," such as William Connolly and Iris Young, properly warn of the tendency of dominant groups to "naturalize" and "privilege" contingent differences, thereby threatening the ideals of liberty and equality, but they themselves privilege and so encourage overstated claims of oppression, thereby facilitating the balkanization of political life.

In light of the success and failures of these other models, Spragens offers in Part Two his "civic" alternative. As befits a liberal theory, liberty and equality retain their central place, but neither is conceived as a goal to be maximized. Instead, liberty is restated as "autonomy," a "constitutive" and "threshold" good, that puts together the "positive" and "negative" dimensions of liberty that Isaiah Berlin misleadingly sundered. Equality is restated as a "moral postulate" that recognizes our distinctively human capacities for rational self-direction and moral judgment as well as an instrumental good that facilitates other aspects of civic liberalism. In politics, it seeks a substantive equality of influence. In economics, it competes with the need for incentives and the moral claims

of individual desert, presumptive self-ownership, and beneficence among family and friends.

Important as are these restatements of liberty and equality, what gives civic liberalism its most distinctive character is its emphasis on civic friendship and virtue. Friendship, of course, is not a distinctively liberal ideal and, for many theorists, is an ideal that is not even compatible with liberalism. Rejecting Aristotle's account of friendship in favor of that of C. S. Lewis, Spragens places less emphasis on the essential goodness of friends than on their "common affection for an object that they do not embody but rather appreciate" (p. 202) whether that be pushpin or poetry—and by lowering the bar, he seeks to render friendship complementary to liberalism's ideals of autonomy and equality. Furthermore, by fostering goodwill and trust and thus greater capacity for social action, friendship, he argues, is conducive to limited government, toleration, deliberation, and compromise. Friendship combines with equality to place renewed emphasis on public venuespublic libraries, parks, zoos, museums, festivals, and schools. And it moderates autonomy to preserve their civic atmosphere and purpose; so schools need not tolerate disruptive students, libraries can throw out the drunks, and museums can insist on decorum.

There is much to admire in this work: its criticisms are incisive, but balanced; its restatement of liberal ideals is nuanced, mindful of the trade-offs among political goods, persuasive, and well moored in the moral intuitions underlying liberal practice; its spirit is generous, though tough-minded; its style is clear, lively, and friendly. Indeed the work exemplifies many of the ideals that civic liberalism extols.

Despite his rhetorical effort to stay within the liberal tradition, it might be more accurate, however, to understand Spragens' work as a synthesis of liberalism and republicanism. And it is important to note that the republican tradition on which he draws is "horizontal" rather than "vertical," that is, its morality derives more from equality than excellence. Accordingly, his work is not altogether immune from the risks of the former or mindful of its need for the latter. In extending equality in politics from the formal equality of voting to substantial equality of influence, he casually endorses restrictions on political speech (or at least spending on political speech), ignoring the empirical literature on the limited independent impact of money and neglecting the warnings from Madison's Federalist Ten on the threat of such egalitarian impulses to the "first object" of liberal government. One must wonder then how well civic liberalism would safeguard freedom of speech against other contemporary lateral pressures such as the feminist attack against what it calls pornography (i.e., whatever has the effect of subordinating women) or the politically correct attack against "insensitive" speech on college campuses. The "vertical," or perfectionist, strand of liberal republicanism, in contrast, by differentiating types of freedom and holding speech higher than mere expression, allows for the restriction of obscenity and vulgarity without threatening political speech or the pursuit of wisdom. Despite its relation to his project and independent importance, however, Spragens gives perfectionist liberalism comparatively little attention. More emphatically than most liberal theories, civic liberalism does stress the importance of virtue in the citizenry. But virtue becomes an instrumental good serving the ends of autonomy, equality, and friendship, not the embodiment of human excellence. Jimmy Stewart and Charles Kuralt, not Socrates or Lincoln, are its exemplars.

Civic liberalism would bring us a polity better suited for the human spirit than any of the four models Spragens criticizes. It would underwrite a centrist approach to a range of policies—welfare, social security, health care, and immigration—with substantial support in the polity but championed by neither

left nor right. It would restore a civil society of vibrant voluntary organizations. And it would support a vital public realm of "effective public schools, accommodating public spaces, inviting public parks, accessible public libraries, and fiscally viable public hospitals" (p. 258). Perhaps it is too much to ask of a liberal theory that it also be inspiring.

**Reproducing the State.** By Jacqueline Stevens. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. 307p. \$49.50 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Somer Brodribb, University of Victoria

Jacqueline Stevens grapples with the meanings of political society and affiliation and how we think about what constitutes family, nation, ethnicity, and race. How do we come to know ourselves and others through these political artifices and naturalized identities? Her project is to trouble our complacencies and make visible the arbitrary practices that produce the inclusions and exclusions of the "state-nation" (p. 43). She examines democratic, communitarian, and liberal theories of political society and finds little attention there to the problem of membership and the ways groups are constituted. Birth, the family, ethnicity, and national origin are undertheorized or considered to derive from natural, ancestral ties. Stevens addresses these inadequacies, and superbly reveals the centrality of birth and kinship practices to political societies.

Reproducing the State is a stunning and original rethinking of justice and the politics of difference. Stevens draws attention to Rawls's understanding of political society "as the location that settles differences, rather than the form that gives rise to them" (p. 4). Her challenge is this: "People starving to death in Ethiopia, dying in cattle cars en route to the United States from Mexico, and losing their homes for want of the right ethnicity in Bosnia...all of these necessarily follow from the prerogatives of political societies to regulate membership according to family ties. These events are not accidents in a world system of familial-based nation-states, but rather are their bases and outcome" (p. 7). The state constitutes and then regulates the intergenerational family form. and this grammar of membership underwrites the nation and reinforces the rules of affiliation and the racial taxonomies of political society.

Methodologically, Stevens draws from Foucauldian forms and practices, Hegelian sense-certainty, and Derridean deconstruction. She is critical of Marx (who somehow forgot intergenerational wealth) and Foucault (who dismissed the sovereign power of the state). Politically, Stevens draws from Rosa Luxemburg and turn-of-the-century anarchists, who "understood that the façade of 'citizenship' which follows from the state obliterated the rights of human beings around the world" (p. 41). Theoretically, she positions herself "critical, neo-Hegelian" (p. xiii). Practically, she urges us "to think through ways of reproducing political societies so that kinship principles would play a diminished role. Two means for accomplishing this would be the elimination of any state involvement in marriage and the curtailment of citizenship requirements based on birth or ancestry" (p. 280).

In contrast to other feminist scholarship, Stevens takes up the role of states in creation of gender rather than the role of gender in the creation of states (e.g., see Carole Pateman, *The Sexual Contract*, 1988). Certainly, this book is a phenomenology of affiliation, not a philosophy of birth (e.g., see Mary O'Brien, *The Politics of Reproduction*, 1981). Stevens is concerned with the traffic in kinship, not the traffic in women (Gayle Rubin, "The Traffic in Women: Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex," in Rayna Rapp Reiter, ed., *Toward an Anthropology of Women*, 1975). For Stevens, gender is

constituted through, rather than constitutive of, political societies.

In the context of critical studies of racism and nationalism, this work is unlike the materialist approach to the racist appropriation of labor power represented by Colette Guillaumin (*Racism, Sexism, Power and Ideology*, 1995). As Stevens tells us, the book is "largely about the heuristics of certain forms of being" (p. 280). Contrary to those who contend that racism creates race, she argues that "race always entails race-ism" (p. 173). Indeed, race is "the culmination of political society, family, nation" (p. 173).

An exercise in meticulous scholarship, Reproducing the State unravels the complexities of categories of being and belonging. Same-sex issues are clearly of interest to Stevens, and their importance is raised throughout the book. Chapter 4, on race and the state, and chapter 6, on religion and fundamentalism, are rewarding reading. Stevens challenges all origin stories and racial taxonomies based on geographical territories and outlines how they are reproduced through birth certificates and laws of miscegenation and legitimacy.

I am ambivalent about the contribution made by *Reproducing the State*. Often, feminist critical race theory and lesbian/queer scholarship are not fully engaged. A discussion is begun but not sustained or is relegated to the footnotes—truly moved to the margins, and in excruciatingly small type. This is odd in a wide-ranging collection by a well-read scholar who can balance discussions across the Norman conquest, surrogacy adoptions, and an equal rights complaint about Kozy Kitten cat food. The effect is to shortchange these critical analyses, and this diminishes the significance of her contribution. Yet, she challenges some of the key notions of these literatures.

This attempt at a political theory based on how the state reproduces and recognizes populations is situated too narrowly in a structural analysis of discourse with phenomenological longings. In the end, Stevens returns to Hegel rather than hegemony, or at least centered and not scattered hegemony (e.g., see Inderpal Grewal and Caren Kaplan, eds., Scattered Hegemonies: Postmodernity and Transnational Feminist Practices, 1994). Emphasizing how identity is tied to the state, Stevens has little room for communities of resistance, social movement praxis, or oppositional imaginations. One clipped and unsatisfying paragraph on "what is to be done" concludes the book. Perhaps it could not be otherwise if transnational feminist practices and literatures are not critically considered. Work on racialized boundaries and democratic futures that could have been analyzed includes M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra Talpade Mohanty, eds., Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures (1997). Nevertheless, her book would be well considered alongside transnational feminist cultural studies that confront liberal theory (e.g., Caren Kaplan, Norma Alarcon, and Minoo Moallem, eds., Between Woman and Nation: Nationalisms, Transnational Feminisms, and the State, 1999).

This is a dense and challenging work that nevertheless maintains strong thematic coherence as it ranges across political theory, philosophies of language, a phenomenology of belonging and otherness, cultural anthropology, and the legal histories of naming, inheritance, migration, and kinship. It is beautifully prefaced with a fabulously engaging story of the author's work in a library in Croatia, her own genealogy of belonging and classification. Overall, it offers intriguing insights into urgent intellectual and practical problems and provides careful empirical evidence to illustrate how normative claims are substantiated. Jacqueline Stevens has produced a rich and profound work of scholarship that deserves serious attention.

**Democracy and Trust.** Edited by Mark E. Warren. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 370p. \$59.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Virginia A. Chanley, Florida International University

The essays in this edited volume are the product of a seminar and conference at Georgetown University. In different ways, each contribution addresses the complex nature of the relationship between democracy and trust and helps to define the issues and questions involved in this relationship. The contributors address the topic from a variety of perspectives, some primarily theoretical and others combining theory and statistical analysis. As editor and contributing author, Mark Warren provides an effective framework for the diverse set of contributions that comprise the volume and develops a typology of theories of trust and democracy.

In the introductory chapter, Warren defines the topic of democracy and trust as it is developed in the volume and describes the organization of the chapters around a set of distinct, but closely related, questions. He identifies increasing societal complexity and interdependence as creating a paradoxical relationship between trust and democracy (pp. 3-4). With increased complexity, differentiation, and interdependence, individuals have greater choice and opportunity. Along with greater choice, however, there is both a greater need to trust and a reduced ability to participate, either directly or indirectly, in the decisions that shape one's life. In other words, at the same time that individuals are faced with greater choices, there is less opportunity to be involved in making those choices. Rather, citizens must increasingly rely on their elected representatives and other governmental authorities if they are to take advantage of the increased opportunities that accompany increased complexity and interdependence. Thus, Warren identifies a central task for scholars of democracy and trust as developing an understanding of the conditions under which trust is justified and identifying the institutional arrangements that facilitate the development of justified trust. Increases in justified trust help to reduce the costs associated with political decision making while, at the same time, enhancing the possibility of democratic decision making in increasingly complex and interdependent societies.

Warren organizes the book around a distinct set of issues, including questions about whether and when trust is desirable, the kinds of trust that benefit democracy, the relationship between trust and civil society, and the relationship between trust and collective action. In the first set of contributions, Russell Hardin, Claus Offe, and Ronald Inglehart each address the question of whether and when trust in government is desirable. These contributions are also useful for illustrating both the strengths and the weaknesses of the volume as a whole.

Proceeding from a rational choice perspective, Hardin argues that trust is possible only when someone knows the motivations of the person who is being trusted. In this view, it does not make sense to speak of trust in the institutions of government, as citizens are unlikely to know their elected representatives or the bureaucratic agents involved in governing well enough to be able to assess the motivations of their actions. Rather, Hardin proposes that it makes sense to speak of depending upon government or feeling reassured when government is predictable. Trust in government, however, is not desirable, because in modern society citizens are not in a position to assess the trustworthiness of governmental officials.

In contrast to Hardin, Offe argues that trust in the institutions of government is both possible and desirable. For Offe, trusting an institution requires knowledge and mutual acceptance of institutional rules, values, and norms, as well as the expectation that these rules, values, and norms will be followed. If there is a lack of trust in the institutions of government, this presents a problem for democracy, as strong governments are typically required to resolve complex problems of collective action that face modern societies.

Inglehart takes yet another approach to address the question of the desirability of trust in government. Based on empirical analysis of data from 1990–1991 and 1995–1997 World Values Surveys in 41 countries, Inglehart argues that the stability of existing democracies relies on subjective well-being and interpersonal trust. In contrast, trust in the institutions of government or trust in political elites is not particularly important for the maintenance of existing democracies. In Inglehart's view, declining trust in the institutions of government reflects a decline in respect for authority that has resulted from increased material well-being and the development of postmaterial cultures. Citizens now evaluate their governments by a more exacting standard, and trust in government has declined without posing a threat to the stability of government.

Illustrating the strength of this edited volume, Hardin and Offe approach the question of the desirability of trust from alternative theoretical approaches, whereas Inglehart addresses the question on the basis of statistical analyses across a range of nations. Thus, the reader is presented with alternative conceptions of trust and a statistical analysis that provides for an empirical assessment of the importance of trust in government. Illustrating the weakness of the volume, the reader is left with questions about which approach is most useful or accurate in addressing the question about the desirability of trust. Similarly, the contributions by Eric Uslaner, Orlando Patterson, Jean Cohen, Rom Harre, James Scott, and Jane Mansbridge do not rely on a single conception of either trust in government or democracy. Like Inglehart, Uslaner and Patterson employ statistical analyses to test some of their ideas. Like Hardin and Offe, the remaining authors employ a more theoretical approach to address the issue of trust and democracy, relying on examples as appropriate to illustrate their arguments.

Given that many of the issues raised in the volume are not new to the study of trust in government, perhaps the most unique and important contribution of the work is Warren's outline of a democratic theory of trust (see pp. 310–43). Distinguishing among three approaches to trust in democratic theory, which he identifies as neoconservative, rational choice, and deliberative, Warren proposes that the deliberative approach provides the most promising model for addressing questions about the kinds of political institutions that are most likely to solve problems associated with the paradoxical relationship between trust and democracy.

Overall, the volume makes a valuable contribution to the study of trust and democracy. The authors raise more questions than they answer, but the volume as a whole introduces readers new to the topic to current theoretical and empirical approaches in this area of research. Moreover, in drawing attention to questions about the relationship between trust and democracy and identifying distinct approaches in studying this topic, the volume helps to provide direction for future research.

**Democracy.** By Albert Weale. New York: St Martin's Press, 1999. 244p. \$59.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Richard Bellamy, University of Reading

Like other volumes in the series Issues in Political Theory, which Weale edits with Peter Jones, this book combines an overview of the topic suitable for advanced undergraduates

and above with an original argument reflecting the author's distinctive perspective that is likely to stimulate fellow specialists. The combination is an attractive one, which, when it works—as it does in this case—ensures that we do not get the sort of deadly dull textbook that merely rehashes other people's ideas. There are two novel features of Weale's argument. The first is his justification of democracy in terms of its capacity to enable members of society to advance their common interests as political equals in a situation of human fallibility. The second is his attempt to delineate the form of democracy, including the type of representation and decision rule, most likely to promote this purpose. I take each in turn.

Weale believes that we should justify democracy mainly in terms of its having consequences that we can defend as beneficial on principled grounds. In Weale's view, the main attraction of democracy lies in its ability to promote certain public interests under conditions of fallibility, in which no one occupies a privileged position with respect to their political knowledge or judgment, and in communities where people regard themselves as political equals. As he admits, quite a lot is packed into this thesis, that many will find contentious. Nonetheless, in my view it has the great virtue of stressing the important yet limited practical role of democracy. It acknowledges, for example, that there are circumstances in which expert adjudication, hierarchical decision making, or individual judgment might be preferable because fallibilism, equality, or public interests, respectively, do not apply. To that extent, his approach has decided advantages over those defenses that appeal primarily to its intrinsic merits in realizing a favored principle or principles, such as autonomy. Of late, theorists have tended to favor this tack. Yet it can lead to the assumption that democracy is either good in itself or good for everything. Different versions of deliberative democracy tend to fall into each of these traps. On the one hand, deliberation gets praised for its role in developing individuals as "political" creatures but in ways that make democracy sound like an educational seminar rather than a decision making process. On the other hand, democracy is expanded to all areas of social life, thereby threatening to overload the capacity of any system to make decisions effectively. In contrast, Weale offers a much more instrumental view that simply stresses that if collective decisions are adequately to reflect the different and often conflicting concerns of those to whom they apply, then we need a form of legitimation that nevertheless protects individuals from having their concerns be simply discounted. As he notes, this aim embodies the most practical interpretations of autonomy and consent arguments for democracy—namely, their antipaternalism and their stress on the importance of people sharing moral responsibility for collective decisions. Both notions can be derived from political equality and are far more suited to a pluralist society than arguments linked to more comprehensive justifications that link democracy to self-realization.

Weale's emphasis on the practical uses of democracy also leads him to give greater attention than many theorists do to the institutional arrangements needed to ensure that democratic processes operate in the desired way. He seeks to make what he regards as realistic assumptions about human motivation and social circumstances that avoid either excessive pessimism or utopian optimism. So he denies that knavery should be taken as a general rule and supposes that ongoing political communities embody a degree of reciprocity that cannot be entirely conceived as merely enlightened selfishness. However, path dependence sets limits on what institutions, no matter how well designed, can achieve in themselves. So representation must balance statistical representativeness against ensuring the accountability of the representatives, and the best mix will have to be sensitive to the complexion of

the society concerned. Likewise with decision rules, with the majority principle needing to be modified to reflect a diversity of opinions and the likelihood that different majorities exist for different issues. Weale's advocacy of a Condorcet count to settle these kinds of problem is one of the most interesting parts of the book.

In most respects, I found myself broadly sympathetic to Weale's approach. My main criticism lies in his not pushing his argument a bit farther. For example, given the sort of instrumentalist line he takes, it is surprising that he gives no attention to contestatory mechanisms of the kind that Philip Pettit has recently insisted upon as vital means for ensuring that democratic decisions genuinely track the public rather than factional interests. Indeed, the republican concern with the avoidance of domination captures much of the reasoning behind his justification of democracy. Given the emphasis on democracy's practical value, I also found the final chapter relating his ideal to real-world situations frustratingly (if also interestingly) elusive. For example, he gives a brief discussion of the infamous "democratic deficit" of the European Union, a topic on which he has written at length elsewhere. This is the sort of issue where I feel his approach has real strengths, though, disappointingly, he fails to bring them out here. Many commentators adopt the sort of arguments criticized above, whereby it is simply assumed that because democracy is a "good thing," the EU must have as much of it as possible. But this begs precisely the sorts of problems Weale's justification raises—namely, is this an area where collective decisions can appropriately be made? If so, concerning what? Are they likely to be better made democratically rather than by elites or technocrats? What forms of representation and decision rule will be necessary to secure political equality? These are rather concrete questions, ones surprisingly rarely posed by policy makers, and it is the merit of Weale's book to focus our attention on them.

**Inclusion and Democracy.** By Iris Marion Young. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 304p. \$29.95.

Barbara Cruikshank, University of Massachusetts

Engaging her contemporaries in debates over democratic ideals and processes, Iris M. Young offers a collection of seven essays that mitigate arguments on either side of those debates (participation vs. representation, localism vs. state, segregation vs. integration, identity vs. difference) by applying the critical ideal of inclusion. She argues that the normative legitimacy of democratic decisions rests upon the extent to which those affected by decisions are included in or have the opportunity to enter the decision making process. One might think that inclusion solves only one problem, the problem of exclusion, for democracy. However, Young extends the ideal of inclusion across manifold debates in democratic theory and speaks broadly to the less than ideal conditions under which we now practice democracy.

Hers is a process-oriented conception of inclusion rather than a spatial or physical one. Inclusion is not the end point, but a condition of democratic legitimacy. To be included one need not enter into a space of deliberation at all; participation cannot be limited to face-to-face interactions and representation is necessary in large-scale multicultural societies. Among other reasons, direct democracy should not be our ideal because our relations to others extend well beyond the local level at which we encounter others physically. If we think of representation in terms of process rather than identity or substitution, as the ongoing relationship of constituents to one another and to their representative, we will be able to sustain a larger measure of inclusion.

Young rejects the idea that inequality and difference necessarily stymie political inclusion. The deeper conditions of inclusion are not only social, economic, or racial, but also procedural: being heard and understood, autonomy, representation, and the ability to move across political jurisdictions that range from local and civic to global. Even under conditions of structural inequality we might still enliven democratic practice if we explicitly acknowledge and accommodate social structural difference in the democratic process. For example, in these terms an argument for inclusion under conditions of residential segregation need not take a side in favor of either group solidarity or integration, of difference or identity. Segregation can be both good and bad; it offers the supportive backdrop of group solidarity for those marked by difference but it also leaves those whose privilege it is to be unmarked by difference unchanged. Still, it matters less where or how we live differently among ourselves (even if it is not perfectly voluntary) if we think of inclusion in terms of process rather than the integration of spaces, institutions, or neighborhoods or the assimilation of cultural difference. Separateness itself is less the problem than that democratic processes do not take existing structural differences into account. That would mean shifting the focus away from the excluded and toward the processes that privilege certain social perspectives and modes of expression.

Young offers the ideal of "differentiated solidarity" as an alternative to the ideals of integration and cultural assimilation as a means of balancing inclusion with the realities of a divided world. She develops the conceptual tools to counterbalance the dangers of involuntary exclusion against the autonomy of groups and persuasively uses social structural difference as a means of mitigating debates over identity and difference. Less persuasively, she suggests that difference can be transformed from an obstacle to a resource in democratic deliberations. Consistent with the critical traditions that she invokes, Young favors ideals for their critical potential.

Viewed procedurally, democracy is above all the best means we have for collective problem-solving because it allows us to approximate the ideals of inclusion, justice, and equality. Young makes a sound case against orienting deliberations toward the common good. Whether the starting point or the conclusion of our deliberations, unity excludes those who do not share our perspectives and understandings. We also exclude the possibility that democratic engagement will transform us or our interests and perspectives on the common good. There is one serious omission in this collection of essays. If we accept a procedural and minimalist theory of democracy as a means of collective problem-solving, we will need to know how a problem gets defined as a collective one. How will we come to accept, say, the problem of racial segregation as our problem rather than their problem? Young's answer is caught up in solving the problem of inclusive political communication and does not directly address how the agenda is set for collective deliberation. This is an old problem in democratic theory but one that continues to nag the critical tradition in particular.

Young can be charged with having too many things both ways. For example, she criticizes the literatures on civil society for imposing exclusionary norms of civility upon politics. In defending unruly demonstrations and boisterous modes of expression and debate, Young unmasks the biases and exclusions that norms of deliberation impose. At the same time, she proposes that one of the most important powers of otherwise powerless groups is to shame the powerful into recognizing their claims to justice. How can we deliver both a politics of shame and a politics that does not impose cultural norms upon others? Distinctions between shameful and inclusive actions are not easy to sustain beyond examples like

the WTO and anarchists. The focus here on procedure solves some problems and, of course, generates others.

Young takes up the crucial question of jurisdiction introduced in her earlier work. Our jurisdictions should extend as far as our obligations of justice to accommodate our relations to any others affected by our decisions. Citing Onora O'Neill, Young argues that our obligations of justice follow a causal chain that extends globally. She couples that argument with one for "relational autonomy." Procedurally, autonomy means noninterference, while relationally a group must remain accountable to the interests and perspectives of others. In addition to the problem of scale, how can we be both autonomous and accountable in any meaningful way? How can democracy accommodate both autonomous local institutions and global obligations of justice? It is her style to mitigate, to find a way of posing the question so that we might have it both ways. It is persuasive and simultaneously inconclusive.

As the ideals pile upon one another in these essays, the reader might get a sense that we are getting too far away from the real world of democracy. Her ideal of a reasonable citizen seems pretty far-fetched in the real world of debate TV and partisan politics: A reasonable citizen is one who is open to having their views and perspectives change in the

process of deliberation. How many citizens do you know who are rational by this measure, who go into a political debate with the expectation that their opinions, their perspectives, and their interests will be transformed? But Young's conception of deliberation, like her conception of democracy, is minimalist. If we do not expect to undergo transformation, we cannot be engaged in authentically democratic deliberation. By treating democracy minimally and procedurally as a means of collective problem-solving, Young does in fact achieve a balance between the real and the ideal that stands out brilliantly in the field of normative democratic theory. Her voice, like her arguments, is temperate but never tepid. However subtle, there is a potent set of arguments here that will draw the attention of those who favor agonistic theories of democracy back to normative theory. It will bring those who favor radical democracy back to exiting conditions and the shortage of negative liberty. Proponents of civil society are reminded that the state is the only institution we have for coordinating public expenditures. All in all, these essays will be of critical interest to everyone working in democratic theory and especially to those ready to grapple with the paradox of her opening line: "Democracy is hard to love" (p. 16).

#### **American Politics**

Crossing Borders, Crossing Boundaries: The Role of Scientists in the U.S. Acid Rain Debate. By Leslie R. Alm. Westport, CT: Praeger. 2000. 160p. \$58.00.

William R. Mangun, East Carolina University

Leslie Alm presents what may be the best study yet produced on the acid rain policy debate, at least with regard to its scientific underpinnings. The book describes the evolution of the current U.S.-Canadian acid rain policy agreement and focuses on the role of scientists in the formulation and implementation of acid rain policy. Alm found that most natural scientists believe they have little influence on the policy process. He suggests they are not trained to understand policymakers, and policymakers are not trained to understand science. Both have a narrow focus that causes them to perceive selectively what the other is saying. As does Lynton K. Caldwell (Between Two Worlds: Science, the Environmental Movement, and Policy Choice, 1990), Alm informs us that scientists and policymakers operate in two totally different worlds using two different languages and two different time scales; this complicates the policy process.

Crossing Borders, Crossing Boundaries is a most important book for both natural scientists and political scientists interested in how science affects public policy. This book is particularly important for scientists who are even remotely interested in becoming involved in the shaping and analysis of public policy. They will gain insight into a totally new and strange world of politics, in which perception is equally or more important than factual reality, almost totally unlike the world of science, where hard facts rule. Alm does a good job of selecting important quotations from congressional hearings that point out to scientists that they, like Dorothy and Toto, are no longer in Kansas but in a totally different and unknown world. He shows how policymakers who attempt to make scientists appear to be advocates of positions the policymakers favor can manipulate "scientific research." The book also does a good job of informing scientists of what to

expect if asked to testify before Congress and, accordingly, how to prepare testimony. The author demonstrates how science must be made policy relevant.

Students of the policy process will acquire considerable insight into the complex world of scientific issues as well as many of the difficulties inherent in the translation of scientific results into public policy. They will learn that scientists seldom are willing to provide conclusive "cause-and-effect" evidence that will support a particular proposal. Alm suggests that scientists who become substantially involved in promoting a specific policy do so at the risk of endangering their professional reputation. Such concerns encourage many scientists to be conservative in their statements, because they realize that new scientific evidence may be just around the corner that could substantially alter the basis of their research findings. Such conservatism often frustrates policy entrepreneurs trying to sell a specific policy solution. "Policy makers are selective, predisposed, and want certainty and scientists cannot give them that" (p. 92).

Alm employs John Kingdon's policy agenda setting framework to describe the role of scientists in acid rain politics. For example, Alm goes to considerable lengths to describe the central role that scientists play in establishing a consensus about the need for policy action on environmental problems, in general, and acid rain in particular. Similar to Kingdon, Alm shows how scientific experts have helped shape the alternative policy courses in the acid rain debate.

Alm's research spans more than ten years. During this time, he scrutinized public hearings on both sides of the U.S.-Canadian border in order to obtain detailed information about which scientists were called upon to participate in acid rain deliberations. He also conducted numerous interviews with American and Canadian natural and social scientists. His attention to detail provides considerable insight into the complex interaction between science and politics in public policy formulation.

Alm depicts what happens when the highly complex world of science collides with political realities. His interviews with scientists highlight necessary ingredients for successful collaboration with policymakers. Neither group has an accurate perception of the world in which the other must operate. Scientists do not appear to realize that compromises must be made among competing interests, and policymakers do not seem to realize or want to acknowledge that science-based policies simply have to operate with a high degree of uncertainty.

This book also has strengths with regard to insights into comparative politics. Alm perceptively identifies both political and scientific aspects, shaped by science, that continually loom over the delicate webs of cross-national policy linkages. He points out that natural and social scientists in the United States and Canada have different perceptions of their roles in the policy process. He also suggests that such differences may influence the policy position of the two governments, which potentially threatens the very foundations of transnational agreements. Alm made extensive efforts to address both Canadian and U.S. positions (scientifically and politically), and those interested in obtaining a better understanding of the intricacies of cross-national policy formulation and implementation should read this book. Despite a somewhat narrow focus on acid rain policy, this volume is useful as a case-study text for courses in environmental politics, international environmental policy, and science, technology, and public policy.

Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit Court. By Christopher P. Banks. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999. 200p. \$38.00.

Isaac Unah, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

For decades the U.S. courts of appeals were afflicted with the proverbial middle child syndrome. They were given less than deserved attention by legal scholars and political scientists, and their decisions commanded less media and popular attention than rulings by the Supreme Court and even decisions of federal district courts. To many observers, the appeals courts were relatively invisible. Circuit courts are convalescing from this affliction because increasingly political scientists are turning their analytical attention to these thirteen important stations of judicial power in American society.

Scholars have used a variety of techniques to analyze these courts. Some choose to examine the courts of appeals comparatively, by emphasizing differences in institutional structure, decision outcomes, and judicial personalities. Others perform a detailed and intuitive case study of only one. This latter technique may limit generalizability, but it gives political scientists and, especially, students of the judiciary a useful sense of the historicity and doctrinal contributions of individual courts. Christopher Banks has written an important book that falls within this second category.

Judicial Politics in the D.C. Circuit Court contributes to the broader judicial politics literature by providing a detailed historical account of the major political and jurisprudential developments in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit after 1960. According to Banks, the post-1960 period was one of significant transformation for the D.C. Circuit. It emerged from relative obscurity to become a dominant political force not only in supervising local community courts and liberalizing the rights of criminal defendants in the Washington, D.C., area but also in superintending the policy decisions of federal administrative agencies and in serving as what is putatively the most fertile ground for the cultivation of prospective nominees for the Supreme Court.

The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 chronicles the D.C. Circuit's great authority in the judicial hierarchy. Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the internal and external political forces that have shaped the current status of the D.C. Circuit.

Chapter 4 discusses the significance of en banc reviews and the degree of scrutiny afforded by the Supreme Court over circuit decisions. Chapter 5 summarizes the main argument and speculates on the D.C. Circuit's future. From the outset Banks notes accurately that, with few exceptions, precious little has been written about this court, even though it occupies a central place in the federal judicial system.

Part of the difficulty is the lack of detailed data (beyond the descriptive material available from the Administrative Office of the Courts [AOC] that would permit rigorous empirical analysis. The recently completed court of appeals database compiled by Donald Songer (Principal Investigator) begins to address this difficulty. Indeed, analyses using AOC data are by necessity historical and descriptive rather than deductive and theoretical. Banks relies upon descriptive data from this federal agency in his coverage of the D.C. Circuit and all the numbered circuits, and these data enable him to emphasize the distinctive features of the D.C. Circuit. Yet, like many scholars who write about the courts of appeals, Banks could not obtain comparative data on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the only circuit court with limited subjectmatter jurisdiction and the court most similar to the D.C. Circuit in jurisdiction and geographic location.

Banks does not explicate and test a new theory of judicial behavior. Instead, he seeks to write a descriptive book about an important circuit court, and he succeeds. Banks relies upon a critical evaluation of various theories of judicial behavior, especially the hierarchical model (chap. 4) proposed by Donald Songer, Jeffrey Segal, and Charles Cameron ("The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions," *American Journal of Political Science* 38:3 [August 1994]: 673–96), to analyze events within the D.C. Circuit from 1960 to 1997.

The main argument is that, since the 1960s, the D.C. Circuit has had two distinct reputations in the legal community, and each influences the court's work. The first was developed during the 1960s, when the D.C. Circuit positioned itself as a progressive forum for adjudicating criminal disputes. Because of escalating crime in American society and the social upheaval of that period, the circuit was vilified for its progressive or lenient stance on the rights of criminal defendants. Congressional Republicans championed wholesale changes in the court's personnel and jurisdiction in an effort to fight crime and restore public order.

The second reputation is that of a quasi-specialized, de facto court for adjudicating administrative appeals, a direct result of the transformation of the court's personnel and jurisdiction. In chapter 3, Banks describes how political forces both inside and outside the D.C. Circuit influenced the court's decision making in administrative law, including differences in orientation among the judges, which led to the development of the popular "hard-look" doctrine that expanded the scope of judicial supervision of administrative agency decisions. In examining both reputations, Banks helps us understand how powerfully Washington politics permeates the judicial system.

Toward the end of the book, Banks addresses the politically controversial issue of subject-matter specialization in the courts. Political elites are sharply divided on the propriety of establishing specialized tribunals staffed with experts to adjudicate legal controversies in a specific policy area. Banks spells out the pros and cons in this debate. Although he seems tepid on this issue at first, his preference is clearly pronounced by the end. The D.C. Circuit is traditionally considered a generalist court, but since the 1970s the court has decided the greatest proportion of administrative agency appeals directly involving the federal government. Therefore, Banks advocates congressional reform to restrict its substantive

jurisdiction to cases from administrative agencies because "the D.C. Circuit operates best as a specialized court" (p. 136). This would turn the D.C. Circuit into a specialized court of administrative law. But Banks is extremely cautious and calls repeatedly for more studies of the issue before any reforms are implemented. This caution undermines the force of his own evidence showing that the D.C. Circuit is the most active tribunal in deciding administrative appeals and that this makes it appropriate for the D.C. Circuit to be formalized as a specialized court.

Legislative Learning: The 104th Republican Freshmen in the House. By Timothy J. Barnett. New York: Garland, 1998. 333p. \$60.00

Gregory R. Thorson, University of Minnesota at Morris

The 1994 elections were watershed elections in several respects. Perhaps most significantly, the Republicans gained control of both chambers of Congress for the first time since 1953. In the process, the 1994 elections also swept into office a large, relatively homogeneous group of 73 House Republican freshmen determined to change the political system. With size comes an opportunity for power in Congress, and the 73 Republican freshmen elected in 1994 were determined to exert considerable influence over the legislative process. Not since the 1974 elections produced the 76 freshmen Democrats (i.e., the Watergate Babies) have political scientists focused so much attention on a single class of legislators. Timothy Barnett's Legislative Learning is a nice complement to similar books already written about this interesting group of legislators, including Richard Fenno and Michael Armacost's Learning to Govern: An Institutional View of the 104th Congress (1997) and Nicol Rae's Conservative Reformers: The Republican Freshmen and the Lessons of the 104th Congress (1998).

Whereas Fenno and Armacost focus on the inexperience and failures of the Republican leadership to develop this new group of legislators adequately, and Rae shares his "insider" experience as an APSA Congressional fellow during this period, Barnett's primary contribution is finding the theoretical significance to these important historical events. In this respect, he is quite successful. His treatment of the rise and subsequent fall of the Republican freshmen class of 1994 is put into a rich theoretical context that includes extensive discussions of Fenno's multiple goal approach, ambition theory, and Sinclair's application of principal-agent theory.

Most of Barnett's arguments do not defy previous interpretations of the events that took place during this period. For example, most political scientists have long argued that the goals of the Republican freshmen class of 1994 were more policy-oriented than reelection-oriented. Barnett's treatment is dedicated not so much to determining the factual basis of these claims but to examining their theoretical relevance. His focus is on to what extent the behavior of the Republican freshmen class of 1994 was consistent or inconsistent with other members and whether any differences are supportive of certain theoretical perspective more than others found in the literature. For example, Barnett's treatment of the tension between Mayhew's reelection goal perspective and Fenno's multiple goal approach is both provocative and insightful.

The evidence used in Barnett's book is largely anecdotal and is derived mostly from secondary sources. Nevertheless, Barnett uses these sources skillfully. For example, in some of his most interesting observations, Barnett describes in great detail the difficulty the House Republican leadership had

in controlling the Republican Class of 1994 during the passage of special rules governing debate for committee funding of the House Oversight Committee and the flood relief bills passed in 1997. His coverage of these events leads to broader discussions of the motivations and goals of the class generally.

Barnett also introduces a limited amount of original data and presents the results of several personal interviews as well. His survey data are limited to just 10 questions answered by members' high-level legislative staffers. The survey had several measures aimed at determining the cohesion of the class as well as its perceived mandate. Not surprisingly, Barnett finds that members of the 1994 Republican Freshmen class had a high level of class cohesion and the perception of a reform-oriented mandate.

Overall, Barnett's *Legislative Learning* is a well-done theoretical volume that attempts to understand the Republican Freshmen Class of 1994 through competing interpretations of principal-agent analysis and member goal and ambition theories. Scholars hoping to find specific hypotheses developed and tested with empirical data will be disappointed. Nevertheless, due to its focus on the theoretical implications of this important class of legislators, I would recommend it to supplement the Fenno, Armacost, and Rae texts.

Presidential Transitions: From Politics to Practice. By John P. Burke. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000. 437p. \$65.00.

Mary Anne Borrelli, Connecticut College

Scholars have long been participant-observers in presidential transitions, which provide extraordinary opportunities to refine their understanding of continuity and change in the presidency. Political science, more generally, has benefited from this engagement. Whether we read the elegant memoranda of Richard Neustadt or the advice-laden briefing papers of the White House 2001 Project, we gain a new appreciation for the challenges confronting a chief executive who must build an administration, establish a policy agenda, and achieve demonstrable political results within a few short months of the election. In *Presidential Transitions*. From Politics to Practice, John Burke makes a notable contribution to our knowledge of these events, both as historical drama and as political developments. Quite simply, this book can be enjoyed for its narrative and appreciated for its analysis by those interested in presidential institutions and policymaking.

Burke focuses on the decision making processes that are established during the preinaugural weeks and tested during the postinaugural months. He gives due attention to the cabinet and to various units within the Executive Office, but his attention is fixed on the White House staff. He readily acknowledges that the White House office is an institution, which is to say that it evidences autonomy, adaptability, complexity, and coherence. Yet, Burke insists, it is remarkably flexible and even malleable. Presidents have conceptualized and managed the personnel and units within the White House office in very different ways, even in the most recent decades, which has significant implications for both executive and (by extension) legislative decision making. "The way in which transitions craft, or do not craft, those processes has consequences, sometimes severe" (p. 377).

The transitions of four presidents—Carter, Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton—are assessed from their preelection planning efforts through to their postinaugural outcomes. The work of presidents-elect is analyzed in terms of the transition organization, nomination and appointment decisions, and the development of a policy agenda; that of

the presidents is examined in terms of decision making processes, presidential management of the White House staff, and domestic and foreign policy outcomes. Bracketing these discussions are chapters that consider the role of transitions in the modern presidency, the limitations of rational actor models in explicating this aspect of the presidency, and the lessons to be learned from the four administrations. As this array of topics suggests, Burke is as attentive to the concerns of practitioners as he is to the interests of scholars.

What distinguishes this work is an extensive reliance on (and cross-referencing of) primary documents and sources. The collections of the presidential libraries and other archives, as well as extended interviews with the principals, reveal the course of managerial and policy decisions. Without venturing into counterhistorical speculations, Burke weighs the importance of roads taken and not taken, including the implications of each for White House operations. Although the Clinton chapters necessarily rely more on secondary sources, they offer original data and insights. Burke explains this book's relationship to other works on presidential campaigning and governance, and it will undoubtedly serve as a springboard for future studies.

In essence, Burke's analysis can be distilled into a forceful assertion that the president is at the center of the presidency—notwithstanding the influential roles played by various other actors and offices—and that each president's managerial choices are important. Transitions matter, then, because they reveal a president-elect's organizational priorities vis-à-vis the White House, as distinct from the campaign or from prior executive positions. Although attuned to patterns of political behavior, Burke is sensitive to the distinctive character of each president, which makes his rejection of rational choice models, for example, entirely comprehensible. It also increases the likelihood that this volume will serve as a lightning rod for debates about research design and methods in presidency studies.

Martha Kumar, in her written and oral presentations as director of the White House 2001 Project, stresses four basic components in setting up the White House office: organization, process, personnel, and values. Burke, who contributed an essay to that project, considers each of these elements in Presidential Transitions, but he places greatest emphasis on organization and process. Who holds which position in the White House is important, but Burke maintains that their choices and actions occur within an organizational and procedural context. Values certainly matter, but he suggests that they are most routinely manifested through relationships and decision making. Thus, an investigation of personnel and values is part of the larger study of organization and process. Each is integral to the White House office, but Burke assigns a particular primacy to organization and process. This claim challenges the presumptions of many organizational theorists, as well as presidency and policy scholars, and fuels debate about the White House staff as a bureaucracy and as an institution. In turn, the book's empirical richness, in conjunction with its theoretical contentiousness, ensures that it will be a valuable resource for political scientists as researchers and as educators.

Maximization, Whatever the Cost: Race, Redistricting, and the Department of Justice. By Maurice T. Cunningham. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. 192p. \$62.50.

Mark E. Rush, Washington and Lee University

With the Supreme Court decision in Easley v. Cromartie, the 1990s round of redistricting litigation came to an end just

in time for the new decade's round to commence. Looking back upon the Court decisions from the 1990s as well as the extensive scholarly commentary on them, anyone new to the field of voting rights in the United States might wonder how the Voting Rights Act, which was a straightforward attempt to remedy indisputably unjust political practices, could have given rise to the I-85 district in North Carolina.

The key, says Maurice Cunningham, is the evolution of the strategy taken by the Voting Rights Section of the Civil Rights Division (CRD) of the Department of Justice to implement the Voting Rights Act (VRA). Cunningham approaches the furor surrounding minority voting rights as a disinterested observer who laments the loss of prestige and credibility (p. 10) that the CRD has sustained as a result of its actions under the VRA in the 1990s. Under the leadership of John Dunne and Deval Patrick, the CRD gradually yet unquestionably shifted its approach to maximizing the number of majority minority districts from a policy that balanced competing concerns about minority representation with state-level concerns about incumbency, different aspects of local representation, and so forth. To recapture its prestige and credibility—and therefore reestablish its capacity to protect effectively minority voting rights—the CRD must "recapture the balance missing from its effort in the 1990's"

Maximization, Whatever the Cost is a refreshing addition to the VRA literature because it is not a piece of advocacy. Instead of criticizing the stands taken by supporters and critics of the CRD and the Supreme Court in the 1990s, Cunningham demonstrates that the CRD is subject to the same pathologies and interest group pressures that affect any other bureaucratic arm of government. The result is an intriguing study of the tensions within the CRD and the role and influence of the interest groups that lobby it.

Cunningham's book is bound to upset many participants in the voting rights policy arena precisely because the analysis is so evenhanded. Minority voting rights advocates are bound to chafe at the contention that the CRD's maximization policy was not in keeping with the spirit of the VRA. Similarly, the author notes that critics of the CRD's maximization policy also suffered from tunnel vision. They were justified in at first fearing and then fighting against the maximization policy, but it is also clear that their very narrow interpretation of the VRA would hardly have served the purposes for which the cet was intended.

In large part, the CRD suffers because it is charged by the VRA with two contradictory roles. On the one hand, Section 2 empowers the CRD to assist minority plaintiffs in vote dilution suits. On the other, Section 5 charges it with an adjudicatory role in assessing changes to state election laws. Cunningham argues that in the 1990s the CRD subsumed the latter role in pursuit of the former.

The CRD dispensed with the first prong of the Section 2 vote dilution test set forth by the Supreme Court in *Thornburg* v. *Gingles* (1986) (which required that a minority group be geographically compact) in favor of a standard that defined "discriminatory intent" on the part of a legislature as the adoption of any other districting scheme when one that provides for more majority-minority districts is available. The CRD then incorporated this interpretation of Section 2 into its Section 5 preclearance procedures. The result was a policy that withheld preclearance unless a state could demonstrate that it had indeed maximized opportunities for minority representation.

Cunningham demonstrates the effect of interest groups on the CRD's policymaking. It is no surprise that members of what he calls the voting rights issue network (the

ACLU, NAACP Legal Defense Fund, Mexican American Legal Defense Fund the Lawyers' Committee, and so on) lined up behind and worked closely with the CRD and its staff attorneys in advocating the policy of maximization. The intimacy of this relationship ultimately did the most damage to the CRD's integrity because it appeared as if the division had allowed itself to be captured by interest groups. This was manifested most clearly in the criticisms leveled at the CRD in the Johnson v. Miller (1995) litigation emanating from Georgia. Of course, the newcomer to the field will wonder what the Republican Party was doing right there, working alongside all these groups that would seem to be its traditional adversaries. Cunningham indicates that it made sense for the GOP to pursue and advocate the maximization policy (despite its philosophical opposition to affirmative action) because it enhanced opportunities to elect Republicans.

Îronically, the CRD's focus on maximization not only blinded it to the counterproductive effect it was having on minority interests (by helping the GOP) but also rendered it deaf to the pleas of black elected officials. They were willing to "settle" for minority influence districts precisely because they had gained positions of influence and established themselves as effective politicians in a manner clearly envisioned by the framers of the VRA.

Cunningham's study reveals several different fates that legislation can suffer at the hands of interest groups. The right thing can be pursued the wrong way (enhancing minority political opportunities via a maximization policy). The wrong (or at least unintended) thing can happen the right way (using the VRA to enhance Republican interests at the expense of Democratic power and therefore minority interests). Finally, the right thing can be done the right way (implement the VRA in a manner that balances theoretical ideals of minority voting rights with the concerns of local—including minority—elected officials).

Perhaps the most poignant discussion concerns the tension manifested by the second scenario. "Elite" actors, such as career voting rights attorneys, found their theoretical yet abstract vision of justice at odds with the interests of the minority elected officials (and, presumably, their constitutents) for whom they were supposed to be working. Cunningham notes (pp. 100–1) that members of the voting rights issues network became so preoccupied with achieving their maximization goal that they overlooked the fact that the VRA was designed to enhance and repair the democratic process in general.

This slender volume merits much praise. My only criticism is the wish that it were a bit longer. Cunningham peppers his discussion with excerpts from and references to interviews with key players, and it is extensively footnoted with references to respected academic sources and state actors. But at points I found myself wishing for more detail and embellishment, such as Dunne's reconciliation of his maximization policy with his membership in a Republican administration, or the discussion of how the state legislators finally caved into CRD pressure to maximize the number of majority-minority districts. The account of how black elected officials were accused of selling out because they had problems creating bizarre districts, such as the I–85 district in North Carolina, is gripping—and makes the reader wish for even more detail.

Maximization, Whatever the Cost is a breath of fresh air and a succinct inquiry into the politics and implementation of the Voting Rights Act. It puts the many works of advocacy that characterize the voting rights literature into a thoughtful political science perspective.

The Prudential Presidency: An Aristotelian Approach to Presidential Leadership. By Ethan M. Fishman. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. 160p. \$52.50.

Michael J. Korzi, Towson University

A sense of puzzlement is likely to be the first reaction to Ethan Fishman's book. Aristotle and presidential leadership? These are topics that we tend not to associate with each other. Yet, as Fishman makes clear in this admirable and provocative work, Aristotle had much to say about proper political leadership, much that is directly applicable to evaluating and understanding American presidents and their acts of leadership.

Fishman is very clear about what he wants to accomplish, and his book is accordingly brief and tightly argued. It is not meant as an exhaustive theoretical account of Aristotle or as a detailed examination of presidential leadership acts. Rather, Fishman intends to "provide a straightforward application of an ancient strategy for effective leadership to information presently available in a language and style accessible to general readers and students in courses on the American presidency and the history of political philosophy" (p. 13). He begins with a theoretical chapter that explicates Aristotle's theory of prudential leadership and discusses three other "competing leadership strategies that [Aristotle's] theory implies-idealism, cynicism, and pragmatism" (p. 6). With this theoretical foundation in place, the bulk of the book constitutes an application of these concepts to particular acts of presidential leadership. A concluding chapter considers further the implications of Aristotle's theory of prudential leadership for presidential studies in particular and presidential leadership more generally.

There are several audiences for this book—general readers as well as students and scholars of political philosophy, the presidency, and leadership studies—but most especially presidency scholars. Fishman is rightly critical of the lack of normative analysis in presidency studies and, indeed, political science in general. Presidency scholars (Fishman singles out for special consideration Richard Neustadt, James Barber, and George Edwards) often do yeoman work in explaining the causes and effects of presidential behavior, but they are typically reticent, or perhaps evasive, when it comes to normatively judging that behavior. Presidents are labeled "good" if they are energetic, or persuasive, or successful in passing legislation. But political scientists rarely question whether the decisions presidents make, or the policies they pursue, are moral or laudable or, to use a rather unfashionable word, "virtuous." By returning to Aristotle and his theory of prudential leadership, Fishman tries to develop a language and model by which to make normative and evaluative sense of the American presidency and presidential leadership. "Presidents serve the public interest of the United States most effectively when their behavior conforms to Aristotle's venerable, but no longer generally venerated, theory of political prudence" (p. 6).

Fishman largely succeeds in giving us a language for making evaluative judgments. The leadership categories of prudence, pragmatism, idealism, and cynicism turn out to be very useful in explaining and interpreting leadership acts of American presidents. For example, idealism is an accurate characterization of Woodrow Wilson's stubborn leadership on the Treaty of Versailles, and cynical leadership best characterizes Bill Clinton's actions during the Lewinsky scandal. Of course, prudence is the key model of leadership, around which the others revolve.

Prudential leadership occurs when leaders "emphasize universal ideals without romanticizing them and do their best to honor values in the face of practical obstacles" (pp. 22–3).

This is to be distinguished from pragmatic leadership, which is often conflated with prudential leadership, that is, "values are secondary to tangible results" (p. 22). Prudential decisions in American history are Lincoln's leadership during the Civil War and Theodore Roosevelt's support of conservation; pragmatic decisions include Truman's use of the atomic bomb and Kennedy's leadership during the Bay of Pigs. Although "the difference between prudence and pragmatism is especially difficult to appreciate" (p. 25), Fishman takes us quite a way toward clarifying the distinction. Undoubtedly, some will quibble with Fishman's interpretation and characterization of certain acts of leadership, but in the main they ring true and help us better understand the range and scope of presidential leadership.

One of the more interesting and provocative contributions of the book is an understanding of the relationship between private character and public action. In light of the Lewinsky scandal, which was a partial motivator for the book (p. 14), this question takes on immediate relevance. Clinton and his defenders argued for a strict separation between private behavior and character and presidential leadership. In fact, some used Clinton to prove that there is no relationship: To wit, Clinton was an outstanding president who had a flawed or immoral private character. Aristotle and Fishman clearly disagree with this viewpoint. Aristotle rhetorically asked: "Is it not true that men who have no command of their passions will fail to serve their own interest even though they possess self-knowledge and self-loyalty and will equally fail to serve the public interest (even though they possess a knowledge of public affairs and public loyalty)" (p. 31)? Whereas Stanley Renshon (High Hopes, 1996) gave us a psychological explanation of the connections between Clinton's private and public behavior, Fishman provides a more philosophical perspective, one that is sure to provoke further debate over the legacy and leadership of Clinton.

Two aspects of the book need refinement and development. First, because the pursuit of "universal ideals" is a hallmark of prudential leadership, one would like to see a more systematic discussion of what might constitute universal ideals and values. There are oblique references to such standards as the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule (p. 112), but a more substantial discussion is warranted. Second, and more important, Fishman's model of leadership places somewhat unreasonable expectations on presidents. "The less we expect of our presidents, the less we are likely to get from them" (p. 119). This may be true, but we need to be more discriminating about exactly when and under what circumstances we should expect great leadership of the Aristotelian, prudential stripe. What if the context and times do not permit prudential leadership?

Fishman confronts Stephen Skowronek's *The Politics Presidents Make* (1993) in the last pages of the concluding chapter, but he does not fully address the powerful challenge that Skowronek's arguments pose. Skowronek's seminal study suggests the very real limitations of expecting great acts of leadership from all presidents, regardless of circumstances or their place in "political time." Surely, we should criticize presidents for squandering opportunities for great acts of moral leadership, but we also should be sure that they did, in fact, have the reasonable opportunity to exercise such leadership. Thus, Fishman makes an important break with the presidency literature in his focus on normative analysis, but his individual-centered leadership perspective, being insufficiently attentive to context and institutions, is too conventional.

Nevertheless, this book is a welcome addition to the presidency (and political science) literature. Fishman has given us a language for better describing and evaluating presidential

leadership, and in the process he demonstrates the continuing relevance of political philosophy and normative analysis to contemporary politics and political science. These are no small achievements.

The Power of the American Presidency, 1789–2000. By Michael A. Genovese. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 273p. \$19.95.

Presidential Power: Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century. Edited by Robert Y. Shapiro, Martha Joynt Kumar, and Lawrence R. Jacobs. New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. 525p. \$49.50

Richard S. Conley, University of Florida

It has been more than forty years since the publication of Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents* (1960). In that seminal work Neustadt rebuffed systemic, legal, and constitutional approaches to emphasize the personal basis of presidential power and the centrality of presidents' reputation and persuasive skills. Michael Genovese's book and the collection assembled by Shapiro, Kumar, and Jacobs are timely and useful additions to the reevaluation of the individual and institutional bases of presidential power, influence, and leadership across time. If scholarship on the presidency is at a crossroads, these works invite us to journey in different analytical directions.

Genovese joins Sidney Milkis and Michael Nelson (*The American Presidency: Origins and Development*, 1998) in producing an authoritative and informative account of the historical development of presidential power. The work focuses on addressing a central problem that teacher-scholars know all too well: "Students today are a-historical; they know virtually nothing about any president who came before George Bush" (p. ix). The writing is accessible to an undergraduate and general audience. The author also engages readers with attention to the personas and sometimes humorous peculiarities of past presidents, including the enigmatic Madison and the vibrant Jackson, as he astutely situates individual presidents' shortand long-term contributions to the office.

The book is organized chronologically, and Genovese does not endeavor to forge a comprehensive theory of presidential power. He does, however, draw useful, if intuitive, distinctions between the formal (constitutional) and informal (extraconstitutional) foundations of presidential influence. Borrowing from his previous work (with Thomas Cronin, *The Paradoxes of the American Presidency*, 1997), Genovese plays upon the contradictory leadership expectations and constitutional ambiguities that presidents have faced since the beginning of the Republic. These include the systemic checks and balances aimed at reigning in presidential power and the wording of Article II, which provides the basis both for restrictive and expansive interpretations of presidential authority by Congress, the Court, and the electorate.

The evolution of the presidency, Genovese posits, is "a story of elasticity and adaptability; of leadership and clerkship; of strong and weak officeholders; of change and stasis" (p. 16). The themes accentuated throughout the brief studies of individual presidencies—the pivotal role of precedents, foreign policy actions, popular politics, struggles with Congress, changing economic and international contexts—emphasize broad historical cycles of rising and declining presidential influence. Genovese's central objective is to highlight the ways in which the office has been transformed across time without any fundamental restructuring of the Constitution. He notes that when presidential power has surged forward, the "great" and "near great" presidents found themselves in challenging governing positions. The common threads that link such icons

as Washington, Jackson, Lincoln, Theodore Roosevelt, and Franklin Roosevelt include skill and the selfless pursuit of a higher purpose in the bid to expand presidential power. It is the combination of individual political acumen, governing context, and the demands upon the presidency relative to the larger American political system to which Genovese fittingly credits the adaptability of the institution to changing domestic and international circumstances across time.

Historians may find one of the book's main virtues, brevity, to be a liability. Because Genovese cannot cover the intricacies of each administration he is compelled to set forth the high and low points and the major historical developments succinctly. An ambitious "political time" framework à la Stephen Skowronek (*The Politics Presidents Make*, 1997) is not fully developed, although useful "periodic" distinctions are drawn. Genovese skillfully crafts a thoughtful, well-documented volume that will surely be appreciated in undergraduate courses on the presidency and political development.

Genovese's concise analysis of turning points in the modern era (since Franklin Roosevelt) and the challenges recent presidents have faced, particularly with respect to economic and domestic policy and the end of the Cold War, is well balanced. Above all, the concluding chapter is insightful and bound to spark lively classroom debates. By underscoring the ebb and flow of presidential influence over three centuries, Genovese reminds us that those elements of our "leadership adverse," separated system that simultaneously sanction and constrict executive power—and are often blamed for gridlock—are not wholly unique to the modern presidency. The continuity that connects the "traditional" and "modern" presidency is the enduring search for equilibrium comprising bold yet democratically accountable leadership.

What of modern presidents' attempts to surmount systemic obstacles and leave legacies commensurate with the "great" presidents of times passed? Should Neustadt's focus on personal power continue to orient presidency scholars today? Presidential Power: Forging the Presidency for the Twenty-First Century is a superlative collection of articles that critically examine Neustadt's influential legacy. Shapiro, Kumar, and Jacobs have produced a volume that rivals Michael Nelson's sixth edition of The Presidency and the Political System (2000) in theoretical scope and surpasses it in sophisticated empirical data analysis. Their volume is appropriate for advanced undergraduates and should be required reading for graduate courses on the modern presidency.

Derived from a Columbia University conference in 1996, the essays in Presidential Power take up a range of issues pertaining to Neustadt's power approach. The authors test key hypotheses, raise new questions, and challenge core assumptions. The book is organized into six parts, and a senior scholar provides an overview and commentary on the essays at the beginning of each section. Chapters by George Edwards and John Gunnell place Neustadt's approach within traditions of American political science. The second section covers issues of personal power-bargaining with Congress, the timing of presidential speechmaking, and advisory structures. The third and fourth parts focus on the institutionalization of the presidency and the position of the executive relative to other systemic actors. The fifth section discusses presidential polling and media communication. The concluding chapters consider the effect of Clinton's proposed impeachment as well as a somewhat plaintive essay by Neustadt himself on the future of presidency research.

If the essays strike a melancholic chord with Neustadt, it is because the objectives of the authors tend to be at odds with the original purpose of his classic study. Whereas that work was meant as a primer for officeholders on the practice

of personal power, these essays are heavily weighted toward rational choice assumptions and the "new institutionalism." They focus less on individual skill and are far more concerned with concrete theoretical development in presidential scholarship. As Jacobs and Shapiro note in the concluding chapter, Neustadt's work "no longer offers a reliable roadmap embodying the consensus among contemporary scholars" (p. 489). Many of the contributors reject "Neustadt's emphasis on the personal basis of power in favor of an analysis of institutions and political structures" (p. 491). At the same time, some of the underlying themes of Neustadt's classic work, including "institutional partisanship" (the view that presidents should prevail over other systemic actors), presidents' relationship with the public, and reputational issues, are prevalent in the essays.

Neustadt is critiqued from a variety of angles, and some disconfirming evidence is presented alongside traces of his wellestablished insight on presidential power. Several authors take issue with Neustadt's choice to hold the institutional context of the presidency constant. Charles Cameron, for instance, considers how party control of Congress shifts legislative leadership from "coordination" under unified government to "strategic bargaining" through the veto power under divided government. Others, like Nolan McCarty and Rose Razaghian, suggest that presidents engage in more "strategic anticipation" than the bargaining model profferred by Neustadt. As they attempt to control the bureaucracy through appointments, presidents may create the false impression of a "honeymoon" early in their term by saving controversial appointments until later. Others, such as Bert Rockman, are skeptical of Neustadt's organizational prescriptions for the presidency. Neustadt touts Franklin Roosevelt's "multiple advocacy" approach as the key to success, yet Reagan, for example, was largely successful (at least in his first term) through a far more structured organization. Renée Smith finds that presidents can act as "teachers" through "selfmade happenings," but they do not always maximize the potential of "prestige" with the public. Public approval does not appear to drive decisions on the timing of presidential speeches.

Embedded in the collection of articles are other considerable insights, controversial theses, and sophisticated methods to which a brief review cannot do justice. Some of the articles draw data from archival material (Matthew Dickson and Diane Heith); Robert Lieberman compares Neustadt's approach to Skowronek's "regimes" in political time; and Congress-centered arguments about legislative delegation to the president are presented (David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran). All told, the collection accentuates how the new wave of research on the presidency focuses on the institutional and structural constraints on presidential power and the executive's direct connection to public opinion. This approach is at variance with Neustadt's emphasis on the personal basis of presidential power and "insider" reputation.

Not all scholars will agree with the general perspective of *Presidential Power*. The "psychological" presidency (e.g., James David Barber, *The Presidential Character* 1992) and interconnecting issues of personality, leadership style, and presidential politics (Fred I. Greenstein, *The Presidential Difference*, 2000; Alexander L. George & Juliette L. George *Presidential Personality and Performance*, 1998; Erwin C. Hargrove, *Presidential Leadership*, 1966) are deemphasized. Nonetheless, the critiques of Neustadt are a tribute to his pioneering work in charting the course for presidency scholarship. The essays also reflect the theoretical maturation of the subfield in recent decades as scholars continue to map out new directions in presidency research.

Not Whether But When: The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO. By James M. Goldgeier. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999. 218p. \$42.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Sharyl Cross, San Jose State University

James M. Goldgeier makes a major contribution to the contemporary case study literature concerning American foreign policy formation. Based on extensive interviews with more than 75 key participants (William Perry, Richard Holbrooke, John Shalikashvili, Leon Panetta, Anthony Lake, Strobe Talbott, and so forth), Goldgeier reconstructs a richly detailed account of the policy process that culminated in the decision to expand the NATO alliance eastward. The study illuminates the complex interplay of political considerations, bureaucratic interests, and individual preferences and skills (even chutzpah) that led to the admission of the first tier of new NATO member nations in Eastern/Central Europe.

No less a figure than George F. Kennan, principal architect of America's post-World War II containment strategy, described the decision to expand the alliance as "the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-Cold War era" (George F. Kennan, "A Fateful Error," New York Times, February 5, 1997, p. A23). Many scholars recognized the potential adverse consequences for relations with postcommunist Russia, the economic costs of admitting new members, questions concerning the potential military-to-military interoperability of Eastern/Central European nations with NATO members, and many other considerations, and they were at a loss to explain the administration's decision to pursue what appeared as a less than optimal policy choice. Goldgeier's balanced and objective treatment of this contentious issue makes clear the confluence of considerations—right or wrong—that resulted in a 1998 Senate vote (80-19) in support of NATO enlargement.

In this concise (six chapters) and well-written study, Goldgeier carefully reconstructs the range of variables that led the Department of State on a fast-track trajectory in support of enlargement, with the primary objective of creating an incentive for democratic transition in the newly independent states of Europe. Based on the interviews with General John Shalikashvili (Supreme Allied Commander in Europe SACEUR), Charles W. Freeman, Jr. (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Security Affairs), and other U.S. officials, Goldgeier provides detailed evidence to suggest that the Pentagon was reluctant to embrace enlargement; it favored the Partnership for Peace initiative as a first step toward constructing the preconditions for eventually integration of new members into the alliance. The Pentagon also appears to have assigned a higher priority to limiting the potential for renewed confrontation with Russia. Beyond defining the core distinctions between the Department of State and the Pentagon, the analysis expands to evaluate the weight of Congress, Russian political realities, U.S. public indifference, and interest groups composed of U.S. citizens of Eastern/Central European descent in the formation of policy.

Perhaps of most interest is Goldgeier's attention to the significance of key individuals in securing U.S. commitment to NATO enlargement. "Lake and the president laid out the vision between September 1993 and July 1994, and Holbrooke had the 'chutzpah' to move the policy forward in the fall of 1994" (p. 11). The author concludes: "My numerous interviews with enlargement opponents within the administration and with enlargement proponents outside of it have created the overwhelming recollection that in October 1994 Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Richard C. Holbrooke pushed forward an enlargement policy that was no more than theory to that point" (p. 152).

Goldgeier persuasively establishes the significant influences exerted by National Security Advisor Anthony Lake and, even more important, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke in securing U.S. backing for NATO enlargement. Goldgeier observes that ambiguity in presidential decision making creates opportunities for policy entrepreneurs (in this case, especially Lake and Holbrooke) to strike decisively in advancing their preferences. The case study reveals how personality, skills, persistence, and conviction of the single policy entrepreneur can be directed toward "outmaneuvering" the bureaucracy to achieve desired objectives.

According to Goldgeier, Holbrooke served the role of enforcer, taking Clinton's words in support of NATO expansion to the implementation phase. Among several illustrations, the author carefully recounts a meeting in September 1994, shortly after Holbrooke's return to Washington as Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; it involved more than thirty officials, and Holbrooke abrasively and astutely set the process in motion. Goldgeier includes General Wesley Clarke's recollection of this first interagency meeting called by Holbrooke: "Kruzel spoke first, since he was the policy guy, and said, 'Why is this policy? It's supposed to be an interagency process.' Holbrooke crushed him like a bug. He said, 'It is policy.' Ash Carter walked out of the room" (p. 74).

Goldgeier's study contributes to discounting some of the simplistic explanations put forward to account for NATO enlargement, such as the claim that Clinton favored the initiative only to gain the Polish vote. Clearly, the decision was far more complex, encompassing a range of individual actors and institutional interests.

Yet, despite the painstaking research effort, there are still some unanswered questions. Perhaps most significant, the factors that led Clinton to support expansion of the alliance are not entirely clear. According to Goldgeier's account, the visits of Polish and Czech presidents Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel with Clinton, in conjunction with the opening of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1993, involved "emotional appeals" for support of NATO expansion that made a significant and lasting impression (pp. 20, 165). But did these appeals prove decisive in persuading the president to favor this policy course? Are there equally plausible alternative explanations? How were Clinton's views shaped by discussions with the policy entrepreneurs. Boris Yeltsin's admonitions concerning enlargement, or strategic considerations?

Clinton's speeches indicate that he desired dual objectives: support of NATO enlargement while simultaneously keeping Russian democratization and the favorable climate in U.S.-Russian relations on track. Goldgeier makes an interesting point advanced by psychologists: "When faced with the problem of competing objectives, individuals often convince themselves that there is no contradiction, that they can, in the words of one senior official discussing the two tracks of this policy, 'walk and chew gum at the same time'" (p. 160). Perhaps this explanation is sufficient. In the end, however, without conclusive evidence regarding the shaping of Clinton's views and motives, one critical area of the case study remains at least partially speculative. Future revelations in interviews with the former president or the release of his memoirs could yield additional material that will be useful in completing this analysis.

The study have been enhanced by devoting greater attention to the influence of the European dimension in the formulation of policy. No one can dispute that to "understand the development of NATO enlargement requires understanding the interplay of process, politics, and policy in Washington,

D.C." (p. 5). Europeans and other observers might take issue, however, with the claim that "all of the key decisions were made in Washington" (p. 5). In fact, concerns were raised throughout the enlargement debate about securing the approval of the 16 NATO members and their respective legislative bodies. Even if the "whether" and "when" were ultimately answered in Washington, expansion was contingent on complex political processes within other alliance nations. Furthermore, it would be interesting to ascertain the extent to which Clinton's position—or that of his key advisors—were influenced by European perspectives or considerations.

Goldgeier offers interesting insights concerning theoretical models. For example: "A classical model of bureaucratic politics tells us that where individuals stand depends on where they sit, and that how they perceive a situation also depends on their bureaucratic role. The NATO enlargement policy process suggests that which bureaucratic position is crucial for understanding the orientation of officials at lower levels, the higher up you go, the more longstanding beliefs rather than a particular job title prove critical in many cases" (p. 156). Goldgeier insightfully observes that support of enlargement from Madeleine Albright, Lynn Davis, Anothony Lake, and others resulted from assigning the highest priority to promoting democratization in Eastern and Central Europe, and the positions of these officials derived from individual preferences, values, or personal and professional experiences even more so than any view that might have been predicted as a result of institutional affiliations at the Department of State or elsewhere.

The author challenges some of the central theoretical arguments in the literature, but core questions and conclusions advanced in this study remain quite fundamental: "How do policies typically develop within the United States government?" (p. 5) "The development of the U.S. initiative to enlarge NATO reminds us that the decision process is often just that—a process—rather than a specific moment" (p. 152). Much that is revealed in this study is likely to be of greater interest to university students seeking to understand the making of American foreign policy than to seasoned specialists, who might expect major new theoretical contributions.

This book should be a priority for those interested in a detailed, focused case study that reconstructs the complex array of factors in a post–Cold War U.S. foreign policy decision likely to have significant consequences for generations to come.

Interest Groups, Lobbying, and Participation in America. By Kenneth M. Goldstein. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 170p. \$49.95 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Beth L. Leech, Rutgers University

Studies of interest-group influence on politics and studies of mass participation in politics typically have been quite separate undertakings. With a few notable exceptions, research projects have been designed to examine one or the other, not both, and the influence of interest-group activity on mass political activity is too seldom considered. In this broadly integrative book, Kenneth Goldstein makes a convincing argument for why this should not be the case.

Goldstein's central argument about mass participation in public policy issues is that little about it is spontaneous. For example, since 1970 the number of citizens who contact their members of Congress by letter and phone has nearly doubled. This increase is remarkable in that it took place during a period in which we have seen a sharp decline in voter turnout in congressional elections. Goldstein argues that while more citizens than ever are calling and writing their members of

Congress, they are doing so as part of orchestrated efforts by elites, by organizers who facilitate the participation of those outside the beltway.

Goldstein's argument about mass participation parallels an argument made by Stephen Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen in their 1991 book, *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. In that book they argued that declines in voter turnout resulted at least in part from declines in party mobilizing efforts. They, too, see mass participation as linked to efforts by elites. Goldstein extends this argument and shows that it holds true for other types of political participation, such as letter-writing and contacting government officials.

The book also contains an important argument about the nature of lobbying strategies. Goldstein argues that the main goal of an outside lobbying campaign is to create the "traceability" that Douglas Arnold wrote about in *The Logic of Congressional Action* (1992). A traceable issue, according to Arnold, is one that is salient, has perceptible consequences, and is linked to an identifiable government action by a legislator. An outside lobbying campaign, Goldstein argues, creates that traceability, but the grassroots message also may be used to give cues to potential challengers, signal information about the direction and intensity of constituency opinion, and frame an issue.

That is a lot of different things for a message to communicate, and the complexity of both this and Goldstein's other theoretical models provides both the strength and the weakness of his book. Lobbying decisions and lobbying strategies are complicated. Lobbyists use multiple tactics, undertaken with multiple goals in mind. Goldstein acknowledges this and eschews any attempt to simplify the process into a caricature.

Two types of evidence support the arguments made in the book. On the interest-group side, there are interviews with 41 interest-group representatives regarding their organizations' activities in 94 grassroots lobbying campaigns. On the individual side, there are survey data from participation and recruitment questions in the Battleground poll of 1994, conducted jointly by Democratic and Republican polling firms. Data from theses polls, supplemented by National Election Study and Times Mirror survey data, allow Goldstein to test the effects of recruitment contacts and to investigate who is being recruited.

Goldstein begins by developing a model of how grassroots lobbying decisions are made: when to target, where to target, whom to target, how to target. The fundamental assumption in this model is that not all grassroots lobbying contacts are equal. Some constituents will be more likely to respond to mobilization efforts than others and the opinions of some types of constituents will matter more to the legislator than others. Recruitment choices, according to Goldstein's model, will be driven in part by the desire to lower the participation costs for the citizens most likely to influence the legislative outcome. His cases support this prediction. For example, groups opposing the Clinton health-care plan mobilized constituents in the districts of members of the five committees that were considering the Clinton bill. Even within those committees, however, grassroots efforts were not evenly distributed, but were focused more strongly on members of committees where the

His theory predicts and his data show that when the lobbying objective is a short-term legislative goal, interest groups will target districts represented by undecided voters and influential legislators. The aim is to provide these legislators with information about the possible negative electoral consequences should they vote contrary to the sentiments voiced in the grassroots campaign. However, when the interest-group goal is more long-term, the objective in the grassroots

campaigns shifts to providing information to voters and potential challengers in districts where there are legislative opponents who are judged to be vulnerable.

Goldstein notes that some scholars have concluded that campaigns like the "Harry and Louise" ads opposing the Clinton health-care plan were not successful because surveys at the time found little national recall of the ads. National recall is a poor indicator of success, however, because the ads were targeted only at specific districts, not the nation as a whole. He quotes a lobbyist: "We were trying to move congressional votes, not Gallup numbers. We didn't need to convince all Americans or all congressmen, we just had to convince the ones that mattered" (p. 77).

This is not a soothing book. A trade association executive is quoted: "Grass roots mobilization is used for one purpose, period—to influence legislative policy. It's not about getting more Americans involved. It's not about educating people on the issues. It's not about making Americans feel good about their political system" (p. 125). Individuals are targeted for mobilization in part based on the likelihood that they will participate if mobilized. Thus, mobilization campaigns tend to exacerbate, rather than mitigate, existing biases in representation.

Goldstein does not suggest that the interest groups are at fault here, that grassroots campaigns should be abolished, or that scholars who worry about the dangers of too much mass participation are correct. Rather, he points out that the reason stimulated participation is so effective is because mass participation rates are low. Low turnout rates make legislators pay particular attention to information about the types of constituencies that are likely to vote and less attention to those that are not likely to vote. This makes grassroots campaigns with electoral objectives easier to achieve, since narrow constituencies can have a large influence in low-turnout contests. Therefore, one solution is to work to increase voter participation, thereby minimizing the unrepresentative effects of the grassroots campaigns. An additional reform suggested by Goldstein is to require interest groups to report the money they spend on grassroots efforts. Such reporting currently is required for expenditures on direct lobbying and campaign contributions, but not for grassroots campaigns.

This book provides a richly theoretical description of lobbying and participation that crosses subfield boundaries and makes crucial connections between political science theory and the realities of political life. We do not walk away from this book with a one-sentence jingle that explains the causes and effects of outside lobbying campaigns but, instead, with a clearer understanding of the linkages between interest organizations and other political institutions.

Flag Burning and Free Speech: The Case of *Texas v. Johnson*. By Robert Justin Goldstein. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000. 269p. \$35.00 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

Scot Guenter, San Jose State University

This is another in the Landmark Law Cases and American Society series from Kansas, joining such topics as the Salem witchcraft trials, *Marbury* v. *Madison*, the Pullman case, and *Bakke*. The series editors have chosen wisely in making this selection, both in topic and author. Goldstein is the nation's leading expert on legislation and judicial review related to flag desecration. He brings to this project considerable knowledge, prolific publications in this area, and a clarity of voice and focus. There are no provocative and startling new approaches or theories, but that is not the purpose. I highly recommend this book as assigned coursework for college seminars on civil religion, the separation of powers doctrine,

First Amendment rights, Supreme Court functioning, or the interplay between politics, the media, and the Constitution. It will work well in classes not only in political science but also in intellectual and cultural history, American studies, philosophy, and communication studies.

Aware that subjectivity is inevitable in an analysis of such a controversial and often emotional concern, Goldstein openly shares his stance in the Preface: "I believe that although flag desecration is usually a completely counterproductive activity that primarily alienates people, it nonetheless is a form of political expression and therefore must be constitutionally protected in a society that claims freedom of expression as its philosophical touchstone" (p. xv). He summarizes the three basic arguments in favor of criminalizing flag desecration, then ponders scenarios when it might serve "socially useful purposes" (p. xviii). Goldstein is precise in establishing chronologies of events and carefully selects quotations to let the adherents of varying positions speak for themselves.

The text is organized into nine chapters. The first is the best brief overview I have yet seen on the early cultural history of the American flag, and it emphasizes the beginning of what Goldstein terms the "Flag Protection Movement" (FPM) around 1890. Chapter 2 is a succinct yet comprehensive summation of flag desecration laws and prosecutions in the period 1897-1980. Getting to the main focus of the book, chapter 3 offers a longer, more detailed consideration of the Texas trials of Gregory Lee Johnson for his infamous flagburning protest outside the 1984 Republican National Convention in Dallas, which renominated Ronald Reagan for president. Next, there are chapters on the Supreme Court handling of and ruling in that case, the media and political backlash that followed, and a comparatively lengthy appraisal of the congressional debate provoked by that backlash, which ultimately led to the Flag Protection Act (FPA) of 1989. The last one-third of the book turns to how the FPA was tested in the courts from October 1989 through May 1990, the Supreme Court response in Eichman in June 1990, and the ongoing and unresolved struggle during the 1990s over a constitutional amendment to outlaw flag desecration.

I particularly enjoyed the way Goldstein elaborates on the workings of the Supreme Court in chapter 4, including private musings of the justices and procedural insights gleaned from clerk interviews. He also brings to life some of the more dramatic personages involved in the chain of events, such as the revolutionary Gregory Lee Johnson, the dynamic lawyer William Kunstler, or the meticulous solicitor general destined for later fame, Kenneth Starr. Two other features accentuate this work's usefulness as a college text: a handy chronology of flag desecration law and a superb bibliographic essay that points to the best reference sources should students wish to follow up on different aspects of this topic.

The American flag is the most sacred symbol in our civil religion. Historically, in times of economic and political crisis or great cultural dislocation, forces in society have emphasized cohesion through enforced demonstrations of nationalistic commitment. This is not going to change, although the specific rituals, rules, and ceremonies may. But we also have a long (and to my mind, admirable) tradition of honoring, protecting, and even expanding our interpretation of First Amendment rights. The tension of these coexisting truths has been at the core of much of America's historical experience, and the fact that this issue is not going away is what makes this book not only timely but also significant for undergraduate reading and reflection.

George Bush was in the White House in June 1990, when the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 ruling, upheld the right to express symbolic political dissent by burning a flag. He immediately

renewed the call for a constitutional amendment to correct what he felt was an error on the part of the Court. That drive, of course, did not succeed, although it came very close. In 2002, in large part due to a 5-4 ruling by another Supreme Court (with two members appointed during his father's presidency), another George Bush sits in the White House, and many of his political views and practices are committed to fulfilling the earlier agendas and aims of his father. We live in a time when close Court decisions are overturning or reexamining issues of privacy, the separation of church and state, and the relationship between federal and state authority. Goldstein convincingly explains why the movement for a constitutional amendment against flag desecration diminished in effectiveness from 1995 to 2000, but he ends the book by reaffirming how divided our nation is on this issue and how it will inevitably resurface in legal and political battles.

For the most scholarly and throughly documented analysis of *Texas* v. *Johnson* or for a wide range of primary sources to assess, look to earlier books written or edited by Goldstein (*Burning the Flag: The Great 1989–90 American Flag Descration Controversy*, 1996; *Desecrating the American Flag: Key Documents of the Controversy from the Civil War to* 1995, 1996). For a handy, accessible text appropriate for general readership, and faithful to Goldstein's well-established scrupulous attention to all his sources, this is the book for you.

Nonprofits in Urban America. Edited by Richard C. Hula and Cynthia Jackson-Elmoore. Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 2000. 235p. \$65.00.

Peter J. Haas, San Jose State University

This volume purports to explore questions about the changing role of nonprofit organizations in contemporary urban America. The stated theme is to explain how and why such organizations "attempt to sculpt the landscape of urban policy and political action rather than simply react or adapt to it" (p. 1), although the nine articles do not embrace it with equal rigor. The editors, who also contribute a chapter, further state that the text will explore "when and where such efforts are effective and when and where they are not" (p. 1). These are timely and important issues, given the Bush administration's stated goal of increasing reliance on nonprofit organizations.

The essays are extremely uneven, both in terms of their ability to deliver on the editors' vision and in their overall quality. The highlight of this nevertheless worthwhile volume is the synthesis in the first chapter by Steve Rathgeb Smith. He does an admirable job of weaving a comprehensive literature review on the evolution of scholarly thought about the origins and roles of nonprofits into the more specific concerns of the articles in this volume. His contribution deftly identifies the lacunae in existing theory, which tends to overemphasize the role nonprofits can play in enhancing social welfare, and points to more explicitly politically significant functions that nonprofits are fulfilling in urban areas. He seeks to show how the other contributions to this volume exemplify various aspects of this more political purpose for nonprofits.

Although generally trenchant, Smith's essay creats something of a straw man argument that is repeated several times throughout the book. Smith maintains that Lester Salamon's oft-cited "partnership" theory of nonprofit organizations cannot account for the emergence of more politically motivated nonprofits. Yet, few readers will be surprised to learn that some nonprofits may frequently take a more independent and even antagonistic stance toward the public and private sectors. It is true that Salamon's theory emphasizes the economic logic behind nonprofit creation, but it seems unenlightening

if not unfair to discredit it on the basis of what may well be a limited number of exceptions that are the focus of this text.

There are many inadequacies in most of the subsequent chapters, which for the most part focus on a particular community or type of nonprofit organization or both. A common foible is that the cases tend to underplay severely potential concerns about method. Beyond a brief article based on a limited survey of nonprofit directors, the essays are only loosely anchored in any kind or rigorous approach to data collection and analysis. Contributors Joseph Cordes, Jeffrey Henig, and Eric Twombly, for example, make the rather bold assertion that increasing "privatization" of nonprofits may risk "further depletion of the role of purposive mission," converting them into "more material-based organizations" (p. 59). Yet, they offer only anecdotal examples of this sort of conversion, which leads me to wonder whether and to what extent it is really occurring.

Todd Swanstrom and Julia Koschinsky argue that community-based housing organizations (CBOs) have the primary goal of "addressing place-based inequalities... that limit the ability of citizens to realize their full potential as active economic, social, and political beings" (p. 75). They find that contemporary CBOs are instead emphasizing "service delivery and real estate development" (p. 85). Once again, however, the evidence is at best sketchy, and the reader cannot judge the validity of the authors' analysis, including the extent to which CBOs actually embrace the authors' notions about their goals. One does not expect definitive data in a volume of essentially case studies, but the contributors collectively ignore such concerns.

Several articles freely substitute normative assertions for more objective analysis. A common undercurrent is the idea that nonprofit organizations should be vehicles of political change, rather than merely alternate modes for urban service delivery. Several authors suggest (as do Swanstrom and Koschinsky) that cutbacks in public funding have forced nonprofits to "sell out." If that is indeed the case, they need to consider to what extent, if any, the clients of these organizations would be better served by more focus on political expression and less on the delivery of tangible goods and services.

Some of the articles seem to be too sanguine about the effect of political efforts by nonprofits. In their essay, editors Hula and Jackson-Elmoore describe the development of "governing nonprofits" in Detroit. These are defined as nonprofits for which "targeted empowerment" of otherwise disenfranchised or alienated groups is a "core organizational goal" (p. 130). They strongly suggests that such groups have succeeded in increasing the representation of African Americans and, therefore, the city's "civic capacity" to address social and economic issues. They fail to consider that this development occurred during a period when Detroit lost a significant portion of its white population to suburban areas, which made increased minority representation almost inevitable, and they do not demonstrate that African Americans are now any better off than they would have been absent these organizations. Similarly, Marion Orr extols the "crucial role" of Baltimoreans United in Leadership Development (BUILD), citing a few limited accomplishments, such as the city's support for a "living wage" that was essentially ignored by corporate employers. I wonder whether and to what extent the political presence of BUILD is actually improving the lives of poorer residents.

In sum, Nonprofits in Urban America is an often provocative but equally disappointing foray into the political aspects of American nonprofits. Too frequently, potentially significant questions are posed (or implied) but left unanswered or are answered with inadequate documentation. Nevertheless,

the volume offers a useful descriptive survey of the range of political dimension of nonprofit organizations, particularly for those unfamiliar with this terrain.

Faithful and Fearless: Moving Feminist Protest Inside the Church and Military. By Mary Fainsod Katzenstein. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998. 270p. \$40.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Laura R. Woliver, University of South Carolina

The power of social movements to transform what we take for granted and what we contest is beautifully displayed in *Faithful and Fearless*. Mary Fainsod Katzenstein shows how some protest in American society has moved inside institutions. Particularly, she means, feminist protest: "Less lawbreaking than norm-breaking, these feminists have challenged, discomfited, and provoked, unleashing a wholesale disturbance of long-settled assumptions, rules, and practices.... Sometimes by their mere presence, but more often by claiming specific rights, and by demanding in certain facets the transformation of the institutions of which they are a part, feminists have reinvented the protests of the 1960s inside the institutional mainstream of the 1990s" (p. 7).

The study takes as its starting point the fact that what used to be seen as outlandish has become commonplace in our society. The book offers an account of how feminist activists have worked to effect change in core institutions of American life. Katzenstein's fieldwork and interviews focus on the institutions of the United States military and the American Catholic Church. From 1988 to 1997 she interviewed about 120 individuals active in women-centered reform efforts within these two institutions. Her findings are compelling for many reasons. One is that the two institutions she studied represent the best test cases for her thesis. If change is occurring within the Catholic Church and the military because of feminist/ womanist pressures (two of our stodgiest, thickly mossbacked, phallocentric institutions), then indeed the "sisterhood is powerful." Different tributaries flow from a common feminist source and set in motion social changes.

She studies the feminists, mostly women, not in the public eye who throughout the last three decades (1960-1990s) have challenged in their everyday lives the institutions in which they work and live. The women engage in unobtrusive mobilization within these patriarchal edifices. These very same institutions, in turn, have a power of their own to shape differences in contemporary feminism. For example, military feminists have a strong belief in equal rights and equal opportunities. Their strategy is simply to have existing laws implemented within the military. The military women are liberal feminists, practicing interest-group feminism, whereas the Catholic feminists are more radical. They want to transform cultures, institutions, and society. They directly confront and contest poverty, homophobia, racism, war, and violence. The feminists within the Catholic Church in America are activists for radical equality. This Catholic feminist protest is a more radical discursive politics. Discursive politics, Katzenstein explains, is the politics of meaning making (p. 17). The American Catholic feminists utilize language, cognition, books, and conferences to process and articulate their vision of a just world which includes a feminist worldview. Their meetings, networks, prayer groups, conferences (indeed, confessional conferencing), and reports constitute discursive activism. They have, therefore, a difference in perspective. They form organizational habitats (protected spaces) within the larger institutions. Within the Church, their enclave becomes like a "women-church;" it is not removed from the male bastions of power but seriously engaged as a dissenting, discursive voice. Like the women in the military, the women-church activists use the ethics and rhetoric of the institution to force the institution to abide by its own promises and principles. The Leadership Conference of Women Religious, for instance, works to revision women in the Church and the Church's role in social justice.

Radicalism in the Church is shaped by the lack of legal redress since the Church is a private and religious organization. These feminist radicals in the Catholic church are seeking an understanding of the structural or systemic bases of inequality in the church and in society. They are not like Mother Teresa of Calcutta, nursing the poor and ameliorating their pain and suffering. Rather, they focus on "the identifying and rooting out of the very *systems* that cause the poor to be poor, the homeless to be homeless, and that cause people to die of poverty or oppression" (p. 21).

Katzenstein's research displays the multilevel significance of the law for women who seek equality within institutions. The legalization of claims making in American politics can assist in the institutionalization of feminist protest. She also explores the meaning of protesting from inside institutions. Katzenstein cautions us against the view that inside activism signals the end of the challenges that movement politics initiates.

For women within the military, Katzenstein explains the complicated and contradictory role of the law. She writes, "The law's role is also a normative one, shaping the way activists come to define themselves, see the world around them, and prioritize their agendas. For how can we explain otherwise the fact that activists seize some opportunities but not others?" (p. 165). The military women are feminists by any other name. They do not directly claim the mantle of feminism, yet all their beliefs, positions, justifications, and orientations are feminist.

Katzenstein shows how these women must be Faithful and Fearless: "Given the previously rigid gender-cast system in both military and church, and given the continued risks to career, status, and respect that those who challenge gender ascription incur, such women must be fearless to be faithful to their institutions on feminist terms" (p. 164). Cultures agree on what requires debate and what does not (p. 35). Feminist issues now require debate, and this is great progress. Backlashes against feminism, then, occur because of feminist progress. Katzenstein deftly proves that by demanding a coequal place inside male-dominant institutions, feminists have transported protest into mainstream institutions and have changed institutional and social givens.

Katzenstein's study is sure to be a classic in social movement, feminist, religious, and democratic theory. It is richly deserving of all the awards it has already received (the Marion Irish Award of the American Political Science Association for the best book in women and politics, for instance) and will receive in the future.

Environmental Injustice in the United States: Myths and Realities. By James P. Lester, David W. Allen, and Kelly M. Hill. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000. 216p. \$19.00.

Michael E. Kraft, University of Wisconsin-Green Bay

Over the past decade the study of environmental justice has sparked considerable debate, with conflict often exacerbated by conceptual and definitional muddles, scarcity of pertinent data, and disagreement over which methods to employ. This book by the late James Lester and his colleagues is unlikely to diminish the controversy. Yet, as a comprehensive attempt to clear out the conceptual underbrush and bring hard data to bear on difficult empirical questions, the book merits

attention by all those concerned with issues of environmental equity. The preliminary findings have been presented at conferences from 1994 on, and many are already familiar with this research. As the authors note, however, they began with a skeptical posture toward the strident assertions made regarding environmental justice. In the end, they reconsidered that position and found much evidence to support concern over environmental inequities in U.S. society.

Environmental justice issues rose rapidly on the policy agenda during the 1990s, prompted by numerous but flawed studies that suggested a disproportionate effect of toxic chemicals and hazardous wastes on low-income and minority communities. Those findings were reinforced by political pressures from environmental justice groups to take corrective action to address what was often termed environmental racism. Horror stories of communities that suffered from high levels of exposure to air and water pollution and hazardous waste sites made the arguement both graphic and compelling.

Political scientists entered the fray to try to identify the key empirical questions and to bring appropriate data to bear. Attention has focused on class and race inequities in exposure to environmental risks (and the presumed health consequences), largely from living in close proximity to hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. As scholars such as Evan Ringquist have noted so well, the methodological challenges faced in trying to address such concerns are formidable.

For example, we have good data on the location of polluting facilities, but living near such a facility is not the same as exposure to its toxic emissions. We also have fairly accurate measures of major chemical emissions by industries, courtesy of the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory (TRI), from which we infer human exposure. Further complicating the situation is the circumstantial evidence that links toxic chemical exposure to health effects, which may appear decades later.

The challenge for scholars has been to unravel this complex situation, largely by examining the relationship between chemical releases and the demographic characteristics of exposed populations. Even when statistical relationships of this kind are found, they may not tell us why environmental inequities occur and what might be done through public policies to reduce them.

Lester, Allen, and Hill offer a multilevel analysis of these relationships at different periods using multiple dependent variables. They examine the contiguous 48 states, the 2,080 U.S. counties for which TRI data are available, and the 410–414 U.S. cities with more than 50,000 residents where they could use TRI data. They employ seven measures of environmental harm to broaden the picture, including TRI chemical releases, air pollution levels, and Superfund sites. They focus on four categories of possible explanations for environmental inequities: race and ethnicity, class, political mobilization, and exogenous variables, such as pollution severity, political culture, government fiscal capacity, business climate, and the strength of environmental interest groups.

The argument is presented in ten relatively brief but densely written chapters, accompanied by 13 figures and 28 tables. The early chapters examine the nature of the environmental justice problem, review the literature (with particular attention to conceptual and methodological issues), and provide an elaborate history of the environmental justice movement.

The heart of the book is a well-developed model of environmental justice that seeks to integrate the variables noted above; three chapters that separately examine environmental injustice at the state, county, and city level; and a summary of the findings and conclusions. The authors find no relationship between political mobilization and environmental injustice,

mixed results for social class, and strong evidence of race-based injustice. Most of the additional explanations examined here, other than the severity of pollution, also yield mixed results. Two final chapters deal with policy implications. The authors review federal and state policy on environmental justice, noting in particular the impressive variation across states, and they systematically examine alternative policy designs based on the criteria of rationality, equity, and efficiency.

Readers may quibble with the selection of particular methods and in some ways question the writing style. For example, why focus on states, counties, and cities but not, as some scholars do, on finer levels of analysis, such as ZIP codes or Census tracks? The review literature tends to be rather heavy on citations (15 or 20 for some sentences) but light on a summary or assessment of what other scholars have done. This may not matter for those already familiar with the literature, but it will be difficult for undergraduates, and even many graduate students, to follow the authors' reasoning in these sections.

Similarly, the authors argue that case studies are an unreliable way to study environmental justice and that only national data of the kind they use can permit generalization. But case studies have some redeeming virtues. They often do a better job of conveying the real human burden created by environmental injustice as well as the political, economic, and social constraints that affect efforts to change the situation. The addition of some case studies might have complemented the statistical analysis.

The two policy-oriented chapters will be of special interest to many. After a detailed and finely structured policy analysis, the authors conclude that a risk-based solution that reflects the severity of pollution problems best meets their criteria. It can be justified in terms of rationality, efficiency in the use of scarce societal resources, and equity for all concerned. This conclusion squares well with arguments of environmental policy scholars over the past decade about the need to set priorities based on such risk levels. Yet, it is at odds with the views advanced by leaders of the environmental justice movement, who tend to favor race- or class-based solutions.

Lester, Allen, and Hill have much to say about how to study environmental justice and how to deal with the inherent conceptual and methodological complexities. Their analysis offers valuable insights into the multiple causes of environmental injustice and what might be done to address it. As a research report that seeks mainly to advance knowledge and further the debate over environmental equity, the volume will be of greatest interest to other scholars in the subfield and to graduate students in environmental politics and policy.

Putting Trust in the U.S. Budget: Federal Trust Funds and the Politics of Commitment. By Eric M. Patashnik. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 231p. \$54.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Daniel J. Palazzolo, University of Richmond

Nearly four decades ago, in a path-breaking book, Aaron Wildavsky taught us, among other things, that "in the most integral sense the budget lies at the heart of the political process" (*The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, 1964, p. 5). Building on Wildavsky's study, many scholars have contributed to our understanding of various aspects of budget policy and politics. Some have discussed the role of trust funds in the federal budget, but none have made them the central focus of their research. Eric Patashnick fills an important void in the literature by explaining why trust funds are created and how they affect deliberation over tax and spending decisions. Using the trust fund mechanism as a point of reference, Patashnik also tests theories of policy history, public choice, and institutionalism.

Aside from a chapter that contains a regression model to test the response of trust fund and general revenues to political and institutional factors, the empirical focus is on case histories of five trust funds—Social Security, Hospital Insurance, Highway, Airport and Airways, and the Superfund. Also examined are the failed attempts to create trust funds for energy security and lead paint abatement. The regression analysis shows that political forces have differential effects on trust fund revenues and general revenues. This chapter is somewhat unrelated to the case histories, which are more central to the book's main objectives, that is, to explain the origin, evolution, and consequences of trust funds. Using the historical-institutionalist method, Patashnik draws out the variations among trust funds, the common traits, and the nuances in their design and evolution.

Patashnik's central argument is that trust funds are intentionally designed policy instruments that seek to provide durability and reduce uncertainty over spending and revenue decisions. They are created when program advocates convince others that establishing a long-term commitment to a program is better than maintaining the flexibility to make ongoing policy adjustments. Among the four distinct rationales for trust funds (making users pay, maximizing budgets, reducing uncertainty, and guarding the Treasury), reduced political uncertainty is found to be most important in all the cases (p. 189). Program advocates for each trust fund demonstrated the value of locking in policy commitments and the need to bind future policymakers. Conversely, in the energy security and lead paint abatement cases, advocates were unable to demonstrate that a trust fund was needed to make the programs work or that a long-term commitment was preferable to preserving flexibility.

By dedicating revenues to a specific purpose for both present needs and future contingencies, trust funds create an implicit contract and define the terms for subsequent policy debates. In this respect, they are similar to entitlements and indexation because they contain procedural safeguards, have greater autonomy than routine programs, and provoke symbolic sensitivities that limit the flexibility of policymakers.

Patashnik deftly points out, however, that although trust funds constrain future choices, the programs financed by them are neither insulated from politics nor impervious to change. The programs are typically financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and they are challenged by threats of insolvency, new ideas, pressures from interest groups, or changes in institutional procedures. The durability of trust funds rests on their capacity to serve a mediating role in policy debates. "Trust fund financing clearly does not eliminate the impact of other political forces, such as struggles among contending groups. But trust funds do influence how those struggles are played out by distributing procedural advantages, reinforcing symbols of moral deservedness and blame, and affecting perceptions of political fidelity and defection" (p. 16).

Patashnik also describes the variation in the design features, autonomy, and durability of trust funds. Social Security is the most durable because individual beneficiaries rely heavily on the government to make good on the program's promise. The Hospital Insurance Trust Fund for Medicare, which is as politically potent as Social Security, is less stable partly because it is more reliant on general funds. The Highway Trust Fund's durability relies on the support of a nexus of producer groups, government officials, and motorists, but it has a low degree of individual beneficiary reliance and periodically has been challenged by budget guardians, environmentalists, and urban mass transit interests.

Despite the variation among trust funds, Patashnik identifies four common attributes that distinguish successful adoption: a base of support for the expenditure program,

plausibility in terms of a precedent and an appropriate revenue source, a demonstration that trust fund financing is necessary to make the program work, and neutralization of opposition to the idea (pp. 183–6). Trust funds often are supported both by program advocates, who want the program protected from the vicissitudes of the annual budget process, and by fiscal conservatives, who view the mechanism as a means of cost control.

Patashnik's insights into the politics of trust fund budgeting contribute significant new knowledge, but the theoretical aspects of the book should not be overlooked. The author effectively points out the shortcomings of the policy inheritance perspective, which views policymakers as severely constrained by their predecessors, and rational choice theory, which argues that institutional structure dictates policy. Patashnik shows that institutional arrangements mediate rather than cause policy outcomes; that policymaking is an evolutionary process and programs are responsive to historical nuances and acts of individual policymakers; and that ideas, not just interests, are critical forces in the resolution of policy conflicts.

In terms of the design and durability of trust funds, Patashnik finds that both competing theories of political transaction costs are incomplete. One of these contends that institutions are efficient and inherent to government, and the other maintains that costs are inflated and contrived to serve the narrow interests of politicians. Either theory might lead us to expect that more trust funds would have been adopted over the years. Yet, not only do agencies such as the Congressional Budget Office and the Office of Management and Budget fight to limit trust funds in order to maintain as much flexibility as possible over annual spending and revenue decisions, but also "Congress itself seems to exercise a degree of collective self-restraint" (p. 193). Patashnik notes that "trust fund advocates rarely can win merely by asserting their narrow mutual interests.... Given the multiplicity of veto points in the U.S. system, it is difficult for a coalition to get its structural projects enacted without fairly board support, and other factions cannot be expected to share the former group's parochial interests" (p. 195).

The only shortcoming is the very limited effort at the end to consider the normative challenges to trust funds. Serious consideration of these matters would require at least another chapter. Yet, any suggestions about what could have been done take nothing away from what has been done. Patashnik's study is a very important contribution to the literature on budgetary politics and policymaking generally. Some may wish for a more parsimonious explanation of the origin and evolution of trust funds, but political scientists would not be better off for it.

In Defense of a Political Court. By Terri Jennings Peretti. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999. 371p. \$27.50.

Sara C. Benesh, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee

Peretti's book purports to refute conventional constitutional scholarship about the dangers of a political Supreme Court, lauding such a political nature as supportive of the peculiar brand of democracy practiced in America. It seems, in large part, that she is quite successful in doing so, although I am certain that it is far easier to convince me of such a notion than it would be to convince the legal scholars whom Peretti so vehemently attacks.

Peretti begins her book with a thorough exposition of the state of legal scholarship on the Court, especially with regard to the undemocratic nature of judicial review and the legitimacy costs involved in such Court behavior. Indeed, the breadth of the review is remarkable. She discusses and defines neutralist approaches to judicial review, critical legal studies analyses, and reviews conducted by so-called skeptics. She finds fault with all of these interpretive models. First, the neutralists are "simply wrong" (p. 35) in thinking that an objective theory of constitutional interpretation exists that justices can apply neutrally, which allows them to maintain legitimacy and thus reconciles judicial review with democracy by allowing the Court to play a "special" apolitical role. The critical legal studies folks are right about the indeterminacy of the Constitution, but their responses to this reality (utopian speculation and judicial restraint) "are of no practical value" (p. 54). Indeed, according to Peretti, a Court that subjugates its preferences by restraining its power actually detracts from democracy and is more apt to hurt its legitimacy than a raging ideological Court would. Finally, the skeptics are misguided because, while they recognize the indeterminacy of the Constitution and recognize the potential for judicial mistakes, they still regard the Court as special, arguing that sometimes its decisions should be final because they are philosopher kings or prophets of some kind. They see the Court as superior to Congress in making certain types of decisions, yet argue that the Court should be subject to this inferior branch. Peretti deems this accommodation of judicial review and democracy "nonsensical" (p. 70).

In Part II, she attempts to defend her central claim that

"there is nothing wrong with a political Court or with political motive in constitutional adjudication" (p. 73). Indeed, she argues that there are democratic benefits to such behavior by the Court. Value-voting on the Court promotes political representation (since judges are selected for and then decide in accordance with their political values), engages political checks on the Court (since policy-minded justices will care more about the policies they are espousing and as such be sure that they are implemented), and leads justices to consensusbuilding activities (since justices need to accommodate abhorrent views in order to install their policy preferences). The constitutional scholars are also wrong in their assumption that a political court begets legitimacy crises (since the public knows little about the Court, cares little about the Court, and is not adversely affected by politically driven decision making). Peretti systematically discusses each and defends each via reference to a huge body of empirical political science research.

Additionally, all of these theorists are fundamentally wrong, according to Peretti, because they totally misunderstand the U.S. brand of democracy. She argues that, because it is based on pluralism and not majoritarianism, complaints about the Court's lack of electoral accountability lose their bite. Indeed, in a pluralist democracy, in which emphasis is placed upon multiple means of influence for multiple groups, the Court's behavior is perfectly normal. The Court is merely one of several coequal branches of government, each offering different sorts of responsiveness and different levels of attention to certain types of groups. The Court is a unique entry point, first, because it may be better suited to hearing claims of the otherwise disenfranchised (although I am not altogether impressed by her justification of this point) and, second, because of its ability to review laws once they are in action and applied to a given controversy. In this way, the Court sees the unintended consequences of legislation, which the legislature is unable to see. Neither the Court nor the constitution is mythical in Peretti's analysis. They are merely additional checks in a pluralist nation. And this, in itself, is worthwhile.

However, there are a few things that I think Peretti could have done better or made stronger arguments for. For example, she discusses in detail the various external checks on the Court, concluding that even though they are not often used. they may still constrain the Court. I think, given her focus on quantifiable arguments and her criticism of the constitutional theorists who make remarks that are not quantitatively justifiable, that she should avoid making a strong argument for the efficacy of external checks. Indeed, little quantitative evidence of such an influence exists and the studies she cites are not convincing in that they are overwhelmingly case studies of peculiar instances where such an effect is identifiable. Not just neutralist legal scholars argue that political checks on the Court are ineffective; many attitudinal scholars also do so. Additionally, it is not clear why only policy-motivated justices would behave in this manner. Surely those judges who are motivated by legal policy, a particular reading of the constitution, or the intent of the framers also care greatly about the policy being made? Too strong a case is made for the influence of public opinion and for the nonfinality of Supreme Court decisions given the empirical evidence on this point.

Peretti could strengthen her argument that Congress is as countermajoritarian an institution as the Supreme Court (if we use constitutional theorists' definitions which center on electoral accountability) because of the incumbency advantage that exists. Surely, electoral sanctions are not perfect in that most-representative body and so that institution may also make decisions that are not strictly accountable to the public.

In short, this is a good, worthwhile book for both legal and judicial scholars. Political scientists can learn much from Peretti's review of constitutional theory, and constitutional theorists much from her review of empirical political science. Perhaps we all need to critically analyze our opinions about the Supreme Court. Is it really all that special?

**The Art of Political Warfare.** By John J. Pitney, Jr. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000. 256p. \$24.95.

Michael John Burton, Ohio University

For political scientists, the world of politics is often comprised of policy markets and aggregated data points. Regression models, actor preferences, and game structures are disciplinary norms. For political professionals, however, politics often has a strongly militaristic bent: It is war by other means. John Pitney analyzes political affairs in the way that political professionals commonly do, using armed conflict as a metaphor to understand complex political phenomena.

Pitney argues that "politics resembles warfare, so military literature can teach us something about political action" (p. 3). The language of politics owes much to military combat—Pitney notes "the war[s] on poverty, crime, cancer, drugs, and AIDS" along with Bill Clinton's campaign "war room" and Pat Buchanan's ringing exhortation: "Mount up everybody and ride to the sound of the guns" (pp. 8-9). Political officials, activists, and operatives see politics as a species of warfare, and "military metaphors ... in turn make politics more warlike" (p. 4). The similarities between politics and war run deeper than just language. Both activities are passionate, confrontational endeavors that "expose participants to peril and uncertainty" and require "elaborate strategies and tactics" for their conduct (pp. 5-6). Politics is not exactly the same as war, but neither is politics just like a marketplace, an academic metaphor that is apt to neglect "hard-to-quantify phenomena such as duty, courage, and compassion" (p. 19).

Throughout the book, Pitney draws tight parallels between war and politics. For military and political leaders, strategy is the integration of means and ends, and political professionals and military planners attend to the tactical details of "geography and logistics" (pp. 140–59). Battle terrain opens some military options and forecloses others; political context defines the range of tactics available to political strategists and sometimes decides the location of the conflict. "The leaders of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference targeted Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963 because they knew that city government would overreact and bare its segregationist teeth" (p. 146; see also p. 94). Martin Luther King, Jr., in the tradition of the great generals, studied the tactical contours of the battleground and planned accordingly (p. 184). Pitney's book is filled with similar anecdotes that reinforce a warfare-driven interpretation of political events.

The Art of Political Warfare is not a simplistic restatement of battle doctrine; it is a sophisticated understanding of political problems in terms of military strategy and tactics. Pitney once served as a senior researcher for the Republican Party, and he understands that no single strategy can fit all political situations. The reason for studying Sun Tzu's Art of War, Carl von Clausewitz's On War, and even contemporary military training manuals is to gain and understanding of strategy and tactics from a discipline—military science—wherein these things are matters of survival (p. 20). The prospect of war has provoked rigorous thinking about the nature of strategy. Political scientists, who study a domain of human activity that often relies on strategic principles, should not overlook the intellectual value of military scholarship.

Pitney's book serves an important function: It introduces basic concepts of military theory and demonstrates their relationship to political phenomena. Students of war examine mobilization, fatigue, intelligence, deception, and stealth. Those who study legislative politics have an intuitive grasp of such military problems as defining victory, navigating through the fog of war, and eliminating internal friction. Passage of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act resulted from "a combination of stealth and congressional fatigue" that allowed a major legislative agreement to get through both houses of Congress "even though most members were barely aware of it" (p. 191). "A military approach would draw scholarly attention to such muddy patches of the political process" (ibid.). More generally, adding the military lens to political interpretations based on games, markets, physics, ecology, medicine, theater, and education-and, one might add, written texts, human sexuality, artificial intelligence, and other metaphors current in political scholarship—"will help us understand the political battlefield": "The picture may not always be pretty, but we can learn much from appreciating the art of political warfare" (p. 199).

Pitney does not claim that warfare is the only metaphor applicable to politics; he believes that political understanding demands a broad range of scholarly approaches. Nevertheless, he argues vigorously that the military metaphor receives less attention than it deserves. By representing politics as warfare, Pitney invites political scientists to seek a more detailed understanding of military strategy. The Art of Political Warfare merely begins the conversation.

Pitney does not elaborate on the stark differences between the teachings of Sun Tzu, who sought nimble conflict, and Clausewitz, who counseled total war. He does not try to reconcile seeming contradictions: On one hand, the threat of brutality toward the conquered can hasten surrender (p. 103); on the other hand, combatants who fear violent recrimination tend to stiffen their resistance (p. 178). The delineation of military classics and the resolution of long-standing tactical disputes lie beyond the scope of the book. Its mission is more carefully focused. Writing in a discipline that does not comprehend the full value of military metaphors, Pitney persuasively argues that the literature on warfare can bring fresh insight to the study of politics.

The Art of Political Warfare is sufficiently lively and readable to suit any undergraduate course in American politics, and it would work particularly well in a graduate seminar that attempts to view the broad sweep of the political landscape. More important, the thrust of Pitney's argument might encourage some scholars of politics and government to begin studying not only David Easton and William H. Riker but also military historians, such as John Keegan and Shelby Foote. Reading Pitney's book, advocates of an interdisciplinary science of politics may find new value in the literature on warfare.

Capital, Labor, and State: The Battle for American Labor Markets from the Civil War to the New Deal. By David Brian Robertson. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 320p. \$75.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Andrew Battista, East Tennessee State University

This important new study argues that American labor markets have been and are governed by employers to a degree unique among Western capitalist democracies; that this pattern of governance is the outcome of crucial struggles among unions, employers, and middle-class labor reformers from the Civil War to the New Deal; and that American political institutions strongly shaped the struggles and their outcome. In the nineteenth century, all Western countries largely protected employer control of hiring, firing, wages, hours, and working conditions, but in the twentieth century nations other than the United States began to curb employer prerogatives and extend worker protection in the form of labor regulations, trade union and collective bargaining laws, public management of labor supply and demand, and work insurance (the four major types of policy in Robertson's framework). In the United States, fewer such protections were established, and the fragmented federal and state labor policies that were enacted were often undermined by lax enforcement or court rulings. On the eve of the New Deal, Robertson shows, U.S. employers had a degree of autonomy in labor markets unparalleled in European and other industrialized countries.

Capital, Labor, and State analyzes and explains this result by means of the changing and conflicting "policy strategies" of unions, employers, and labor reformers as well as the influence of political institutions in shaping and selecting among policy strategies. By the onset of the twentieth century, the American Federation of Labor (AFL) had concluded that it could not rely on government to protect workers. It abandoned the strategy of seeking inclusive public policies in favor of the union shop approach, whereby unions relied on their own economic power to organize employers, control the supply of labor, and manage the terms and conditions of employment through labor contracts. The strategy was decisively defeated, however, by the open shop campaign of both large and small employers in the first two decades of the century.

Thereafter the AFL retreated into a narrow defense of craft unions and skilled labor, otherwise conceding employer sovereignty in labor markets. Labor reformers led by John R. Commons and his colleagues, who initially favored governance of labor markets by industrial commissions staffed by middle-class experts, also then tailored their policy proposals to employer dominance. Later, the New Deal "mounted the most formidable challenge to employers' labor market prerogatives in the nation's history" (p. 260). But Robertson argues that New Deal labor market policies were limited in duration and effect, and by the 1950s employers again had an exceptional degree of control.

These strategies and conflicts were shaped and resolved by the limited authority of the federal government, the separation of powers at both the federal and state level, and economic competition among the states ("competitive American federalism"). From the Civil War to the New Deal this institutional structure, according to Robertson, made it very difficult for labor to win—or even place on the public agenda—policies that meaningfully limited employer authority and thereby channeled it along the path of "voluntarism" and the union shop strategy. The structure not only favored employers opposed to changes in the policy status quo but also, by allowing mergers but prohibiting collusion, encouraged large and small firms alike to resist unions rather than use them to help stabilize production and prices. Even during the Depression this institutional structure limited the extent to which New Deal policies curbed employer sovereignty in labor markets.

Capital, Labor, and State has many virtues and makes a substantial contribution. It is distinguished by its careful conceptualization of labor market policy, thorough research in both primary sources and secondary literature (in political science, labor history, and industrial relations), focused and well-developed argument, and effective blending of historical, institutional, and political-economic analysis. To my knowledge no other work analyzes developments before the New Deal so comprehensively and systematically (a separate chapter is devoted to each of the four types of labor market policy) or with such careful and sustained attention to all four actors—unions, employers, academic reformers, and government.

Moreover, various scholars have emphasized the role of law and courts in shaping labor politics and industrial relations in the late nineteenth century, but Robertson makes a very strong case that other political institutions, especially federalism and separation of powers, had at least as great an influence. Indeed, even for political scientists not deeply concerned about labor market policy, this book should be of interest as an unusually detailed and cogent case study of how the distinctive governmental structure of the United States molded the development of political conflict and public policy.

I have two reservations about Robertson's argument. First, the claim that at the start of the twentieth century the AFL's union shop strategy aimed at a "fully unionized industrial capitalist economy" (p. 66) and "posed a militant, sweeping, and credible challenge to employers' prerogatives" (p. 85) surely exaggerates the potential of that strategy. Although the AFL grew significantly between 1897 and 1903, which generated an employer counterattack, the federation's small size and narrow social base, exclusion from or weakness in key new industries, subordination of industrial to craft unions, and lack of solid political allies all weigh against such a claim, which could not reasonably be made even of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) of 1937 or 1945.

Second, although Robertson makes a powerful argument that U.S. labor market policy has been and remains exceptional among the Western capitalist democracies, the "exceptionalist" approach limits his comparative analysis and the light it could shed on the U.S. case. That approach inevitably downplays differences in labor market policies, or any other characteristic, among the other Western countries and does not reveal whether and why the United States is closer to some countries than to others in its labor market policies or union political strategies. *Capital, Labor, and State* is by no means blind to these issues, but they are overwhelmed in the exceptionalist form of argument it pursues.

Yet, any reservations are themselves overwhelmed by Robertson's remarkably rich and impressive study of an issue that so agitated American politics from the late-nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth. Capital, Labor, and

State is a considerable achievement that should be widely read and discussed.

The U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process. Edited by David K. Ryden. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000. 322p. \$65.00 cloth, \$23.95 paper. Campaigns and the Court: The U.S. Supreme Court in Presidential Elections. By Donald Grier Stephenson, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 363p. \$49.50 cloth, \$19.50 paper.

John B. Gates, University of California, Davis

The controversy surrounding the 2000 U.S. presidential election has already generated major scholarly work and will do so for years to come. Both works reviewed here were written before the historic judicial events surrounding the November election of 2000. Far from irrelevant, each work offers unique insight into the fundamental rules surrounding political conflict and the historical flow of elections with major social and economic change. As such, we learn much about political science and the struggle over the proper analytical lens for understanding politics.

David Ryden's edited volume, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process, examines the fundamental rules surrounding some neglected and not so neglected areas of election law. The charge to the distinguished contributors is weighty given the issues and resurgence of interest in the questions surrounding democratic governance. Can or should the U.S. Supreme Court adopt and defend, on the grounds of neutrality and consistency, a theory of representation? How does the judiciary approach one of the most important arteries of representation? More specifically, what rules should govern how political parties struggle with the inevitable tension between majority representation and minority interest in such diverse areas as regulatory politics and campaign finance? What reforms, if any, can the Supreme Court either endorse or initiate given the immediately "suspect" character of an unelected body deciding the constitutional course of representational politics?

Yet the Supreme Court may be ill suited to deal with the incredibly complicated and innately political context of representation. Nancy Maveety provides a useful framework for analyzing the Rehnquist's Court's general approach to political representation. She ultimately describes the Court's treatment as atheoretical. Howard Scarrow's more focused and even more pessimistic account the of the Court's treatment of legislative districting reveals how the Court often veers far from the standard of neutrality and logic. A comparison of these two chapters highlights the challenges before the authors and the U.S. Supreme Court. Neither more general nor narrower investigations of representational rules can avoid the inherent value choices available to the judges at the level of the Supreme Court.

Anyone interested in election law, political parties, and democratic governance can learn much from this microanalytic work on the rules laid down in the American context. It is striking that the authors tackle these questions both with rugged scholarship and with an often-hidden eye toward how the different answers could play out in the new international political arena. Yet international readers, and even casual observers of the U.S. Supreme Court, should come with a rather broad knowledge of the Supreme Court's decisions on the U.S Constitution and political representation. It is a shame that books must have broad and intriguing titles because their flaws ultimately are noted in the lack of coverage of a particular area. Nonetheless, given the quality of the work contained in *The U.S. Supreme Court and the Political Process* and the

events surrounding Bush v. Gore, 121 S.Ct, 525 (2000), readers should find this volume in a second edition very soon.

Donald Grier Stephenson's work on electoral politics is much different in its approach, theoretical focus, and method. Stephenson sets forth several macroanalytical propositions in Campaigns and the Court. As such, he examines each proposition with an historical method eschewing quantification and precision. He also employs a broader time frame and a very different focus beyond the institutional rules at the forefront of the Ryden volume. Stephenson forces us to integrate how environmental and broad social changes precipitate and interact with the complex character of the U.S. Supreme Court. More specifically, he examines the Supreme Court in the periods before and after so-called "critical" presidential elections. He seeks to test five propositions contained generally in the existing literature. First is the proposition that partisan involvement with the Court is more likely when the Court uses its power of judicial review to overturn rather than uphold the policy choices of the popularly elected branches. This proposition finds strong support in the historical record.

The second proposition is well-known: The Court will become embroiled in policy conflict with a new majority coalition following elections denoting major and long-term partisan change. Stephenson's third proposition relates to such major partisan shifts: The Court will begin within a decade to make policy more consistent with the new majority. This proposition does hinge on several nearly stochastic events such as turnover on the high bench. The fourth proposition focuses on how the Court's decisions can "clarify" or "define" the response of party leaders and their constitutional options on the issues surrounding major partisan change. Finally, when the Court becomes involved in the politics of the divisive issues surrounding major partisan change, there are attacks on the Court's legitimacy and its power of judicial review.

None of these propositions will be considered novel by careful readers of the work of Robert Dahl (1957), David Adamany (1973), Richard Funston (1975), William Lasser (1985), et al. Yet no single work in this literature attempts to test the validity of each proposition across such a long time frame, spanning from 1800 to the mid-1980s. With this book, Stephenson may well enter the ranks of constitutional historians such as Charles Fairman and Charles Warren. Rarely does one find such care and scholarship in addressing so many interesting and difficult questions.

Clearly, Stephenson has mastered the historical method and uses it to address generalizable propositions about the dynamics of the Supreme Court and important presidential elections. Similarly to those who use a strained theory to address important questions with precision and technical expertise, one walks away from the method utilized with serious reservations. Each conclusion is so qualified that no settled answer follows. While some may blame the method used, it is documented that other methods generate similar qualifications on these very questions. The reason is simple: Huge, macroanalytic questions often belie a single analytical strategy. Nonetheless, Donald Grier Stephenson's work stands at the forefront of a research tradition he warmly embraces.

The U.S. Supreme Court is dynamic in its rules and its place in American political history. Such trite offerings in no way take away from the lessons learned by Ryder's fine volume or Stephenson's masterful historical analysis. Yet one is reminded of Terri J. Peretti's In Defense of a Political Court (2000). The American judicial ideal of neutrality and consistency is perhaps nowhere more difficult to meet than when confronting the U.S. Supreme Court and the fundamental questions surrounding representation and democratic governance.

A Logic of Expressive Choice. By Alexander A. Schuessler. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 177p. \$49.50 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Michael C. Munger, Duke University

An interesting aspect of life at Duke is the annual construction of our local Brigadoon. The well-ordered but ephemeral tent city is named "Krzyzewskiville," after Duke's head basketball coach. K-ville appears once a year in the weeks before the game against UNC-Chapel Hill, our arch rival. So many students want to see this game that an elaborate nonprice rationing scheme, based on a queue, has evolved to allocate tickets. "Tenting" students may have to wait two weeks or more to get tickets. The game is in January or early February, so they sleeping outside and try to keep up with their school work despite rain, snow, and subfreezing temperatures at night. Random checks (even in the middle of the night) are conducted by student representatives; if a tent is empty too often it is taken down, and the residents lose their place in the queue.

Why do 3,000 students queue up for 2,000 seats (which are never used, since students stand throughout the game)? Because the game is sold out (tickets on the "spot" market sell for \$1,000 or more), it is always televised over both broadcast and cable networks. Students cite fun as the reason, but deeper probing reveals a nearly uniform response: "I want to go to show support for the team. I'll cheer them on!" In other words, they tent out for two weeks in freezing temperatures because they feel their support makes a difference. No individual student can believe s/he makes a difference, of course, since that person's seat would be taken by someone else, just as fanatical, if s/he stayed home. Furthermore, one voice has a negligible effect in the cauldron of noise that is Cameron Indoor Stadium on the night of battle. No one fan "matters" in any important respect, yet each student eagerly pays huge queuing costs for the chance to be there.

What does this have to do with voting in a political contest? In a way, that question in Alexander Schuessler's starting point in A Logic of Expressive Choice. He claims that "individuals often are motivated by a desire to express their tastes, or preferences, because such expression has direct influence on who they are—on their identity." (p. 3) Schuessler's choice of title is interesting and gives an insight into his approach: He is proposing "a" possible logic of expressive choice, one that is different from, although not entirely opposed to, the more standard logic of collective action of rational choice theory.

Schuessler's goal is to give an internally consistent account of why a citizen might rationally (although not strategically) choose to express a preference in an election.

For example, and most simply, it is the voter's statement of her preference for the Democratic candidate, through voting, that *makes* the voter a Democrat. This self-definition through voting will at least in part determine her motivation to support a candidate. Following the very same logic, candidates campaigns are designed to draw voters into an election by making it attractive for them to identify with their vote choice. Consequently, to understand voting fully requires us not merely to map out the instrumental consequences of the individual's vote on the electoral result, as in modern political economy we most typically do; it additionally requires us to investigate the expressive, or in some sense *existential*, consequences of the voter for the voter herself (p. 3, emphases in original).

Schuessler (wisely) does not pretend to "resolve" the knotty paradox of participation. The argument rests, rather, on two key points. First, he claims that the paradox simply disappears when the problem is realistically considered. Participation is not a contribution to a public good, with the associated problems of free riding and underprovision. Rather, the public good is an outcome, which will occur with or without the voter's participation. The participation decision is then a choice by the voter: "I can, at the mere cost of participation, purchase for myself the status of outcome-producer" (p. 5, emphasis in original).

producer" (p. 5, emphasis in original).

Second, Schuessler argues that methodological individualism is the appropriate starting point, but that this individualism should be conceived as ontological. More simply, campaigns are not a process of appealing to a preexistent and fixed set of preferences. Instead, the preferences being expressed by voters are the product of the campaign itself. An effective campaign, according to Schuessler, will focus on the "who" and "how many" dimensions of the electorate. The who aspect derives from the (potential) voter's perception of the candidate's standing among the rest of the electorate. The how many aspect is a product of beliefs about just which people, or groups, can be expected to offer support. The aggregation process implied here is much more of a macro (social) to micro (individual) process.

I expect that many traditional rational choice theorists will be profoundly uncomfortable with this approach, and not a few will reject it out of hand. That would be a mistake. Theoretical rational choice is, or should be, quite agnostic about the source of preferences. The notion that they might be determined endogeneously is not outlandish, particularly when the behavior in question is collective and social. Given the way that Schuessler specifies preferences, his citizens are perfectly rational.

Overall, this book is terrific. Unusually well-written, it offers many insights, large and small, into the voting choice and the nature of campaigns. It is this last point that may prove to be the book's lasting contribution; if voters behave as Schuessler claims, the very nature of the campaign will have to be rethought. This provocative and important book is a large first step toward directing that new thinking.

Crowded Airwaves: Campaign Advertising in Elections. Edited by James A. Thurber, Candice Nelson, and David A. Dulio. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution. 2000. 178p. \$39.95 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Karen M. Kedrowski, Winthrop University

The essays in this short volume address three themes: the characterization of political campaign television advertising, the need to measure its effects, and the role and implications of issue advertising. This is an ambitious agenda, but the book makes some important contributions to the literature on campaigns and on political ads specifically.

There is much to like. First, the book is comprehensive. Various chapters address all federal elections—presidential, Senate, and House. Both the issue ads sponsored by interest groups and those produced by the campaigns themselves are covered. Most chapters attempt to combine methods and to place analyses within the broader context of campaign studies. For example, in the chapter on House races, Herrnson and Patterson analyze district-level data in both competitive and noncompetitive races and in open-seat and incumbent races. Scholars know that these variables change campaign dynamics greatly.

Second, the authors take on important questions. For instance, much of the literature on voting behavior suggests that the key predictor is partisanship, and the media have no influence on vote choice, which is a serious blow to the careers of those who study political campaign ads. Yet, the

Iyengar and Petrocik chapter reminds us that "correlation is not causation." The authors start with the premise of "basic rule voting," that is, presidential vote choice can be predicted by either partisanship or approval of the incumbent. The latter accounts for the vote choices of independents, disgruntled partisans, and such outliers as Reagan Democrats. They show some intriguing evidence that media exposure over the course of a campaign may mobilize partisans to vote and may convince potential defectors to stay with the party's standard bearer.

Another fine chapter, by Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick Kenney, covers Senate elections. They test whether voters learn more from negative advertising rather than positive or issue ads. They conclude that more learning does occur from negative ads.

The features that make this book appealing to scholars are likely to make it unappealing to other audiences. For instance, the comprehensive review by Richard Lau and Lee Sigelman covers about 55 studies over 15 years on the effectiveness of negative campaign ads. They cautiously try to determine the "majority opinion," and although the chapter is rather thinly cited, it is worth reading. The bibliography is a treasure trove for anyone studying for comprehensive exams or doing a literature review for a dissertation.

Another example of narrow appeal is chapter 3, which categorizes political advertisements. Kathleen Hall Jamieson, Paul Waldmen, and Susan Sherr make two methodological points of considerable interest to scholars but of less interest to practitioners, undergraduates, or others. The first is that the conventional classifications of positive and negative ads are too facile. A more sophisticated approach would change the unit of analysis from the ad to the ideas and arguments it contains, which would reveal a smaller amount of negativity in campaign ads. Their second argument deals with the superiority of the Annenberg School's collection of presidential campaign ads over the University of Oklahoma collection. Again, this is a point of some importance only to scholars.

The last substantive chapter concerns issue ads. Written by Darrell West, it is different in focus and approach from the other chapters and does not fit as well into the entire volume. Most of the other essays are quantitative, but West uses a qualitative approach to describe the rise of issue advertising in federal elections nationwide, and he describes the various "solutions" proposed to this problem. The chapter includes little original research and relies primarily on anecdotal evidence. In the end, West does not convince me that issue ads are a "problem," much less that relatively incremental recommendations would solve it.

The Courts of International Trade: Judicial Specialization, Expertise, and Bureaucratic Policymaking. By Isaac Unah. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. 233p. \$47.50.

Stefanie A. Lindquist, University of Georgia

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In The Courts of International Trade: Judicial Specialization, Expertise, and Bureaucratic Policymaking, Isaac Unah has ventured into territory that has remained largely uncharted by scholars of judicial politics. With the prominent exception of Lawrence Baum's work on specialized courts, few researchers in political science have chosen to explore courts that fall outside the federal judiciary's core hierarchy. Yet as Unah points out, these specialized courts, including the U.S. Tax Court, Claims Court, Court of International Trade, Bankruptcy Courts, and the Federal Circuit, perform critical functions that have the potential to affect business interests and shape bureaucratic performance in highly complex

regulatory and economic areas. In this book, and in his previous published research, Unah has initiated an important expedition into unfamiliar but promising terrain.

By focusing on the U.S. Court of International Trade (CIT) and the Federal Circuit, Unah raises a series of interesting research questions. First, how does decision making differ between generalist and specialized courts? Do models of judicial behavior developed in the context of generalist courts apply to judges on specialist courts? How does the institutional structure of administrative agencies affect judicial review of agency decisions? And do these specialized courts exhibit any particular policy orientation, even after controlling for the partisan affiliation of judicial personnel? Fortunately, the CIT's docket is composed of cases that allow Unah to construct a straightforward research design to analyze several of these questions.

The CIT hears cases appealed from the International Trade Commission (ITC), an independent regulatory commission, and from the Department of Commerce (DOC), an executive agency, both of which render related judgments in antidumping and countervailing duty (AD/CVD) cases. In these cases, the ITC judges the adverse impact of unfair trade practices on domestic industry, while the DOC determines whether a claim of dumping or foreign government subsidization can be supported by hard evidence. Both tasks are critical for the imposition of protective tariffs but are rendered by separate bureaucracies with different institutional structures. Aggrieved claimants can appeal an unfavorable determination by either agency to the CIT, where individual judges render decisions in AD/CVD cases under a deferential standard of review. A loss in the CIT may be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Unah begins his analysis by setting forth a series of theoretical propositions regarding the behavior of specialized courts. Although his theoretical discussion tends to drift into normative territory, Unah first suggests that judges with specialized knowledge and expertise will less often defer to administrative agency decisions. To test this proposition, Unah compares reversal rates at the CIT of appeals from administrative agencies with reversal rates of agency appeals in the federal district courts and U.S. Supreme Court. Perhaps not surprisingly, Unah finds that the CIT is significantly more likely to reverse the agency's decision. While this finding may be suggestive, it cannot be viewed as conclusive, since the types of agency decisions appealed to the district courts differ substantially from those appealed to the CIT. In a later chapter, Unah compares reversal rates of agency appeals in the Federal Circuit and the D.C. Circuit, finding (contrary to expectations) that the Federal Circuit demonstrates a higher level of deference in agency appeals than the generalist D.C. Circuit. Of course, many cases in the D.C. Circuit are appealed directly from federal agencies, while the Federal Circuit hears cases appealed from a lower court. The Federal Circuit's deferential stance toward trade agencies could thus be attributable to the agencies' choices not to appeal losses in the court below

Drawing on research presenting integrated models of judicial behavior based on legal and extralegal factors, Unah turns to theories of judicial decision making. In specifying a series of decision models at the CIT and the Federal Circuit, Unah includes variables that reflect judges' party affiliations, certain case facts related to the applicable statutory standards, economic indicators reflecting trade deficits and other factors, and industry-specific measures related to party resources. To evaluate his hypothesis that decisions rendered by an independent regulatory commission will receive greater deference than those rendered by an executive agency, Unah also includes a variable measuring whether the case was ap-

pealed from the ITC or the DOC. Based on his models of CIT decision making, Unah concludes that the court generally adopts a protectionist orientation, that it is more likely to reverse the DOC than the ITC, that statutory standards are significant determinants of CIT decisions, that industry political power has some, but not an overwhelming, effect, and that the political affiliation of CIT judges has little impact on case outcomes. At the Federal Circuit, Unah tests similar models and finds that the Federal Circuit is more likely to protect U.S. industry when the plaintiff is an economically powerful industry, when the U.S. holds a high trade deficit with the trading nation, and when the panel is dominated by a Republican majority. And, as in the CIT, the Federal Circuit is more likely to affirm the ITC's decisions than those of the DOC.

From these findings, Unah draws several broad conclusions. First, he argues that bureaucratic structures condition judicial review. Based on the finding that decisions from the ITC (an independent regulatory commission) are more frequently supported than those of the DOC (an executive agency), Unah suggests that the bipartisan, quasi-judicial ITC renders more defensible judgments than the more political DOC. Of course, this interpretation is somewhat speculative, since Unah's data do not allow a clear conclusion concerning the causal connection between institutional structure and judicial review. It is possible, for example, that the ITC is affirmed more frequently because its judgments concerning economic consequences for domestic industry are more clearly susceptible to proof with reliable data. Second, Unah concludes that integrated models of judicial decision making best account for judicial behavior in the CIT and Federal Circuit, as both specialized courts are sensitive to statutory factors, as well as extralegal pressures such as party capability.

Finally, Unah suggests that CIT judges' expertise translates into less deference to the judgments of administrative agencies, and that these specialized judges "embrace uncertainty far more courageously than do generalist [judges] in their dealings with the bureaucracy" (pp. 175-6). While it may be true that expertise leads to more intensive judicial review, some might quibble with Unah's characterization of such review as "courageous." As Dean Leebron of the Columbia Law School noted in 1999 at the Eleventh Judicial Conference of the Court of International Trade, "some have said that expertise-there may be too much of a good thingmay lead to a distortion in a standard of review, as members highly experienced with the subject matter might be more inclined to second-guess administrative agency determinations" (195 F.R.O. 89). From this perspective, Unah's findings could support the more negative interpretation that expertise engenders overly intrusive judicial review.

Unah's book thus raises interesting empirical and normative questions about the nature of judicial review by a specialized judiciary and will surely generate further research on the relationship between specialized courts and the bureaucracy. Because the book represents an extended foray into rarely explored territory and substantially expands our knowledge of the specialized judiciary, Unah has made a significant contribution to the literature.

Reelection: William Jefferson Clinton as a Native-Son Presidential Candidate. By Hanes Walton, Jr. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 352p. \$49.50 cloth, \$22.00 paper.

Jay Barth, Hendrix College

At the end of the Clinton era, it is appropriate for political scientists to undertake analyses of this two-term president's

effect on any number of political and public policy phenomena. Clinton's most obvious talent showed itself in the electoral arena, where (even in a television era) he formed deeply personal relationships with voters, and many of these analyses rightfully focus on the foundations of Clinton's public support. Continuing this line of research, Hanes Walton examines a potential explanation for Clinton's relative strength in one region of the country—the turf on which his political career began—through an in-depth analysis of Clinton's electoral base across time in Arkansas and the South. The book examines a well-justified question, about the ongoing vitality of a "native son" phenomenon but numerous problems with the method by which Walton attempts to answer that question weaken this work. Numerous factual errors and muddled writing make it even more problematic.

Walton is quite conscious of grounding his analysis theoretically. He lays out the line of research on native sons in American voting, beginning with V.O. Key's highlighting of "friends and neighbors" voting in the Old South (Southern Politics in State and Nation, 1949). Walton clearly presents the ways in which later scholars built on this tradition, culminating with his own examination of Jimmy Carter's linkages to fellow southerners (Walton, The Native-Son Presidential Candidate: The Carter Vote in Georgia, 1992). Because of the tremendous shifts in southern partisanship since Key's work, an analysis of the persistence of regionalism in voting in the Clinton era is certainly pertinent.

Walton is less clear in another theoretical chapter. He notes the inadequacies of the frameworks traditionally used to describe electoral outcomes (e.g., realignment theory) and presents what he terms a "more complete" approach. His "political party perspective" posits that individual voters' choices as well as the historical context of a particular election are both important and, of course, linked. Walton goes on to make the (quite logical) contention that race is the central driving force in this vision of electoral politics in the United States. Yet, the discussion of the political party perspective is muddled, and, more important, Walton's argument about race is not well grounded in the literature on the interaction between race and American politics. In addition, the linkage between the native son theory and the political party perspective is never made.

Walton then sets out to paint a picture of the political-historical context of Arkansas and, more specifically, of its racial context. In the second of these chapters Walton makes his greatest contribution, one that is of primary relevance for students of Arkansas politics. As he makes clear, voting by African Americans in Arkansas has not received adequate attention, and Walton employs creative techniques that he terms "political archeology" to recapture their role in the state's politics in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century.

Walton then discusses Bill Clinton's political entrance into this context and undertakes a chronological journey through the ups and downs of his political career in Arkansas. The roles of Clinton's home counties and counties in which black voters are most prevalent are examined as the two parts of the state that serve as "friends and neighbors," to use Key's term. Unfortunately, a variety of methodological problems undermine Walton's attempts to investigate the two tangentially related parts of his theory as they relate to Clinton's electoral life.

By necessity, scholars of American electoral politics often rely upon county-level data. Walton, however, is not careful to note the limitations of such analysis in gaining an understanding of the voting behavior of the individuals living in those counties. Moreover, Walton fails to introduce key control variables to enhance one's confidence that home county or racial composition are the true explanatory factors of electoral patterns. Throughout this portion of the text, Walton moves back and forth between analyzing vote percentages and raw votes. Because county populations differ, any statistical analysis of raw votes is irrelevant, but Walton relies upon correlation data on raw votes in drawing conclusions. He also ignores the fact that presidential and nonpresidential elections affect turnout, which undermines other of his points. In short, the rudimentary statistical analyses are very questionable.

More specific problems arise with the two theoretical arguments. Regarding the native-son phenomenon, Walton examines only electoral behavior in Clinton's home counties, not the homes of his opponents. In addition, in his analysis Key employs maps, and more of these would have made Walton's points much clearer than the series of confusing tables he uses.

Even more problematic is the analysis of race. Throughout the text, Walton uses the three counties in the state that have remained majority black to provide empirical insights. The electoral results in those counties, which have a large number of white voters, are his gauge of Clinton's support from African Americans in the state as a whole. Issues of statistical validity aside, Walton fails to discuss the fact that white southern voters, as Key found, behave differently depending on the size of the black population in their locale; whites in counties with a majority of African Americans feel "threatened" and base political actions on this fear. Furthermore, the role of African Americans in Arkansas politics is never united with the theoretical framework presented earlier in the work. This disconnection between the theoretical and empirical portions of the work is a weakness.

The descriptions of Clinton's races in the state are surprisingly weak. In the coverage of his first race for Congress in 1974, there is no discussion of the role of Watergate in aiding the Democrat Clinton against a long-time Republican incumbent, and the coverage of other races is lacking in crucial detail. Moreover, there are some obvious errors, including the outcome of a key gubernatorial election in the 1960s, the fact that Governor Winthrop Rockefeller (from New York) was not "homegrown," and the identity of the congressional district in which Little Rock lies.

Factual errors mar the credibility of the work more generally. These range from stating that Richard Nixon ran for president in 1964, to misidentifying both the states that George Wallace won in his 1968 bid for the presidency and the southern states captured by Clinton in 1992 and 1996, to the date of the Lewinsky scandal. Also, the writing is not of high quality, and arguments are not pulled together or clearly explained.

Walton attempts to compare the performance of Clinton as a presidential candidate in his home state and region with that of Jimmy Carter. It quickly becomes apparent, however, that dramatic changes in southern presidential politics during the Reagan-Bush era make comparisons of limited relevance. In the end, Walton makes the point that there remains a "regional variable," at least for southern candidates in presidential elections, but this work fails to move our understanding of contemporary southern politics beyond this truism.

The Politics of Women's Rights: Parties, Positions, and Change. By Christina Wolbrecht. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 266p. \$55.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Kathleen Dolan, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

When we talk about the gender gap, students in my Women and Politics course are always surprised to learn that men used to be more likely than women to support the Democratic Party and that Republicans were the original supporters of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Many people forget, or are not familiar with, the significant party transformations on these issues over the last 50 years. Christina Wolbrecht's new book provides important insights into this transformation and is a valuable contribution. The study of political parties has not, to date, accounted for this phenomenon, and gender studies too often ignore the crucial role of political parties in our system.

Wolbrecht is generally concerned with exploring how, when, and why party issue realignments occur. More specifically, she seeks to explain the 180-degree turn of the two major parties on women's rights during 1952–92. On both counts, she succeeds admirably. A major contribution of this work is the careful explication of a theoretical framework that accounts for adoption of and change in issue position by parties. Drawing on theories of critical realignment, issue evolution, agenda setting, and congressional behavior, Wolbrecht suggests that the two parties' relative positions on any issue are determined by three factors: the issue, the party coalitions, and the party elite. She then incorporates a discussion of issue equilibrium and disruption, processes through which one can view changes in party position.

A second contribution is the thorough discussion and analysis of the broad issue of women's rights during the period under study. Wolbrecht carefully details the important players, events, societal changes, and political aspects of a movement that had profound consequences in our society. Beyond this, she moves from description to explanation through the application of her theory. She outlines a debate that began between the Democratic Party and its support for protective legislation and the Republican Party and its support for the ERA; it evolved into a debate between liberation (the Democrats and their embrace of feminism) and tradition (the Republicans and the increased influence of social conservatism).

In unraveling the changes in the debate, Wolbrecht addresses questions about the public salience of women's rights, the changing nature of the party coalitions, and the coincident changes in elite behavior. Relying on data from several sources, she demonstrates how the social and political context of the 1960s and 1970s gave women's rights greater salience among the public and political elites. The resultant disequilibrium in women's rights led to profound changes in the party coalition interests of the Democrats and Republicans and the responses of their leaders. Today, the two major parties take positions on women's rights that are very different from the past and also are very different from each other.

A third strength is the ability of the author to tackle difficult measurement questions and bring several different sources of data to bear on the central argument. The methodological aspects of the work are rigorous, appropriate, and follow from the theoretical framework that underlies her arguments. Documenting a complex transformation over 40 years is not easily accomplished, but Wolbrecht pulls together several creative sources of information to do just that. She employs survey data and content analysis of the *New York Times* to show the importance of increased public salience to the process of issue equilibrium disruption; material from congressional hearings and party platforms to illustrate the process of issue redefinition and agenda change; and cosponsorship of legislation, roll-call data, and interest group ratings to establish the shifting behaviors of party elites.

My one quibble is with chapter 6, where Wolbrecht attempts to show how changes in interest coalitions and the composition of party elites contributed to the transformation in issue position. "It is important to distinguish between party elites, such as members of Congress and party leaders, and the parties' coalitions of interest," by which she means

"the general array of interests associated with each political party ... identifiers, voters, convention delegates, funding sources, activists, and organized allies" (p. 182). Yet, she relies on the composition of party delegations in Congress (arguably party elites) as a proxy measure of the composition of party coalitions. To that end, she offers party unity scores and geographic and ideological data on members of Congress for the years under study. In discussing the changes in party elite behavior, she also uses data on members of Congress, in this case cosponsorship of women's rights legislation as a measure of changing behaviors. Wolbrecht points out the difficulty of measuring party coalition activities, but since she makes an important distinction between coalitions and elites, her use of data on members of Congress to measure the behaviors of both leaves us without a clear sense of how external groups and actors influence party behavior.

But this is a small exception to take with a work that succeeds at many levels. It provides a strong theoretical framework in which to consider the development and change of party issue positions, and it provides a rich and detailed summary of a complex movement and set of issues. Scholars of political parties, public opinion, and gender politics will find much in this volume to like.

Pursuit of Justices: Presidential Politics and the Selection of Supreme Court Nominees. By David Alistair Yalof. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, 280p. \$27.50.

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It is a pleasure to review this well-written book, which should be of enormous interest to every serious student of judicial politics and the presidency. Based upon a thorough mining of the presidential papers of seven presidents and numerous interviews with key participants in the selection process, along with other primary and secondary sources, Yalof gives us a presidency-by-presidency take on the recruitment of Supreme Court nominees.

In his introductory chapter, Yalof lays out the variables that shape who is nominated. Among them are the timing of a vacancy, the political and ideological composition of the Senate, the popularity of the President, the attributes of the justice responsible for the vacancy, the realistic pool of available candidates, and the decisional and bureaucratic framework used by the President to reach the selection decision. Yalof suggests three decisional frameworks: an open recruitment process whereby recruitment begins after the vacancy occurs; a single-candidate process in which the nominee has been, for most intents and purposes, chosen in advance of an actual vacancy; and a criteria-driven process whereby, in advance of a vacancy, the president specifies criteria to guide selection.

In addition, Yalof discusses 10 factors that help explain how the recruitment process has evolved. Perhaps the most important of them are the growth and bureaucratization of the Justice Department; the growth and bureaucratization of the White House, particularly the White House Counsel's office; the divided government; an increasingly public confirmation process; increased participation by interest groups; and increased media attention. The variables including the decisional frameworks as well as the factors are considered more or less systematically in the subsequent five chapters and then in a more focused fashion in the last major chapter.

In his chapter on Harry Truman, Yalof traces Truman's personal process of picking Supreme Court justices, offering new light on the twists and turns that culminated in Truman's appointments of Burton, Vinson, Minton, and Clark. In contrast, Dwight Eisenhower's selection of Supreme Court nominees after Earl Warren was dependent upon the top officials

of the Justice Department, who worked from the constraining criteria that Eisenhower imposed including judicial experience, age (no one older than 62), and, as Yalof documents, religion in terms of finding a Catholic to appoint before the 1956 presidential election. The chapter on Kennedy and Johnson points up the differences between Kennedy/Johnson and Eisenhower and also between Kennedy and Johnson in the selection of Supreme Court justices. The path to the selection of Byron White was more circuitous than that for Goldberg. Most remarkable in the history of Supreme Court selection was Lyndon Johnson's, in effect, creating vacancies that he could fill with Abe Fortas and Thurgood Marshall, stories told before but well recounted and documented here by Yalof.

Yalof offers some fascinating revelations in the Nixon and Ford chapter including Warren Burger's behind-the-scenes maneuvering to get appointed to the Court as well as events leading up to the nominations of Haynsworth, Carswell, and then Blackmun to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Abe Fortas. The story of finding replacements for the Black and Harlan seats is discussed and the documentary evidence suggests that Richard Nixon was indeed serious about wanting to place a woman on the Supreme Court.

Events leading to Ronald Reagan's appointments to the Court including the ill-fated nomination of Robert Bork and the aborted one of Douglas Ginsburg have been told before, but not until this book have they been grounded in the Reagan presidential papers, which gives Yalof's account greater authenticity. Concluding the main body of the study, Yalof notes several trends in the evolution of the selection process including the near-lock that federal appeals court judges have had on nominations since 1968 (Yalof points out that 16 of the 19 nominees have been appeals court judges) and the shifting of selection from the back pocket of the president to the back rooms of the White House Counsel's Office and Justice Department. Yalof notes that there has been a shift to the criteria-driven decisional framework. The open decisional framework accounts for only five nominations since 1945, the last one being that of Stevens in 1975. The single-candidate framework accounted for 9 nominations but the criteria-driven framework can be seen with 14. Yalof provides an epilogue in which he provides what he calls

a tentative analysis of the Bush and Clinton appointments to the Supreme Court relying on newspaper and secondary sources.

As thorough a study as Yalof's book is, there is an important omission. In only two footnotes do we find mention of President Jimmy Carter. Of course Carter did not have an opportunity to name a justice to the Supreme Court but he had ample opportunity to name lower court judges and the Carter administration selection process had an important influence on administrations to come. In particular, during Carter's administration key White House Counsel and Justice Department personnel began regular meetings to decide on recommendations to be made to the president. This was the beginning of the joint White House-Justice Department Judicial Selection Committee that has been a part of the process since. And most importantly, Carter and his administration pushed affirmative action in judicial appointments. Had Carter not been so insistent on finding qualified women for the bench and had he not been widely expected to name a woman to the first vacancy on the Supreme Court (he was seen as grooming Ninth Circuit judge Shirley Hufstedler, who resigned her lifetime position to join Carter's cabinet), it is questionable whether Ronald Reagan would have made his pledge to appoint a woman to the Supreme Court during the fall 1980 presidential campaign.

There are a few typographical or other errors. As for the latter, for example, the discussion of the growth and bureaucratization of the Justice Department fails to mention the Reagan Administration's creation of the Office of Legal Policy, which undertook the responsibility of screening, vetting, and processing all judicial nominations (p. 13). Edward H. Levi is described as "only marginally active in Republican politics" when in fact he was a former Democrat turned political independent (p. 126). Senator Hruska is described as being from Alaska when in fact he was from Nebraska (p. 247). Miller v. California is footnoted as the case that "included some pornography within the First Amendment's protections" (p. 133), instead of Stanley v. Georgia.

It should be evident that the errors are minor and that this book is a major contribution to our understanding of the nominating of Supreme Court justices. David Yalof is to be congratulated for his outstanding work.

## Comparative Politics

Political Culture in Post-Communist Russia: Formlessness and Recreation in a Traumatic Transition. By James Alexander. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 267p. \$65.00

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Of all the "traumatic transitions" in the postcommunist world, the Russian one ranks as one of the most tortuous and painful. Why is this? Does the problem lie in the institutional structure created in the early postcommunist years, or do the roots lie deeper, in Russia's innate authoritarianism and cult of strong leadership? Employing the concept of political culture, this is the question that Alexander seeks to answer. He approaches the idea in an unusual way, however, by focusing rather more broadly on the concept of "culture" and its potential for change rather than any narrowly defined notion of "political" culture. He insists that a nation's political culture cannot be reduced to one or two simple and measurable parameters but is a complex web of malleable relations and contradictions; and he seeks to understand them by using what he insists are nonstandard approaches.

The book takes an ethnographic approach to the study of postcommunist society. The fieldwork was conducted in the cities of Syktyvkar (the capital of the Komi Republic) and Kirov (formerly Vyatka) between October 1993 and August 1994. The material is marginally updated as a result of a further research trip to Syktyvkar in summer 1997, but the work stands or falls on the material gathered during the earlier research to these two provincial towns nearly a thousand miles to the northeast of Moscow. The general argument, rehearsed repeatedly though the book, is that traditional and predominantly quantitative methods fail to grasp the complexity of political culture. Alexander insists that only ethnographic methods, above all, open-ended face-to-face interviews, can provide the nuance that is forgone by closed-question surveys.

The two towns selected as case studies are illustrative of two federal categories: Syktyvkar is the capital of a republic and thus enjoys enhanced federal privileges and greater independence from the central authorities. Kirov, on the other hand, is just one of Russia's 50-odd ordinary oblasts (regions). A further difference between the two is that Kirov is an industrial town tied to the fortunes of the military industrial complex, whereas Syktyvkar is a relatively small administrative center

in a republic that has great natural resources that were once exploited by prisoners in the many labor camps that formed part of the *gulag* archipelago. The differences between the two towns allowed conclusions to be drawn from the differential impact of economic reform on public attitudes, assessed on the basis of some 30 interviews with representative individuals in each place. The author insists that it is misleading to suggest that there is a homogeneous national political culture and, instead, argues that each community will have contours of its own. To a degree this is proven, but largely in matters of detail: there appears to be a remarkable underlying similarity between the two areas in broader cultural responses to the breakdown of the old order and the troubled birth of the new.

The analysis is structured in terms of a tension between two types of political culture, "democratic" and "authoritarian," although Alexander allows some subtle blending of the two. He adds another variable, the notion of "formlessness," to suggest the flux undergone by political culture in a period of accelerated change. The basic conclusion is that Russian political culture still bears the imprint of Soviet authoritarianism, yet was "primed" (p. 3) for liberal democracy as it exited communism. The work explores the tension between continuity and change, examining the dynamics of both and the often contradictory political culture that emerges as a result. Crude versions of the "continuity" thesis-of an unbroken and implicitly unchangeable Russian tradition of authoritarianism-are rejected. Alexander nevertheless insists that the dominant trend in Russian political culture is support for the symbols and values of what we may call "Russian traditionalism." Although Alexander does not say so, his findings appear to be confirmed by the rise of Vladimir Putin's distinctive blend of a liberal modernizing agenda cast in a traditionalist form. The book suggests that a political system out of kilter with the political culture (pace Eckstein's notion of congruence) will be unstable and that the optimal outcome is a "resting place" (pp. 40-1) in which the two reinforce each other. It remains to be seen whether Putin's system is that stable "resting place" for Russia.

The work is thus an unusual combination of "thick explanation" (not description; p. 67) and a methodological critique of the traditional survey approach to the study of political culture. The author insists that the latter cannot begin to identify and quantify the nuances of popular understandings, beliefs, and preferences, arguing that words and concepts take on different meanings as they travel between cultures. This point is perhaps rather labored, since the better studies of political culture have always been aware of the need for historical contextualisation, but appears to be part of the author's own liberation (suggested in his comments about his two years spent in the Peace Corps in Ecuador in the mid-1980s) from the tyranny of quantitative methodologies. Similarly, the concept of "formlessness" is not adequately theorized: One wonders whether there would be substantively greater "form" in Western popular perceptions of terms such as "democracy" and "freedom." The precise relationship between formlessness and the broader problem of regime change and societal transition is not adequately spelled out; that is, to what degree is the so-called formlessness a structural characteristic of a society that has responded in traumatic ways to the challenges of modernity for well over a century? Or is it a local phenomenon confined to the postcommunist transition? The associated issue of the direction of causality is not adequately addressed: The relationship between institutional development and societal characteristics—the eternal tension in transition studies between state-centered and societally oriented approaches—is left hanging in the air.

The key test of any work studying political culture is the durability of the evidence and results. The bulk of Alexander's research was conducted in the early 1990s, at a particularly traumatic time of institutional change, culminating in the violent confrontation between the presidency and the parliament in Moscow in October 1993. To what degree can his findings help us understand long-term patterns of development? The blend of political science and anthropological methods (although I doubt whether professional anthropologists would recognize his approach as in any way anthropological) does in fact produce results that transcend the narrow limitations of the time and place in which they were conducted. Although some of the claims for methodological originality are rather exaggerated, the study does help establish the contours of the formlessness (a contradiction that is recognized in the work itself), insisting that the experiences of democratization and marketization themselves contribute to shaping political responses; and thus primordialist approaches to the study of political culture are rejected. The enduring value of this work, however, perhaps lies not in the detailed analysis of the formlessness of the transition, but in the establishment of a framework in which we can begin to understand the process of "recreation" of a stable political order. This book takes us some way along this path but is constrained by its limited time horizon and its engagement in other debates. However, any attempt to understand the way in which tradition and innovation are being recombined in contemporary Russia will be the poorer without drawing on Alexander's theoretically sophisticated, methodologically robust and empirically rich work.

Public Health Policies and Social Inequality. By Charles F. Andrain. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 292p. \$50.00.

The Politics of Health in Europe. By Richard Freeman. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2000. 164p. \$69.95

Governing the Health Care State: A Comparative Study of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Germany. By Michael Moran. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999. 196p. \$69.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Accidental Logics: The Dynamics of Change in the Health Care Arena in the United States, Britain, and Canada. By Carolyn Hughes Tuohy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 312p. \$45.00.

Theodore Marmor, Yale University

International meetings about health-care issues—conferences, symposia, cyber-gatherings—have become something of an epidemic in the past decade. There is a brisk trade in the latest panaceas offered for the various real and imagined ills of modern medical care systems. When policy fixes fail in their country of origin, they are regularly offered to unsuspecting audiences elsewhere. Moreover, what travels as comparative analysis is often simply a collection of parallel descriptions of national health arrangements. So when there is a flurry of systematic comparative studies of health care by political scientists, a development illustrated by the four books under review, one ought to pay attention.

Ten years ago, there were relatively few political science texts on health care—the only truly comparative treatise by Odin Anderson was published in 1972, a book dealing with postwar medicine in Britain, Sweden, and the United States. (And Anderson was a sociologist.) It is not that health care was ignored, but the ferment was most evident in the growth of health *economics* texts.

Yet, over the last decade, there has been a literal explosion in comparative studies by political scientists and others. Academic conferences on comparative health studies have

attracted many scholars. A spate of comparative reports by international organizations such as the OECD and WHO has provoked commentary and controversy, as well as supplying a wealth of comparative data. Now we see a third stage, one of book-length treatment, four of which this review examines. (Two other works of comparative politics came to my attention too late for review here. One is the admirable 1998 portrait of Japanese medical care—contrasted with that of the United States—by John Campbell and Naoki Ikegami, *The Art of Balance in Health Policy*, 1998. The other is Colleen Flood's wide-ranging "legal, economic, and political analysis" of *International Health Care Reform*, 2000.)

One can evaluate this literature by, at a minimum, two standards. One is the degree to which the work advances our understanding of how and why various nations have developed their health-care systems. The second is the extent to which the analysis permits readers to draw plausible policy lessons—predictive and prescriptive—for the national systems studied? The issue for this essay is, How well do the four scholarly works of comparative politics under review satisfy these standards?

Tuohy's Accidental Logics stands out as a sophisticated, thorough, and insightful synthesis of comparative politics and policy in Canada, the United States, and Britain. As she makes clear in her title, the book concentrates on explaining patterns of policy continuity and change, buttressed by a thorough understanding of both the institutional details of modern health care and the demands of comparative political analysis.

Tuohy's central thesis is that a "common logic" dominates health-care policy cross-nationally. But, she argues convincingly, the working-out of that logic in any given country reflects the "accidents" of history, the combination of which gives rise to each country's particular national system. Tuohy examines the national relationships between the market and the state in health care along two common dimensions: the balance of influence among types of actors (state, private finance, and health-care professionals) and the mix of instruments of social control (hierarchy, market, and collegiality). This framework not only descriptively illuminates the medical care we see, but also enhances the reader's understanding of seeming puzzles in the tumultuous area of health care policy. Tuohy's discussion of the United States over the past two decades illustrates her contribution. She understands recent American health-care developments as a result of the intersection of "the logic of entrepreneurialism inherent in market-based systems" and the increasing "influence of private financial actors at the expense of the medical profession" (pp. 158-9). Her general medical-care discussion reflects as well a profound scholarly understanding of the complexity of professional regulation. And her analysis of professional autonomy highlights the centrality of physicians, a group that has influenced and continues to influence health-care policy everywhere in the world of industrial democracies.

Accidental Logics begins by noting the features of medical care that make it the object of intense policy concern, analyzing the pressures for change internal and external to contemporary national health arrangements. The speed of change in the three countries she studies intensively differs according to the particular "institutional mix" (defined as the degree of government hierarchical control, market forces, and professional collegiality) and the "structural balance" among state, medical professionals, and private financial interests. With this approach, Tuohy then illuminates the variation in the impact of reform ideas on policy practice in the three Anglophone nations she knows so well. Substantively, Tuohy gives us national portraits that conflict with much conventional wisdom: comparative stability in the basic policy framework of

Canada since the 1960s, tumultuous change in the United States in the 1990s, and a more limited degree of change in the world of British medicine from Thatcher to Blair.

Richard Freeman's contribution is of a different order. His book's scope is very ambitious. It is about," as he states on the first page, "health, politics, and Europe." The central question for the non-health-care specialist is whether the focus on publicly provided health care—which is what Freeman really has in mind, as opposed to the broader topic of health—illuminates European politics in especially striking ways. For health politics specialists, the issue is how the book's theoretical or empirical content advances the understanding of the subject.

Freeman's book is a readable, useful guide for the nonspecialist to the shape of European health-care systems, their origins, major institutional features, and contemporary disputes. (By contemporary, I mean over the last two decades of the 20th century.) Indeed, the focus of the empirical chapters is the disputes about "re-forming" health care that have raged since the stagflation of the 1970s in France and Germany, Italy, Sweden, and Great Britain. Freeman's title might well have been the "politics of health reform in five European States," emphasizing the pressures for change from those who use public health care, those who provide it, and those who pay for it.

The treatment of this subject is sensible, solidly documented, and very valuable for those trying to make sense of the very complicated, ever-growing arena of health-care funding, delivery, and regulation. The sequence of chapters begins with an introduction to the questions and the approach Freeman will take. It then moves to a very brief, but helpful sketch of European health-care politics in the century from 1880 to 1980 and takes up in comparative chapters the five national health-care programs. Freeman divides the substantive, descriptive chapters in two, distinguishing "national health services" (Italy, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) from what he conventionally labels as "social insurance systems" (France and Germany). Readers could use this dichotomy to analyze the health arrangements of other countries in western Europe, putting Holland and Belgium into the latter camp and Norway, perhaps, in the former one. Doing so would, however, raise the question of whether this particular classification is all that helpful. Does it really illuminate the political struggles over health care across Europe? Is thinking about policy arenas in terms of legal ownership/financial categories such as social insurance and national health service all that helpful in understanding what health policy matters are at issue and what patterns of resolution emerged in the Europe of the late 20th century?

The answer for this reviewer is simple. The formal designation of social insurance or national health service is but one of the potential factors shaping health-care politics and deserves no particular privileged status. Freeman concedes that the distinction is "not real" but "makes a wealth of information more manageable" (p. x). In fact, he regards the study of particular disputes in health care as warranting different analytical approaches, "necessarily eclectic," as he puts the point (p. viii). So what the reader has here is an accurate sketch of European political/medical history, a well-informed summary of salient disputes in five of Europe's nations, and some interesting, but not fully developed approaches to understanding why health-care policies and programs have worked out as they have.

For scholars (and students) of comparative politics, it will be a valuable substitute for the outdated work of Odin Anderson, a useful companion to the descriptive, statistical portraits of the OECD, and a helpful companion to the many articles on particular disputes or national programs.

What the specialist reader will find disappointing, however, follows precisely from the virtues of the book for the general reader. This is an excellent synthesis of available understandings. But there is little that advances that understanding, or reveals why and how comparative analysis can make a substantial difference in how we either explain comparative policy development or inform policy disputes about health care with an understanding of the crucial political constraints that research has revealed. Freeman does make a good case for adapting theoretical approaches to the different disputes within medical care but does not provide an especially illuminating way to conceptualize that. He suggests rightly that, for both explanation and evaluation, the comparative method is as close to experimentation as social science is likely to get. But, there again, the justification of the comparative approach does not produce in practice an explanation of change and continuity that goes beyond conventional national accounts. For that topic, Accidental Logics is superior. Freeman's contribution, however, is no less worthy for being synthetic rather than a theory-building exercise.

Michael Moran's Governing the Health Care State takes as its central question the following: How can one explain the embrace by the Thatcher government of American-inspired market reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s? The puzzle arises because the apparent motivation of those reforms—the control of health-care costs—was something that the unified government of the NHS was already capable of doing. The answer to that puzzle, Moran argues, can be revealed only by cross-national analysis. And his investigation is part of a broader concern about why "in the early 1990s the health care systems of most of the advanced capitalist nations were

reformed" (p. x).

Moran's book, like Freeman's, offers a standard, competent description of the main health-care features of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany. But the patterns emphasized are not as illuminating as promised. The interplay of health-care institutions and the state constitute what this book regards as its central "insight," leading Moran to emphasize the analytical importance of what he terms the "health care state" (p. 10). This conception—health care as a subunit, so to speak, of the welfare state-defines the "closed loop feedback mechanism" of interaction between health-care interests (those of patients, providers, payers, drug firms, device manufacturers, etc.) and the political order. It is surely true that industrial democracies expend (publicly and privately) vast sums on health care. These in turn create a complex set of economic and political pressures. But to note that is not, in my view, to advance the reader's understanding appreciably.

The Moran analysis breaks out three elements of the "health care state"—consumption politics (access and cost), professional politics (expertise, ideology, and pressure groups), and production politics (health care as an industry commanding a substantial share of the GNP). The work is most helpful in dealing with consumption politics (chapter 3) and summarizes well developments in that sphere in the three countries. The other parts of the triumvirate are less well treated. For example, Moran unconvincingly regards the politics of professional regulation as simply what economists call "rent-seeking" by the medical professions, a "chance to gain competitive advantages in markets by securing preferential policy outcomes" (p. 14). There is no doubt that many regard professional self-regulation as simply window dressing for economic advantage. But one hopes for a more sophisticated discussion of such topics when issues of the quality of care are real and, in the case of the United Kingdom, a central feature of current criticisms of the NHS.

Moran returns in the end to his initial puzzle of why the United Kingdom turned in the latter 1980s to reform models

inspired, he claims, by U.S. intellectual entrepreneurs. His unremarkable conclusion is that "the form and direction of health care policy are responding to some forces deeper than pressure for cost containment" (p. 174). But Moran is unable to explain precisely why precisely the particular class of innovations appealed, although along the way the reader receives an overview of changes taking place in all three political and health-care systems. Descriptively helpful, this book promises more than it delivers in making sense of continuity and change in the health-care arrangements of these three democracies.

Charles Andrain's book on inequality and public health is the most ambitious of the works under review and the most disappointing. Andrain approaches health-care policies deductively. He treats the topic as derivative of three models of the modern welfare state, using Gosta Esping-Anderson's typology as his organizing analytic framework in Part I of the book. He attempts to describe and explain developments in eight countries, placing each in one of the three welfarestate models—entrepreneurial, organic corporatist, and social democratic. Canada and the United States are treated as instances of the first category; Germany, Holland, Japan, and France exemplify the second; and Sweden and Britain are examples of the social democratic mode. It is unclear whether Andrain uses these categories to characterize the respective governments per se as the predicate for understanding its health policies or whether, as he sometimes suggests, these models reflect his understanding of each countries health-care features (pp. 14-5). To the extent that it is the latter, one must wonder about the applicability of these models.

Consider the result for Canada. Its universal coverage, global provincial budgets, and bans on extra billing and supplementary health insurance place Canada, according to Andrain's scheme, in the same "entrepreneurial" category as the United States, with its hundreds of health insurance firms, millions of uninsured and underinsured, and no overall budget setting by government (p. 19). On the one hand, there is no doubt that Canada' economic system and national culture resembles the United States' more than it does Sweden's (Andrain's exemplar of social democracy). But that fact does not substantiate the claim that Canada's medical-care arrangements rest on core entrepreneurial values—as opposed to those of corporatism or social democracy. Indeed, Canada's hospital and physician insurance arrangements are among the world's most egalitarian, and I can think of no specialist literature that supports Andrain's conclusion here.

Andrain's mistaken treatment of Canada is worth emphazing because it illustrates a key weakness of his approach to the comparative study of public policy, health, and social inequality. That weakness is empirical, the absence of a firm command of the literature on health-care systems. (His footnotes are extensive, but they come clustered at the end of paragraphs that do not link particular pieces of evidence with a specific argument. In that sense they reveal industry more than accuracy.) Canadians, we are told, "live "under a more decentralized system than the Americans" (p. 36). This characterization reflects the powerful role played by provincial governments in administering Canadian Medicare. The implication is that substantial variation exists in Canada because of that provincial administration of a program whose core features are actually enshrined in federal legislation. The fact is that Canadians—across the provinces—have in their hospital and medical insurance a substantially common policy. But this does not imply—unfortunately it does for Andrainthat the United States is more centralized. By most measures America's nonuniversal "system" has a smaller role for government of any type, whether federal or state, and reflects substantial decentralization of health-care policy and

practice. The constraints of Andrain's deductive approach not only produces mischaracterization in this particular instance, but also undermines the credibility of his entire enterprise. Andrain begins with the presumption that "social inequality influences public health policies and their outcomes on people's health" (p. ix). That presumption, rather than a careful analysis of health-care policy, dominates the subsequent interpretations.

Even more fundamentally, this book rests on a conflation of public health and health-care policy. For Andrain, "public health policies" encompass all government decision making about health-care funding and allocation. At times, the term expands to include environmental, worker-safety, and labor policies. So what is presented is the work of a political scientist most interested in social inequality and governance, where health policy broadly understood is a vehicle for describing what is worthy and unworthy public policy. Social democratic governments, Andrain's logic suggests, "should promote the equality of workers," while entrepreneurial systems are presumed to reflect "fragmented power structure[s]" where "low income people must rely on public health programs for their health care services, [programs] based on means-tests [that] usually supply niggardly benefits" (p. 15). This logic, however, makes incomprehensible either Canadian Medicare or American Medicare.

Understanding health-care systems and how they fit into their political setting is demanding. It requires analysis that is both theoretically illuminating and substantively accurate. Judged by these exacting standards, the Tuohy book is an extraordinary work, concentrating more on explaining policy developments than designing a framework for evaluating reform options. The other three books fall short of her exacting comparative standard, but in quite different ways. Freeman's contribution is that of synthesis, not theoretical advance. In the case of Moran's work, the analytic contribution promises more than it delivers, though the book's comparative portraiture will be useful to many teachers and students. In contrast, the Andrain book is, to this reviewer, an unhelpful contribution to the comparative politics of health care.

The comparative politics field, however, gains from this expansion of scholarship into health-care politics. Not only is health care central to the fiscal status of most governments—consuming an average of approximately 9% of the GNP among OECD nations—but the arrangements of care prompt intense political conflict. The varieties of those conflicts are substantial—from the moral disputes over cloning, abortion, and assisted suicide to the intense labor struggles over hospital closures and union organization, from the ideological struggles over rationing to the distributive struggles over research funds. Charting and explaining these differences more fully remain on the agenda for future works on health care and comparative politics.

Cuba Today and Tomorrow: Reinventing Socialism. By Max Azicri. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. 396p. \$55.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Sheryl Lutjens, Northern Arizona University

Max Azicri writes with acumen on the Cuban revolution in the very different decades of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and he offers an insightful assessment of the changes and challenges of the 1990s. His objective is to answer the puzzle of what he calls the "Cuban miracle": the island's surprising survival in the face of the deep economic crisis associated with the collapse of the socialist bloc and the ongoing "punitive" policies of the United States. Azicri is not the only scholar to attempt an interpretation of Cuba in the 1990s. Susan

Eckstein (Back from the Future: Cuba Under Castro, 1994), Ken Cole (Cuba: From Revoution to Development, 1998), Julia Jatar-Hausman (The Cuban Way: Capitalism, Communism, and Confrontation, 1999), and Robin Blackburn, ("Putting the Hammer Down on Cuba," New Left Review, July-August 2000 (4):5–36) are among those who have examined the nexus of Cuba's past and future in the post-Cold War context. An explosion of travel writing also demonstrates the intrigue of contemporary Cuba, as does the list of new detective thrillers—some of them bestsellers—with a Cuba setting. Azicri's book has a distinctive place in this literary landscape.

Cuba Today and Tomorrow is a careful, thoroughly documented, and wide-ranging analysis of landmark events in Cuba and its international relations in the 1990s. The factfilled journey begins with the collapse of the Soviet system and the disturbing social dislocations of adjustment in Cuba, including a resurgence of prostitution; moves on to the economic and political reforms that enabled survival and then recuperation; and explores Cuban-U.S. relations during the Clinton administration, Cuba's outreach to the reordered world, and Pope John Paul II's visit to the island in 1998. Azicri distinguishes between domestic and external "environments," and his "underlying theme" is "that Cuba is undergoing another radical social transformation under the revolution, different from what was experienced before" (p. 5). This radical transformation is "reinventing" Cuban socialism. A more away from the "total socialism" of previous Cuban strategy (and dreams) "is not a matter of choice" (p. 5), but other choices matter in the reinvention of socialism in Cuba.

Azicri catalogs the increasingly well-known reforms of the 1990s, all of which serve three objectives: "to resist and overcome economic collapse, to safeguard the socialist system, and to integrate the country into the world economy" (p. 304). Economic reforms reflect capitalist adjustments to Cuba's economic model, ranging from legalization of dollars and self-employment to new fiscal policies, the opening to foreign investment, and free trade zones. Obdurate problems of development-and socialist development-persist, but the policy achievements (and failures) of previous decades explain mid-decade recovery as well as the potential for successful reinsertion in the global economy (p. 129). Which paradigm Cuba will pursue as it leaves behind the "total socialist" model is not yet clear (p. 175), and Azicri advises an expansion of private entrepreneurial space as well as renewed state control of the social programs (p. 175) that temper the pernicious combination of scarcity, tourism, and new inequalities, in order to reaffirm the egalitarian commitments of Cuban socialism.

The political reforms of the 1990s are more modest, among them the revision in 1992 of 77 articles of the Cuban constitution, the acceptance of "believers" as party members, and the inauguration of direct elections for provincial and national representatives. Azicri explains that democratic centralism has been redefined (p. 114), and he warns that typical questions about representative democracy are not "germane to the organic structure of a socialist political system" (pp. 121–122). He identifies two crucial issues within the single-party system: expanding the base of the party and ensuring that its role is one of policymaking, not implementation (p. 122). "Sensible electoral and political reform would reinforce the system as a socialist democracy, while increasing its political legitimacy at home and especially abroad" (p. 128).

The dynamics of reform in Cuba are contextualized in

The dynamics of reform in Cuba are contextualized in Azicri's discussion of the complexities of finding allies and friends in the postsocialist world, of UN deliberations on human rights and U.S. wrongs, and of the Pope's historic visit. Tensions between Cuba and the United States figure

prominently in the external environment, including the unprecedented legislative aggression of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton sequel enacted after the two-planes incident in 1996. Although thorny issues of dissent, democracy, and development are indeed caught up in the interplay of Cuban exiles' actions, U.S. domestic politics, and official foreign policies that have harmed Cuba, Azicri advises that "most problems on the island should not be blamed on Washington" (p. 296) and "the reform process must continue uninterrupted regardless of hostile U.S. policies" (p. 307). Azicri recommends that the reinvention of socialism continue with a further opening to resurgent Catholic/Christian values. These would provide an ideal moral and ethical antidote for the "creeping materialism" associated with economic reform and would foster political reform by pluralizing official ideology and the ideational foundations of everyday life (pp. 304-5).

Azicri does not engage in debates about how to study Cuba and does not forge his argument in opposition to others' interpretations. He writes with regard to the nature and outcomes of reform: It "is in the detail more than at the macro level that the nature of things is defined" (p. 305). Indeed, much is quite familiar in the Cuba that Azicri presents, including his assumptions about Castro's leadership. "Power is personalized in him," and Cuba's political culture—a "civil (secular) religion"—is Castro's (p. 302). Less familiar, however, are the many claims for the achievements of the revolution—its strength and resilience, for example, or the "inventive policy making, grassroots ingenuity, and vital national character resources" that aided survival in the special period (pp. 19, 7). Azicri also focuses with uncommon respect on the refinements of Marxist theory in Cuba in the 1990s, and although he is ecumenical in the sources he uses and drives the study with detail rather than a framework, his conclusions advocate the dialectical method. In daring to take seriously the possibility of a better and still-socialist "tomorrow," Azicri problematizes Cuba and what we are willing to see and know about it. He may leave some important details out of focus, including Afrocubans and their religious orientations, but his contribution to renewed debate is timely, intelligent, and welcomed.

**Elections and Democratization in Ukraine.** By Sarah Birch. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 212p. \$65.00.

John T. Ishiyama, Truman State University

Elections and Democratization in Ukraine represents a valuable contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of party systems development in postcommunist politics. Unlike many volumes that rely on largely anecdotal evidence and narrative, this book is extremely well organized and systematic. There is a clear theoretical structure, and systematic evidence is employed to test specific hypotheses. Using some of the classic works on the development of party systems and relations between parties and voters to provide a theoretical framework, the author derives a set of hypotheses about characteristics that might affect voter choices over time.

The empirical scope of the study is quite impressive, covering elections from 1989 to 1998, including the referenda on the fate of the USSR and on Ukrainian independence, as well as two parliamentary and two Presidential contests. Data were collected from the Archives of the Supreme Rada of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, archives of individual regions in Ukraine and the Crimean Republic, and local newspapers. In addition, the book relies heavily on extensive fieldwork, particularly data derived from a March 1998 voter survey.

The author's central question is, What forms long-term electoral cleavages in postcommunist Ukraine? In answering this question she argues that, contrary to the currently popular claim that the Soviet Union left in its wake an atomized society with weak social divisions, the Ukrainian electorate has, from the advent of competitive elections, exhibited a relatively stable sociogeographic cleavage structure, a structure which can be explained by social cleavage patterns that developed in the Soviet period.

In particular, the author emphasizes the importance and persistence of regionalism in post-Soviet Ukrainian politics She divides the country into five regions—"West," Bank" and "Left Bank" of the Dniepr, "South," and "East." She convincingly demonstrates continuing, strong support for nationalist parties, candidates, and positions in the West. On the other hand, voters in the South and East have tended to back parties of the "left"—communists, socialists, and agrarian socialists. In addition to the regional cleavage, there have been continued (although slightly declining) ethnic bases for electoral support of the Ukrainian political parties. Indeed, she shows that, over the years, proponents of statehood and Ukrainian nationalism have drawn largely from ethnic Ukrainian supporters, whereas opponents are derived mainly from Russian speakers or are of Russian descent. Further, religious factors also help define political cleavages in post-Soviet Ukraine, where the highest level of nationalist support is found among Ukrainian-Rite Catholics and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox believers, whereas adherents of the Russian-affiliated churches (the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church) tend to support the Left parties. These ethnic, regional, and religious cleavages have remained remarkably stable over time, contributing to continued debate within Ukraine over the nature of the state. A somewhat less salient cleavage structure (although increasingly important) exists concerning the nature of the economic system, which manifested itself particularly after the parliamentary election

One of the more interesting findings of the book is that there appears to be little evidence to suggest that the underlying cleavage structure has molded itself closely to that of the party system. In other words, despite the existence of fairly stable patterns of sociopolitical cleavages, these are not matched by parties that represent these patterns of political cleavages. Indeed the parties in the Ukraine are largely conglomerations of shifting coalitions of personalities, without strong attachments to particular social constituencies (a pattern of development which is not unlike that in many other postcommunist states, such as Russia). In part, the author suggests that the evolution of the party system has been limited by the small number of contested elections held in Ukraine compared to other postcommunist states. In addition, there also exists a popular aversion to party politics, as such, and a tendency of many voters to vote on the basis of the nonparty attributes of candidates. This has led to the weakening of the ability of parties to match particular patterns of social and political cleavage.

This argument is consistent with the observations of many other scholars who have noted similar patterns of development in postcommunist Russian and Eastern European politics. Indeed, to a large extent, the pattern of Ukrainian party development is not very different from the patterns found elsewhere—that despite the existence of persistent voter cleavages, the party system does not match these cleavages. Perhaps one reason for this (a reason noted by other scholars but not emphasized by the author of this book) is that voting on nonparty attributes has something to do with the fact that the Ukrainian system (as in Russia) has maintained

presidentialism coupled with single-member district elections. Both of these institutional characteristics tend to favor individual personalities over party programs in electoral competition.

Another minor problem with this book is the absence of a discussion of party behavior in the Rada. This would have been useful in discerning whether distinct party orientations were emerging in parliament, providing an important corollary to the author's analysis of party development on the ground (among voters and candidates). Given that early parties in the West grew out of the legislatures as coalitions of political elites, we might expect a similar process of development in the Ukrainian parliament. Thus, some analysis of political elites within the Rada would have provided a more complete picture of party development in the Ukraine. This would have given greater insight into party system development (the focus of Chapter 7) than viewing party development only from the perspective of the "party on the ground."

Finally, the conclusion is very short and offered almost as an afterthought—there is some attempt to discuss the findings in light of larger theoretical issues, but not much more. What would have been of great benefit is a discussion of the findings in some comparative way—particularly in the conclusion. Indeed, given the substantial amount of work, among both East European and Western scholars, who find remarkably similar processes of the development of the electorate in countries as diverse as Russia and Lithuania, the Ukrainian case represents yet another example of the mismatch between party development on the ground (among voters) and party actors that comprise the postcommunist party systems.

Nonetheless, these rather minor omissions do not detract from the high quality of this book. In particular, this book will prove to be indispensable reading for scholars who seek to employ the systematic techniques derived from political science to understand better the realities of postcommunist politics.

## Cycling into Saigon: The Conservative Transition in Ontario. By David R. Cameron and Graham White. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000. 224p. \$75.00.

S. J. R. Noel, University of Western Ontario

One defining feature of a constitutional democracy is that the defeat of the governing party in a general election leads to a peaceful, orderly, and more or less routine change of government. Given the inherently combative nature of electoral politics and the potential for disruptive action by the losing side, this is no small achievement, and when it happens it is justly celebrated. Transitions in constitutional regimes, moreover, provide a unique if momentary window through which to view the mainsprings of political power. This volume is a study of the 1995 transition from New Democratic Party (NDP) to Progressive Conservative (PC) rule in the province of Ontario. It makes an important contribution to the sparse literature on transitions in Canada and in parliamentary regimes generally. For students of comparative government, it usefully complements recent work on presidential transitions in the United States, particularly Charles O. Jones, Passages to the Presidency: From Campaigning to Governing (1998).

In the United States, a change of president involves an elaborate and prolonged process that is controlled by partisans and results in thousands of offices changing hands. In Britain, a change of government is swift and unceremonious: In 1997, moving vans arrived to remove the personal effects of the defeated prime minister from Number 10 Downing Street less than twenty-four hours after the election. The

changeover of personnel, however, is limited to ministerial offices and ministers' political staff, and the mechanics of the transition are handled by career civil servants. In Ontario, as in the Canadian federal government in Ottawa, transitions are somewhat slower and more politicized than in Britain, although there is no turnover of unelected officials comparable to that which occurs in Washington following a change of president or in most states following a change of governor.

The broad theme of this study is that transitions can be done well or badly, and how they are done has a major effect on an incoming government's performance—specifically, its ability to carry out its agenda. It would have been helpful if, at the outset, the authors had more clearly identified and ranked their criteria for evaluating transitions. Instead, it gradually becomes clear from their analyses of three transitions (1985, 1990, and 1995)—the first characterized as a modest success, the second as an abject failure, and the third as a brilliant triumph—that they attach primary importance to the quality of the working relationship established during a transition between politicians and senior public servants, since a transition "centrally involves taking control of the public service" (p. 151). In order to achieve a productive working relationship, they conclude, it is essential for opposition political parties with a chance of winning power to engage in thorough, systematic, preelection transition planning, and incumbent governments must authorize preelection planning exercises by the bureaucracy so that it, too, will be properly prepared if the election results in a change of government.

In assessing transitions, the authors rely heavily on material gathered through unstructured interviews (presumably, since the questions asked are not revealed). These were conducted on a not-for-attribution basis. Among the principal subjects were nineteen civil servants (ten deputy ministers and nine others of an unspecified lesser seniority) and thirteen members of the two opposition parties' transition teams (eight PC and five Liberals). Only three politicians gave on-the-record interviews: two minor PC ministers and the former leader of the Liberal party, Lyn McLeod, who resigned following her party's electoral defeat. It is not reported how many potential respondents were approached but declined to be interviewed. The lack of any explicit attention to methods is a serious weakness in a study of this kind. Nevertheless, the authors' key findings are amply supported by insightful (if also anonymous) quotations that only could have come from well-informed insiders.

In sum, they find that Ontario's NDP government of 1990–95 was handicapped from the outset by a disastrous transition, whereas the PC government that took power in 1995 benefited from an outstandingly well-executed transition. One of the most appealing features of the book is the detailed, incisive, and eminently readable account of these events.

The failed transition of 1990 is clearly explained and appears in retrospect to have been virtually inevitable. The NDP never expected to win the election and did no serious transition planning; it was confused over its goals and priorities; and some of the newly appointed NDP ministers and political staff were left-wing ideologues who were deeply mistrustful of what they saw as the inherent conservatism of the public service. When the premier appointed his notoriously partisan chief political advisor to the post of Cabinet Secretary (the head of the Ontario public service) and parachuted a number of other partisans into the higher echelons of administration, career bureaucrats understandably interpreted these moves as signals that the NDP was intent upon politicizing the public service. In one of the most interesting sections of the book, "Politicizing the Bureaucracy" (pp. 44-9), the authors come to the surprising verdict that the bureaucrats' case against the NDP is not proven. Nevertheless, as their study demonstrates, the antagonistic atmosphere during the transition had a lasting and ultimately debilitating effect.

The 1995 transition, which is the main focus of the study, is dealt with in an equally illuminating and readable fashion. It is also an original contribution to scholarship in the field. The authors show how the PC, from the very beginning, approached the election with "a governing mindset." Transition planning was given a high priority by the party leader, Mike Harris, who as early as January 1994 put in place the core members of a capable and experienced team of transition advisors. Consequently, when the PC won an upset victory it came to power ready to govern. It helped that the party also had an unambiguous right-wing agenda that it was determined to push through, and that Harris took immediate steps to placate the bureaucracy. As the authors state, the PC transition team "viewed the incoming government's relationship with the public service as the most important element in taking power effectively, and it sought and received a good deal of advice from former public servants who knew the system and the senior players well" (p. 85).

The authors also give due credit to the Cabinet Secretary, whose appointment by the NDP had provoked outraged cries of "patronage" and "politicization." It is an ironic ending to the story (and to his career as a bureaucrat, since he was fired by the Conservatives immediately after the election) that he contributed greatly to the success of the PC takeover by doing a thoroughly professional, nonpartisan job of preparing the bureaucracy for a transition.

A concluding section, "Practical Lessons and Recommendations" (pp. 153-9), neatly sums up the authors' advice on transition planning. It is so wise and plainly stated that their book will almost certainly become essential reading for future transition teams in Canada, and it merits attention in other parliamentary democracies as well.

The book's obscure title is not explained until page 102. It derives from an arch joke by an unnamed PC transition planner. Upon entering the deserted Cabinet office the day after the election, he recalls, he had the eerie sense that bureaucrats were watching him from behind the potted plams. "I felt," he said, "like the first Viet Cong soldier cycling into Saigon after the Americans had left."

The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan. By Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998. 371p. \$47.00.

Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties. By Bruce J. Dickson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 276p. \$69.00

Steven Goldstein, Smith College

These books address the same issue, the democratization of Taiwan, but use diametrically opposed analytic frameworks. The results are individually unsatisfying but, paradoxically, complementary.

The key question for Bruce Dickson is whether ruling Leninist parties can evolve toward democracy without collapsing? Working from the assumption that both the Kuomintang Party (KMT), which dominated Taiwanese politics until 2000, and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the mainland are "Leninist" by nature, he presents a detailed comparison of their evolution. He concludes that the democratization of Taiwan suggests a positive response to this central question. There, a reforming leadership, aided by favorable international and domestic conditions, responded to growing societal demands by sharing political power. On the mainland, a party dominated by nonreformers who per-

ceived an unfriendly international and domestic environment choose to suppress societal demands. The recalcitrant record of the CCP leadership, Dickson concludes, offers little hope for its ability to adapt fully.

Linda Chao and Ramon Myers explicitly reject a depiction of the KMT as Leninist. They seek to explain the uniqueness of democratization in Taiwan when compared with other Chinese societies in the twentieth century. They present a typology of three different kinds of relationships between the political center and the rest of society: "a subordinated political center" and a political system that responds to society (democracy); an "uninhibited political center" and a society that "passively complies" with the political system; and an "inhibited center" that "does not control many of society's resources" and "gives more leeway to other loci of decision-making" (pp. 8–9).

Whereas Dickson argues that democratization was the result of KMT success in overcoming the limits of its Leninist origins, Chao and Myers view it as the result of the decision by the ruling elite to establish, from the outset, a non-Leninist basis for the party. Rather, they established an inhibited political center or limited democracy, characterized by a commitment to full democracy but without a timetable, and allowed limited oppositional activity. According to Chao and Myers, Taiwan followed a path from an inhibited to a subordinated political center, whereas the CCP has only recently evolved from an uninhibited to an inhibited political center. Thus, rather than ultimate failure to democratize on the mainland, the authors suggest that the two societies may gradually be converging as they follow similar developmental trajectories.

A review of this length does not permit a full assessment of the arguments. There is much that is useful and intellectually stimulating in both studies, especially the emphasis on the evolution of the electoral system on Taiwan. Yet, each fails in its response to the "big question" it poses because the premise from which each proceeds is flawed.

Although he recognizes differences between the CCP and the KMT and acknowledges that his comparison is inexact, Dickson does not make a convincing case for the KMT as a Leninist party. To be sure, at its founding in the 1920s and after its arrival on Taiwan, Leninist trappings were evident, but the KMT was a very selective and truncated version of a Leninist party. Specifically, what was largely absent was commitment to the central orthodoxy of Lenin's thought: the dogged insistence that the "consciousness" of the party/state should guide, not respond to, mass demands ("spontaneity"). Rather, the KMT was guided by a jumbled ideology (with a vague suggestion of political tutelege) and was an incomplete Leninist organization.

If one proceeds from this premise, it is not difficult to understand why democratization came to Taiwan and not the mainland. The ruling elite and their party organization in the People's Republic of China were/are fundamentally Leninist, whereas the system on Taiwan was Leninism *manqué*. In this light, Dickson's conclusion seems somewhat more modest than he suggests: Leninist states cannot adapt, and incomplete Leninist states can.

Similarly, the Chao and Myers depiction of the KMT as committed to democratization from the time of its arrival on Taiwan is very hard to accept. First, the authors never fully develop the content of the "Sunist ideology," which they claim was the basis of this commitment. Second, their use of Chiang Kai-shek's rhetoric to demonstrate a commitment to democracy is simply far-fetched. He made such statements even as his oppressive government decayed on the mainland. In the late 1940s and early 1950s this rhetoric became more intense as Chiang sought to gain American support for the idea of a "free China." More important, the

practice of "limited democracy" during his rule was certainly far more brutal and less accommodating than the sanitized version presented by Chao and Myers. One could equally—and perhaps more accurately—term this period limited autocracy.

These two very different books complement each other. Myers and Chao remind us that the KMT was always a divided party under foreign pressure and institutionally weak in all but its coercive capacities. It was certainly not as Leninist as the CCP. Yet, elements of Leninism were there, as Dickson suggests. Moreover, Dickson's identification of the three elements that contributed, over time, to Taiwan's democratization, when stripped of their Leninist assumptions and comparisons with the CCP, provides a far more sophisticated conceptualization of the process presented in great historical detail by Chao and Myers, but placed by them in the less useful paradigm of limited democracy.

## Theories of Comparative Political Economy: New Paradigms. By Ronald H. Chilcote. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000. 316p. \$28.00 paper.

James Petras, State University of New York at Binghamton

Ronald Chilcote is a leading radical political economist, and this book is a fine illustration of his well-earned reputation. It is a comprehensive survey of most of the major writers and themes that have dominated the literature on liberal and radical political economy, organized historically and by schools of thought around key concepts: class, state, imperialism, and transitions. The core of the book focuses on these four conceptual areas.

In the chapter on transitions, Chilcote outlines the major shifts—from feudalism to capitalism and from capitalism to socialism. The scholarly debate ranges from Paul Sweezy's notion that feudalism was largely a result of the emergence of a merchant class engaged in international trade; to Maurice Dobb's theory that the transition was the result of internal class conversions; to Robert Brenner's argument for the centrality of peasant-based class struggle. The diverse explanations posed by Chilcote highlight the complex reality of transitions and call into question the simplistic and schematic Rostovian stages of growth and Wallersteinian so-called world system approaches.

Chilcote's own approach to political economy is most clearly revealed in his discussion of class analysis perspectives. He recognizes the limitations of "class reductionist" approaches but argues very persuasively for examining the interface of class structure, productive processes, and state institutions in order to understand long-term, large-scale change. An additional benefit is the annotated bibliography at the end of the chapter, which includes many of the major authors in the debate.

In the chapter on the state, Chilcote suspends his class categories and refers to the liberal state and the progressive state. He returns (p. 42) to class categories in assessing the dichotomy, but without elaborating on the distinction between regime and state—a problem endemic among many theorists. Chilcote's summary of theorizing by Philippe C. Schmitter and Bob Jessop would have benefited from the extensive critical literature that highlights the many pitfalls of using the concept of corporatism to describe fascist, social-democratic, and nationalist-populist regimes.

The discussion of neoliberal views on the state accurately describes ideological principles (favoring a minimalist state) but does not analyze neoliberalism's powerful statist thrust: the state role in subsidizing capital, bailing out banks, intervening in civil society to limit the role of labor, and so on.

Neoliberal statism is most clearly a very current perspective and requires full exposition.

Chilcote provides a wide-ranging discussion and classification of the rich and sophisticated debates on the state by Marxist scholars. He evaluates and compares the Marxist, institutional, instrumental, regulation, and feminist perspectives. Surprisingly, there is no examination of the imperial state or of what some writers call the globalized state, although these topics are at the cutting edge of debate in the new millennium. The imperial state plays a major role in the world market by establishing new trading rules for expanding the influence of its multinational corporations and by directing international financial institutions to bail out crisis-ridden regimes and impose structural adjustments that facilitate privatization and buyout by Euro-American investors.

Chilcote's exposition of the capitalist-democracy debate provides excellent background on the historical and theoretical disputes between liberals and Marxists. Once again, however, a clear distinction between regime and state would help explain the apparently contradictory position of U.S. policymakers toward democracy in Latin America. In transition from military rule to democracy, the United States supports regime changes when the apparatus remains intact, but it opposes democratic changes when the apparatus is dismantled and replaced by a revolutionary state. The pertinent question is not whether capitalism opposes democracy but whether the transition to democracy entails changes in property relations.

The chapter on theories of imperialism, as distinct from the imperial state, is probably the strongest in the book. Chilcote provides a highly informative comparative-historical discussion of imperialism from Marx, to Schumpter, to those he describes as the contemporary analysts of imperialism, including Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy, Harry Magdoff, and Eric Hobsbawm. Various schools have focused on issues of unequal trade, foreign investment, and/or the role of multinational corporations, whereas newer schools address the problem of the internationalization of capital (p. 235). Mention is made of globalization theory, but the burgeoning literature in favor of an interdependent world in which stateless corporations govern through international financial institutions is largely ignored. Although globalization theory is the hegemonic perspective, it does not lack for critics, and certainly its claims to have eclipsed the imperial paradigm are short on data and weak in accounting for the unipolar world that emerged after the collapse of the U.S.S.R. This highly informative chapter would have benefited from the inclusion of globalization theory.

The survey of debates and theories and the classification of schools of thought on the major historical changes in the nineteenth and twentieth century provide a useful starting point for developing new theories and approaches to the problem of imperialism. Moving from theory to current policies and structures of the international political economy, one discovers an enormous gap between abstraction and practice. For example, neoliberal or free-market doctrines circulate widely and are formally embraced by Washington and Brussels, but the actions of these imperialist powers more closely resemble mercantilist than genuinely liberal policies. Although the United States demands from its Latin American trading partners the elimination of trade and investment barriers, it upholds and enforces quotas on agricultural commodities, textiles, steel, and a host of others. In addition, it applies antidumping regulations in a very loose and haphazard manner, which leads many countries to suspect that these are a "nontraditional" form of protectionism.

Massive state subsidies to U.S. agriculture and technology (\$30 billion in the case of agriculture) allow U.S. multinationals and exporters to capture markets, but the U.S. government

pressures the International Monetary Fund to enforce budget cuts in Latin America directed at similar subsidies. The Bush administration's Free Trade Area of the Americas Treaty would consolidate U.S. economic dominance in the hemisphere based on the mercantilist relations currently in place. Neither Samir Amin's Accumulation on a World Scale (1974) nor Immanuel Wallerstein's world system approach provide any empirical or conceptual guidance in understanding the particular forms, policies, or effects of neomercantilistic imperialism. I am suggesting that Chilcote's book would have benefited from testing the various theories of international political economy with some contemporary case studies in order to allow readers to evaluate the explanatory power of the competing theories.

This book is a much needed antidote to conventional political economists who ignore the issues of imperialism, social class, and large-scale, long-term changes. When the next major U.S. military intervention takes place, I hope that the major professional journals will not ignore the imperialism hypothesis, as was the case during the U.S.-Indochina conflict. By broadening our analytical vision and introducing key concepts, Chilcote does a great service to the study of comparative political economy.

Israel and the Politics of Jewish Identity: The Secular Religious Impasse. By Asher Cohen and Bernard Susser. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 167p. \$36.00.

The Politics of Religion and the Religion of Politics: Looking at Israel. By Ira Sharkansky. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000. 161p. \$40.00.

Yael Yishai, University of Haifa

Religion has played a prominent role in Israel's history. The country was founded in 1948 with a declaration of being a Jewish state, not only a state for the Jews. This definition has been the source of two thorny problems. The first involves the relations between state and religion, the second the relationship between two communities, namely, the secular majority and the religious minority. The two books under review tackle these problems in a fascinating manner. They complement each other by presenting different aspects of the intricate religious issue in Israel. They also contradict each other by offering conflicting conclusions based on historical and contemporary analysis.

Sharkansky focuses on the relationship between religion and politics. His point of departure is comparative. Judaism is not unique, and politics in Israel is not exceptional. There are, according to his thesis, rules that govern the relationship between the two domains. His major argument is that religion and politics interpenetrate and actually resemble each other, having much in common. Neither can claim to have a monopoly of virtue or to be free of evil. Both religion and politics attract majorities, most of whose members remain loyal across time; both have their mainstream and their extreme elements. Leaders in both spheres tend to mix the promotion of spiritual and symbolic goals along with material payoffs for the faithful. Both are creative, inventing new doctrines and rituals, despite claims about absolute values; both attempt to distinguish themselves from their previous allies and current antagonists. In both religion and politics ambiguity is part of success and failure. The essence of the similarities lies in the policy arena: Religious issues are often the subject of political dispute. Religious demands, however, are not fully met because they come up against one another and because they encounter secular or antireligious opposition. The result is generally a stand-off in which neither religious nor antireligious activists can overcome the other.

This thesis is widely demonstrated by Israel, with its long history of a "thick" mixture of politics and religion. In a breathtaking journey through Jewish history and contemporary politics, Sharkansky demonstrates his thesis and shows that dispute over religious issues is a chronic phenomenon. At stake are problems of conversion, of personal matters, of observing Sabbath and holidays, and of the composition of religious institutions. Religious parties, described in detail in the book, exert demands that, if yielded to, may turn Israel into a halachic state, governed by religious law. This, however, has not been the case. Although religious issues are often on the political agenda, neither religious nor secular groups can overcome the other. The agenda of both proponents and opponents of religion is not translated into public policy.

According to Sharkansky, the reasons for this failure are grounded both in the universal attributes of the commonalties between politics and religion, on the one hand, and in the particular characteristics of the Israeli scene, on the other. The following reasons are prominent. First, although religious groups unite in seeking to advance their interests, they also compete with one another. Second, Israel as a state is so imbued with religious values that it is difficult to define the labels "religious" and "secular." Not only does a substantial share of the population consider itself "traditional," but also daily practices of individual secular Israelis are embedded in religious symbols, constituting part and parcel of the national culture. Third, the fact that no party has ever won a majority in the Knesset elections has served to mitigate the conflict between the secular and the religious. Fourth, surrounded by hostility, Israel is forced to maintain a degree of unity in order to survive. Politicians' pursuit of consensus and conflict minimization also contributes to easing the tensions. The result is that neither religion nor politics has gained total victory or encountered total failure.

Sharkansky's book makes an important contribution to understanding both the religion-politics nexus and the problems of religion in Israeli politics. The richness of data and the abundance of issues covered are overwhelming. In a brilliant exploration across time the author does not skirt any religious issue raised on the public agenda in Israel, be it trivial or major. The fit between the theory, captivating in its originality, and the case study is impressive. This is a thorough, innovative, and important work.

Cohen and Susser tackle the problem of religion in Israel from a different angle, focusing on the relationships between the two camps, the secular and the religious. Their major thesis contradicts that of Sharkansky. The picture they paint is not at all optimistic. In fact, they lament the decline of consociationalism in Israeli politics, implying that the secularreligious cleavage is in a new and unprecedented perilous phase. Not only are past animosities part of present realities, but also important changes have taken place in the character, context, and personal aspects of the religious-secular confrontation. In the authors' view, something qualitatively different has occurred in recent years, and there is a mounting potential for destructive crises along the religious-secular divide. "The language of consociational reciprocity, compromise, and mutual adjustment is quickly giving way to strident talk of total victory" (p. 139).

After elaborating the principles of consociationalism and the conditions that favor its emergence, Cohen and Susser adapt their conceptual framework to the Israeli scene by emphasizing the moderating and compromising effect of these arrangements, particularly in a society riven by deep cleavages. They then delve into Israel history, demonstrating the efficiency of consociational arrangements in the first

generation, from the state's independence to the change of power in 1977. Admittedly, even in that peaceful period there were thorny and highly disputed problems. The authors give a detailed account of these, including the drafting of the constitution, military service of religious students and women, observance of Sabbath and holidays, religious education, and the formidable problem of who is a Jew. These problems were dealt with in the past in line with the consociational spirit, namely, by mutual adjustments and accommodation.

From this point onward Cohen and Susser differ with Sharkansky. They maintain that the second generation witnessed an enhanced power of radicals, ideological transformations both in the secular and the religious camps, and most important, a growing correspondence between Jewish identity and the territorial issue; all of these have eroded consociationalism in Israel. The causes of breakdown are grounded in the political, ideological, and social domains. Succinctly put, the transition from a dominant-party system to a balanced two-bloc system with the growing empowerment of the religious, especially the *Haredi* parties, is the first reason. These parties are no longer minor groups with limited assets but pivotal parties able to determine the composition of the ruling coalition. Changes have occurred also within the religious camp, and there is growing dominance of the Haredi over the national religious party. The dramatic convergence of religiosity with militant views regarding the future borders of Israel has produced overlapping cleavages in Israel's public life. Ideology, according to these authors, has become more prominent.

Contrary to Sharkansky, Cohen and Susser believe that "religious values are understood to be absolute, and the tendency to present them in ultimative fashion is, therefore, only to be anticipated" (p. 41). Radicalization of demands, backed by deepening social rifts and by effective use of the political constellation, is the main reason for the crumbling of the consociational arrangements that have kept the religioussecular rift at bay. The broadening of judicial intervention in politics and the constitutional revolution have added fuel to the flames, making the two camps drift apart. In addition, demographic, cultural, and religious transformations have put consociationalism under pressure. Among the most noticeable are the growing influence of the media, the growing insistence on "good government," and the immigration of many non-Jews. Cohen and Susser have written an excellent book. well organized and highly systematic. They present their argument clearly and concisely and provide ample evidence to prove their point.

The two books have some omissions. Sharkansky overlooks the radicalization tendencies in the religious-secular rift. Assuming that religion and politics are alike does not mean that they cannot clash. Although, as he suggests, both invoke compromise, the process has its drawbacks and shortcomings. By presenting the grand design of the religious-politics nexus, he pays too little attention to undercurrents.

Cohen and Susser do the opposite: They rely on contemporary events to explain processes of a much broader scope. A good example is their reference to the peace process (p. 72), which has been nipped in the bud. Both books disregard civil society, whose activity has both invigorated the consensual spirit and fueled the flame of extremism. Cohen and Susser refer in passing to "grassroots initiatives that mobilize support across communal lines, [and] detour the normal political leadership" (p. 87), but activity appears to be flourishing. A plethora of movements and associations are active on the scene, which is no longer monopolized by political parties and elites.

Despite these slight oversights the two books are mandatory reading for anyone interested in Israeli society, which ex-

cellently exemplifies the relationship between the two leading forces in human history, politics and religion.

Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia. By Timothy J. Colton. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 324p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia. Robert G. Moser. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001. 183p. \$19.95.

Sarah Oates, University of Glasgow

As the Soviet regime recedes farther into the past, two types of scholars are now working hard to put the post-Soviet experience in comparative context. Some are those who built their careers on a study of the Soviet Union and have now significantly expanded on their work, while another group comprises scholars of the post-Soviet regime who completed their dissertations after the collapse of the Communist regime. These two books represent some of the best of both of these groups, and both are important in their scope in bringing Russian politics into one of the most important fields in politics, namely, that of elections, parties, and voters.

Timothy Colton's latest work on the former Soviet Union, Transitional Citizens: Voters and What Influences Them in the New Russia, breaks ground into new and exciting territory. He imports models of voting behavior, drawn mostly from the U.S. literature, into a postcommunist country. After a careful literature review and construction of a model, Colton applies the model to Russian voting behavior, using a series of three national surveys conducted in 1995 and 1996. The results of this methodical and groundbreaking work are engaging and fascinating and represent a major step forward in what social scientists can reap from studies of postcommunist states. The premise of Colton's book is that study of postcommunist politics has not always been informed by comparative theory and most work on voting behavior in Russia has not used a fully cross-national model.

Colton orders his research into several themes, including an examination of the socioeconomic determinants of vote choice; the development of partisan allegiances to parties and candidates; the impact of attitudes on vote choice; and what role personality, retrospection, and perspective evaluations play in elections. Throughout, he compares his results from the parliamentary elections to that of the presidential elections. Colton finds more similarities than differences in Russian voting behavior when comparing it with results in the West. For example, it is clear that socioeconomic characteristics such as age, rurality, and education have affected vote choice, particularly for the well-established Communist Party of the Russian Federation. In addition, there is compelling evidence for nascent partisan identification. Issues appear to have an impact on vote choice, as do evaluations of parties and candidates as well as evaluations of their past and future performance.

The book by Colton, who has written extensively on the Soviet Union and Russia, is a wealth of information for those who study Russian voting behavior, dealing with issues ranging from contact from campaign workers to the evaluation of parties on particular issues. The panel design of the survey allows Colton to make a convincing case of the stability of opinion on many issues. Colton's experience in studying Russia and his earlier work on public opinion and voting behavior are clear in the careful question design for the survey. For example, Colton makes a distinction among weak, moderate, and strong partisan identification, which is particularly important

in understanding the origins and strength of possible party identification in a postcommunist state. In his study of the impact of attitudes about the economy, he is careful to clarify that Russians are not dealing with relatively small issues of policy but are coping with global change in their polity.

Colton deals deftly and well with the bewildering range of Russian political parties, election laws, and candidates, yet the book raises several points that offer scope for further research. For example, his survey data indicated that those who were well educated and more attuned to politics were more likely to be influenced by the media in elections. This raises two interesting questions. Although Colton sees this as positive, it also suggests that the media is immensely powerful if it has more influence among the most politically sophisticated. In addition, the book does not differentiate between the highly polarized state and commercial television broadcasts. Colton notes that there is a lack of trust in television; further studies have found that there is a high level of trust in the prostate, state-run media but not in the commercial media, which championed the case of some contenders for power in the 1995 elections. Meanwhile, he does see media as particularly important in Russia (p. 60): "The question of media impact is more piquant in protodemocratic Russia than in a settled democracy because of the disproportionate leverage the state, and business interests affiliated with it, have over mass communications."

In Unexpected Outcomes: Electoral Systems, Political Parties, and Representation in Russia, Robert Moser uses Russia as a test case for hypotheses about the impact of electoral systems on party formation. Moser eloquently argues that Russia shouldn't be disregarded because the outcomes of electoral design were different from those predicted by theory. Rather, the "conclusion is simple, yet surprisingly absent from much of the neo-institutionalist research: context matters" (p. 4). Thus Moser makes a careful study of the Russian case to provide convincing evidence for his theory. Yet his argument is wider than a study of Russia or even the role of institutions in the formulation of democracy in postcommunist states. As he writes, it is "better to integrate the study of less developed democracies into comparative politics and develop hypotheses that describe and explain patterns of behavior found in these contexts" (p. 5). In this attitude, Moser joins many of the "new wave" of scholars of Russian politics in seeing the importance of integrating the Russian case into general comparative politics.

Why does Russia provide this laboratory? The irony is that Russia's electoral system is informed by political science research (as it now is a subject of the same). Faced with the need to create a party system in a matter of months after the revolt of parliamentarians in 1993, Russia's political advisers chose to implement a mixed electoral system for the 1993 parliamentary elections. Half of the 450 members of the lower house (the Duma) would be elected through a national party-list contest and half would be picked through first-pastthe-post races in 225 single-member districts (SMD) across Russia. Moser considered this institutional design a perfect opportunity to study the impact of different electoral systems on party formation (and, to a lesser degree, on voting behavior). However, he is careful throughout the book to note that the Russian context also will inform the nature of the political "game." Moser does find several elements to the formation of Russian political parties that he considers somewhat unique, Although he feels that other third-wave democracies aside from Russia have a high electoral volatility, weak party identification, and little party organization (p. 31), what is distinct in Russia is the large number of independent candidatess who contest and win elections. But rather than perceiving this as an argument for making Russia sui generis, he writes, "Given that weak party institutionalization is a common feature of third-wave democracies, the experience of the Russian case may have broader implications for many new democracies."

In addition, Russia's party-list system defies the expectations of certain classic political theories, namely, Duverger's law and the Downsian spatial analysis of party preference. Rather than dismissing Russian politicians or voters as irrational or immature, however, Moser makes a careful analysis of possible rational preferences for an explosion of political parties by the 1995 elections. He finds that "party proliferation in the PR tier seems in part to be one of hidden rationality caused by the many competing incentives of the mixed electoral system" (p. 39) like nested games. Moser also argues that the proliferation of candidates in the SMD tier was caused by the weakly institutionalized party system. In Chapter 6, Moser tackles the puzzle of why Russian voters have twice elected a fairly reactionary Duma and a relatively reformist president a few months later. Moser argues that it is not irrational or even particularly unformed voting preferences; rather, the differing outcomes are the result of the institutional design of the electoral system. Moser uses an analysis of voting patterns for broad ideological camps to show that there was relatively little change from the Duma elections of 1995 to Yeltsin's election in 1996; what changed "were the rules of game that structured the vote choice and translated the vote into political power" (p. 97).

However, in this analysis some of the context does in fact matter, in that it is difficult to categorize particular party groupings, as Russian parties are often based less on ideology than they are on personalities or the needs of particular bureaucrats. Moser posits that the key factor in Yeltsin's surprising reelection in 1996 was the consolidation of reformist and centrist voters behind a single candidate. His arguments on the importance of ideology and the presence of rational voting behavior should, however, have taken more into account some of the distortions of the 1996 presidential campaign. Notably, Yeltsin enjoyed full control of the primary state and commercial television channel, as well as virtually unlimited access to funds and political "pork" as both a carrot and a stick for voters. While it is worthwhile to assess and measure voter preferences, it could be argued that there needs to be some additional compensation for the particularly unfair elements in the Russian political system, namely, the domination of the media, public funding, and public office by some political parties. These distortions have become more important over time, particularly in the most recent Russian elections (not covered in this book).

Both Colton and Moser's books provide an important contribution to the understanding of voting behavior and party formation in Russia. More importantly, they use comparative theory to inform the discussion about Russia and, in turn, illuminate points about this theory in general. Russia is a fascinating laboratory for political scientists, as parties develop in a sort of "Big Bang" rather than at the evolutionary pace that they did in much of the West. As such, it is possible to observe and measure phenomena such as the development of partisan identification and the relative effect of party-list structure on party formation in an accelerated manner.

Both Colton and Moser are guardedly optimistic about the development of democratizing patterns in voting behavior and party organization along Westernized lines. There is worrying evidence, however, that any movement toward a Westernized, liberal party system in Russia has stopped. As both of these books are based on studies of elections in 1996 or earlier, it was impossible to include in-depth analysis of the 1999 and 2000 elections in the volumes. Preliminary studies indicate that while studies of voting behavior and

party organization are still relevant, the ability of powerful state bureaucrats to use ephemeral political parties and the media to manipulate electoral results has increased markedly. Realistically, future studies of elections in Russia must now take into account theories of propaganda and authoritarian "staging" of elections that are more reminiscent of the former Soviet Union than holding promise for a democratic Russia. However, the way in which Colton and Moser have integrated the study of Russia into the larger questions of the discipline remains an example for other scholars to follow.

East Asian Democratization: Impact of Globalization, Culture, and Economy. By Robert W. Compton, Jr. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2000 224p. \$68.00.

Cal Clark, Auburn University

Studies of Asian politics tend to follow one of two divergent analytic strategies. Area specialists emphasize the importance of Asian culture in shaping the politics and economics of those nations, whereas comparative theorists apply broader models of political behavior to the Asian context. Robert Compton seeks to integrate these two traditions, which generally speak past one another, by proposing a promising (albeit somewhat limited) model of the dynamics of democratization in East and Southeast Asia. The model explicitly incorporates the distinctive cultures of these nations as the central causal factor explaining the process of democratization and the characteristics of the democratic polities that have emerged in the region. Furthermore, in terms of normative questions, Compton uses this analysis to critique both sides in the current debate between advocates of democracy and critics who claim that democracy is incompatible with "Asian values." Thus, East Asian Democratization should be of interest to a wide variety of scholars concerned with Asian politics or with theories of democratization.

Compton's theoretical analysis is developed from a central empirical finding that party systems in the democracies of East and Southeast Asia are systematically different from those in the industrial societies in Europe, North America, and Oceania. In particular, the analysis focuses upon "competitiveness" and is based on an index that has two distinct components: (1) the fractionalization of the system as measured by the partisan dispersion of seats in the national parliament and (2) the variety in the system as measured by the difference in the proportions of seats controlled by parties representing the "power elite" of business, the military, and the bureaucracy and by those representing other, nonelite sectors of society. Statistical analysis demonstrates that the party systems in Asian democracies are considerably less competitive than in other industrialized nations. Moreover, increasing levels of industrialization and urbanization do not bring greater party competitiveness in Asia, thereby controlling (at least crudely) for their status as late developers.

One easily discernible explanation for these findings is that the emphasis in Asian cultures on respect for authority and community solidarity, as opposed to the assumedly paramount Western values of individual freedom and autonomy, shape political parties that differ significantly from their Western counterparts. Compton's theoretical model, however, goes far beyond such a simplistic static comparison. Instead (and almost certainly appropriately so for cultural analysis), the author takes a much longer historical perspective and views political development in these nations as an integral consequence of their economic development strategy. During the postwar era, first capitalist East Asia and then Southeast Asia cast their fates to the winds of the international marketplace. Their development strategies,

however, were far different from Anglo-American laissezfaire practice and reflected instead a "Confucian" or communitarian capitalism led by developmental states that were generally authoritarian. The stupendous success of exportled Confucian capitalism ultimately challenged these political regimes by expanding the educated middle classes, who pushed for political reform. The governmental elites, in turn, eventually responded with a "top-down" form of democratization that differed significantly from Western democracy.

In the developmental state model, as adumbrated by Compton, Asian governments, especially the economic and financial bureaucracies, created their developmental states by melding modern and traditional components in a very creative manner. In the economic realm, they were quite modern as they created internationally competitive industries. They essentially turned to the traditional culture, however, for their political legitimacy, which was based on a combination of three sources in Asian cultural values: (1) respect for authority and for government officials, who are seen as a "guardian class"; (2) patron-client relationships that are part of paternalistic authority patterns; and (3) a greater concern for community and family than for the individual.

The political cultures in East and Southeast Asia were largely constructed by the elites in these developmental states—bureaucrats, the military, corporate leaders, and (where elections were permitted) electoral politicians. Compton, to sum up, conceptualizes the economic and political development of Asian democracies as going through a series of stages defined by the relative power of these four elite segments. He then applies the model to three case studies—Japan, South Korea, and Thailand. The first two, despite significant differences in the ability of their developmental states to gain popular legitimacy, fit the model quite well. The fit is not quite so good for Thailand, but the hypothesized developmental stages can be discerned there, too.

This analysis also has implications regarding the quality of Asian democracy. Elites success in leading economic development and the nature of the prevailing political culture combined to limit participation in the Asian democracies that did evolve, in particular by continuing the near exclusion of labor, students, women's groups, and environmentalists from positions of influence. In addition, the emergence of strong parties was prevented by several factors, including the strength of government bureaucracies, the prevalence of patron-client ties, and the marginalization (even after democratization) of groups outside the traditional power elite. Consequently, Compton challenges both sides in the democracy versus Asian values debate. On the one hand, the assertion of conventional modernization theory that Western-inspired capitalism and democracy are spreading around the world is clearly invalid; rather, economic and political development in Asia constitutes modernization without westernization. On the other hand, the fusion of economic and political elites based on Asian values creates problems as well. Corporate leaders have used economic power to subvert democracy, and the pursuit of economic gain by politicians delegitimizes the

Overall, Compton's model is a valuable heuristic tool that should make us think more deeply about important aspects of the political economies in East and Southeast Asia. It needs to be extended in several important regards, however. First, the book provides very little direct description and analysis of democratic politics in the region. For example, the scores of the individual countries on the two components of the party competitiveness index are not given; and the case studies of South Korea and Thailand overwhelmingly treat the predemocratic era. Second, as Compton's treatment of Thailand suggests, the nature of the state and its relationship

to the economy vary widely in the region. Third, this also suggests that a much more nuanced use of Asian culture would be valuable. For example, Lucian Pye's Asian Power and Politics (1985) presents a typology of political cultures that appears well suited for differentiating the political and economic structures in the region.

Discordant Comrades: Identities and Loyalties on the South African Left. By Allison Drew. Aldershot, Hampshire: Ashgate, 2000. 282p. \$74.95

Courtney Jung, New School University

Drawing on a wealth of new information made available by the opening of the Comintern archives, Drew sheds the light of hindsight on the relationship between the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) and, in turn, the Soviet Comintern, the South African liberation movement, and the white and black trade union movements in the first half of the twentieth century. This rich book makes a unique contribution to our understanding of ties between the Comintern and its satellite parties as well as the early history of the South African antiapartheid movement. There are only two other major books on this period of party history, and both are memoirs of party members who try to establish a particular version of the record. Drew contests the teleology of their accounts of communist party history and instead weaves a contingent narrative that identifies major turning points that narrowed the possibility for a radical reorientation of the party (p. 281). It was not inevitable that the party would split and finally dissolve in the way it did-other outcomes were possible, almost until the end. That they were not taken was the layered result of personal and ideological rivalries and party alliances that made socialism, and socialists, perpetually weak and vulnerable in the context of South African politics.

Drew argues that much of the internal weakness of the CPSA derived from its relationship with the Comintern. South African communists were always vulnerable to external influence, in part because most communists were recent immigrants from Europe with connections to European parties, and in part because South Africa had no socialist tradition of its own. As a result, the Comintern was exceptionally influential in South Africa, particularly in the late 1920s, and the CPSA had difficulty maintaining a steady party line and leadership because the Comintern vacillated among positions almost year by year. As ideological stances fell out of favor, so did the leaders most closely associated with them. Internal rivalries and splits were raised to the level of doctrinal challenges as conflicting sides turned to Moscow to confirm, and legitimate, their position. In a local reflection of the international division, those who fell out of favor were called Trotskyists, regardless of their ideological views. The split between (Stalinist) communists and Trotskyists was mapped onto racial politics in South Africa, as each side aligned with different black opposition groups.

Although the Comintern played such an important role in guiding the party, its ideological directives had little to say about the main problems facing South African communists: how to organize across racial lines when local conditions (racism as well as legal constraints) precluded such organization, and whether African nationalist organizations were legitimate engines of social change. Before 1924, the CPSA focused most of its recruiting efforts on organizing white labor. As the most skilled and stable sector of the working class, whites were expected by some within the party to be the vanguard of an urban proletariat. White workers consistently saw their interests as separate from and even conflicting with

those of black workers, however, and refused to align across racial lines to build a unified working class. The CPSA finally turned its attention to black workers in 1924, demonstrating some ability to respond to local conditions and to the growing significance of black labor. In the 1930s and 1940s, party members such as Ray Simons played a crucial role in building a black trade union movement through the painstaking work of organizing on the factory floor. That movement is one of the lasting legacies of the early CPSA.

What stands out most is precisely how small and isolated the CPSA was, considering the important role it later played in South African opposition politics through its influence on the liberation movements. At its peak in 1929, the CPSA had only 3,000 members. By the time it was banned through the Suppression of Communism Act in 1950, it had fewer than 2,000. Yet, many of the positions and rhetorical flourishes made familiar through African National Congress (ANC) discourse turn out to be early socialist positions—from which the much more conservative ANC quickly distanced itself.

The relationship between the South African communists and other oppositional organizations, such as the All African Congress, the anti-Coloured Affairs Department, the ANC, and the Non-European Union Movement, was complicated by "the race question," which confounded CPSA ideologues and strategists for most of the century. How to handle race in the effort to forge a class struggle was a central problem for South African communists and was a decisive, and indeed divisive, problem between the CPSA and the Comintern. In 1929 Sidney Bunting, an influential South African communist leader, established the League of African Rights. It was meant to be a broadly based organization that included strands of democratic and national liberation as well as communist ideology. The league was growing quickly, particularly in comparison to the tiny ANC, when the Comintern ordered it disbanded.

Drew speculates that if the League of African Rights had survived, it could have offered the basis of a working class or social democratic challenge to the ANC (p. 278) Instead, the CPSA pursued a policy of tactical alliance with the ANC through the 1940s, even as both groups were careful to maintain an independent identity. The ANC considered the CPSA too radical, and the CPSA feared being tainted by ANC nationalism. When the CPSA was banned in 1950, party leaders unilaterally elected to disband completely, to the surprise of many members. The party was reconstituted underground three years later, but it was almost completely subverted within the ANC. Drew ends her account of the South African Left in 1950, perhaps because, "in the era of apartheid and the Cold War, South African socialism subordinated itself to nationalism" (p. 280).

This narrowly constraining perspective unnecessarily pits nationalism and Left as opposing paradigms. In the case of South Africa, as in many others, nationalism was harnessed to the project of the Left after 1953. For example, the 1955 ANC Freedom Charter included such provisions as "the land belongs to all who work on it." The true legacy of the CPSA was its influence on the ANC, from within, and later also on the United Democratic Front. In the final decade of apartheid, the state was challenged by mass-based people power anchored in the black trade union movement. This also was the Left, speaking simultaneously in the voice of race and class and confounding the oppositions that long structured South African intellectual and academic discourse—is it race or class conflict? It was both, and leftist opposition expanded to occupy all the spaces of domination and marginalization. Today, the CPSA is one of very few communist parties in power anywhere in the world, as part of the Tripartite Alliance with the ANC and Congress of South African Trade Unions. Yet, the alliance with the trade unions and the liberation movement has hardly strengthened the hand of the Left. In the postapartheid era, it has finally subordinated itself, not to nationalism but to governance and neoliberalism.

Women, Religion, and Social Change in Brazil's Popular Church. By Carol Ann Drogus. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997. 226p. \$26.00.

Mala Htun, New School University

Historically, the Roman Catholic Church is seen as an obstacle to progressive social and political change in Latin America. Beginning in the 1960s, however, the Second Vatican Council and the growth of liberation theology prompted doctrinal and institutional changes in the church in Brazil and several other countries. From an ally of the conservative oligarchy and establishment, the church turned into an engine of mobilization for grassroots movements and a focal point for popular opposition to authoritarian governments. One of the more significant and widely researched changes in the "popular church" was the establishment of thousands of ecclesiastical base communities (CEBs) among the poor. The fact that the majority of CEB participants are women has received far less attention.

In this well-researched and engaging book, Carol Ann Drogus analyzes women's participation in the CEBs of Brazil's popular church with the intention of addressing two theoretical concerns. The first is the extent to which gender acts as a filter for religious experience and interpretation of liberation theology. Can the failure of CEBs to make a more radical contribution to Brazilian politics be attributable to the fact that they are comprised largely of women? The second question focuses on how women's participation in the popular church has affected their attitudes toward gender. Have CEBs empowered women, and if so, has this led to development of a gender consciousness among them? Drogus's findings are based on extensive fieldwork that consists of interviews and participant observation in seven CEBs in Santo Antônio, a low-income parish on the outskirts of São Paulo. The book contains rich descriptions of the daily lives of the women and their families (interviews with a core sample of 30 women who are CEB participants provide most of the data) and of the development of the popular church in Brazil.

Drogus found that, although the women face similar challenges in daily life and share a history of "long, intimate identification with the Church" (p. 78), they interpret the messages and symbols of liberation theology quite differently. Identifying at least three distinct religious personality types (liberationists, traditionalists, and Samaritans), Drogus argues that women as a group have neither "energized nor stymied" the liberationist project (pp. 81-107). Their political attitudes also vary. Liberationists are prone to link their personal struggles for survival with the status of the working class in general, and traditionalists are more likely to accept being poor as part of the natural order of things and to perceive strategies for upward mobility in individualistic terms. Despite their differential acceptance of liberation theology and class consciousness, however, the women share a positive response to the social movements endorsed by the church. They mobilize to participate in day care, sanitation, and land movements, which they see as mothers' movements that enable them to work on behalf of children—"their own and all poor children more generally" (p. 142).

To what extent do the CEBs empower women and promote gender consciousness? To be sure, CEBs are not hotbeds of feminist activism. The popular church conforms to traditional Catholic doctrine in condemning civil divorce, abortion, and

birth control. Virtually every woman in the study endorses these traditional views.

Liberation theology, moreover, tends to subordinate gender to class oppression (p. 157). Yet, CEBs encourage women's active participation in the public sphere and offer opportunities for women to assume new religious and political roles. In some cases, the fact that their domestic gender roles and family lives almost never change in parallel to their changing public role plants a seed of gender consciousness. Frustrated with the lack of change in men's attitudes and behavior, some of the liberationist women in the study want more help around the house and also argue "for real equality and a division of labor that allows women to assume what they see as their right to participate" (p. 172).

The strength of the study lies in the compelling narratives about religion, politics, and daily lives. The fact that Drogus elicited this level of candor from her subjects is a testament to her skills. Yet, the research design permits the author to address only the second of the two questions posed at the beginning of the book. The data allow Drogus to advance claims about women's reception of liberation theology but not the analytical significance of gender. An understanding of how gender filters religious messages requires a control group—in this case, men.

I also have some concerns about generalizeability. The author claims to have chosen Santo Antônio as a "critical case" region, the idea being that if "liberation theology does not flourish in the conditions its proponents have deemed most hospitable, it is unlikely to do so elsewhere" (p. 20). The area had a "famously liberationist bishop" and "pastoral workers with a clear liberationist agenda" (p. 21), which created a particularly "propitious context" for CEB development. The parish participated in some of the major civil uprisings of the late 1970s that weakened Brazil's military government. Because CEBs had only a limited effect on these women, I have the impression that in the rest of Brazil the effects of CEBs are small to nonexistent.

It may be significant that only liberationist women demonstrated a class consciousness and a desire to change gender roles. Given their underlying activist predispositions, one wonders whether they would have found modes of public participation—in neighborhood movements, for example in the absence of CEBs. After all, women's changing attitudes toward gender "have been largely an inadvertent byproduct of their participation rather than something with which the CEBs should be directly credited" (p. 179). This implies that the effects of CEBs on the attitudes of even liberationist women may have been largely epiphenomenal, a possibility that should be considered more seriously in the book. Incidentally, Drogus is too quick to endorse the proposition that gender characteristics account for women's rejection of party politics (pp. 138, 184). When political parties fail to offer equal opportunities to women to participate as militants, to rise in the party ranks, and to stand for office, it is quite rational for women to avoid them.

The book should be of interest to scholars of religion and politics, Latin American politics, and gender and politics.

Brokers and Bureaucrats: Building Market Institutions in Russia. By Timothy Frye. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 272p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Stefan Hedlund, University of Uppsala

Over the past decade, Russia's attempted transition to a market economy has attracted a great deal of scholarly interest. Given the complexities at hand and the rather disappointing outcome, it is natural that debates have been acrimonious at times. Some have argued that we are witnesses to a great success; others, that we are seeing a monumental failure. A book that promises to deal with "building market institutions in Russia" might harbor yet another contribution to such debates, but that is not case. Timothy Frye is careful to note (on p. 12) that his book "does not attempt a holistic analysis of the process of economic and political reform in Russia."

Leaving the overall assessment of success or failure for others, he chooses to tell a more specific story, and to use that story to advance our understanding of an important field in social science theory, namely, that of institutions and the problem of social order. The factual story, which has great merit in itself, covers the rise of three types of markets in post-Soviet Russia: currency futures, commodities, and corporate equities. The accounts are based on a combination of published materials and personal face-to-face interviews with brokers.

The aim of the five case studies presented is to explain differing degrees of success among brokers seeking to establish functioning systems of self-governance. It is also here that we may find the author's claim to originality: The absence of state agents from existing theories of self-governance constitutes a hole in the literature.

In a broader sense, Frye's undertaking represents a continuation of a large body of literature. Those who are not familiar with the field are given a very quick tour, ranging from Hobbes onward to Ostrom, Putnam, North, and new institutional economics.

The main thrust of his argument, however, is not to refine but to challenge the predictive value of previous economic and sociological theories of self-governance, arguing that his "political" approach is better suited to explain the cases at hand. Based on factors such as taxation and delegation, his discussion of the interaction between brokers and bureaucrats sheds valuable new light on the processes at hand. He deserves credit for highlighting the roles that may be played by state agents in promoting or hindering the emergence of institutions to support self-governance. But to what extent does he succeed in advancing the main body of theory? My problem here is chiefly one of presentation, of claims to have climbed mountains that really turn out to be hilltops.

From an institutional point of view, the role of the state as an outside enforcer is to promote such norms that we may achieve sustainable progress. If self-governance emerges in association with methods that go clearly against that longerterm goal of the state, then we have a mixed outcome indeed. By ignoring this dimension, Frye in some sense flushes the baby out with the bath water.

In a narrow sense, he presents an interesting analysis of factors that decide whether actors will rely on self-governance or turn to private protection, but he fails to note that in the broader picture even a formally successful case of selfgovernance will depend for its sustainability on the functioning of the surrounding state. More specifically, we must question the validity of Frye's critique against those who have argued that the roots of social capital are "lost in the mist of history" (p. 107). While he is correct in saying (on p. 154) that "culture is too broad a variable," he clearly goes too far with claims that his technical explanations of organizational competition offer a "more general explanation for the rise of the racket in Russia." If it is true that culture cannot explain specifics, then it is equally true that exactly the same set of formal rules will have very different outcomes in different cultural contexts. From a policy point of view, these are important distinctions.

More generally, the political approach based on state agents can be held up as "better" than, say, the criticized economic approach only in a very narrow sense. By failing to incorporate the dynamic aspects of institutional change, as laid out by North and others, it has little to say about the broader issue of how the newborn social order will evolve. Thus it also has limited policy relevance.

In this sense Frye also greatly overstates when arguing (on p. 155) that his technical explanations are better suited to explain the weakness of the Russian state than arguments relating to the neoliberal ideology of the reforms. He is right only if we ignore completely the formation of social norms to support the formal rules of the reforms.

Turning to another problem, much emphasis is placed on the corporate equities market, as a prime example of successful self-governance. Again, the interplay between brokers and bureaucrats is given an interesting and certainly valid interpretation. But perhaps it might be better in this case not to speak of "state agents" at all, but of the interplay between foreign operators with clear money-making strategies and young Russian reformers eager to impress their foreign benefactors. The mechanics of formal rule setting would remain the same, but we would also capture all those problems of moral hazard that, inter alia, have led the U.S. government to file a law suit against Harvard University for activities undertaken by Harvard-employed advisors to the Russian government. What "state" did these "state agents" represent?

Throughout, the text also has a certain gloss of success. Chapter 8, in particular, which details the process leading up to the crash in 1998, studiously avoids any mention of bad behavior by Russian actors. I have no problem with this, but it does go against the declared ambition of staying clear of any broader assessment of success or failure.

My real problem with this book is that it ends up a halfway house of sorts. By neglecting to deal with some of the more unsavory aspects of Russia's emerging markets, such as the protection of minority shareholder right, it fails really to come to grips with the broader story, which is a pity. At the same time, by neglecting to deal with the full scope of theory, such as the formation of norms and the consequent risk of institutional traps, it also fails to derive real benefit from the Russian example, which, perhaps, is even more of a pity.

Audacious Reforms: Institutional Invention and Democracy in Latin America. By Merilee S. Grindle. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press 2000. 269p. \$45.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Brian F. Crisp, University of Arizona

Merillee Grindle addresses three questions: Why would rational politicians choose to give up power? What accounts for the selection of some institutions rather than others? What are the political consequences of the creation of new institutions? She studies cases of decentralizing political reforms in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina. Her case studies are loosely guided by eleven hypotheses deduced from three schools of thought. The schools to which she refers in an introductory and concluding chapter are rational choice, comparative institutionalism, and new institutionalism (the latter has two subvariants: transaction costs and institutional design). The theoretical perspectives are apparently not equally useful across questions, as new institutionalism is not used to deduce hypotheses on why politicians would choose to reform, and rational choice is not applied to the reasons some some institutional changes are chosen over others.

Devoting two chapters to each national case, Grindle marshals a variety of materials about how politicians and groups

in civil society justified their positions regarding the need for and content of political reform. In Venezuela the decision was made to elect directly state governors (previously presidential appointees) and mayors (an office that had not existed previously). In Bolivia the Popular Participation Law made it more difficult for national officials to rely on patronage, and it formally recognized the citizenship and participation claims of the large ethnic population. In Argentina the government of Buenos Aires, where 10% of the population lives, was granted greater political autonomy, including increased control over its own financial resources and the direct election of its executive (previously a presidential appointee). To assess the consequences of reform, the author draws on the opinions of those involved and traces trends in partisan identification, voter turnout, and parties' electoral support. In addition to a brief summing up at the end of each case-oriented chapter. she provides a concluding chapter that explicitly returns to the hypotheses deduced at the beginning of the book.

Given the complexity of the issues, the research design employed, and the unwieldy nature of several key concepts, it is inherently difficult to make compelling statements about whether support was found for a particular theoretical approach. Regarding the motivation for reform, Grindle interprets politicians' willingness to decentralize in an effort to recoup legitimacy as support for a rational choice approach. The lack of mobilized groups who champion the cause of decentralization undercuts the usefulness of comparative institutionalism as an approach. A related lack of overt conflict among organized factions regarding the content of reform signals a lack of support for the comparative institutional approach in relationship to Grindle's second question. Instead, the relatively consensual design of reforms by specialists who are motivated by explicit critiques of existing institutions is taken as support for the transaction costs and principalagent variants of new institutionalism. Grindle concludes that politicians and parties did alter their behavior in predictable ways after the reforms, which supports both rational choice and comparative institutional approaches. The case studies yield mixed results regarding support for both variants of new institutionalism because transaction costs and principalagents issues vary across actors—some benefited from reforms, and others found politics more difficult.

Readers interested in decentralization and its contribution to the further democratization of already democratic regimes will find empirical details of great interest here. The case studies provide insights into the motivations of several types of actors. Although never formally conceptualized, the arenas through which they come into contact (the previously existing institutional designs) are covered in some detail. Grindle points out that history, including previous institutions, helps explain the problems that provoke reform and the diagnosis of those problems but not the content or timing of reform. One wonders whether a pattern would emerge with the coverage of more cases, more explicit conceptualization of the (historical) institutional features hypothesized to influence the content of reform, or consideration of additional types of democratizing reform (e.g., electoral reform at the national level). Grindle's point about the inability to explain the timing of reform seems particularly troublesome for comparative (historical) institutional approaches. Recent literature on path dependency and critical junctures is not get reviewed in Audacious Reforms, but the author's conclusion that we cannot systematically explain the timing of institutional change defines a challenge for institutionalists of all stripes.

Another challenge to scholars emerges through Grindle's accentuation of "leadership" as key to explaining many outcomes. For example, politicians decided to decentralize de-

spite the lack of focused pressure from below to do so, and specialists played a key role in determining the content of reforms. How does "leadership" fit into the theoretical perspectives tested in this book? Grindle notes that comparative institutionalism might provide the most promise in this regard, leading one to wonder whether there is a relationship between leadership as used here and preference formation as discussed in much of the literature on institutions. Attention to preference formation is supposed to be a relatively strong suit of historical approaches, and it may be that the stress on leadership is nothing more than recognition of the importance of preference formation in a different guise. Yet, the seeming importance of creative leaders may simply be an artifact of the research design. In the book, the dependent variable, the adoption of decentralizing reforms, is held constant. If it were allowed to vary, we might find equally creative leaders in other countries who did not choose to pursue decentralizing reforms or who preferred to do so but failed

In sum, Audacious Reforms takes on an important topic and assembles a rich array of case materials. Those with an interest in decentralization or politics in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Argentina will undoubtedly find this a rewarding book. Both explicitly and implicitly, the book is very thought provoking on larger theoretical concerns that will be of interest to a wider readership.

Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective. Edited by Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 496p. \$85.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Media and the Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections. By Anthony Mughan. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 179p. \$65.00.

Margaret Scammell, London School of Economics

The themes of crisis and transformation have fueled a miniexplosion of research on media and democracy in the last decade. Researchers within or close to the "media studies" school have developed a burgeoning literature on questions of citizenship and the public sphere, in the context of deregulation, expanding media markets, and rising interest in the arguments of the deliberative democrats. Scholars more closely connected to political science have pursued an overlapping but different agenda. From the United States and western Europe, amid concern at signs of a crisis of citizen engagement, the focus increasingly is on media power to mobilize or demobilize voters. From Eastern and central Europe and Latin America there is an emerging corpus on the role of media in the transition and consolidation of democracy. Cross-cutting these various strands are the Internet revolution and the question of globalization and, more specifically, U.S. potency to lead or at least predict trends in political communication for the democratic world.

Mughan and Gunther's edited collection is a substantial contribution to these more identifiably political science themes. With the one notable, if understandable, absence of the Internet, the book brings together admirably the concerns of established and establishing democracies. A strong cast of scholars analyzes the contemporary contribution of media to democracy in 10 countries: the United States (Thomas Patterson), Japan (Ellis Krauss), the United Kingdom (Holli Semetko), Germany (Max Kaase), The Netherlands (Cees van der Eijk), Spain (Gunther et al.), Italy (Carlo Marletti and Franca Roncarolo), Russia (Ellen Mickiewicz), Hungary (Miklós Sükösd), and Chile (Eugenio Tironi and Guillermo Sunkel). The various individual parts are knitted together

by Mughan and Gunther's introductory and concluding chapters. They establish the organizing principle, which is to combine micro-level analysis of media impact in specific circumstances and elections with a macro focus on media systems and their inferences for the distribution of power.

Comparative volumes usually work best when a clear overarching hypothesis is tested against the experience of the individual cases (for example, David L. Swanson and Paolo Mancini. Politics, Media and Modern Democracy, 1996). This book is not so tightly connected. Its research question is more open-ended and descriptive. It says, in effect, let us bring together macro and micro evidence in key countries and then assess it for patterns in media environments and the democratic character of political regimes. This approach pays some dividends. The chapters on the newer democracies, Russia, Hungary, Chile, and Spain, are especially fascinating reading. This is less because they tell us things we did not know-research on these countries is fairly readily available elsewhere—but because they are brought together, side by side, and amount to a riveting account of the importance of media in high politics. Clear cross-country patterns do emerge in totalitarian and authoritarian control over press and television and, equally, the crucial role of media in every case to the progress of democratization. Anyone who doubts the political importance of the media would do well to read these chapters and, indeed, the ones on Italy and Berluconi's adventures and van der Eijk's provocative account of the media's leading role in the depillarization of Dutch society.

The appeal of this book rests precisely in the quality of some of its individual chapters. Equally, the chapters that work best are those rooted most firmly in politics, especially the politics of transformation. This is not quite the same thing as saying that the political impact of the media is most interesting in those countries with the most intriguing politics, although that is a tempting conclusion. Rather, it is to say that the macro-level analysis of politics and media is the most valuable contribution of this work. The idea of micro-level analysis was a useful one in theory. It is instructive to know the state of media effects research in the various countries and the consensus verdicts about their impact on public opinion and elections at key times. However, this was generally the most variable and least satisfactory contribution of the countryspecific chapters. Methodological approaches to the micro either were simply not comparable from country to country, or were not well elaborated, or were indeed detailed but too time-specific to add greatly to general arguments. Despite this, the editors' conclusion makes strong, too strong, claims for the direct impact of media in individual elections and, more broadly, for the "socializing" effects of media in central European countries. To take one example, it is simply not proven, or capable of proof from the evidence as presented here, that continued support for socialism in central Europe was the direct consequence of "four decades of government censorship and propaganda." Direct media effects are notoriously difficult to prove beyond doubt, and the editors simply did not need to overegg the evidence of their authors: There is abundant material here anyway for the political impact of the media.

One would not wish to quibble too much with editors, given the sheer amount of the work in this book and the general value of its contribution. Yet one cannot help being struck by the irony of some of their U.S.-centric assumptions, given the internationally collaborative nature of the work. One such example is their major conclusion, which is to challenge the "conventional wisdom" that the freer the media are from government, the stronger the contribution to democracy. This may be the conventional wisdom in the United States, al-

though they offer few references in support of it. However, it is simply not the conventional wisdom in Europe, where for more than 10 years media researchers have sought to protect key elements of public service systems precisely in the interests of a democratic public sphere. The free market/democratic media equation just does not hold as strongly in Europe. In fact, the editors unwittingly admit as much with their comment that European Union commitment to public service systems suggests that it is unlikely that many democracies will copy the U.S. system. A second example is their introductory comment contrasting the current wave of pessimism about media performance with earlier decades of apparent contentment. Again, this simply ignores the European critical tradition, the Frankfurt School, and the critique of sociology-grounded media studies. With these caveats, the editors deserve congratulations for a volume that is a sure-fire certainty on all political communication reading lists.

Mughan's solo book, The Presidentialization of Parliamentary Elections, is, in contrast, far less grand in its ambition. It is a careful and rigorous study of the theme for which he is most familiar in Europe, the trend toward "presidentialization" of parliamentary politics. He confines the study to Britain, which, he argues reasonably, is a fair test-bed. If the proposition is that presidentialism is a broad phenomenon of democratic politics, it should certainly be apparent in Britain, with its strong majoritarian electoral system. A key contribution of this work is Mughan's attempt to define the phenomenon of "presidentialism" and "presidentialization" and, more importantly, to deconstruct it into testable elements. Presidentialization is defined as a movement over time away from a system of collective to one of personalized government, within the parameters of an unchanging constitution. He tests two aspects of this. First, presentation: Has there been a move from predominantly party- to predominantly leader-focused presentation? Second, are leader effects becoming more influential on voting decisions? This is a helpful approach to a subject that is as ubiquitous as it is vague in the political communications literature. Personalization, we are told endlessly, is a defining feature of modern democratic politics. Rarely, though, are the core concepts defined and, even more rarely, carefully tested against empirical evidence. So in this sense Mughan's book is a welcome addition.

Beyond that, though, it is slightly disappointing. Mughan's test of personalization of presentation comprises primarily content analysis of Times editorials in election campaigns since the 1950s and Gallup opinion polls conducted for newspapers. There are two main difficulties with these data: one admitted, one not. The first is that since the Gallup surveys do not include a measure of party identification, there is no way of disentangling party and leader preferences. The second is the use of Times leaders as a proxy for party campaigns. It is neither uncommon nor unreasonable to suggest that campaigns have become more leader-centered, but it is not verifiable or otherwise from these data. One is left wondering quite what Mughan's content analysis adds to the existing body of research, which does indeed demonstrate increasing media attention over time to leaders. He concludes that there is a trend toward presidentialization consistent with the "threshold" model, that is, a substantial increase in personalization at threshold elections, followed by fluctuations, which never return to the prethreshold lows. However, beneath the claim for the trend, Mughan's conclusions are modest and predictable from preexisting studies: Leadership is still far less important than party and probably sufficient to swing results only in exceptionally tight contests. This is solid stuff from Mughan, but aside from his opening discussion of the core concepts, it is more safe than exciting.

Constructing Sustainable Development. By Neil E. Harrison. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 175p. \$54.50 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Rodger A. Payne, University of Louisville

Nearly 15 years has elapsed since the World Commission on Environment and Development—the so-called Brundt-land Commission—popularized the idea of "sustainable development." The phrase turned out to be unusually slippery, providing both political cover and ammunition for almost anyone engaged in debates about the global environment and/or development. Indeed, scholars and policymakers of all theoretical or ideological stripes found creative ways to employ the phrase "sustainable development" to support a wide array of arguments in these discussions.

Neil Harrison has written a clear and concise book that addresses important questions related to the ambiguous and multiple meanings. He analyzes, in the postmodern tradition, three dominant, yet often conflicting, policy narratives of sustainable development. These are efficiency, equity, and ethics. For each narrative, Harrison explains and evaluates the premises and arguments borrowed from various social, economic, or political theories. Then, over the course of five short chapters, he highlights logical inconsistencies that make viable policy goals literally impossible to achieve. The author reveals the conceit often hidden in these narratives and, in turn, promotes greater humility. His arguments are sharp, but his purpose is not mere deconstruction. In fact, Harrison often notes the elements of a narrative that might be made to work and that should be preserved in some fashion.

Still, Harrison concludes quite forcefully that "sustainable development is a Holy Grail that does not exist. It is a legend, a myth.... [The term] cannot be objectively defined, cannot be known" (p. 99). So what would people have to do to make development sustainable, which is the goal the author establishes on the book's first page (p. vii)? The answer is certainly not found in traditional literatures on economics, politics, or environmental ethics. The chapters on efficiency, for example, describe and critique biases in the neoclassical vision of the market and then dissect alleged technological fixes, which are not likely to be developed in the current political-economic context. The chapters on equity likewise explain why neither redistribution of wealth nor international cooperation is about to occur. Finally, Harrison demonstrates that no society can embrace ecologically ethical policies without first embracing environmental ideals. This presents a bootstrapping dilemma, since ideas cannot be changed absent education policies that promote ecology.

Harrison offers his own recommendations in the final chapter. He borrows from the postmodern tradition to find metanarratives that might be able to transcend barriers across the political, economic, and social divides he has identified (p. 101). From this perspective, the author derives a need for a far more participatory politics and an ecological view of science that values flexibility and adaptability. Data need to be accumulated, and education promoted, he asserts, so as to match the most appropriate policy initiatives to local needs. Perhaps most controversially, Harrison wants sustainable development to be "the central concern of political discourse" (p. 118).

If most of these prescriptions seem somewhat vague and (at least to the informed reader) mundane, Harrison is unapologetic. On the last page, he returns to an earlier admonition (Chapter 2) that policies supporting sustainable development (or virtually any policy goal) "are always stabs in the dark, best guesses in an uncertain world" (p. 118). Harrison's broad challenge to "rational" economics, science, and policymaking, however, might tempt readers to question whether

his preferred choices are better than those he critiques. After all, the author warns that sustainable development seems to be "the ultimate 'postmodern' issue" and "can be interpreted to support any agenda, or objective" (p. 102).

Consider Harrison's plea for education. While the author means his claims to be taken differently, it is difficult to imagine that college administrators will be persuaded to build their general education or liberal arts curriculums around the idea of sustainable development precisely "because it can mean everything to everybody" (p. 118). Harrison stresses that education should be sensitive to ambiguity and that teachers should take diverse perspectives into account when considering something as elusive as sustainable development. In practice, however, his warnings literally seem to imply that nothing is valid and that everything is valid.

Why should an idea like the precautionary principle (pp. 16, 111), for example, presumptively favor environmental goals? A probusiness advocate might argue that caution demands favoring jobs and economic well-being over "risky" policies to defend the environment. During the Cold War, "worst-case planning" meant spending hundreds of billions of dollars on nuclear weapons to promote "security." No one should assume that environmental goals would come out on top if the most basic societal goals started to be compared. Harrison's argument for community and participatory politics could even subvert environmental objectives. In actual debates about forest policies, loggers of the U.S. Pacific Northwest apparently prefer to retain their jobs to the preservation of owl habitats.

Anyone who has perused the right's antienvironmental literature (e.g., see Ronald Bailey, *Eco-Scam*, 1993), quickly learns how postmodern insights and arguments can be turned against environmentalists. Scientists have often been wrong about past warnings of ecological or resource collapse, the skeptics assert, so why should anyone make costly policies based upon their latest warnings about global warming? The problem is magnified when a scientist or two challenges the environmental views.

Postmodernists, ironically, might fault Harrison for failing to embrace their project more fully. He acknowledges that his "approach is not specifically postmodern" (p. 112) and at times he seems to favor the employment of both material and instrumental measures. For instance, he advocates substantial increases in aid to poor countries, which would essentially bribe them to support sustainable development. He also supports higher taxes on consumption to influence consumer demand for resources. Yet material levers distort dialogue and would not necessarily promote an ecological mindset.

Harrison's book seems most useful for educators who teach undergraduate or master's-level courses about the environment. Students would benefit from the author's succinct and lucid critique of prevailing economic, political, and ethical theories and from his application of postmodern theorizing. No doubt, Harrison's arguments would provoke interesting and useful classroom exchanges.

Eroding Military Influence in Brazil: Politicians Against Soldiers. By Wendy Hunter. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997. 243p. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Craig Arceneaux, California Polytechnic State University

Writing at a time when the literature on transitions to democracy was fixated on the mode of transition, and when concepts such as authoritarian legacy, authoritarian enclave, or the shadow of the past dominated, Wendy Hunter's 1997 book,

Eroding Military Influence in Brazil, went against the grain. In a direct attack on institutionalist approaches that emphasized the resiliency of military prerogatives in transitions from military regimes, Hunter argues that democracy itself would, over time, reduce the influence exerted by the armed forces. A solid theoretical orientation, rich casework, and insightful commentary on the dynamics behind the creation of civilian control all mark the book as a noteworthy contribution to the literature on democratic transitions, civil—military relations, and Latin American politics.

Guided by a rational choice perspective, Hunter argues that elected politicians answer first and foremost to their own immediate self-interests. Their aspirations directly impinge on the armed forces insofar as the retention of military prerogatives hinders the capacity of politicians to cater to the demands of the electorate and secure patronage to aid their future careers. Brazil is viewed as an exceptional case study because of the control exerted by the military during the democratic transition. Insofar as the military used its control to instill its advantages into political institutions, Hunter has a case that allows a test of her theory against that of historical institutional approaches, which hold a higher expectation of institutional resiliency. Hunter views institutions as the product of existing political desires and conflicts, while the institutionalist approach argues that institutions are not so malleable and, in fact, produce expectations, desires, and conflict independent of the interests and interactions of current actors.

The subtitle of the book, Politicians Against Soldiers, in fact obscures a more complex approach which recognizes the different pressures faced by executives, on one hand, and legislators, on the other. Both presidents and legislators can be threatened by military bullying, but legislators face a collective action problem that prevents them from feeding military desires to offset the threat-insofar as a response to the military demands a reduction in patronage resources, one legislator cannot be certain that his colleagues will follow. Hence, during times of crisis, only presidents answer to military intimidation. The second difference is the types of goals pursued by executives and legislators. Particularistic goals refer to the patronage distributed by officials to garner support from specific groups, while programmatic goals are those that cater more to the interests and principles of society as a whole. Both goals are important to politicians in a general sense, but smaller, regional constituencies lead legislators to be more concerned with particularistic goals, while presidents are more attuned to programmatic goals.

To illustrate the expression of legislative particularistic aspirations, Hunter devotes a chapter to budgetary politics and argues that the draw to patronage leads policymakers to withdraw funds previously devoted to military spending, although military pressure on the executive can offset some of this decrease. In another chapter, she uses advances in labor policy to illustrate the pursuit of programmatic goals by both legislators and presidents. The third case is devoted to Amazon policy. The immediate connection to democracy is not very clear in this third case. Changes in land-use policies and concessions to indigenous groups did infringe on military security interests, but pressure to do so came not from the Brazilian public but, rather, from international organizations, NGOs, and foreign governments.

While the discussion of eroding military influence distinguishes the book in a literature which largely thought otherwise, Hunter is not naively optimistic. In the conclusion, she recognizes that civilian control involves not only the reduction of military power, but also the establishment of mechanisms of civilian control such as greater civilian input in defense issues, education and training, the military justice

system, and other areas that do not conflict with politicians' quest for patronage resources and, in fact, often entail greater costs than benefits. Civilian supremacy demands not only the destruction of military influence, but also the construction of civilian oversight, and democracy does more to contribute to the former. Indeed, insofar as the short-sighted interests of politicians prevail, democracy may actually hinder civilian supremacy. This allows her theory to be more dynamic and to account not only for eroding military influence, but also reversals in democracy. Some comparisons to other South American cases are used to illustrate the applicability of the theory.

While the focus on democracy itself is interesting, and an important contribution, one cannot help but recognize that other, perhaps more important, factors are at work in the Brazilian case and elsewhere. In particular, Hunter seems too quick to dismiss the role of institutions in her effort to distinguish her rational choice approach from historical institutionalism. The Brazilian case was a controlled transition, but military prerogatives were not as institutionalized as in, for example, the Chilean case. Hunter herself notes that the armed forces very often expressed their interests through "entendimentos" (understandings) rather than codifying them into institutions, and this makes the case less of a "most likely" scenario for historical institutionalism. Indeed, institutions are largely responsible for the democratic dynamic in Brazil: Intense electoral competition is closely tied to Brazilian electoral rules (e.g., open lists, liberal state funding, ease of party creation); the lack of legislative influence over the placement of military bases and the insularity of defense production from civilian producers both remove areas that might typically tie military interests to legislative electoral interests; the 1988 constitutional changes gave the legislature more control over the budget; and the ruling that congress must work within the budgetary level set by the president constructs a zero-sum game between legislator and military budgetary interests. One need look no farther than the United States for evidence that congressional and military interests can coexist. Democracy comes in many forms, and its institutional configuration does more to set the battlefield for civilmilitary interaction than do individual interests. The indeterminacy of individual interests can be teased out of Hunter's theoretical discussion when she notes that presidents have the capacity to exert civilian control but lack the incentive (due to the greater fear of a military reprisal), and legislators have the incentive but lack the capacity (due to the collective action problem). How do we get from here to there? The answer rests at a higher level, within institutions, which rational choice approaches too easily dismiss as simple reflections of individual interest. Indeed, if institutions were so malleable and so directly reflective of rational individual interests, we would expect Brazilian politicians, who hold traditionally poor records of reelection, to concentrate first and foremost on creating an electoral regime to better secure their futures.

The second factor that would contribute to a better understanding of civilian empowerment after transition would be the military itself. The Latin American military has changed dramatically since the transitions to democracy—the post-Cold War world calls for new roles and missions, foreign actors scrutinize their actions as never before, and time itself under democracy has allowed the military to alleviate some of its traditional mistrust of politicians. Changes in military perceptions, beliefs, and attitudes have led the armed forces to be more open to civilian calls for reform in some areas. Tips in the civil—military balance are thus the result of not only civilian pushes, but also rethinking and acceptance on the part of the military—in some policy areas more than others, and in some countries more than others.

Eroding Military Influence forces scholars of democratic transition and civil-military relations to consider seriously democracy itself as an influential factor. Further research would do well to heed this advice, as well as to recognize the roles that institutions and the military itself play.

Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions. Edited by Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 319p. \$59.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Michael Laver, Trinity College Dublin

This book is about the motivations of political actors. Many of the most commonly used models of party competition and government formation are grounded in explicit assumptions about the motivations of party strategists. These tend to assume one of three basic and interrelated motivations—the desire to fulfill policy objectives, the desire to control the perquisites of office, and the desire to maximize votes. While recognizing that living and breathing people may be driven by any or all of these motivations, among others, and that these may interact with each other in complex ways, most theorists ground their models in assumptions of policy-seeking OR office-seeking OR vote-maximizing by key political decision makers. Indeed this distinction between motivational assumptions is one of the most common ways to classify models of party competition. In part the grounding of models in a single motivational assumption is for the sake of analytical tractability; in part it is because the heuristic insights made possible by these approaches are enhanced if the models are kept simple and their relationship to core assumptions is kept straightforward.

The publication of Müller and Strøm's edited volume is timely because there has been a growing feeling in the literature that the time has come to move on. It has always been the case that, when analysts have applied formal models to realworld examples, they have explained anomalies by acknowledging motivations that go beyond those in their models. Thus the refusal of Communist or Green parties to converge on the center ground may be excused in vote-maximizing models of party competition on the ground that they are policy seekers. The willingness of ideological strange bedfellows to get into coalitions with each other may be explained in policy-driven models of government formation by the assertion that these particular parties care much more about getting into office than about enacting their policy program. Increasingly, these observations are leading theorists to try constructing models in which politicians have multiple motivations, which they must typically trade off against each other when making hard choices.

It is one thing to write down a model containing such trade-offs. It is quite another to apply it to the real world, an exercise that requires the analyst to provide at least a ballpark estimate about how a particular politician might trade off such-and-such a probability to getting into office against such-and-such a dilution of fundamental policy objectives. If my model tells me that you can increase your probability of being in government by 40% if you drop your long-standing policy objective of nationalizing the commanding heights of the economy, how do I know a priori whether or not you will do it? I need some realistic information about how you trade off office and policy motivations.

Müller and Strøm have provided us with the first booklength empirical study of precisely this problem. Essentially it is an edited collection of thickly descriptive case studies, topped and tailed by general chapters by the editors in

reviews that are sensitive to a range of the theoretical implications of this material. They set the scene in an opening chapter that does not contain a model or even a typology of trade-offs and hard choices, but that sets out to clear away some of the conceptual underbrush entangling these—a task that necessarily precedes the construction of such a model. We then have 10 case studies written carefully by well-established experts in their fields. Each of these takes a particular set of hard-choice trade-offs in a particular country, providing a detailed post hoc interpretation of this. The countries covered, in chapter order, are Ireland, Denmark, Spain, The Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Norway, Germany, Sweden, and France. This book was a long time in the making and the case studies are not wildly up-to-date, but that is not the point in this instance. What the case studies do is use a lens fashioned by the editors to throw serious light, pretty much for the first time, on the real-world trade-offs and hard choices that will be of critical importance to theorists who want to construct improved models of party competition based on more complex sets of motivational assumptions.

There is no space here to go into detail on the substance of each case study, but it should be said that the authors of the case studies have a sure touch with the detail of their material that should inspire confidence in those who might wish to build on these foundations. The main virtues of this book are thus the astute way in which the editors have identified a theoretically important matter that requires a preliminary empirical survey and the professionalism with which the authors of the case studies have set about their tasks. This is thus essential reading for those who have ambitions to build more complex models of party competition. It is also an attractive supplementary text for those teaching courses on party competition.

Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics. By Melissa Nobles. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. 248p. \$49.50 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Howard Winant, Temple University

A thoughtful book on a subject that can be quite vexing, Shades of Citizenship benefits greatly from the comparative analytical framework employed. The central poles of comparative attention are the U.S. and Brazilian censuses, but Nobles also comments on a range of other national processes of census-taking and systems of racial classification employed; Germany and South Africa as well as other Latin American, African, and European countries are mentioned.

Censuses are treated as political in a dual sense. The obvious political logic of population enumeration is state centered: The census is a central instrument in the administration and organization of the nation/polity/society. It is a crucial tool of governmentality, which has all sorts of implications. The second political meaning is civil society based. In recent times the census has often been seen by groups as a vehicle for recognition; indeed, it has been viewed as a logical target of political mobilization by those excluded from the full benefits of citizenship or by those experiencing discrimination. Looking at censuses both in the United States and Brazil, and considering census politics both from the state and the civil society vantage points, Nobles develops a sophisticated comparative approach to this complex topic.

Race quickly becomes the touchstone of debates, the key issue, when we examine census politics. Why is that? Why are not classifications of social stratification/class, occupation, even education or health the central themes? The answer lies in the fundamental character of racial classification in many

societies (certainly in the United States and Brazil), the relatively intractable and ineluctable nature of racial identity, and the relationship, which is deeply rooted in national (and global) histories, between race and citizenship. To study census politics is in a fundamental way to study racial politics.

That is the overall rationale for this book, summarized here but well articulated by Nobles. The rationale is particularly important because the chief concerns of the project might easily be relegated to technical realms, might easily be dismissed, if the census were viewed as "simply" a means of information gathering. This is how many demographers would view the book, for example. But Nobles is explicit about framing her concerns differently, and that is the point of the extensive introductory chapter.

The fundamental concerns of the book are the historical evolution and fairly explicit racialism of the U.S. and Brazilian censuses as well as the way recent conflicts about and changes in procedures reflect those issues. Considerable attention is paid to state-centered political logic in framing and carrying out censuses. The author's crucial point is that strategies to demarcate racial categories and then locate populations in terms of them not only classify and measure, are not only investigative, but also are constructionist in both a social and political sense. This constructionism goes beyond the responsibility to create categories for empirical enumeration and analysis. It extends to the role of the state in "making" society or in this case race. This claim has large theoretical implications in many areas because it involves a certain view of racial formation; a political sociology, particularly of race and citizenship; and the historical treatment of ideas about race, a sort of sociology of racial knowledge or history of racial ideas. All this is presented with respect to the evolving census apparatus and practices in the two countries, from slavery to contemporary debates. I both commend the empirical work of Nobles and question the theoretical limits of the text. Although she offers a solidly grounded historical account of the evolution of census policy in both countries, there is very little interpretation. Yet, Nobles does signal her awareness of most of the interpretive questions I am raising, and she focuses her analysis on the question that most interests her: political struggles over racial meanings.

The key contemporary chapters present accounts of census-oriented popular campaigns in each country. In the United States the issue was framed (in the 1980s) around a "mixed-race category" and a proposal by the Office of Management and Budget (Statistical Directive No. 15) to incorporate such a category in the 1990 Census. In Brazil the issue was framed (in 1990–91) around "lightening" or "whitening": There was a limited but real effort on the part of a coalition of black groups to convince people to report their race "accurately," that is, not to pass for white. In each case nonwhite organizations demonstrated a much greater awareness of the political significance of census classification than ever before. As Nobles notes, the fact that these two campigns emerged and prefigured future conflicts is itself a reflection of the changing dynamics of racial politics in the two countries.

In my view the situation was considerably more politicized in the United States than in Brazil: The U.S. civil rights movement and its legacy had no real equivalent in Brazil, and the Brazilian military regime eliminated race-focused questions from the 1970 and 1980 censuses (except for a limited house-hold study). Thus, the reinstitution of race in the 1990 (or 1991, as it worked out) Brazilian count posed far more basic questions about race than existed in the United States. The comparative logic is limited as far as the details of the two campaigns are concerned. The chapter on the campaigns would have benefited from a more conceptual or more the-

oretically nuanced focus, which would have made the different political contexts more central. Despite this objection, Nobles's central concern—grassroots campaigns against the top-down politics of the census as framed by the state—is well addressed.

Although the book's conclusion is very solid, I want more. Nobles focuses on the (in)effectiveness of the census in capturing the meaning of race and its occlusion of, or even collusion in, the fundamental political questions that are the core of what race means, of its social-historical significance and so on. This she brings out very well, linking these themes to such issues as official classifications of race and methods of enumeration. That is very valuable. What I would like is a larger set of theoretical points about how and why these two states are constructing race in a certain way, about how racially defined minority movements understand these processes (and race itself) differently, and what this indicates for the comparative state of racial politics in the two countries. But that is a tall order. Notwithstanding these small criticisms, Shades of Citizenship is a very valuable, well-conceived, and well-researched work. It is important in several respects: as a study of racial politics (particularly on a comparative level), as an historical treatment of issues of race and citizenship, and as a contribution to our understanding of the census.

A Virtuous Circle: Political Communications in Postindustrial Societies. By Pippa Norris. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 398p. \$59.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Stephanie Greco Larson, Dickinson College

Scholars of media and public opinion in Western Europe and the United States will find plenty of useful information and much to argue about in *A Virtuous Circle*. The data are rich and broad, and the conclusions drawn are provocative and relevant to some of the major debates in the field. The central question addressed is whether the news media discourages political engagement.

Pippa Norris challenges the increasingly popular idea that cynical news and passivity of television viewing create a disengaged public. Instead, she characterizes the relationship between news media and political attitudes and actions as a healthy and reciprocal one. This relationship is called a virtuous circle in which "watching the news activates existing predispositions to vote and, simultaneously, the predisposition to vote prompts people to seek out more news" (p. 264). Political interest and knowledge also stimulate attention to news, which results in more interest and knowledge. In addition, people who lack interest give news too little attention or trust to be adversely effected by it. Therefore, the news media is judged to have a positive to benign influence on civic life.

The evidence in support of these claims is cross-national and ample but, as the author admits, falls short of proving causation. Nevertheless, the conclusions resonate with longstanding minimal and conditional consequences theories of media effects and resurrect voting behavior studies that came before The American Voter (1960). The book reminds us that any rush to scapegoat the media not only overlooks other culprits but also ignores much of what we know about attitude change and information processing (e.g., selective perception, reinforcement, and the knowledge gap). Even those who find videomalaise (Michael Robinson, "Public Affairs Television and the Growth of Political Malaise," American Political Science Review 70 [June 1976]: 409-32), The Spiral of Cynicism (Joseph N. Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, 1997), and the notion that television culture has left Americans bowling alone (Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone, 2000) more compelling than the "virtuous circle" (either rhetorically or substantively) will still need to consider this book's critiques. The comparisons of media systems and public opinion in numerous democratic nations and the close look at the timing of trends in media use and political behavior raise serious concerns about the media malaise thesis.

Another contribution of this book is its careful and comprehensive discussion of how media have changed over time. The five chapters in Part 2 describe trends in political communication and the structural differences in news environments of 29 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nations. The complexity of the current communication systems is evidenced by an expansion of news from diverse sources and formats, which makes a broad range of news available to growing audiences. New media supplement old media, rather than replace them. For example, Internet users still read newspapers and watch television. The special attention to the Internet audience (in chap. 2 and 12) raises concerns about how many people are fully engaged in the virtuous circle, since only 4% of Internet users contact groups and officials about politics or have political discussions online (p. 270).

Chapters 7 and 8 will be of particular interest to those who study the media and elections. Norris describes an "evolutionary processes of modernization" (p. 137) in campaign communication that entails three major stages: premodern, modern, and postmodern. This discussion judges the role of the media in contemporary campaigns less harshly than do most critics. "The postmodern campaign can be seen to represent a new openness and tolerance for alternative views and multiple forms of understanding, as well as a source of anxiety and disorientation as the familiar standards are swept away" (p. 178).

In addition to building the virtuous circle argument, chapters 9 and 10 stand alone as a comprehensive study of news coverage and public attitudes about the European Union. The extensive content analyses of 189 newspapers in 15 member states from January 1995 to autumn 1997 and 10,000 hours of television coverage from six countries is impressive and illuminating. It reveals that coverage of the European Union was minimal and focused primarily on monetary policy and development. Overall, the direction of this coverage was moderately anti-Union (especially on television). This tone coincided with a low level of public support for Union membership and the euro.

A Virtuous Circle is likely to stimulate research that supports, expands, and challenges it. More attention needs to be paid to the content and consequences of entertainment media, since this book points out that heightened political participation of television news viewers coincides with lower participation rates among heavy entertainment television viewers. In addition, the one panel survey used in this book suggests more questions than it answers. Therefore, laboratory and social experiments should be conducted to get a better sense of the causal mechanisms at work. Conclusions about how media environments, political institutions, and public opinion interact could also be enriched by studying non-Western nations. The effect of news on civic life in Latin America would be an interesting contrast to Europe, given the author's brief discussion of their media and campaign systems. Finally, some scholars will likely follow the author's advice to look to systemic problems to understand political disengagement. "Blaming the news media is easy, but ultimately that is a deeply conservative strategy, especially in a culture skeptical of regulation of the free press, and it diverts attention from the urgent need for real reforms to democratic institutions, which should have our undivided attention" (p. 319).

Uncivil Movements: The Armed Right Wing and Democracy in Latin America. By Leigh A. Payne. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 328p. \$42.50.

Martha Huggins, Union College

Leigh Payne greatly enriches our knowledge of Latin American transitions from authoritarianism to democracy. The Armed Right Wing focuses on the role of violent right-wing groups and government responses to them in three Latin American countries, with application elsewhere. Explaining that uncivil social movements "use political violence . . . to promote exclusionary objectives . . . as a deliberate strategy to eliminate, intimidate, and silence political adversaries" (p. 1), Payne contrasts these movements with "civil" social movements. They employ rule-breaking (and violence) to "expand [rather than curtail] citizen rights and freedoms" (p. 1).

Payne defines uncivil movements in the first chapter and in the second chapter develops her analytical approach. In three following chapters she presents three Latin American "uncivil" right-wing movements: Argentina's promilitary carapintada after the "Dirty War"; the powerful Brazilian landowners' Rural Democratic Union (UDR); and the Contra movement in Nicaragua after the civil war. This ambitious research project, which involved open-ended interviews and secondary research in three countries and three languages, uses carefully crafted structured-focused comparisons to explain the emergence, evolution, and demise of uncivil social movements.

Payne makes six central claims. Uncivil movements are a unique blend of civil-institutional and uncivil-mobilization politics. Political threats are necessary but not sufficient for the emergence and growth of uncivil movements. Leaders "sell" perceived political threats to potential members by using culturally available myths and images. Uncivil movements' inherent contradictions weaken them over time, but not before they have negatively affected the democratic process. Democratic governments can exacerbate or lessen these movements' negative effect. Uncivil movements can emerge in "consolidated" and transitional democracies.

Payne's discussion of the difficult ethical, personal safety, and methodological problems faced by scholars who study secrecy and danger resonate with two recently completed projects of my own. How does one conduct research when groups' activities are either totally or partially clandestine? How does one obtain a satisfactory sample of respondents when informants' names are difficult to uncover? To address these problems, Payne started with each uncivil movement's most visible leaders and used their trust to obtain interviews with others.

Once interviewees were identified, nagging ethical questions emerged: How does one strike a balance among protecting anonymity, disclosing illegal and/or human rights violations, and protecting one's own personal safety? Payne's solution was to disclose only the names of already well-known movement leaders—even though the possible cost was (and is) violence against her—and withhold the names of less powerful voices associated with or outside the movement. Anyone interested in social science research methods, especially the problems associated with interviewing powerful or not-so-powerful violence supporters and perpetrators, should read Payne's fascinating explanation of her research methods.

The author skillfully incorporates into each case analysis a wealth of synthesized political science, sociological, and social-psychological thinking on social movements, and she rigorously weaves social movement variables into each case analysis. Payne astutely incorporates and revises political science institutionalization and social group mobilization

theories to bring out their policy implications for a government's handling of uncivil social movements.

Consider, for example, how Payne weaves interview data into social movement theory in her analysis of how uncivil movements develop political power. They grow by leaders "framing" and "cueing up" culturally resonant images to support their activities and by creating "legitimizing myths" and selling these to their publics. How this process unfolds and whether it uses sufficient culturally viable images in part shape the success or failure of an uncivil movement. Payne, for example, illustrates how Argentina's carapintada military officers and Brazil's landowner association successfully promoted their power by drawing both on older autochthonous cultural cues and by developing new ones. In contrast, she argues, the 1990s Nicaraguan Contras were unsuccessful as an uncivil social movement precisely because they were unable to frame their movement as distinct from, superior to, and more legitimate than other political groups.

A particular challenge for the leaders of uncivil social movements is to expand the appeal beyond the hardliners who make up the movement's core. Payne finds that an "entrepreneurial" charismatic figure is required to manage the process. A new framing and operational style develops out of these conflicts and adjustments.

For example, in order to convince "pragmatists," which uncivil movements need in order to grow, that the movement is legitimate, the charismatic entrepreneur must present himself as different from the movement's earlier authoritarian leaders. The fact that these new leaders—urban, educated, and urbane—are in fact different from their predecessors is not enough. Leaders have to "frame" and "cue up" the movement's new persona: Argentina's carapintada needed to be seen as not self-serving, ruthless military caudillos; Brazil's UDN could not be merely a reincarnation of the older rustic and uneducated landowner coroneis; Nicaragua's new Contra leaders were not merely brutal "Somosista" National Guardsmen. How and to what extent these changes are "sold" to pragmatists and a wider public will shape the course and operational success of each uncivil movement.

Factors inherent to these movements can promote or undermine them. If the goals are highly specific, then achieving success puts the movement out of a job. The original leader's charisma poses a destabilizing succession problem. The personal ambitions of these charismatic leaders often make them easy prey to those in government who subscribe to institution-building theories about democratically shaping and incorporating uncivil movements. Yet, political institution theorists will discover from Payne that incorporating these leaders or their agendas into democratic institutions can backfire: Lending them power and legitimacy disguises their violence, builds membership, and fosters their goals.

Payne recognizes the importance of timing: President Alfonsin of Argentina may have moved too soon and too strongly against the military. "Without the [military] trials the carapintada would not have emerged" (p. 97). This created conditions for the attenuated military coups. Governments may enter into negotiation with carefully selected movement factions, but Payne recommends they investigate uncivil movements and prosecute their violence. Transition governments must build up and reform judiciaries.

Payne's term "uncivil movements" should be discussed and debated. Some will ask why she did not use the more traditional designation "counterrevolutionary" in the usual continuum: "conservative," "reformist," and "revolutionary" social movements. Cannot the Contras—"contra" for "counterrevolutionary"—best be described as a counterrevolutionary movement? Is it questionable to define uncivil movements as only right-wing? Have there been un-

civil (exclusionist, violent) movements on the Left? Payne would argue that leftist movements struggle for the systemically disadvantaged, whereas uncivil movements protect, foster, or seek to restore the powers of the previously (or currently) advantaged. Every reader will find Payne's definition and designation of uncivil movements theoretically and analytically useful and thought provoking.

Another source of lively debate arises in Payne's last chapter, which compares uncivil movements in Latin America to those in other societies. In particular, she focuses on three consolidated democracies—Le Pen's Front National in France, Meir Kahane's KACH Zionist movement in Israel, and militia movements in the United States—and one in a transitional government, South Africa's AWB Afrikener Resistance Movement. There will be debate and analysis about the movements left out of Payne's "uncivil" categorization.

Payne raises and addresses most questions, however, and just enough in her extraordinary analysis is left unstated to generate new and alternative questions and explanations. The literature on social movements, on politics, and on Latin America is significantly advanced by Payne's careful research and scholarly analysis.

Disaffected Democracies: What's Troubling the Trilateral Countries. Edited by Susan J. Pharr and Robert D. Putnam. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 348p. \$65.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Markus M. L. Crepaz, University of Georgia

A specter is haunting the Trilateral Democracies—this specter is called civic malaise. It has visited these countries before; rearing its head for the first time a quarter-century ago, proclaiming the demise of democracy due to the inability of governments to respond to the onslaught of waves of new forms of participatory democracy and political action. (Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission, 1975). Too much democracy, as it were, may be too much of a good thing. Fortunately many of these dire predictions have not materialized, perhaps partly because they were highlighted a quarter-century ago. The sequel, Disaffected Democracies, celebrates the silver anniversary of the original Crisis of Democracy. This successor volume is similarly concerned with the fate of democracy in rich countries. These democracies are "troubled" (p. 7), so the argument goes, because their public institutions are undermined by declining confidence in government and sagging interpersonal social trust. The authors of this edited volume situate the sources of these "disturbing" (p. 13) developments squarely in the political sphere. In other words, the origins of the decline in confidence in political institutions is not explained by a frail social fabric but, rather, by failures of government and politics themselves. Despite a tight focus on the temporal (the last 25 years) and spatial (the Trilateral countries) parameters of this edited volume, it is refreshing to see so many diverse and innovative diagnoses as to what is ailing the rich democracies.

Of the 13 essays that compose the text (bracketed by a foreword by Samuel Huntington and an afterword by Ralf Dahrendorf), three are single country studies: two on Japan, by Hideo Otake and Susan J. Pharr, and one on the United States, by Anthony King. Even though King's contribution is entitled "Distrust of Government: Explaining American Exceptionalism," what all three of these essays have in common is that they locate the sources of civic erosion firmly in the untrustworthiness of politicians, for once making the United States NOT exceptional. Similarly, Donatella della Porta's

three-country comparison of Italy, France, and Germany finds that confidence in government was highest in Germany and lowest in Italy, where the lowest and highest levels of corruption were found, respectively. France took a medium position. The contributions by Alberto Alesina and Romain Wacziarg and by Kenneth Newton and Pippa Norris take a wider view, each looking at a larger number of countries. Both research teams conclude that the culprit of low public confidence may have to be found in the subpar performance of government policies and the institutions designed to implement these policies. The somewhat more "philosophical" contributions by Russell Hardin and Fritz Scharpf speculate on the decreased need for the state in modern societies leading to reduced trust in the state (Hardin) and on the quality of discourse between elites and masses: A more realistic discourse between these groups should prevent wishful thinking and bring the desires of the electorate closer to the actual capacities of governments (Scharpf). Pippa Norris' essay on the effect of watching television on social capital does not unequivocally find that the former undermines the latter, thereby reducing confidence and trust in government. It simply depends on what you watch. Peter Katzenstein looks at the lessons from smaller democracies and finds that neither the end of the Cold War nor internationalization is a valid predictor of the already much less accentuated civic malaise that has befallen the smaller countries of Europe. They are characterized by well-developed welfare states and inclusionary political structures that cushion their citizens from exogenous shocks, with the effect of creating a less polarized society with a citizenry that is not turned off by government.

Just when the reader's sense of impending doom in the rich democracies is becoming unbearable, along come the two essays by Russell Dalton and Sidney Tarrow, both of which put a more cheerful spin on this dire topic. Dalton argues, refreshingly, that value change is an ongoing process, driven by changes in the skills and knowledge of citizens in postmaterial societies, that institutions and political parties are constantly challenged, and that democratic regimes simply must adapt to these processes. For Tarrow, new forms of political activism have arisen, leading to short-lived and shifting coalitions with little likelihood of sustaining high levels of confidence in government.

As this description of the individual essays indicates, there is a rich diversity in explanations regarding the origins of the decline of public trust and confidence in government. This very diversity, however, has the effect of connecting the various essays rather tenuously with one another and, while they are superbly written and argued, encourages even more speculation as to what is actually disquieting the democracies of the world. Perhaps the liberal democracies have advanced "too far," i.e., the toxic mix of radical individualism, hyperconsumerism, and economic individualism makes "public" institutions look anachronistic. Perhaps people today are simply more educated, so they criticize more. Perhaps their lack of trust and confidence in governmental institutions can be interpreted as a maturation process, or a process of emancipation in which citizens take a more alert and cautionary stance against political institutions—indeed if this were the case, there would be no need to be "troubled." Or perhaps the reasons for the civic malaise are to be found in the decreasing capacity of the state to integrate ever more atomized, detached, and fragmented citizens? Is it conceivable that rising inequality, particularly in the United States, is reducing the pool of people who still trust government and have confidence in their political institutions? This book will certainly leave you with a strong desire to explore these fascinating topics further.

However, perhaps the most crucial question of all is, how seriously should we take these observations that seem to show that citizens are upset? With the advantage of hindsight we can say that the original message of *Crisis of Democracy* was unnecessarily alarmist. The democracies have adapted and become even stronger. Today's concern with the troubled democracies may again turn out to be nothing but a tempest in a teapot, 25 years hence. After getting closer to the substance, we may realize that this specter was nothing but a mirage after all.

**The Anatomy of Public Opinion.** By Jacob Shamir and Michal Shamir. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 320p. \$52.50.

Barry J. Balleck, Georgia Southern University

What is public opinion? In this aptly named book, authors Jacob Shamir and Michal Shamir attempt to address their perceived deficiencies in public opinion research by posing a new theoretical framework for the study of this important subject. Though hundreds of books, articles, and monographs have addressed public opinion, the authors contend that current theories of public opinion are too deterministic and that they fall short of explaining the full range of public opinion possibilities. Existing studies attempt to interpret public opinion on the basis of the observed outcomes—i.e., Why was a particular opinion expressed? What does it mean in the context of the instrument constructed to measure that opinion? The authors believe that to understand public opinion, one must come to understand the role of the information environment in which that opinion is located. In other words, Shamir and Shamir are not interested simply in the static outcomes of public opinion but in the environment in which that opinion is constructed. To this end, they propose a new theoretical construct by which to interpret it.

According to the authors, "Public opinion lies at the juncture of society, communication, and the individual; of the public and the private domains; of civil society and the state; of citizenry and politics; of masses and elites; of social control and rationality; of norms and events" (p. 2). Current theories are inadequate in that they have not captured the various constituent elements of public opinion, particularly the nuances and motivational factors by which public opinion is constructed and maintained. To correct these deficiencies, Shamir and Shamir propose a theory that lies at the confluence of communication, social psychology, social cognition, political science, and political psychology. They base their theory upon four premises.

First, public opinion is a social construct and, as such, is "perceptible, exposed, shared, and relevant to all citizens as well as to government" (p. 3). Public opinion is not static, but rather an "organic entity" which emerges and is continually recreated through societal discussion and debate. Public opinion is the product and reflection of the society in which it is found. However, it also helps to construct society in its continual expression. Public opinion thus maintains a symbiotic relationship with society.

Second, public opinion is multidimensional and cannot be reduced to a single expression. Current theories of public opinion concentrate on measuring attitudes and what these attitudes mean in reference to policy issues and/or political candidates. Such attempts do not assess the values of individuals or society, or the various dimensions that underlie these values. The authors attempt to assess public opinion in all of its facets while recognizing the various guises in which public opinion can manifest itself—i.e., symbolic, verbal, individual, group, electoral, etc.

Third, public opinion is dynamic and evolutionary. Shamir and Shamir contend that there are multifaceted divergences and convergences in public opinion. One such divergence, that of the concept of the "silent majority," is indicative of the discrepancy that exists between the evaluative and the expressed facets of public opinion. By coming to understand the silent majority and if it, in fact, exists, the authors hope to answer the "nagging political and theoretical question" of which public opinion the government should heed in making its policy choices.

Finally, public opinion consists of an "information environment" whose nature must be studied and understood in order to determine the processes that the expression of public opinion will set in motion. Previous studies of public opinion have included little about attitude distributions and the component elements of public opinion. The authors intend to study public opinion not simply from an observational standpoint, or from a point "outside the box," but from an interactive standpoint by climbing into the box and dissecting public opinion and then recombining it through meaningful interpretation.

With these four premises as their theoretical impetus, Shamir and Shamir set out to decipher the information environment in which public opinion is formed. Their task is a formidable one. Indeed, the authors recognize that their study is broad in its scope and that their efforts are but scratching the surface of a full understanding of public opinion. However, they are quite successful in laying the foundation for an interesting and innovative approach to public opinion research.

Using as their case study Israeli public opinion on issues of peace and territories before and during the first Intifada, Shamir and Shamir combine an innovative use of survey instruments and "thinking-aloud protocols" to help decipher the cognitive elements which comprise public opinion. Their research is guided by a rich and detailed survey of public opinion literature, though they rely upon the works of Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann to an unusual degree in their research. Despite their lengthy discussion of such terms as "pluralistic ignorance"—which is the gap between "aggregate distributions of opinion and their perceptions by the public at large" (p. 1), and which comprises the entirety of Chapter 5—the most interesting aspect of the authors' approach to understanding public opinion is their use of "thinking-aloud protocols."

Pioneered by Anders Ericsson and Herbert Simon (Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports As Data, 1984), thinking-aloud protocols are designed to provide clues to the cognitive processing of individuals as found in their verbal reports. By utilizing the thinking-aloud methodology, Shamir and Shamir provide rich insights into the "information environment" of Israeli public opinion. Indeed, their interpretations of their subjects' responses to questions concerning peace and the return of territories during the Intifada period are crucial to understanding the multidimensional facets which make up the information environment as well as the variability of that environment.

By virtue of their methodology—particularly the thinkingaloud protocols—the authors conclude that estimates of public opinion are an exercise in everyday reasoning—not formal reasoning as evidenced by exercises which measure problemsolving abilities. Thus, people use cognitive shortcuts and heuristics when assessing public opinion, but the process is far from infallible. In fact, citizens still make mistakes in their assessments—such as those manifested by pluralistic ignorance. These mistakes occur because the cognitive shortcomings of individuals do not allow for adequate information processing to take place.

Believing that typical public opinion research has ignored motivations, the authors delve into how citizens construct their opinions, what information they rely upon, and how well they discern the overall environment of public opinion. Thus, a major issue for the authors is the role which values play in the formation and maintenance of attitudes. These values can be assessed in light of the "climate of opinion" which exists in any society. This climate in which the values of the individuals are found is a socially derived phenomenon which is collective and shared. The climate itself is the result of societal processes and interactions, such as those manifested by the direct relations of individuals (one-on-one interactions), small groups, various social networks, and large aggregations of individuals and groups (a community or state). Shamir and Shamir find that individuals base their opinions on their own personal experiences, as well as those of their family, friends, and colleagues and the groups of which they are a part. These findings are interpolated from the thinking-aloud protocols and reinforce the authors' contention that public opinion is not simply a number manifested by a poll or a sampling of attitude distributions. Rather, it is a dynamic phenomenon which is created by the information environment in which it is found, but is also re-created at various times and shapes the opinions of those who find themselves in that information environment.

The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State: Institutions and Interest Group Power in the United States, France, and Japan. By Adam D. Sheingate. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 279p. \$45.00.

Grace Skogstad, University of Toronto

This is a helpful addition to the growing body of historical institutionalist literature that demonstrates the influence of macro- and sectoral-level institutions on policymaking. The central arguments, examined here with regard to agricultural policy, are two. First, institutional relationships among state and nonstate actors may facilitate one policy objective but impede other policy goals. Neither novel nor inconsistent with the literature, this proposition is advanced through elaboration of how various interrelationships between political parties and interest groups shape governments' policy capabilities. Second, Sheingate argues that the American institutional framework of dispersed authority and pluralism does not necessarily render governments incapable or subject to interest group capture. In advancing this proposition, he seeks to put paid to popular depictions of American agrarian politics as constituting iron triangles and all-powerful farm groups.

To elaborate these arguments and demonstrate the particular effects of American institutions on agricultural policymaking, Sheingate adopts a long historical perspective—from the 1860s through the close of the twentieth century—and contrasts developments in U.S. agricultural policy over this period with those in two countries with quite different institutional structures: France and Japan. The first objective is to demonstrate the interrelationships among the respective American and Japanese/French institutional structures of dispersed versus concentrated political authority, pluralist versus corporatist farm group representation, and separated versus aligned political party and farm group relations. The second goal is to show how these institutional relationships have affected governments' abilities to develop the "agricultural welfare state."

Sheingate argues that four phases are common to all three countries and present "a distinct policy task that requires different relations between government and farmers" (p. 21):

the era of promotional policies (1860s to 1910s), market intervention and production controls (1920s to 1940s), a mature subsidy regime (1950s and 1960s), and retrenchment (1970s onward). U.S. institutions, he maintains, facilitated the first and last phases and frustrated the second and third. The policy effects of the French and Japanese institutional frameworks were just the opposite, enabling market intervention and a mature subsidy regime but handicapping retrenchment policies.

This historical and comparative analysis is well executed. Although the national agricultural policy expert is unlikely to learn anything new—the discussion of Japanese and French agricultural policies draws heavily on secondary sources, and English sources alone in the case of Japan—the book makes a contribution by virtue of its historical sweep and the quality of research. Analyses are well documented, with good use of summary tables and figures to capture distinctive expenditure patterns, structural transformations in agriculture, and agricultural representation in national legislatures.

The Rise of the Agricultural Welfare State is not without limitations. In contrast to other historical institutionalists who seek to examine the role of ideas in policy making, as factors in their own right and in interaction with institutions, Sheingate makes no such attempt. The analyses here are resolutely structural, save for an occasional nod to the role of exogenous factors, such as the state of the economy and international developments. The author dismisses the possibility of ideational differences between the U.S. and Japan/France regarding agriculture's contribution to the public good (p. 36), and he makes no effort to examine the role they play in agricultural policy outcomes across the three countries. Institutions bear virtually all the explanatory weight for policy outcomes and government policy capabilities. To carry the burden, they are sometimes miscast (e.g., the relationship between French farm groups and the state is described as more corporatist than the reality of plural and competing farm groups warrants), and their importance is overplayed. An example of the latter is the claim regarding the significance of links between French conservative parties and the dominant farm group. There is evidence that the power of the French farm lobby transcends the ideology of the governing party, which suggests the need for an argument that goes beyond the organizational strength of French farmers and their linkages to political parties. It requires recognition of the role that ideas about the multifunctionality of agriculture play in agrarian politics in France and the European Union more generally.

On occassion, theory-building and empirical data are not fully compatible. Sheingate constructs a careful theoretical argument on how the U.S. institutional framework facilitated retrenchment of agricultural policies whereas the French and Japanese frameworks thwarted it. Retrenchment policies, he argues, require frameworks like the American system that facilitate blame avoidance, venue change, and entrepreneurship. But the argument is problematic empirically, undermined by expenditure data—Sheingate's chief indicator of retrenchment—subsequent to the 1996 agricultural reforms, which demonstrate sharp escalations in government transfers to American farmers. Expenditure data are only a partial measure of a government's capacity to effect radical reforms, and Sheingate's undue reliance on them undermines the strength of his own claims about the policy autonomy afforded governments by the American agricultural institutional framework. To his credit, Sheingate stresses the contingency of radical policy reform in the U.S. institutional framework and the role of exogenous factors, but he remains adamant that interest group "capture" is impossible in this institutional context (p. 239). The reservation of that appellation to state-farm group relations in Japan and France is probably not unwarranted. At least in the instance of Japan, however, it lacks the nuance of a relationship under stress as detailed by Aurelia George Mulgan, a leading authority on Japanese agrarian politics (*The Politics of Agriculture in Japan*, 2000).

These examples illustrate the book's capacity to provoke. They do not diminish its theoretical and empirical contribution to comparative public policy and to our understanding of the effect of institutions on policymaking and policy reform.

The Politics of Institutional Choice: The Formation of the Russian State Duma. By Steven S. Smith and Thomas F. Remington. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 180p. \$42.50 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

John Londregan, Princeton University

Politics of Institutional Choice is an important contribution to the literature on legislative institutions. The authors' backgrounds complement each other to good effect. The result is a study that is both conversant with the literature on legislative politics in the United States and Western Europe and solidly grounded in the politics of contemporary Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the adoption of reformed legislative institutions by the Russian Republic in 1993 left the newly elected representatives with the need to devise a working set of parliamentary institutions for the newly formed bicameral legislature. The "building materials" out of which these were fashioned—legislative committees, party caucuses, rules allocating agenda control to leaders—resemble those of the U.S. Congress and Western European parliaments, but the institutional structure was adapted to the needs of Russian politics.

Smith and Remington use the choices made by Russian legislators as they crafted their new parliament to learn about the motives of members of the Duma in particular and about legislators in general. The authors are interested in measuring the relative weight of what they call "policy incentives," "electoral incentives," and "party incentives." To do this they examine three attributes of legislators: policy preferences, measured on a one-dimensional continuum from Left to Right; mode of election, that is, some Duma members were elected from single-member districts (SMDs), and others were chosen through a system of proportional representation (PR); and faction membership. These three characteristics create a taxonomy of Duma members.

The authors link the three characteristics to "incentives," but this is problematic. For example, knowing that PR and SMD deputies behave differently does not directly measure the strength of reelection incentives (often refered to in other literature as "office motivation"). Differences in what it takes to be elected from SMD and PR constituencies may lead office-motivated deputies from SMD constituencies to behave differently from their PR counterparts, but this is only one of many possible explanations. Another is that ideologically motivated independent deputies with no interest in reelection may view competing on an artificial party list as an infringement on their independence, whereas ideologically motivated members of major parties find competing on PR lists more congenial. The link between incentives and a characteristic such as a deputy's mode of election is not airtight.

Smith and Remington use the multitude of institutional choices made during the mid-1990s by Duma members to gauge the effect of their three measured characteristics. They also look for, and find, evidence that preferences toward

institutional arrangements evolved over time as deputies learned. The taxonomy is both a strength and a weakness. It enables the authors to ask concrete questions that can be answered, but this comes at the cost of not being able to address fundamental questions about legislatures directly. For example, how important is the "information processing" roll of committees relative to their role as gatekeepers for political parties or special interests? To what extent do legislators join parties because of their policy preferences, and to what extent are their preferences the result of their party affiliation?

The bulk of the book uses several important decisions reached during the Duma's first session as "natural experiments." The authors look for statistically significant effects of mode of election, policy leanings, and membership in a legislative faction. They skillfully draw on a range of evidence, including roll-call votes, popular election returns, organizational data, and the results of two detailed attitude surveys of Duma members. The result is a useful array of what might be called "stylized facts." For example, party discipline was highest among the communists and was generally better explained by faction membership than by location along a Left-Right continuum.

The book is organized around a core of substantive chapters, each of which begins by setting forth a set of propositions. Various relevant roll-call votes and survey responses are then used to test the propositions. Those that survive become the book's stylized facts, such as proposition 2.2, which states that SMD deputies were more opposed to allowing parties to expel PR deputies who bolted their party. The authors could do a better job of tying the hypotheses to the literature on party control and mode of election. Some of this is done, but many propositions are introduced on the basis of their intuitive appeal, and the opportunity to draw wider connections seems not to be fully exploited.

Perhaps Smith and Remington should have noted more often the relationship between legislative politics and the executive in the Russian Federation. For example, they present convincing evidence that the parties on the Left tend to prefer more centralized parliamentary control that would allow the majority to legislate more easily, whereas the "reform" parties of the Right oppose such measures. Readers unaware of the proreform president's ability to bypass the legislature using his decree powers will find this affinity of proreform legislators for the status quo puzzling, even in an opposition controlled legislature. A modicum of extra background material would have made this important book more accessible to scholars who do not specialize on Russia.

The authors are conscientious about describing their data, and they use logit models that treat their explanatory variables, such as faction membership and mode of election, as "risk factors" for voting a certain way or expressing a certain opinion. This offers a useful window on the behavioral links in their data. There is a technical problem, however. We can think of the dependent variable in a logit model as taking on two values, "success" and "failure," and the model then estimates the probability of success conditional on the values for the explanatory variables. For example, Smith and Remington analyze a vote taken in the Duma in January 1994 on whether to require any group of deputies who want to organize into a faction to have at least 50 members.

In this case, "success" corresponds to voting in favor of the amendment, "failure" to voting against it, and the explanatory variables include indicators of the faction to which a member belongs. In Table 2.2 (p. 41) the authors report that every member of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) who participated in the roll-call vote was in favor, but no member of the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRES) voted for the amendment. An explanatory variable

such as membership in LDPR that perfectly predicts success (in this case, a "yes" vote) corresponds to a logit coefficient of "positive infinity." Likewise, a "no" vote corresponds to a logit coefficient of "negative infinity." This is tantamount to removing all the LDPR and PRES members from the dataset before estimating the remaining coefficients.

A classic mistake is to include a variable such as LDPR or PRES, estimate the logit model via maximum likelihood, and stop the computer algorithm when the likelihood function ceases to register large improvements. The results will typically be an implausibly large but statistically insignificant positive coefficient estimate for the variables that perfectly predict "success" and an implausibly large negative coefficient estimate for variables that perfectly predict "failure." This is just what we see in Table 2.3 (p. 43), and it is not an isolated event. The same problem arises at least seven other times in the same table and at various other points in the book (e.g., the "DPR" coefficient in all three columns of Table 2.5. the "NRP" coefficient in both columns of Table 5.6). The authors need to be sure that removing these hidden "perfect predictors" from their data and reestimating their model does not affect the remaining coefficient estimates.

Assuming that the substantive implications of this methodological problem are minor, the book hinges on the authors' energetic pursuit of stylized facts that link behavior with their taxonomy of member characteristics. Their approach has the advantage of posing concrete questions and finding answers: Do SMD deputies exhibit lower party discipline than their PR colleagues? "Yes," barely. But the connection with members' motives is unresolved: Do the high rates of party discipline on roll-call votes mean that members join factions that reveal their policy preferences (Smith and Remington think so), or do they reflect party whipping (the authors observed no welts during their interviews with legislators)? Yet, this is a generic problem faced by any study that is primarily empirical. The theoretical controversies in legislative politics remain controversial because they tie in ambiguously to objective measures.

The authors make a serious effort to address these wider questions. Although they do not set any of the major controversies to rest, their results bring the workings of the Duma into clearer focus.

The Left's Dirty Job: The Politics of Industrial Restructuring in France and Spain. By W. Rand Smith. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998. 363p. \$50.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Michael Loriaux, Northwestern University

W. Rand Smith compares socialist policies of industrial retrenchment in France and Spain during the 1980s and 1990s. Both governments sought to adapt their national economy to change in the global market, through investment incentives and labor policies, in a way that would avoid sectoral crisis or even collapse. They sought to achieve an "orderly exit" of labor from redundancy-plagued industrial sectors, notably steel and automobiles, through job retraining, help in establishing small businesses, relocation incentives, and improvements in the job market, not to mention such standard support mechanisms as severance payments and preretirement systems that supported the incomes of unemployed workers. There was a distinct convergence between French and Spanish policy around this kind of adaptive policy. Neither country after 1983 resisted global market trends through price controls or subsidies or trade protection, and neither government embraced market adjustment through more liberal policies of deregulation of capital or labor markets.

International structural factors do not explain this convergence, since those factors could just as well entail a more liberal response than the one the two governments adopted. A number of domestic factors do explain it. Weak industrial capacity is one. French industrial firms were in dire financial shape in the early 1980s, and Spain's legacy of backwardness and protectionism made its industry even more fragile. A second factor is the capacity of both states to intervene decisively to manage adjustment. Both had a powerful executive and centralized administration. Many of the industries that needed restructuring were state-owned. Furthermore, both governments enjoyed strong electoral and parliamentary majorities. The Spanish socialists were able to deploy policies that their more conservative predecessors had tried to implement but failed. The French socialists were able to effect a complete reversal in policy approach without major loss of parliamentary support. Finally, both governments informed policy with the same ideological preference for reconciling market efficiency with the activist state.

Smith devotes much of his analysis not to convergence but to differences between the two experiences. The Spanish elaborated strategies of adjustment that were more coherent than the French but in the end less effective. The author explains the greater incoherence of French policy with reference to the greater need in France to build a governing coalition among the disparate forces of the political and labor Left. The French Left that assumed power in 1981 was an alliance of a rather Stalinist Communist Party, a splinter of the old anticlerical liberal party, the Radicaux de Gauche, and a Socialist Party that was itself a coalition of four more or less independent political forces, ranging from the far left Centre d'Etudes de Recherche et d'Education Socialistes of Jean-Pierre Chevènement to the modernizing right wing of Michel Rocard's Parti Socialiste Unifié. Incoherence in policy reflects efforts to keep this wide-ranging coalition

The Spanish socialists were able to govern with minimal concerns about alliance politics. Felipe Gonzalez had solidified the Socialist Party by eliminating internal factions and by centralizing control over the party apparatus. The Spanish Communist Party was in decline, and the socialists were not compelled to enter into electoral alliance with them.

Smith explains the greater effectiveness of French policy with reference to the greater interventionist capacity of the French state and the greater weakness of French labor unions. Divisions among the unions facilitated the implementation of policy in France, whereas labor unity occasionally threatened implementation of policy in Spain. This dynamic was most apparent in the steel industry. Organized labor in neither country was able to deter the government from adapting steel to a slow market, but Spanish unions mobilized more effectively and extracted more concessions. Despite many protests in French coal and steel regions there was little effective action, in part because of divergent analyses among the unions regarding the nature of the crisis and the appropriate response. The independent Confederation Française Democratique du Travail sympathized with the need to adapt the industry to the slow market, but the procommunist Confederation Generale du Travail sought to subsidize investment and retain labor.

Smith eschews monocausal explanations and provides a rich, textured political analysis that he lays out with great clarity. He returns again and again to the importance of coalition building and the politics that informs it. In so doing, he reinvests agency in the actors who make policy and demotes the importance of international structural constraints. This is a good, rewarding book.

Unemployment and Government: Genealogies of the Social. By William Walters. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 240p. \$64.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Stephen McBride, Simon Fraser University

William Walters probes understandings of the concepts of unemployment that developed and, to an extent, succeeded one another over a hundred years in British history. The British case has its own unique trajectory but parallels developments elsewhere, so the book's interest is not confined to specialists in British politics or social history. Walters applies a Foucauldinspired governmentality perspective to unemployment in order both to overcome the routine and familiar understandings that have become attached to the concept and, more broadly, to contribute to what he terms a genealogy of the social. The latter refers to a particular sphere of governance as exemplified by the practices, techniques, and institutions devised to govern processes and problem populations, in this case the unemployed. Genealogical approaches are suspicious of generalization and systematization and hold that "we can learn from the particular and the contextual" (p. 8). Thus, Walters argues, the government of unemployment will be instructive for understanding social governance generally.

Walters charts this route into the unemployment question and presents a valuable account of many of its facets. The discussion of the transition of unemployment from a moral problem (based on individual failings), to a social problem, with unemployment just one of the risks inherent in the operation of an industrial economy (and one sufficiently predictable that it could be insured against), to an economic problem (lack of aggregate demand) that appropriate Keynesian measures could counteract and control is nicely done. Similarly, the examination of administrative practices and the way they link to and reinforce certain concepts of unemployment is insightful.

The duality of purpose, in which the genealogy of the social looms as theoretically most important, leads Walters to a series of disclaimers throughout the study that seek to define what the book is not. It is not concerned with the historical experience of unemployment or its causes, and it is not a history of unemployment or of the welfare state. Rather, it is a historical sociology of the governance of unemployment. This technique serves to situate the book but perhaps is overdone and certainly lends a defensive tone to the discussion. This is compounded by the determined avoidance of confronting or testing the interpretation against those from other perspectives.

ing the interpretation against those from other perspectives. At times the disclaimers "protest too much." Walters obviously does not want the book to be considered simply as a history of ideas; yet, in pursuit of his own project, he provides a very good history of the idea of unemployment. Notwithstanding his emphasis on the institutional construction of unemployment, or techniques for governing unemployment and the unemployed, it is the ideas (definitions, conceptualization, and so on) that come through most prominently. The institutions are enmeshed in the production of ideas, new forms of knowledge about unemployment, new ways of categorizing and thinking about the subject. Conceived in this way an institution ostensibly set up to deal with unemployment "does not simply find unemployment already there. It produces unemployment.... In a sense, we are talking about the invention of unemployment" (p. 47).

The author does not consider unemployment a preexisting condition; rather, it is constructed—through discourse and through the practice of government agencies, such as the labor exchanges of the early twentieth century, established to deal with the recently defined phenomenon. This analysis contrasts with social policy or structural accounts of unemployment. But Walters does not confront that literature

directly; his account evades it and is offered as another way of looking at the unemployment issue, a supplementary account perhaps.

The social conditions that made it possible to "invent" unemployment are alluded to, and it is recognized (p. 15) that changes in economic and occupational structure played a role in developing the notion of employment (and unemployment). But the failure to discuss adequately the maturation of a capitalist labor market and its first real crisis, the Great Depression in the 1870s, weakens the plausibility of this account of the arrival of the concept of unemployment in that period. The view that concepts reflect reality rather than constitute it, and institutions respond to problems rather than invent them, has much to commend it; avoidance is not an effective strategy for dealing with that position.

With Keynesianism, Walters observes, the seemingly natural link between governance of unemployment and simulataneous government of the unemployed was temporarily broken. "Temporarily" because recent conceptions of unemployment have retured to the notion of individual culpability for the experience, as expressed, for example, in explanations that rely on deficiency of skills and poor attitudes among the unemployed. On this point, Walters presents a case study of New Labour's "New Deal," a work for welfare program. The initiative is presented as steering a path between the neoliberalism of the Thatcher Conservatives and the statism of old Labour.

The case rests on the view that the New Deal is partly an ethical and moral project and thus "is shielded from the criticism that training and jobseeking schemes are somewhat limited in tackling persistent unemployment because they do little to affect the aggregate supply of jobs; it is about the ethical as much as the economic" (p. 132). Others claim that the New Deal creates few jobs, perhaps 80% of which would have been created anyway, and from which 60% of the participants drop out, and might regard it as an exercise in the politics of manipulation rather than morality. But addressing such claims is beyond the defined scope of the book, which consistently side-steps confrontation with other perspectives.

Ultimately, therefore, the genealogy of the social perspective, with its emphasis on discourse and the "invention" of social phenomena, limits itself by its failure to engage with interpretations that see institutions as responding, in various and often contradictory ways, to social problems that are, however, extant rather than invented.

**Power and Wealth in Rural China: The Political Economy of Institutional Change.** By Susan H. Whiting. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 348p. \$59.95.

Benedict Stavis, Temple University

While this book does not quite cover the broad range promised by its title, it does offer a sophisticated analysis of the privatization of rural industry in China, thick in social science theory and rich with empirical data.

Whiting poses an important question: Why did the Chinese communist system endorse the expansion of private ownership of rural industries, rather than emphasizing collectively owned enterprises? What were the administrative links and feedback mechanisms among central policymakers, local administrators, and China's entrepreneurs and rural workers that led to privatization? For decades, a primary presumption in the scholarship of socialist systems was that communist bureaucrats had such deep vested interests in state ownership of economic enterprises that they would never convert. But Whiting reaches the startling conclusion that it was easier for local officials to tax and control private enterprises

than socialist enterprises that were embedded in the state structure.

The tax system is crucial to her analysis. Most tax revenue came from the turnover and income taxes on rural industry. Taxes went up to the central government, but a share was retained locally, so local officials had an interest in expanding local industry. At the same time, local officials were given extensive local obligations, including education, health, etc., so they needed more revenue. Thus, they needed to increase rural industry and other sources of discretionary local income. They would be rewarded with promotions and higher salaries if they succeeded. Whiting's key point is that local officials were eager to increase their revenue, and higher levels agreed on this (Chapter 3).

In regions where the central government had earlier encouraged rural industry in the collective sector (rural Shanghai and Wuxi provide case studies for Whiting for this pattern of development), further development of collective industry was the easiest solution. Local leaders already had much influence over the collective sector and could easily get information to obtain tax revenues from them. However, and this is one of Whiting's key discoveries, local collective industry deliberately kept profits low by inflating expenses. They overstated the number of employees and expanded entertainment costs to shift expenses to tax deductions. As enterprises avoided taxes, local officials benefited indirectly from better economic and social conditions, but, at the same time, their tax revenue for themselves and higher levels was limited. (This subterfuge may also have resulted in Chinese and foreign analysts overstating the inefficiencies of the collective system.)

In areas where the central government had not helped to develop collective rural industry, private rural industry got a head start. (Whiting's case study work on this pattern is in Yueqing, near Wenzhou in southern Chejiang.) Rural officials had essentially no way of knowing the financial accounts of private industry for tax purposes, so they developed a far simpler institutional environment. A new form of enterprise, the "share-holding cooperative enterprise," was created. It was a private firm, with the restriction that it had to reinvest 50% of profits and contribute at least 25% of profits to public accumulation funds (p. 160). Moreover, a simplified sales tax of about 9-10% of gross production replaced a complex set of taxes that required far more intrusive information to compute. Both private entrepreneurs and local officials gauged this a reasonable deal. The government got reasonably high tax revenues fairly easily. Moreover, if competition and overproduction started to push prices down and banks refused to loan money to failing firms, the local officials had no financial obligation to private firms if they went into debt and possible eventual bankruptcy. At the same time, private entrepreneurs got their private investment protected with a new, safe legal status (p. 177).

Thus Whiting arrives at an important and counter-intuitive insight, that local officials could do their jobs and please their superiors more easily by dealing with private enterprises than with collective ones. By the late 1990s, private ownership was becoming better accepted and protected and was expanding as a part of China's economic system.

At a macro-political level, her insights show that Chinese citizens do make inputs into the development of state policy. The modality is not through an institutionalized formal democratic process of elections between competing parties; rather it is by withholding resources from the state by locally sanctioned tax minimization and forcing the central government to adopt new policies that encounter less resistance.

From a methodological perspective, Whiting's book is a wonderful model. Her use of public documents is superb. She

has found a wide range of yearbooks, government directives, and collections of articles on both local and national levels that provide a very full image of rural industrial development. She has supplemented this with 252 interviews, so that she can convert cold laws and statistics into living social, economic, and political processes. Quantitative analyses of economic and financial data further confirm some of her hypotheses. She proves that one does not need to take the risks of internal (nei pu) documents or secret materials to do in-depth research in China.

While Whiting's argument is persuasive, it is not necessarily complete. I wish that she had explored more systematically whether officials encourage private economic development because it gives them more opportunities to help their children, other relatives and friends, and maybe even themselves to become successful businessmen and leap above the financial constraints imposed on public servants. She tantalizes us with hints, "[L]ocal party secretaries and township executives ... translat[ed] their political power into ownership of a relatively large number of individual shares in the most valuable firms, often at highly favorable prices" (p. 156), but does not treat this issue with the same rigor that she does her other hypotheses.

All in all, this is a fine contribution to our understanding of the internal dynamics of China's policy process as it continues to reform the economic system. It reminds us of the central importance of public finance institutions and policies to sustain a state. It is clear that the Chinese Communist Party understands this requirement.

Continuities in Poland's Permanent Transition. By Harald Wydra. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 257p. \$65.00.

Arista Maria Cirtautas, University of Virginia

In studying and analyzing the postcommunist "transition" countries, it is becoming ever more apparent that what calls for explanation is not only change, as expressed in the trajectory of liberal capitalist reforms, but also continuity. Even in the face of profound institutional transformation, mentalities and behaviors associated with the past are not readily giving way to new modalities of thought and action. Accordingly, one way of approaching the problem of explaining the variability of regime outcomes in the former Soviet bloc is to focus on the particular institutional and discursive forms that the interplay of change and continuity has produced in each country. In his work on Poland, Harald Wydra encourages us to analyze this interplay from a particular point of viewone that is rooted in the lived experiences of the populations involved, as opposed to how countries measure up with respect to progress toward liberal capitalist outcomes. Consequently, he argues that even as discontinuity and change have characterized the "first reality" of post-1989 institutionbuilding, important continuities mark the "second reality of images, myths and mentalities" (p. 26). In turn, this "second reality" provides "fundamental reference points in post-1989 Poland and Eastern Europe" (p. 25) that infuse the new institutional realities with unique, culturally determined, content and meaning.

As Wydra sees it, neither elites nor publics have been autonomous or free to respond to changing circumstances according to detached rational cost-benefit calculations. Instead, their responses have been driven, at the unconscious level, by inherited structures of thought that generate collective patterns of interpretation and "processes of situational adjustment" (p. 22). These patterns, while fluid and indeterminate as to how specifically individuals or groups might combine elements of the inherited structures, are

nonetheless predictable within the parameters of a society's or group's given cultural habitus. Although these inherited mentalities have most often been characterized as part of the negative legacies of communism, as in the "homo sovieticus" syndrome, Wydra remains refreshingly free of such valueladen terminology. Nor does he assume that the less educated social groups are the sole carriers of inherited mentalities. Indeed, his empirical focus is on Poland's political elites and how their choices and actions have been impacted by continuities at the level of the second reality. This is consistent with his theoretical aim of "detaching the concept of second reality from a functional meaning in the service of the antagonism of state vs. society" (p. 17). For Wydra, it is too simplistic and ultimately misleading to reduce the continuities of the "passions and identities" of contemporary Eastern Europe to a single faultline that pits unreconstructed societies against "modernizing" state elites. In contrast, Wydra directs our attention toward a more generalizable condition that continues to structure mentalities and situational responses regardless of social class. This condition is characterized by the perception of "the menacing dissolution of order." Hence, in the particular circumstances of Poland, "second realities should be regarded as subjective-emotional expressions of desire to leave an unwanted or unsatisfactory situation" (p. 17) and return to order or normalcy. According to Wydra, this desire has continuously shaped Polish political culture from 1945, and even before, to the present

Central to the sustainability of the "pre-political identities" inherited from the communist and precommunist past has been the condition of liminality or "permanent transition" in which Poland has found itself for most of the 20th century. Or, to put it more precisely, Polish elites have consistently interpreted their country's condition as one of transition from an undesirable state to a more desirable one. In this regard, the post-1989 political establishment is no different from the post-WWII communist leadership. The empirical substance of Wydra's work, and the bulk of the chapters, elaborates on the three main consequences of this worldview: (1) A utopian public discourse that is often couched in terms of mirror images or "mimetic conflicts;" (2) the organized expression of this discourse in the "anti-structures" of "moments of nationwide communities" (p. 25), most dramatically illustrated by Solidarity; and (3) the "backwardness" of Polish political elites resulting from "their imitation of blurred images of democracy and capitalism and their recurrent reference to images of the past" (p. 30).

The major contribution of Wydra's work is not, however, his empirical findings, since he relies almost exclusively on secondary sources. The greater value clearly lies in Wydra's efforts to analyze, on the basis of the Polish case, the interactions between the objective socioeconomic conditions of backwardness and the "subjective-emotional" interpretation of these conditions, and how these interpretations become consequential in their own right. This mode of analysis draws our attention to the fact that although the Central and East European countries share many objective structural attributes of backwardness and late development, the ways in which these attributes have historically been interpreted and internalized have varied: Variances which in turn have contributed to the differential outcomes of the post-1989 period. Thus, while Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic currently seem similarly poised to escape the debilitating "inbetween" state of backwardness by becoming fully consolidated democracies en route to European Union membership, the conflicts and cleavages that inform the political struggles and experiences of elites and citizens in these countries remain quite distinct as a result of different political traditions

or, in Wydra's terms, the continuities of differing "national and social habitus" (p. 192).

Ultimately, however, Wydra's contribution to a cultural theory of change and continuity in postcommunist polities is undermined by inconsistencies in the logic of his argument, an underelaborated analytical framework, and the lack of serious engagement with alternative approaches. There is, for example, an apparent glaring inconsistency between Wydra's assertion that his "understanding of transition should be separated both from the fashionable 'transition to democracy' and from transitional post-communism as an abnormal state of affairs" (p. 202) and the implicit reference point of Western practices and mentalities employed by the author. Polish politics is, in the final analysis, evaluated according to its "considerable distance from Western democracies in terms of political trust, social cohesion, and stable political identities" (p. 204). Given such an underlying comparison between a Polish "national and social habitus" characterized by the pursuit of (unrealizable) utopian principles and the (unrealistic) perpetual demand for change, as contrasted with the author's own idealized understanding of the "normal" habitus of Western democracies, it is at times rather hard to see the difference between Wydra's approach and those that explicitly treat "transitional post-communism as an abnormal state of affairs." Such inconsistencies become even more problematic in the absence of a fully developed analytical framework. Wydra suggests that his analysis is guided by insights derived from the work of Norbert Elias, Arnold van Gennep, Victor Turner, Rene Girard, and Bruno Latour (see, especially, page 25). Little effort, however, is made to relate these insights to one another in a systematic and coherent way that would help the reader understand the author's claims, where his work fits into the existing literature on cultural theory and how, in substance, his approach might deviate from alternative approaches to the study of postcommunism. Surprisingly, Wydra does not refer to the growing body of literature on the cultural aspects of postcommunist transition. As a result, when the author claims that "continuities in Poland's transition are neither evolutionary nor linear, but repetitive and ritual-like" (p. 191), not only is the contrast itself opaque, but it is unclear how his overall analysis of the continuity of "second reality" images and myths differs from other culturally oriented studies of contemporary Eastern Europe.

In short, this work should be read both with a sense of appreciation for the author's efforts to recast our analytical perceptions of the transition and with a critical sense of how this project might be improved upon.

#### International Relations

German Unification and the Union of Europe: The Domestic Politics of Integration Policy. By Jeffrey Anderson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 240p. \$59.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Beverly Crawford, University of California, Berkeley

German unification presents conceptual puzzles of which comparativists dream. Has this monumental change, which boils down to full German sovereignty, growth of German power, and the emergence of new domestic political interests, altered Germany's relationship to Europe? Is Germany withdrawing from or dominating European institutions? Does the new Germany still tread its well-worn postwar path of the model "European"? The questions are important for our understanding of the sources of policy change and continuity as well as the process of regional integration in general and the course of European integration in particular. In which issue areas has Germany's postunification policy broken with the past? Is the break caused by changes in domestic politics or the increase in the power of a unified and fully sovereign Germany? Have policy changes impeded or enhanced the speed and character of European unification? Are important continuities evident? If both policy continuity and change are present, why the variation? These are the questions Jeffrey Anderson tackles in this timely and important volume.

In the decade since unification Germany's European policy has been characterized by both continuity and change. Situated securely—but not exclusively—at the domestic level of analysis, Anderson's explanation relies on the particular interaction of institutions, ideas, and interests before and after unification. He makes an important distinction between the constitutive and regulative dimensions of the European integration process, arguing that Germany has exhibited seamless continuity in constitutive politics because German "identity" was so entwined with Europe. Furthermore, as European integration deepened during the postwar period, Germany participated in shaping European institutions and securing its domestic interests within the European Union (EU).

It is within regulative policy that the real puzzle is revealed. In some areas (trade and internal market affairs) Germany's postunification policy remained constant but in others (environmental and energy policies) exhibited subtle shifts, and is still others (structural funds, state aid, and agricultural support) it underwent dramatic changes. The key to continuity and change rests with domestic political interests, their response to the unification process, the degree to which domestic actors' desire for policy change resonated with longstanding German economic beliefs, and the availability of domestic and EU institutions to translate actor demands into policy choice. When interests conformed to prevailing ideas and when institutional channels were available, domestic actors were able to push through their policy preferences. When their interests contradicted prevailing ideas and when few institutional channels were available for their voice to be heard, their policy demands were thwarted. Entrenched ideas and the institutions that support them are of crucial explanatory importance in cases in which the demands of domestic actors pose a challenge to prevailing policy; they are of little direct importance when they support—or at least do not clash with—the interests demanding policy change.

Anderson provides solid empirical evidence for this argument. Unification put the entire German economy under considerable stress and affected the interests of all economic actors. Eastern firms, labor unions, and state governments clamored for trade subsidies to enhance competitiveness, but these contradicted prevailing liberal beliefs. Bonn soundly resisted domestic pressure from the East for policy change. In stark contrast, domestic actors from the new Länder success $fully \, pushed \, for \, radical \, policy \, departure \, that \, would \, garner \, for \,$ themselves more EU aid, subsidies, and development funds. Successful policy change rested on an institutional structure in these sectors that permitted eastern domestic interests to be "partners" in the policymaking process. And the ideas supporting previous policy could be stretched enough to incorporate and justify the policy shift.

More nuanced changes occurred when both German federal and EU institutions favored the demands of German domestic interests, even when these demands appeared to fly in the face of prevailing ideas. These more subtle changes were evident in the environmental regulatory sector. Strict national regulations, exporters had always argued, hampered Germany's competitive advantage. Before unification Germany ignored this objection had led the effort to strengthen EU environmental regulation as German domestic regulations stiffened. Ideas about environmental protection prevailed over interests. But when German export competitiveness sharply declined after unification, German officials were less eager to see increasingly strict environmental policy and attempted to slow the EU process as the German process slowed.

In the energy sector, liberal ideas had favored deregulation, but hard coal interests and postwar decisions to provide a sure and cheap energy supply made Bonn drag its feet on deregulation. After unification, the cost-benefit calculations changed: Energy-intensive industries, favoring gas and oil over coal, were always eager to deregulate. Now their lobbying efforts paid off, especially in Brussels, where the European Commission also favored rapid deregulation: Bonn, hampered by hard coal interests and institutional constraints, favored a slower approach. But the economic crisis triggered by unification provided the impetus to speed it up. A coalition between German exporters and the European Commission provided the needed push to accelerate energy deregulation at the European level. That push finally gave Bonn the upper hand over coal interests and brought more rapid energy deregulation in line with liberal ideas. In these two issue areas, it was the speed of European policy change that was affected, rather than Germany's overall policy stance. Prevailing ideas about environmental protection and liberalization remained intact.

This convincing argument makes an important contribution to the scholarly debate over the sources of states' foreign policies. Some analysts behind that national policy changes result from external pressures—growing or declining power in the international system or the increasing role of international institutions in shaping states' preferences. Others look to domestic forces in the policy process as the primary cause of change. Anderson makes a convincing case for domestic explanations of policy preference. Yet, he rejects monocausal accounts, and his careful analysis shows precisely how ideas, institutions, and interests—at both the domestic and international levels—interact to influence policy choice. Unlike arguments that bundle ideas and institutions together in their explanations, Anderson gives institutions independent explanatory status, apart from the ideas that gave birth to them.

Will this argument stand the test of time as unification pressures recede? Germany is increasingly less likely to face the same mix of domestic pressures in the future, and Anderson's argument relies heavily on unification and its domestic consequences as a cause of change. Nonetheless, his analytic framework will continue to be useful under other conditions that affect one or more of the three variables.

Can the lessons learned from these seven cases be generalized? Indeed, the case of dramatic postunification changes in German export control policy seems to defy Anderson's account. Before unification, Germany's regulations controlling the export of commercial technology with military usefulness to potential adversaries were liberal, lax, and minimal, and the Germans consistently opposed the stricter control policies of European partners and the United States. The logic of export regulation was in direct conflict with Bonn's liberal trade ideas, and tight policy networks between government and in-

dustry in favor of loose controls ensured lax enforcement and minimal regulation. Institutional forces favored exporters' interests; indeed, the major industrial association virtually wrote Germany's export control regulations. Clearly, ideas, interests, and institutions combined to ensure minimal export control in the face of strong external pressures.

After 1989, however, despite heated protests from industry, Germany's export control system underwent its most dramatic transformation in history. It moved from a reluctant controller to a fervent proponent of tight controls, and its laws were among the strictest in the world. Within the EU, Germany successfully pushed for a common export control policy, and initial EU guidelines mirrored the new German legislation. Institutional changes in Germany favored tighter controls and stricter enforcement. Neither ideas, nor institutions, nor interests can explain this shift; their interaction had long worked to ensure a liberal export control policy. And exporter interests in lax controls only grew stronger after unification as competitiveness declined. Perhaps in this case, analysts must look to external pressure associated with growing German power and growing responsibility for regional security.

This objection, however, does not undermine the significance of this important book. Anderson has gone far in strengthening both the argument for domestic explanations of foreign policy preferences and arguments about the domestic sources of EU policy. Scholars will benefit greatly from the use of his analytic framework, and the argument will long continue to pose a significant challenge to those who claim that Germany's foreign policy will now be shaped primarily by external forces and its growing power on the European and international scene.

Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals. By Gary Jonathan Bass. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 402p. \$29.95.

Arthur W. Blaser, Chapman University

This excellent book is a worthwhile acquisition for anyone and any library, but it is an essential one for those concerned with international law, international organization, and war crimes. Bass combines the best of his scholarly political science training with his experience as a former correspondent with *The Economist*.

Bass offers comparative case studies of war crimes trials, including successes and failures. There are separate chapters on the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars, the trials at Leipzig following World War I, the trials at Constantinople after the massacre of Armenians, Nuremberg, and the Hague Tribunal on the former Yugoslavia. Along the way Bass makes points about other trials, such as the Rwanda tribunal and the Tokyo tribunals after World War II. These chapters are sandwiched between first and last chapters that offer propositions and arguments about war crimes trials.

This is a contribution to international relations that acknowledges extensive reliance on a work in political theory, Judith Shklar's *Legalism* (1986). As Shklar argues about Nuremberg, Bass claims that legalism, or "due process across borders" (p. 20), makes a difference. It has not made for perfect solutions, but it is preferable to the alternative, vengeance. It is the "least awful alternative" (p. 304). Furthermore, Bass's argument is important with respect to three related divisions in the study of world politics. His words will not be the last about these divisions, but they are eloquent and well supported by evidence.

First is the idealist-realist distinction. Bass belongs to the former group, although he is careful to point out that legalism

is a product of liberalism, not democracy. Indeed, it may work at its best when it operates to limit democratic decisions. Bass also is careful not to claim too much for the tribunals; he is anything but a utopian. Even the great success at Nuremberg, he remind us, was achieved at great odds and was not unblemished. His work reminds me of psychologist William James's distinction in *Pragmatism* (1907) between the "Tough-Minded" and "Tender-Minded." When Bass offers countering opinions to those of Henry Kissinger in *A World Restored* (1957), for example, he is careful to provide plenty of evidence. For this section it comes from extensive documentary research; in contemporary cases, such as the chapter on the Hague (Yugoslavia) tribunal, Bass includes interviews with many of the principals.

Bass argues that tribunals may offer punishment that vengeance cannot. He describes the legalist rationale: "For public attitudes to shift, criminal leaders must be tried—their aura of mystery shattered by showing their weaknesses and

stupidities" (p. 288).

Although I suggested in the first paragraph that this book is essential reading for those interested in international law, Bass specifically states this is one of three subjects he does not cover. The other two are domestic transitions to democracy and international institutions (p. 34). His concern is international war crimes proceedings. Although Bass does not get mired in abstract discussion of how states ought to behave according to international lawyers, he does describe how they have behaved, and how rules can and have affected this.

The second distinction is between traditional and descriptive approaches to international relations as opposed to more scientific and quantitative ones. Bass's work exemplifies the strength of the former approaches. The book is comparative history at its best and is very readable. There is some conceptual discussion (useful terminology to some readers, needless jargon to others) in the footnotes at the end of chapters.

Bass's argument is easy to follow owing to effective use of headings and subheadings. Figures or tables would have been useful; I found myself constructing some to clarify the attributes of some tribunals but not others. Bass acknowledges that he does not offer precise typologies of liberal and illiberal states and that there is great variety within the categories he writes about, but he points out that for his case studies a simple dichotomy is sufficient.

Finally there is the distinction, about which Bass convincingly argues that many analysts have been much too rigid, between international relations before and after World War II. He points out that the phrase "crimes against humanity" was used by Soviet Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov to describe the massacre of Armenians and by others to describe conditions during the 1910s.

Most of my quibbles concern the book that might have been written. Bass could have said more about Rwanda and the Tokyo trials, particularly about Justice Pal's lengthy dissent. (Bass easily discredits self-serving Soviet statements at Nuremberg; Pal's Tokyo dissent would have made interesting fodder for refutation.) Although Bass acknowledges that liberal states have shown lots of self-interest, he convincingly argues that they are the only ones to have created war crimes tribunals. They also have a record of human rights atrocity, including slaughter of indigenous populations, slavery, forced relocation, and investment strategies that induce dependency (in many accounts linked to war crimes). Bass argues the merits of a universalistic worldview (p. 23); critics of Western states' policies charge that such a worldview has brought disastrous consequences to those who do not fit it. Bass comments on the new International Criminal Court (ICC) but could have offered more. His thoughts include: "If there is to be, despite American objections, a serious permanent war crimes tribunal—the ICC—then liberal governments will have to make a far stronger commitment to international justice than they have in the 1990s" (p. 282).

By offering comparative case studies, this book fills a void. Other recent works are comparable in some ways but not others. Steven Ratner and Jason Abrams (Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (2d ed., 2001), provide many useful points of comparison but do not offer the historical breadth of Bass's book. That is important because, as Bass reminds us, "the Leipzig war trials were a disaster" (p. 80). As he observes, it will be to our peril if we remember Nuremberg but forget about Leipzig and other precedents in designing policies toward war crimes in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. By placing the Nuremberg tribunal in the context of others. Bass allows for more accurate appreciation of that tribunal. The book contains telling anecdotes about U.S. foreign policymakers (including Henry Stimson, Madeline Albright, and William Cohen). It is suitable for course use and is accessible to upper division undergraduates and graduate students.

**Cambodia Confounds the Peacemakers, 1979–1998.** By Macalister Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998. 272p. \$39.95.

David W. Roberts, University of Ulster

This book takes the reader through the complexities of the search for peace in the first chapters and through the provision of the UNTAC operation up to 1993. It concludes with an overview of the 1998 elections, and in between there is a section dedicated to the period between the two polls. The first section is reasonable, but the text is repetitive and it repeats what several others have already written (Trevor Findlay, Cambodia: The Legacy and Lessons of UNTAC, 1995, and various works by David P. Chandler, Ben Kiernan, and Michael Vickery). The analysis reflects that by several of the recognized Khmer scholars, and is useful to read, but while the analysis is insightful regarding Western peacemaking processes and the Khmer resistance at various points, it does not question assumptions regarding the overwriting of Western peace paradigms onto Khmer political culture. This has a distinctly different historical evolution and an equally dissimilar set of contemporary values regarding the notions of opposition, power sharing, and social harmony. The limits of this type of analysis are present throughout the work and are probably best illustrated by the statement that the violence of July 1997 "transformed UNTAC's enterprise from what may have been termed a 'limited success' to a failed rescue of a failed state" (p. 265).

First, Cambodia was not, in 1991, a failed state. I found that most of its primary organs worked reasonably well, other things being equal. There was no anarchy, no brutal police state, and no war by October. Trade was conducted at all levels, fuel was available for commerce, and capital city hospitals were functioning at varying levels. Second, shortcomings in the operation were not UNTAC's fault, but the fault of the Paris Peace Agreement. This vessel carried peace not for Khmers in the first instance, but for the Perm-5's concerns, specifically the United States and China, regarding their relations with Viet Nam. It was not UNTAC's fault that they could not conduct an unfeasible (in practice) mandate. More importantly, the statement reflects a simplistic analysis of the peace process in and above Cambodia and seems to reflect a notion of Western superiority and the poverty of Khmer politics. This is quite noticeable when the writers discuss how a Japanese proposal, with European backing and support, provided for Prince Ranariddh to reenter Cambodia for the 1998 election after he had run away prior to the July 1997 fighting. They state that "once again, members of the international community helped provide a pathway to open Cambodia's deadlocked politics" (p. 303). But it equally can be argued that there was no domestic deadlock. A new prime minister had been appointed, the Assembly continued in its deliberations, and stability ensued in Phnom Penh, where it had been absent before. Some might view the writers' perspectives as patronizing.

These perspectives are also reflected in the title of the work. It seems that Cambodia has "confounded" the "peacemakers." That is, the West, irreproachable for all its valiant efforts at peacemaking, has been undermined by the efforts primarily, if the book is to be believed, of an arch-strongman, Prime Minister Hun Sen. It must be considered that the virtuous West ignored Cambodia in its darkest years and then created a peace framework ordained to ensure the inclusion of the Khmer Rouge in a political settlement.

That framework also rejected domestic peace overtures, such as those between Sihanouk and Hun Sen in 1987 and 1989, which would have dispensed with the need for foreign intervention. One senses a certain set of values that that are "offended" by Cambodian actions that undermine a Western "rescue," when in fact the Khmer elite were prevented from undertaking their own peace plans. The man most responsible for either steering Cambodian decision making or resisting Western planning is clearly Mr. Hun Sen, and he is the target of uncritical and partisan analysis. There is a strong sense that Hun Sen has been responsible, mainly, for the demise of the West's valiant attempts to "save" a nation. This is strongly evident in the section on the July 1997 "coup." This term is repeated frequently throughout the book in an uncritical manner that does not even consider the possibility that Hun Sen was forced to defend himself against Ranariddh's illegal practices or, indeed, that any other explanations exist. Since July 1997, a raft of evidence has been provided, some by the Khmer Rouge, that Ranariddh was involved in private deals with the former guerrillas aimed at militarily changing the balance of power against his coalition partner.

The treatment of sources is also problematic in this context. For example, Brown and Zasloff subtly challenge the veracity of Ranariddh's smuggling of private weapons disguised as machine parts by stating that Hun Sen "accused" Ranariddh of the above crime (p. 262). Similarly, in the Epilogue, the authors conceal through omission that Ranariddh was proven guilty of smuggling weapons, etc. They write that Hun Sen "contended" that Ranariddh had been guilty, and that Hun "postured" various things (p. 302). In fact, Ranariddh confessed to the act, and the papers were full of the story at the time. Given this, and given the authors' considerable use of local papers from Phnom Penh, this has been curiously avoided or neglected.

Indeed, the book leaves the impression that Hun Sen is the bogeyman of Cambodian politics. Again, such analysis is uncritical. Identifying him as authoritarian is right in some respects, but most scholars of this subject, including those who are diametrically opposed on many issues, agree that both Ranariddh and Rainsy are equally authoritarian in nature; however, this is not addressed. Indeed, Rainsy seems to have grown a halo in some parts of the book, most notably in Chapter 8, which reviews the period 1993–1997. The authors do, however, redeem themselves in recognizing Rainsy's virulent racism against Viet Namese people during and after the 1998 elections. Indeed. This section (Epilogue) contains much to commend it. It offers a clear review of the polling and, because the authors were present, recreates the atmosphere

of the time, reminding even of the 1993 election. It also avoids the tedious accusations that the election was critically rigged by the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and neutrally considers the arguments concerning the role of the CPP-biased National Election Commission in the preelection period. But once again, omission is evident. Concerning the period after the July fighting, the authors note "extra judicial killings" and then lend legitimacy and credibility to that statistic by attributing it to the U.N. Special Representative for Human Rights (no less). But there is no mention of the fact that four of those "dead" miraculously reappeared alive, undermining the credibility of the Human Rights body and embarrassing the Special Representative. Equally, no mention is made that some of the killings were undoubtedly score settling and turf wars, not extra-judicial political acts blamable on the CPP elite.

Clearly much effort was involved in the writing of this book, and the authors have studied the politics closely and visited the country. However, their analysis is often weak and evidently biased against a key political actor, undermining the neutrality and credibility of the book. The work also does not criticize the peace plan for propriety in the context of Khmer conflict management culture and does not discuss whether the shortcomings in the peace plan of a cultural nature led to more, but different, conflict within Cambodia. As a U.S. Ambassador once noted, "In 1991, we settled the Cambodian war. In 1997, the Cambodians settled the Cambodian war." Read with caution.

Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice. Edited by Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury. New York: St Martin's, 2000. 258p. \$75.00.

Kim Richard Nossal, McMaster University

Edited collections usually have relatively clear provenance. Most often they are brought to life by colleagues who are intrigued by an issue or a question; they then organize a conference (or a collection) around that theme and seek a publisher for the resulting collection. Such works are commonly marked by the putative expectations associated with an edited book: There is an attempt by the editors to present the unifying theme desired (if not demanded) by most university presses and the academic reviewers whose reports determine which way the thumbs go. Usually the editors attempt to herd the cats they have invited to participate—and ask that the contributors address unifying themes or take desired approaches. Even if the cats do no more than tip a ritual bow in the direction of the unifying theme, the editors normally use the introduction and conclusion to craft at least the appearance of unification.

This collection of essays on international sanctions, published in the widely respected Macmillan series on international political economy, has none of these signposts to its origins. The editors provide no preface that might give the reader some sense of where the collection came from—or why. There is no rationale offered for the topics included or excluded. There is no attempt to provide a unifying theme or puzzle, and there certainly is no central argument. To be sure, there is an introduction, but it bills itself as an "overview" and lives up to that title, for it is no more than a brief outline of what is to come. The nine chapters that follow clearly indicate that their authors have had no herding. The only commonality among them is that they focus on international sanctions. In short, this is a collection that just is.

Taken for what it is—nine essays on sanctions between ridiculously expensive Macmillan/St. Martin's cloth covers—the book provides a useful and intellectually stimulating

reflection on this tool of statecraft. First, several essays employ methods that depart from the common approaches in the international sanctions literature: A. Cooper Drury uses statistical analysis of U.S. presidential decisions on sanctioning; William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg prefer public choice; Valerie Schwebach uses formal modeling; Daniel W. Drezner uses Boolean analysis to explore Russian economic statecraft.

Second, this collection offers a number of analytically rich case studies that will appeal to traditionalists who might be less than taken with the results of the above approaches. Jason Davidson and George Shambaugh focus on incentives as a tool of economic statecraft, a theme picked up by Curtis H. Martin, who examines the all-too-often ignored case of the 1994 agreement between the United States and North Korea as an example of the differences between sanctions and inducements as instruments of foreign policy. Daniel W. Fisk's chapter on the American sanctions against Cuba does an excellent job of locating the Helms-Burton sanctions of the mid-1990s in a broader political perspective, looking beyond the usual arguments about the domestic roots of American efforts to sanction Cuba. Steve Chan chronicles the seemingly endless debate in the United States over whether China should receive most-favored-nation (MFN) status-or "normal trade relations," as some Americans have unilaterally decided this centuries-old European convention should now be called. Of course, the debate has continued long after MFN status was granted, although it now focuses on whether MFN status should be withdrawn over such matters as the Chinese government's crackdown on the Falun Gong movement or Beijing's initial responses to the air collision near Hainan. David M. Rowe revisits the Rhodesia sanctions of the 1960s and 1970s and examines the domestic political effects of the boycott on Rhodesia's important tobacco industry.

This collection features an interesting mix of methods and case studies, but there are some significant holes in the coverage of contemporary sanctions. For example, there is no discussion of sanctions against South Africa in the 1980s or against Iraq since 1990, even though those cases remain crucial episodes. There is no exploration of the various ways in which the international community has sought during the post–Cold War era to sharpen and smarten sanctions. (Perhaps that is not surprising, since the book tends to limit its focus to the national level, rather than explore sanctions from a multilateral perspective.) Perhaps most important, there is no extended discussion of the normative implications of sanctions, an issue that has increasingly engaged both policymakers and academics over the last decade.

International Relations—Still an American Social Science?: Toward Diversity in International Thought. Edited by Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 394p. \$88.50 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Timothy Dunne, University of Wales, Aberystwyth

Early accounts of the development of the discipline of international relations (IR) attribute causal significance to changes in the "real" world. In this respect, historigraphy was a reflection in history's looking glass, such that World War I created idealism, and World War II prompted the revival of realism. The editors of *International Relations—Still and American Social Science?* remind us that the identity of the discipline is also a reflection of geopolitical and cultural circumstances. The sixteen essays seek to reawaken the question of the identity of the discipline and how this has been transmitted and contested. There is no doubt that the book

will be widely read and is likely to find its way onto many postgraduate course lists. It is also likely to find critics and supporters in fairly equal number, which is reason alone to applaud the labors of the editors.

Stanley Hoffmann once referred to the United States as the "heartland" of IR. Given the importance of his essay, "International Relations: An American Social Science," to the forging of the dominant self-image of the discipline, the editors were right to publish it as the lead contribution to the volume. Many readers will welcome the opportunity to read once again Hoffmann's finely crafted argument and fluent prose, which qualities are less evident in many of the subsequent contributions.

Two main themes underpin the book. The first is the extent to which IR continues to be bound to the cultural and economic interests of the United States. The second, dealt with below, is whether the recent proliferation of approaches enhances the standing of the field. Regarding the former, there is broad agreement among the contributors that America continues to dominate the study of IR. I use the term "broad" because the editors are unwilling to furnish a compelling criterion for what counts as dominance. As Robert Crawford writes in the Introduction, "this volume offers no consensus on how 'American intellectual hegemony' should be conceptualized, measured, and defined, nor do our contributors agree on the degree to which nationality in any guise ultimately matters" (p. 6). Kim Richard Nossal's chapter is not so reticent. His survey of fourteen IR textbooks shows "how an image of world politics is constructed and thus world politics understood, and how this is reproduced from one generation to the next in a hermetically sealed Americocentric vacuum" (p. 183). The argument would be much stronger if Vossal had demonstrated that textbooks produced in other national contexts are not guilty of ethnocentrism.

Concerns about methods resurface in A. J. R. Groom and Peter Mandaville's essay. To sustain their argument that there is an emerging "continental" disciplinary identity, the authors conducted a survey that they describe as "dirty and very unprofessional" (p. 159). They should be applauded for being so candid about the limits of their method, but this surely provides grist to the mill of those who believe that much of what passes for scholarship outside the United States lacks rigor and precision. More substantively, there is no doubt that Groom and Mandaville are right to argue that IR in Europe is gaining in strength, but does this generate a European perspective on the international?

This relationship between national (or regional) community and world view is hotly debated elsewhere in the volume. The case of Canada is instructive here. Tony Porter contends that nationality is only one variable influencing how IR is taught and researched. Mark Neufeld and Teresa Healy support this contention through their engagement with "minority currents" in Canadian IR. Exponents of these critical perspectives share the following two propositions. The first is a disinterest in policy advocacy (which is not meant to imply a lack of concern for concrete political practice), and the second is a commitment to critical pedagogy. Here we read that realism and idealism offer only two versions of the same dominant discourse. This is contrasted with "Critical IR," which apparently succeeds in connecting with students who are concerned with issues of social justice. These observations are interesting but beg many questions, such as how this teaching strategy works with students (a majority?) who would rather work for Microsoft than join the brigade of anticapitalist protestors. At a more specific level, it would have been useful if Neufeld and Healy had told us more about the details of their pedagogy. For example, does it work best with case study teaching? Should reading be directed, or is it better to allow students to roam more freely into other disciplines and explore other mediums?

Roger Epp's chapter shows us that critical theory is more convincing when the authors "just do it" rather than talk endlessly about its virtues (while parodying the positions of so-called uncritical theory). Epp's interest is in indigenous peoples and what their neglect tells us about IR. The one theoretical approach that has engaged with them is the English School, even though its narrative of the expansion of international society has relied on "a domestication of aboriginal peoples" (p. 312). Even a rewriting of such narratives to include aboriginal diplomacy risks seeing aboriginal cultures only insofar as they were recognized by European sovereign states. Epp concludes his essay with a warning that pluralism is limited unless there is a genuine commitment not just to represent but also to listen to the other.

Feminist thinkers have long made this argument. In her chapter on transcending national identity, Jan Jindy Pettman reminds us of the gender inequalities built into both academic IR and global political practices. As a critique, this is powerful stuff. It is less convincing in the claim that there is a transnational community of women based on the "near-universal ways in which so many women experience identity conflicts and different kinds of violence" (p. 261). In support of this claim she quotes Virginia Woolf's famous contention that, "as a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world" (p. 261). Only a few years after Woolf wrote these words, women showed that they did want their country and made significant sacrifices for its survival. Pettman is aware of the importance of location and the fact that there are many tensions within the world of women along race and class lines. But this raises the question of how much diversity the feminist project can allow while maintaining its commitment to the emancipation of women as a transnational identity based on shared values and experiences.

D. S. L. Jarvis's chapter on identity politics has a great deal to say about feminism. It is highly critical of standpoint feminists for privileging the gender variable over other identities. Postmodern feminists are dismissed for retreating from the main IR agenda. The main contention is that identity tribalism is a blind alley: We are different in many important ways, Jarvis argues, but what matters is what we share, such as a repulsion against violence and poverty. Jarvis's answer to the second thematic question underpinning the book is that the recent proliferation of approaches does not constitute theoretical progress.

More is not better for Kalvi J. Holsti either. He mobilizes a polemical critique of those who inhabit what he calls Identityville—the "postmodernists, poststructuralists, critical theorists, feminist standpointers of unlimited hues, hermeneuticians, empiricists, historical sociologists, symbolic interactionists, and post-Marxists, just to name some of the more prominent (pp. 81–2). Interestingly, one of Holsti's criticisms of the inhabitants of Identityville is their lack of tolerance and respect for other approaches. There is no evidence that these qualities are present in Holsti's reading of critical theory. Traditionalists in glass houses should not throw stones.

Those who fear theoretical diversity might, ironically, gain some sustenance from Chris Brown's argument. In an engaging chapter, Brown argues that the discipline was founded upon Anglo-American liberal principles, and "the modern discipline has not yet escaped from its liberal internationalist past" (p. 217). In other words, the gap between traditionalists and postmodernists may not be as wide as either side would like to think.

A telling critique of the framing of *International Relations:* Still an American Social Science? is that all the authors are

located in institutions of higher education in Western nations. To show convincingly that there is diversity in international thought, the book should have included a greater focus on the research and teaching of IR in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and so on. There is diversity out there, but not enough of it is represented in this otherwise lively collection of essays on the state of the discipline.

State Learning and International Change. Andrew Farkas. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. 208p. \$50.00.

Erik Gartzke, Columbia University

Learning would seem to be a natural topic for the academic study of international politics. Interest in dynamic processes, however, and in learning, in particular, has been uneven, while the impact of contributions to date has been mixed. State Learning and International Change provides a thorough, thoughtful application of a complex biological learning model to international politics. The text is engaging and well written. Modeling and philosophy of science issues are addressed with aplomb and humor. For example, the author refers to the residue from social Darwinist applications of biological models to social science as "pesky," discusses stocasticity and pleiotropy with reference to striped and spotted cross-eyed bandersnatches, and mentions "deranged mutant-killer-monster snow goons" as a possible method of biological selection, all in the space of a few pages (pp. 59–67).

The core of the text is an evolutionary learning model, intended to "explain how states arrive at foreign policy decisions" (p. 1). In the model, agents (policy elites) are initially randomly assigned policy positions. Policy evolves as the weighted average of the recommendations of policy elites succeeds or fails and the weighting of recommendations is adjusted in response to performance. A later version of the model allows elites to shift their own recommendations in response to success or failure. Propositions derived from the model include the insight that extreme policy positions may improve policy (p. 101) and the finding that multiple advocacy can be counterproductive (p. 149). These propositions are in tension, however, if including extreme positions involves more policy advocates.

Evolutionary metaphors are often used to justify key "as if" assumptions of rational theory. Noting that selection generates "fitness," the quality of being successful by appropriate evolutionary criteria, Farkas is able to show that even automatons can approximate optimizing behavior. This is an appealing finding, and one that emphasizes complementarity between the rational and the biological approaches. Unfortunately, Farkas presents the evolutionary model as an alternative to rationality.

Farkas appears to criticize a particular kind or rationality, ignoring opportunities to address his concerns, while adopting practices or attributes that parallel rationalist approaches or are equally subject to criticism. For example, Farkas challenges the plausibility of assumptions used in rational choice models but assumes that agents in his game all have heterogeneous preferences over goals. While defensible on tractability grounds, it is clearly not true (Stalin and Trotsky had different goals) and it alludes to the fundamentally problematic nature of arguing over assumptions. More to the point, policy elites in the evolutionary model are egoistic and purposive, seeking to enhance their influence over policy outcomes by adopting recommendations that they believe will be successful. The critical differences, then, between the evolutionary approach and an explicitly rational theory are that elites are initially randomly assigned policies rather than being able to choose

policies, that elites update recommendations based solely on past performance, and that selection is exogenous.

There are more minor lapses in the text that perpetuate common errors. For example, in the introduction Farkas asks how people "who individually do not act as if they were rational" (p. 2) can behave as such collectively. Rationality, of course, is not what Farkas is addressing. Since rationality is judged by conformity to a postulated set of objectives (derived from a preference ordering and constraints), we can say that a particular formulation of rationality is wrong, but not typically that people are not rational. Prospect theory, for example, offers a different utility function, not an assertion that individuals do not have preferences or that they fail to seek preferred outcomes.

A more important set of issues has to do with evolution and politics. As the text points out, "The evolutionary model of state learning ... depends on an analogy between beliefs and genes and policy and positions and phenotypes" (p. 62). At the core of the evolutionary model is the selection mechanism that adjusts the influence of policy elites. In biological systems, selection may be an exogenous process, but in politics seeking to manipulate the criteria by which one succeeds or fails is an important part of the game. Whether selection occurs in the consciousness of the leader (where contrary to claims in the text it would involve complex calculations), or in the institutions and norms of the state, an agent that can influence the way weights are assigned is evolutionarily advantaged. Since this requires cognitive skills (one must anticipate events and the actions of other agents), it is evolutionarily desirable in politics not to be an automaton. The assertion that the assumption of rationality is overly restrictive then appears somewhat more restrictive than allowing actors to think.

Another concern with, or potential expansion of, the model is that it assumes that objectives do not change. Policy evolves in the learning model to respond better to existing policy concerns. This is problematic if, for example, one is dealing with nuclear weapons. The ability to think and act strategically may be superior if learning from experience is dangerous or costly. Similarly, whether policy elites view the world through the insights of predecessors depends on whether these insights continue to be germane. If relevant processes remain substantially the same over time, then decision making based on inherited heuristics is sound. If, instead, environments change rapidly (as apparently occurs in modernity), then the value of inherited heuristics declines and individuals have an incentive to depend on other sources (peers, their intellect) for insight. This implies that the environments that are most ripe for the evolutionary perspective are those that do not change much or often.

In natural or sexual selection, as the rate or intensity of change increases, individuals or groups with traits that bias toward survival or desirability will increasingly predominate. However, in politics, the rapidity or intensity of change affects the *salience* of the evolutionary metaphor. As the rate or intensity of change increases, individuals or groups that depend on inherited knowledge will tend to do less well than those who reason. If allowed to exist, rational agents will predominate. After all, human cognitive abilities appear out of natural selection. Thus, the irony is that it would be at odds with the evolutionary metaphor to advocate the current evolutionary model of learning. In systems where knowledge is likely to be time-bound, adopting inherited heuristics biases against selection. The approach with greater fitness is to avoid heuristics and adopt rational choice.

The text emphasizes that the validity of a model depends on how much it explains. "Careful readers who are concerned with the misapplication of biological models would do well to ask how accurately a model captures the behavior it purports to represent and whether the predictions made by the model are supported by the data available to test it" (p. 67). The text offers many anecdotes, but there is no systematic assessment in the context of international relations. Further, there is substantial overlap between the evolutionary approach and existing rationalist explanations for international behavior. "The evolutionary model of learning produces outcomes that are identical—or nearly so—with those predicted by rational-choice models" (p. 76). I am willing to believe that the model has empirical leverage, but let me suggest at least one framework for a more general test.

Why not assess implications of the evolutionary approach for government institutions, rules, SOPs, etc.? There is little discussion of institutional and informal constraints on decision making in the text. This is striking because rules and other constraints are well suited to the propagation of knowledge. It is clear why incumbents seek to impose their will on future decision makers through institutional constraints. What is less immediately obvious is why subsequent decision makers would defer to such constraints. Rules carry knowledge of the relationship between policies and outcomes and so impact decision making. The evolutionary perspective suggests why and how rules develop and when they are maintained. Further, these are easily observable properties of states, so that tests of implications of the evolutionary approach should be manageable. Finally, this is an interesting aspect of politics that rationalist theories seek to explain, but not without some difficulty.

One learns from State Learning and International Change that there is much still to learn about learning in international politics. Farkas forces readers to examine conventional assumptions about foreign policy decision making. Rationality is not necessary to generate behavior that is consistent with the claims of rational models, nor need one adopt rational theory to engage in interesting, informative research. However, while contrasting rational and evolutionary approaches is of considerable value, of even greater value would be an exploration of the boundaries between, and synthesis of, rational and evolutionary models. Farkas offers a promising glimpse of the value of an exploration of learning in international politics and a hint at what the synthesis between these two perspectives can achieve. This alone should encourage readers to have a look.

Public Attitudes Toward Immigration in the United States, France, and Germany. By Joel S. Fetzer. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 272p. \$54.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Gallya Lahav, State University of New York at Stony Brook

Joel Fetzer is to be congratulated for a serious attempt to bring a public opinion approach to comparative immigration politics. His book represents an ambitious step toward bridging the gap between policy input and output in the immigration equation of advanced industrialized democracies. Its occasional choppy organization and underdeveloped data analysis tend to distract from the import of the work and leave the reader yearning for a deeper and more substantive discussion.

Although the title promises to tell us about public attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, the focus is on *negative* attitudes, or what Fetzer calls "nativism," an American term that can be equated with xenophobia in the European context (see chap. 1, note 1). Fetzer never goes beyond a broad definition of the term, but he is careful to isolate the complex renditions of this dependent variable along three dimensions: immigration affect, policy preferences, and support for

anti-immigrant movements. The author's stab at compiling extensive comparative data is impressive, especially given serious constraints in obtaining cross-national data.

The exploration of causal attitudinal factors ventures into a major polemic in our understanding of tolerance of minorities and immigrants. What explains immigrant rejection and hostility—economics or culture? Attitudinal research has yielded contradictory results over ecological and contextual factors, and theoretical advances are inconclusive. Ironically, Fetzer rarely speaks directly to a whole host of budding scholarship in the immigration field, which has made significant headway on subjects he addresses. These include the rise and consolidation of the extreme Right parties, restrictive immigration policies, and immigration politics. To these studies, Fetzer's book uniquely adds rigorous empirical data testing that relies on theories exported from social psychology, economics, and cultural anthropology.

Fetzer works in "threes." He tests three theories in three separate nation-states employing three different modes of analysis: historical, time-series, and cross-sectional analyses. The first question to be asked is how the United States, a traditional country of permanent immigration, fits into a comparative scheme with such temporary labor countries as France and Germany. More might have been said about the comparative framework, the rationale of case selection, and the convergent findings.

The prevalence of each theory—marginality, economic self-interest, and contact—is tested against models of the three forms of nativism/xenophobia. Marginality theory, whether cultural, economic, religious, or gender-based, poses that people who are considered outside the dominant cultural template of a society are ceteris paribus more likely than their native counterparts to empathize with oppressed individuals (i.e., incoming immigrants). It suggests that marginalized groups will not be socialized into the dominant norms of the society, as Fetzer argues is the case with American Jews, who maintain a culture distinct from the dominant Protestant culture of the United States (p. 9).

Economic self-interest theory includes both the typical labor market variant and the use-of-service type. It may involve relative deprivation or sociotropic effects. In terms of immigration, the theory posits that individuals who believe their economic well-being is endangered by an influx of cheap labor will be more likely to feel an anti-immigrant effect than will people who believe they are secure in their job and income position. There is a tendency here to treat immigrants as a monolithic group and to overlook the threat that the rapidly growing and important skilled labor force poses to highly educated natives (p. 21).

The contact thesis (both individual and aggregate) involves the amount and type of exposure to immigrants. Much of this theory stems from the work of Gordon Allport (*The Nature of Prejudice*, 1979), who identified two main types of contact: "casual contact," which promotes prejudice, and "true acquaintance," which generates more tolerance. Fetzer attempts to conduct analysis on measures that he argues represent both forms of contact. The analysis seems to fall short of effectively measuring what would allow us to distinguish between casual and true acquaintance contact. To some degree this problem can be ignored, because all the measures used to test for the presence of contact theory are not systematically proven, but it does beg some questions about theoretical utility.

Fetzer concludes that a number of assumptions of both economic and marginality theories are upheld by the data. When they contradict each other, the marginality theory has a slight advantage, especially when it is formulated in cultural terms. These conclusions are rather clear, but the explana-

tory power of each theory alone is somewhat compromised by the failure to account for interaction effects. Many of the theoretical streams overlap (i.e., economic marginality and economic self-interest) or appear to be at loggerheads (i.e., sociotropic versus self-interest), which underminies their predictive value. One might take issue with these competing paradigms in favor of a more interactive approach, such as that used by Jeannette Money in her analysis of antiimmigrant sentiment at the local level (Fences and Neighbors, 1999). Her study reveals that the interactive part of job competition, for example, comes not from the mere presence of migrants but their presence when unemployment rises (which is what creates labor market competition). This perspective underscores the need to identify and delineate more systematically these contextual variables so as to predict conditions under which rejection explodes.

Fetzer is much more successful at isolating the causes of xenophobia than he is in his perscriptive trajectory. Although he builds a compelling case for policy-relevant attitudinal research, his policy prescriptions do not flow from the data. Fetzer never clearly states how public opinion relates to policy articulation and elaboration. He corroborates conventional postnational arguments made by such scholars as Yasemin Nuhoglu Soysal (*Limits of Citizenship*, 1994) and David Jacobson (*Rights across Borders*, 1996) about the narrowing of boundaries, but there is some tautology in his assessment that the lines between immigrants and dominant cultures fade. In fact, this claim seems to contradict his important finding that minorities continue to ally with their "cultural" kin.

The use of multilevel modes of qualitative and quantitative analysis is commendable. The longitudinal rationale and breakdown of timeframes are not necessarily obvious, however, and the historical analysis is often anecdotal. Fetzer runs into some typical problems with cross-national measures of foreign-born populations (see tables A1.1, 4), which vary with regard to geographic or citizenship criteria. The comparative operationalization of the dependent variable is also somewhat uneven. Intuitively, Fetzer captures an important distinction in the literature between immigration and immigrant policy preferences, but his measurement of these concepts often confounds the two. Does support for Le Pen or the Front National strictly capture anti-immigrant sentiment in France (p. 85), and is it really analogous to American attitudes toward immigration levels? Furthermore, is the right to asylum tantamount to immigrant rights, as Fetzer conceives (p. 111), or does it represent the admission-type of policy areas?

Fetzer's bold foray into the critical "micro-macro question" (p. 148) is a thrilling opening to those stuck in that scholarly divide. The discussion of the two components of Allport's contact theory is a thought-provoking and welcomed alternative to the linear thinking on immigrant effects. Ultimately the book fails to answer directly the important question of individual-aggregate discrepancies, because it is not certain that it truly tests for the latter form of contact and because it defers to the promise of "further research" (p. 81). To be fair, Fetzer does not make this question the pivot of his study. In fact, his goals are much more humble and modest.

If research contributions are evaluated by the extent of questions and further research they inspire, then Fetzer's book is a promise of success. Are the conclusions generalizable? Cultural marginality does not seem to explain why, in immigrant-importing countries of the Middle East, temporary labor is recruited specifically from Asia and other non-Semitic countries. What is the role of international relations as an intervening variable (p. 59)? What is the role of political elites and the media, and how do they relate to

mass attitudes? More generally, how do these attitudes relate to policy outcomes? My own comparative work on elite and public opinion has revealed far greater convergence than Fetzer (p. 149) and others project. As Fetzer readily concludes in explaining the German outlier (pp. 132, 149), leaders shape the immigration debate and therefore public reaction. If so, do public attitudes matter? My findings imply that they do, and, thus, Fetzer's work is illuminating.

By embracing the normative component, Fetzer helps fill a critical void in comparative immigration scholarship, and he makes a unique advance in the scientific inquiry into such an emotionally charged issue. Despite the disappointing array of evasive inferences, the book serves as an important prelude and invites more in-depth studies of attitudes. It will be widely cited.

Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution. By Avery Goldstein. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. 356p. \$49.50.

Lawrence Freedman, King's College, London

Clausewitz once observed that in war everything is simple, but the simplest things are very complicated. This seems to apply doubly so to nuclear deterrence. The principle is very simple: A potential enemy is persuaded not to do anything rash by the prospect of devastating retaliation. But it soon gets complicated. What difference does it make if the idea is not only to protect the homeland but also allies? As potential enemies acquire their own means of devastating retaliation, issues of preemption arise, and this requires close attention to the details of force structure. How varied, overwhelming, and surprising need the attacker be, especially if there is little interest in preemption? How much need the defender disperse, conceal, or protect forces, or develop antimissile defenses, just in case the other side is contemplating preemption? What happens if both sides are contemplating preemption at the same time? Can understandings, tacit or negotiated, between potential enemies ease the dangers of a crisis getting out of

Questions such as these kept busy generations of nuclear strategists and led them to develop a substantial literature. Although this was largely concerned with the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the literature nonetheless was often abstract and theoretical, trying to work out what rational actors might do in hypothetical nuclear predicaments before worrying what the actual states involved might do. At the same time, because much appeared to depend on the hardness of concrete shelters or the accuracy of a missile warhead, this high theory had to be combined with some quite technical analyses of the properties of particular weapons. And then there was always the political dimension, concerned with the tenability of alliances and the dynamics of crisis management, followed by demands to come up with sensible proposals for force structure and arms control negotiations.

By such processes do simple problems become complicated. The deterrence industry grew even as the superpower relationship itself stabilized. The stability was the result of the practice being a lot simpler than the theory. Politicians understood the essential point. If you were going to risk nuclear war, you had to be really sure of your calculations. The consequences of getting it wrong were huge, and the inherent uncertainties were substantial; prudence was always the order of the day. This was especially so after the tense moments over Berlin and Cuba in the early 1960s.

The problem of deterrence for lesser nuclear powers appeared to be far less demanding. Robert McNamara, when

Secretary of Defense, claimed that small nuclear forces would be "dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence and lacking in credibility as a deterrent." Either he was right, in which case the disincentives to getting into the nuclear business would be profound, or he was wrong, in which case proliferation could be expected as more states concluded that at quite modest numbers a nuclear deterrent could be both survivable and useful.

Avery Goldstein, who takes the second of these views, considers the Cold War experience of China, Britain, and France and judges its relevance for the post-Cold War world. He examines not only the rationales for their acquisition of nuclear forces but also what they thought was necessary to achieve their deterrent purposes. He finds that they felt able to do this without attempting to match the exacting standards set by the United States and the Soviet Union, at least so long as they were limited in their ambitions and confined themselves to preserving the status quo. The trouble is that in developing this position goldstein demonstrates himself to be a complicator. There appears to be not a single issue of deterrence theory that he does not attempt to address, and he even includes his own little "expected utility model." The result is a dense read, with the more interesting material often tucked away in footnotes, and few general propositions are reached on the viability of alternative deterrence strategies that are not context-dependent.

Fortunately, Goldstein also seeks to develop his argument through case studies. His previous book was on China, and by far the best sections of this book are those that deal with the history of China's nuclear force. He is on top of all the best scholarship on Chinese foreign policy, from the entry into the Korean War to the Sino-Soviet dispute and the opening to the United States, and he has interesting things to say on why the force structure took the form it did. The case studies of France and Britain are less successful. Goldstein's neorealist position leads him to argue that the core motive behind acquisition was the lack of confidence in a superpower protector. That has some validity with France, as with China, but for Britain that is a much smaller part of the story. Of course the "standing alone" scenario was part of the rationale, but the basic impulse behind Britain's nuclear capability was, first, its initial status as one of the "big three" and indeed as the first country to demonstrate the possibility of a nuclear bomb and, second, its constant belief that a national nuclear capability provided an entrée into American policymaking.

Whether these three cases tell us much about the future is unclear. One might have thought the Israeli, Indian, and Pakistani cases, to which Goldstein devotes a few pages, are more relevant. As for future proliferation he points to the importance of the degree of insecurity afflicting individual states, the availability of nonnuclear means of addressing such insecurity as does exist, and the economic and technical capacity to develop the nuclear option. Goldstein's candidates are those that neorealists identified just after the end of the Cold War—Germany, Japan, and Ukraine—although in none of these cases is a military nuclear program on the immediate political agenda. The candidates that most bother American politicians—Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—are dealt with only in a cursory manner.

The underlying philosophy appears to be an expectation that the international system might one day conform to a neorealist model, that is, return to the great power politics of the old days, and then governments might be very grateful for any nuclear insurance that they had taken out. This indicates the basic problem with the title. Of course, the nuclear revolution remains important, and who knows what challenges might develop in the future, but to understand deterrence and security in the twenty-first century it is

necessary to make sense of ways in which the state system is already changing; new forms of insecurity are developing, and therefore new forms of deterrence are required. This book is welcome for the historical analyses of the smaller nuclear powers but, contrary to the title, has nothing to say about security and deterrence in the twenty-first century, other than to suggest that it may be like the twentieth century.

Unipolarity and the Middle East. By Birthe Hansen. New York: St. Martin's, 2000, 288p. \$59.95.

War, Institutions and Social Change in the Middle East. Edited by Steven Heydemann. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 372p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

"Pariah States" and Sanctions in the Middle East: Iraq, Libya, Sudan. By Tim Niblock. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 241p. \$49.95.

Robert O. Freedman, Baltimore Hebrew University

Scholars of Middle Eastern studies in the last decade often were preoccupied with two major problems. First, the democratization that has spread over most of the globe seems to have missed the Middle East. Second, there appears to be a growing gap between international relations and comparative politics theory, on the one hand, and Middle East studies, on the other. In seeking to explain why, some point to the highly politicized scholarship that can still be found in Middle East studies. Others argue that the theorists simply have not tried hard enough to fit the special nature of the Middle East into their theoretical models, or that Middle Eastern scholars have not tried hard enough to deal with theory. Two of the three books under review, by Hansen and Heydemann, do a great deal to narrow the gap between theory and reality in the Middle East. The book by Niblock is an example of the kind of highly politicized scholarship that is still found too often in Middle Eastern studies.

International relations theory meets the Middle East in Birthe Hansen's Unipolarity and the Middle East. In an admirable attempt to adapt Kenneth Waltz's theory of neorealism to Middle Eastern events in the 1990s, Hansen discusses a number of key developments during that period, including the Gulf War, the unification of Yemen, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, from the perspective of what is depicted as the "unipolar world" that emerged in the 1990s. Hansen offers some useful insights, but the problem, as with some of other international relations theorists who seek to deal with a region in which they do not have first-hand knowledge, is that a series of factual errors and questionable interpretations mar the rigor of analysis. Nonetheless, Hansen's discussion of unipolarity has strong theoretical merit and can be usefully refined by other scholars, including those with a greater knowledge of the region as well as international relations theorists, to reflect more closely Middle Eastern realities.

Essentially, Hansen argues that in the unipolar world that emerged in the 1990s the states of the region had to adapt or suffer the consequences. Syria, which did adapt, was able to reinforce its position in Lebanon by "flocking" (p. 65) to the side of the United States during the Gulf War. By contrast Iraq, which did not adapt, suffered a major defeat. Similarly, Hansen argues, Yemen unified because the northern and southern sections of the country could no longer benefit from the superpower "zero-sum game" competition for their support. Morocco was able to consolidate its control over the former Spanish Sahara because Algeria no longer had the Soviet Union to support it, whereas Morocco continued to have the support of the unipole, the United States.

A number of other interpretations of these events and others cited in the book are possible. To take but one example, it can be persuasively argued that the bloody civil war in Algeria, rather than the loss of Soviet support (which, in any case, diminished during the 1980s [p. 164]), was the primary reason Algeria acquiesced in Moroccan control of the former Spanish Sahara. Another questionable assertion is that the Cold War ended in September 1989, when Moscow made concessions on strategic arms to the United States (p. 78), rather than in January 1989, when the USSR withdrew from Afghanistan, or, as most observers contend, when the USSR acquiesced in both the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 and the subsequent unification of Germany.

In addition to some questionable assertions, there are some factual errors. Syria intervened militarily in Lebanon for the first time in 1975, not 1976 (p. 141). Following the Hebron massacre in 1994, foreign observers were sent to Hebron, not Jericho (p. 169). There is also a misreading of Soviet support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war (after flip-flopping several times, Moscow tilted to the side of Iran in 1987) (p. 109) and a downgrading of the increasing Soviet opposition to the U.S. war effort against Iraq in January and February 1991. Hansen overestimates the influence of the Arab Cooperation Council in the 1989–90 period.

One also may question the theory of unipolarity itself. If the United States is indeed the unipole in the system, how does one explain Iraqi and Iranian opposition to the United States from 1991 to 2001, and the Palestinian rejection of U.S. mediation efforts in July 2000 (the Camp David II talks) and December 2000, during the Al-Aksa Intifadah? Perhaps it might be more useful, from a theoretical perspective, to call the 1990–2000 period one of limited unipolarity and to restructure the theory accordingly to explain the behavior of Iraq, Iran, and the Palestine Liberation Organization. Such a restructuring also would add more credence to the other case studies in the book. Despite its faults, the book is well worth reading because of Hansen's contribution to international relations theory.

Whereas Hansen asserts that the unipolar world led by the United States, with its emphasis on the spread of liberal democracy and free market capitalism, is basically a positive development, Tim Niblock describes the new world order established by the United States after the Gulf War as a "malign hegemony" (p. 6). A strong strain of anti-Americanism pervades his book, which purports to show "the view from the underside" (p. 7). Niblock asserts that this persective "does not imply disregard for international law but rather a determination not to allow international law and international institutions (such as the UN) to be used to promote Western/U.S. interests" (p. 6). He cites numerous interviews in both Libya and Iraq in his footnotes, and he clearly sympathizes with both countries, which weakens the analytical quality of the book. In the case of Libva, he asserts that one effect of sanctions, corruption, reflects the more general commercialization of society that is clearly associated with wider global processes that have spread Western values (pp. 76-7), and he also blames sanctions for the spread of Islamism in Libya (p. 90).

If Niblock takes a rather gentle view of Kaddafi's policies in Libya, he is even more sympathetic to Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Time after time Niblock supports Iraq's resistence to UN efforts, from ascertaining the status of Iraq's holdings of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the UN distribution of food to the Iraqi population, as justified because of Iraq's sense that its sovereignty was being challenged. Niblock frequently simply restates Iraqi arguments without critically evaluating them, such as the statement that the UN WMD inspection efforts were "simply a cover for creating an imbalance of power in the region favorable to Israel" (p. 104).

In sum, if one is looking for an apologia for the Libyan and Iraqi regimes, and a strong denunciation of the U.S.-led sanctions against them, this is the book.

By contrast, the edited book by Steven Heydemann is an example of first-rate scholarship. Heydemann asked a group of scholars to examine the thesis of Charles Tilly and others in Tilly's edited book, *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (1975), to see whether their perspectives on the role of war in the expansion of state capacities, the emergence of new patterns of human and economic mobilization, and the organization of extractive institutions could be usefully compared to the formation of states in the Middle East. There are a number of excellent chapters in Heydemann's book, many of which not only add a new theoretical perspective to the dynamics of statebuilding in the Middle East but also offer new information about the evolution of many states in the region.

One of the best chapters is by Heydemann and Robert Vitalis on the role of the Middle East supply center in Cairo during World War II. The story of the center has been told before, as Roger Owen notes in a very helpful concluding chapter, but Heydemann and Vitalis cover new ground by convincingly demonstrating how Egypt and Syria, once they became independent states, had a much greater role for the state in their economies than they otherwise might have, due to the effect of the supply center on the two countries during World War II.

The chapter by Reem Saad on the experience of the Egyptian peasants during the 1967 and 1973 wars, based on detailed interviews in a single village, provides some fascinating insights on peasant attitudes toward their government and leaders in time of war. Although loyal to the state, they were very angry at Nasser, hitherto a hero for his land distribution policies, whom they blamed for lying to them at the beginning of the conflict about Egypt's great "victory" (p. 242), although they felt he was misled by his advisers. Interestingly enough, there was little lasting emotional feeling about the 1973 war. Saad speculates that this may have been due to the exhaustive Egyptian state propaganda about the "victory" in the 1973

Another very strong chapter deals with the formation of the militarized regime in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Written by Isam al-Khafaji, it demonstrates how, through a combination of external war and internal terror, Saddam built loyalty among Sunni Muslims while marginalizing both Shia and Kurdish Iraqis (p. 282). Al-Khafaji also analyzes Saddam's use of "Arabism" as a device to secure loyalty not only from Sunni Iraqis but also from Arabs throughout the Arab world. According to Saddam, as their champion, Iraq deserved, indeed, was owed money by the Gulf Arabs (al-Khafaji calls this "strategic rent extraction," p. 273) to support its war against Iran (despite the fact that Saddam started the war by invading Iran).

A central theme in the Heydemann book is that unlike the states of Europe from the 17th to 19th century, which extracted taxes from their own populations to build up their military power and, in some cases, became more responsive to their populations as a result, a number of states in the Middle East avoided conflicts with their populations over taxes by becoming rentiers. This group included not only the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf but also Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, which received military equipment from abroad either gratis or paid for by other Arab states. Needless to say, the end result was a very different relationship between rulers and ruled in the Middle East than in Europe. The Heydemann book goes a long way toward explaining why, in countries such as Syria, Egypt, and Iraq as well as in the Gulf states, genuine democracy has yet to develop.

Empire. By Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 478p. \$36.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Manfred B. Steger, Illinois State University and University of Hawai'i—Manoa

Hailed by sympathetic reviewers as the "Communist Manifesto for our time" and condemned by scathing critics as an "impenetrable work of absolute abstraction," Empire has exploded on an unsuspecting international academic scene. Indeed, the tremendous appeal of the book has transcended the narrow walls of the ivory tower, drawing to its authors a glaring public spotlight that only rarely shines on political and literary theorists. In the ongoing public debate over the virtues and flaws of the study, even its most intransigent detractors can hardly deny that Empire represents a powerful neo-Marxist contribution to the rapidly emerging field of "globalization studies."

Like this new area of research, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's best-selling study is unapologetically interdisciplinary in character. Its authors are willing to paint in broad strokes, in the process eagerly digesting a plethora of materials drawn from legal studies, politics, economics, philosophy, anthropology, cultural studies, comparative literature, and critical theory. Franz Kafka and Herman Melville are made to rub shoulders with Baruch Spinoza and Karl Marx; the postmodernist ideas of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and Félix Guattari are interspersed with the modernist insights of Hans Kelsen, Otto Bauer, and Max Weber.

Mixing passionate revolutionary appeals with abstract philosophical investigations and detached sociological analyses, Empire constitutes a fascinating tapestry of innovative ideas, brilliant interpretations, flamboyant provocations, shameless exaggerations, and bold generalizations. The 400plus pages of text pulsate with creative energy, taking the reader on an intellectual roller coaster ride that too often relies on dense language and esoteric terminology. The book incorporates Negri's long-standing sympathies for the central themes of the "autonomist movement" within 1970s Italian communism: skepticism of "big government, big business, and big labor" (p. 350); the "quest for workers' autonomous self-government" (p. 349); and "the multitude's right to selfcontrol and autonomous self-production" (p. 407). Hardt's influence is most obvious in the study's poststructuralist emphasis on the biopolitical (re)production of social life under conditions of late capitalism, in which the economic, the political, and the cultural increasingly overlap and invest one another (see, especially, pp. 22-41).

At the core of the study, one finds the authors' insistence that "Empire" represents a radically new paradigm of authority and control—a "new global order" composed of a series of national and supranational organisms that supersede old, nation-state-centered forms of sovereignty. For Hardt and Negri, "Empire" is not merely a metaphor but a promising theoretical concept signifying a "political subject that effectively regulates these global exchanges, the sovereign power that governs the world" (p. xi). In their view, this single logic of globalization operates in all spheres of social life, perhaps most visibly in the regulation of human interaction, the formation of global markets, the creation of new technologies, the expansion of vast circuits of material and immaterial production, and the generation of gigantic cultural flows. No longer opposed by an extrasystemic "outside," this new form of sovereignty constitutes a regime that effectively encompasses the "spatial totality" of the entire globe (pp. 353, 413). Wielding enormous powers of oppression and destruction, Empire neither establishes a territorial center nor relies on fixed boundaries, but "manages hybrid identities, flexible hierarchies, and plural exchanges through modulating networks of command. The distinct national colors of the imperialist map of the world have merged and blended in the imperial global rainbow" (pp. xii–xiii) As a regime "with no temporal boundaries and in this sense outside of history or at the end of history" (p. xv), Empire thus dwarfs any particular imperialist project previously undertaken by single nation-states.

Indeed, one of the major debates in globalization studies revolves around the question of whether the current "spatial reorganization of production" (James Mittelman) and the apparent "compression of time and space" (David Harvey) really constitute an entirely new phenomenon. On this issue, Hardt and Negri clearly side with other "hyperglobalizers," such as Susan Strange, Kenichi Ohmae, William Greider, and Martin Albrow, who argue that globalization defines a new epoch of human history, a fundamental reconfiguration of the framework of human action in which nation-states are becoming increasingly less important actors (see, especially, pp. xi, 5-20, 336). Unfortunately, however, Hardt and Negri never discuss in sufficient detail contrary empirical evidence provided by such globalization skeptics as Paul Hirst, Graham Thompson, and Linda Weiss, who conclude, first, that current world flows of trade, investment, labor, and ideas are by no means historically unprecedented and, second, that national governments seem to possess enduring powers to regulate economic activities. This omission points to a systemic flaw that prevades *Empire*: its authors' reluctance to engage fully the rapidly growing, diverse body of literature on the subject of globalization.

After a descriptive analysis of the present features of Empire and a long interpretation of the historical transition from imperialism to Empire, Hardt and Negri conclude on an optimistic note, suggesting that the creative forces of the exploited and subjugated producers that sustain Empire are also capable of autonomously constructing a "counter-Empire"—an alternative political organization of global flows and exchanges fueled by the multitude's "will to be against" (p. 210). Struggling for global mobility, global citizenship, a guaranteed social wage, and the right to the reappropriation of the means of production, this subjugated multitude is poised to invent new democratic expressions and new forms of constituent power.

In this context, Hardt and Negri's discussion of the subversive effects of a political demand for global citizenship is simply superb (pp. 396-400). A direct response to a globalizing world, mass migration and increasing mobility contain a truly revolutionary potential to undermine economic inequalities and asymmetrical power relations that are rooted in an anachronistic defense of fixed boundaries and spatial divisions separating the Northern and Southern hemispheres. Calling for subversion, insurrection, and biopolitical selforganization, Hardt and Negri end their study by introducing the heroic figure of the "militant" as the one who best expresses the life of the multitude. A cross between St. Francis of Assisi and a Wobbly organizer, the counter-imperial militant engages with new vigor in a "revolution that no power will control," thus posing against the misery of Empire "the irrepressible lightness and joy of being communist" (p. 413).

The greatest virtue of the book lies in its authors' ability to construct a new grand narrative of globalization that draws on relevant insights from diverse left traditions such as Marxism, anarchism, existentialism, poststructuralism, critical theory, critical race theory, subaltern studies, and feminist theory. Yet, contrary to its professed philosophical eclecticism, *Empire* remains stubbornly wedded to dogmatic Marxist categories that reify production (albeit in its postmodern,

"biopolitical" version), reaffirm a communist teleology, and reduce the political arena to a "field of pure immanence" (p. 354). Unable to resolve the tension between the posture of revolutionary subjectivism and that of detached objectivism, the authors frequently fall prey to a deterministic view of globalization as a "structurally inevitable" and "irreversible" process (p. 336)—politically disempowering constructions that are the hallmarks of both Marxist and neoliberal ideology.

While rightfully criticizing "ideological master narratives" that are partly responsible for producing the very conditions they purport to explain, Hardt and Negri nonetheless accept all too easily Marxist and neoliberal representations of globalization as an all-encompassing process driven by a single capitalist logic. It is one thing to argue that modernity has both touched and transformed even the remotest corners of this earth, but it is quite another to suggest that the alleged "systemic totality" of Empire is no longer opposed by a qualitatively different "outside." To this reviewer, Hardt and Negri's account of globalization is hard pressed to explain the current renaissance of patriotic discourses that reify the nation-state as the chief provider of security against terrorist attacks from the antimodernist "outside"—or, conversely. exclusivist narratives that glorify the nation-state as the chief supporter of antimodernist struggles against the menacing secular "outside."

Still, *Empire* ought to be required reading for those interested in what is shaping up to be the most significant issue of our time.

Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and U.S. Efforts to Open Japan. By Mayumi Itoh. New York: St. Martin's, 1998. 256p. \$45.00.

Kent E. Calder, Princeton University

The tide of globalization that has swept the world political economy over the past two decades is clearly a development of epic importance. Given Japan's economic scale—one-seventh of global GNP and more than one-quarter of world savings—its ability and inclination to respond is likewise a subject of broad international concern. Yet, the debate on Japan's evolving political-economic course has so far yielded far more heat than light.

Despite the bitter, sterile, and increasingly irrelevant struggle of the past decade between "revisionists" and their detractors, there are remarkably few well-researched and theoretically coherent works on the domestic political origins of Japanese foreign policy. There are virtually none in English on the Japanese worldview. This solidly researched and theoretically conscious work, which employs the clear and original concept of *sakoku* to explain Japan's international behavior in a wide range of policy spheres, helps fill an important void.

in a wide range of policy spheres, helps fill an important void. By sakoku (literally: "secluded nation") mentality, Itoh means the parochial worldview with which both the Japanese public and, to a substantial degree Japan's political leadership, approach international affairs. This mindset, she argues, "is not only ubiquitous in the business sector, but is also prevalent in Japan's cultural, educational, and societal systems" (p. 13). "It constitutes the core of Japanese foreign policy decision-makers' attitudinal prism" (p. 14).

The first third of Globalization of Japan is a concrete explication of how sakoku mentality originated and how it is expressed consistently in Japanese perceptions of the United States and Asia as well as in Japanese prescriptions for economic diplomacy. The other two-thirds of the volume present five richly detailed empirical studies of how sakoku is expressed in concrete policy terms, followed by a conclusion that

assesses prospects for Japan's internationalization in the face of such parochial tendencies. The cases cover immigration, Okinawa policy, rice liberalization, collective security, and UN peacekeeping. The conclusion includes suggestions on how foreign nations should deal with Japan, given its deeply rooted but not incorrigible parochial tendencies.

Itoh's provocative overall argument involves a number of contentions. (1) The internationalization of the Japanese mind has not occurred. (2) Cultural barriers are among the foremost barriers to internationalization. (3) Other Asian nations, such as Korea and Taiwan, are responding more actively and sensitively to globalization than is Japan. (4) Japan has a long way to go, but (5) significant future movement toward true internationalization is not impossible. To encourage internationalist tendencies, Itoh argues that the United States, in particular, should continue to pressure Japan to liberalize but should tailor its appeals more sensitively to exploit potential for collaboration with allies inside Japan (pp. 183–5).

The strength of the book is its combination of a clear original analytic concept (sakoku mentality) with meticulous application in a series of admirably well-researched cases. Itoh makes no pretensions to grand theory, but she draws effectively on Robert Jervis, Jack Snyder, Harold and Margaret Sprout, and other international relations theorists to situate her argument. The sakoku concept seems to have explanatory value across a remarkably broad range of cases, including some, such as the textbook controversy with Japan's Asian neighbors, that have intensified since the book was written.

This creative and carefully researched volume does, to be sure, raise some important yet unanswered questions. Most important, Itoh does not clearly come to terms with arguments that blame institutions, rather than parochial mentality, for Japan's disappointing lack of prointernationalist behavior. She does observe, intriguingly, that on immigration issues the Japanese government has often been more rigid than the general populace (pp. 109–18). Itoh does not pursue the possibility of institutionalist alternatives to her worldview-based explanation very thoroughly.

Itoh is stronger in her description of current Japanese realities than in her policy prescriptions. Few, for example, would quarrel with her sensitive and original observations that Okinawans have suffered as a result of mainland sakoku mentality. Whether it follows that making Okinawa (or any individual region) self-supporting should be a national policy priority is not so clear.

Overall, this is one of the four or five most creative and solidly researched studies on the politics of Japanese foreign policy to appear in the past decade. It deserves wide readership among students not only of Japanese politics and policymaking but also of international relations more generally. Written from the unique standpoint of an expatriate Japanese scholar, it casts critical yet sensitive light on problems of growing importance to our increasingly integrated world.

The Cultural Construction of International Relations: The Invention of the State of Nature. By Beate Jahn. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 182p. \$65.00.

The State and Identity Construction in International Relations. Edited by Sarah Owen Vandersluis. New York: St. Martin's, 2000. 207p. \$69.95.

Cynthia Weber, University of Leeds

Conceptualizing the sovereign nation-state remains a core concern in the discipline of international relations (IR). Yet, as the volumes by Sarah Owen Vandersluis and Beate Jahn demonstrate, the theoretical location of this conceptual debate is shifting. Questions of identity, like those re-

garding sovereign nation-states, were answered in the 1990s with reference to terms like social construction. In the new millennium, "the social" is increasingly joined by "the cultural" as an intellectual marker of how serious IR scholars must pose questions of identity. Why this shift? And what difference does it make to our understandings of sovereign nation-states, not to mention IR theory more generally?

The glib answer to the first question is that the discipline of IR is following trends found in the humanities and social sciences generally, albeit typically years behind other disciplines. So the shift in IR is simply a reflection of what occurred earlier elsewhere. Even if this is the case, what accounts for this shift in the first place? Some might say it is the (postmodern?) ungrounding of the terms social and cultural, making the first a less necessary place from which to theorize question of identity and the second a less objectionable place to begin such theorizations. Others might argue that the shift from the social to the cultural is less theoretical and more material, reflecting a recognition that contemporary global phenomena must be equally understood through notions of consumption (more often associated with cultural consumption) as well as through notions of production (more often associated with social construction).

Whatever the reasons for the shift in emphasis from the social to the cultural, the volumes by Vandersluis and Jahn offer an opportunity to address the more important second question: What difference does this shift make for our understanding of sovereign nation-states and for IR theory in general?

The Vandersluis volume consists of a series of engagements with "the question of how to understand the state and its relationship to identity" (p. 4), without caving into the tired debates about whether the state is whithering away in an era of globalization. Organized into two sections, "Constructions of the State" and "Beyond the National State," the volume adopts a self-consciously social constructivist perspective. Its project is to undertake "an interrogation of the ways in which the state and sovereignty as intellectual categories and as historical practices are very slowly changing in response to the different demands, expectations, and constraints being placed upon them" (p. 1).

After a brief "Prologue" by James Mayall and Vandersluis, which does a nice job of offering a coherent overview of what is to follow, the first part of the book contains four essays that address primarily post—World War II understandings of the state. In "The State of International Relations," Martin Shaw provides a synopsis of his historical sociological "globality" argument, which presents the contemporary international system not only as socially constructed in general terms but also as characterized by a Western unified state conglomerate and other centers of state power. Christopher Clapham's chapter, "Degrees of Statehood," argues against an absolutist understanding based on his discussions of statehood and rival centers of power, such as guerrilla movements in sub-Sahara Africa.

The next two chapters in Part I examine the nation/state relationship. Dominique Jacquin-Berdal discuses Eritrean national identity and examines how the principle of "one-nation, one-state"—usually used to legitimize existing states—was in this case used to justify national separatism. Peter Shearman's chapter, "Nationalism, the State, and the Collapse of Communism," analyzes the case of the former Soviet Union to suggest how nationalism, globalization, and democratization are connected in the contemporary world order.

In Part II, three essays take up alternatives to the nation as the only legitimate site for securing state identity. Tim Dunne,

in "Colonial Encounters in International Relations: Reading Wight, Writing Australia," reads Australia's encounter with colonialist diplomacy, law, and theories of identity to argue for a "radicalized post-colonial Rationalism [that] can contribute to the process of reconciliation" (p. 124). By focusing on Southeast Asia, Hari Singh, in "Hegemons and the Construction of Regions," looks at how hegemons construct identifiable regions and how these regions influence domestic and international relations. Naomi Mobed's chapter, "Culturalizing Security: Narratives of Identity and the Politics of Exclusion in the Arabian Gulf," examines how the practices and interests of the Gulf Cooperation Council are constructed at the intersections of two discourses of identity, one based on Western state forms and the other based on traditional religion.

Overall, the Vandersluis volume is accessible, clear, and varied. It may not offer many novel theoretical insights and does not risk straying as far away from the state and the nation as it might in the discussion of sovereign identity, but its contribution is to be found in its organization around key questions about state identity and some alternatives and in an array of strong empirical pieces, all of which enact a social constructivist project in one way or another. As Daniel Warner States in his illuminating "Epilogue," "what makes these chapters interesting is that they indicate the variety of responses available to [what Warner calls the state/sovereignty/institutional] dialogue" (p. 197).

In many ways, Beate Jahn's volume is a nice companion to the Vandersluis collection. It also might be classified as social constructivist. Jahn traces the social construction of the concept of the state of nature, which she explains undergirds both realist and liberal conceptualizations of the state, back to its specific historical introduction by the Spanish in their encounter with the Amerindians. In so doing, she produces a straightfoward deconstruction of the nature/culture dichotomy and some of its uses in IR. Put simply, Jahn argues that there is nothing "natural" about what IR calls a state of nature, which is a cultural construct.

Jahn does not stop there. What distinguishes her book from the Vandersluis volume is her preoccupation with how the construction of the state of nature functions culturally. Drawing upon the Clifford Geertz notion of thick description, Jahn argues that state of nature stories function as a cultural context to IR theory generally. She positions herself as a cultural analyst (in addition to a social constructivist) and demonstrates how IR theory conceives of culture as a problem and nature as its solution, how culture and nature became opposed in the Spanish/Amerindian encounter, and therefore how the Western concept of the state of nature is rooted in this cross-cultural experience, thereby making it cultural rather than natural. When IR theorists base their theories on state of nature stories, which construct a hierarchy of cultures between so-called civilized and so-called primitive peoples, they are "justifying in the process the very policies which have produced injustice and inequality in the international sphere in the first place" (p. 155).

Jahn concludes: "Culture, then, exerts quite a considerable power in mainstream International Relations. For the concept of the state of nature contains a culturally peculiar understanding of human nature, history, and destiny" (p. 168). Jahn argues that IR theory would do well to abandon such a concept and is particularly well placed to do so. It should enquire "into the conditions of cooperation and conflict between cultures which are mutually constitutive and subject to change, rather than hope for the day when nature will eventually overcome culture" (p. 169).

Jahn's story is a powerful one. The author convincingly

deconstructs one axis of the nature/culture dischotomy in IR

theory and analyzes its effects. Even though Jahn often slips from theorizing culture as a context into theorizing it as an ontology, her analysis enables us to think of IR theory not only as socially constructed (which has become a euphemism for "change" in IR theory) but also as cultural practice, as what Geertz has called "an ensemble of stories we tell about ourselves" (Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures, 1975, p. 448).

Overall, these two volumes lead us to engage not only with specific IR concepts, such as the sovereign nation-state or the state of nature, but also with IR theory itself conceived of as cultural practice. "Culture" in IR theory should not reductively be read as merely "change" but as complexity analyzed in much the same way Michel Foucault read power (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Critique of Postcolonial Reason, 1999). Such a cultural analysis of IR theory is indeed distinct from a social constructivist analysis, having implication for how we understand not only sovereign nation-states and states of nature but also IR theory more generally.

The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda. By Arthur J. Klinghoffer. New York: New York University Press, 1998. 208p. \$40.00.

Peter Uvin, Tufts University

This well-documented book analyzes the manifold inconsistent, inefficient, piecemeal, and sometimes counterproductive ways the international community intervened in the dynamics of violence that beset Rwanda before, during, and after the 1994 genocide. Klinghoffer takes a position that runs counter to the popular description of the international community as being totally inactive and uncaring before and during the genocide. Rather, he maintains, interventions did take place, but they failed to achieve their aims. At a descriptive level, Klinghoffer, following Bruce Jones ("Intervention without Borders:' Humanitarian Intervention in Rwanda 1990-1994," Millennium 24 [Summer 1995]: 225-49), makes this point rather successfully. The book contains many interesting pieces of information that, taken together, force us to acknowledge some new elements in the simple picture that has become so dominant about the international community's conduct in Rwanda.

Klinghoffer also seeks to make a few broader, more theoretical, arguments based on his empirical analysis. The foremost is that sovereignty is withering: The events demonstrate that sovereignty "had fallen by the wayside" (pp. 13, 61, 154) or is in "death throes" (p. 154). But more is required to demonstrate that sovereignty is close to death than merely documenting the presence of ethnic hatred, regional war, and cross-border interventions. A second theoretical point is a plea for "humanitarian realism," that is, a serious look at the combination of altruism and self-interest that underlies many countries' behavior in such crises as Rwanda. This point has been made better both empirically and conceptually by Stephen Garret (Doing Good and Doing Well. An Examination of Humanitarian Intervention, 1999). In short, judged on its theoretical contributions, this is a rather disappointing

In its attempt to make an original argument that runs counter to established consensus, the book suffers from some defects. The background section is weak; it simplifies too much, draws solely on far-removed tertiary sources (see, e.g., note 1 p. 6), and occassionally contradicts itself (compare data on 1959-62 refugee flows on pp. 8 and 13). In addition, in what I take to be an effort to demonstrate the complexity of the situation, Klinghoffer seems to adopt a policy of equal criticism against the Habyarimana government and the Rwandan

Patriotic Front (FPR). This creates some odd outcomes: To mention but one extreme example, the discussion of the number of persons allegedly killed by the FPR after the genocide (pp. 64–5) is significantly longer than any discussion of the number of people slaughtered during the genocide.

More generally, the author ends up following an overly simplistic "they are all bad guys" storyline, which oversimplifies the complexities and ethical quandaries involved. In order to make his points, Klinghoffer tends to overstate the degree of external peace efforts in the Rwandan crisis before the genocide. There is much very good information pointing to the diplomatic trail left by Western countries as they sought to promote peace. Simultaneously, however, a great deal was done by the international community that seemed to be totally indifferent to the dynamics of violence, exclusion, militarization, and polarization in Rwanda. (I, among others, document this at length in Aiding Violence. The Development Enterprise in Rwanda, 1998). The latter information does not fit into Klinghoffer's points, so he simply does not mention it.

This book adds some important questions to the standard story about the Rwandan genocide. It provides a nice collection of factual information to make that point. Its weakness is that it is rather obsessed with making this point, as well as a few theoretical ones that supposedly follow from it. This seriously reduces the analytical and descriptive quality of the overall work. I recommend it for those who are familiar with the Rwandan case and want a well-documented argument that asks some tough questions. I do not recommend it to people seeking a nuanced and well-grounded understanding of the Rwandan genocide's causes or, indeed, even the overall performance of the international community.

Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989–2000. By David M. Lampton. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 497p. \$35.00.

David Bachman, University of Washington

David M. Lampton's book on the U.S.-China relationship is the best in a series of strong works on the topic in recent years. In contrast to James Mann's About Face (1999) and Patrick Tyler's A Great Wall (1999), books by scholarly journalists that cover the history of the relationship from the late 1960s to the late 1990s and that use declassified documents from the U.S. side extensively, Lampton concentrates solely on the former Bush and Clinton administrations. Moreover, he takes great advantage of his experience as president of the National Committee on United States-China Relations from 1988 to 1996 (he was professor of political science at Ohio State University before serving on the committee, and he is now a professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies) to illustrate the ins and outs of U.S.-China relations. In contrast to Mann and Tyler, Lampton had great access to top Chinese leaders (and top U.S. officials as well) on a recurring basis, and the Chinese side is presented here with more insight than in any other source.

The book is part memoir, part history, part description, and part issue analysis of the dynamics of U.S.-China relations from early 1989 until the last days of the Clinton administration. Political scientists looking for great theoretical insights will be disappointed, but for those who want to understand the nature and evolution of U.S.-China ties, this is the best book to read on the subject.

Seven major themes are interwoven throughout the text. (1) The U.S.-China relationship can be seen as operating on three levels—global, domestic, and individual leader. (2)

Leaders confront two vary different constituencies—global and domestic. (3) Interdependence and external demands create opportunities for nationalistic appeals. (4) China is the largest late modernizer and a growing force in international affairs. At the same time, Chinese leaders and citizens see China as having been victimized by the international system for a long time. (5) Secure and effective political leadership in both countries is a key to managing the bilateral relationship well. (6) The challenge of managing this relationship will only grow in coming years. (7) Despite differences, the United States and China share many important interests, and this gives the relationship more durability than is commonly thought.

Lampton sees four main or potential turning points in U.S.-China relations during the period 1989 to 2000: maintaining the relationship after the Tiananmen massacre of 1989; Clinton's linking and delinking of human rights and China's most-favored-nation status in 1993-94; the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96; and the series of events between April and November 1999, when the United States first turned its back on major Chinese concessions for a bilateral agreement on China's accession to the World Trade Organization, then bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, and finally concluded the bilateral accord on WTO accession. These historical events provide the structure for much of the work, but there are chapters on security issues (with a tour d' horizon of China's international relations), economics and human rights, global institutions, the role of third parties in the bilateral relationship, the images by which each side sees the other, and how their media portray each other.

This is the first book to read on Sino-American relations for the 1989–2000 period, but it is not flawless. The major problem is that the book tries to be a bit of everything. Is it a history of the relationship? Is it an overview of issues? Is it an analysis of conditions in which the relationship is likely to be good (or bad)? Is it an analysis of conditions in which the relationship is likely to be good (or bad)? Is it justifying a series of policy recommendations? Is it designed to show the importance of the National Committee on United States-China Relations (this reviewer is a member of that committee)? Because Lampton tries to do some of all these things, he provides less depth on a number of issues than might be the case if there were a clearer sense of what the book is supposed to be.

A second problem is that of a bias (which I share). Lampton is deeply committed to U.S.-China relations and more generally to the policy of engaging China. As a result, more critical views of U.S.-China ties do not get the type of play that one might hope. This can take several forms or directions. Some expect the Chinese Communist Party will fall from power (or, indeed, believe that the United States should work to hasten its fall), but Lampton does not say much about the implications of these beliefs for the relationship. China's growing military capabilities and human rights abuses are discussed, but they donot receive a balanced treatment or are not constructed into an effective dialogue with the "comprehensive engagement" school of thought.

Implicitly, Lampton presents a view that is sympathetic to the primacy of the executive branch of government and to business in the setting of U.S.-China ties on the U.S. side, a view that is critical of the role of Congress or the role of public opinion in the framing of American policy toward China. Thus, when Lampton examines how individuals matter in the policy process, he highlights congressional critics of engagement (no member of Congress is singled out for advancing U.S.-China relations) and, for an example of an individual who advances the relationship, highlights Maurice Greenberg of the American International [Insurance] Group,

who was a major supporter of the National Committee on United States—China Relations. The section on Greenberg almost reads like a thank-you note for the work he did for the committee when Lampton was its president.

These criticisms do not detract from the vast majority of insights provided in this book, which is, as stated earlier, the best work on the subject. But will those who do not share Lampton's views on engagement be persuaded by his analysis? Unfortunately, for all too many people, U.S.-China relations are no longer an issue on which rational argument can contribute to the setting of good policy.

Peace, Power and Resistance in Cambodia: Global Governance and the Failure of International Conflict Resolution. By Pierre P. Lizee. New York: St. Martin's, 2000. 206p. \$65.00.

David W. Roberts, University of Ulster

This work discusses conflict resolution in the Western paradigm and Cambodia's recent experience of that. Lizee makes a notable contribution to our understanding of the management of transitions from conflict to peace in this sophisticated piece of analysis. The work revolves around the general hypothesis that the failure of the Cambodian peace process is attributable almost entirely to the inappropriate character of the Western-determined peace process. The book starts by comparing the evolution of conflict management processes in the West and in Cambodia; Lizee makes the differences quite clear, and this part of his work is very strong as an indicator of the evolution of socioinstitutional mores in Cambodia (especially pp. 39-43). He argues that a critical tension accounts for the failure of the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA). This is to be found in the Khmer approaches to social harmony through balance-of-power equations and Buddhist

Political violence and conflict resolution in Cambodia can be explained, claims Lizee, because harmony is only maintained when there is a weighted balance of power in favor of a hegemonic group, such as a political clan or monarchy. When a weaker body tries to redress this, it destroys the fabric of harmony, legitimizing violent behavior by the challenged party or grouping. This was probably the case in the fighting that erupted in July 1997, inaccurately characterized in much of the less critical literature as a "coup" by Prime Minister Hun Sen. Moreover, Lizee continues, the academic literature does not acknowledge such concepts, so it can provide no alternatives for the unsuccessful peacekeeping operation in Cambodia between 1991 and 1993. This process, it is claimed, is self-reinforcing because of the repetition of Western peacecreating assumptions, which are transmitted through globalization and which ignore difference in cultural traditions of conflict resolution and the use of violence in settling disputes.

The book is divided into four parts. The second part is directed toward proving the impropriety of the PPA by applying an analysis of cultural institutions and processes in Cambodia to the PPA. According to Lizee, the PPA was conceptually and culturally flawed from the outset, letting down Cambodians and Westerners alike. A great deal of this analysis is thoughtful and probably gleaned through personal insights into Cambodian culture, but it neglects the limitations specific to the evolution of the peace process. Lizee discuses the stages of the war and its movement to peace in a clear manner, and he concludes that the outcome of the political settlement is inappropriate for Cambodia. But this was not because people were ignorant of, or well versed in, Khmer culture. Rather, the limitations were those of geopo-

litical Cold War realism. The PPA did not take the shape and form that it did because not enough policymakers had an inside track on Cambodia. It took its rigid form because that was what the United States and China sought as conditions for normalization between them and Viet Nam and the USSR.

Throughout the peace process, and certainly up until mid-1990, Washington demanded inclusion of the Khmer Rouge, not because this made sense in terms of conflict resolution but because they were a tool with which to continue the confrontation with Hanoi. The peace process itself only broke through the impasse of the Cold War when the USSR and Viet Nam acquiesced to the terms and conditions for normalization. Lizee provides evidence of these processes, but he does not relate them to the PPA and the failure he identifies. Thus, to blame the whole failure on the cultural limitations of the peace plan is to neglect the overarching shaping process conducted as an adjunct to normalizing relations with Viet Nam and, to a lesser degree, Cambodia. It seems hard to blame either the PPA or the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) if their contours were shaped largely by the various constraints that framed and determined the

Part three of Lizee's work seeks lessons from the peacemaking experience in Cambodia that do not focus on orthodox arguments regarding technicalities and logistics. It teases with the suggestion that the author is going to provide some evidence as to why the main parties did not cooperate, but this is not forthcoming. A minor criticism is that Lizee describes the Cambodian people as being "fortunate enough to benefit" from the UNTAC operation (p. 139), which seems a little patronizing.

Part four argues that many important lessons from the 1993 experience were not incorporated into the 1998 elections. Lizee misses one crucial new experience, when the opposition refused to accept the victory of the Cambodian People's Party (CPP). The solution was found in the creation of the Senate, an unelected upper house into which the defeated parties' members could be dispersed in the traditional patronage and clientelist system of loyalty and reward. Also, Lizee takes a rather limited perspective on what he terms the "coup" of July 1997. Evidence available since then challenges strongly Lizee's view that Hun Sen was to blame. Furthermore, there is no reference to the fact that Hun Sen was publicly seeking to integrate the remaining Khmer Rouge while Ranariddh was engaged in covert processions with the intention of recruiting forces to influence the all-important balance of power against Hun Sen and the CPP. And there is no reference to Ranariddh being caught redhanded while smuggling weapons into Cambodia disguised as machine parts.

Despite the sometimes dense writing style (e.g., p. 47, para. 3; p. 76, para. 3), this work goes farther than most on this topic. It is especially welcome for offering a sophisticated conceptual alternative to the usual explanations for the failure of UNTAC as being rooted in administrative, technical, and logistical problems. It is marred, however, by certain evaluations, including the persistent reference to "failure" of UNTAC, which did surprisingly well in many areas. Any failure in conflict resolution was a fault neither of UNTAC as an institution nor its members (generally). The fault, as Lizee correctly argues, lies in the international nature of the PPA and the fact that the Cambodian conflict was not settled due to any concern for the Cambodian people. Rather, the PPA ended a superpower conflict in a manner that suited China and the United States. Those needs were incongruent with conflict resolution in Cambodia, and Lizee does well to illustrate this at certain points. With some exceptions, this is a valuable contribution to peace and conflict studies and to work on Khmer.

Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation. By Lisa L. Martin. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 225p. \$49.50 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Kathleen R. McNamara, Princeton University

One of the sharpest and most consequential divisions in international relations lies between those who believe that international politics is a realm unto its own and those who see the lines between domestic and international politics as both permeable and pertinent. For the former group, the consequences of anarchy swamp any potential for politics to be ordered at the international level as it is within states. In this view, the dynamics of domestic political life, such as the rule of law, norms of trust, or the independent effects of institutions, are foreign to the international system.

Lisa L. Martin's groundbreaking new book, *Democratic Commitments*, challenges this (still dominant) canonical viewpoint by forging strong theoretical and empirical linkages between the realm of domestic legislative institutions and international cooperation. By demonstrating that legislatures in stable democracies have the potential to increase the credibility of states' commitments and thus improve the chance of international cooperation, this book contributes significantly to emerging work on the interaction between the domestic political sphere and international outcomes.

The nature of domestic political arrangements has been shown before to be important for international politics, of course, but a persistent obstacle plaguing the literature is a lack of systematic theorizing as well as overly broad hypotheses. So many things may matter in the domestic realm; the trick is to focus on one element without trivializing it. Martin offers a good example of how to solve this problem by positing the role of the legislature as a crucial explanatory variable in the progress of international cooperation. Legislatures are a key element in the broader debate about the nature of democracy's effects on interstate relations, but they have not received ample study. Martin points to how legislative-executive arrangements reverberate back and forth to the systemic level, and the challenge of credible commitment acts as the fulcrum of her investigation.

The general analytical framework explains how differences in international cooperation may vary with different patterns of domestic legislative structure because of their effect on the credibility of national commitment. Martin evaluates alternative perspectives on executive-legislature relationships, and then she teases out more specific hypotheses from different logics of institutional delegation and how they might play out in the area of international cooperation. Legislative influence, not executive dominance, is her emphasis, against most of the literature and much conventional wisdom. Provocatively, she argues that instead of being pesky interlopers who ruin the chances for serious diplomacy, legislatures contribute to positive and cooperative outcomes by allowing agreements to be reached that are more likely to be implemented.

Martin parses out specific predictions and applications of her general framework in several empirical chapters that range over a variety of areas, but all examine the level of executive discretion in foreign policymaking and the effects of such discretion on the policy outcomes. In the U.S. context, she looks at a series of executive aggreements and treaties over the postwar era, using statistical methods to explore the interaction among the domestic influence of legislatures, decisions regarding ratification processes, and the credibility of U.S. commitments to specific agreements. Other chapters examine economic sanctions and variation in the role of Congress, and foreign aid, particularly food assistance.

The second part of the book applies Martin's line of questioning to Europe and parliamentary governments. Arguing quite rightly that the general outlines of her approach should be applicable in a variety of comparative settings, the author examines how variation in the organization of legislatures across the European Union (EU) had a predictable effect on the particular role member states have played in European integration, particularly decisions over the single market. This research is particularly helpful, given the paucity of systematic empirical work on the role of electoral politics in the path to EU integration.

The book also contributes usefully to practical debates in the EU over democratic accountability, in which democracy and efficiency seem locked in a zero-sum battle. Martin suggests that under some conditions (when legislative involvement makes implementation of agreements more likely) these two ideals can be complementary. Her reading of the EU case suggests that legislative involvement increases when there is a high level of conflict between the executive and the legislature on an issue, but she argues that this may be good in the long term, by making the commitments of states internationally more durable and implementable. This focus on the dynamics of implementation is a real strength of Martin's research, as most scholarship in international relations stresses only the negative effects of legislative involvement in bargaining or ratification processes.

Readers may not be satisfied by some of the solutions to empirical challenges. Much of the analytical story is about indirect, subtle mechanisms of influence. Anticipated reactions, such as the ways in which executives may a priori take into account legislators' preferences, and the dynamics of credibility are two areas critical to political life, but there is unlikely to be much in the way of direct evidence. Martin employs proxy tests and looks for observable, logical consequences in lieu of process-tracing methods. For example, credibility, an inherently intersubjective social phenomenon, is measured by outcomes, that is, commitments are credible when a state does what it says it will do. Despite the thoughtfulness and sophistication with which Martin rises to these challenges, some readers may decide the empirical work demonstrates correlation but not causation. Also, Martin's cases were chosen because they represent interesting substantive areas not probed by other authors, not because they offer the maximum leverage on her critical variables. The mechanics of executive-legislative relations at times become quite complex and contingent in her account, as the specifics of the cases vary dramatically. But these points are dealt with up front by Martin and do not detract from the overall contribution of the book.

As we prepare for the next round of GATT negotiations, we will need to know how domestic politics may play into the future of cooperation. The crucial issue of the timing of the EU's enlargement to the East will undoubtably continue to be entangled with domestic politics as well. The implication of Martin's work for these and a host of other issues demands attention from scholars as well as from policymakers concerned with the future of these international agreements and institutions. Joined (although not necessarily in agreement) with other important works, such as Helen Milner's Interests, Institutions, and Information (1997), the ideas advanced by Martin crystallize one of the promising new directions in the field at the turn of the millenium. Her forceful view that "part of the secret of democratic success lies precisely in its supposed handicap, constant interference in policymaking by legislative actors" (p. 47), is bound to cheer some and provoke many more, both in the scholarly world and in the real one Martin writes about so astutely.

Justice and Reconciliation: After the Violence. By Andrew Rigby. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 207p. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Gary J. Bass, Princeton University

Much of the growing literature on human rights issues focuses on the post-1989 democratizations and the ethnic conflicts of the 1990s. It reaches across many disciplines, including work not just by political scientists but also by legal scholars, historians, sociologists, anthropologists, journalists, and practitioners. Much of the literature confronts the tension between the pursuit of justice and the pursuit of stability. Andrew Rigby, who teaches on forgiveness and reconciliation, contributes an eclectic and good-hearted meditation on the dilemma of political reconciliation after mass atrocities.

Rigby considers a number of different ways of coming to terms with the past: forgetting about it; holding trials or simple purges; setting up a truth commission; paying reparations. He briefly considers the effect of these various options as they have played out in different cases: Germany and Western Europe after World War II, Spain after the Franco dictatorship, Chile after Pinochet, Argentina after the "dirty war," Eastern Europe after communism, South Africa after apartheid, and others. His goal is the creation of "a new culture of respect for human difference and human rights—what some might term a culture of peace as opposed to a culture of violence" (p. 183).

The book reveals an intelligent skepticism about all these policy options; for instance, some Latin American truth commissions were not allowed to single out perpetrators by name (p. 9). "There is an ongoing tension between the need for truth, the quest for justice, and the desire for peace" (p. 12). Justice is not an absolute value for Rigby; it does not trump all other political concerns. More specifically, following Samuel P. Huntington's *The Third Wave* (1991), Rigby argues that "wherever the transition has been negotiated rather than imposed, some kind of amnesty is almost inevitable, particularly if the parties to the settlement continue to possess the capacity to shatter the peace" (p. 184).

Rigby does not just think this tradeoff is inevitable; he suggests that it may, perversely, be helpful. His most intriguing argument is that dwelling on terrible events in the past may not be a wise way to deal with them: "I am not convinced of the appropriateness of opening up the past and talking about it as a means of dealing with the hurt" (p. 1). He even notes that he has lost loved ones in terrible circumstances: "I will not forget them; to do so would dishonor them in some way. But I do not want the pain of those times to come back" (p. ix). This runs contrary to the therapeutic argument popular among some human rights advocates, who see truth commissions and trials as cathartic opportunities for the surviving victims to face and thereby overcome past traumas.

But Rigby does not always stick to these guns. Toward the end of the book he also argues that victims need to be "heard and validated" in order for members of a shattered society to build "a new definition and relationship that acknowledges difference but on the basis of a shared identity as survivors and as human beings" (p. 186). He also suggests that France has been too quick to close the book on its Vichy past, and Spain was wrong to engage in "a collective exercise in public amnesia" (p. 54) about Franco's regime in order to proceed with the establishment of parliamentary democracy. This sounds more like the therapeutic argument he earlier seemed to be against. In a splendid book, *Unspeakable* 

Truths: Confronting State Terror and Atrocity (2001), Priscilla B. Hayner gives a more sustained and richer account of the difficulties of pursuing truth, and she points out it is not clear whether truth commissions provide the kind of therapeutic effects that Rigby sometimes attributes to them.

Unlike Hayner, Rigby relies almost exclusively on secondary sources. There is always a potential tradeoff between depth and breadth. The liveliest chapter is the only one for which he has done primary work: on Palestinians accused of collaborating with Israel. He condemns the internecine violence among Palestinians, many of whom are targeted for personal rather than political reasons, as "the worst kind of lynch law" (p. 147; see also Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1994, pp. 747–8, and Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal, Palestinians: The Making of a People, 1993, p. 268). For the rest of the cases, Rigby covers a lot of ground in a relatively slender book, which shows a laudable ability to synthesize broadly; but this comes at the expense of digging more deeply into the cases.

This book adds to a growing discussion. The question of the therapeutic effects of trials is one that might usefully be supplemented by the work of psychologists, as well as by a reconciliation specialist such as Rigby, all of them joining in what is increasingly a multidisciplinary area for study.

Appeasement in International Politics. By Stephen R. Rock. Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000. 237p. \$29.95.

David Cortright, University of Notre Dame

Since Neville Chamberlain's concessions to Adolph Hitler in Munich in 1938, appeasement has become a term of disrepute. The word is almost an epithet, denoting weakness in the face of aggression. Generations of scholars and policymakers have learned the lesson that appeasement emboldens the aggressor and makes war more likely. Academic attention has focused instead on deterrence theory and the role of coercion and compellence as key elements of international politics.

In recent years scholarly interest in inducement policies has been rekindled. Stephen R. Rock's new book is an important contribution to this emerging literature. Rock challenges the assumption that concessions do not work, and that hostile leaders cannot be appeased. He reminds us that appeasement was once an accepted practice of European diplomacy and was considered an effective means of reducing tensions and removing the causes of conflict. Through analyses of five cases—British concessions to the United States in the late 1890s, the appeasement of Germany before World War II, the Anglo-American acceptance of Soviet demands at Yalta, the American "tilt" toward Iraq in the late 1980s, and the use of incentives that led to the 1994 Agreed Framework containing North Korea's nuclear program—Rock offers lessons on the benefits and limitations of conciliatory strategies. He develops theoretical propositions and policy guidelines to aid scholars and policymakers in assessing the merits of inducement policies.

As Rock notes, appeasement is a subcategory of the broader concept of engagement. He acknowledges that engagement is a more widely accepted term among scholars and policymakers. Engagement is the more encompassing concept, referring to the building of longer-term cooperation. Appeasement tends to be narrower in scope, referring to concessions that remove the causes of conflict and reduce tensions. Because Munich still casts such a long and dark shadow, it would be best to subsume the analysis of appeasement under the general heading of engagement. A book with the word appeasement in the title is inherently handicapped.

This is unfortunate, for there is much insight and wisdom in Rock's compact volume.

Rock catalogs the various purposes that appeasement policies may serve, the mechanisms by which inducements exert influence, and the factors that account for success or failure. Inducements may seek to preserve the status quo—through crisis resolution and prevention—or to alter conditions—by offering political tradeoffs and developing alliances. The four mechanisms by which such policies reduce tensions are satiation, reassurance, socialization, and altering political dynamics within the adversary regime. Incentive policies, like sanctions, are an attempt to influence the political debate within a target or recipient regime by strengthening the hand of advocates of cooperation, while weakening the position of hostile factions. These internal influences are most likely to occur where some degree of pluralism exists.

While it is true that war-seeking states cannot be appeased, most countries that engage in hostile behavior are pursuing objectives that can in theory be appeased. Rock draws a major distinction between hostile policies that are driven by greed-a state's pursuit of territory, resources, or commercial advantage—and those that are security-driven—when a nation is motivated by concerns for its safety. Rock's characterization of these motives and how they function in different cases is not always convincing—nor is his attempt to define the circumstances in which incentives should be conditioned on reciprocity and accompanied by threats. Rock argues that when the adversary is motivated by greed, inducement policies should be conditional and combined with coercive measures. When the adversary is motivated by insecurity, inducements should be offered without the requirement for reciprocity and without accompanying threats. These are innovative propositions, but they have little grounding in Rock's case studies. They are based more on what he terms their "logic" than on hard empirical evidence. These propositions may be valid in some circumstances, but they need more thorough testing than Rock offers in his study.

The nature of inducements and how they are perceived by the adversary are crucial to the chances of success. Inducements must be properly directed to address the goals and motivations of the adversary. They should be delivered as much as possible to the supporters of reform rather than hostile factions. They must be of sufficient scale to satisfy the adversary. Finally, the state or coalition offering incentives must send clear signals and have a reputation for fulfilling its commitments. Mixed or confused messages and a failure to deliver on promised incentives can undermine effectiveness. As Rock notes, the hesitation and slowness of the United States in fulfilling its promises under the 1994 Agreed Framework have impeded progress in freezing Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program and slowed efforts to tackle ballistic missile testing and other contentious issues.

Inducement policies carry significant risks. They may be perceived by the adversary as a sign of weakness and may lead to further attempts to extract concessions. The adversary may become more daring and aggressive in pursuit of its hostile objectives. Rock argues that this is more likely in a regime that is motivated by greed than by insecurity, although his evidence in support of this claim is limited. Rock is on firmer ground when he identifies means for avoiding this moral hazard. A state can diminish the chances of being perceived as weak by making concessions conditional on reciprocal cooperation, by establishing a reputation for firmness and strength, and by maintaining the materiel capability to employ deterrent or coercive strategies if conciliatory gestures fail. In the case of North Korea, the United States and its South Korean and Japanese partners offered incentives on a step-by-step basis and made the delivery of benefits conditional on reciprocal cooperation from the other side

Rock's case studies and theoretical propositions significantly advance our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of inducement strategies in the conduct of international affairs. The book has limitations, including an overreliance on the distinction between greed and insecurity as motivations for hostile behavior, but its strengths far outweigh its weaknesses. Rock has confirmed, as other scholars have demonstrated, that engagement strategies can be and have been successful in advancing international cooperation.

**Vehicle of Influence: Building a European Car Market.** By Roland Stephen. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 240p. \$49.50.

James A. Dunn, Jr., Rutgers University, Camden

The significance of European integration as a process and an intellectual focus is undeniable. The economic importance of the European auto sector and its worldwide dimensions are also self-evident. Roland Stephen's effort to deepen our analytical understanding of the former through a detailed examination of the latter thus promises to be of interest to readers from a variety of fields, ranging from economics and politics to the analysis of corporate strategy.

Stephen acknowledges that no single, parsimonious theory is adequate to explain the complex trajectory of the development of the European Union (EU). Indeed, he gives short shrift to many of the traditional theoretical approaches to European integration, particularly the neofunctionalist or spill-over theory long identified with Ernst Haas. Stephen offers instead an analytical framework based on an eclectic set of insights and propositions taken from well-known theories of regulation, policy formation, and institutional analysis. Its key elements are the perceived distribution of the costs and benefits of integration across auto firms and member states as well as the institutional arena in which policy initiatives are debated and decided. The meat of the book is the application of the framework to four key issue areas: setting common standards for permissible levels of auto emissions, reducing national government subsidies to auto firms, antitrust policy toward the auto sector, and developing an EU-wide voluntary export restraint (VER) system with Japan to replace the hodge-podge of national restraints.

Stephen's framework can produce very plausible explanations of policy outcomes. For example, in the case of auto emissions, different firms specialized in different propulsion technologies and were divided because the costs of potential regulations would fall more heavily on some firms than others. National governments were also divided, because some felt more environmental political pressure than others. Policymaking shifted to the European Parliament and eventually resulted in higher common emissions standards than most auto companies would have preferred. In the case of Japanese imports and transplants, the auto companies were united in their reluctance to accept complete openness to what they perceived as unbeatable (and perhaps unfair) competition. Some national governments were more liberal in theory than others, but none was willing or able to put together an open auto trade coalition in the face of determined industry opposition. Policymaking remained very informal, and the result was a variant of the European tradition of managed trade in the form of a complex Europe-wide VER with Japan, which was "an antiliberal outcome ... imposed on consumers and importers" (p. 19).

In his cases the author makes good use of interviews with European auto industry officials, lobbyists, and Brussels

Eurocrats. He also draws on appropriate official documents from various EU institutions, some national documents, and a wide range of secondary literature about auto industry economics, politics, and corporate strategies. He displays an impressive knowledge of the kind of policymaking by informal understandings and insider deals among auto firms, national governments, and European officials on issues such as Japanese imports, which he labels as "typical of Brussels at its most opaque" (p. 134).

Occasionally, familiarity with the interests and positions of the various stakeholders and the desire to cast light on murky behind-closed-doors politics leads Stephen to the very edge of what his evidence will support. He resorts to assertions that might well be true but cannot be documented. His language then takes on a slippery, conditional air. For example: "Spain no doubt expected to be a beneficiary from an open investment regime. . . . The Japanese may even have quietly indicated as much, and EU structural funds were perhaps promised by the president of the Commission, Delors" (p. 133). Or: "Also, VW's preferences for high emissions standards must have been somewhat moderated after the acquisition of small-car producer SEAT (in Spain) in 1986" (p. 89). This can be annoying, in that it requires the reader to parse his sentences very carefully. But it is hardly a fatal flaw, given the less than full disclosure of much of the politics surrounding the European auto industry in these

Stephen acknowledges that he has traded breadth of scope for depth of analysis. He notes that he makes little mention of potentially significant actors, such as labor unions, local and regional governments, consumer groups, and components manufacturers (p. 83). Except for a few brief references, the detailed coverage ends in the early 1990s. And there is no mention of the efforts, which were being discussed at both the national and European levels even in the 1980s, to limit the automobile's effect on cities, to promote alternative modes of mobility such as urban transit and high-speed trains, and to increase fuel taxes and levy other kinds of fees and ecocharges on automobiles.

Within these self-imposed limits, most readers will not be disappointed by what Stephen has to tell us about how the integration pulse provided by the Single European Act affected European auto markets, auto producers, and both national and EU policymakers. Readers interested primarily in the European auto industry will find a wealth of detail and some fascinating interpretations of events. Those interested primarily in the process of cooperation, integration, and institution building will also be rewarded by some very interesting and important insights into how to think about the interaction of business and politics at the national and European levels in the late 1980s and early 1900s

What Do We Know About War?. Edited by John A. Vasquez. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 420p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

H. E. Goemans, Duke University

The new collection of essays edited by John A. Vasquez in What Do We Know About War? provides a useful overview of the quantitative literature on war. This book makes no claims to move the field forward significantly but, instead, offers seniors and first-year graduate students a good basic understanding of how statistical analyses have been used to explain the variation between war and peace. The book has significant strengths and weaknesses. Its strengths are the wide array of questions addressed and the attempt to provide a systematic discussion of the current state of the quantitative

knowledge on war; its weaknesses are the paucity of attention paid to new insights from the rational choice literature and their implications for the quantitative study of conflict.

The book is divided into four parts. The first offers an overview of the history, progress, and underlying issues of the Correlates of War (COW) and International Crisis Behavior (ICB) projects. The second examines factors that bring about war; the third, factors that promote peace; and the fourth and final part offers up some lessons and conclusions. The first part is particularly useful for undergraduates and first-year graduate students. In three chapters J. David Singer, Stuart A. Bremer, and Micahel Brecher, Patrick James, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld—prominent pioneers in the quantitative study of war-provide a good overview of the background, progress made, and questions that still need to be addressed by the COW and ICB projects. It is somewhat surprising to find that the contributors to this volume are strikingly modest in their claims about the success of the program. When Bremer assesses progress in attempts to answer the questions "Who fights whom, when, where, and why?" he feels compelled to "admit that this has not been a very successful endeavor" (p. 35). (See also Zeev Maoz' caution in his chapter on alliances [pp. 112, 137].) Singer's discussion of assumptions and some metatheoretical considerations offers good advice and food for thought for graduate students. In the third chapter, Brecher, James, and Wilkenfeld assess the progress of the ICB project and make some short comparisons of their findings with the COW findings. This is one of many instances where new insights from rational choice theory should have been discussed. James D. Fearon ("Signaling Versus the Balance of Power and Interests-An Empirical Test of a Crisis Bargaining Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 38 [June 1994]: 236-69) has argued that ex ante observable characteristics such as military power should play a fundamentally different role in situations before and during crises. Except in the excellent chapter by Jack Levy, fundamental problems such as selection effects and endogeneity are barely discussed. (To be fair, Paul K. Huth, Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, and James Lee Ray briefly address some of these issues in their chapters.) This is regrettable since these issues are coming to the front of the field.

The second group of essays discusses factors that bring about war. These nine chapters offer a nice mix of new and emerging research agendas (or variables), such as the role of territory and enduring rivalries in international conflict, and more established research agendas, such as the role of alliances, capabilities, military buildups, and escalation. The chapters by Paul R. Hensel and Paul K. Huth are among the best in the book and form a particularly nice match. Hensel carefully and instructively unpeels several layers of the onion and offers several original empirical analyses on the relationship between territory and war. He finds that "[t]erritorial claims appear to be a leading source of militarized conflict and war, increasing both the likelihood [and] ... severity levels of [militarized conflict]" (p. 81) While Hensel analyzes new data and proposes new hypotheses, Huth offers a rich and subtle discussion of theoretical explanations for the role of territory in conflict. The chapters on alliances by Zeev Maoz and Douglas M. Gibler consider a broad range of factors affecting how alliances can promote peace and war. The chapter by Maoz presents an especially thorough overview of the role alliances have played, with extensive tests and replications of the main propositions. Gibler proposes a reconceptualization and new typology of alliances and some initial tests. The two chapters, by Goertz and Diehl and by Frank Whelon Wayman, on rivalries offer only limited empirical evidence on the role of (enduring) rivalries but provide a good discussion of this emerging but relatively neglected research agenda.

Russell J. Leng's chapter on crisis escalation is a clear instance where the book achieves its goals. Since it is impossible to keep up with all the literature on conflict, I had missed Leng's earlier work on crisis escalation. He presents a very interesting typology of crises based on both realist (rationalist) and psychological factors. He finds that "[v]ariations in the crisis structure are strongly associated with whether the crisis escalates ... " and "that any examination of dispute escalation that does not consider its dynamic character is incomplete" (pp. 247, 256). Daniel S. Geller's chapter on material capabilities unfortunately highlights this book's failure to examine the links between the existing quantitative research and more recent formal work. Thus, while Geller broadly discusses the role of status quo orientations, no attempt is made to evaluate the empirical work in light of recent extensive work on status quo orientations and war, as, for example, by Robert Powell (In the Shadow of Power, 1999).

Part III of the book examines factors that promote peace and includes a chapter on international norms by Raymond and a chapter on democracy and war by Ray. The chapter on international norms discusses mainly theoretical concerns about norms and their effects; little attention is paid to the rich empirical literature linking norms and the democratic peace. Ray examines the empirical literature that links democracy and war with a careful eye on potentially confounding variables and spurious correlations. His discussion does incorporate the contributions made by the formal literature.

Three chapters, by Levy, Manus I. Midlarsky, and Vasquez, summarize the findings presented in the preceding chapters and offer conclusions on the progress of what is referred to as the "scientific study of war." Although brief, Levy's chapter stands out in this book as an excellent primer for future empirical research. Levy discusses emerging issues and concerns in the study of war, paying attention to new insights from the formal literature and constructivist approaches. He discusses how these insights affect and impact the quantitative study of conflict. To name but two of these, Levy offers brief but insightful discussions of the poor efforts in much of the quantitative study of war to understand and incorporate interaction and selection effects fully.

Most chapters clearly point to a lack of good theories to explain the relationship of the author's preferred variable to the variation between war and peace, and so it is all the more surprising that so little attention is paid to the emerging formal literature. Overall, however, I would recommend this book to new graduate students. Some of the chapters are excellent starting points for students surveying the existing quantitative literature on international conflict and for students starting their own research. Regrettably, there is a distinct trend toward Balkanization in international relations. A not-to-be-underestimated quality of this book is that it makes it easier for those interested mainly in other research traditions to follow and understand current debates in the quantitative study of war.

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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












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
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
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


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
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








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
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
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
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
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# **Notes from the Editor**

In my "Notes" in the March 2002 issue, I announced several modifications that we have introduced into the APSR's review process. Here I will simply refer again to two new procedures that are included in our "Instructions to Contributors"; I highlight these, not because they are the most important of the new procedures, but because they seem to have escaped the notice of many authors. First, when you submit a paper to the APSR, you are also invited to suggest the names of appropriate reviewers. Of course, we do not guarantee that we will follow your suggestions, but so far we have found these suggestions quite helpful. A second, and more mundane, instruction is to submit an electronic (i.e., diskette), anonymous version of your manuscript along with the requisite number of paper copies; having an electronic version on hand can greatly expedite the review process in certain circumstances.

It has not been all that many years ago that, after submitting a paper to a journal, an author could expect to wait six months, a year, or even longer before hearing back about the paper's fate. Times have changed, and authors now quite reasonably expect faster service. The brutal fact is that the news they receive is generally bad, for the great majority of the decision letters that I write (something like 9 out of every 10) are rejection letters. Receiving bad news is doubly painful when one has been kept waiting for it for an inordinately long time. Accordingly, we are working hard to try to make the review process move along in a timely manner. Inevitably, some manuscripts get bogged down, but for the most part our efforts, and of course those of the scholars from whom we solicit reviews, seem to be paying off. So far, from the day a paper arrives in our office until the day my decision letter goes into the mail, the median elapsed time has been just 39 working days.

#### IN THIS ISSUE

The March 2002 issue, the first to bear my imprint, was really more Ada Finifter's than mine, for almost all the articles in that issue were in advanced stages of the review process when I assumed the editorship. Of the articles in the current issue, half were submitted to, and revised at the invitation of, my predecessor. Future issues can be expected to contain an occasional article on which a significant portion of the decision making preceded me, but for the most part the credit or blame (depending on one's perspective) for future issues should be directed at me.

In this respect, I am delighted to report that a number of papers are in the queue that are, in my estimation, not only truly interesting and important but also refreshingly diverse in terms of subject matter and analytic approach. Please stay tuned.

In the lead article in this issue, Paul Stern poses a question of special interest to political theorists but of much broader interest as well: What is the connection between politics and philosophy? In "The Philosophic Importance of Political Life: On the 'Digression' in

Plato's Theaetetus," Stern turns for guidance to a wholly unexpected source: a Platonic dialogue well known to philosophers but less so to students of politics, and more specifically to a passage in the Theaetetus that was identified by Socrates himself as a digression and has been regarded as such ever after. Stern's accomplishment, as one of the APSR's reviewers summarized it, is to show that a passage long dismissed as an irrelevant digression "is in fact a rosetta stone" for understanding the interwoven relationship between politics and philosophy. While many interpretations of ancient texts are congenial only to a certain school of thought (Straussian, liberal, postmodern, or whatever), Stern's interpretation can be appreciated by theorists of various persuasions. No less importantly, it is important enough to command the attention of, and accessible enough to be understood by, nonspecialists as well. Even those who have never even heard of the Theaetetus and who now remember Plato only dimly, if at all, will find their understanding of politics and political science enriched by Stern's essay.

Two articles in this issue focus on the courts. According to the conventional view, only an independent judiciary can serve effectively as check and balance on the operation of the other branches of government. Although this view is virtually taken for granted in the United States, Gretchen Helmke questions its applicability to other contexts, and in particular to developing democracies. In "The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy," Helmke contends that it is not judicial independence but the lack thereof that leads judges to turn against a government whose future looks insecure. Focusing on the Argentine case, Helmke integrates this previously overlooked factor into accounts of the calculus of judicial decision making, and in so doing addresses larger issues of judicial legitimacy, institutional design, and the strength of democratic institutions in developing democracies.

While Helmke's mission is to call a widely held idea about the courts into question, Mark Richards and Herbert Kritzer set out to rehabilitate a traditional notion that has fallen into some disfavor and disuse: the idea that judges' decisions are strongly influenced by law and precedent. With the rise of the "attitudinal model," judges' ideological perspectives and policy preferences have come to the fore in analyses of judicial decision making, and judges' understandings of the law sometimes seem to matter hardly at all. By contrast, in "Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making" Richards and Kritzer outline and test a law-and-precedent based account. In the process, they suggest a new way, manifested by the concept of "jurisprudential regimes," of thinking about how legal precedents shape the decisions of America's highest

The next two articles in this issue focus on the bureaucratic sector—and more specifically, on why bureaucracies are so, well, bureaucratic. Bureaucracies

are reviled in every corner of the globe and from every ideological direction, though for altogether different (and sometimes contradictory) reasons. The image of bureaucracy that motivates Rui de Figueiredo's "Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation" is that of unresponsiveness. In this article, Figueiredo challenges the widely held view that political uncertainty motivates elected officials to insulate agencies from outside pressures and political opponents. Supplementing the tools of formal modeling with illustrative case studies, Figueiredo illuminates the limits of the uncertainty-based approach and posits new ways of understanding bureaucracies and their foibles.

Unresponsiveness, the face of bureaucracy examined by Figueiredo, is one thing. Death and destruction, the subject matter of William Weaver and Thomas Longoria's analysis of bureaucracy, are something else again. In "Bureaucracy That Kills: Federal Sovereign Immunity and the Discretionary Function Exception," Weaver and Longoria focus on a seemingly innocuous but potentially lethal provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, the "discretionary function exception." The authors trace numerous cases of damage, injury, and death to this provision, which they unflinchingly characterize as "an anachronism sandwiched into an ideal" that is "at war with justice." Following an historical review of the normative and legal issues concerning sovereign immunity, Weaver and Longoria use data drawn from hundreds of federal circuit court decisions to buttress their historical-legal interpretation. Their article can be read as a case study in what Hannah Arendt called "the banality of evil," and their conclusions have important implications concerning the operation of judicial oversight of government agencies and the achievement of justice.

A much more upbeat message about the effects of governmental policies and programs is conveyed by Suzanne Mettler in "Bringing the State Back In to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans." The "golden age" of civic engagement in the United States was the post-World War II era, when millions of Americans were direct beneficiaries of massive government social programs most notably, the G.I. Bill. Could it be, Mettler wonders, that such programs helped foster civic engagement by enhancing their beneficiaries' senses of belongingness or reciprocity? Mettler not only presents a close, multimethod analysis of the long-term impact of the G.I. Bill on citizen participation, but does so within a framework that should open up opportunities for parallel analyses of the effects of other government programs in other contexts.

Among students of American politics, debate rages about the role of party in legislative politics, with one side portraying legislators as self-interested actors whose behavior is affected only incidentally by partisanship, and the other viewing parties as an important, or even a central, influence on the behavior of legislators. The normal focus of this debate is Congress. However, in "The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Legislatures," Gerald Wright and

Brian Schaffner change the venue to state legislatures, following the often-heard but seldom-observed recommendation to treat states as "laboratories" or empirical testing grounds. Using what students of comparative politics will recognize as a "most similar systems" design, Wright and Schaffner match two neighboring states, Kansas and Nebraska, which have many features in common and a great difference as well: Nebraska's legislature, unlike its counterpart in Kansas, is nonpartisan. What Wright and Schaffner discover about the ideological structure of the two legislatures speaks directly to a scholarly controversy that has proven difficult to resolve when attention is confined to Congress, but also speaks more broadly to ongoing public debates about the role of parties in democratic systems.

lished in this issue is Kim Fridkin Kahn and Patrick Kenney's analysis of the outputs of the "fourth branch of government," the press. Over the course of the twentieth century, the norm of "objective" news coverage of political campaigns and controversies gradually diffused. Nonetheless, many politicians, pundits, journalists, and members of the general public continue to lambaste the media, not for taking strong political stands per se, but for permitting their political preferences to shape their news coverage. Such criticism of the media poses a direct challenge to what is supposed to be a saving grace of modern journalism, the "wall of separation" between news and editorial content. How high is that wall? That is the question that Kahn and

Kenney ask in "The Slant of the News: How Editorial

Endorsements Influence Campaign Coverage and Cit-

izens' Views of Candidates," a calm attempt to address

a heated issue that divides critics and defenders of the

media. In addition to providing content-analytic evi-

dence that weighs heavily on one side of the debate.

Kahn and Kenney introduce survey-based evidence

that their answer matters in terms of election outcomes.

Completing the institutional focus of the articles pub-

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The APSR publishes original work. Therefore, authors should not submit articles containing tables, figures, or substantial amounts of text that have already been published or are forthcoming in other places, or that have been included in other manuscripts submitted for review to book publishers or periodicals (including on-line journals). In many such cases, subsequent

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Manuscripts being submitted for publication should be sent to Lee Sigelman, Editor, American Political Science Review, Department of Political Science, The George Washington University, 2201 G Street N.W., Room 507, Washington, DC 20052. Correspondence concerning manuscripts under review may be sent to the same address or e-mailed to apsr@gwu.edu.

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# The Philosophic Importance of Political Life: On the "Digression" in Plato's *Theaetetus*

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The reassessment of Plato's stance toward democracy has made his understanding of the relation-ship between philosophy and politics a salient issue. To gain clarity on this issue, I examine the central passage of Plato's Theaetetus, which treats the conflict between the philosopher and the orator-politician. Located in a dialogue devoted to the meaning of knowledge and often dismissed as a digression, the passage has received relatively scant attention regarding this issue. A careful consideration of the passage and its context, however, shows that the question of the meaning of knowledge requires a consideration of the more comprehensive question of good and that this question is properly investigated through an examination of political life. Socrates thus focuses on politics not to guide political life but rather to vindicate the philosophic life. An appreciation of this motive should inform reflection concerning Plato's view of the relationship between philosophy and politics.

ow should philosophy guide politics? The recent scholarly reassessment of Plato's disposi-Ltion toward democracy has once again made this a salient question. This reassessment rejects the portrayal of Plato as an inveterate enemy of democracy, concluding instead that he is "engaged in a fruitful dialogue with democracy" (Ober 1998, 158).<sup>2</sup> The goal of this revision is not, however, simply to set the historical record straight. It also holds out the possibility that Platonic philosophy might provide guidance concerning the nourishment of our own democratic practices.<sup>3</sup> But if we are to seek such guidance about specific democratic practices, we should first be clear regarding Plato's understanding of the scope and aim of philosophy's guidance of politics in general. We need to ask, How does Plato think philosophy should guide politics? I provide an approach to this large and vexing question by considering why, in Plato's view, the philosopher takes an interest in politics at all.

My consideration of this issue focuses on a dialogue not usually regarded as bearing on Plato's political philosophy—the *Theaetetus*. The *Theaetetus* initiates the octet of dialogues through which Plato weaves the story of Socrates' indictment, trial, and execution.<sup>4</sup> The most general issue of the trial, the conflict between the political life and the philosophic, recurs throughout the octet, but it is nowhere more explicit than in the central passage of this initial dialogue of the

drama. Yet, because of its anomalous context, this passage has, until recently, received less attention than it deserves.<sup>5</sup> Its practical theme seems to spring up abruptly from an intensely abstract discussion between Socrates and two mathematicians concerning the meaning, and even possibility, of knowledge. And its confident praise of the philosophic life sits uneasily in the heart of this most skeptical of dialogues (Benardete 1986, ix). In fact, Socrates himself identifies the passage as a digression (Theaetetus 177b8).6 As a result, those interested in the epistemic issues of the dialogue often skip over this central passage, while students of political philosophy concentrate on discussions of its theme that occur in more obviously political contexts.<sup>7</sup> I suggest, however, that we regard this unusual context as an invitation to consider the conflict underlying Socrates' trial from an alternative perspective. Plato often portrays Socrates' attempts to open nascent politicians' minds to the benefits of philosophic activity. But in the Theaetetus Socrates aims to turn theorists' minds to politics rather than politicians' to theory. With this aim, he focuses not on the practical needs motivating his consideration of political life but on the theoretically required rationale that led him, unlike his predecessors. to see philosophic importance in political life.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This scholarly reassessment includes works by Euben (1997), Mara (1997), Monoson (2000), Rocco (1997), Saxonhouse (1996, 1998), and Wallach (2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> This characterization is applicable as well to the authors mentioned in footnote 1. But see also Saxonhouse 1996, 90, 112. On the conventional view of Plato's Socrates vis-à-vis democracy, see Saxonhouse 1996, 87–90, and Monoson 2000, 13–4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For example, see Euben 1997, 30, 208; Monoson 2000, 237–83; Rocco 2001, 103; and Wallach 2001, 1–2, 391–2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The octet comprises *Theaetetus*, *Euthyphro*, *Cratylus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Apology of Socrates*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Articles by Hemmenway (1990) and Rue (1993) are the exceptions to this long-standing neglect. I have benefited from their perceptive analyses of this passage.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> References to the *Theaetetus* are hereafter by Stephanus page only. The Greek text is Burnet 1979. The translation is by Benardete (1986).

Among commentators that consider the central passage as purely digressive, Schleiermacher (1973, 197-8) sees it as providing reassurance that, despite the skepticism of the dialogue, the stable Platonic world remains firmly in place. Cornford (1935, 83), McDowell (1973, 174), and (despite some differences with Cornford) Cooper (1990, 81-5) believe that it provides the more specific reassurance that, contrary to what immediately precedes the digression, Plato does think that there are permanent standards of justice, beauty, and piety. But, according to McDowell, to make this point at length would have taken Plato "too far afield from the original topic of perception" the "digression" thus contains material "which in a modern book might be served by footnotes or an appendix" (1973, 174). Burnyeat maintains that the digression has the moral function of reminding us how important knowledge is for the way we live our lives. But, contrary to the argument of the present essay, he concludes that it "does not contribute to the main inquiry" (1990, 36).

This rationale emerges from a conversation with Theodorus and Theaetetus—and looming behind them, the figure of Protagoras-two mathematicians whose theorizing is so abstract, so lacking in self-awareness, that it leaves them unable to defend their theoretical activity as either possible or desirable. In responding to the groundlessness of their position, Plato's Socrates treats another question that remains vital. As thinkers at least since Nietzsche have recognized, the failure to place theoretical inquiry in its practical, human context leaves it defenseless when, perhaps inevitably, the good of this often disruptive activity is doubted. But a question remains regarding how this human context should be understood. What exactly is the practical, pretheoretical basis out of which theory derives its justification? The *Theaetetus* compels this still vital question precisely by showing why the dialogue's theoretical theme necessarily requires a consideration of the digression's practical theme. In particular, as I argue, the dialogue shows that the issue of the meaning of knowledge resides within the more comprehensive context of the issue of human good. The digression is thus not a digression at all but a culmination of the issue that precedes it. 9 And, I argue further, the "digression" itself responds to this question with its explanation of why the issue of human good is best investigated through a consideration of political life. It is this investigation that ultimately vindicates theoretical inquiry, especially philosophic inquiry. Understood in the setting of the dialogue, then, the central passage of the *Theaetetus* deserves our careful attention because here we learn why that inquiry into politics, which culminates in Socrates' trial and execution, was and is a philosophic and not simply a political necessity.<sup>10</sup> Appreciating Plato's response to this question, we will better understand Plato's view of the relationship between philosophy and politics.

#### THE CONTEXT OF THE "DIGRESSION"

#### Theories of Knowledge and One's Own Good

What connection exists between the meaning and possibility of knowledge, on the one hand, and the examination of conflicting ways of life, on the other? The explicitly digressive character of the *Theaetetus*' central passage places this puzzle right on the surface of the dialogue. Like nearly all subsequent commentators, Socrates' interlocutors simply accept his characterization of the central passage as a digression. But Socrates'

conversation with Theodorus and Theaetetus reveals a necessary link between these apparently disparate themes. Paradoxically, that link emerges most clearly from his interlocutors' efforts to obscure it.

Socrates' conversation with Theaetetus began as an examination of Theaetetus' soul but had quickly become an examination of the more abstract question, What is knowledge? (145b6–7, 145e9). Socrates linked Theaetetus' suggestion that knowledge is perception to Protagoras' famous claim that (each) man is the measure of all things. The idiosyncratic character of perception provides the connection. Specifically, insofar as perception is individual, each perceiving through his or her own eyes and ears, each necessarily becomes the measure of the beings. Socrates proceeded to radicalize this thought, maintaining that if knowledge is perception, and each act of perception is unique, then we cannot know of stable beings, including human beings.<sup>11</sup> Rather, each perception is one in a series of unrepeatable events, each occupying a unique set of spatiotemporal coordinates, as the ever-changing perceiver makes contact with the ever-changing perceivable. Socrates finally arrives at a thoroughgoing relativism based on universal flux, a thesis associated with the philosopher, Heracleitus, but that Socrates traces ultimately to the poet, Homer (153a2).

Having constructed this thesis, Socrates then raises this objection to it: The thesis dissolves anything distinctly human because it provides no standard by which to distinguish between human and nonhuman perceptions, much less among human perceptions. To sharpen this objection, Socrates addresses the thesis's bearing on intelligence or phronesis, claiming that it leaves Protagoras indistinguishable from a tadpole "in point of intelligence (phronesis)" (161d1). Phronesis refers here to that cognitive capacity by which an individual judges the goodness of his or her way of life. 12 And in these passages leading up to the "digression," Socrates focuses on the tension between Protagoras' theory and Protagoras' view of his own good. For example, Socrates wonders how, if Protagoras' thesis is true, he could actually "claim for himself that he justly deserves to be the teacher—with great wages—of everyone else" (161d8-e1). He also worries about his own activity because if the thesis is true, "the entire business of conversation is also open to ridicule" (161e5-6). Thus, well in advance of the "digression," Socrates' objection in

<sup>12</sup> For Plato, this capacity also involves a theoretical understanding, knowing how things are in general.

<sup>8</sup> See Gadamer 1988, xi-xii, 214-74; Heidegger 1973, 32-5, 98-9, 122-49; Husserl 1965, 83-7, 119-20, 280-2, 295; Husserl 1970, 315-34; and Nietzsche 1989, 9-32.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> For the sake of convenience I continue to refer to the digression but I place it in quotes to express my judgment on this characterization. <sup>10</sup> Euben (1997, 85), Rocco (1997, 113), and Wallach (2001, 6, 9, 24–5, 33) regard Plato's political philosophy as a response to political dilemmas in Athens. My own view is closer to that of Mara (1997, 159–60, 173–4) in seeing a philosophic rationale for Socrates' interest in politics. On this point see, especially, Strauss 1989, 126. This is not to deny that, as Saxonhouse writes, "Socrates is a creature of democracy and no other regime" (1996, 91). But this judgment does not yet explain why Plato's Socrates found philosophic interest in political life.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Socrates confronts Theaetetus with the most radical version of this doctrine, repeatedly inducing him to undermine any distinction that would preserve the possibility of stability on the side of the beings or objective judgment on the part of the knower. As Modrak (1981, 38–9) points out, the resulting phenomenalism does not necessarily undermine the possibility of stable objects of perception, but Socrates lets such an impression stand. Socrates' procedure has generated controversy over whether he actually holds this radical view of perception. See Burnyeat 1976a, 44–54, Cooper 1970, 123–46, and Modrak 1981, 41–8, on one such controversy. I believe that Socrates' transparent neglect of these distinctions aims to raise questions about the tenability of the extreme version of the Protagorean thesis, moving the reader to ask what the attraction of such a dubious doctrine might be.

the name of *phronesis* relates the issue of knowledge to this very practical question: How can Protagoras, or Socrates, or anyone justify his or her chosen way of life on the basis of Protagoras' theory?

This practical context is also evident in Socrates' subsequent speech, where he impersonates Protagoras to defend him. He thus invites his interlocutors to confront not only Protagoras' theory, but Protagoras himself as an embodied human being facing the question of the good of his chosen way of life. Speaking as "Protagoras," Socrates again endorses the flux doctrine in its most extreme form. On the basis of this endorsement "Protagoras" (notably now speaking of opinion as well as perception) denies that one individual's opinion can be truer than another's, each being the measure. 13 But, he maintains, one opinion can nevertheless be better than another. "Protagoras" wisdom—for which he "deserves a lot of money"—consists precisely in the art by which he can change someone's condition so that good things will in fact appear as good (167d1). Yet how can "Protagoras" maintain this distinction between true and good? or, more specifically, How can he maintain both his theory of knowledge and this definition of his art? Among many other difficulties, the theory undermines the very distinction between the true and the apparent good on which the definition depends; it also subverts the possibility, required by the definition, of even speaking of the condition of an individual enduring over time. 14 The manner in which this discrepancy is "reconciled" becomes clear as the speech continues.

Drawing an analogy between his own art and that of the physician, "Protagoras" states that the physician "effects a change by drugs, the sophist by speeches" (167a5-6). But the analogy is imperfect. Clearly, the goods aimed at by the sophist's art, which are said to include the "just and beautiful," are controversial in a way that the good of health is not (167c4-5). To maintain the prestige of his art—wisdom as the power to effectuate good-Protagoras must obscure the potentially controversial character of good. Otherwise, the efficacy, and thus marketability, of his artful wisdom—its status as a technique of providing certain good—becomes dubious. Decoupling good from truth not only obscures but denies the controversial character of good. It renders meaningless the question of whether or not something is truly good. The nature of the reconciliation of Protagoras' theory of knowledge and his art is thus clear: Protagoras' theory subserves the definition of wisdom that defines his practice. His epistemic commitments are formulated to promote his good.

This conclusion is further substantiated in connection with Socrates' focus on the tension within Protagoras' doctrine between the claim that some are wiser than others and the claim that each is "self-sufficient in point of phronesis" (169d5). In opposition to the latter claim, Socrates notes the opinion of "all human beings" that they lack self-sufficiency in phronesis, that some are, indeed, wiser than others insofar as they have a firmer grasp of truth (170a7). As Socrates makes clear. this universal opinion is followed in practice. When faced with danger or illness, we invariably seek those who know better to secure our good (170a9-b1). Yet this universally held opinion places Protagoras in a bind. If he affirms the opinion, the homo mensura thesis is refuted by its content. If he denies it, the thesis is refuted by the implication that some opinions, notably his own, are superior to others. Protagoras could challenge its universality but this would ultimately entail the indefensible claim that no one believes that anyone is wiser than someone else (170c5–d2).

As many commentators have pointed out, however. there does remain one option for Protagoras. In presenting Protagoras' view, Socrates neglected to provide its most self-consistent version. The contradiction, so evident in the version presented, could have been avoided by strict adherence to the claim that all opinions, including Protagoras' own, are true only for each individual. But would Protagoras himself favor this option? His deeds suggest not. Socrates maintains that the living, breathing Protagoras would be a much more vigorous defender of "his own things" than would Socrates and would "disparage our attempt while solemnly upholding his view" (168c4-5, d2-4). And when Socrates has the deceased "Protagoras" pop out of the ground, the late sophist asserts the superiority of his own view and thus contradicts his own radical relativism which maintains that each is the measure (171d1-3). But finally, as Socrates suggests in the conclusion of this argument, Protagoras was the author of a book entitled Truth, which, as such, aims to make a general nonrelative claim about the way things are (171c6). 16 Again, as in his earlier speech, Protagoras sacrifices consistency for the same reason that all human beings seek those who are wiser: seriousness about his good.

This same seriousness is powerfully evident in the words and deeds of Socrates' interlocutors, especially in their attraction to Protagoreanism. Subsequent to the speech of "Protagoras," Socrates makes Theodorus, the senior mathematician, his interlocutor. Theodorus has previously shown great reluctance to join in Socrates'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> In his articulation of the Protagorean thesis, Socrates had collapsed all cognitive activities, including speech, into perception. But this reduction is difficult to maintain; to see is to see some thing, a unity available only in speech as a *collection* of sensuous qualities. On this point see Bolotin 1987, 165–6. Unlike the inherent privacy of perception, opinion is inherently shareable. It is the medium of political life. Accordingly, when speaking of the sophists' treatment of opinion, "Protagoras" brings up "the just and beautiful in the opinion of each city" (167c4–5). On this shift from perception to opinion see Maguire 1973, 118–9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> On the various difficulties with this argument see Cole 1966, 109–12; Cropsey 1996, 40–2; Maguire 1973, 126–30; McDowell 1973, 166–7; and Polansky 1992, 123–7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Bostock (1988, 89–92), Lee (1973, 244–7), and McDowell (1973, 171) maintain that the omission of the qualifier, "for one," vitiates the argument against Protagoras. For an opposing view consider Burnyeat 1976b, 172–95. Polansky (1992, 131) maintains that both may be right because the argument is self-contradictory. Omitting these qualifiers, I argue, makes the reader question whether anyone, including Protagoras, can actually adhere to this unqualified position, whether, that is, in the very act of speaking as an embodied human one refutes the Protagorean position.

one refutes the Protagorean position.

16 McDowell (1973, 170) recognizes this as an allusion to Protagoras' book.

dialectical mode of investigating through question and answer. Seeking to overcome this reluctance, Socrates throws down this challenge to Theodorus: Should Theodorus accept Protagoras' doctrine he would also have to accept that everyone is as competent as himself in geometry, astronomy, "and everything else in which you are charged with excelling" (169a4-5). This, Theodorus is unwilling to do. He is provoked and charges Socrates with compelling him to "give a logos," a defense of his way of life (169a7). Now, it is clear that Socrates does not press Theodorus so hard because he harbors some hope of converting him to Socratic philosophy at this late date (146b3-4). Rather, Theaetetus and Socrates himself are the intended beneficiaries of this conversation. For both, the benefit derives from Socrates' examination of Theodorus' own Protagoreanism.

It may seem odd that a mathematician, oriented as such on permanent invisible objects, should be drawn to the unceasing flux underlying Protagoreanism. It is hard to see how any objective claims could be made on such a basis. But Theodorus' reluctance to give a logos, to examine the underpinnings of his deepest choices, helps explain the friendship between Theodorus and Protagoras (161b8, 162a4, 168c3, 168e7, 171c8). Protagorean relativism enables the mathematician Theodorus to dismiss the realm of moral and political choice as one of endless and thus fruitless contention, exemplified precisely by the ceaseless questioning of Socrates. Theodorus can use Protagoreanism to carve out a realm of certainty free of the controversies generated by such questions (see Hemmenway 1990, 341–2).

The source of Theodorus' concern for certainty becomes evident in the dilemma Socrates sets before him. Throughout the passage Socrates pummels Theodorus with the aforementioned point: Protagorean relativism goes too far to serve Theodorus' purpose; it cannot be prevented from infecting all of knowledge. Theodorus cannot both adopt a doctrine that renders his view invincible because all views are equal and maintain the superiority of his own knowledge in its pristine certainty. It becomes clear that what moves Theodorus to adopt this untenable position is not so much his devotion to Protagoras' theory as it is his self-concernand a concomitant desire for mastery. Accordingly, in response to Socrates' question—"Don't thousands battle you on each occasion with counteropinions, convinced that you judge and believe what is false?"-Theodorus swears, "Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, it's indeed thousands... and it's they who give me all the trouble that I have from human beings" (170d8-e3). Theodorus wishes knowledge to be unassailable so that he can silence those "thousands" who would challenge his view and, so, dominate his world. 17 So deep is this desire for dominance that he is willing to purchase unassailability

at the cost of rendering his own theoretical pursuits indefensible. Socrates' interrogation of Theodorus exhibits the fact that, like Protagoras, Theodorus' epistemic allegiances are shaped by an understanding of his good. It is this understanding that determines what, in his view, counts as knowledge.

Induced by his teacher and by his own inclinations, Theaetetus has also joined his mathematical education with an attraction to Protagorean relativism (152a5). The great desire of this bright, eager student is to find the correct answer, to avoid making a mistake (146c6). Apparently antithetical, both mathematics and Protagoreanism speak to Theaetetus' desire in their shared insistence that unassailable knowledge is immediately available, whether in the rational necessity of mathematics or in the absolute idiosyncrasy of Protagoreanism. 18 Both provide immunity from doubt. Both, in particular, reject the notion that our knowledge must be gained mediately, through ascent from the particular to the general or, to use the language of the dialogue, from "the things nearby" to "the nature of each whole of the things that are" (174a1-2). On the basis of this rejection, Theaetetus can set aside such phenomena as error, falsehood, and opinion, each of which exists because of the incomplete character of that ascent.<sup>19</sup> But in rejecting this ascent from opinion he must also reject that possibility essential to the activity of the teacher and the student, the possibility of learning (145d5–9). This he is willing to do to secure his desire that knowledge be unassailable.

In avoiding the realm of opinion, Theaetetus, like Theodorus, especially wishes to avoid the realm in which he might confront perplexing questions of good. Thus, while he was aware of Socrates' investigations, he avoided Socrates and the dizziness induced by the perplexities of Socratic inquiry (148e2-3). In the portion of the dialogue just prior to the "digression," Socrates shows that the cost of this avoidance is self-contradiction. In Protagoras' case, the selfcontradiction lies in his effort to maintain a view of humanity in general that cannot apply to himself as the individual expressing the view. He attempts to exempt himself from the limits of his individual existence, forgetting or neglecting that he speaks as an embodied individual concerned, as such, with his own good. Such cases of self-contradiction occur throughout the dialogue: The Megarians of the dialogue's prologue, adherents of a philosophical school that denies the reality of potential, discuss whether Theaetetus fulfilled his potential (see Aristotle, Metaphysics 1046b29–1047b2); mathematicians adopt the view that all knowledge is perception with its consequent denial of any stable entities; a teacher and a student adhere to a view that makes impossible an account of learning.

Socrates' aim, however, is not simply to catch his interlocutors in a contradiction. Rather, he means to plumb the meaning of this self-contradiction, to see

<sup>17</sup> Certainly, Plato could have portrayed mathematicians motivated by an appreciation of the beauty of mathematics. (There may be a suggestion of this motive at 147d1–148b4.) But in this dialogue Plato has chosen to emphasize the motives that would lead to their attraction to Protagoras.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> This position is compared to Cartesian foundationalism by Recharko (1994, 142-3)

Reshotko (1994, 142–3).

19 Thus, a considerable portion of the dialogue is given over to a discussion of the possibility of falsehood.

what it teaches about the soul. By recognizing the mathematicians' adherence to beliefs that make impossible an account of their own mathematical activity—or even of their lives as humans—Socrates can witness the power of the desire for good as it exerts its pull even on those passionately devoted to knowledge. He can also assess the validity of those views that cast doubt on his own, "terrible love" for speeches about the human good (169c1). He can thus better judge whether his way of life is defensible, an outcome that can benefit not only the young Theaetetus but also Socrates.

This defense, however, does not involve an abstraction from the orientation on one's own good. Socrates does not urge his interlocutors to adopt, or even to seek, some view liberated from the question of good. This would be to repeat the same self-forgetting mistake of his interlocutors. To embark upon such a search would be, once again, to forget or neglect, in the manner of Protagoras, that we speak as embodied individuals, concerned as such with our own good. It would be to neglect the human context of theoretical inquiry. For Socrates' point is not simply that one's views of good can affect and even distort one's epistemic commitments. The manifest devotion of his interlocutors to the acquisition of knowledge is intended to tell a broader story. The influence of the view of good on those who most assiduously attempt to avoid it-on one who, in the case of Theaetetus, is indisputably brilliant—suggests that such a view is inalienable; we cannot help but consider the world through the lens of a view of good.<sup>20</sup> For exactly this reason, a careful examination of views of good in relation to knowledge becomes necessary. This at least is the indication of Socrates' own deeds. Far from undertaking a value-free analysis of the meaning and possibility of knowledge, he now examines precisely those views of good that motivate the diverse views of knowledge. The character of Socrates' examination makes clear that the question of good provides the pretheoretical framework within which we seek knowledge and so accounts for what we take knowledge to be. Socrates now also makes clear that this question is best considered through the medium of politics.

# The Specific Question of Good in the "Digression"

Admittedly, it is not immediately clear how Socrates' examination of the more comprehensive issue of good might resolve all difficulties. After all, the question of good assumes importance precisely because of the elusiveness of comprehensive certainty; the evaluative perspective from which we view the world can wield such influence because of the uncertainty of our knowledge. But if, as Theodorus and Theaetetus suspect, it proves impossible to acquire certain knowledge of these views of good, then all claims to knowledge will be dubious.

Socrates responds to this concern, but he does so by interrogating the *expectation* of such certain knowledge

rather than by directly providing a comprehensive and certain account of the good. He, in particular, examines the view of good on which this criterion of certainty is based. The deepest strand of this examination involves the issue Socrates now introduces: the character of "the political things," which comprises advantage, on the one hand, and beauty, justice, and piety, on the other (172a1–b2).

Socrates maintains that while Protagoras' homo mensura is appropriate in the realm of taste, when it comes to a good such as health even Protagoras would want to recognize the existence of superior knowledge (171d9-e8). And, according to Socrates, as it is with an individual and health, so it is with a political community and its "advantage" (172a5). By 'advantage' Socrates means, first of all, that which is useful or profitable, distinguishing it from any sense of beauty, justice, and piety. There can be little doubt whether the steps a community has taken to secure the good in this basic sense have been successful; it is not difficult to determine whether or not the community endures and achieves material well-being. About these things even Protagoras "would scarcely have the nerve to assert that whatever a city lays down for itself in the belief they're to its advantage, it's as certain as can be that these things will be to its advantage" (172a8-b2; emphasis added).<sup>21</sup> Socrates thus easily transforms radical Protagoreanism into a modified Protagoreanism that does recognize a good not simply dependent on the view of each. If it were Socrates' goal simply to respond to radical Protagoreanism, he could end the discussion with this conclusion. He continues, however, because his focus is on the view of good that underlies both radical and modified Protagoreanism, the good of advantage.

Good so understood renders the community a means to secure the good that we enjoy as individuals. Like health, the goods of security, dominance, and material gain answer to needs we have as embodied, individuated beings. It is good, understood in this way, as answering to our most basic needs, that first calls forth our desire for knowledge; we do not want to be mistaken regarding our survival (170a9-b1). Error is wellnigh intolerable when it concerns our very existence. But advantage reaches beyond wealth to encompass power and glory in the pursuit of what each wants as an individual: "to have things happen in accordance with the commands of one's own soul" (Laws 687c5–7). It is knowledge understood as certainty that gives the power to accomplish our heart's every desire, to be free of need. 22 The beliefs that the good is advantage and that the touchstone of knowledge is unassailable

On Theaetetus' mathematical achievements see Desjardins 1990, 226, n. 2, 228, n. 4, and the material cited therein.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> In his careful consideration of the "digression," Bradshaw (1998, 63–5) argues that its purpose is to use "modified Protagoreanism" to show that the Philosopher's way of life is superior to that of the orator-politician because he more surely achieves what he deems to be his advantage than does the latter. I argue, however, that the "digression" bears not on means but on the end insofar as it raises a question about the very notion of advantage. A significant part of that question involves doubt as to whether the Philosopher (as opposed to Socrates) can in fact attain the end he has in view.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Accordingly, Protagoras considers knowledge as power. See 166d5–167d1.

certainty go hand in hand. Theodorus and Theaetetus, as well as Protagoras, desire to have, or be seen as having, the knowledge that will let them either master the uncertain future or be free of these nagging uncertainties. Again, the question of good provides the framework within which they seek knowledge and so accounts for what they believe knowledge to be. But this means that if our view of good should change, so must the sought-after object of knowledge. In particular, if our good is not properly thought of as advantage, in the sense defined above, then we must also question whether unassailable certainty is properly thought to be the touchstone of knowledge.

It is, however, difficult to question advantage. Its solidity stands in marked contrast with the variability of those other constituents of the political things, beauty, justice, and piety. In light of this variability, many conclude about the latter that "none of them is by nature with a being of its own," that they are merely conventional (172b4-5). This conclusion is, in fact, held by "everyone": even those who do "not altogether speak the speech of Protagoras [lead] wisdom in one way or another to this" (172b6-7; emphasis added).<sup>23</sup> In view of the widespread agreement that advantage is the human good, this consensus should not be surprising. If our understanding is expected to provide the certain means to this good, then whatever partakes of the sort of fluctuation evident in the meanings of beauty, justice, and piety must be ruled out as part of the natural human good. As Socrates' remark indicates, the sophist Protagoras is not alone in drawing this conclusion. Nor is Protagorean relativism necessarily required for this outcome; with his introduction of modified Protagoreanism Socrates confirms that Protagoras' relativism is a tool wielded in pursuit of the same view of good underlying conventionalism. This conclusion is thus reached by others oriented on wisdom, others who need not wholly share Protagoras' theoretical orientation. As the "digression" makes clear, these others include Socrates' philosophic predecessors who do share the view of good that leads to this conclusion.

Examining this view of good in the digression, Socrates assesses whether the judgment regarding the conventional status of beauty, justice, and piety does not already presuppose a specific conception of the good. He considers, in other words, whether these constituents of the political things, even in their variability, could be as expressive of our nature and of our good as is advantage.<sup>24</sup> In approaching this question of good

<sup>23</sup> On the translation of this line see Burnyeat 1990, 33, n. 41. Cornford (1935, 81–3) and Polansky (1992, 133, n. 86) believe that Socrates is referring to some who go farther than Protagoras in denying any natural basis for the city, including advantage. Burnyeat (1990, 32–3) and McDowell (1973, 172–3) maintain that it refers to some who are less radical in their relativism than Protagoras, applying it only to justice. My view is closer to the latter but differs in maintaining that Socrates is ultimately more interested in conventionalism than in relativism because the former reveals the view of good to which relativism (of whatever degree) is instrumental. His ultimate concern is this understanding of good that is shared by his philosophic predecessors.

predecessors. <sup>24</sup> Following the "digression," Socrates refers to the good things rather than to advantage. See 177d2–3.

through a consideration of the political things, Socrates means not merely to critique Protagoras but ultimately to understand, more clearly than did his predecessors, the character of that knowledge that is the ultimate goal of inquiry. Accordingly, notwithstanding his later characterization of the central passage as a digression, Socrates tells Theodorus, as this central passage begins, that "a greater speech . . . from a lesser speech is overtaking us" (177b8, 172b8-c1).

#### THE "DIGRESSION"

#### The Philosopher's Neglect of Politics

The "digression" considers the question of good through a comparison of the life of the Philosopher and the life of the orator–politician. <sup>25</sup> As several commentators have recently shown, in this comparison Socrates not only roundly demeans the orator–politicians, the Philosopher also comes in for his share of ridicule. Specifically, in opposition to his own philosophic concern for that which is good, beautiful, and just, Socrates portrays the Philosopher as otherworldly and apolitical, ignorant or neglectful of the transitory, particular, and trivial affairs of humans. <sup>26</sup> In what follows I focus on this critique of the Philosopher.

The Philosophic life appears in the "digression" as the antithesis of the political life. Those leading these divergent ways of life interpret the exact same phenomena in opposite ways. This difference conduces not only to ridicule but to contempt issuing from both sides (172c8-d2; see also Rue 1993, 84). The opposition is manifest in Socrates' initial distinction between the Philosopher's speech and courtroom oratory. As Socrates remarks to Theodorus, the Philosophers "always have available that which you said—leisure" to speak at whatever length they desire (172d4–5). But the orators who embody the Protagorean doctrine, being swept along in the Heracleitean flow of time, "are always speaking in the press of business—water in its flow is bearing down on them—and there's no room to have their talks about whatever they desire" (172d9-e2).<sup>27</sup> This activity has a deleterious effect on the orators'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> The "digression" thus introduces the issue of Socrates' trial. The connection between Socrates' trial and the central passage of the *Theaetetus* is made most clearly by Hemmenway (1990, 323–46) and Rue (1993, 71–100). They also provide the most sustained discussions of the digression as a critique of non-Socratic philosophy. Berger (1982, 400) and Waymack (1985, 483) make the same general point but without the same degree of detail.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> See Hemmenway 1990, 331–6; Rue, 1993, 78–82; and Howland, 1998, 63–4. I capitalize 'Philosopher' to indicate the difference between Socrates and the character portrayed in the digression. The aforementioned commentators argue that Plato thus intends to point to the superiority of Socratic philosophy, which takes seriously the human realm, as opposed to the otherworldly abstractions of the Philosopher. What remains to be specified, however, is both what problem compelled Socrates to take human affairs seriously and how Socrates' focus on human affairs constitutes a response to this problem. For a list of the differences between Socrates and the Philosopher that are expressed within the *Theaetetus* as a whole, see Benitez and Guimaraes 1993, 300–1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> According to Benardete (1986, I.187, n. 44), a water clock measured the speaker's allotted time.

souls. As a result of having to argue out of self-interest, rather than orienting their speech on "that which is" as do the Philosophers, the orators "become sharp and shrewd...small and not upright in their souls" (172d9, 173a1–3).

Socrates responds to Theodorus' wish that he speak also of "our chorus," the Philosophers. But Socrates does not speak of the Philosopher's soul as he had spoken of the orator's. Instead, he enumerates all that the Philosopher simply neglects in the orator's political world. Socrates makes emphatically clear that this neglect is a serious error, leveling against the Philosopher his most significant charge: The Philosopher does not know that he does not know these things (173e1). To begin to discern exactly what the Philosopher has missed in his dismissal of politics we must consider just what it is that the Philosopher ignores. The Philosophers, Socrates states.

don't know the way to the marketplace, or where's a court, councilhouse, or anything else that's a common assembly of the city. And laws and decrees, spoken or written, they neither see nor hear, and the serious business of clubs for gaining office, and meetings, banquets, and revelries with flute girls—it doesn't even occur to them to do them in their dreams. And whether someone has been well-born or base-born in the city, or whether someone has incurred some evil from his ancestors, on the men's or women's side—he's less aware of it than of the proverbial pitchers of the sea. (173c8–e1)

Before considering this lengthy list, it is worth noting that at the beginning of the dialogue, Euclides, the transcriber of this conversation, reported that Socrates had exercised editorial oversight of the transcript of the conversation (143a3–4).<sup>28</sup> The items in the foregoing list reflect this care; each helps display the characteristics of political life.

The marketplace, of which Socrates speaks first, exists, most basically, because of our mutual dependence in the satisfaction of our corporeal needs. But in the satisfaction of these needs conflict arises. Individuals are not always willing to reconcile the satisfaction of their needs with the needs of others. And so government is necessary with its councilhouse, courts, and other common assemblies. These rely especially on the rule of law, which, as an amalgam of reason and coercion, implies that these differences can be controlled or minimized but not eliminated. The political community is thus always characterized by a conflict among parties that, in the pursuit of their divergent interests, engage in the pursuit of office and power within the community.

But these divisions are not only caused by the clashing of those needs we have as embodied beings. We want not only to eat but to engage in "banquets and revelry with flute girls" (cf. Symposium 212d6). In other words, we have psychic capacities, and needs, that find fulfillment in friendship and conversation. The political community attempts to respond to these higher aspirations, producing further distinctions among its citizens with regard to their nobility (173d4–5). But, as witness Socrates' plight, these needs may lead beyond what the community believes it can tolerate.

In his encapsulation of political life Socrates highlights those elements that portray it as a scene of persistent conflict. But given that political life exists as a response to human need, these conflicts must be regarded as reflective of tensions between and among these needs. The persistence of these tensions makes law, courts, and vying for office characteristic institutions of political life. The ongoing existence of these institutions suggests that the conflicts among humans and their needs may be only imperfectly reconcilable. The saga of Socrates' trial indicates just how imperfectly; even if all corporeal needs could be perfectly satisfied, there would still be the desire for the kinds of activities portrayed in the Symposium—that is, the desire to satisfy psychic needs for friendship, conversation, and beauty that can threaten the common good.

Socrates introduces the "digression" with the question of the natural status of justice, beauty, and piety precisely because their questionable status itself reflects an important fact about our natural constitution.<sup>29</sup> By including these among the political things, he recognizes that political communities attempt to respond to our psychic needs.<sup>30</sup> But by raising the question of their natural status, Socrates points to the essential controversy surrounding these virtues. He thus points to the complexity of human needs, which can give rise to variety, and thus difference, regarding notions of human fulfillment; from the variety of needs emerges a vast range of human potentials such that individuals can differ radically from one another while still being human. In short, this complexity of needs makes the meaning of human fulfillment or wholeness itself a problem. Socrates focuses on political life and its persistent conflicts to shed light on the problematic character of the human whole. This becomes ever more evident in what follows, as Socrates makes clear that in neglecting politics, what the Philosopher misses is precisely this problematic character. He also makes clear that this neglect is traceable to the founder of the philosophic tradition, Thales himself, and that the cost of this neglect is a lack of self-understanding.

Socrates describes the incident in which Thales, gazing aloft, fell into a well. His fall prompts a witty. Thracian slave girl to say that in his "eagerness to know the things in heaven Thales was unaware of the things

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> The *Theaetetus* begins with a prologue, occurring many years after Socrates' conversation with Theaetetus and Theodorus, in which Euclides and Terpsion, two Megarians who were acquaintances of both Theaetetus and Socrates, meet after Euclides happens upon the wounded and ill Theaetetus being carried to Athens. Their conversation turns to the discussion the young Theaetetus once had with Socrates. Euclides possesses an edited transcript of this discussion that he had developed with the contribution of Socrates himself. Euclides produces the book, and he and Terpsion listen as a slave boy reads it to them. This is the conversation that we hear. See 142a1–143c7. On the prologue see Wood 1999, 810–3, and Johnson 1998, 585–6, 594–7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> His goal here is not, then, to demonstrate that one particular definition of any one of these has a natural rather than a merely conventional warrant.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> The same is true of liberal political orders insofar as they too are informed by some conception of a good life.

in front of him and at his feet" (174a6–8). This comment, according to Socrates, is applicable to "all those who engage in philosophy" (174a4–b1). Socrates now maintains that the Philosopher appears laughable not only in public, as he had previously stated, but also "in private" whenever he must speak about the particulars "in a court or *anywhere else*" (174c1–2; emphasis added). This Philosopher, whose thought explores "everywhere every nature of each whole of the things which are...letting itself down to not one of the things nearby," appears absurd to Socrates as well as to the politicians (174a1–2).<sup>31</sup>

Among the particulars, "the things nearby," that the Philosopher finds difficult to discuss are his neighbors.

For someone of this sort has truly become unaware of his neighbor next-door, not only as to what he's doing but almost to the point of not knowing whether he is a human being or some different nursling. But what a human being is and in what respect it's suitable for a nature of that sort to act or be acted on that's different from all the rest—he seeks that.... (174b3)

The Philosopher bypasses his neighbor, the individual human, and focuses on human nature as a whole. However, this procedure actually precludes him from accurately grasping the human whole in all its complexity. In particular, he fails to see the perplexing diversity of human needs and the vast range of human possibilities that this diversity produces. The lack of selfunderstanding, manifest by his own words, makes this failure evident. For example, he finds trivial the possession of a great deal of land, "accustomed as he is to look at the entire earth" (174e4-5). Yet, while the Philosopher's mind may conceive of the entire earth, he like all other humans must occupy one small portion of it and derive his sustenance from it. Furthermore, when he hears praise of wealthy ancestry, "he's convinced the praise is from those whose sight is altogether dim and limited, who are incapable, by lack of education, of looking over all eternity" (174e7-175a1). But while he can reflect on eternity, he too is generated, born into a family on which he was dependent for, among other things, his education.

The Philosopher's neglect of human diversity is particularly on display when he does briefly address political life. Politics, for him, certainly does not involve the give and take among citizens necessary for the rule of law. In fact, he regards rule as a form of herding. The Philosopher thus banishes the ruled from humankind altogether; humans are "different nursling[s]" (174b3). Yet, in the course of speaking in this way, Socrates has the Philosopher call the one ruled "a more conspiratorial animal" (174d6–7). But of course to conspire is to speak, to plan, to deliberate—the province of humans alone (174e4–5, 175a1). Such beings are properly ruled not by herding but by law (nomos) (of which we are reminded by the frequent use of words in this context that have the *nom* stem), which, as an amalgam of reason and coercion, responds to both those aspects of our

<sup>31</sup> I follow Rue's (1993, 80) judgment that *ta engus* means the 'particulars' as well as 'the things nearby'.

being expressed in the phrase, "conspiratorial animals" (174d4, 174d7, 174e1).

This understanding of humanity, reflected in the rule of law, is also evident, if unwittingly, in the Philosopher's very ridicule of the politicians. And this ridicule best reveals the impact of his ignorance of "the political things" on his self-understanding.<sup>32</sup> The Philosopher's ridicule would itself be ridiculous if those he criticized were not fellow humans; seldom do we ridicule herd animals for their inability to follow abstract arguments. But this ridicule also tacitly acknowledges the deep and perhaps unbridgeable distinctions between different ways of life. The Philosopher recognizes in the politician, and vice versa, the existence of a significantly different conception of the human good. Thus, the ridicule is comprehensive, touching on every aspect of life. But the mutual ridicule between the adherents of the two ways of life also shows that the followers of both want to be assured that they have chosen the right way, that their way of life will secure the good. The inability of both the Philosophers and the politicians to let an alternative way of life go unremarked, regarding it instead as an object of ridicule or a threat, expresses exactly this need for reassurance. It expresses a deep sense of uncertainty about what is the good that fulfills our humanity. But this is just where the Philosopher's self-understanding is deficient. He does not adequately appreciate that his own ridicule implies the questionability of the good. His focus on the wholes has obscured the source of this question-namely, the problematic character of the human whole.

Admittedly, given the vast range of human potential, our capacity to be in so many diverse and conflicting ways, everyone finds difficulty in considering what human fulfillment or maturity should mean for oneself as an individual. So great is this range that to predict accurately an individual's future can be regarded as a wondrous bit of prophecy (142c4-5) In the prologue Plato puts this perplexity of human wholeness before the reader in a variety of ways: by the remarkable device of providing a "snapshot" of the mature Theaetetus prior to recounting the story of the young Theaetetus; by having Euclides and Terpsion hold both Theaetetus and Socrates up as models, even though the one dies for the city that executes the other; and by having Euclides refer to Theaetetus as "beautiful and good," a phrase that evokes the vexed issue of the unity of human excellence (142b7).33 But the philosopher can least of all afford to neglect the problematic human whole, for in the Theaetetus it is the initial cause of that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> The terms he uses are similar to those used to describe Socrates himself in Aristophanes' *Clouds*. On the echoes of the *Clouds* in this passage see Howland 1998 59.62

passage, see Howland 1998, 59–62.

The word, *kala*, beauty or nobility, points to the vexing problem of what should be meant by a beautiful or noble or fulfilled human being. Plato presents this problem near the beginning of the dialogue when Euclides describes Theaetetus as beautiful because of his many accomplishments, but Theodorus regards him as "not beautiful" in appearance. See 142b7 and 143e8 as well as 185e7–8. On the problem posed by beauty see Zuckert 2000, 55–8, 67–70.

wonder that Socrates designates as the beginning of philosophy (155d2–5).<sup>34</sup>

The name that Socrates gives to this problematic human whole is soul. In the "digression," soul refers to a living, growing thing capable of a variety of levels of development as dictated by one's education and way of life.35 The image is of the growth of a tree, which through improper care can be deprived of "growth" and "straightness," to become "bent and stunted" (173a3-4, b1). It is the assemblage of potentials, more and less fulfilled, that must find their realization in body. Socrates makes clear that because it does involve this kind of realization, we are capable of a vast array of possibilities; we certainly do not automatically achieve our full humanity. Reflection on the political things best discloses the problematic human whole. Yet, unlike Socrates, who certainly knows the way to the marketplace as well as the ancestry of his fellow citizens, the Philosopher dismisses the political things as "small and nothing" (144c5-8, 173e4). It is appropriate, then, that the discussion of the Philosopher's neglect of politics replaces an account of his soul. For in neglecting politics, in thinking that "his body alone is situated in the city," while his "thought" explores "everywhere every nature of each whole," the Philosopher neglects the soul (173e2-174a2). In so doing he reveals something of his own soul, specifically, his reluctance to encounter that which resists the certainty of quantification much as do the innumerable "proverbial pitchers of the sea" (173d8-9).36 He focuses instead on the "things in heaven," the wholes that he can believe are permanent and unchanging. He thus misses the point revealed by Socrates' own examination of politics: that our wholeness, the character of our fulfillment, is a question, and so then must be our good. But more specifically, as we see in what follows, this understanding of humanity, revealed by reflection on political life, makes particularly doubtful that advantage can be the ultimate human good.

#### The Imperishability of Evils

When, earlier in the dialogue, Socrates shifted the discussion to the problem of knowledge, it may have seemed that he acceded to Theaetetus' desire to avert his eyes from the perplexity surrounding the question of the goodness of his soul (145b1–9). Yet because this question asks the extent to which a particular individual fulfills his or her humanity, it is formally analogous to the problem of knowledge. Both concern the connection, if any, between the particulars and the wholes.<sup>37</sup>

<sup>34</sup> The several references to wonder in the prologue refer to an individual defying expectations. See 142a3, 142b9, and 142c4. Wonder at human nature continues in the initial exchanges between Socrates and Theodorus. See 144a2, 144b6, and 144d3.

Both the Philosophers and the Protagoreans wish to deny any tension between the particular and the whole. The former want to see only abstract wholes and the latter want to see only particulars, only discrete instances of perception. The evidence of the dialogue belies both views. The dubious character of the Protagorean claim is evident throughout the dialogue in its inevitable generation of self-contradiction. But, as we have just seen, the aspiration of the Philosopher to concern himself only with wholes is just as dubious. It is with respect to this dubious possibility that Socrates links our nature and our good most clearly.

He makes the key point in response to Theodorus, who, much taken with Socrates' account of the Philosopher, expresses the hope that if all could be persuaded by it, "peace would be more widespread and evils less among human beings" (176a4). With this statement, Theodorus shows his desire that all agree with him. He longs for a world in which all differences are absorbed into generalities, in which the rational necessity of mathematics compels the assent of all. The result would be a peace in which none would contest him. Responding to Theodorus, Socrates expresses one of the most far-reaching statements in the Platonic corpus about the nature of humanity and the world we inhabit:

But it's not possible for the evils either to perish, Theodorus—it's a necessity that there always be something contrary to the good—or for them to be established among gods, but of necessity they haunt mortal nature and this region here.... (176a5–8)

Together these two necessities define something crucial about our nature and thus our good. Let us consider them in more detail.

The first necessity is that evils cannot perish because there must always be something contrary to the good. If this is the case, then the existence of that which is good in itself must be dubious; that which is good is so only in relation to something else, specifically, in relation to evil (see Bolotin 1989, 172-73). Without evil, good does not exist. But why must good exist only in relation to evil? The second necessity helps answer this question in defining what is meant by evil. Evils are said to be a necessary aspect of mortal nature. They are thus linked to our finitude, to our lack of that perfect self-sufficiency assigned to the immortal gods. For this reason, evils are said to haunt "this region here" rather than the home of the gods (176a7-8). Death is, of course, a sign of this lack, but it is simply the most prominent sign of the general condition of deficiency or neediness that characterizes us insofar as we are mortal. Socrates' association of evils with mortality therefore also connects evils with this neediness.

To understand fully the *imperishability* of evils, however, the character of this neediness requires further specification. All living things are mortal and thus needy. But in associating the notions of good and evil with this neediness Socrates and his interlocutors have in mind specifically human neediness; Theodorus' hopes pertain to the evils "among human beings" and Socrates' response provides advice relevant only to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> The first use of soul in the passage (172e7) refers in fact to an individual's life.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> On this phrase, see Benardete 1986, I. 187, n. 46.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> The radical 'Knowledge is Perception' thesis denies the problematic wholeness on the side of both humanity and the beings. That these are analogous is not, however, to say that they are identical.

humans (176a4, 176a8-b2).38 The specific character of human neediness is evident in the case of mortality. Human mortality includes not only the brute fact of our demise but also awareness of that fact. Plato frames the octet with this awareness, beginning with the dying Theaetetus being carried homeward and culminating with Socrates' discussion of immortality on his last day (142a6-b1; Phaedo).<sup>39</sup> This most dramatic example of our neediness provides further insight into what Socrates means by evils. For humans, evils are not only needs themselves but our awareness of these needs. Evil is a condition known as such, a condition that therefore might be otherwise. Specifically, it might be remedied or at least ameliorated by that which is thereby known as good. In sum, evil is neediness of which we are aware, and good is that which we judge might answer to this condition of neediness.

Yet the question remains why Socrates asserts the imperishability of evils so understood, that where there is good there must also be evil. Using the strong language of necessity, he implies that the existence of evil is inherent in the nature of things. This is a conclusion that follows, I think, directly from Socrates' reflections on those heterogeneous needs that dictate the character of political life. That is, because we are capable of being aware of our neediness, because therefore the very notion of good can become an issue for us, we necessarily have conflicting and irreconcilable needs. The psychic capacities that enable such awareness generate needs whose requirements are not perfectly compatible with corporeal needs. In other words, exactly insofar as we are capable of asking the question of good, our nature is such that all our needs cannot be perfectly satisfied. Socrates' use of the strong language of necessity is appropriate because inherent in the capacity that defines us, the capacity to ask of the good, is the existence of ineradicable need or imperishable evils. It is, finally, this existence of need, of evil, and thus of good that distinguishes the human region from the divine (176a6-7).

Given that the specific character of political life in general, and Socrates' trial in particular, has elucidated the irreconcilable character of human needs, it is appropriate that Socrates makes the claim about the imperishability of evils in response to Theodorus' desire for freedom from political life. Socrates, he hopes, might "persuade everyone" "to leave off from 'How am I wronging you, or you me?' and [turn] to the examination of justice itself" (175c1–3). Peace would be more widespread if Theodorus' desire to comprehend all particulars within wholes resulted in a transcendence of all individual claims by justice itself (176a4).

In Theodorus' dream, reason would have the power to answer all needs and thus bring about the perfect harmony of all individual goods in one common good. Theodorus' desire for freedom from politics is connected to his extravagant hopes for the power of reason or speech; he believes that his words could be effective even in Sparta (162b4–7).<sup>40</sup> These hopes reflect that desire for mastery promised by sophistry, with its ability to manipulate words and images to attain its ends. But political life, with its characteristic institutions of law and the courts, persists, testifying to the imperfect resolution of these particular goods. Reason, it seems, is incapable of overcoming fully that self-concern rooted in our individuated existence, which is, after all, itself the source of Theodorus' dream (170e1-3). No one could be more fully aware of these limits than Socrates himself, whose life-long pursuit of phronesis will soon result in his execution. Such awareness stands in stark contrast to the Philosopher, who, sharing Theodorus' dreams of freedom, longs to be more than human (172c8-d2).<sup>41</sup> However, the fulfillment of these dreams of freedom-from politics, from ambiguous words, from the body—so reminiscent of the Enlightenment hopes that persist in our own time, proves elusive. These dreams founder on the necessities that Socrates has adduced: the imperishability of evils, the ineradicable neediness, attendant on our mortal and complex nature.

The dubiousness of these dreams suggests that the good for us cannot be advantage alone because advantage is oriented precisely on achieving complete freedom from need. As such, it must necessarily distort the kind of being we are. But given the connection we have established between the good, on the one hand, and knowledge, on the other, if advantage cannot rightly be regarded as the ultimate human good, then the knowledge we seek in pursuit of our good cannot be oriented solely on the certainty that would supply this advantage. This is not to say that such knowledge cannot be a good. Whenever faced by "the greatest dangers...foundering on campaigns, in illnesses, or at sea," we seek rulers and teachers who "don't differ by anything else than by the fact they know" (170b1). There can be no doubt that knowledge that answers to our urgent needs—to

<sup>41</sup> Theodorus states his approval of the Philosopher's freedom immediately after Socrates raises the possibility that they might "abuse too much in excess the freedom and possibility of exchanging speeches that we were just now speaking of" (173b6–7, 173b8–c5).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> Perhaps this is why Cornford (1935, 87) and (McDowell 1973, 53) translate the phrase *thnata phusin* as "our mortal nature." Levett (in Burnyeat 1990, 304) translates it as "human life."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Mortality is present in several other ways in the prologue. Euclides mentions that Socrates met Theaetetus shortly before his death (142c6). And the city of Erineos, to which Euclides accompanied Theaetetus as he was being carried to Athens, is, as Benardete (1986, I.184, n. 3) notes, the place from which Hades abducted Persephone and carried her to the underworld. Burkert (1985, 161) states that through the Persephone story, "a dimension of death is introduced into life." See also Hesiod (*Theogeny 773*).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> Theodorus, however, seems to sense that the very need for speech can be considered a limit. Theodorus states that he, "for some reason or another, inclined rather early away from bare speeches and toward geometry," (165a1-2). He perhaps believes that the symbols of geometry provide access to the world in a more immediate way than do the ambiguities and uncertainties of "bare speeches." Inherent in this belief, as in his desire for freedom from politics, is a desire for freedom from the body, the source of the need to rely on images—for the words that constitute speeches are precisely not (at least not wholly) the objects of perception but are rather the medium through which the things can be represented or expressed. And this mediacy, while being a source of freedom in granting the possibility to consider alternatives, also dictates a limit to that freedom; this difference between word and thing entails that the capacity to manipulate mental objects does not necessarily correspond to our capacity to manipulate the world, including human beings.

Theodorus states his approval of the Philosopher's freedom imme-

know with certainty, for example, which of the many objects in the world might heal or protect us—is good (Apology 22c9–d4). But such knowledge cannot be the ultimate goal of inquiry precisely because Socrates has maintained that evils are imperishable, that insofar as we can ask the question of our good, not all needs can be fully answered. The knowledge that might stand as the ultimate goal of inquiry would have to acknowledge this persistently needy condition and the problematic nature that underlies this neediness.

In this light, the knowledge that we most need concerns which of the many conflicting goods we ought to pursue. It is, in short, that phronesis in which Socrates doubts we are self-sufficient (169d5). Such knowledge could not be oriented on the "wholes" alone because if evils are ineradicable for all, then concerns that reflect this condition, concerns thought dismissable by the Philosopher, have crucial importance. The Philosopher, too, pursues his own good, and insofar as that good is the good of an embodied being, he cannot afford to focus only on unchanging intelligibles. He would have to consider as well "things at his feet and things before his eyes" (174c2-3). He would have to study those evils of which Socrates says the Philosopher is ignorant (174c7–8). No object of inquiry, practical or theoretical, could be precluded beforehand as unworthy of investigation. In particular, only such a being would see the need to understand the problem of knowledge as it is examined in the *Theaetetus*, the problem of relating universals and particulars that arises because of our mediated relationship with the world. Only such a being would need to understand the political things, including those virtues of justice, piety, and beauty dismissed as wholly conventional by Socrates' predecessors. In sum, such a being would seek the knowledge of all things.42

Taking his bearings from the criterion of certainty about the whole, the Philosopher is unable to defend the philosophic life because he shares with the political community the same view of good: to have the good in perpetuity, to be something more than human, to disregard his mortality as he "flies...above heaven" (173e5-6). Gazing at the stars instead of reflecting upon himself and his neighbor, the Thalesian Philosopher misses the problematic wholeness of humanity. More particularly, in failing to take politics seriously, Socrates' predecessors did not appreciate the necessarily questionable status of good. They are thus left unable to defend the good of their own way of life even to themselves. For this reason, Socrates ends his comparison of the two ways of life by saying that what distinguishes the Philosopher from the politicians is merely that he knows "how to arrange his cloak on the right in the character of a free man" (175e7). On the basis of this perfectly conventional distinction, there is no possibility of a reasoned defense of the life of reason. "This," Socrates tells Theodorus, "is the one you would call a philosopher" (175e1-2; emphasis added). In what immediately follows, Socrates paints a very different

picture of the one he would call a philosopher. It is a portrayal of philosophy as *the* human good.

### Socratic Philosophy

Because of the primacy of the question of the good in the human context, the articulation of Socratic philosophy involves a confrontation with the poet, Homer, as the general of the army of fluxists rather than with the philosophical flux theorists. It is Homer who provided the Greeks with their paradigmatic portrayal of the good life, in part through his depiction of the Olympian gods (Herodotus, *History* II.53).<sup>43</sup> Accordingly, the initial focus of Socrates' formulation concerns the philosopher's relationship with the "divine region." He begins specifically with the advice that the philosopher flee our region of evils for the divine region (176a8–b1).

Given Socrates' earlier statement regarding the relationship of evils and good, such a flight would also leave behind the notion of human good. It would fulfill the Philosopher's dream of being more than human. However, this advice, so reflective of the Philosopher's yearnings, quickly undergoes modification. The notion of actually going somewhere is not maintained (176b1–3). Furthermore, Socrates alters the meaning of this flight. Initially, 'flight' means "assimilation to a god." Subsequently, it is taken to mean "to become just and pious with *phronesis*," which Socrates equates with flight from wickedness, the opposite of the pursuit of virtue (176b1–5). What began sounding distinctly other-worldly becomes ever more terrestrialized.

The qualities to be pursued are, to say the least, not usually attributed to gods. Each involves an awareness of human limits and dependency. Justice, singularly lacking in many of the Greek pantheon, reflects human dependence on one another; piety, the possession of which by gods would be contradictory, involves an acknowledgment of subordination to that which transcends humanity. And, finally, there is *phronesis*. This intellectual capacity replaces beauty in the trio of virtues mentioned prior to the "digression." As we have seen, Socrates uses the word in contexts that bear directly on the special problem of knowing how one should live and thus the problem of knowing the character of human fulfillment or wholeness. As such, it is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> My discussion of "evils" and their bearing on philosophy is indebted to Bolotin's (1989, 172–3) treatment of this passage.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> Pertinent in this context is the comment by Ford (1994, 216, n. 30): "When the son of "Good Fame" [Euclides] presents a text to "Pleasure" [Terpsion] we may suspect a deliberate revision of traditional oral transmission as represented by Homer where the *klea andron* are sung by the likes of *Phamios Terpiades*," (Odyssey 22.330).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> Annas (1999, 64) states that this "unworldly strand" has its afterlife in religion. She associates its unworldliness with the definition of philosophy offered in the *Phaedo*, the culminating dialogue of the octet. There it is said that philosophy is preparation for death. But this definition can be understood in a wholly this-worldly manner. The same is true of Socrates' advice in the *Theaetetus*. On the *Phaedo*, see Stern 1993, 174–8, and Ahrensdorf 1995, 199–201.

<sup>45</sup> On this point, see Hemmenway 1990, 335, and Rue 1993, 89. Annas (1999, 66) cites Plotinus as one who recognizes the absurdity of attributing these virtues to the gods.

tributing these virtues to the gods.

46 This replacement raises a question concerning Bradshaw's contention that the Philosopher, who is oriented on wholes, achieves his advantage more surely than does the orator-politician. On phronesis in the Theaetetus see also Polansky 1992, 142–8.

a capacity unnecessary for an eternally self-sufficient being such as a god. It is appropriate, then, that in this account of his own philosophic activity *phronesis* replaces beauty, that quality that at least holds out the promise of attainable human wholeness.

Just as the 'god' to whom Socrates advises assimilation is not quite like any recognizable member of the Greek pantheon, neither does the Socratic philosopher resemble the Philosopher previously encountered in the "digression." Socrates constructs this new version of the philosophic life in light of the necessities that have just been announced. With this new orientation of philosophy, Socrates also redefines just what distinguishes the philosopher from all others. He provides this definition through a critique of his opponents' rationale for practicing virtue and avoiding vice. This critique turns into a consideration of their view of wisdom.

Socrates holds that both the many and the sophists maintain that one practices virtue and avoids vice to seem to be good. Protagoras' followers, because they conceive of all goods other than advantage as merely conventional, are driven to this conclusion. However, Socrates also attributes this view to those who engage in "the practice of political power... and the arts" (176c6-d1). The many, the sophists and politicians, the practitioners of the arts—all those who desire what the arts aim to provide—freedom from need—share this view. But in addition, as long as philosophy takes its bearings by the criterion of certainty about the whole, it too shares this same motive and orientation. Socrates' predecessors must therefore also be included within this group.

Because virtue, for Socrates, is a cognitive matter—it is the *recognition* that trying to become as just as possible is true virtue and the failure to *recognize* this is vice—he identifies virtue with wisdom (176c4–5, 176b3–7).<sup>47</sup> And he distinguishes his wisdom from what he calls "vulgar" and "common" wisdom (176c7, 176d1). He elaborates on the non-Socratic view of wisdom by describing the self-understanding of one of its adherents. This one thinks himself "clever" (*deinos*)

by his criminal willingness to stop at nothing for they glory in the reproach and believe they're hearing that they're not utter nonsense, merely *burdens of the earth*, but that they're men as they ought to be in a city—those who will get themselves to safety. (176d2–5; emphasis added)

Socrates' allusion to Homer's *Iliad* leads to the heart of the distinction between the two views of wisdom. The italicized phrase is uttered by Achilles in grief over the death of his friend, Patroclus (Homer, *Iliad* XVIII. 104). Socrates' gloss on the allusion suggests that Achilles' view is oriented on the axis, death–safety. It is oriented, in particular, on the provision and security of one's own—one's own friends, family, and life. Believing that this is *the* good, those who hold this view conclude that wisdom, and human excellence in general, resides in directing all of our power toward

securing this end. Thus, wisdom becomes identified with cleverness, the capacity to calculate the most efficacious means to the predetermined end of advantage.

This identification follows from the example of Homer's heroes, Achilles and Odysseus, through which he portrays death as the greatest threat to human good (Homer, Odyssey XI.489-91; Vernant 1996, 58).48 This Homeric conception spurs us to overcome those limits on our mortality, "to stop at nothing," in the hope that evils are not imperishable, that we might possess the good forever (177a8). Following the Homeric hero's example, these efforts should be aimed at the acquisition of that power and mastery, as signified by glory, that will grant us our heart's every desire, including above all our own perpetuation (Vernant 1996, 61). But as was the case for Achilles, and is so for each one of us, these efforts must ultimately fail. From this thwarted hope one might conclude that the world is a scene of instability, of senseless and ceaseless change, wholly inhospitable to human good. This nearly intolerable conclusion conduces to a belief in beings greater than we, beings such as the Olympian gods who care for us, reward and punish, altering what might otherwise be considered as unchangeable necessities. Plato portrays this psychology in Theaetetus' willingness to jettison immediately the flux doctrine, with which he had identified himself, when hearing of its negative impact on the authority of the gods (162c7–d2). Underlying both of these widely divergent views is a single concern, the concern for his own advantage. For this same reason, Homer can be both the authoritative source regarding the gods and the general of the army of fluxists. He articulates the view of good that underlies both.

To oppose this view is to strike at the very heart of the accepted notion of piety. Socrates does just that by rejecting the claim that the reward for living virtuously is some sanction apart from this life. Of those who do believe this Socrates states,

...They're ignorant of the penalty for injustice, and it's what they least ought to be ignorant of. For it's not what it is in their opinion, beatings and executions—people who do no injustice undergo them on occasion... (176d7-e1)

Those who are concerned above all with their own advantage, those for whom safety is preeminent, might well think that beatings and executions were the true punishments for the evil life. But this is to ignore what Socrates makes explicit: that it is often the just that are punished. It is the unwillingness to accept this fact that moves people to fill the world with gods that can provide the sort of order that the world evidently does not. Socrates resists the nearly irresistible desire to subscribe to this belief. Underlying his civic impiety stands his strong suspicion that the city's gods reflect the dubious Homeric conception of the human good.

But piety remains a virtue for Socrates; there is still that which we look up to—namely, the paradigm of the "divine and happy" life (176e3-4). The ultimate reward for living according to this paradigm, as opposed to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> But vice is not simply corrigible through reason alone, for while vice is a kind of ignorance or incoherence, there are nonrational causes of this ignorance or incoherence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> This quote is expunged in Socrates' purification of poetry in the *Republic* (386c3–7).

paradigm of the "godless and miserable" life, is not, however, some extraneous sanction. As was said of the orator's soul, each becomes more like these contrary "paradigms" through his own actions (176e3). The reward is the life that is lived (176e3-4). The ultimate penalty, too, is this-worldly. It is, in particular, to live life without seeing the true end, without seeing how things truly are. Socrates insists that the miserable life is followed not out of some evil inclination but from a failure to see clearly the alternatives; those who follow the godless and miserable paradigm do so by "folly and extreme foolishness" and act "unawares" (176e4-177a1). Its followers are those clever men who are in fact self-deceived, those who "are by so much more the sort they suspect they're not because they don't suspect it" (176d5-6). These clever students of Homer cannot help but be self-deceived. The belief that advantage is the good must involve self-deception insofar as it defies the necessities, including mortality, that define our existence. Socrates' criticism of the clever implies that the true good is, instead, the avoidance of self-deception, or clarity. The ultimate reward is to see our situation clearly, to see, and accept, that we do not inhabit a world that answers to all needs. The virtues of this life are those that reflect our limits: our dependence on others, on that which transcends us, and above all our persistent need for guidance regarding how to live our lives.

But why believe that this is our ultimate need, that the good lies in seeing how things truly are? Why think that by nature humans would rather live according to the way things really are, especially when so few do? Socrates suggests an answer when he maintains that following the wrong way is a matter of error rather than evil, that all really want the same thing but just do not see clearly enough. The "digression" supports this claim precisely in its portrayal of the ridicule to which the conflict between the two ways of life leads.

As I have maintained, this mutual ridicule shows that both desire reassurance concerning the goodness of their way of life because of the sense, more or less tacit, that they are not fully sure of the true human good. In speaking of the orators at the end of the "digression," Socrates points to one symptom of this desire: the self-dissatisfaction they experience when they cannot provide "an account (logos) of the things they blame" (177b1-7). The desire for assurance is evident not only in the orators but also in the reluctance of those who, like Theodorus and Theaetetus, avoid giving "an account (logos)" because they fear an outcome similar to that of the orator; in the widespread adherence to beliefs, such as those provided by Homer, that offer such assurance at the cost of obscuring a clear view of our own nature; and, finally, in the Philosopher's contemptuous dismissal of political life (169a7). Each of these is a reaction to doubt, and a concomitant desire for reassurance, that one's good is truly good.

Through his conversation with Theaetetus and Theodorus, Socrates perceives that this powerful desire can drive even these extremely intelligent interlocutors to adopt self-contradictory views. Such conversations provide Socrates himself with some assurance that his desire for what is truly good is not idiosyncratic;

this desire is evident, if unwittingly, in the words and deeds of others. Socrates' "terrible love" of speeches thus benefits the young Theaetetus in pointing toward the surer, if more arduous, path to the good (169c1). But his conversations also benefit himself, in making possible a reasoned defense of his chosen way of life. On the basis of the universal desire for that which is truly good, and on the basis of the equally universal sense, more or less tacit, that certainty regarding the good eludes us, Socrates can legitimately claim that his way of life at least brings him closer to what humans by nature want. The distinction between Socrates' way of life and that of others is thus not simply conventional.

#### CONCLUSION

Socrates bases the defense of his life of philosophic inquiry on his understanding that the question and the questionability of good provides the unavoidable, the natural, framework for all human activity. Everyone depicted in the "digression" inhabits a world defined by this question; the Philosopher's judgment that the political things are "small and nothing" emerges from a view of good as much as does the slave girl's laughter. The discussion leading up to the "digression" shows that this unalienable concern for good comprehends our epistemic commitments such that it determines what it is we take knowledge to be. Accordingly, Socrates' reflections on political life, which make dubious the widely held view that advantage is the sole good, must also bear on the meaning of knowledge. Specifically, through showing that humans are ineluctably needy, these reflections imply that advantage, which aims at the eradication of need, cannot be the ultimate understanding of human good. This conclusion also makes dubious the idea that the certainty that will provide that advantage must be the sole criterion of knowledge. Because we lack godlike self-sufficiency, the proper goal of our inquiry is knowledge of all things, including the perplexities and uncertainties that necessarily accompany our existence. Given the persistence and irreconcilability of our needs, chief among these perplexities is the character of the human good. It remains a continuing object of inquiry from which no matter can be precluded without prior investigation. Accordingly, the philosophic life involves a search for phronesis rather than its presumed possession (Statesman 272c4).

In substantiating the good of philosophy so understood, the *political* character of the human context is crucial. Because this political context embeds inquiry, like all human activities, in the question of good, it prevents the self-forgetting stance of Theodorus, who ignores the human meaning of his activity. Moreover, the inherently conflictual nature of political life obstructs the perfect reconciliation of all differences in one perefectly common good. It thus undermines those Theodoran dreams that overestimate the power of reason. Finally, in showing that our wholeness is problematic, Socrates' consideration of the political character of the human context lets us see that the question of our good thus endures and, most importantly, that so then does the need for inquiry.

This message of the *Theaetetus*' central passage is a gift for the young, immature Theaetetus. Socrates shows him that it is only by appreciating the problem of becoming a full human that one achieves full humanity. Failing to do so, Theaetetus will not fulfill his much vaunted potential; he will rather be like those "who seem to be no different from children" (177b6-7). But the central passage of the Theaetetus is a gift not only for Theaetetus. In the climax of his life, Socrates carefully edits the written version of the entire conversation with Theaetetus and Theodorus, aiming to reach not only his interlocutors, but also all those potential philosophers to whom this conversation will be transmitted through the schools of philosophy (142d6–143a5).<sup>49</sup> At the heart of this conversation is a brief for Socrates' upcoming trial, a brief that prepares its readers to grasp the philosophic meaning of that trial. This is Socrates' gift to his philosophic heirs. For the central passage of the Theaetetus teaches that Socrates' philosophical inquiry into political life becomes necessary primarily not as a response to political dilemmas but, rather, to understand and defend the possibility of philosophy to philosophers.

The primacy of this motive suggests that understanding political life should remain central to philosophy insofar as philosophy, among all intellectual endeavors, requires awareness of its preconditions. But the primacy of this motive also informs the guidance that philosophy might give to politics. In particular, the affinities between the philosophy of Plato's Socrates and democratic practices should be understood to derive not from Socrates' particular political context but from the extent to which such practices are thought to comport with the requirements of Socratic philosophy. Thus, for example, the Platonic philosopher would resist the tyrannical urge to eradicate the diversity of views of good, inherent in distinctively political life, because this would be to destroy the very rationale for philosophic inquiry.<sup>50</sup> Similarly, in the conversational character of Socratic philosophy, in its demand for a logos defending one's way of life, and in the consequent freedom of speech required to provide such a logos, we might well find Platonic arguments to favor that political community in which these characteristics are most persistently present.<sup>51</sup> But if we turn to Plato for such guidance we should be clear about the standpoint from which all these arguments flow. Any understanding of the guidance Plato might offer our politics must begin

and end with a consideration of that standpoint: the good of the life of philosophic inquiry.

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Euben 1997, 91, 102–8; Mara 1997, 83–95, 133, 240–59; and Saxon-

house 1996, 90, 91, 102, 112-4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> Only the *Phaedo* and the *Theaetetus* have introductory conversations set outside of Athens. Both bear most pointedly on the question of the transmission of philosophy. In both, the transmission depends on very particular, and thus fortuitous, circumstances. It should also be noted that both Euclides and Terpsion were present at the philosophic convention in attendance at Socrates' death. See *Phaedo* 58d3 and 59c1–2.

This reading thus supports the view that, to paraphrase Saxonhouse (1992, 91), Plato's pursuit of unity is ambiguous indeed. See also Strauss 1964, 118–21, and Nichols 1987, 109–22. On Plato's view of the limits thus imposed on Platonic philosophy's guidance of politics, see Mara 1997, 240–6, and Wallach 2001, 429.
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# The Logic of Strategic Defection: Court–Executive Relations in Argentina Under Dictatorship and Democracy

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Building on the separation-of-powers approach in American politics, this article develops a new micro-level account of judicial decision-making in contexts where judges face institutional insecurity. Against conventional wisdom, I argue that under certain conditions the lack of judicial independence motivates judges to "strategically defect" against the government once it begins losing power. The result is a reverse legal-political cycle in which antigovernment decisions cluster at the end of weak governments. Original data on more than 7,500 individual decisions by Argentine Supreme Court justices (1976–1995) are used to test hypotheses about why, when, and in which types of cases judges are likely to engage in strategic defection. Consistent with the theory's predictions, the results of the analysis show a significant increase in antigovernment decisions occurring at the end of weak dictatorships and weak democratic governments. Examining subsets of decisions and controlling for several additional variables further corroborate the strategic account.

All judges are politicians, whether they know it or not.

Enrique Petracchi, Argentine Supreme Court Justice, 1983-present (Abramovich 1992)

7 hy do judges rule against the government? Standard answers suggest that judges do so only if they are independent (Larkins 1998; Stotzsky 1993). Although contemporary scholars disagree over how to define and measure judicial independence, the assumption that it is a necessary, if insufficient, condition for a functioning system of interbranch checks and balances has remained unquestioned since Hamilton's ([1787] 1961, 471) eloquent observation that judges who lack independence will rarely "hazard the displeasure" of those in power. Yet even casual observation of judicial behavior in institutionally insecure environments suggests that the facts do not fully support this assertion. From Franco's authoritarian Spain, where judges routinely expressed views at odds with the government, to countries such as Guatemala and Peru, where judges refused to legitimize autogolpes (self-coups) staged by sitting executives, to Argentina, where judges have sent to prison the very politicians by whom they were appointed, evidence suggests that judicial decision-making varies a great deal even where the basic institutional requisites for independence are conspicuously absent.

If the existing literature offers little insight into why dependent judges sometimes serve to check their governments, how can we make sense of this behavior? I develop one set of answers to this question by building on the emerging separation-of-powers approach in American politics. In contrast to legalistic approaches that assume apolitical judges and approaches that focus on judges' attitudes or ideologies, the separation-of-powers approach treats judges as rational decision-makers who are constrained by other institutional actors (see, e.g., Epstein and Knight 1996, 1998; Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; and Spiller and Gely 1990). Whereas strategic approaches in the American politics literature have been criticized on the grounds that judges are relatively insulated from the alleged pressures imposed by other actors (Segal 1997). I argue that precisely because such institutional protections are in short supply in many parts of the developing world, the separation-of-powers approach should prove particularly compelling for analyzing judicial behavior beyond the American context.

Extending the separation-of-powers approach to new institutional settings yields several intuitive but novel predictions about judges' reactions to their political environment. Most fundamentally, in stark contrast to the conventional wisdom sketched above, I argue that under certain conditions the very lack of independence motivates judges to challenge the other branches of government. Specifically, once the government in office begins to lose power, judges who lack institutional security begin facing incentives to increase their antigovernment rulings to distance themselves from a weakening government. I refer to this phenomenon as strategic defection. Taking into account factors such as the degree of institutional security that judges face, the number of relevant political actors, and the timing of sanctions, the theory of strategic defection predicts a reverse legal-political cycle in which antigovernment decisions increase at the end of weak governments and are handed down by the very judges whom the government

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For surveys of competing definitions of judicial independence and problems of measurement, see Larkins 1996, Rosenberg 1992, and Tate and Haynie 1994.

had earlier appointed. The logic of strategic defection offers an important but heretofore undertheorized mechanism for analyzing a variety of interinstitutional behaviors under dictatorships and democracies alike.

The Argentine Supreme Court presents a textbook case for examining the theory of strategic defection. Despite the constitutional guarantee of lifetime tenure for Argentine Supreme Court justices, the decades of political instability that plagued Argentina from the 1930s through the 1980s resulted in the de facto norm of removing and replacing the members of the Supreme Court with each regime transition. In the period examined here, the Court was replaced en masse by the military following the coup in 1976 and again by the incoming democratic government of Raul Alfonsín in 1983. This institutional insecurity continued even as democracy consolidated. As recently as 1990 newly elected president Carlos Menem gained control over the Court through a court-packing scheme that ultimately enabled him to appoint six of the nine justices to the bench.

# THE SEPARATION-OF-POWERS APPROACH IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: THE THEORY OF STRATEGIC DEFECTION

In extending the separation-of-powers framework beyond the United States, I begin with three observa-

tions. First, in many parts of the developing world, judges face threats far greater than simply having their decisions overturned. In such contexts, sanctions range from impeachment, removal, and court-packing to criminal indictment, physical violence, and even death. Compared to American justices, who serve an average of 16.3 years on the bench, in Argentina in the post-Perón period, the average length of tenure has been a mere 5.6 years (see Table 1). Although judges stepped down for a variety of reasons throughout each of the three governments, multiple resignations clustered at the end of both the military and the first democratic government of Alfonsín suggest that incoming governments in Argentina routinely get rid of their predecessors' judges despite constitutional guarantees.


Second, in many developing countries the *de facto* concentration of power in the executive branch eclipses the formal institutional judicial sanctioning powers granted to the legislature. This is particularly true in Latin America, where despite constitutional guarantees, the functional separation of powers is notoriously weak or absent and power is concentrated heavily in the executive branch (O'Donnell 1994). The weakness of these other institutions thus also tends to increase dramatically the threat judges face, for sanctions against the judges are unlikely to be successfully blocked by third-party actors such as the legislature.

TABLE 1. Characteristics Name of Justice	Dates	Government	Departure	Tenure (Months)
Horacio Herredia	1976–78	Videla*	Deceased	24
Frederico Escalada	1976	Videla*	Resigned	9
Adolfo Gabrielli	1976–83	Videla*	Resigned**	94
Alejandro Caride	1976–33	Videla*	Resigned	21
Abelardo Rossi	1976–83	Videla*	Resigned**	94
Pedro Frías	1976–83	Videla*	Resigned	69
Elías Guastavino	1978–83	Videla*	Resigned**	72
Enas Guasiavino Emilio Daireaux	1976–63	Videla*	Deceased	36
		Videla*	Resigned	24
César Black	1980–82 1982–83			2 <del>4</del> 24
Carlos Renom		Galtieri*	Resigned	12
Julio Martínez Vivot	1983	Bignone*	Resigned*	
Emilio Gnecco	1983	Bignone*	Resigned*	12
Genaro Carrió	1983–85	Alfonsín	Resigned	24
José Caballero	1983–90	Alfonsín	Resigned*	84
Augusto Belluscio	1983–	Alfonsín		192
Carlos Fayt	1983–	Alfonsín		192 .
Enrique Petracchi	1983-	Alfonsín	D. C. Jane	192
Jorge Bacqué	1985–90	Alfonsín	Resigned**	60
Julio Oyanarte	1990–91	Menem	Resigned	12
Ricardo Levene	1990–95	Menem	Retired	67
Mariano Cavagna Martínez	1990–93	Menem	Resigned	36
Rodolfo Barra	1990–93	Menem	Resigned	36
Julio Nazareno	1990–	Menem		108
Eduardo Moliné O'Connor	1990-	Menem		108
Antonio Boggiano	1991–	Menem		96
Gustavo Bossert	1993-	Menem		72
Guillermo López	1993	Menem		72
Adolfo Vázquez	1995—	Menem		48

7.

(Average = 67.5)

Source: Compiled from data in Carrió 1996; Miller, Gelli, and Cayuso 1995; and Poder Cuidadano 1997. Note: \*Judges appointed during the dictatorship; \*\*judges who resigned during a political transition.




Third, in many developing countries the primary threat to judges comes not from incumbent governments but from incoming ones. This follows from the fact that those with the greatest incentives to sanction justices are not those who appoint them but, rather, those who succeed the appointing government. Theoretically, this means that the appropriate locale of what Ferejohn and Weingast (1992) refer to as the "intertemporal conflict of interest" shifts from one between past and current governments to one based on the current, incumbent executive and the future, incoming executive. Under this alternative scenario judges face incentives to curry favor not with the current government but, rather, with the future government.

Taken together, the first two points suggest that judges' incentives to engage in strategic behavior in developing democracies are potentially far greater than in developed democracies. The third point implies a difference based not on mere degree but, rather, on the particular repertoire of strategic behavior that emerges. When judges believe that they are constrained by incoming governments who oppose the incumbent government, their best response may not be to support the current government (e.g. Epstein and Knight 1996) but, rather, to defect from it.

Figure 1 provides a basic strategic setting that illustrates the logic of strategic defection. The figure depicts a sequence of decisions with the current government (G1) moving first, the court (C) second, Nature (N) third, and the future government (G2) fourth. In the first stage, the current government acts by selecting justices for the court. In the second stage, these justices rule on policies of this government, either upholding or overruling the policies of the government. In the third stage, Nature selects the next government, with a probability p that the incumbents will remain and 1-p that opponents will take office. In the fourth and final stage, the future government decides whether to sanction the court based on the court's decisions made under the previous government.

For the sake of simplicity, assume that the basic rule that guides the actors' choices is that if the court has decided cases close to the views of the incoming government, the future government will be less likely to sanction the justices. If the court has decided cases against the views of the new incumbents, however, the future government will be more likely to sanction the justices.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> A more general assumption is that judges are uncertain about the incoming government's type. If an incoming government cares about



The first implication is that in only two circumstances will the incoming government be unlikely to sanction justices who continued to rule in favor of the previous government. The first condition is when the current government itself is strong and able to maintain itself in power; that is, G1 = G2. The second is when the incumbents lose to the opposition, but the location of the new government's ideal points is such that it prefers G1 to SQ, where SQ is the status quo (see Figure 2A). Such a circumstance might obtain, for example, if there are relatively few policy differences between the outgoing and the incoming governments. In these circumstances, incoming governments will have little incentive to punish their opponents' court, even if the court that served under the previous government continues to rule in its favor.

In all other circumstances, future governments will have incentives to sanction justices who continued to rule in favor of the previous government. If the incoming government opposes the policies of its predecessors such that it prefers that its opponents' policies do not become law, then, in effect, the future government can be said to favor the status quo (that is, the condition that obtains whenever the policies of the current government are not enacted). In short, future rulers will have an incentive to sanction justices loyal to the previous government (judges whose decisions fall between G1 and SQ) whenever SQ is between G1 and G2 (see Figure 2B).

I am now in a position to propose a new set of answers to the question of why, when, and in which cases judges who lack independence are likely to rule against the government. Assuming that judges wish to avoid sanctions, loyalty to the current government clearly may not be the best strategy. Instead, once the government in office begins to lose power, judges will face incentives to engage in strategic defection.<sup>4</sup> Stated as a testable hypothesis, the first prediction is as follows.

Hypothesis 1. Judges will increase their rulings against the current government once the prospect emerges that the current government will lose power.

Moreover, to the extent that judges use strategic defection to mitigate the sanctions they face, it follows

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The assumption that the court has a dichotomous choice is simplifying, as judges may decide neither strictly for nor strictly against the government. I assume that governments have well-defined, stable, single-peaked preferences in a unidimensional policy space.

legitimacy, it might not sanction judges regardless of what the judges do. But if judges are uncertain about the next government, strategic defection will never hurt them and could help them.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Further research on justices' motives, such as seeking to enhance their legal reputations, should examine judges' behavior where the preferences of the legal community and the incoming government diverge. Judges seeking to enhance their legal reputation should appeal to the legal community regardless of the political environment.

that defection should occur in cases about which the opposition is likely to care most. Thus, the second prediction can be stated as follows.

Hypothesis 2. All else equal, judges will concentrate their defection in cases that are considered most important to the incoming government.

Evidence would be inconsistent with these hypotheses if judges facing sanctions remained loyal to the outgoing government or if antigovernment decisions were limited to relatively minor cases.

#### **DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN**

Elsewhere, I have tested the theory of strategic defection by considering high-profile cases such as the reelection case involving Menem's bid for a third term in office in 1999 (Helmke n.d.). Here I use new individual-level data on the Argentine Supreme Court justices' decisions between 1976 and 1995, contained in the Argentine Supreme Court Decisions Database (ASCD), which I constructed.<sup>5</sup> I compare the behavior of justices in periods of relative institutional security to their behavior in periods of relative insecurity. Inferences about strategic defection are thus based not simply on the total percentage of antigovernment decisions, which may be affected by any number of factors, but on whether the willingness of judges to rule against the government changes relative to changes in their political environment. In this section I briefly describe the organization and decision-making process of the Argentine Supreme Court, explain how the data needed to test the hypotheses were gathered, and discuss the operationalization of several key variables.

# The Argentine Judiciary and the ASCD Database

The Argentine Supreme Court (Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación) stands at the head of a federal judiciary established by the Constitution of 1853, modeled on the United States Constitution, and recently reformed in 1994. The Argentine Supreme Court is the highest court in the country, with original and appellate jurisdiction over all federal questions. In 1887, the Court established through its own jurisprudence the power of judicial review. It cannot exercise abstract review. Once a case arrives at the Argentine Supreme Court it is circulated among the nine justices, who may either sign the draft opinion or write a separate opinion. The order in which a justice receives the case depends on

the type of appeal filed.<sup>7</sup> Justices meet either weekly or biweekly in sessions called *acuerdos*, mainly to sign opinions and occasionally to discuss cases. There are no oral proceedings and the records of weekly meetings are not publicly available. Moreover, the norm is that while all of the justices who agree with the opinion of the majority sign it, the actual "author" of the opinion remains anonymous (Carrió 1996). Nevertheless, for all full opinions<sup>8</sup> the judges in the majority are listed at the end of the opinion and the identities of those justices who sign separate dissents and concurrences are also clear, allowing me to code the individual justices' positions.

One of the main challenges involved in constructing the database was developing a reliable and systematic method for selecting cases in which the government had an identifiable interest. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, the Argentine Supreme Court decides thousands of cases annually.9 Many of these are relatively unimportant legally and politically, raising the issue of which cases were most appropriate for evaluating the strategic behavior of Argentine justices. After considering several alternatives, 10 I used the indexes contained in the back of each volume of Argentine Supreme Court decisions (Fallos de la Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación) to generate a complete list of cases that met one or both of the following criteria: (1) the case named the state as a party and (2) the case named a decree passed by the current executive. Using these two criteria ensured that all cases in which the government had an interest would be selected. By coding additional information on case type, appeals brought by the government, and types of issues (described below), I can address the concern that the government may not care equally about winning all of the cases in which it is a party or in which the legality of a particular decree is at stake. The total number of individual votes based on these cases is 7,562.11 These votes are coded

8 All judicial decisions are either full or summary opinions. However, because justices do not sign summary opinions, individual votes can be coded only for full opinion cases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The ASCD database provides the first systematic collection of information on judicial decision-making in contemporary Latin America. See Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin 1999 for additional data, analyzed in Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tomassi 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Congress determines the number of justices. There were five justices under the military and Alfonsín, and nine under Menem. Two Alfonsín appointees resigned in 1990, allowing Menem to appoint six new justices, or a majority, upon taking office.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> In cases that reach the Court on grounds of arbitrariness granted by the appeals courts (recurso extraordinario), the order of circulation is determined randomly. In cases where lower courts denied the appeal (recurso de queja) or cases involving more than 800,000 pesos (recurso ordinario), the Chief Justice determines the order, although in practice another justice may set the agenda (anonymous interview, Buenos Aires, July 2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> From 1974 to 1994 the annual number of cases entering the Court averaged between 4,000 and 6,000, but it has risen to more than 36,000 cases since 1997 (FORES 1988, 1/3; Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación Secretaria Letrada de Estadisticas 1998; Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin 1999, 710). Each justice currently receives an average of 50 cases per day (anonymous interview, Buenos Aires, July 2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Coding all decisions and randomly selecting cases yielded too many cases with no identifiable interest for the government. Efforts to replicate Dahl's (1957) method also failed, as there is no necessary overlap between constitutional cases and cases where one could identify the interest of the government (but see Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Individual justices votes are recorded on a total of 932 cases, with 325 cases under the military government, 278 cases under Alfonsín, and 329 cases under Menem.

dichotomously according to whether the justice voted in favor of or against the government.<sup>12</sup>

### Regime, Government, and Political Timing

Testing the strategic defection explanation requires, first and foremost, a measure of the judges' expectations about the threats they face and the ability of the incumbent government to remain in power. Because it is impossible to measure directly the justices' beliefs about their own and the government's future, I generate proxy measures for the justices' expectations by drawing on primary and secondary accounts of political events during the three governmental periods examined. Each entry contained in the ASCD database records the exact date on which the decision was officially handed down. Based on this information, I created a series of dichotomous timing variables that allow me to model the changes in the justices' perceptions about their political environment. Under the military, the earliest plausible beginning for the transitional period in which judges would have expected the military to lose power was two years prior to the regime change. 13 Under the two democratic governments examined, the midterm parliamentary elections two years before the presidential elections serve as the earliest cutoff points for establishing the transitional period.<sup>14</sup> Beginning with the two-year cutoff point, I then capture each transition by creating a series of dummy variables with adjusted cutoff points at eighteen, twelve, 6, and 3 months. These cutoff points generate a series of transition variables—final 24 months, final 18 months, final 12 months, final 6 months, final 3 months—which allow me to assess how judges' behavior changes as an election approaches and a change to a new government becomes increasingly likely. I assign a value of one to all decisions falling within the periods of the transitions. All other decisions take a value of Zero.<sup>15</sup>

# Additional Control Variables: Case Importance, Composition, Issue Categories

All of the individual votes analyzed in this article are based on full opinion cases. Thus, the data on individual decisions already deal with a subset of cases considered sufficiently relevant by the justices to warrant a full opinion. To provide additional measures of case importance, I constructed four dummy variables. 16 The first variable, Decree, provides a rough measure of importance based on political rather than legal criteria. Because these cases involve only decrees passed by the sitting government, this measure distinguishes decisions that deal with timely political issues from decisions involving the government as a litigant, which, as result of case backlog, may be less important by the time the cases reach the Supreme Court. The second variable, Salient Decree, takes account of the fact that not all decrees passed are necessarily of equal importance (e.g., Ferreira Rubio and Gorretti 1998). To deal with this concern, I selected a subset of the decree cases that dealt with issues considered to be especially relevant under each of the three governments, including cases involving issues of constitutional interpretation, amparo cases, 17 and habeas corpus cases. To address the further concern that the government may not care equally about winning all cases, I constructed Appeal as a dichotomous variable that distinguishes cases in which the government lost in the lower court and filed an appeal to bring the case to the Supreme Court. Finally, to measure the Court's level of effort as an indicator of importance, the fourth variable, Overturn, distinguishes cases where the Court had to overturn a favorable decision handed down by a lower court to rule against the government from cases where it upheld a negative decision. To account for individual-specific effects, I include dummy variables for each judge on the Court at the time the decision was handed down. Additional dummy variables are included to deal with the possible effects of the Court's composition and the mix of cases coming before the Court. The Appendix includes a complete list of the issue variables used in the analysis.

# EVALUATING STRATEGIC MODELS OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING ON THE ARGENTINE SUPREME COURT

Confidence in inferences about strategic defection increases as alternative explanations for such change can be ruled out. 18 For example, if the mix of cases being

the probability of antigovernment decisions but, rather, the judges' perception that the government will lose power. Dummy variables model the change in the judges' perception as discontinuous.

<sup>16</sup> The descriptive statistics for each of these dummy variables are listed in Table 3.

<sup>17</sup> The recurso de amparo accelerates judicial review to remedy a government's abuse of constitutional guarantees (Rogers and Wright-Carozza 1995, 168)

<sup>18</sup> Ideally, to evaluate the strategic account one would use an independent measure of the justices' attitudes, for example, a

Decisions decided against the state on the merits that make important concessions to the government are coded "partially against." Decisions decided for the state on the merits but that make important concessions to the other litigant are coded "partially for." Because less than 1% of the cases contain partial votes, here I recoded the "partially against" decisions as "against" and the "partially for" decisions as "for."

Although there was great uncertainty about the democratic transition (Munck 1998; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986), by 1981 the opening of dialogue with the opposition, mass human rights protests, the palace coup against Viola, and the failing economy suggested that the military regime could lose power (Nino 1996). In Argentina's leading law journals the future fate of the military's justices was debated, suggesting that the justices were aware of the threat they faced if the military left power (Carrió 1996).

if the military left power (Carrió 1996).

14 During the last two years (1987–1989), Alfonsín's government was crippled by labor strikes (McGuire 1997), mass protests, military rebellions, and successive rounds of hyperinflation. The Radicals lost seats in the 1987 midterm elections, and Alfonsín's approval ratings fell steadily, from 42% in April 1987 to 9% prior to the 1989 election (Catterberg 1991). Menem's popularity grew during the first administration (Levitsky n.d.; Stokes 2001). In 1993 the Peronist Party swept the midterm elections. The 1994 constitutional reforms changed the presidential term from a single six-year term to two four-year terms, allowing Menem to win a second term in 1995 (Acuña 1995).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> The theoretical justification for treating the timing variables as dichotomous is that it is not the elapsing of time *per se* that increases


decided by judges is relatively stable over time, a significant increase in antigovernment decisions clustered at the end of a government's term cannot be fully explained by a nonstrategic account. Put differently, the null hypothesis is that if the mix of cases is stable and judges are not reacting strategically to changes in their political environment, then antigovernment decisions should occur at approximately the same rate throughout the government's term.

#### **Timing**

The timing hypothesis states that when judges lack secure tenure, antigovernment decisions will increase once judges perceive that the government in office is beginning to lose power. Given the evidence regarding the growing weakness of the military and Alfonsín governments, the specific prediction is that judges during both periods began to turn against the government once it began to lose power. As discussed above, I examine this shift in justices' perceptions between two years and three months prior to the change in government. For the third period examined, the relative strength of the first Menem administration suggests that the justices lacked similar incentives to defect at the end of Menem's first term. Thus, evidence would be consistent with the timing hypothesis if antigovernment decisions increased at the end of the first two governments but not at the end of the third government.<sup>19</sup>

Figure 3, showing trends in antigovernment decisions by year across each of the three governments, strongly supports the patterns predicted by the first strategic defection hypothesis. Under both the military and the Alfonsín governments, judges increased their antigovernment rulings during the last two years of each government as it became increasingly likely that the incumbents would lose power. Under the military regime in the years through 1980, judges ruled against the government in 36% of cases on average. But in 1982 and 1983, once it became likely that a transition would occur, judges increased their percentage of antigovernment rulings considerably, to 48 and 46%. Under the Alfonsín government, antigovernment rulings also began at a relatively low level and then rose as the government became increasingly weak. From 1983 to 1987, antigovernment rulings occurred in only about 37% of all decisions. In 1988 and 1989, antigovernment rulings rose to an average of 47% of all judicial decisions.

liberal-conservative scale is used in the American literature (Segal 1997). No comparable data on judicial preferences exist for developing countries. Assuming that governments appoint like-minded judges, the fact that each Argentine government selected its own



In contrast, during the first Menem government (1989–1995), when the justices did not face a credible threat, there was no increase in antigovernment decisions. Indeed, consistent with the logic of strategic defection, the patterns in the individual-level data show that as Menem became increasingly popular and as it became more likely that he would stand for a second term, the percentage of antigovernment decisions declined. Under Menem, the percentage of antigovernment rulings began at roughly the same level as in the early years of the two previous governments, increased to 40% in 1993, but then fell to roughly 25% during the last two years of Menem's first administration. This was a period of success for Menem's economic policies and an increasing likelihood of Menem's bid for reelection.

To delve further into the relationship between changes in the political environment and changes in patterns of judicial decision-making, I employed a series of logit models.<sup>20</sup> The results for each period are presented in Table 2. Beginning with the military period, the results for Models 1-6 overwhelmingly support the timing hypothesis. Consistent with the prediction that judges would increasingly decide cases against weak governments, every transition coefficient for the military period contained in Models 1, 2, and 3 is negative and statistically significant at the  $p \le 0.05$  level or better. Calculating the marginal effects for these coefficients reveals that in the 24, 18, and 12 months prior to the regime transition, the likelihood of the justices voting against the government increased by 20, 21, and seven percentage points, respectively. Somewhat less convincing are the results of Models 4 and 5, which examine the decisions of judges during only the last six- and three-month periods prior to the regime transition. Here the coefficients are also negative but fall short of statistical significance. One interpretation,

majority partially alleviates this problem.

19 Using timing variables raises ambiguities for the strategic account: Justices may rule against unpopular governments to build popular support (Epp 1998; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998). However, to the extent that democratically elected incoming governments reflect the public's views, this is hardly at odds with a strategic account (Epstein and Knight 1998; Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; Vanberg 2000, 2001). Future research can further determine whether changes in public opinion are sufficient to cause a change in the behavior of the Court by examining judges' decisions in cases where the government's and the public's preferences diverge.

 $<sup>^{20}</sup>$  I calculated descriptive statistics with SPSS 10.0; all logit models used STATA 6.0.

	Final 24	Final 18	Final 12	Final 6	Final 3	Final 3 vs.	
	Months	Months	Months	Months	Months	Pre-24 Months	
			Military Gove	ernment, 1976–{	33		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	
Constant	0.51*	0.49*	0.49*	0.49*	0.49*	0.49*	
	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.24)	
Transition	-0.81***	-0.85***	-0.38*	-0.11	-0.29	-0.61*	
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.17)	(0.22)	(0.26)	(0.27)	
N	1,339	1,318	1,318	1,318	1,318	1,037	
Significance of $\chi^2$	0.001	0.001	0.399	0.769	0.685	0.432	
	Alfonsín Government, 1983–89						
	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12	
Constant	0.90***	0.75**	0.71**	0.63**	0.63**	0.59*	
	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.28)	
Transition	0.39**	-0.30*	-0.40*	-0.39	—̂0.59 <sup>*</sup>	–`0.62*	
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.27)	
N	989	837	837	837	837	552	
Significance of $\chi^2$	0.014	0.170	0.141	0.379	0.207	0.311	
	Menem Government, 1989–95						
	Model 13	Model 14	Model 15	Model 16	Model 17	Model 18	
Constant	0.45***	0.44***	0.40***	0.44***	0.46***	0.42***	
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(80.0)	(80.0)	(80.0)	(0.09)	
Transition	0.09	0.10	`0.48**	`0.49*	`0.13	0.28	
	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.26)	
N	1,640	1,613	1,640	1,640	1,640	1,272	
Significance of $\chi^2$	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	

Note: The unit of analysis is a justice's vote in a (full opinion) decision, coded 0 = against the government or 1 = for the government. Transition is measured as described in the column headings. Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients. Dummy variables for each justice are included in each model, but the results are not presented here. Standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p \le 0.05$ ; \*\* $p \le 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p \le 0.001$  (two-tailed test).

somewhat troubling from the perspective of strategic defection, is that the willingness of justices to decide cases against the government peaks at the beginning of the transitional period but declines in the final months before the regime change. A different interpretation is that when the timing cutoff points are altered, the model ends up lumping the previous transitional period effects into the pretransitional period, thus decreasing the effects of moving from one period to another. This could also explain why the likelihood declines from 21 to 7 percentage points when moving from the 18- to the 12-month period prior to the transition.

To examine which of these two interpretations provides the better explanation, I excluded all decisions between 24 and 4 months prior to the end of the regime, thus enabling me to compare directly the period in which judges had the least information about the prospects of the sitting government (before the last two years) to the period in which judges had the most information (the last three months). The results clearly favor the second interpretation. Consistent with the strategic account, the coefficient, final 3 vs. pre-24 months, for Model 6 (-0.61) is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that as the transition drew near.

justices were continuing to defect against the government. According to the marginal effects, compared to the first five years of the dictatorship, in the final three months of the transitional period justices were more likely to vote against the government by 15 percentage points.

Repeating the analysis for the second period under the new democratic government of Raul Alfonsín yields equally impressive results. In Table 2, all of the coefficients from Models 7-12 are negative, and with the exception of the six-month transition variable (-0.39), all are statistically significant. Indeed, the statistical significance of the coefficient (-0.59) in Model 11 shows that even without excluding the interim period, justices in the final three months of the Alfonsín regime were significantly more likely to rule against the government. The willingness of judges to rule against the government increased by approximately 9 percentage points for each cutoff point, reaching to 15 percentage points in the final three months prior to the 1989 presidential election compared to the period prior to the 1987 midterm elections.

Shifting the focus to the decision-making pattern among judges under the government of Carlos Menem,

TABLE 3. Number and Percentage of Individual Antigovernment Judicial Decisions by Year in Decree Cases, Salient Decree Cases, Government Appeals Cases, Cases Overturning Second Instance Court, and Habeas Cases

	% Against (N)						
				Overturning 2nd			
'ear	Decree	Salient Decree	Govt. Appeals	Instance	Habeas		
976	(0)	<del> (0)</del>	53% (87)	26% (175)	— (0)		
977	0% (13)	0% (13)	46% (79)	18% (103)	— (0)		
978	0% (3)	0% (3)	100% (4)	22% (37)	(0)		
979	19% (21)	19% (21)	68% (37)	21% (62)	100% (4		
980	17% (24)	17% (24)	37% (41)	11% (85)	— (0)		
981	24% (38)	24% (38)	50% (103)	25% (92)	0% (11)		
982ª	48% (10Ó)	45% (95)	64% (86)	33% (101)	69% (39		
983ª	51% (75)	48% (̀71)́	66% (82)	29% (93)	100% (3		
984	13% (32)	13% (32)	74% (19)	27% (44)	— (0)		
985	17% (29)	21% (24)	55% (40)	12% (50)	— (0)		
986	58% (̀47)́	64% (̀42)́	57% (75)	32% (77)	— (O)		
987	25% (Ì03́)	27% (98)	53% (49)	29% (93)	— (0)		
988ª	35% (102)	40% (92)	43% (63)	48% (105)	0% (5)		
989 <sup>a</sup>	67% (51)	67% (46)	58% (77)	43% (106)	— (0)		
990	19% (63)	21% (57)	36% (44)	7% (56)	0% (5)		
991	14% (̀37)́	14% (28)	27% (113)	25% (111)	— (0)		
992	40% (Ì0Í)	41% (92)	27% (151)	22% (126)	— (0)		
993	37% (248)	36% (237)	53% (186)	30% (152)	— (0)		
994ª	30% (178)	30% (178)	26% (70)	22% (101)	— (0)		
995ª	25% (185)	25% (166)	42% (98)	18% (119)	— (0)		
Total	34% (145)	34% (133)	45% (1,504)	26% (1,888)	51% (67		

the evidence presented in Table 2 overwhelmingly supports the prediction for null cases consistent with the theory of strategic defection. As expected, none of the coefficients in Models 13-18 is negative, confirming the expectation that antigovernment decisions would not increase at the end of Menem's highly successful first government. Indeed, in the midst of Menem's run for reelection, the coefficients (0.48 and 0.49) for the final year and the final six months before the end of this first term show that justices were significantly more likely to support the government in its last year prior to Menem's reelection. The marginal effect of the last year on the justices' behavior was to increase by 11 percentage points the justices' willingness to hand down a favorable governmental decision. Although it is difficult to distinguish here between strategic and sincere behavior, the fact that the justices under Menem increased their progovernmental decisions in the final year before his reelection fits well within the longstanding suspicion that insecure tenure amplifies the willingness of judges to curry favor with the government, but only when governments themselves are seen as likely to remain in power. In sum, the patterns in the data on judicial decisions under each of the three governments support the prediction that when judges face uncertain futures, they increasingly decide cases against the outgoing government.<sup>21</sup>

#### **Importance**

I now turn to the second main hypothesis, which predicts that when judges defect, they will do so in the most important cases. Table 3 provides information on the behavior of Argentine judges in the most important decisions they make. Among decisions involving decrees and in the subset of salient decree decisions, these data show large increases in antigovernment decisions clustered at the end of the first and second transition periods. In each of the first two groups, the overall number of decisions increased as the cases involving decrees passed by the executive reached the Court, and, quite dramatically, so did the percentage of antigovernment decisions, as shown by the jump from 21% in 1981 to 48 and 51% in 1982 and 1983, respectively. A similar trend occurred at the end of the Alfonsín government, with the sole exception of 1986, when antigovernment decisions peaked. Also in line with the theory of strategic defection is that antigovernment decisions among both groups of decree cases did not exhibit a similar pattern under Menem.

The findings for the three additional categories are somewhat more mixed. In cases where the government clearly had an interest in appealing a negative lower court decision, the percentage of antigovernment decisions increased only modestly in the first transition and actually declined to its lowest level in 1988. The subset

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Logit regression models were estimated comparing the last two years of the previous government to the first two years of the next government in the second and third transition periods. Both coeffi-

cients (0.42 and 0.40) were significant at the 0.05 level, showing that justices defect more at the end of the governments' terms.

TABLE 4. Antigovernment Votes by Time to Transition in Decree Cases, Salient Decree Cases, Government Appeals Cases, and Cases Overturning Second Instance Court

	Decree	Salient Decree	Govt. Appeals	Overturn 2nd Instance		
	Military Government, 1976-83					
	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22		
Constant Final 24 months	1.10 (1.15) -2.52*** (0.64)	1.39 (1.19) -2.46*** (0.64)	0.24 (0.40) -0.93*** (0.24)	0.85* (0.35) -0.67** (0.23)		
$\it N$ Significance of $\chi^2$	176 0.001	172 0.001	515 0.085	748 0.059		
	Alfonsín Government, 1983–89					
	Model 23	Model 24	Model 25	Model 26		
Constant Final 24 months	1.44 (0.44)*** -0.63* (0.26)	1.30*** (0.45) -0.63** (0.27)	-0.20 (0.40) 0.25 (0.23)	1.51*** (0.35) -0.86*** (0.20)		
$\it N$ Significance of $\chi^2$	263 0.067	248 0.130	323 0.777	470 0.001		
	Subset of Four Military-Era Justices, 1976–83					
	Model 27	Model 28	Model 29	Model 30		
Constant Final 24 months	2.34*** (0.60) -2.34*** (0.63)	2.34*** (0.60) -2.26*** (0.63)	0.05 (0.13) -0.89*** (0.23)	1.36*** (0.14) -0.59** (0.22)		
N Significance of $\chi^2$	148 0.001	144 0.001	354 0.001	480 0.008		

*Note*: The unit of analysis is a justice's vote in a (full opinion) decision, coded 0 = against the government or 1 = for the government. Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients. Dummy variables for each justice are included in each model, but the results are not presented here. Standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p \le 0.05$ ; \*\* $p \le 0.01$ ; \*\*\* $p \le 0.001$  (two-tailed test).

of decisions in which the justices had to overturn a progovernment decision supports the theory of strategic defection, particularly for the second transition, when the percentage of antigovernment decisions increased dramatically, from an average of 25% in the first four years to 45% in the government's final two years. Undoubtedly as a result of the Dirty War waged by the military against "subversives" in the late 1970s, most habeas corpus cases were concentrated under the military government. Despite the relatively small number of decisions in this category, the jump from 0% in 1981 to 69% in 1982 strongly supports the idea that when defection occurs, it is in the most politically charged cases.

Logistic regression models estimated for each subset of cases under the military and Alfonsín governments (Table 4) confirm these overall patterns. All of the coefficients for the final 24 months for the first transition are negative, with three of the four coefficients achieving statistical significance at the 0.001 level. The likelihood of antigovernment decisions increased by 56 percentage points among decree cases, by 55 percentage points among the salient decree cases, by 23 percentage points among government appeals cases, and by 16 percentage points among cases overturning a favorable lower court decision.

Consistent with the overall patterns identified in Table 3 for the Alfonsín period, three of the four timing coefficients in Table 4 are also negative. For this period, the likelihood of handing down an antigovern-

ment decision in decree cases, salient decree cases, and cases where the decision of the lower court had favored the government increased by 12, 12, and 16 percentage points, respectively, during the final two years of the Alfonsín government. Overall, the data reveal systematic support for the hypothesis that when judges defect, they do so in the most important cases.

## **Assessing Alternative Explanations**

Composition. I now consider two sets of competing explanations for the increase in antigovernment decisions. The first alternative explanation is that changes in the composition of the Court during each of the governments' terms may account for the increase in antigovernment decisions. If the composition of the Court changed during a single government's tenure, how can one know whether the increase in the justices' votes against the government was driven by strategic defection or by the replacement of justices?

Because the composition of the Court remained stable during Alfonsin's government between 1983 and 1989, a compositional explanation for the observed change in voting pattern of the judges is relevant only for the military period. Between 1976 and 1983 there were no fewer than 10 compositions of the Supreme Court (Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin 1999, 703). Of the 12 justices who sat on the bench during this period, only two remained during the entire military regime (Justices Gabrielli and Rossi) and only four sat on

the bench during portions of both the pretransitional and the transitional periods (Justices Gabrielli, Rossi, Guastavino, and Black).

To deal with the possibility that only later appointees ruled against the government, I reestimated several of the previous models to examine the impact of timing and case importance only for the subset of the four justices who served during both periods. Similar to the findings for the full set of judges' decisions, the coefficients for each of the final 24 months timing variables are statistically significant, with the subset of justices increasing their antigovernment decisions in the last two years of the military government by 41 percentage points in decree cases, by 39 percentage points in the salient decree cases, by 21 percentage points in government appeals cases, and by 11 percentage points in overturning cases (see Table 4). These results suggest that the increase in antigovernment decisions cannot be explained away by the changing composition of the Court at the end of the dictatorship.<sup>22</sup>

Mix of Cases. The second set of alternative explanations is that the increase in antigovernment decisions at the end of weak governments was driven by changes in the types of cases coming before the court. One plausible alternative hypothesis is that if governments acted less legally at the end of their terms, then the increased rulings against the government might be due to changes in the cases themselves, not strategic defection. While plausible, this interpretation does not square fully with what is known about the actions of recent Argentine governments. For example, it is highly dubious whether increasing illegality explains the actions of the Court at the end of the military period. Cases involving the most egregious violations of human and civil rights began coming to the Court immediately after the military seized power.<sup>23</sup> Thus, what changed was not the legality of these cases but, rather, the decisions of the iustices.

To test this claim, I isolated the cases that involved writs of habeas corpus filed on behalf of prisoners detained or "disappeared" by the military and estimated a separate logit model (not shown here) with a constant, final 24 months, habeas, and an interaction term, final 24 months \* habeas. Consistent with a strategic interpretation, the coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant at the  $p \le 0.05$  level, but the coefficient for the habeas term is indistinguishable from zero. In other words, in nontransitional periods habeas cases were no more or less likely than all other types of cases to be decided against the government, but in transition periods they were more likely to be decided against the government. Thus, the judges' willingness to decide against the government in habeas corpus cases coin-

cided not with a change in the legality of the cases per se, but with the unraveling of the military dictatorship.

A somewhat different alternative explanation posits that regardless of the legality of the government's actions, the mix of cases coming before the Court may have included more that were likely to be decided against the government. To examine this possibility, I ran logistic regressions for each of the first two final 24-month transitional periods with all of the 19 issue variables contained in the database.<sup>24</sup> The results in Table 5 suggest that a change in the mix of cases does not erase the timing effect predicted by the theory of strategic defection. Consistent with the strategic argument, Model 31 shows that during the first transitional period under the military, controlling for the issue categories has virtually no effect. The coefficient for the final 24 months under the military (-0.83) remains negative and significant at the  $p \le 0.001$  level.

For the second final 24-month transitional period Model 32 shows that cases involving several types of issues (armed forces retire, customs, emergency, federal, procedures, and public administration hiring/firing) were significantly more likely to be decided against the government.<sup>25</sup> Thus, I constructed a new dummy variable (Issue Group), which subsumes all of the issues with negative and significant coefficients. Inconsistent with the alternative explanation, however, the coefficient from the second timing variable (-0.31) remains negative and significant at the  $p \le 0.05$  level. Although less impressive than the findings for the first transition, the data show that when controls for cases of a type more likely to be decided against the government were introduced, the justices still increased their decisions against the government during the second transition period by a margin of six percentage points.

#### CONCLUSION

Scholars have long assumed that only judges free of political pressure and manipulation are capable of ruling against the government. In many parts of the world, this explains why judges who lack institutional security support incumbent governments but not why they also make decisions that go against the government. I have argued instead that under certain conditions institutional insecurity may be the very reason why judges rule against the rulers. Once the incumbent government begins to lose power, judges who lack institutional security face incentives to distance themselves from the outgoing government by ruling against it, engaging in strategic defection. The results reported here strongly support the strategic defection account: Under both dictatorship and democracy Argentine judges tended

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> Only the dummy variables for Justices Black and Renom were statistically significant. That these justices were among the last to be appointed undermines the view that later appointees were more likely to your against the military than earlier appointees.

likely to vote against the military than earlier appointees. <sup>23</sup> During the military period 4% of cases dealt with writs of habeas corpus. Among the leading human rights cases under the military were *Ercoli* (1976), *Lokman* (1977), *Pérez de Smith* (1977), *Timerman* (1978, 1979), and *Zamorano* (1977) (Carrió 1996).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> The vast majority of cases (85%) includes only one or two issues. <sup>25</sup> To deal with the separate question of whether the effects of the changing political environment obtained across different issues, I ran separate logistic regressions for each issue category with the votes of justices as the dependent variable and the 24-month timing variable as the independent variable. Although the timing variable achieved statistical significance in some issue categories and not in others, in none of the issue categories did the justices increase their support for the outgoing government.

TABLE 5. Individual Supreme Court Justices' Antigovernment Votes, Controlling for Changing Mix of Cases

Independent Variable	Model 31	Model 32	Model 33
Constant	0.68* (0.29)	0.77** (0.29)	1.23*** (0.23)
Final 24 months (military)	-0.83*** (0.17)	, ,	, ,
Final 24 months (Alfonsín)		-0.13 (0.16)	-0.31* (0.14)
Military (hiring/firing)	-0.44 (0.43)	0.24 (Ò.26) <sup>′</sup>	` ,
Military (other)	0.28 (0.23)	-1.00*** (0.29)	
Amparo	1.23*** (0.32)	-1.02*** (0.28)	
Monetary claims	-0.19 (0.15)	-0.04 (0.18) <sup>′</sup>	
Constitutional issues	0.81*** (0.22)	0.61** (0.22)	
Customs	-1.05 <b>**</b> (0.31)	-1.92**`(0.56)	
Emergency powers	0.25 (0.98)	-1.09* (0.56)	
Federal-provincial	-1.55* (0.73)	-0.49 (0.28)	
Federal (other)	1.05 (0.64)	0.95 (Ò.56)	
Habeas corpus	-0.99** (0.33)	, ,	
Interpretation	0.09 (0.15)	0.04 (0.17)	
Judiciary	0.59 (0.47)	-0.12 (0.42)	
Jurisdiction	-0.35 (0.47)	1.30** (0.43)	
Procedures	-0.14 (0.27)	-1.23*** <sup>`</sup> (0.29)	
Property	-0.54 (0.35)	, ,	
Public employees (hiring/firing)	-0.49* (0.22)	0.72* (0.32)	
Public employees (other)	-0.50* (0.24)	0.30 (0.29)	
Taxes	-0.83** (0.25)	0.07 (0.31)	
Issue group	. ,	, ,	-1.23*** (0.16)
N	1,335	971	989
Significance of χ <sup>2</sup>	0.001	0.001	0.001

*Note*: The unit of analysis is a justice's vote in a (full opinion) decision, coded 0 = against the government or 1 = for the government. Cell entries are logistic regression coefficients. Dummy variables for each justice are included in each model, but the results are not presented here. Standard errors are in parentheses. \* $p \le 0.05$ ; \*\* $p \le 0.01$ ; \*\*\*\* $p \le 0.001$  (two-tailed test).

to support governments when governments were strong and to desert them when they grew weak.

Several broader implications emerge from examining judicial behavior under institutional insecurity. The analysis not only reveals that there is more than one way in which checks and balances can emerge, but also suggests that the nature of checks and balances may differe depending on whether they are induced by secure or insecure tenure. Students of the U.S. Supreme Court have long observed that secure tenure tends to produce judges who are backward-looking or conservative (Dahl 1957). A major area of debate among scholars of the U.S. judiciary is whether courts can be at the forefront of social change (McCann 1994; Rosenberg 1991; Schultz 1998). Although much work remains to be done on the relationship between civil society and courts beyond the United States, this analysis suggests a new mechanism by which even a Court that lacks basic institutional security may become forward-looking and even progressive, depending, of course, on the nature of the incoming government. Under such conditions, it may be that social movements should choose a legal course of action, if only to speed up or reinforce an expected policy shift in that direction. This may explain why, despite the overall lack of confidence in the independence of the judiciary, many social movements in Argentina have sought redress through the courts (Brysk 1994).

The flip side of insecure tenure, however, is that when the incumbent government is secure the court is com-

pletely captured. This may be good news to some democratic critics of the court who argue that judges should not be allowed to overrule the will of the people, but it is more problematic in a context where elected representatives do not necessarily respect that will. Under conditions of insecure tenure, judges are continually and directly affected by politics. If one thinks of judges as part legalist, part politician, then under conditions of insecure tenure the latter role tends to dominate the former. Thus, in addition to suffering from the same institutional deficits as their tenured counterparts (i.e., having neither the purse nor the sword), the legitimacy of judges is compromised by their subservience to the government of the day. Moreover, when political influence is limited to selection, the question remains whether judges will actually prove loyal. Politicians may fail to anticipate all issues that will come before the court, or judges may turn out differently than expected. The possibility that judges will eventually be able to operate independently of political considerations is absent under conditions of insecure tenure, where the mechanisms of control and influence are contemporaneous and thus comparatively more effective.

The foregoing analysis does not imply that insecure judicial tenure automatically increases the power of all political actors. It does not. Notably, the power of executives does not uniformly increase where institutional insecurity obtains. On the contrary, insecure tenure may be one of the very mechanisms by which presidential power is reduced: Just when executives are most in

need of a loyal court, they are least likely to get one. That Latin American presidents are not all-powerful is familiar to scholars of presidentialism (Shugart and Carey 1992). Strategic defection provides a new twist on this phenomenon by explaining why even the most loyal supporters of presidents turn against them once they begin to lose power. Moreover, to the extent that institutional insecurity obtains more broadly, the analysis reported here establishes a new agenda for explaining the behavior of various other institutional actors who may face similar incentives to defect strategically from weak presidents, such as legislators, bureaucrats, and nonindependent central bankers.

Finally, with respect to broader questions about democratic consolidation and the rule of law, strategic defection offers no panacea. Strategic defection may lead to progressive decisions in some contexts, but so too might things work in the other direction. The character of decisions depends not on the judges' sincere reading of the law, but on their ability to adjust their interpretation of the law in light of the values and preferences of the incoming government. Thus, even though judges challenge governments, as long as insecure tenure obtains and judges are forced to take into account political actors' views, the rule of law will continue to prove elusive.

#### **APPENDIX**

The issue variables are coded as follows. Military (hiring/ firing) = 1 when the case involved the hiring or firing of military personnel. Military (other) = 1 when the case involved any military issue that is not hiring or firing. Amparo = 1 when a case involved an injunction against the government (referred to in Latin American law as a writ of amparo). Monetary claims = 1 when the case involved monetary claims made by or against the state. Constitutional issues = 1 when the case involved a federal or provincial constitutional question. Customs = 1 when the case involved customs claims. Emergency powers = 1 when the case involved the emergency powers of the executive contained in Article 23 of the 1853 Constitution. Federal-provincial = 1 when the case involved a dispute between the federal and the provincial governments. Federal (other) = 1 when the case involved a federal question not subsumed by the other variables. Habeas corpus = 1 when a case involved a writ of habeas corpus. Interpretation = 1 when the case involved a federal statutory interpretation. Judiciary = 1 when the case involved judicial salaries, hiring and firing, or promotion. Jurisdiction = 1 when a case involved a question of jurisdiction. Procedures = 1 when the case involved criminal procedures and due process. Property = 1 when the case involved private property. Public employees (hiring/firing) = 1 when the case involved the hiring or firing of any nonmilitary public employee. Public employees (other) = 1 when the case involved any nonmilitary public employee and was not about hiring or firing. Taxes = 1 when the case involved federal taxes.

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### **Jurisprudential Regimes in Supreme Court Decision Making**

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Te theorize that if law matters in Supreme Court decision making, it matters not as a mechanistic force that dictates decisions, but as an institutional construct created by justices who possess political attitudes. Jurisprudential regimes identify relevant case factors and/or set the level of scrutiny or balancing the justices will use. These jurisprudential regimes have the potential to make a significant difference in the decisions of the justices. We identify a candidate jurisprudential regime, content-neutrality, which appears to govern the general area of free expression law. The Court applies the strictest standard of review to regulations of expression that target the content or viewpoint of expression. Relying on a series of statistical tests using logistic regression, we find that the justices take seriously this jurisprudential regime.

oes law influence the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court as they decide cases? Some leading scholars of the Supreme Court assert that law makes little difference. According to the most extreme version of this position, justices largely follow their personal ideological preferences—a view that the Supreme Court itself did much to enhance in Bush v. Gore (2000). If this is true, then the Supreme Court differs from a small legislative body only in the selection and tenure of its members, its technical rules of procedure, and its inability, at least formally, to initiate issues to consider. Whether or not courts generally, and the Supreme Court specifically, differ from legislative bodies has major implications for how we think about the role of courts and analyze their processes and outputs.

We contend that courts, including the Supreme Court, are different, and that part of this difference is the role of law in decision making. In this article, we describe and test a new approach to incorporating law into statistical models of Supreme Court decision making. At the same time, we do not reject the importance, or even the dominance, of attitudinal influences on the Court's decisions. However, we argue that one must move beyond the images of the role of law as a mechanistic, autonomous force to arrive at a legal model that is relevant at the Supreme Court level.

Segal and Spaeth (1993, 1994; Spaeth and Segal 1999), the leading proponents of the attitudinal model of Supreme Court decision making, argue that justices of the Court are free to decide cases solely in line with their policy (attitudinal) preferences and almost always do so decide. According to this interpretation the justices' freedom to pursue their own policy goals is due to their specific institutional situation: They possess life tenure, sit at the pinnacle of the

judicial hierarchy, seldom have ambition for higher office, choose which cases they will decide, and have little fear of being overturned by the elected branches of government, particularly in constitutional interpretation cases (Spaeth and Segal 1999). We do not dispute that the Supreme Court's institutional setting frees justices from the kinds of constraints that are faced by lower court judges, elected officeholders, or appointees serving either fixed terms of office or at the pleasure of some other officeholder. However, freedom from review or electoral accountability does not prevent the justices themselves from erecting other constraints that shape their decision-making processes and/or outcomes (Gillman 2001; Knight and Epstein 1996).

Almost 40 years ago, Martin Shapiro proposed "political jurisprudence" as an organizing principle for the study of courts and judicial decision making. By combining "political" and "jurisprudence" Shapiro (1964, 1968) sought to convey both that courts must be understood as part of the political and governmental structure and that courts differ from other political institutions because of their unique relationship to law. Scholars have marshaled impressive evidence that the justices and lower court judges seek to advance their own policy preferences (Cross and Tiller 1998; Segal and Spaeth 1993) and that the justices are sensitive to both internal and external strategic concerns (Epstein and Knight 1998; Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman 1998). Largely lost in these developments is the other half of Shapiro's concept: jurisprudence. Judges and justices are undoubtedly political, but are they also jurisprudential? Courts and judges are certainly part of the political world, but they are also part of a distinctive legal culture (Grossman et al. 1982).

We look for the influence of law in the form of "jurisprudential regimes." Jurisprudential regimes structure Supreme Court decision making by establishing which case factors are relevant for decision making and/or by setting the level of scrutiny or balancing the justices are to employ in assessing case factors (i.e., weighting the influence of various factors). Justices then apply regimes in subsequent pertinent cases. After a new regime is established, we expect case factors to matter to the justices in a manner distinct from their influence in cases decided prior to the establishment of

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the regime. Leaving jurisprudence out of the analytic framework fails to recognize both the distinctive nature of courts and the theoretical point that ideas and institutions matter. Ideas can take on a life of their own and become institutionalized because they serve to frame how people think about political issues, how they evaluate the actions of others, and how they try to persuade others to their own perspective.

# MECHANISTIC LAW OR LAW AS INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCT?

Segal and Spaeth (see also Brenner and Spaeth 1995) rely upon an extreme model of legal constraint. In their most extensive writing on the subject, they limit their focus to precedent and measure the influence of law in terms of justices' willingness to defer to precedent when it directly conflicts with their policy preferences (Segal and Spaeth 1996; Spaeth and Segal 1999). Elsewhere, their discussions of the influence of law are similarly mechanistic, focusing on either the "plain meaning" of statutes or the "intention" of the legal drafters (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 33–53).

Earlier political scientists saw law's influence in a more nuanced way. As Shapiro (1968, 71) observed,

[Even if] stare decisis does not dictate automatic results,... [that] does not mean that legal decision making is a form of free play in which every judge can do exactly what he pleases.... [H]e is constrained by the previous state of the law insofar as it is clear. Because it is never entirely clear he always has some discretion. And he is likely to find the law less and less clear and exercise more and more discretion as he finds that the old law is giving the bad results.

Nor does Segal and Spaeth's characterization of the role of law bear much relationship to the way in which legal scholars consider the impact of Supreme Court decisions. Typically these scholars do not talk about the Court creating precedents that define or predict outcomes of future Supreme Court cases. Rather, scholars ranging from Tribe (1988) to Posner (1987) focus on how the decision structures created by the justices will affect future decisions, both at the Supreme Court level and in the courts below. Central to these discussions are the categories and levels of scrutiny or balancing that should guide decisions: "compelling interest," "market participant," "incitement of imminent illegal action," "strict scrutiny," and "undue burden." These are important because of the Court's institutional role in the polity. As appointed members of a branch of government that lacks the electoral support of other democratically elected political actors, the justices must provide reasons for their decisions. They employ the concepts of legal categories and levels of scrutiny to explain and justify their decisions (Carter 1994).

Political scientists of the institutionalist school recognize that the Supreme Court is centrally a political institution interacting with other institutions. Those other institutions seek to anticipate the Court's action, either by trying to predict based solely upon the justices' policy preferences or by also understanding the analytic framework the Court is applying. While in some areas

such as capital punishment, prediction based solely on justices' preferences as illuminated by key leading cases might be most efficacious, in many areas patterns and categories of analysis described by the justices must be combined with the justices' preferences (Shapiro 1964, 40-3). For example, if the Court is applying a "rational basis test," the other political actors understand that the Court will likely defer to other political decision makers. One can argue that the Court's decision to apply such a deferential standard is a reflection of policy preferences, but there are other basic explanations, such as justices' recognition of the Court's institutional role within the larger governmental structure (Sunstein 1999), the problematic nature of some areas of law for ongoing judicial scrutiny (Shapiro 1964), and the body of practice that provides the foundation for law generally and the Court more specifically (Brigham 1999).

Thus, the central role of law in Supreme Court decision making is not to be found in precedents that predict how justices will vote in future cases. Rather, law at the Supreme Court level is to be found in the structures the justices create to guide future decision making: their own, that of lower courts, and that of nonjudicial political actors. Shapiro (1968, 39) stated this succinctly: "[T]he opinions themselves, not who won or lost, are the crucial form of political behavior by the appellate courts, since it is the opinions which provide the constraining directions to the public and private decision makers who determine the 99 percent of conduct that never reaches the courts." As they write the opinions that justify their decisions, judges and justices do not mechanistically follow rules. Rather, they engage in case analysis—the process of analogical reasoning that involves parsing the issues in a case and referring to prior cases for guidance on acceptable alternatives. Sunstein (1999, 43) argues that case analysis allows judges flexibility but does not lead to unconstrained decision making. Precedents remove "certain arguments from the legal repertoire [which] simplifies analysis.... Most of the important constraints on judicial discretion [in interpreting the Constitution] come not from constitutional text or history, but from the process of grappling with previous decisions" (Sunstein 1999, 42).

Advocates of the attitudinal model point out that the justices create the law that guides their own decision making, so the law is itself a reflection of the justices' attitudes. We do not deny this. However, as others writing in an institutional vein have argued (see, e.g., McCann 1999), this begs the question. With the exception of the strict natural law perspective, all jurisprudential understandings of law see it as a human construct, including theories ranging from originalism (Scalia 1997) to positivism (Hart 1961) to political and normative interpretations of law (Dworkin 1996). That is, law, as a "cognitive structure" (Smith 1988, 91), is itself a political institution, created by men and women to impose constraints on themselves and others. As Brigham (1999, 20) observes, "Institutions share a capacity to order social life because people act as if they exist, as if they matter." Thus, as with other humanmade institutions, law is created to serve a purpose, and people go along with the institution if they see its

purpose as worthwhile or if they are otherwise constrained by the institution. If the adherents of a pure attitudinal model wish to reduce law to nothing more than attitudes formally stated, the attitudinal model becomes tautological; attitudes drive decisions because every decision is made on the basis of attitudes. Our position is that attitudes influence the development of law, but law can also affect the decisions of the Court, and these effects are not purely attitudinal.

Law can be changed if the views of those charged with creating it change. This potential for change is true of all human-created institutions, but institutions differ in the ability of those possessing the power of change to make actual changes. The Supreme Court may have more freedom to make changes than many other institutions, but that does not mean that members of the Court persistently fail to abide by the institutional structures that define the Court's role and its range of potential action and decision making. This point reflects the fundamental insight of neoinstitutionalism: Political actors create institutions based on their policy goals, but those institutions then structure and constrain the behavior of the very political actors who created them.

### WHY DO JUSTICES USE THE LAW?

As we have argued, justices see the law that they make as providing guidance to other institutions in society. For that guidance to be effective, they must rely upon that same law as guidance to themselves in order to treat like cases consistently. The justices commonly hold consistent treatment of like cases as a goal, although they may differ in their individual treatment of this goal. They attempt to make their decision fit within the relevant analytic framework. They can generalize from the particular factors of the case at hand to the more general, consistent analytic framework that has applied to similar cases. Justices want to treat like cases alike based not simply on the results of previous cases, but on the principles that justify those results. Thus Dworkin (1978, 113) suggests that the "gravitational force" of precedent is explained by the "fairness of treating like cases alike." The justices are engaged in a process of reasoning about their judgments. As they do so, they make arguments that are based on more than personal policy preferences. They strive to reason in a generalizable manner that takes into account the points of view of other justices and other political actors, as well as their own views. They must reason in a way that makes sense to others; they cannot merely offer reflexive, first-personal rationalizations of their decisions (Nagel 1997). They engage in bargaining and accommodation with respect to the content of opinions, so the reasons they offer in opinions matter to the other justices (Wahlbeck, Spriggs, and Maltzman 1998). Appeals to law are means of achieving this goal. An additional reason for following the law is that competency in the language of the law is a prerequisite for making plausible arguments (Brigham 1978).

Because the justices use law to decide new cases that almost invariably differ from prior cases, they need to think of law as defining and refining decision structures rather than as creating rules in the form of "if X, then decide Y." In its simplest form, a decision structure could be expressed as a regression-like equation:

Decide Y if 
$$(b_1X_1 + b_2X_2 + b_3X_3 + \text{etc.}) > k$$
,

where this reads, decide Y if the weighted combination of factors 1, 2, 3, etc., exceeds some threshold. The decision structure is the definition of the relevant factors (Xs), how they should be weighted (bs), and whether they exceed the threshold. For example, whereas the attitudinalist view of the analysis in Shaw v. Reno (1993) would be that it was only a rationalization for the conservative preferences of the majority, Bybee (1999, 221) argues that Shaw "did not merely provide a rationalization for political opposition to race-conscious redistricting." Rather, Shaw "offered a new set of terms in which the problem of minority representation could be understood. The resulting framework made a difference in how representative institutions were conceptualized and structured." More importantly, the framework guides not only those drawing district lines, but also the courts, including the Supreme Court itself, in assessing the constitutionality of districting plans.

Decision structures reflect the attitudes of the justices who create them and can be changed by justices who find them problematic, but they also structure *how* justices go about deciding cases even if they do not directly constrain the votes of justices. Decision structures reflect core understandings of the bases on which cases should be decided, the interests or goals to which deference should be shown in situations of conflict, and the relevant roles of governmental institutions. A broad concept that captures the role of decision structures and the idea that they change is that of "regime," or as we label it for our purpose, "jurisprudential regime." 1

### **JURISPRUDENTIAL REGIMES**

### The Concept of Regime

In common parlance, the term "regime" is typically associated with a particular governing elite or, possibly, with a particular system of rule or government. Political scientists, in contrast, normally use the term in connection with institutional forms.

For example, in the literature of American political development, a regime defines a period marked by a combination of political content and the particular ways in which federalism and separation of powers operate in practice (Orren and Skowronek 1998–99, 690).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In previous papers, we have employed the label "legal regime" rather than "jurisprudential regime." "Legal regime" has been widely used, with varying implied or explicit definitions; our search of the Westlaw journals and law review database produced more than 6,000 hits on the term "legal regime." The term "jurisprudential regime" has a much narrower (and less frequent—only 15 hits in the Westlaw database) usage.

It is the regime that "infus[es] institutions with meaning, purpose, and direction" (Orren and Skowronek 1998–99, 694), reflecting a combination of intellectual, political, and institutional forces (Polsky 1997, 153–4). More specifically, in recent work on the New Deal period,

Political regimes... appear as working arrangements among institutions fashioned by new governing cadres to elaborate their particular political commitments. As regimes transform new ideas about the purposes of government into governing routines, they carry on the reformer's central contention as the political common sense of a new era, a set of base assumptions shared (or at least accepted) by all the major actors in this period. In this way, political regimes come to exercise an overarching influence over the affairs of state. (Orren and Skowronek 1998–99, 694)

Such regimes are not mechanistic forces. This neoinstitutional conceptualization of regimes integrates human agency with institutional explanations. Individuals create regimes, and regimes are vulnerable to changes at both the elite and the mass level.

Some scholars focusing on U.S. constitutional history have explicitly or implicitly applied a construct of regime to understanding broad patterns of Supreme Court decisions. Ackerman (1991, 59), for example, explores "constitutional regimes:" the matrix of institutional relationships and fundamental values that are usually taken as the constitutional baseline in normal political life. He argues that American history has been marked by three distinct constitutional regimes: the initial founding regime; the "Middle Regime," which began with Reconstruction; and the "Modern Regime," which began with the "switch in time that saved nine" in the 1930s and was epitomized by footnote 4 in U.S. v. Carolene Products (1938). This and other work makes it clear that the Court not only functions within constitutional regimes but also is central in creating those regimes (see, e.g., Smith 1997 and Whittington 1999). Similarly, Clayton and May (1999, 234) have called for application of the neoinstitutional concept of "political regimes" to the study of legal decision making. "The approach suggests that judicial attitudes and strategies in decision making are both constrained and constituted by the broader context within which the Court operates."


The regime concept is also used extensively in the literature of international relations (Krasner 1983a; Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997). In that context, regime, or more specifically "international regime," is customarily defined as "principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area" (Krasner 1983b, 2). The core argument of international regime theory scholars is that nations must consider both policy goals and the regimes that govern particular sets of issues. Decision makers take into account national interest and national power in dealing with issues, but also assess the principles, norms, rules, and procedures that govern decision making on those issues. In the absence of anything like a regime, nations would simply pursue their own interests in whatever way each believed appropriate. Furthermore, regimes are established by the states, particularly the more powerful states, which are then constrained by those very same regimes; the effect of the regimes is to overcome what would otherwise be major coordination problems (Young 1983).

### **Conceptualizing Jurisprudential Regimes**

In defining the concept of jurisprudential regime, we step down one level from the broad notions of constitutional and political regimes used by Ackerman and by Clayton and May. Whereas constitutional and political regimes define expansive patterns of decision making and institutional interrelationships, jurisprudential regimes focus on more specific areas of Supreme Court activity. We draw upon one standard definition of jurisprudence: "a system or body of law; especially a body of law dealing with a specific issue or area" (Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Law 1996). Specifically, we conceptualize a jurisprudential regime referring to a key precedent, or a set of related precedents, that structures the way in which the Supreme Court justices evaluate key elements of cases in arriving at decisions in a particular legal area. The decisions enunciating these key precedents serve to demarcate jurisprudential regimes that are established for a particular period of time. Fundamentally, jurisprudential regimes function as intervening variables between factors influencing justices' decisions and the decisions themselves, much as international regimes function as intervening variables in the actions of nation-state actors (see Krasner 1983b).

The construct of jurisprudential regime fits squarely within the neoinstitutionalist perspective on politics generally and within recent institutionalist approaches to the study of the Supreme Court (see Clayton and Gillman 1999 and Epstein and Knight 1998). A jurisprudential regime is a social institution in the sense that law more generally is a human construct. As such, jurisprudential regimes rely upon, even as they structure, the actions of the legal decision makers. There is nothing about a jurisprudential regime that prevents a justice from ignoring it if the justice is so motivated. That is, unlike the physical law of action-reaction governing physical machines (i.e., an action mandates a reaction), human decision making generally, and legal decision making specifically, can and often does deviate from social and institutional constraints. This is why attitudes matter. However, justices need something like jurisprudential regimes to overcome what might otherwise be major coordination problems if each justice simply sought to advance his or her own policy preferences. Thus, law can be thought of as serving this coordination function, while at the same time the justices are deciding cases based primarily, but not solely, on their own policy goals.

Figure 1 represents jurisprudential regimes graphically. A justice's decision involves inputs that we label "potential decision elements;" these include policy attitudes, factual elements, and strategic implications for other actors. One can think of these potential decision



elements as unweighted as they are initially identified and defined. In Figure 1, the unweighted nature of the potential decision elements is indicated by the absence of any coefficients in the arrows going into the jurisprudential regime. Figure 1a shows the jurisprudential regime filtering these potential decision elements and transforming them into actual decision elements carrying some specific weight in influencing the justice's vote. In the end, not all potential decision elements actually affect the decision; this is indicated by the absence of one possible arrow emerging from the jurisprudential regime. That is, some of the potential decision elements do not emerge from the regime because they are deemed irrelevant. The weighting of the elements by the jurisprudential regime is reflected in the coefficients (italicized lowercase letters) attached to each of the arrows leading finally to the decision. (The missing arrow could also be thought of as having a coefficient equal to zero.) If one were to place two jurisprudential regimes for a given area of decision making side by side, they would differ in which arrows emerged out of the regimes and/or in the weights associated with each.

We do not in any way reject the possibility that justices are influenced significantly, perhaps even primarily, by attitudes. For example, potential decision element A in Figure 1 could well be the justice's attitude, and one could redraw the model so that it emphasizes the heavy contribution of that element (as in Figure 1b). Furthermore, there is nothing that necessarily restricts the potential decision elements. whether or not attitudinal, to policy questions (e.g., criminal justice, economic policy, civil liberties policy). The factors might include "legal policy" goals (Baum 1997, 4) and "role attitudes" (Gibson 1978). Nor is anything in this framework inconsistent with the view that justices are constrained by institutional and strategic concerns such as the need to obtain agreement from four additional colleagues to secure a majority in favor of the justice's position (Epstein and Knight 1998; Murphy 1964) or the desire to avoid overturning of decisions by acts of Congress (Marks 1989; but see Segal 1997). While Figures 1a and b have all potential decision elements filtered through the jurisprudential regime, this need not be the case. Some potential decision elements might influence the decision directly, without any mediation by the jurisprudential regime. Judicial attitudes might be one such element; the position of the Solicitor General as a party or amicus might be another. Figure 1c shows a further modification of the jurisprudential regime model that allows for decision elements unmediated by the jurisprudential regime.

The key to validating the existence of jurisprudential regimes is change by the Supreme Court in basic factors associated with decision making in a particular legal area. Typically such changes become the focus of discussion in commentary on the Court's decisions, and one can rely upon such commentary to identify "candidate regimes" (i.e., hypotheses about precedents constituting regimes for certain periods). One can then use these candidate regimes to test whether the kinds of changes in decision making the regimes model would lead one to expect do happen. Such tests should be straightforward: The influences of case elements on the justices' decisions should vary across regimes, and the factors influencing justices' decisions should change consistently with regime breaks.

What the regimes approach allows that other institutionalist approaches have not succeeded in doing is incorporating a role for law in testable models of the justices' votes. This is not to suggest by any means that institutionalist analyses have neglected the role of law; quite the opposite is the case, as reflected in work such as that by Gillman (1993) and Smith (1988). However, attitudinalists would likely dismiss this work as lacking rigor. And as Segal and Spaeth (1993) point out, even statistical models of Supreme Court decision making that have utilized case characteristics that might

be deemed to have a legal basis to predict Supreme Court decision making (see George and Epstein 1992 and Segal 1984) are not satisfactory. Such variables are not unambiguously legal; they may also matter for attitudinal reasons. For example, George and Epstein (1992) find that Supreme Court justices' votes in capital punishment cases are shaped in part by the case characteristic of whether the punishment is proportional to the crime, a characteristic based on Supreme Court precedent. However, a justice's attitudinal disposition could also influence whether this factor mattered. With the exception of some work on the U.S. Courts of Appeals (Songer and Haire 1992) and state supreme courts (Traut and Emmert 1998), scholars have failed to assess how precedents can condition the influence of case characteristics over time; our approach is able to overcome the shortcomings of prior case characteristic or fact pattern analyses of the Supreme Court by doing iust this.

# OPERATIONALIZING JURISPRUDENTIAL REGIMES

Freedom of expression law is an area where the justices have established a coherent legal framework for decision making, and this is the area in which we test our theory.

### Why Select Freedom of Expression Cases?

Free expression cases constitute a fair test of jurisprudential regimes for several reasons. Free expression law is an area that allows room for attitudes to operate. The great diversity of speaker identities in free expression cases increases the potential for the attitudes of particular justices to matter. Free expression law covers criminal, civil, labor, and regulatory law. It also covers private suits, government denials of benefits or opportunities to speak, and cases where the government fires employees or disciplines lawyers. This breadth of cases avoids the problem of testing only criminal cases, for example. Limiting analysis to one type of cases may skew the likelihood that the justices vote consistently with a legal or attitudinal explanation.

The trend toward a more conservative Court membership begins around the time that the speech-protective (i.e., liberal) content-neutrality regime was established in the 1972 companion cases *Chicago Police Department v. Mosley* and *Grayned v. Rockford.* Testing a liberal regime that is instituted as the Court is becoming more conservative provides an even more challenging test for regime theory than if we were to test a conservative regime established at this time.

# Identifying Content-Neutrality as a Candidate Regime

To identify a candidate jurisprudential regime for freedom of expression law, we looked for key precedents that established which case factors are relevant for free expression decision making and/or set the level of scrutiny or balancing that the justices are to employ in assessing those case factors.<sup>2</sup> The relevant case factors frequently require interpretation; Grayned and Mosley ask whether the law at issue regulates the content of expression.<sup>3</sup> The separate question of whether the regime was influential, rather than merely the subject of scholarly commentary, we sought to answer through statistical analysis. We also required that the candidate regime should have been adopted by at least a five-member majority of the Court.4 To help identify candidate regimes, we relied on four constitutional casebooks with a variety of political perspectives (Kmiec and Presser 1998; Shiffrin and Choper 1996; Smolla 1994; Tribe 1988) that cover free expression law in detail. Such commentary is particularly useful because it is external to the Court. All four recognized the content-neutrality jurisprudence as identifying relevant case factors and setting the level of scrutiny in free expression law, and three of the four casebooks specifically linked Grayned and/or Mosley to the contentneutrality regime.

Thus, we hypothesize that the jurisprudential regime that currently applies to most cases that raise a free expression claim is based on the principle of contentneutrality. Tribe's (1988) two-track interpretation of the general free expression regime suggests that the Court asks whether the regulation in question is content-based (aimed at the communicative impact or viewpoint of the expression) or content-neutral. According to the Court, content-based regulations merit the most rigorous scrutiny and are unlikely to be sustained, because they are at odds with a core principle of the First Amendment as it pertains to freedom of expression. Content-based, or track one, regulations are subject to strict scrutiny: they must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest. A challenged regulation is not narrowly tailored if the government could have used a less restrictive regulation that would have achieved the government interest. Expression governed by content-neutral (track two) incidental, time, place, or manner regulations receives less constitutional protection.<sup>5</sup> These regulations are assessed according to intermediate scrutiny: They must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Appendix A for a discussion of how to identify a candidate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> We use the term "case factors" rather than the label "case facts," which is commonly used in statistical models of decision making, because we acknowledge the interpretive aspect of these factors. See Gillman 1999 on interpretive neoinstitutional approaches to Supreme Court decision making.

Supreme Court decision making.

As an initial step, we traced the evolution of a potential regime back to the earliest precedent in which the regime received the support of five justices. This involved immersion in the casebooks written by scholars in the free expression area to get a sense of the content of the regime and the names of key cases that follow it. We then used Findlaw's collection of Supreme Court case law with hyperlinked citations (Findlaw.com 2001) to trace the evolution of the regime backward in time to the foundational precedent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Incidental regulations are regulations of behavior or conduct rather than expression but have incidental effects on expression. Time and place regulations concentrate on the circumstances in which expression occurs. Manner regulations deal with the mode of expression, such as limits on decibel levels.

interests. This standard of review is quite protective of expression, but not as protective as the track one standard. The Court formally established the two-track regime in the *Mosley* and *Grayned* 1972 companion cases, striking down attempts to prohibit all picketing outside of schools except for labor picketing as content-based regulations that were not narrowly tailored. However, the Court also upheld a regulation of noisy picketing outside of schools during school hours as narrowly tailored and content-neutral. The vote in each case was nine-zero, with three concurring votes.

Identifying which cases are the regime-defining cases is a fairly interpretive process. To give readers a better sense of how we identify the cases that define the start of the regime, we engage in the following discussion of why these cases stand out from other ones. In several important decisions prior to Mosley and Grayned the Court started to use the categories and concepts that it developed more fully in Mosley and Grayned. As early as 1941, in Cox v. New Hampshire, the Court mentioned the time, place, and manner categories. At that point, however, those categories were not clearly linked to a standard of review. In N.A.A.C.P. v. Button (1963), the Court applied a stringent standard of review to laws that abridged the First Amendment, requiring that such laws be justified by a compelling government interest and be written precisely to minimize intrusion upon First Amendment freedoms. However, the Court did not elaborate whether content-neutral regulations should be treated differently. In the first of two Cox v. Louisiana (1965a) decisions, the Court overturned a civil rights leader's convictions for disturbing the peace and obstructing a public passageway, because those convictions discriminated against him based on the content of his expression. However, the Court did not apply a standard of review. In the second Cox v. Louisiana (1965b) decision, announced the same day, the Court rejected the argument that a law that prohibits picketing near courthouses is unconstitutional on its face. Although this case would have been a suitable vehicle for explaining the different treatment of a contentneutral place regulation compared to a content-based regulation, the Court did not use it as such.

Not until the Mosley and Grayned decisions did the Court more fully develop the content-neutrality regime. Several key points emerged from Mosley and Grayned. First, a regulation that appears to be a time, place, or manner regulation is not necessarily contentneutral, such as the ordinance banning all protests except labor protests outside schools; the Court will scrutinize time, place, and manner regulations to be certain that they are content-neutral. Second, contentbased restrictions of expression are more likely to be unconstitutional than content-neutral regulations. Finally, even if the state regulates in a content-neutral manner, it must also do so in a precise manner, so that the regulation does not restrict more speech than is necessary to achieve the government interest. We hypothesize that after the Grayned regime was established, expression that is governed by both content-based and content-neutral laws was more protected than before, although expression regulated in a content-neutral manner should not have been as well protected as expression restricted by content-based regulations.

There are two important exceptions to the two-track regime. First, cases must meet the threshold of First Amendment protection. Cases in which free expression is not abridged or there is no government action do not invoke the protection of the First Amendment. The other exception is that certain regulations of expression receive less rigorous scrutiny because the Court has recognized specific justifications for regulating these types of expression that limit the applicability of the twotrack regime.<sup>6</sup> These less protected categories include commercial speech (Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission 1980), obscenity (Miller v. California 1973), broadcast media expression (Federal Communications Commission v. League of Women Voters of California 1984), expression in nonpublic forums (Perry Education Assocation v. Perry Local Educators' Association 1983), expression in schools (Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier 1988), picketing of secondary sites by labor unions (Longshoremen v. Allied International 1982), speech in a private forum against the will of the owner of the property (Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board 1976), and libel against private figures (Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 1974).

Identifying a candidate regime is merely the first step toward assessing the claim that the justices take the regime seriously. To assess whether the regime is influential, we test a series of logistic regression models.

# ANALYTIC STRATEGY AND STATISTICAL METHOD

The core hypothesis derived from the jurisprudential regime model is that the factors that influence justices' decisions for a particular area should vary across jurisprudential regimes. The results of statistical models predicting decisions before and after the establishment of a two-track regime should differ in significant and meaningful ways. Testing the two-track regime involved the following steps.

- 1. We first identified and coded, or extracted from existing data sets, the variables that were expected to account for decision making. These variables include the justices' attitudes, the identity of the speaker, the party acting against the speaker, and the type of action taken against the speaker. In addition, jurisprudential factors (jurisprudence) were coded, such as whether the regulation of expression was content-based or content-neutral.
- 2. Next, we estimated statistical models across, before, and after the regime changes and compared the results to ascertain whether they support the core hypothesis. The key statistical test of regime-based change is a variant of the well-known Chow test (Hanushek and Jackson 1977) of differences in regression results across sets of data. Our analysis uses

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> We are not claiming that the Court never strikes down contentbased laws in these areas. Rather, the Court applies less speechprotective standards of review to regulations in these areas than it does to typical content-based laws.

- logistic regression, and the computation of the test of change is consequently based on features of logistic regression.<sup>7</sup>
- 3. The next step involved estimating additional models to rule out the major alternative explanation, that change over time can be explained entirely by personnel (and hence attitudinal) change (Baum 1992). This involved reestimating the models while limiting the justices included to those who were on the Court at the time of the regime change.
- 4. One important test of our argument is whether the influence of variables specifically associated with the regime ("jurisprudential variables") changes as regimes change. To test for changes in the influence of these variables (content-based, content-neutral, and threshold not met), we estimated a model including all variables plus interaction terms with the regime dummy variable for nonjurisprudential variables; we then added interaction terms for the jurisprudential variables to the model and determined whether these interactions as a set were statistically significant. We then repeated this "jurisprudential variables test" limiting our analysis to those justices on the Court at the time of the hypothesized regime change.
- 5. Finally, we performed a sensitivity analysis by trying alternative annual time breaks. If the chi-square statistic for the regime break was high relative to the other annual breakpoints, we would have strong confirmation of a regime that shaped the influence of the jurisprudential variables. This sensitivity analysis was also reestimated while controlling for change in personnel.

We coded all cases from 1953 to 1998 that presented a free press, free expression, or free speech issue, according to the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database (Spaeth 1999) and Westlaw. A case that raised a free expression issue was included even if a majority of the Court failed to decide the free expression issue; otherwise, the Court's refusal to address controversial First Amendment issues could bias the data set to cases for which jurisprudential regimes were more likely to matter. We selected all orally argued cases for which the Court issued written opinions, including per curiam opinions. We excluded cases with tie votes. We mainly used U.S. Supreme Court opinions, but we supplemented these data with lower court opinions in per curiam cases.<sup>8</sup>

### MODEL SPECIFICATION AND RESULTS

Our statistical model of the *Grayned* regime includes five types of variables: the attitudes of the justices, jurisprudential factors, and other factual elements (i.e., the type of action taken against the speaker, the party acting against the speaker, and the identity of the

speaker). To address validity and reliability concerns, in Appendix B we provide examples of coding rules and information on intercoder reliability and validity. We include the attitude variable to assess the merits of the dominant explanation of Supreme Court decision making, the attitudinal model. We include four jurisprudential variables that represent the basic parameters of a free expression regime: whether a regulation of expression is content-based, content-neutral, a regulation of a less protected category, or a regulation that does not invoke the protection of the First Amendment due to a lack of state action or because expression is not abridged (threshold not met). We consider the insight of the strategic model that the justices sometimes take into account the preferences of other political institutions. Given the strategic influence of Congress and the Solicitor General, the federal government should generally fare better before the Court than other parties (Epstein and Knight 1998; McGuire 1990). To test this hypothesis, we take into account the party acting against the speaker (e.g., federal government, state government, local government, party involved in education, private party, or other). We also consider the type of action taken against the speaker (e.g., civil action, criminal action, disciplinary action against a lawyer, causing a speaker to lose employment, administrative denial of benefits [deny benefit] or an opportunity for expression [deny expression], or another type of regulation). The justices may be less sympathetic to criminal prosecutions of speakers and denials of opportunities for expression than they would be to taking away government benefits or employment. There are not strong justifications for why these factors would influence the justices, but they are worth evaluating to discount alternative explanations for voting change.

We also include speaker identity variables (e.g., politician, racial minority, alleged communist, military protester, member of business, member of religious group, print media, broadcast media, or other). The policy goals of the justices may influence their attitudes about particular groups of speakers and individual speakers and may influence the willingness of the justices to protect civil liberties.<sup>9</sup>

Table 1 shows results for models involving the votes of all justices in all cases, cases decided before *Grayned*, and cases decided after *Grayned*. Table 1 also shows

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See Appendix C for specification of how we performed the Chow

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See Appendix B for information on the validity of coding Supreme Court opinions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Three distinct groups of scholars support this theoretical point. First, public opinion scholars have defined political tolerance as "a willingness to permit the expression of those ideas or interests that one opposes" based on the observation that people are inconsistent in their willingness to protect the civil liberties of members of different groups (Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus 1979, 784). Second, some Critical Legal Studies scholars suggest that the attitudes of Supreme Court justices regarding whether to support the free expression rights of dissidents such as communists and war protesters vary from justice to justice and waver according to historical events, shifts in societal consciousness, and shifts in power relations (Kairys 1990). Finally, some Critical Race Theorists submit that racial attitudes may also influence free expression decision making (Matsuda, Lawrence, and Delgado 1993).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> SPSS 9.0 commands and the data are available on the World Wide Web at http://www4.gvsu.edu/richardm/. We excluded the *Grayned* and *Mosley* cases from all statistical models.

	All justices			Grayned justices		
Predictor	All	Before	After	All	Before	After
Attitudes of justices	-1.07** (0.06)	-1.21** (0.13)	-1.06*** (0.07)	-1.15** (0.06)	-1.39** (0.18)	-1.15
Grayned	-0.35*** (0.09)	(0.10)	(0.07)	0.06 (0.12)	(0.16)	(0.07
Jurisprudence	(0.03)			(0.12)		
(Less protected—base) Threshold not met	1.00**	0.47**	0.70**	0.05**	0.40***	
Threshold not met	1.30** (0.23)	3.47** (0.76)	0.70** (0.26)	0.85** (0.26)	3.42** (0.88)	0.48 (0.28)
Content-based	-0.74 <b>*</b> *	-0.06	-1.03***	(0.26) -0.94**	(0.86) -0.27	-1.16
Content-neutral	(0.09)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.29)	(0.13
	0.44**	1.93**	0.05	0.40*	1.69**	0.16
Action	(0.14)	(0.35)	(0.16)	(0.18)	(0.52)	(0.20)
(Civilbase)						
Criminal	-0.38**	-0.22	-0.51***	-0.61**	-0.38	$-0.65^{\circ}$
Dame and the	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.34)	(0.17)
Deny expression	0.39** (0.12)	0.62* (0.30)	-0.58***	-0.57**	-0.64	-0.77
Deny benefit	0.61**	0.69**	(0.14) 0.56**	(0.16) 0.46*	(0.45) 0.63	(0.17) 0.32
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	(0.15)	(0.26)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.42)	(0.22)
Disciplinary	-0.82**	_`0.01 <sup>^</sup>	-1.12***	-1.14**	-5.72	-1.18
l ago amenia	(0.24)	(0.60)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(7.62)	(0.31)
Lose employment	0.33* (0.17)	0.31	0.45	0.06	-0.31	0.18
Regulation	0.05	(0.27) 0.28	(0.24) -0.24	(0.22) 0.25	(0.47) 1.26*	(0.27) -0.72°
	(0.19)	(0.37)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.58)	(0.25)
Sovernment		, ,	` ,	( /	(====)	(0.20)
(State—base) Other	0.47	0.07	0.47	2.42		
Other	0.17 (0.48)	-3.37 (13.50)	0.47 (0.50)	0.12 (0.54)	3.98 (22.24)	0.47
Private	0.31	-0.29	0.54***	0.20	(22.24) -0.45	(0.56) 0.35
	(0.16)	(0.32)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.52)	(0.24)
Education	-0.11 (0.10)	0.00	-0.25	-0.38	-0.05	_0.51 <sup>°</sup>
Local	(0.19) 0.01	(0.35) 0.00	(0.23) 0.03	(0.24)	(0.54)	(0.28)
Looa	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.12)	-0.08 (0.13)	-0.46 (0.30)	0.03 (0.15)
Federal	0.47**	0.82**	0.28**	0.51**	0.78**	0.13)
1 11	(80.0)	(0.15)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.25)	(0.14)
dentity (Other—base)						
Politician	0.10	a	0.10	0.03	a	0.00
	(0.30)		(0.31)	(0.33)	<u>—</u> -	0.09 (0.34)
Racial minority	−`0.60 <sup>*</sup> *	-0.26	—`0.70 <sup>*</sup>	—0.65 <sup>*</sup> *	0.03	-1.10*
Allogad communist	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.29)	(0.22)	(0.32)	(0.36)
Alleged communist	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.25 (0.17)	-1.49*	-0.27 (0.20)	-0.23 (0.23)	-2.79*
Military protester	0.54*	0.68*	(0.67) 0.24	(0.20) 0.53*	(0.29) 0.81*	(1.06) 0.48
	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.34)	(0.27)	(0.41)	(0.40)
Business	-0.33**	0.24	—`0.66 <sup>*</sup> **	-0.53 <sup>*</sup> *	-0.14	-0.84*
Religious Print media	(0.10)	(0.22)	(0.13)	(0.13)	(0.35)	(0.15)
	-0.69** (0.19)	1.36** (0.38)	-0.66** (0.24)	-0.68* (0.29)	-1.43 (0.74)	-0.50
	-0.36**	-0.81**	(0.24) -0.34*	(0.29) -0.71**	(0.74) -2.06**	(0.34) -0.63*
B 1	(0.12)	(0.27)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.53)	(0.17)
Broadcast media	-0.03	1.44**	-0.19	-\0.36*	1.27*	—̂0.45́
Constant	(0.14) 0.42**	(0.41) -0.34	(0.15) 0.53**	(0.18) 0.51*	(0.57)	(0.19)
Constant	(0.16)	-0.34 (0.27)	(0.18)	0.51* (0.21)	-0.18 (0.41)	0.90* (0.21)
χ <sup>2</sup>	877.22**	344.34**	572.26***	753.78**	214.76**	538.23**
(df)	24	22	23	24	22	23

	All justices			Grayned justices		
Predictor	All	Before	After	All	Before	After
$R^2$	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.18	0.21	0.18
% correctly predicted	68	73	68	72	77	71
% reduction in error	24	21	32	34	17	39
N	4,986	1,991	2,995	3,056	878	2,178
Chow test χ <sup>2</sup>	•	124.68,*** 21 df			113.16,*** 21 df	

Note: Vote is coded so that 1 = anti-expression rights and 0 = pro-expression rights. Entries are unstandardized logistic regression maximum-likelihood coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. \*p < 0.05, \*\*p < 0.01, \*\*\*p < 0.001 (two-tailed). a Parameter could not be estimated due to lack of variation.

results for these three models with only the votes of those justices on the Court at the time of *Grayned*.<sup>11</sup> In all of the models presented in Table 1, including those that control for personnel change, the attitudes of the justices are highly significant. The more liberal a justice is, the more likely he or she was to vote for the rights of speakers.

Our main concern is how the parameters are conditioned by the Grayned regime. 12 For the models that included the votes of all justices, there are significant differences in the influence of both jurisprudential variables and other variables depending on whether the cases were decided before or after Grayned  $(\chi^2 = 124.68, 21 \text{ df}, p < 0.001)$ . To control for personnel changes, we restricted the analysis to justices sitting on the Court at the time of the Grayned decision. The test statistic continues to be consistent with the idea that Grayned is an influential jurisprudential regime  $(\chi^2 = 113.16, 21 \text{ df}, p < 0.001)$ . It is very unlikely that the differences in the before and after models are a result of the change in the membership of the Court. More specifically, the significance and direction of the coefficients of some nonjurisprudential variables change before and after *Grayned*. <sup>13</sup> For example, racial minorities, alleged communists, and businesses were likely to fare better after Grayned.

In the next step we considered whether *Grayned* significantly conditioned the influence of the jurisprudential variables. Using the jurisprudential variables test described above, the chi-square (46.71, 3 df) for the interaction of the jurisprudential variables with the *Grayned* dummy is significant at p < 0.001. Even after controlling for personnel changes, we observe a chi-square (21.82, 3 df) that is significant at p < 0.001. As for the individual jurisprudential variables, one of the most striking results is that the coefficient for content-based regulations is insignificant before and significant

after Grayned. This indicates that after the adoption of the speech-protective part of the regime that applies to content-based regulations, the justices were likely to be more supportive of speakers who were regulated based on the content of their speech relative to speakers whose expression fell within the less protected categories.<sup>14</sup> In addition, the content-neutral coefficient is significant before, but insignificant after, Grayned. The speech-protective part of the regime that applies to content-neutral regulations made it harder for the government to regulate such expression after it was adopted and made it less probable that the justices would vote for the government in track two cases. As expected, however, the justices were more likely to uphold content-neutral than content-based regulations. The models that control for change in personnel confirm all of these observations.

Our final step was the sensitivity analysis, which considered the strength of the chi-square statistic in the jurisprudential variables test relative to the chi-squares generated by a series of alternative annual breakpoints before and after the regime breakpoint. 15 The results of the sensitivity analysis are shown in Figure 2. The chisquare associated with the Grayned regime breakpoint is quite high (46.71, 3 df, p < 0.001) and is the fourth highest of 32 splits tested. Although it is not the highest, the chi-squares that are higher than that for Grayned (those associated with the breakpoints for the Court's 1967, 1968, and 1972 terms) are clustered around the time of *Grayned*, which was decided during the 1971 term. In addition, the general trend in the data provides reasonably strong confirmation that Grayned is an influential regime, as the chi-squares are the highest in the late 1960s and early 1970s and are significantly lower in the early 1960s, late 1970s, and 1980s. Performing the sensitivity analysis based on a model that includes only


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> These justices are Burger, Douglas, Stewart, Marshall, Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> We present separate models for cases decided before and after *Grayned*, rather than presenting models with interaction terms for *Grayned* and the other variables, to provide clearer interpretations of how the influence of the individual variables changes over time. However, we used the multiplicative interaction approach to generate the Chow test chi-squares for Figure 2, as we explain in Appendix C.

<sup>13</sup> Testing for change in populiciparudential factors over time also

<sup>13</sup> Testing for change in nonjurisprudential factors over time also enables control for sources of change over time that are alternative explanations for change in the influence of jurisprudential factors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> To ascertain that these results for the jurisprudential variables were not an artifact of a shift in the base category of less protected types of expression before and after *Grayned*, we tested the jurisprudential variables as individual, rather than categorical, variables. In other words, we tested them relative to the constant rather than the base category. This analysis produced virtually no perceptible differences in the results for the jurisprudential variables. The influence of the base category, the less protected cases, is fairly stable over time.
<sup>15</sup> The jurisprudential variable tests were performed by creating 31 alternative breakpoints designating the Court's 1960–90 terms.



the justices on the Court at the time of the *Grayned* decision produced very similar results. 16

Overall, these results constitute robust evidence regarding the claim that *Grayned* is an influential jurisprudential regime. Not only does the content-neutrality regime condition the influence of particular case factors, but also it conditions the influence of specifically jurisprudential factors. In addition, the changes in the influence of jurisprudential variables shaped by whether a case is decided before or after *Grayned* stand out in comparison to changes generated by a series of alternative annual breakpoints in the data. After controlling for changes in the membership of the Court, the data analysis still confirms that *Grayned* is an influential regime.

### CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court is not simply a small legislature. Law matters in Supreme Court decision making in

ways that are specifically jurisprudential. Specifically, jurisprudential regimes structure Supreme Court decision making by establishing which case factors are relevant for decision making and/or by setting the level of scrutiny the justices are to employ in assessing case factors. Our jurisprudential regime construct moves beyond the dominant model of Supreme Court decision making, the attitudinal model, which posits that legal considerations make little difference in the way the justices vote. We theorize and observe that both the justices' policy goals and legal considerations matter in Supreme Court decision making. Although this point may be seen as an unorthodox challenge to the hegemony of the attitudinal model, our approach brings back the "jurisprudence" of Shapiro's pioneering but recently neglected "political jurisprudence" approach. Although Shapiro anticipated the political insights of attitudinal and strategic scholars of judicial politics, he never lost sight of the jurisprudential side of political jurisprudence. Our approach is also consistent with the neoinstitutional insight that political actors create institutions and institutions that in turn structure the actions of political agents. This insight is widely accepted in subfields such as American political development and international relations and is strongly advocated by some students of judicial politics (see the essays in Clayton and Gillman 1999 and Gillman and Clayton 1999). In addition, our findings parallel the conclusions of international regime theory that ideas matter as they become imbedded in institutional frameworks.

 $<sup>^{16}</sup>$  The jurisprudential variables test chi-square for *Grayned*, 21.82 (3 df, p < 0.001), is again the fourth highest of the 32 chi-squares. The higher chi-squares (1968, 1972, 1973) are again clustered around the time of *Grayned*. Skeptics may wonder whether these results may still be caused by personnel change because Justices Powell and Rehnquist had so few votes before *Grayned*. After controlling for this possibility by excluding Powell and Rehnquist as well, the results remain remarkably parallel, with the *Grayned* chi-square remaining the fourth highest and the higher chi-squares clustering around the time of *Grayned*.

We contend that the justices must consider both policy goals and jurisprudential regimes; similarly, international regime scholars argue that nations must consider national interest and the principles, norms, rules, and procedures that comprise regimes.

The jurisprudential regime approach not only incorporates the attitudinal insight that the justices' policy goals shape their votes, but also provides a new empirical method for assessing whether law matters. To date, researchers have had difficulty finding statistical support for legal models, due in part to a focus on law as mechanistically dictating outcomes. Another difficulty researchers have faced is that legal variables are not unambiguously legal; such factors may also matter for attitudinal reasons. Our method overcomes these limitations by recognizing that law is a human construct and by looking at variation over time. We test whether the case factors that the justices consider vary significantly after jurisprudential regimes are created and assess the strength of these regime-based changes relative to that of other annual changes in the influence of case factors. We find that the justices take seriously the Grayned content-neutrality jurisprudential regime. The changes that we observe after the regime is established are not due to changes in the membership of the Court and are strong relative to other annual changes.

Attitudinalists may criticize our approach by suggesting that jurisprudential regimes are created on the basis of the justices' attitudes, so regimes are solely attitudinal (although this argument renders the pure attitudinal model tautological). Advocates of the strategic model may claim that jurisprudential regimes are purely strategic; regimes matter because the justices need to persuade their colleagues, and regimes constitute a framework for making persuasive arguments.

These critiques misconstrue our theory. We do not view law as a mechanistic constraint on decision making outcomes. Rather, law is a construct created by justices with political values and policy goals, and jurisprudential regimes matter in part because they constitute means of persuading other justices. We do not contest these insights of the attitudinal and strategic models; rather, we incorporate them. However, reducing decision making to purely attitudinal or strategic factors creates an incomplete explanation of Supreme Court decision making. Decision making involves more than rationalizations of conclusions that are reflexively generated by a justice's policy preferences. Justices share the goal of treating like cases consistently. As the justices reason about how the case at hand fits with the relevant jurisprudential regime, they are able to offer generalizable reasons that make sense to other justices.

We have tested our jurisprudential regime construct in the context of freedom of expression cases. The next step is to extend the analysis to other areas of Supreme Court decision making. Good candidates for analysis include Establishment Clause cases, Free Exercise cases, administrative law cases, confession cases, search and seizure cases, and specific areas of free speech such as obscenity and commercial speech. We do not believe that all substantive policy areas are necessarily suitable because a given policy area may raise very different

legal or jurisprudential concerns. Another possible issue for analysis is the question of unanimous versus nonunanimous cases. Can jurisprudential regimes help us understand what leads the justices to unanimous decisions in cases that would, on their face, lead us to expect a divided Court given our understanding of the justices' policy preferences? We do not have an answer to this question, but we believe that further analysis might be fruitful.

Finally, it is interesting to speculate on what might account for regime changes. We can identify at least three possible causes of regime change. First, regime changes may simply reflect changing personnel on the Court; this is something that many observers argue has been taking place in the area of federalism. However, our controls for personnel change rule this out as an explanation of the content-neutrality regime. Second, changes in economic, social, or political conditions challenge the core principles of a regime (Ackerman 1991); essentially, this is the argument that Gillman (1993) advances to account for the demise of the laissezfaire framework that dominated Supreme Court decision making vis-à-vis economic regulation early in the twentieth century. Finally, as with any kind of organizing framework, the anomalies and contradictions of a regime may become increasingly apprent, leading the justices to seek out a different approach to dealing with cases in a given area (compare to Kuhn 1963); Miller might be seen as representing such a shift in the area of pornography, and much of the dissatisfaction over the so-called Lemon test in Establishment Clause jurisprudence may be leading to a regime break in that area (Lemon v. Kurtzman 1971). The reason(s) for regime change is an important area for inquiry, but it is an issue that we must leave for future research.

# APPENDIX A: IDENTIFYING CANDIDATE JURISPRUDENTIAL REGIMES

To identify a candidate jurisprudential regime for an area of law, one first refers to casebooks and treatises in that area to understand the key case factors and the level of scrutiny or balancing the justices are to employ in assessing those case factors. Next, using Findlaw, one traces the case law back in time to the first precedent that gained the support of the majority of the Court, identified the relevant case factors, and indicated the level of scrutiny or how those factors should be balanced. Finally, one uses several casebooks representing a variety of political perspectives in the area of law to examine whether they identify this precedent with the candidate regime.

### **APPENDIX B: CODING**

Table A1 shows the results of our analysis of the reliability and validity of the coding. Richards did all of the initial coding. Subsequently, we used SPSS to select randomly approximately 10% of the Court decisions. Another scholar then recoded these cases to assess reliability. The retest method is appropriate for reliability assessment if there are no concerns about reactivity or changes over time in the phenomena being observed (Carmines and Zeller 1979). Based on 3,836 items coded in common, the rate of agreement for the two coders

TABLE A1. Rates of Agreement for Reliability and Validity of Variables Used in Analysis

Variable	Reliability	Validity
Jurisprudence	87%	100%
Action	92%	100%
Government	93%	99%
Identity	98%	99%
All variables coded	93%	99%
All jurisprudential variables coded	93%	99%
N (items coded)	3,836	3,515
N (court decisions)	54	50

Note: Entries are simple percentages indicating rate of agreement. "Jurisprudence" refers to the jurisprudential variables used in the analysis. In contrast, "all jurisprudential variables coded" includes all jurisprudential variables coded but not necessarily used in the analysis. Likewise, "all variables coded" includes all variables coded but not necessarily used in the analysis. For a description of the procedures used to assess reliability and validity, please refer to Appendix B.

is 93%. Among the sets of independent variables used in our analysis, the highest rate of agreement is 98% for the speaker identity variables (labeled *identity* in Table A1), and the lowest rate of agreement is 87% for the jurisprudential variables (labeled *jurisprudence*); this rate of agreement is fairly high, especially considering the interpretive nature of the coding for these factors. As a comparison, we looked at the reliability analysis James Gibson conducted as part of the Supreme Court Database Project. Several of the variables he coded were judgmental, and the level of reliability he found varied from 80 to 100% depending on the specific variable; the highest reliability was for whether the "value of church and state was implicated in the opinion" and the lowest was for whether the "value of government power is implicated in the decision" (Gibson 1997).

A second issue is whether Supreme Court opinions provide valid measures of the independent variables. One could argue that these variables are not independent of the Court's decision and could be influenced by law. To the extent that the concern is that the variables would be influenced by law, this would be even more true if we coded primarily from lower court opinions, so we chose Supreme Court opinions as our primary source. 17 However, we recognize the validity concern, and to assess validity we used SPSS to select randomly approximately 10% of the Court dicisions. Richards recoded these cases after a five-month interim using as the data source the written opinion of the highest court below the Supreme Court that issued a written opinion. We then compared the rate of agreement for the variables coded from the Supreme Court and the lower court opinions. The rate of agreement for the jurisprudential variables used in the analysis (labeled jurisprudence in Table A1) is 100%. The lowest rate of agreement is 99% for the identity and government variables. Based on 3,515 items coded in common from Supreme Court and lower court opinions, the overall rate of agreement is 99%, and the rate of agreement for all jurisprudential variables that were coded but not necessarily used in the analysis is also 99%. This leads us to the conclusion that coding solely from lower court opinions would

not have significantly improved the validity of the variables. This analysis excluded Supreme Court *per curiam* opinions, because as part of the basic coding scheme we had already decided to use lower court opinions as the source when the Supreme Court wrote a *per curiam* opinion. For this analysis, obviously we also had to exclude lower court opinions that were not reported.

We include codebook instructions for the jurisprudential regime variables shown in the tables to show how they were coded. Note that in the statistical models, the coded variables are arranged in categorical sets. We have also specified the attitudes, identity, government, and action variables and the dependent variable. The coding was not done by deference to the majority opinion, which would bias the results, but rather according to the rules and examples delineated below after reading all majority, plurality, concurring, and dissenting opinions in each case.

Votes: For our dependent variable, we used individual justices' votes on all free speech cases from 1953 to 1998: 0 corresponds to a pro-expression rights vote; 1 corresponds to an anti-expression rights or progovernment vote. A pro-expression rights vote supports the right of the speaker over the government or private party attempting to limit the expression. An anti-expression rights vote indicates support for the government or private party seeking to limit expression over the speaker.

Attitudes: To estimate the influence of the attitudes of the justices, the standard measures based on content analysis of newspaper editorials about nominees at the time of nomination are used (Segal and Cover 1989; Segal et al. 1995).

Grayned: This variable captures whether a case was decided before or after Grayned and Mosley. Votes in the Grayned and Mosley companion cases are excluded from the analysis.

**Jurisprudence:** The set of variables labeled *jurisprudence* considers the basic components of the *Grayned* content-neutrality regime.

Threshold not met: This variable indicates whether a case reached the threshold of First Amendment protection. Cases in which there is no government action or there is no abridgment of speech do not invoke the protection of the First Amendment. For example, the First Amendment does not forbid nonpublic unions (acting not under statutory authority but rather independently) from limiting a union candidate's receipt of outside money for a union election, because there is no government action. This variable is coded 1 if a case fails to reach the threshold of First Amendment protection and 0 otherwise.

Content-based: Is the regulation of expression justified by or focused on the communicative impact of the expression? Communicative impact means the content or substance of the act of speech or expression. Content-based regulations are coded 1; others, 0. One type of content-based regulation, viewpoint discrimination, is relatively easy to identify. When the regulation targets the speech of a specific individual or group, for example, civil rights protesters, then the regulation is content-based. Content-based is broader category than viewpoint discrimination. Some cases involve content-based, but not viewpoint-based, regulations. One example of a dispute over content-based but viewpoint-netural legislation is Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims Board (1991). The New York legislature passed a law that required that income derived from works describing the crime of an accused or convicted criminal be made available to the victims of a crime. Although the law did not burden a particular viewpoint, the Court unanimously noted that it was contentbased. The law "imposed a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech" (508; Smolla 1994, ch. 3,

<sup>17</sup> The exception is that in six Supreme Court per curiam cases where the Court's opinion said next to nothing, we used the available opinion of the highest lower court that heard the case before the Supreme Court to supplement the information.

pp. 15–6). In coding for content-based regulations, evidence relating to the government's motive should be considered, in addition to the language of the regulation or statute and how it was applied (Tribe 1988).

Content-neutral: The content-neutral category covers four types of content-neutral regulations: time, place, manner, and incidental regulations (see examples and rules below). Content-neutral regulations do not focus on, and are not justified by, the content or communicative impact of expression. If a regulation is content-based, it cannot be content-neutral, even if it is a time, place, manner, or incidental regulation. Content-neutral regulations receive a value of 1; others, 0.

Content-neutral time regulations: The time category asks whether a regulation of expression limited the time of expression in a content-neutral manner. One example is an ordinance that prohibits noisy demonstrations immediately outside schools during school hours.

Content-neutral place regulations: The place category asks whether a regulation of expression limited the place of expression in a content-neutral manner. One example is an ordinance that prohibits noisy demonstrations *immediately outside schools* during school hours.

Content-neutral manner regulations: The manner category tests whether a content-neutral regulation attempts to cover the way in which an act of expression is presented. Some examples of manner regulations are limits on the number of participants in a demonstration, limits on the size or number of signs used, requirements for silent protest only, and bans on the use of amplification devices.

Content-neutral incidental regulations: This category asks whether a regulation is content-neutral but has incidental effects on speech. For example, a law against trespassing is not targeted at the content or viewpoint of speech, nor is it a time, place, or manner regulation. Despite its content-neutral character, when applied to protestors in a private location, the trespassing law has incidental effects on speech (*Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board* 1976). Similarly, when a government requires all citizens to respond to grand jury subpoenas, this requirement has incidental implications for freedom of expression when applied to newspaper reporter (*Branzburg v. Hayes* 1972).

Less protected: This variable indicates whether the regulation in question is a regulation of expression that falls into one of the eight less protected categories. Less protected expression receives a value of 1; other expression, 0. This is the baseline category. The less protected categories are as follows.

Regulation of expression in a private forum against the will of the owner of that forum.

Regulations of expression that is obscene or alleged to be obscene.

Libel suits by private figures not suing for presumed or punitive damages.

Content-based, but not viewpoint-based regulations of speech in nonpublic forums. Examples of nonpublic forums include military bases, jails, prisons, and specific forums not open to the public at large such as candidate debates. The nonpublic forum category does not include private forums, traditional public forums such as streets, sidewalks, or parks, or forums that the government has designated public forums.

Regulation of commercial expression. Commercial expression is expression that concerns lawful commercial activity. Commercial activity is the interchange of goods and services among individuals and corporations.

Content-based regulations of the broadcast media. The broadcast media includes television and radio. This category does not include cable television. Examples include requirements for public access to such media.

Regulations of expression in schools. Schools include elementary through high schools.

Regulations of picketing of secondary sites by labor unions.

**Action:** The action variables consider the type of action taken against the speaker.

Criminal: When the action taken against the speaker is based on a criminal law, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Deny expression: When the action taken against the speaker is to deny the speaker's opportunity for expression, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Deny benefit: When the action taken against the speaker is to deny the speaker a tangible government benefit, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Disciplinary: When the action taken against the speaker is to discipline the speaker, such as a bar association disciplinary committee's public reprimand of a lawyer, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Lose employment: When the action taken against the speaker is to cause the speaker to lose government employment, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Civil: When the action taken against the speaker is a civil suit or a judge's civil order such as an injunction, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0. This is the baseline category.

Regulation: When the action taken against the speaker is a regulation without a clearly specified civil or criminal penalty that does not fall into the above categories, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Government: The government variables consider the level of government acting against the speaker.

*Private:* When the case involves a private lawsuit against the speaker, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Education: When the level of government is a school, school board, university, or college, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Local: When the government is below the state level, for example, a town, city, or country, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Federal: When the federal government is acting against the speaker, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

State: When the level of government is a state, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0. This is the baseline category.

Other: When none of the above categories are applicable (for example, Puerto Rico), the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

*Identity:* The *identity* variables consider the identity of the speaking party.

*Politician:* When the speaker is an office-holding politician, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Racial minority: When the speaker is speaking as a racial minority, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Alleged communist: When the speaker is speaking as a communist, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Military protester: When the speaker is speaking as a war or military protester, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Business: When the speaker is speaking as a member of, or for, a corporation or business, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

*Religious:* When the speaker is speaking as a member of a religion, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

 $\bar{P}$ rint media: When the speaker is print media, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

*Broadcast media:* When the speaker is broadcast media, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0.

Other: When all of the above identity variables equal 0, the value is 1; otherwise it is 0. This is the baseline category.

We also coded for broadcast media, politicians, candidates, feminists, racists, and members and supporters of labor unions, but these variables were not close to being significant estimators.

### APPENDIX C: CHOW TEST

Our version of the Chow test compares the  $-2 \log$  likelihood of the regression including all cases to the  $-2 \log$  likelihood for a model introducing interaction between a dummy variable representing whether a case was decided before or after the regime was established (regime dummy) and the other independent variables. This produces a chi-square test for change in the parameters across the two time periods before and after the regime change.

Alternatively, one may proceed as follows. First, estimate the logistic regression equation across all cases including a dummy variable representing the regime change. Next, estimate two separate logistic regressions, one before and after the regime. Subtracting the sum of the  $-2 \log$  likelihood of the before and after regressions from the  $-2 \log$  likelihood of the regression including all cases provides a chi-square statistic. The latter approach provides separate parameter estimates for the different periods, and it was used where such estimates were desired.

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### **Electoral Competition, Political Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation**

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Thy are government bureaus not necessarily organized to implement policy effectively? One view holds that a main culprit is political uncertainty. Elected officials know that they will not hold office forever, so they use "insulating" structures that constrain bureaucratic discretion, making bureaus less subject to sabotage but also less effective. I revise this theory by modeling how public officials choose administrative structures. I show that in systems with few veto points, groups will be most likely to act cooperatively on policy when political uncertainty is greatest. In contrast, in systems with many veto points, only electorally weak groups will insulate policies from future interference, therefore shifting focus from uncertainty to electoral strength. Because the conditions that lead to policy insulation are rare, electoral competition should not be thought of as a primary cause of bureaucratic inefficiency.

he frequently voiced complaint that government bureaucracies are both ineffective and inefficient has caused many political scientists to ask why bureaus are not necessarily organized to implement policy effectively. One view holds that in modern democracies, a main culprit is uncertainty resulting from electoral competition. According to this view, because elected officials know that they will not hold office forever, they look for ways to ensure that the policies they enact will survive their tenure. This aspect of democratic politics has led scholars to claim, first, that political uncertainty creates an opportunity and incentive for opposed groups to sabotage each others' policies; second, that this threat leads public officials to legislate organizational structures that "insulate" bureaus from future pressure from opposing groups; and, third, that this insulation makes public organizations relatively ineffective. This conventional account, however, raises several important questions concerning the relationship among electoral uncertainty, policy insulation, and bureaucratic inefficiency. How do the incentives to insulate agencies vary with the degree of political uncertainty? Do these effects vary across types of democratic institutions, such as presidential and parliamentary systems? Given the answers to the two previous questions, to what extent is electoral competition a primary cause of bureaucratic inefficiency?

I examine these questions by modeling how politicians and the groups they represent choose the structures by which policy will be implemented. The analysis makes three contributions to the literature on bureaucratic structure and performance. First, in systems where it is easy to overturn legislation—in other words, in systems with relatively few veto points, such as two-party parliamentary systems—groups are more likely to cooperate on policy when they are most uncertain

about the likely outcome of elections. For electorally weak groups, cooperating on policy is very attractive; during all of the periods when these groups are out of power, they benefit from cooperation, which they will happily trade in exchange for occasionally giving up some possible benefits when they are in power. Electorally strong groups, however, have precisely the opposite incentives: They are not willing to make the same trade. Unless *all* groups have an incentive to cooperate, cooperation will fail.

As competition becomes more balanced, these incentives are muted. Here, *all* groups value benefits when they are out of power more, and this makes reciprocal threats of being excluded from policy compromises more effective. As competition increases and uncertainty is maximized, policy cooperation, not sabotage, is most likely.

A second result is that when insulation is durable, when multiple veto points make it hard to change administrative structure, only electorally weak groups will attempt to protect their policies. These groups are willing to bear the costs of insulating policies when they are in power, in exchange for some benefits when they are out of power. Electorally strong groups, however, will not have the same incentives. They know that even if their policies are removed when they leave office, they will be back in power and able to reestablish them. They will not be willing to pay the costs of insulating their policies to lock in benefits gained while in office. The model, therefore, predicts that insulation will be observed only under conditions of certainty. It further predicts that even in cases of certainty, groups' incentives to insulate bureaucracies will be asymmetric: Only weak groups will use an idiosyncratic opportunity to lock in programmatic benefits.

These results point to a third contribution, returning to the original question. To what extent can ineffectively designed agencies be ascribed to the effects of electoral competition? Contrary to the literature, the answer offered here is: probably very little. The reason is that in separation of powers systems, groups that are electorally weak are the ones that will choose inefficient structures to insulate their policies. But by definition, these groups rarely gain office. Consequently, little policymaking is likely to be affected by this dynamic. Groups that are more regularly in power, alternatively,

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do not have the same incentives to pay a cost to lock in benefits. Therefore, the incentives described in the theory should only rarely create occasions for insulation from future sabotage.

### THE COSTLY INSULATION HYPOTHESIS

Recently, scholars (Horn 1995; McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1989, 1990, 1991; Rothenberg 1994) have begun to develop a non-formal theory that relates electoral uncertainty, organizational constraints on bureaucracy, and bureaucratic efficiency. According to these scholars, political uncertainty induced by electoral competition means that "today's winners" know that, at some point, they will be out of power. Their loss of control will give opponents an opportunity to undo their policies (Moe 1990). The potential for such destructive behavior means that today's winners will try to protect their policies against the future actions of their opponents (Moe 1989).

Interest groups, working through elected representatives, can protect their favored policies from interference by creating an implementation apparatus usually, but not exclusively, through organizational structure—that limits policy drift. Among these structural "insulation" mechanisms, politicians can write detailed legislation, emphasize professionalism, limit oversight and other forms of political involvement, assign policies to a "friendly" part of the government hierarchy, and enhance the role of the judiciary (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1989, 274–5). Each of these aspects of organizational structure allows politicians to bias agency policies so that, even after their political creators leave office, the agency will run on "autopilot," continuing on its original policy course (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987).

There is another potential problem, however, for today's winners. As Moe (1989, 1990) explains, the insulating mechanisms themselves could be overturned. How do officials overcome this problem? The answer is legislation. Because of the multiplicity of veto points in the legislative process under a separation of powers system, new laws are extremely difficult to pass, for a minority can block new legislation. This means that when a group can gain enough control to overcome barriers to legislating, it utilizes this "moment in the sun" to formalize not only its mandate but also the insulation of that mandate. This difficulty in passing legislation means that when it can be passed, it is likely to remain in place for a longer time.

This durability of legislated insulation mechanisms in a separation of powers system can be contrasted with legislative durability in a unicameral two-party parliamentary system. As Moe and Caldwell (1994) point out, in a parliamentary system, unitary control means that legislation is not difficult to pass. Therefore, using organizational structure as a means for cementing policies will not be effective in these systems. Insulation of the type found in the United States is not available in parliamentary systems.

The final insight from this literature is that the mechanisms by which a program or agency is insulated from future interference are not costless. By limiting an agency's flexibility and expertise, policy insulation increases the costs to implement policy and reduces an agency's effectiveness. As Moe (1990, 137) summarizes, "The driving force of political uncertainty, then, causes the winning group to favor structural designs it would never favor on technical grounds alone. . . . The group has to protect itself and its agency from the dangers of democracy, and it does so by imposing structures that appear strange and incongruous indeed when judged by almost any reasonable standards of what an effective organization ought to look like." Thus, bureaucracy is "inefficient by design" (Moe 1991).

Although this literature has significantly advanced our understanding of bureaucracy, inadequately examined claims and implications remain. For example, no systematic account has been provided of variation in electoral competition across time and space. Uncertainty has been greater in the postwar United States than in Japan, for example. Even within the United States, interest groups face differing likelihoods of gaining a "moment in the sun." Compare, for example, the more balanced interest-group competition between business and labor before World War II to that of the oft-cited example of business versus consumers. Scholars have alluded to the importance of this variation (Moe 1990), but the literature has suffered from unclear predictions about the conditions under which the incentives to lock in benefits will outweigh the costs incurred by doing so and from an overemphasis on cases in which "new" groups gain advantage. Similarly, the literature does provide a broad comparison of parliamentary and presidential systems, but it does not explicitly explain how these effects compare at different levels of political uncertainty. Finally, the claim that bureaucratic inefficiency can be accounted for by the dynamics of policy insulation is never supported by an explicit connection between the conditions for policy insulation and the likelihood of observing those conditions.

### THE RECIPROCITY GAME

To address these shortcomings, I develop simple formal models of structural choice that capture the spirit of the non-formal theory of policy insulation just described. The intention is to follow the original theory as closely as possible, stating its assumptions formally to understand whether the stated results necessarily follow. To that end, the basic components of the formalization follow the central principles of that theory: that the primary actors are interest groups; that structural choices are "inefficient," meaning that insulation reduces the value of the policy to the implementing group and, conversely, that there can be gains

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> It is important to note that in an attempt to be true to the theory, and for analytical simplification, I reduce the game to one in which the players are represented to be *interest groups* vying for control over public authority. In fact, this is a close approximation to Moe's (1989, 281) own view of legislative struggles over the politics of structure.

from avoiding these costs; that play is dynamic, so that groups are long-lived and benefits, costs, and strategies are forward-looking; and that uncertainty is inherent to political outcomes. To capture these features, I begin by presenting a model that most closely resembles parliamentary systems: In such systems, legislation is relatively easy to pass for the current holders of public authority (Moe and Caldwell 1994). In this first model, policy stability can be achieved only through acquiescence by all groups. I subsequently present a model that more closely resembles a separation of powers system in which players can implement insulating structures.

The first game is an infinite repetition of a two-player interest-group game. Following Calvert (1989), I call this the reciprocity game (RG). In each period t, a nonstrategic player called Nature selects either A or B to move. The probability that A is selected in any stage is  $\gamma \in (0, 1)$ . A substantive interpretation for  $\gamma$  is the probability of A's supporters being elected, so  $1-\gamma$  is the probability of B's supporters being elected. Obviously, the degree of political uncertainty increases as  $\gamma$  approaches  $0.5.^2$  As  $\gamma$  moves toward either of its bounds, a particular group's reelection chances become more and more certain.

# **Definition 1.** *Political uncertainty is decreasing in* $|\gamma - 0.5|$ .

Each player has its "own" program. In each turn in which it is selected, the player implements its program with certainty.<sup>3</sup> Further, if the other player's program is in place, the moving player must decide whether it will remove the other player's program.<sup>4</sup> In these cases, the player has to choose from the action set  $A_{it} = \{O; NO\}$ , where I denote "overturn" O and "not overturn" NO. If a player chooses O, then the other player's program is not in effect in that stage.

In each stage, a player's payoffs depend on which programs are in place. If A's program is in place by itself, then the payoffs, expressed as  $(u_{At}, u_{Bt}) = (A$ 's payoff, B's payoff), are (1,0). If B's program is in place by itself, the payoffs are symmetrically (0, 1). If both players' programs are in place, then both players get a payoff,  $\beta \in (0, 1)$  (i.e., the payoffs in the stage are  $(\beta, \beta)$ ). Therefore, if a player chooses NO when given

the opportunity, it is accepting a loss of  $1-\beta$  in that iteration. Note that this construction of payoffs is extremely flexible. For example, if  $\beta=0.5$ , then choosing NO means that a player splits the available benefits with the other player. Alternatively, if  $\beta>0.5$ , then choosing NO is welfare-improving, for the total benefits are greater than one.

A player's payoff is the sum of these stage payoffs, discounted by a factor  $\delta \in (0, 1)$  for each stage. Thus, the payoffs for each player can be calculated as

$$U_{it} = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t u_{it}, \qquad i = \{A, B\}.$$

A player's strategy describes what a player will do given all possible histories  $H_{\tau}$  of the game to that point. Player *i*'s strategy is a function  $s_i$  that in each stage maps all possible histories into a choice  $\{O, NO\}$ . In particular, a player's strategy in turn T depends on  $N^T = (n_1, n_2, \ldots, n_T)$ , which is a record of the random selections made by Nature in each turn t to that point,  $A_A^T = (A_{A1}, A_{A2}, \ldots, A_{A(T-1)})$  and  $A_B^T = (A_{B1}, A_{B2}, \ldots, A_{B(T-1)})$ . Further, I assume that in all stages there is complete information. In other words, players know the structure of the game, including the parameter values represented by the triple  $(\delta, \beta, \gamma)$ , the history of the game to that point  $h_{\tau}$ , and the strategy being employed by the other player.

The solution concept I employ is subgame perfection. In other words, players will be playing optimal strategies at each point for every point forward. In infinitely repeated games, there invariably exist a multiplicity of equilibria. A number of "folk" theorems have demonstrated that, given sufficiently patient players, every feasible payoff set that is individually rational can be supported as a Nash equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991). To analyze these types of games, one conventionally posits a set of equilibrium strategies for the players and then determines under what subsets of the parameters of the game such strategies can be supported as an equilibrium. To obtain these conditions, one must state the expected payoffs to playing a particular strategy and identify the conditions under which playing such a strategy is a best response given the other player's equilibrium strategy.

I am particularly interested in the conditions under which cooperation can be sustained as an equilibrium. Cooperative equilibria are defined as those in which, on the equilibrium path, both players choose *NO* in every stage. In general, in repeated games in which discounting is not too extreme, strategies exist that can result in sustained cooperation (Bendor and Mookherjee 1987). Following this solution concept, I consider the parameter space under which cooperative equilibria can be

Although the focus here is on the relationship between electoral probabilities and political uncertainty, one might also be able to interpret  $\gamma$  as the degree of "optimism" (or "pessimism"). Groups are increasingly optimistic as their probability of winning rises. Similarly, one might think of the group with the probability greater than 0.5 as being the optimistic group and, conversely, the group with the probability less than 0.5 as the pessimistic one.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> More generally, the payoffs can be interpreted as representing an opportunity for the players to act either in cooperation with the other player or not.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This construction is implicitly two-dimensional because the programs are not exclusive. I consider later the implications of unidimensionality.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The assumption of equal payoffs to both sides is important in establishing Proposition 2, which follows. I employ this assumption for two reasons. First, in some situations, such "splitting of the benefits" will obtain in practice. Second, even if one assumes that the payoffs are not the same for the winner and the loser, as long as there are benefits to cooperation, the results in Proposition 2 will remain substantively

the same, as will be shown in the case of spatial utility functions. Further, although  $\gamma$  is assumed to be exogenous, under many types of endogeneity, such as incumbency advantages, the substantive results that follow will hold.

that follow with floid:

6 For clarification,  $n_t \in \{A, B\}$  and  $A_{it} = \begin{cases} \emptyset & \text{if } i \neq n_t \\ \{O, NO\} & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$  So, let  $h_t = n_t \times A_{At} \times A_{Bt}$  and  $H_t = \{h_1, h_2, \dots, h_{t-1}, n_t\}$ ; then for period  $t, s_{tt} : H_t, \rightarrow \{O, NO\}$ .

sustained for a punishment strategy commonly referred to as *grim trigger*. Under grim trigger, each player will cooperate only as long as the other player has always cooperated.

**Definition 2.** A player i plays a **grim trigger strategy** if in each stage, it plays NO if the other player has played NO in every turn previously. If the other player has ever played O, then i plays O for every turn thereafter, given the opportunity.

I analyze equilibria under grim trigger for two reasons. First, grim trigger is a particularly suitable strategy to analyze for repeated games of complete and perfect information. The reason is that with perfect information, grim trigger is the most extreme form of punishment that is still subgame perfect (Bianco and Bates 1990). That it is subgame perfect with complete information is straightforward: The punishment strategies are, for the RG, simply Nash-reversion strategies, which means that they are subgame perfect off the equilibrium path (Morrow 1994, 266).<sup>7</sup> In this sense, grim trigger is a test case, a necessary condition, for cooperation to be a Nash equilibrium. If cooperation cannot be sustained under a grim trigger punishment strategy, it is unsustainable under any feasible strategy. Second, it is reasonable to assume that in practice, players will not play such extreme strategies. However, the results that follow in Propositions 1 and 2 hold for any finite period punishment phase. In other words, even if players punish deviators only for a few periods, the results will be qualitatively the same.8

Given this approach, it is possible to characterize cooperative equilibria in the RG.

PROPOSITION 1. Given  $\delta$  and  $\gamma$ , if  $\beta$  is sufficiently high, cooperation can be sustained.

Proposition 1 demonstrates that under certain conditions, it is possible to sustain cooperation. <sup>10</sup> In interest-group competition, there are a number of reasons  $\beta$  might be sufficiently high. If groups value *policy continuity*, there will be a payoff to cooperation. Groups

might value continuity for one of two reasons: First, they could be risk averse; second, policies could be more effective with lower policy volatility. Another reason  $\beta$  could be large is that much political bargaining takes place across more than one dimension. If the players care differently about the dimensions—for example, about pork in their home district versus pork in another district—then compromise positions will potentially yield benefits for all players.

That cooperation can be sustained is not very surprising. It has been shown in a number of different repeated games that as long as the penalties for cooperation are not too stiff (expressed here as a sufficiently high  $\beta$ ), and the players value the future sufficiently (in other words, if  $\delta$  is sufficiently high), cooperation can be sustained. Proposition 1, however, allows me to obtain *comparative statics* concerning the relationship between uncertainty and cooperation.

PROPOSITION 2. As  $\gamma$  approaches 0.5, cooperation can be sustained over a wider range of the parameters.

Proposition 2, illustrated in Figure 1, contains a surprising result: As political uncertainty increases, reciprocity becomes easier to sustain. 11 This is interesting for three reasons. First, it is distinct from the many results concerning discount factors in infinitely repeated games. In particular, numerous folk theorems state that as the discount factor increases, as the players place a greater value on future opportunities, cooperation can be sustained over a wider range of the parameter values.<sup>12</sup> This is not the case with the parameter  $\gamma$ . As shown in Figure 1, the parameter values over which cooperation is an equilibrium are not monotonically increasing in  $\gamma$ . Instead, the cooperative space is parabolic, with a vertex at one-half. The source of this pattern is the complementary nature of the reelection parameter. Because both players must choose NO for a cooperative outcome to be achieved under grim trigger strategies, and an increase in one player's reelection

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Further, an analogue of the Fudenberg and Levine theorem applies in this case, since pulling the trigger is the minimax outcome (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991; 161).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> As mentioned, we use the solution concept of *subgame perfection*. Some game theorists argue that a more appropriate solution concept for repeated games of this nature is *renegotiation proofness*. The basic concern about subgame perfection is that even if players are playing optimal responses to other players' strategies, *following* a deviation, the punisher could have an incentive to go back to playing the original equilibrium; if players can confer about their strategies during play, it will be in the punisher's interest at least to try a renegotiation. In this game, however, it is possible to construct a set of strategies that are renegotiation proof: Players execute finite punishment periods in which the deviator participates in the punishment. Under these more complex strategies, Propositions 1 and 2 remain substantively the same.


Note that proofs of the propositions appear in the Appendix; proofs of all other results are available from the author upon request.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Note that the cooperative space obtains for a pair  $(\delta, \gamma)$  only if  $\beta > \frac{1}{2}$ . This means that for cooperation to be an equilibrium, the total payoffs under cooperation must be greater than the sum of the payoffs under noncooperation. Thus, there must be either two policies or, as I show later, some degree of risk aversion.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> It is interesting to compare these results to those of Calvert (1989). Propositions 1 and 2, with a few caveats, can be considered refinements of Calvert's model. He considers a case in which the probability of one group (say A) asking for a favor is extremely low, while the probability of the other group (say B) asking for a favor is very high (which would correspond to  $\gamma \to 1$  or  $\gamma \to 0$  in the RG). He finds that in this case, the ratio of A's costs for giving a favor to its benefits for receiving one must be "tiny" for reciprocity to obtain. This result conforms with the intuition behind Propositions 1 and 2. The structure under which these results are obtained has an important difference from my results, however. Whereas in Calvert's model the probabilities of the two players' offering cooperative favors are independent, in the RG they are dependent (specifically, if one player has a probability  $\gamma$  of winning, then the other has  $1 - \gamma$ ). It is this dependence between the probabilities of having an opportunity (in Calvert's terminology) that generates the parabolic nature of the cooperative parameter space in the RG. Further, Calvert's players move simultaneously, whereas control in the RG is exclusive to a single player in any stage t, which more closely conforms to a situation in which there is winner-take-all competition for public authority. These refinements are important later when insulation decisions are examined. (Calvert 1989, 270-3, 276-9). See also Alesina 1988, Besley and Coate 1998, and Coate and Morris 1999 for models of electoral competition and economic policy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, T5.1, T5.2, T5.6, and Kreps 1992, Appendix A.

?



chances implies a decrease in the other's, as  $\gamma$  moves toward its extreme values, an increased propensity to cooperate by one player is complemented by a decrease in the other player's likelihood of cooperating. Thus, as reelection probabilities jointly move toward the middle values, the parameter space for cooperation increases.

Second, this result is interesting because it runs counter to the claim made in the literature that uncertainty will create incentives to sabotage previous policies. According to Proposition 2, although increasing uncertainty about retaining political power gives opponents greater opportunities to undo what a currently prevailing group implements, it also gives players a greater payoff for cooperating. Thus, as long as the penalties for cooperation are not prohibitive, uncertainty provides incentives for constructive rather than reciprocally destructive behavior. More generally still, the intuition is powerful: In a democratic institutional structure, repeated play in itself is not sufficient to sustain cooperation. Instead, it is precisely the possibility of losing power that enables players to employ punishment strategies that can effectively engender coopera-

Finally, as noted by Moe and Caldwell (1994), in parliamentary systems, legislation is easy to pass for those who hold public authority. This means that, in contrast to presidential systems, legislating insulated agency structures will not tie the hands of those that follow: The legislation that is designed to insulate can itself be overturned by future holders of public authority. This is precisely the situation described by the RG, in which the players do not have an option to insulate. In this sense, the RG makes an important prediction about cooperation between groups in a parliamentary

system: When no dominant group exists, cooperation will be more prevalent. In other words, when there is electoral balance, cooperative, and perhaps even moderate, outcomes will be most likely to obtain.

Before considering the effects of insulation strategies, it is useful to consider the generality of these results. One issue is that in many cases (including many of those described in the literature) competition is on a single dimension—the history of labor, environment, and consumer protection policies, for example, all might be described in this way. This raises the question whether the results still hold where policy competition is so direct.

As long as the players exhibit sufficient aversion to risk, the results in Propositions 1 and 2 hold. Indeed, the degree of "cooperative benefit" represented by  $\beta$  could be interpreted in the traditional setting of negative quadratic spatial preferences in a unidimensional policy space. To see this, consider a case in which the players have normal quadratic-stage game payoffs in a policy space  $x \in X \equiv \Re$ , represented by the utility function  $u_i = -(x - x_i)^2$ ,  $i \in \{A, B\}$ . Without loss of generality, the players' ideal points are  $x_A = 0$  and  $x_B > 0$ . Now, when a player holds public authority, it must pick a policy.

In this model, there is a region in X over which each player will be willing to cooperate. Specifically, A will cooperate if B cooperates and if  $x \in \{-x_B\sqrt{\delta(1-\gamma)}, x_B\sqrt{\delta(1-\gamma)}\}$ . Similarly, B will cooperate if A cooperates and  $x \in \{x_B(1-\sqrt{\delta\gamma}), x_B(1+\sqrt{\delta\gamma})\}$ . Because cooperative equilibria require both sides to cooperate, these equilibria will exist only if these two regions intersect. In other words, they will exist if the highest policy A would accept in a cooperative

equilibrium is higher than the lowest policy B would accept in a cooperative equilibrium. A closer examination of these bounds also reveals that their size increases as  $\gamma$  moves to 0.5. Thus, even if conflict is one-dimensional, Proposition 2 holds. In other words, the assumption of negative quadratic utility functions in a unidimensional policy space is simply a special case of the model presented above.

A second extension considers what happens when control over public authority can be divided. Here I extend the model to analyze a case in which there are k institutions. For simplicity, assume that a policy change requires control of the full set of institutions, or undivided control over public authority. I assume that the probability that a group controls any single institution is the same as before. To provide an intuition, I assume that the probabilities of holding authority over any one of the institutions are independent across k.  $^{13}$ 

With this modification, again the parameter space for which cooperative equilibria is the largest is when political uncertainty is maximal. The logic of this result is that the payoffs of cooperation for both A and B are the same as in the earlier formulation with a single institution. To calculate the payoffs off the equilibrium path, I must first calculate the probabilities of three possible states: undivided control for A, undivided control for B, and split control. These occur with probability  $\gamma^k$ ,  $(1-\gamma)^k$ , and  $1-\gamma^k-(1-\gamma)^k$ , respectively. In a noncooperative equilibrium, the last policy emerging from undivided control is retained with a higher probability than in the previous formulation. For example, if A's policy is the status quo, then the likelihood that A will be the policy in the following period is the probability that A obtains undivided control or control is divided, or  $1-(1-\gamma)^k$ . However, if B's policy is the status quo, then the probability that A's program will be implemented is only the probability that A gains undivided control or  $\gamma^k$ , which is lower. In this sense, policy implementation under separation of powers exhibits "stickiness." Further, this stickiness advantages the stronger player: Whoever is more likely to control the institutions on average will have its program in place for an even longer time than in the game with only singular institutions. This means that the stronger player will have an even weaker incentive to comply with any cooperative equilibrium.

The attenuation of incentives has a number of implications. First, the minimum  $\beta$  for which cooperation can be sustained will be weakly higher, meaning that cooperation will be more difficult to obtain. Second, as before, these incentives are dulled when competition is relatively even. The intuition is similar to Proposition 2 above. When a player is extremely strong, it has little incentive to cooperate. With the addition of multiple veto points, this effect becomes magnified; with even smaller increases in the stronger player's electoral chances, the parameter space for cooperation shrinks. In the reverse case, however, as the players become more equal, the incremental effect decreases, making

cooperation easier to sustain, as Proposition 2 states. Thus, despite the change in the level of gains from trade required to obtain cooperation, the comparative statics within the institutional structure, that cooperation is easiest to sustain when electoral chances are even, remain the same.

### THE INSULATION GAME


The results just presented provide a general context for an analysis of uncertainty, but the extant theory explains that in systems with separated powers, overturn and sabotage are not the only recourse for groups. Through the use of organization structure, groups can waylay such sabotage attempts.

This description points to a further refinement to the RG. I therefore introduce the insulation game (IG), in which groups can insulate an agency from sabotage. The structure of the IG is similar to that of the RG. As with the RG, the game is between two players, A and B, and is repeated indefinitely. Again, players implement their proposals with certainty, and, if the other player's program is in place, the moving player has the option of either overturning (O) or not overturning (NO). The players must make an additional strategic choice: whether to insulate their agency or not. When implementing its program, a player must choose from the action set  $\{I, NI\}$ , in which I denotes insulate and NI denotes not insulate. To capture the notion that this opportunity is available only rarely, a player makes this decision only during the *first* period in which it is recognized.

In each stage, if a player plays NI, then its payoffs are identical to those in the RG. However, if a player chooses I, its payoffs are modified by a factor  $\alpha$  that is strictly less than  $1(\alpha < 1)$ . The benefit to the player of playing I is that, irrespective of the other players' play from {O; NO}, the insulating player's program remains in place forever. Thus, if the other player's program is in place, the insulating player receives  $\alpha\beta$ ; otherwise, it receives  $\alpha$  (which, by construction, is greater than  $\alpha\beta$ ). In the process of formalization, then, I am able to define more precisely what policy "insulation" means. Specifically, insulation can be thought of in either of two equally valid ways. On the one hand, insulation is a mechanism whereby groups or officials can avoid punishment strategies. Because insulation locks in benefits, groups can act destructively without fear of retribution. On the other hand, insulation mechanisms are those that trade benefits when in power for benefits when out of power; groups can smooth their benefits. This construction allows me to interrogate the conditions under which an agency will be insulated and those under which it will not be. In particular, Propositions 3a, 3b, and 3c characterize equilibrium strategies and outcomes as the cost of insulation, parameterized by  $\alpha$ , varies.14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Since the probability of controlling all n institutions is a function of  $\gamma$ , the results from Proposition 2 will hold under an assumption of correlation in election results.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> For the *IG*, the strategy that we analyze is a modified version of *grim trigger*. The insulation choice is an element of the action set only at the player's first period of recognition. Regardless of the player's 'strategy at that node, its strategy is to play grim trigger with respect to the overturn-not overturn choice in every turn it is recognized.



Proposition 3a. If  $\alpha$  is sufficiently large, both players will play  $\{(I, O)\}$ .

PROPOSITION 3b. If  $\alpha$  is not sufficiently large for both players to play  $\{(I, O)\}$ , then an equilibrium for the IG is either  $\{(I, O); (NI, O)\}$  or  $\{(NI, O); (I, O)\}$  if  $\alpha$  is sufficiently large.

PROPOSITION 3c. If  $\alpha$  is sufficiently small, then neither player will insulate.

Propositions 3a through 3c show that when insulation is too costly, groups will leave policies unprotected. This is consistent with intuition but also provides a much better understanding of the behavior of competing groups. As the extant theory contends, the prospect of future competition forces groups to insulate and, therefore, can cripple agencies by design. However, the results from the *IG* indicate that this account is incomplete: Only if the cost is relatively minor will agencies be insulated. If the cost is moderate, then, depending on the reelection potential of the group, only one group will choose to insulate. And if the cost is prohibitive, neither agency will insulate and the players will play the reciprocity game.

Propositions 3a, 3b, and 3c allow me to return to the primary question about the relationship between political uncertainty and the decision to insulate. According to the literature, it is the fact of uncertainty that causes groups to insulate. As shown in Proposition 4, electoral uncertainty interacts with the cost of insulation to determine equilibrium behavior.

Proposition 4. Under the conditions given in Propositions 3a through 3c, as political uncertainty increases,

the parameter space over which either both players insulate or neither player insulates increases, while the parameter space for which a single player insulates decreases.

When combined with Propositions 3a through 3c, Proposition 4 conveys a richer understanding of insulating mechanisms as a structural choice. <sup>15</sup> Under fairly general conditions, we can characterize an equilibrium for the IG. As shown in Figure 2, the equilibrium will depend on a combination of both the costs of insulation and the probability of reelection. As the costs of insulation increase (as  $\alpha$  decreases), only those with a very small chance of being elected will insulate. Thus, they ensure that they get some benefits on an ongoing basis, an incentive that outweights the cost incurred by overburdening an agency with procedures.

Proposition 4 provides two characterizations of the relationship between political uncertainty and insulation. First, it shows that as long as there is some political uncertainty, public organizations will be less effective than private ones. To see this, compare two cases: an organization operating like a private one, with no electoral uncertainty, and an organization in which uncertainty exists. In the former case, as Proposition 4 shows, insulation will never be employed. In the latter case, uncertainty can give groups an incentive to insulate. Second, as shown in Figure 2, Proposition 4 also allows us to consider how the incentives to insulate change as uncertainty changes. Interestingly, as political uncertainty decreases, one of the groups (that which is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> For the purposes of illustration, I describe an equilibrium, here and in Figure 2, that assumes that the triple  $(\delta, \beta, \gamma)$  is such that  $\alpha_A^{**} < \alpha_B^*$  when  $\gamma < 0.5$ , and  $\alpha_B^{**} < \alpha_A^*$  when  $\gamma > 0.5$ .

most commonly out of power) will be willing to bear greater costs, as represented by  $\alpha$ , to preserve benefits. As political uncertainty increases, however, we have a mixed result. For some levels of costs, both groups will insulate. For others, neither will insulate. Thus, while political uncertainty might lead to insulation, it might have the exact opposite effect, eliminating any chance of it.  $^{16}$ 

More importantly, Proposition 4 indicates that to explain variation among agencies, focusing on uncertainty is inappropriate. Instead, insulation is most likely in situations where there are electoral asymmetries. Moreover, I can make a more precise statement: Groups that are electorally weak will be the most likely to insulate.

This prediction has an important implication. When group power is unbalanced, the policies of the weaker group will be less effectively implemented than those of the dominant group. Because only the weaker group will insulate its policies, only its policies will bear the costs of inefficiency that go with such insulation. In this sense, the relative value and competence of the weaker group will be *self-confirming*: When it gets its moment in the sun, it is not able to implement their policies as effectively as the stronger groups.

The IG also illuminates another aspect of agency performance: the degree to which political uncertainty will lead to inefficient agencies. According to Moe, along with political compromise, uncertainty means that bureaucracies are "designed to be inefficient." Propositions 3 and 4, however, clarify the claim that bureaucracy is "inefficient by design." First, they establish a lower bound on how inefficient agencies will be due to political uncertainty. If the costs of insulation in terms of program performance are high, groups will choose not to insulate their programs. Second, only groups that have very weak future electoral prospects will insulate. This means that when the usual winners erect agencies, they will not be hampered by such organizational designs. Assuming that the distribution of agency creation is spread evenly over time, most agencies will be uninsulated. Therefore, inefficiency cannot be widely attributed to electoral competition.

Once again, it is useful to consider the robustness of these results. One simplification made in the IG is the assumption that insulation mechanisms survive for the life of the game. In practice, insulation is subject to repeal. This is reflected in the literature on bureaucratic insulation (Moe 1989, 1990), in which two states are implicitly assumed: divided versus unified control of public authority. When a group has control of all the veto points, it can pass legislation. This means that a group can implement administrative structures that insulate agencies. Undivided control also allows the group to repeal earlier legislation, including insulating mechanisms passed previously. When control is divided, groups cannot pass legislation. Instead, they can affect the direction of policy only when previous policies were not protected. An alternative, and perhaps more realistic, assumption for the IG, therefore, is that insulating mechanisms survive only as long as the opposing group does not gain undivided control of the institutional apparatus.

To explore this situation, I modify the IG. Assume that there are k institutions, or veto points, each with an independent probability  $\gamma$  of being controlled by group A. If a group insulates its program, it obtains a payoff  $\alpha$  until the insulated program is repealed. If a group chooses not to insulate, then its payoffs are a function of the number of institutions j within its power in a given period. For simplicity, I assume that this function is linear in j, taking the form j/k. These assumptions capture two features implicit in the literature (Moe 1989, 1990): First, if a program is not insulated, it will "drift" in the direction of its current institutional overseers via nonstatutory means; second, legislation is hard to pass and is possible only in the rare moments when control is complete.

For this model, it is sufficient to analyze the incentives of a potential insulating group. As before, not surprisingly, as the costs of insulation decrease—as  $\alpha$  gets larger—players have a stronger incentive to insulate. More importantly, even when it is assumed that insulating mechanisms can be overturned when new legislation is passed, the level of costs necessary to encourage insulation decreases in  $\gamma$ . In other words, it is still the case that as the probability of winning an electoral contest increases, the incentive to insulate declines, as in Proposition 4.

The intuition for this result can be seen by comparing the expected value for choosing to insulate or not. Formally, the expected payoff for player i from taking either action is

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \delta^t S(t) \sum_{l=1}^k \Pr(j=l) U_i(j=l), \qquad i = \{A, B\},$$

where S(t) is the probability that i's opponent does not have unified control up to period t or, alternatively, the probability that i's action "survives" to period t. Note that the two terms on the left side are unaffected by whether or not programs have been protected. The difference under the two choices is the expected value represented by the summation on the right-hand side. In the insulated case, this payoff is always  $\alpha$  irrespective of how many veto points j the group controls. But if a group chooses not to insulate when given the opportunity, this payoff depends on how many veto points it holds, which in turn increases with the probability of winning any given veto point. Thus, players are still trading off costs when in power against benefits when out of power. A group that is pessimistic about its future prospects and leaves its program uninsulated will see the program captured by a more powerful group even if that group does not have an opportunity to overturn the legislation. Thus, weak or vulnerable groups will be willing to pay a large cost to secure a smaller ongoing stream of benefits. On the other hand, stronger groups will be more optimistic about their ability to control bureaucratic drift and therefore will be less willing to pay those costs of insulation.

<sup>16</sup> Note that these results broadly hold for zero-sum games as well.

### TWO ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES

A few stylized examples illustrate the mechanisms evaluated in the models. Moe (1989, 1990, 1991) and others (e.g., Horn 1995) provide evidence that groups with a tenuous hold on public authority, such as environmentalists and consumers, will try to saddle government agencies and the policy implementation apparatus with mechanisms that reduce the agency's ability to carry out its mandate but also protect it from future interference. Importantly, however, these cases are outliers, since the groups behind these policies were traditionally out of power and act based on a temporary hold on public authority. The models above, however, provide a more general understanding of the relationship between electoral competition and policy insulation. In what follows, therefore, I offer two examples that illustrate these results. Each case illustrates parts of the story that have been overlooked.

### **Trade Policy**

The conclusion of the reciprocity game is that when political uncertainty is high, cooperation is easier to sustain, and when it is low, it is likely to be unsustainable, even when there are benefits for cooperation. The latter is precisely the case with tariff policy from the late nine-teenth century until the 1930s. 17 In this period, the Republicans were in control most of the time, although their control was not complete. Of the 30 Congresses from 1871 to 1931, although some elections were close, the Republicans had undivided control of both houses 18 times, the Democrats had undivided control five times, and control was divided seven times (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census 1975, 1083). Because policies survived until there was undivided government, this division of political institutions meant that Republican policies were in place more than 80% of the time, while Democratic policies were in place less than 20% of the time.

The two parties' positions on tariffs were clearly articulated: The Republicans preferred protectionist policies; the Democrats wanted open domestic markets. In this case, with a low degree of political uncertainty, the two sides were unable to coordinate on a cooperative solution. Instead, each side, when in power, either reduced or increased tariffs. As Epstein and O'Halloran (1996, 303) describe, "... [T]ariffs changed

regularly in roller-coaster fashion when a new party entered office. High tariffs were followed by low tariffs, which were succeeded by high tariffs. The tariff acts of 1883, 1890, 1894, 1897, 1912, 1922, and 1930 were passed close on the heels of federal elections, with each peak in the tariff rate associated with Republican control and each trough with Democratic control."18 To understand U.S. tariff policy, Epstein and O'Halloran consider it necessary to take account of partisanship. As they conclude, "... [W] hen strong parties take divergent positions on an issue, changes in the preferences of the median voter that result in a new party taking office will lead to changes in policy outcomes above and beyond those explained by changes in the median voter alone. ... [C]oalitions will aggregate interests in different ways, implying that policy will be biased towards the coalitional base of the party in power" (Epstein and O'Halloran 1996, 302).

While demonstrating that partisan regime change is an important determinant of changes in tariff policy, Epstein and O'Halloran's argument is incomplete in ignoring what enabled this behavior. The results of the reciprocity game suggest that the low degree of uncertainty during this period interacted with partisan shifts to produce changes in tariff policy. It is possible to use the results in Propositions 1 and 2 to posit a counterfactual: If political uncertainty had been high, partisan changes would not have led to significant shifts in tariff policy.

The tariff case also illustrates the results from the insulation game. As mentioned, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, the dominant Republican party would undo any reductions in tariffs made during infrequent periods of Democratic supremacy. When they again were in a position to legislate tariff policy in the 1930s, they faced a familiar problem: How would they make the changes more durable? They found an answer in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) of 1934. As Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast argue, the RTAA ceded control over tariff policy from Congress to the President. Given that presidents were more liberal on trade than legislators, the Democrats would ensure that tariffs would be lower than under the usual Republican Congresses. "... [B]y giving the President agenda-setting power, tariff cuts would be more extensive and durable even if congress were to be taken back by protectionist forces," they explain. "Even Republican Presidents, with their national constituencies, would be more liberal on trade than Republicans in Congress and could use their institutional power to constrain the protectionist impulses of Republicans in Congress" (Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997, 310).

Two features of this example are important, then, to illustrate the results from the *IG*. First, as predicted, an electorally weak party, the Democrats, was willing to bear the costs of insulating its agenda in return for a steadier stream of expected benefits. Perhaps more importantly, the dominant Republicans did not insulate

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> One important question is whether this was a zero-sum policy. Although tariff policy represents a single-dimensional policy choice, as I argue above, even in a single dimension, if there is sufficient risk aversion, there will be the possibility of gains from cooperation. In the case of trade policy, these gains almost certainly exist. Take, for example, the case of protected industries. If they adjust the capacity to a constantly changing tariff level, they will either incur significant fixed costs, which will be underutilized, or the benefit of the tariff will be unrealized, as the capacity will be below the optimal level. In this case, even though the tariff involves massive transfers, importers, exporters, and even consumers will place some value on policy stability at the expense of (part of) the distributive benefits and costs to the tariff. Further, even if this were a case in which the gains from cooperation are slight—in other words, the policy is close to zero-sum—the model would predict the same dynamics both when insulation was not yet a possibility and once insulation became possible.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> See also Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997, 5–6. Their Table 1 provides strong evidence of this pattern.

their changes. They were more content to sabotage the Democratic programs when given the opportunity and to continue to implement their programs during their frequent times in power.

### **Broadcast Radio Regulation**

The origins of radio regulation in the United States also present a set of political conditions different from the cases examined in the literature, for radio regulation was demanded by a dominant, largely unopposed coalition. In this case, an administrative structure was erected that was less constrained but also subject to interference.

The two major pieces of legislation that created a formal administrative apparatus for radio regulation were the 1927 Radio Act, which created the Federal Radio Commission (FRC), and the 1934 Communications Act, which created the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Prior to 1927, federal policy toward radio frequency regulation was governed by a series of legislative acts—the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act, 1910 Mann–Elkins Amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act, 1910 Wireless Ship Act, and 1912 Radio Act—that were designed for management of commercial shipping frequencies and not broadcasting.

With the emergence of broadcast radio, the courts began to rule against the applicability of previous legislation to management of the broadcast frequencies. In a series of court and executive decisions, it became increasingly clear that extant statutes would not be sufficient to manage the new technology (Emery 1971; McMahon 1979; Wollenberg 1989) This gap in the regulatory framework created a strong alignment of interests in the mid-1920s behind the creation of an agency to manage radio frequencies. The relatively unopposed coalition was led by existing or aspiring broadcasters, who saw regulation as a boon in two senses: On the one hand, it was sorely needed to eliminate negative externalities from congestion and lack of coordination; on the other hand, it promised to provide stations with a way to maintain a strong position in growing and potentially competitive markets.

Broadcasters who were demanding regulation had little to fear from opponents in either the short or the long term. In the short term, the growing disorganization of the industry, with no coordination, meant that all segments of interests were clamoring for the government to step in and more actively organize the use of the airwaves: Nascent broadcasters, listeners, religious groups, content providers, and commercial radio operators had a common and intense interest in overcoming congestion, interference, and the lack of coordination. Even in the future, consumer interests were unlikely to play much of a role, as they were largely unorganized. Alternatively, the broadcast industry was very quickly organizing, with the National Association of Broadcasters emerging as an important force driving the development of legislation in the four National Radio Conferences in the 1920s and 1930s.

The lack of opposition, a situation that was likely to hold for the foreseeable future, was reflected in the focus on efficiency rather than insulation. Almost all parties supported removing any jurisdiction from the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which was perceived as being more interested in other domains and lacking sufficient focus. Given that a separate regulatory agency was to be created, the question was how to structure its powers. This classic structural choice, however, was resolved in a way much different than the later debates over the organization of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). In this case, the agency was, in almost every area, given leeway, discretion, and a wide range of authority.

Rather than giving the FRC a highly specific statute to implement, in the 1927 Act "Congress turned essentially all radio regulation over to the new agency, whose discretion was limited mainly by a new requirement that its actions serve the public interest" (Wollenberg 1989, 65; see also Emery 1971, 45-49). Indeed, specific procedures that were considered but summarily discarded highlight the nature of this debate. An example of such an issue is how the commission's decisionmaking authority over licenses would be structured. One possibility was to house decisions over license appeals in the full body of the agency, which would have lessened the impact any single commissioner might have had on the implementation of policy. Instead, Congress arranged that each commissioner would have full authority over licensing decisions in five regional zones (U.S. Congress 1927, sec. 29). This enhanced the speed and efficiency with which licenses were granted, but it also made these decisions more susceptible to future appointments by potential rivals. This broad mandate meant that the period from 1927 to 1934 featured a sea change in the implementation of radio policy, primarily by a largely unfettered FRC (Wollenberg 1989, 68).

Seven years after the creation of the FRC, Congress passed the 1934 Communications Act. The Act was prompted by the desire to integrate regulation of all communications into a single agency. The 1927 Act had divided control over communications policy between the FRC, which regulated radio, and the ICC, which retained control over common carriage. The 1934 Act eliminated the FRC but transferred control over radio to the newly created FCC.

The broad discretion granted to the FRC in 1927 might have been altered in 1934, with the passage of the Communications Act; however, the procedural constraints on radio regulation remained muted, becoming more stringent only in some limited sense (Krasnow 1982). Title III of the 1934 Act, which governed the licensing of broadcast radio operators, added several provisions to the previous statute, but all were innocuous (Wollenberg 1989).

If anything, the 1934 Act maintained the bureaucracy's discretion while expanding its reach. Under the same discretion as before; the FCC was to have the authority to suspend or revoke the license of any operator (U.S. Congress 1934, sec. 303(m)). Similarly, section 302

of the Act included additional rule-making powers for the FCC to govern chain broadcasting, again with no constraint on the agency's interpretation or implementation except that it be in the public interest. More generally, the issue of the extent of judicial review was also debated as a potential constraint on the agency. During hearings about the Act, several radio broadcasters who had had their licenses revoked objected to the limited extent of review and appeal granted in the 1927 Act (Cass 1989, 86-87; U.S. Congress, Senate Hearings 1934, 56–57). Ultimately, review powers were very limited, as Congress decided to limit the courts and leave discretion to the agency. Further, the Act provided strong discretionary powers for enforcement, allowing for fines and penalties, in addition to revocation of licenses. The use of these powers was left largely to the FCC's discretion. In the end, the main limitation on the FCC was, as with the 1927 Act, a stricture to regulate in the "public interest." This broad standard meant that the agency was granted considerable discretion to manage licenses and promulgate regulations.

The history of early regulation of radio broadcasting shows what happens when enacting groups enjoy more than a "moment in the sun." In both the 1927 Radio Act and the 1934 Communications Act, regulation was initiated not by such a constellation of interests, but by groups that did not fear loss of power in the future. The result was legislation that culminated with an agency enabled to act on its own. As Cass (1989, 90) notes, "The Commission's capacity to shape policy in a manner that responds to changing circumstances and shifting interests is further advanced by the broadly worded authority delegated to the Commission in Titles II and III and by the limited scope of judicial review available."19 Relaxed procedural and jurisdictional control was made possible precisely by the absence of any fear that the agency would be captured in the future by opposing interests.

### DISCUSSION

Structural choices are crucial to both interest groups and legislators. These choices, are made in a process of *strategic interactions* between players set in an institutional context. The existing literature on treatments of these choices is at once instructive and incomplete: Political uncertainty, under certain conditions, can lead to bureaucratic inefficiency, but this occurs only to a point. In many cases, political uncertainty actually discourages inefficient insulation of public policy.

The analysis and examples provided here help, therefore, to clarify unexplored aspects of this literature. In thinking about policy insulation, electoral strength, and not uncertainty, should be seen as the determinative factor. Those with the most to gain by giving up

benefits now in exchange for benefits in the future—either through policy cooperation, when insulation is not available, or through costly structural means, when it is—are precisely the groups that will have the least capacity to do so. Accordingly, the claim that bureaucracy is "inefficient by design" must be tempered. For costly insulation to take place, groups must have both the motive and the means. The analysis shows that in most cases, when players have the means—when they are elected frequently—they do not have the incentive to use it, and when they have the motive, they do not have the opportunity to act on their incentives.

More generally, the models illustrate one role of electoral volatility. Frequent turnover among elected officials, depending on the policy in question, can lead to greater cooperation. The critical mechanism that leads to such cooperation is the employment of punishment strategies. Players whose electoral fates are uncertain are more willing to take conciliatory postures toward their opponents when they believe that they will soon have to cede authority to opposing groups. Although I focus on a particular context for reciprocity—the structural choices by interest groups—the implications of my analysis extend beyond this application to general theories of democratic representation and policy implementation. Both models suggest a potentially important avenue of research: the nature and manifestations of reciprocity emerging from democratic institutions.

Finally, an important question in the literature on political institutions concerns the sources of policy stability. Though not comprehensive, the theory developed here posits three processes that can generate stability, albeit in much different ways. First, when policy insulation is not a viable alternative, either because it is not durable, as in parliamentary systems, or because it is extremely costly, stability can occur through cooperation when groups' power is evenly divided. Second, when insulation is not available and the groups are not cooperating, it is likely that one group is dominant. In this case, policies will still be stable, although not as stable as with reciprocity, because one group will be able to impose its policies consistently. Finally, when insulation is available to players, groups that are historically dominant in the electoral arena will not insulate their policies. But since they are in power often, they will be able to maintain the continuity of their policies. Groups that are disadvantaged electorally will insulate their policies, in those occasional political moments when they do rise to control the public apparatus. So although they are infrequently in power, their policies will be stable as well, albeit less effectively implemented.

### **APPENDIX: PROOFS OF RESULTS**

**Proof of Proposition 1.** In this case, one must only analyze a subgame in which the other player has moved. For A, its choice at any point is whether or not to play O, given B's strategy. Given that the choice at the first stage is identical to that at later stages, one must consider only the first opportunity to overturn. Since B is playing grim trigger, if A plays O, then its expected payoff is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Robinson (1989, 18) provides a similar assessment, "What is remarkable about the communications field is the degree of freedom permitted the agency not merely to adapt its powers to deal with new contingencies, but indeed to expand its jurisdictional reach to concerns wholly different from those that animated the regulation in the first instance."

$$EU_A(A_A = O) = 1 + \frac{\delta \gamma}{1 - \delta} = \frac{1 - \delta + \delta \gamma}{1 - \delta}.$$
 (1)

Note that I suppress the subscript t and the conditioning on  $s_B$ . If A plays NO, however, for all t, its expected payoff is

$$EU_A(A_A = NO) = \frac{\beta}{1 - \delta}.$$
 (2)

Thus, A will cooperate if and only if (2) is greater than (1). Thus, A cooperates if and only if

$$\beta > 1 - \delta + \delta \gamma = \beta_A^* \tag{3a}$$

By symmetry and substituting  $1 - \gamma$  for  $\gamma_1$ , B will cooperate if and only if

$$\beta > 1 - \delta \gamma = \beta_B^*. \tag{3b}$$

Since cooperation is sustained only if both players do not have an incentive to play O, and both (3a) and (3b) are lower bounds, I therefore can define a condition such that cooperation can be sustained:  $\beta > \max(\beta_A^*, \beta_B^*) = \beta^*$ . The proposition follows from the fact that  $\beta^*$  is a function of  $\delta$  and  $\gamma$ .

**Proof of Proposition 2.** Solving for the maximum condition given in Proposition 1, I obtain the following:

$$eta^* = egin{cases} 1 - \delta + \delta \gamma & & if & \gamma > rac{1}{2}, \ 1 - \delta \gamma & & if & \gamma < rac{1}{2}. \end{cases}$$

The proposition follows from the fact that  $\beta^*$  is a decreasing function of  $\gamma$  if  $\gamma < 0.5$  and increasing if  $\gamma > 0.5$ .<sup>20</sup>

**Proof of Proposition 3a.** To solve for the equilibrium conditions, we again employ the concepts of subgame perfection. Although the insulation choice is a one-shot play, the overturn-not overturn decision is infinitely repeated. We are evaluating the equilibrium under grim trigger strategies, so each player must choose from the action set  $A'_{ij} = \{(I, O); (I, NO); (NI, O); (NI, NO)\}^{21}$ . To find the conditions under which a particular set of strategies is an equilibrium, we evaluate the four potential strategy combinations, having fixed the equilibrium strategy of the other player.

To find the conditions under which both players insulate, we evaluate  $\{(I, O); (I, O)\}$ . Initially, we evaluate when (I, O) is a best response for A given that B is playing (I, O). Note first that if B plays (I, O), (I, O) weakly dominates (I, NO) and strictly dominates (NI, NO) for A. Thus we must compare the expected payoffs for A from (I, O) and (NI, O). If A plays (I, O), its expected payoff is given by

$$EU_{A}(A'_{At} = \{(I, O)\}|A'_{Bt} = \{(I, O)\})$$

$$= \frac{\alpha\gamma(1-\beta)}{1-\delta\gamma} + \frac{\alpha\beta}{1-\delta} - \frac{\alpha\beta(1-\gamma)}{1-\delta+\delta\gamma}.$$
(4)

Similarly, if A plays (NI, O), its expected payoff is

$$EU_{A}(A'_{At} = \{(NI, O)\} | A'_{Bt} = \{(I, O)\})$$

$$= \frac{\gamma(1-\beta)}{1-\delta \nu} + \frac{\beta \gamma}{1-\delta}.$$
(5)

Solving for the conditions under which (4) is greater than (5) yields

$$\alpha > \frac{(1 - \delta + \delta \gamma)(1 - \delta + \beta \delta(1 - \gamma))}{1 - \delta((2 - \delta)(1 - \beta(1 - \gamma)) - \gamma(1 - \delta)} = \alpha_A^*.$$
 (6)

Thus, if (6) holds, then A's best response to B's playing (I, O) is (I, O). From the symmetry of the game form and payoffs, we can derive the condition under which B's best response to A's playing (I, O) is (I, O) by substituting  $(1 - \gamma)$  for  $\gamma$  in (6). We call this cut point  $\alpha_B^*$ . Since  $\alpha$  must be greater than both  $\alpha_A^*$  and  $\alpha_B^*$ , we have the result:  $\{(I, O); (I, O)\}$  is an equilibrium,  $\alpha > \max(\alpha_A^*, \alpha_B^*) = \alpha^*$ , which is the proposition.

**Proof of Proposition 3b.** Consider first that  $\alpha < \alpha_B^*$ . Then from the proof of Proposition 3a above, we have that, given that A plays (I, O), B's best response is  $(NI, \odot)$ , so B will not insulate even if A does. We must then compare the expected payoff for A from playing (I, O) versus (NI, O) given that B plays  $(NI, \odot)$ .

If A plays (I, O), its expected payoff is given by

$$EU_{A}(A'_{At} = \{(I, O)\}|A'_{Bt} = \{(NI, O)\})$$

$$= \frac{\alpha(\gamma - \delta\gamma(1 - \gamma) + \delta\gamma\beta(1 - \gamma))}{(1 - \delta)(1 - \delta + \delta\gamma)}.$$
 (7)

Similarly, if A plays (NI, O), its expected payoff is

$$EU_A(A'_{At} = \{(I, O)\}|A'_{Bt} = \{(NI, O)\}) = \frac{\gamma}{1 - \delta}.$$
 (8)

Solving for the conditions under which (7) is greater than (8) yields

$$\alpha > \frac{1 - \delta + \delta \gamma}{1 - \delta + \delta \gamma + \delta \beta (1 - \gamma)} = \alpha_A^{**}. \tag{9}$$

Thus, if  $\alpha < \alpha_B^*$  and (9) holds, then A will insulate, while B will not. By substituting  $(1 - \gamma)$  for  $\gamma$ , we can derive a similar result in which B will insulate and A will not if  $\alpha < \alpha_A^*$ .

$$\alpha > \frac{1 - \delta \gamma}{1 - \delta \gamma + \delta \beta \gamma} = \alpha_B^{**}. \tag{10}$$

Equations (9) and (10) constitute the proposition.

**Proof of Proposition 3c.** This follows directly from conditions (9) and (10) above. If  $\alpha < \alpha_A^{**}$ , then playing NI is the best response for A if B plays NI. Similarly, if  $\alpha < \alpha_B^{**}$ , then NI is a best response for B given that A plays NI. Thus if  $\alpha < \min(\alpha_A^{**}, \alpha_B^{**})$ , then both players playing NI will be an equilibrium. Further, from Proposition 1, we have a condition under which, given that players are playing  $\{(NI, \odot), (NI, \odot)\}$ , they will overturn if and only if  $\beta < \beta^*$ . Thus, depending on the value of  $\beta$ , the players that are not insulating will play either O or NO.

**Proof of Proposition 4.** To see this consider the conditions given in Propositions 3a through 3c. First note that from Proposition 3a, we have both players insulating if and only if

$$\alpha > \alpha^* = \begin{cases} \alpha_B^* & if & \gamma < \frac{1}{2}, \\ \alpha_A^* & if & \gamma > \frac{1}{2}. \end{cases}$$
 (11)

Taking the first derivative of (11), we obtain the following result:

$$\frac{\partial \alpha^*}{\partial \gamma} \begin{cases} < 0 & \text{if } \gamma < \frac{1}{2}, \\ > 0 & \text{if } \gamma > \frac{1}{2}. \end{cases}$$
 (12)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Since  $\beta_A^*$  and  $\beta_B^*$  are linear in  $\gamma$ , this means that  $\beta^*(\delta, \gamma)$  is not differentiable in  $\gamma$ . I ignore this problem by assuming that  $\gamma \neq \frac{1}{2}$ .

<sup>21</sup> Implicitly, we are evaluating equilibria in which if a player does not want to overturn in the first turn, it will not do so afterward.

From Proposition 3c, we analyze the behavior of cut points  $\alpha_A^{**}$  and  $\alpha_B^{**}$ . From (9), we analyze  $\alpha_A^{**}$  for  $\gamma$  less than 0.5:

$$\frac{\partial \alpha_A^{**}}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{\delta \beta}{(1 - \delta + \delta \gamma + \delta \beta (1 - \gamma))^2} > 0.$$
 (13)

Similarly, if  $\gamma$  is greater than 0.5, we examine  $\alpha_B^{**}$ :

$$\frac{\partial \alpha_B^{**}}{\partial \gamma} = \frac{-\delta \beta}{(1 - \delta \gamma + \delta \beta \gamma)^2} < 0.$$
 (14)

Equations (12), (13), and (14), constitute the proposition.

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# **Bureaucracy that Kills: Federal Sovereign Immunity and the Discretionary Function Exception**

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Political scientists normally discuss sovereign immunity in the context of international law and relations. The domestic effects of sovereign immunity are almost never examined, even though those effects are profound and implicate a range of issues of interest to political scientists. The Federal Tort Claims Act (FCTA) (1946) is a main waiver of federal sovereign immunity and is designed to allow people injured by government employees to sue for money damages. The FTCA has a number of exceptions, the most prominent of which is known as the "discretionary function exception." This exception retains sovereign immunity for the United States when a federal employee acts "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty...whether or not the discretion involved be abused." This simple exception expanded into a comprehensive tool of government that now confounds justice and federal governmental accountability.

n April 16, 1947, a ship anchored in the harbor of Texas City, the Grandcamp, exploded, leveling most of the city, killing 576 people, and injuring five thousand more. Destined for Europe as part of the Marshall Plan, the Grandcamp had more than 1,850 tons of fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate (FGAN) aboard, along with a heavy load of commercial explosives. When the captain of the Grandcamp saw smoke coming from a hold of the ship, he ordered the hatches battened and injected steam into the cargo area to quell the fire. This was normal procedure for fires in holds, but unfortunately those administering the fertilizer program neglected to warn the captain that FGAN is an oxidizing agent and does not need any external oxygen for combustion. The heat and the pressure created by the spontaneous combustion, the steam, and the battened hold caused the FGAN to explode.

Federally owned munitions factories that less than two years before the disaster had been turning out ordnance to be dropped on Europe now manufactured fertilizer to be spread on its fields. A private company would have been liable for the damage and injury caused by the explosions, but the United States escaped liability through a little-known provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) (1946). The government had the FGAN bagged at extremely high temperatures, usually 200°F (*Dalehite* v. *U.S.* 1952 [hereafter *Dalehite*], 40), and administrators knew perfectly well the dangerous propensities of the fertilizer and about incidents of FGAN undergoing spontaneous combustion and exploding (66–7). Even more, there were no warnings on the fertilizer bags, and stevedores, cargo

masters, and ship captains were not informed about the properties of FGAN. Most telling, administrators halted safety testing of the fertilizer when contract laboratories told them that, under procedures adopted by the government, it looked as if the FGAN would pose substantial danger to the public (66).

The Discretionary Function Exception (DFE) (FTCA 1946, sec. 2680(a)) to the FTCA protects the federal government from liability when policy decisions or actions of agencies or employees injure people. Growing out of the doctrines of sovereign immunity and separation of powers, the exception specifically applies "whether or not the discretion involved be abused." In Dalehite, the DFE saw its first use to protect the U.S. Government from liability, and it succeeded magnificently, turning out to be just the beginning in a long train of success. The DFE gives rise to several important and interesting questions concerning its scope and use. But beyond these matters, it provides a concrete example for examining contending understandings of the role of judges in controlling bureaucracy, influencing policy formulation, and bringing administrators to account for their actions.

Debates over judicial control of bureaucracy are contentious and long-standing. In the 1950s and 1960s a small but influential group of scholars sought diverse means to limit administrative discretion and independence. This group included Henry Friendly (1962), Walter Gellhorn and Clark Byse (1974), Louis Jaffe, Kenneth Culp Davis, and others, but Jaffe and Davis are perhaps the most important authors for the present concerns

In Judicial Control of Administrative Action, Jaffe (1965) presented a powerful view of the relationship between courts and administrators. He reacted against New Deal antijuridical views of public administration theorists, who believed that "if any person is to count for less than one . . . it is the lawyer" and that the lawyer suffered from a "meager social outlook," representing "everything stultifying" (Waldo 1948, 79). To these New Deal theorists, in administrative agencies "thoroughly motored and controlled by rational elaboration," judicial review and incursion into the sphere of

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the administrator were not only disruptive but also unjust (Jaffe 1973, 1186). Born in this crucible of antilegalism, the DFE first appeared in proposed legislation in 1942 (H.R. 6463), to help prevent what some commentators referred to as judicial "sabotage of the administrative process" (Blachly and Oatman 1946, 213). Testifying concerning this bill, an assistant attorney general asserted that the DFE preserved administrative autonomy to conduct "legally authorized activity" and protected agencies against "alleged abuse of discretionary authority" (U.S. Congress, House 1942, 33). The exception, therefore, is steeped in the counterjuridical impulse of New Deal administrative theory and is a vestige of an exuberant faith in administrative expertise.

Against the New Deal impulse, Jaffe implored judges to take a "hard look" approach to administrative decision-making. In piquant language, he noted that historically judges have been "adept...at removing the hide of an administrative agency" and that the "glint of the scalpel is still detectable behind the voluminous folds of [judges'] robes" (Jaffe 1965, 565). Judicial surgery on administrative agencies is precisely what Jaffe was after, and to achieve this he had to discredit the tendency to deference adopted by judges when reviewing administrative decisions. He saw judicial review of agency action as the necessary moral countervailing force to the scientism of administration theory and stated that "the touchstone of rejecting an administrative decision is the sense of the judge that it is unfair" (Jaffe 1951, 1245). And he termed the New Deal sentiment that agencies should be free of judicial "sabotage" a "heresy" (1259).

Davis likewise authored powerful tracts arguing for control of administrative power, but he focused more narrowly than Jaffe on the mechanics of discretion and disfavored the cumbersome, formalized process of court review of administrative action. Davis (1969, v) saw that injustice at the hands of administrators is directly proportional to the amount of discretion floating free in agencies. He believed that earlier efforts to eliminate or severely constrict administrative discretion actually achieved the opposite result (27–51) and that courts should not try to control discretion directly, but to channel legislators and administrators into avenues of effective rulemaking (220–1). Judicial review in America is too geared to large interests, and the transaction costs of going to court mean that "the system frequently fails to take care of parties with small interests" (155). By "parties with small interests," Davis meant poor, helpless, and troubled people. With appropriate planning and distribution of discretion, these are precisely the sorts of interests that administrators are most effective at serving. The problem, Davis said, is not so much providing substantial discretion to administrators, but how intelligently to circumscribe discretionary power and make sure only the optimal amount of discretion for performance of mandated functions is in the hands of agencies. Our system, Davis said, is in "imbalance"; it is "saturated with excessive discretionary power which needs to be confined, structured, and checked" (27).

More recently, some theorists have gone further than Davis, keeping the opposition to New Deal administrative theory, but embracing New Deal antilegalism in formulating solutions to problems of agency control. These thinkers believe that oversight of administrators need not come from courts; "judicial participation in the administrative process is not indispensable" (Krent 1997, 1187), and though the impulse to "exercise review over discretionary administrative action is understandable, the consequences can be perverse" (1189). But the DFE often arises when administrative incentives are at their worst. Because it provides a shield not only from liability, but also often from discovery, there is an incentive to employ the exception to avoid embarrassment and disclosure of information that would trigger action adverse to agency interests. The DFE is at odds with the work of both Jaffe and Davis, for it frequently protects administrators and their agencies when they wield their discretion most unwisely or even maliciously.

The FTCA can be a powerful tool for controlling agency discretion. As Rosenbloom (2001) notes, it is one of several steps taken by Congress in 1946 to redefine the relationship among Congress, the judiciary, and the bureaucracy in the postwar era. This "legislativecentered" view of public administration acknowledges that administration has legislative functions, that agencies serve as extensions of Congress, that administration should be informed by political authority, and that Congress has oversight and supervisory roles. This view also acknowledges not only that the president and political appointees are charged with day-to-day implementation of statutorily authorized functions, but also that administrators have discretion to formulate action where Congress has not provided explicit direction (Rosenbloom 2001, 776). Significant in Rosenbloom's perspective is that Congress, at a time when it attempted to reclaim control over the bureaucracy, sought to transfer responsibility for determining governmental liability to the judiciary. Rosenbloom (2001, 776), from a largely normative position, argues that it is the primary role of the federal courts to "provide judicial review of agency actions" to prevent the exercise of discretion Congress intended to prohibit. On this view, the FTCA not only transferred determination of federal governmental tort liability to the judiciary, but also sought to make the judiciary partners with Congress in oversight of administrative action.

As discussed more thoroughly below, one of the reasons Congress moved to abandon the private bill system is that it was inefficient. It is generally unwise, though, to rely on federal courts to resolve disputes between citizens and government effectively, and it may not be reasonable in light of weaknesses identified in the judicial branch in areas of policymaking. Effective policymaking requires capacities such as technical expertise and the ability to conduct long-range planning and public policy analysis that facilitate effective implementation, capacities that courts do not possess (Rosenberg 1991, 20). As Rosenberg observes, the efficacy of judicial action is questioned even in areas normally thought to be exemplary instances of the federal courts as effective promoters of social and policy change:

areas such as civil rights, voting rights, and women's rights (20).

Rosenberg's "constrained court" perspective is well supported by evidence and forces a balanced approach to understanding the policymaking role of federal courts vis-à-vis other branches of government. However, in the case of the DFE, the issue is not about whether judges can effect broad social change by taking on roles as policymakers. In cases where the DFE is raised, the courts are playing a role that they are accustomed to and very well equipped to fulfill. The claims are taken to the courts on relatively narrow legal grounds, the decisions rendered by the courts do not require ongoing enforcement and oversight, and such decisions do not directly alter agency policy and practice. And while the speed, efficiency, and narrow focus of court action are ongoing concerns, suits under the FTCA are usually the only remedy available to citizens harmed by the government.

The DFE is at war with justice, and the question is who should be in the fight. Although judicial control of bureaucracy presents many intractable problems and dangers, we believe that the courts should construe the DFE narrowly, far more narrowly than at present, to maximize judicial review of administrative action. We argue this for several reasons. First, the FTCA substantially commits oversight of administrative action for injuries caused to citizens to the judiciary. Second, when the DFE is raised it is often in cases where great harms have been committed and administrators are trying to avoid embarrassment or disclosure of revealing information about policies and procedures. In such cases, oversight cannot be left to the agencies, and it is dubious to depend on congressional intervention. Third, by their very nature, FTCA cases concern injuries inflicted on citizens at the hands of government. Determination of legal liability for tortious conduct is one of the most common and routinized activities in the legal system, and courts are extremely adept at adjudicating such cases. Here the courts are on sure footing compared to that in administrative oversight cases arising under other statutes that entangle the judiciary more deeply in agency action. Fourth, finding liability under the FTCA is not a direct review of agency policy and practice; no court tells an agency to change a policy or procedure or adopt new standards. When the court finds liability, it, at worst, forces the offending agency administrators to make a calculation of whether to maintain the policy or action that caused the injuries or to make changes. This decision is left to the agency and not the court. Finally, we note that FTCA cases are generally "large interest," rather than Davis's "small interest," cases and, therefore, presumably more amenable to legal resolution.

The DFE is an anachronism sandwiched into an ideal. On the one hand, the FTCA represents a landmark in governmental acceptance of responsibility and efforts to reduce injustice. On the other hand, the DFE and other exceptions to liability in the FTCA are vestiges of an age of credulous faith in the expert administrator. Congress passed the FTCA on the cusp between two eras, between the twilight of New Deal faith in the expert agency and the bare beginnings of an era

of profound distrust of administrative discretion; the FTCA reflects both of these eras.

It is also important to know if the DFE is having a substantial effect on our constitutional system and on means of governmental accountability. Although broadened by the FTCA, the exception performs a crucial function in our constitutional system and has long been held by federal courts to be implied in the Constitution. As Justice Marshall observed in *Marbury* v. *Madison* (1803, 170), "The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion."

Where the DFE applies, there is no remedy for governmental abuse, regardless of its seriousness. Indeed, the greater the injury inflicted by the government, the more likely the DFE will be proffered to the courts to immunize agencies, employees, and the United States from liability (Axelrad 2000). To give some idea of the breadth of the DFE, it immunizes the government for the following.

- Allegedly hiding knowledge of a murder by an inmate, securing the inmate's release, and then misleading state law enforcement authorities as he kills five additional people (*Taitt* v. *U.S.* 1983).
- Placing a known embezzler in the Witness Protection Program and allowing him to become CEO of a publicly held company, even though he is currently under investigation for defrauding another publicly held company. He steals \$1.5 million (*Jet Industries*, *Inc.* v. *U.S.* 1984).
- The CIA setting up a dummy investment corporation, placing a known swindler in charge of the organization who then, with government knowledge, bilks private investors out of millions of dollars (*Frigard* v. *U.S.* 1988).
- The exposure of military and civilian personnel to pesticides, botulinum toxin, and unapproved vaccines without their knowledge, causing birth defects in children born to exposed parents (*Minns* v. *U.S.* 1997).
- Knowingly exposing thousands of employees, military personnel, and private citizens to ionizing radiation, failing to inform or warn the victims of their exposure, and using them as "guinea pigs" in long range studies of the effects of radiation exposure (Allen v. U.S. 1987; Consolidated Atmospheric Testing, in re 1987).
- Conducting a simulated biological attack on an unwarned, unsuspecting San Francisco public utilizing bacteria that causes death and injury (*Nevin* v. *U.S.* 1983).
- Cremation and acid reduction of stolen bodies or body parts for radiation assay and study without the permission or knowledge of relatives.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Project Sunshine, initiated at a 1953 Atomic Energy Commission conference (see, e.g., Atomic Energy Commission 1953 and Rand Corporation 1953) and lasting until 1985, took parts from cadavers and whole bodies without the permission of relatives (see the Atomic Energy Commission's [1955, 8] discussion of the importance of "body

The list could go on at quite some length. Despite its consequences, the DFE is unaccountably ignored by political scientists and is mentioned only occasionally, usually in connection with international law and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (Evans 1980, 951; Falk 1965, 778; Leigh 1987, 949; Semmelman 1993, 290–2). This is odd, since many issues central to political science are implicated by the DFE: issues concerning judicial oversight of administrative decisions, separation of powers, governmental accountability, intrusion into the peace and dignity of citizens, and justice. To start out, it will be helpful to sketch a history of sovereign immunity as it relates to our analysis.

# FROM "THE KING CAN DO NO WRONG" TO "THE ADMINISTRATOR CAN DO NO WRONG"

Historically, tyrannies and democracies alike frequently refused to be legally accountable for the wrongs committed by their officials. But governmental immunity from legal action in a democracy, where the people are sovereign, presents special problems. In the United States, efforts to address these problems began in the first Congress. In discussing whether a comptroller of accounts should be empowered to hear and "adjust" claims against the United States, James Madison thought that people turned down by the comptroller should have a "right to petition the Supreme Court for redress, and they should be empowered to do right therein; this will enable [them] to carry [their] claim before an independent tribunal" (Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States, 1, [1965], 612).

Sovereign immunity is one of the few areas of law that remains undisturbed in a slumber of pre-Revolutionary War theory. It is as absolute today in the United States as it was in the England of George III, though the justifications for it have changed. The King and Queen were ultra vires, extrajudicial, and so could not be sued without their consent. Blackstone made this point succinctly in his well-known statement: "[B]esides the attribute of sovereignty the law also ascribes to the king, in his political capacity, absolute perfection. The king can do no wrong" (Ehrlich 1959, 67). And as Pollock and Maitland ([1895] 1968, 516) observe, "If Henry III had been capable of being sued, he would have passed his life as a defendant." Sovereign immunity extended to government officials, and discretionary acts by administrators in conformance with the Crown's desires or policies have always been protected. This extension of immunity to the discretionary functions of administrators acting within the scope and authorization of their duties served several important purposes.

First, it prevented elliptical attacks on the Crown's policies and desires by protecting those charged with

snatching"). Some 15 thousand bodies were mutilated or stolen under this program (*Philadelphia Enquirer* 1995; Welsome 1998, 299–304). Though, amazingly, apparently no suits were filed over Project Sunshine activities, it seems likely that the government would raise the DFE as a defense in such an event.

their execution. A wronged or injured subject might sue the administrator who caused the injury, but courts would suspend judgment unless the King or Queen specifically disclaimed the act of the administrator. If the Crown claimed the act as its own, the administrator was absolutely immune from legal action. By the time of James I, efforts to close off access to legal redress for injured subjects increased. For example, the prefatory statement to a 1609 statute designed to discourage suits against officers begins with the observation that "many causeless and contentious suits... have been and daily are commenced [by] evil-disposed, contentious persons... [and these suits are a] hindrance to efficient administration" (Jaffe 1963, 10).

Second, if administrators, or those being recruited for administrative positions, know that their decisions will not place them at peril in suit, they are more likely to accept government employment and to discharge their duties more effectively. Administrators left unprotected may make decisions based on their own perceived risks, rather than in accord with their defined duties

Finally, the extension of sovereign immunity to the actions of administrators safeguards the public treasury from predation by means of damage awards. As bureaucracy expanded with the reach of the British Empire, so too did the number and severity of injuries caused by governmental policies. Without immunity, government and its administrators would have been subject to enormous damages.

Nevertheless, a number of practices arose that allowed suit both against the King or Queen *eo nomine* and against the Crown's officers. Beginning as early as the reign of Edward I, the Crown made itself amenable to suit in many circumstances (Jaffe 1963, 3). The King and Queen, though, usually retained their immunity from liability for the delicts of their servants, and public administrators were not vicariously liable for the actions of their employees. This doctrine is reaffirmed time and again throughout English history, and a major effort to overthrow it failed in 1865 (*Feather v. Queen*). The effect of these rules was to secure administrators and policies from judicial oversight and intrusion.

This view of sovereignty and the grant of immunity to administrators leaped the Atlantic and set up firmly in U.S. law. In the United States, with the framing of the Constitution an effort ensued to define the U.S. Government clearly as a robust, unitary sovereign. Hamilton, for example, in *Federalist* 81, wrote that "it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent" (Madison, James, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay [1788] 1961, 487). And Chisholm v. Georgia (1793), Cohens v. Virginia (1821), McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), and other cases pressed this issue, with greater or lesser success. As John P. Roche (1961, 801) famously noted, increasing the power of the sovereign was eminently practical under the circumstances of the founding: "In politics there are no immaculate conceptions, and ... our very survival in the Hobbesian jungle of world politics depended upon a reordering and strengthening of our natural sovereignty."

Though present from the Founding, the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly embraced the doctrine of sovereign immunity in 1821, when it noted that "[i]t is an axiom in politics, that a sovereign and independent State is not liable to the suit of any individual" (Cohens v. Virginia 1821). And in 1907, Justice Holmes gave a famous and succinct, if unsatisfactory, logical justification for sovereign immunity: "[O]n...logical and practical ground[s]...there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends" (Kawananakoa v. Polyblank 1907, 353). But from the beginning, the Republic shifted with discomfort over the consequences sovereign immunity and unchecked administrative discretion could bring down on its citizens. In Poindexter v. Greenhow (1885, 291), Justice Matthews, writing for the Court, lamented,

Of what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right for the security of individual liberty have been written, too often, with the blood of martyrs shed upon the battle-field and the scaffold, if their limitations and restraints upon power may be overpassed with impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to guard, defend, and enforce them.... The doctrine is not to be tolerated.

Despite discomfort with the unitary theory of the federal sovereign, the theory survived more or less intact until the later years of the nineteenth century. Increasingly, though, commentators derided the government's refusal to grant legal relief for people it injured. In the latter portion of the nineteenth and beginnings of the twentieth centuries, political scientists and others began to attack the traditional view of sovereignty. In 1893, Ernst Freund subjected the unitary doctrine to withering analysis. Freund (1893, 638) noted that "there are evidently cases where justice demands the adjudication of rights against the state, while the logic of the law apparently forbids it." He thought that this apparent conflict makes sense only if the state is viewed as a unitary sovereign, which he thought to be a dangerously simplistic view: "The state is an exceedingly complex organism, and its functions are widely divergent.... The concentration of these various functions in one power would be impossible without a separation of organs" (638). Freund suggested that the regulative effects of liability would act as a check on governmental activity (647–8). These effects could be especially important in the face of governmental expansion and more attenuated control of administrative departments by the president.

One of the chief rationales for sovereign immunity is found in the sovereign's supervisory responsibilities in protecting the lives and properties of its subjects. The sovereign needs to be free to act in the public good without constant legal harassment that drains public coffers and diverts resources to nonproductive work. Given the multiplicity of activities and the complexity of the federal government's interaction with its citizens and others, it is clear that oversight of activity has been a major challenge to elected officials and presidentially appointed administrators for well over a century (Bibby 1966; Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989; Carpenter 1996). In the face of growing difficul-

ties in maintaining control over bureaucracy, Freund's analysis suggests that citizens could in effect regulate government policy and practice through lawsuits and money damages, discouraging administrators from undertaking misdeeds.

Others were less elegant than Freund-but just as vehement, deriding sovereign immunity as an "antiquated relic" of a "barbarous and monistic rationalism" (Elliott 1925, 476) and stating that "the case against 'the discredited state' is one whose strength cannot and ought not to be underestimated" (491). These sentiments echoed John Dewey, Mary Parker Follett (1919), and other pragmatist thinkers, who saw sovereignty as "a more or less shapeless wish, except as it finds expression in organized institutions" (Dewey 1894, 43). Despite these assaults, at the dawn of the twentieth century the U.S. Government was no more accountable for the wrongful behavior of its administrators who hurt citizens than was the crown of England. In the mounting pressure to rethink sovereign immunity, the federal courts began to look favorably on actions against government officials for equitable relief. Federal officials were in theory subject to equitable action from the beginning of the Republic, but the U.S. Supreme Court extended this relief to allow for federally enforceable injunctive relief against state officials (Young, ex Parte 1908). This leniency toward equitable actions followed the English tradition exemplified in Rookes Case (1599, 210), which held that the use of administrative "discretion is a science...and not to [be used] according to [administrators'] wills and private affections." But the decision in Rookes did not concern money damages, and it is clear that this holding would not apply where the remedy is a judgment against the crown treasury.

One of the chief means, of course, of bringing the U.S. Government to account is through injunctive relief, as in the school desegregation and voting rights cases. But there are important occasions when equitable remedies are useless to secure a person's rights against the federal government. On such occasions money damages from a suit in tort may provide the only means of bringing the government and its administrators to account for their actions. Along with enforcement of criminal laws, the primary legal means for controlling behavior in our society is through the application and threat of application of monetary liability.

Because organizations tend to act in more predictable and rational ways than do people, the threat of tort liability is often an effective deterrent to undesirable behavior (Calabresi 1970; Coase 1960; Landes and Posner 1987). Administrators and officers in organizations and institutions almost universally consider potential liability in tort before undertaking policies, producing products, or engaging in activities. This comprehensive reach of tort liability is comparatively recent and tracks the growth in complexity and size of our market-based economy and the products it produces. But efforts to make the federal government accountable in the form of tort liability have repeatedly stumbled on the arcane but vigorous doctrine of sovereign immunity. Additionally, Congress's consistent unwillingness to visit the issue of federal liability except in

specific, well-publicized cases foiled hopes of diminishing the domestic effects of sovereign immunity.

Mass compensation schemes by Congress are modern remedies, and up until the passage of the FTCA in 1946, the principal method the federal government used to handle liability claims was the "private bill" system. For most of the history of the United States, claims against the states and the federal government were not statutorily authorized but were handled through legislative committees. This process distracted legislators from their duty to work on behalf of all their constituents and often resulted in great injustice or justice delayed for years, or even decades. As one member of Congress noted in 1878, "There are just claims which have been before the Congress for half a century, and been favorably considered in one Congress by one house, and in another Congress by the other without ever having received that concurrent action in any Congress necessary to determine them" (U.S. Congress, House 1878, 2). This system also had the effect of preventing judicial oversight of administrative action that caused injury to citizens. Despite the nuisance and injustice caused by the private bill system, Congress only reluctantly took steps to abandon the institution.

## PRIVATE BILLS AND THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT

The use of private bills to compensate people injured or killed by governmental actions proved to be unwieldy, expensive, and unjust. In the first three U.S. Congresses alone, members introduced 2,317 private bills for relief (U.S. Congress, House 1848, 32). The Twenty-second, Twenty-third, and Twenty-fourth Congresses saw 8,655 private bills, with 603 passing both houses, making for a 7% success rate (32). An 1848 House report on private bills in the previous decade found that 16,573 bills were introduced in the House, 3,436 reported out of committee, with only 910 passing both houses; a 5.5% success rate (4). In the Seventy-sixth and Seventy-seventh Congresses, about four thousand bills were introduced and 908 approved, a success rate of about 23% (U.S. Congress, House 1945, 2).

While Congress was apparently reaching more bills by the time of these later sessions, it did so at great expense in time, money, and justice. Even as early as 1838, a House report complained that "members elected to participate in the examination and discussion of national subjects have devoted their time in the adjustment of private claims" (U.S. Congress, House 1838, 1). Nearly a century later, private bills still cut deeply into legislators' time (U.S. Congress, House 1942, 9–10).

Frequently, the investigative and review committees for private bills were composed of a single member, and disagreements between members of Congress affected the passage of claims for relief. Under the private bill system, justice "awaits upon political considerations or the popularity of a Congressman or the influence of a Senator" (U.S. Congress, House 1942, 51). John Quincy Adams opined, "There ought to be no private business before Congress. [Private bills are] judicial business,

and legislative assemblies ought to have nothing to do with [them]" (quoted in U.S. Congress, House 1942, 49). And a House report in 1878 declared in disgust, "No tribunal can be less fitted to examine and decide upon private claims than the Congress" (U.S. Congress, House 1878, 1).

To alleviate the private bill problem, Congress experimented with the Court of Claims, which it established in 1855 (10 Stat. 612). This court represented a hybrid solution, midway between judicial and legislative determination of compensation for victims. Congress prohibited the Court from making legal determinations about liability, and the Court could only make recommendations to Congress about compensation for victims. This allowed members of Congress to "transfer responsibility [for private bills to the Court of Claims] but still make it possible for beneficial outcomes to be attributed to individual legislators" (Hill and Williams 1993, 1012). Although Congress expanded the Court's power in 1863, the Court was still too limited and weak to alleviate the glut of private bills. Abraham Lincoln (1862) took to berating Congress for the mess it had made in this area, saying, "It is as much the duty of Government to render prompt justice against itself in favor of citizens as it is to administer the same between private individuals." These words were eventually engraved on the Court of Claims building in Washington, D.C.

Nevertheless, the problem continued unabated until 1922, when Congress passed the Small Tort Claims Act. This act authorized the head of every federal department or establishment to "consider, ascertain, adjust and determine any claim" on account of damages to or loss of privately owned property, up to one thousand dollars, caused by the negligence of an officer or employee of the U.S. Government. This statute led to some strange and unjust results. For example, the government could be liable for the cost of a pocket watch crushed by a federal employee but not for the life of the person carrying it who was run down by a mail truck.

The explosion of federal employment during the Depression and World War II put tremendous pressure on Congress to enact an effective piece of legislation that would remove claims for governmental liability to the judiciary. After several stalled attempts in the 1930s and early 1940s, legislators in the Seventy-ninth Congress poised to pass a significant bill waiving sovereign immunity in tort. Then-Attorney General Robert Jackson recommended the FTCA for passage, saying, "The subject of tort claims against the government has long been a troublesome and vexatious matter.... The ... immunity of the Government to suit in . . . torts does not seem to be warranted either as a matter of principle or as a matter of justice" (U.S. Congress, House 1945, 7). It astonishes that in passing this legislation Congress held no hearings, as the bill promised to alter substantially the duties and functioning of members of Congress and affect countless thousands of constituents. It is true that Congress held hearings in 1942 on a similar bill that failed because of preoccupation with the war, but the FTCA represents a significant change in the arrangement of power and duties in the federal government, and it seems odd that it should proceed so quietly.

Originally, the FTCA set out to be a "general waiver" of sovereign immunity circumscribed by various exceptions. And occasionally, courts still refer to it in that way, though, at least when the DFE is implicated, it has long ceased to fulfill that function. The shift from the FTCA's original function as a general waiver of sovereign immunity to one good only in tightly circumscribed instances makes recovery under the FTCA difficult, to say the least.

The main waiver provision of the Act is short and clear: "The United States shall be liable...[for] tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances" (sec. 2674). Section 2680, though, lists 13 exceptions to this waiver of sovereign immunity. Some of the exceptions are quite sweeping, but the tiger of the lot is found in paragraph (a). The Discretionary Function Exception protects the government against claims "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." Though Robert Jackson (1940) later maligns the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the provision in Dalehite, the terms of the DFE are in accord with his own stated New Deal impulse to free the administrator from judicial second-guessing. In the course of the last half-century, the DFE and other exceptions in the FTCA have eclipsed Congress's intention to make the United States broadly liable for negligent or malicious policies and decisions of administrators. The waiver to immunity has become the exception and the exceptions have become the rule; the FTCA has been turned inside out.

# THE BIG BANG: FROM GENESIS TO EVOLUTION

The U.S. Supreme Court has visited the DFE on only four occasions, once in 1952 (*Dalehite*) and three times in the seven years spanning 1984–1991 (*U.S.* v. *Varig Airlines* 1984, *Berkovitz* v. *U.S.* 1988, and *U.S.* v. *Gaubert* 1991).

In *Dalehite*, after the destruction of Texas City, the United States and the thousands of plaintiffs who had filed suit agreed to litigate a "test" case in federal district court. All of the parties agreed to be bound by the results of the case, and the plaintiff won considerable damages at trial. Facing damages that could aggregate to more than \$200 million (conservatively, \$1.4 billion in year 2002 dollars), the stakes on appeal were enormous. In Dalehite it became clear that the FTCA could be much more than the means for compensating victims of governmentally caused injury and death and relieving Congress of the private bills burden; it could effect change in government just as expanded tort liability had changed corporate America. This was the potential result and regulative power for which Freund had hoped. The FTCA threatened to allow rank-and-file citizens to shape the activities and policies of government and to allow greater judicial oversight of the administrative process.

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, hearing the appeal *en banc*, reversed the judgment, holding that the actions of the government in producing and shipping the FGAN were discretionary acts and therefore came under the ambit of the DFE. The court also noted that the DFE clearly indicated Congress's desire that administrators "be free from any unwarranted judicial supervision" (*Texas City Disaster* 1952, 778).

The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case in 1952 and, in a five-to-three decision, affirmed the ruling of the Fifth Circuit. The Court ruled that Congress did not intend to subject the sovereign to liability for "acts of a governmental nature or function" and that uppermost in Congress's waiver of sovereign immunity were "the ordinary common-law torts" (Dalehite, 28). The Court found it "unnecessary to define... where discretion ends," since the DFE "includes determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations" (34).

But Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Black and Frankfurter, filed a scathing dissent. Jackson started by writing that the result of such a sweeping interpretation of the DFE meant that "the Government... can clothe official carelessness with a public interest. Hence, one of the unanticipated consequences of the Tort Claims Act has been to throw the weight of government influence on the side of lax standards of care" (50). And as for the Solicitor General's claim that the government should not be liable because it tried to emulate standard industry practice in shipping the FGAN, Jackson likened the argument to a request for "one free disaster" for each new policy (56).

Dalehite yields the paradoxical result that the greater the harm inflicted by administrators and their policies, the more remote the chance that they will be held accountable for their wrongdoing. As Jackson complained, the maxim that "The King can do no wrong" has "merely been amended to read, 'The King can do only little wrongs" (60). Lower courts interpreted Dalehite to set up a planning-operational test for application of the DFE. Planning activities were protected, while mere operational activities, those activities carrying out the details of policies and not invested with policy discretion, were not protected. For the next 30 years, the Court let its Dalehite ruling stand undisturbed, until it perceived that lower courts were taking liberties with the decision and using the planning-operational test to expand judicial oversight of administrative actions.

By the 1980s, the Court moved to quell the view that the interpretation of the DFE "expressed in *Dalehite* ha[d] been eroded, if not overruled" (*U.S.* v. *Varig Airlines* 1984 [hereafter *Varig*], 811). In *Varig*, relatives of passengers who died of smoke and toxic gas inhalation aboard a Boeing 707 sued the federal government for negligent inspection and certification of the aircraft. The district court found for the plaintiffs, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court provided even broader governmental protection than that embraced by *Dalehite*.

The Court, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Chief Justice Burger, explained that application of the DFE depended upon two considerations: "First, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function exception applies in a given case"; "Second, [the DFE] plainly was intended to encompass the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its role as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals" (813). The exception is meant to prevent "judicial 'second guessing'" of policy decisions, but only those decisions "grounded in social, economic, and political policy" (814).

Four years later, another unanimous Court read the DFE to admit liability for administrators' negligent licensing and release of a lot of live polio vaccine. In Berkovitz v. U.S. (1988 [hereafter Berkovitz]), the plaintiff took live polio vaccine manufactured as Orimune and contracted polio. The disease permanently paralyzed Berkovitz, and he pressed two claims. First, he asserted that administrators negligently licensed the vaccine without first receiving testing information as required by law. Second, he claimed that they released a noncomplying lot of vaccine against their own regulations and practices. In defense, attorneys for the United States asserted that all regulatory actions are shielded from liability by the DFE. If the Court had accepted this argument, the consequences would have been enormous, since large expanses of governmental activity would have become immune to suit and judicial review. But the Court rejected this contention, holding that the DFE "will not apply when a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow" (536). Where there is no discretion there is no immunity. After Berkovitz, lower courts began to reinstitute the planning-operational distinction they had used up to the Varig decision, but the apparent loosening of judicial construction by the U.S. Supreme Court proved to be illusory.

In U.S. v. Gaubert (1991 [hereafter Gaubert]), a federal court of appeals applied a modified planningoperational distinction and found against the government. Administrators of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) exerted heavy control over a bank, pressuring majority stockholder Thomas Gaubert to remove himself from management of the bank and to post a \$25 million security interest guaranteeing the bank's solvency. The goal of the FHLBB was to force Gaubert's bank to merge with a weaker bank (Gaubert, 319). While Gaubert ran the bank, it was financially solvent, but after he stepped down, through a series of perplexing blunders, the FHLBB caused Gaubert's bank to fail (320). Gaubert lost his \$25 million security and the value of the shares he held in the bank. The district court dismissed the case under the DFE, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed most of the lower court ruling. But the Court of Appeals also held that the DFE did not immunize the government for administrative actions made after assuming control of the day-to-day operational activities of the bank. The Supreme Court reversed, stating, "It is clear that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the exception does not reach decisions made at the operational or

management level of the bank involved in this case" (325). And in reclaiming territory for the government that it presumably lost in *Berkovitz*, the Court noted, "A discretionary act is one that involves choice or judgment; there is nothing in that description that refers exclusively to policymaking or planning functions.... Discretionary conduct is not confined to the policy or planning level" (325).

The Court reaffirmed the *Varig* analysis, holding that judges must determine the following: (1) Did the complained of action or inaction admit of discretion? and (2) If it did admit of discretion, was it the kind of discretion that Congress sought to immunize from liability? But the Court also added a requirement that creates a nearly insurmountable hurdle for plaintiffs: "For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it must allege facts which would support a finding that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime" (324–5).

This meant that henceforth the burden would be on the plaintiff to show that the decision is one not "susceptible to policy analysis" (325). In explaining what "susceptible to policy analysis" meant, the Court reiterated its phrase from Varig. Decisions are protected if they implicate "social, economic, and political" policy (Gaubert, 323; Varig, 814). Very few decisions by bureaucrats cannot be squeezed into the frame of this ruling. Gaubert appears to be part of the Court's newfound respect for sovereign immunity in general and state sovereign immunity in particular. And Gaubert, along with cases such as Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996) and Alden v. Maine (1999), signals that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is as vigorous today as it was at the beginning of the Republic. In Gaubert, again, there were no dissents, with only Justice Scalia filing a concurring opinion.

Gaubert reemphasized the formidable nature of the DFE and gave it a scope and strength beyond what it had in the past. And the Department of Justice wishes to husband this strength; using it only where the stakes are high so that it is not overused and therefore loses potency. For example, U.S. Attorneys are required to 'obtain approval from the appropriate Torts Branch Staff prior to raising the 'discretionary function exception' defense..." (Deptartment of Justice 2001, sec. 4-5.220). This is the only exception to the FTCA that requires prior approval before being used and, apparently, the only defense in any circumstances that must be cleared by the Department of Justice. It is clear that the DFE is the brightest flower in the "garland of prerogatives" that surrounds the sovereign in civil matters (Francis Bacon, quoted in Pollock and Maitland [1895] 1968, 517). But our citizens pay a steep price for the maintenance of this broad protection for governmental action.

### **QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF DFE CASES**

To understand the DFE better, this section examines 377 federal circuit courts of appeals cases where the

DFE is invoked. These cases span the time period between the first appellate decision on the DFE, May 4, 1950, and March 7, 2001, and include all reported cases where courts ruled on assertion of the DFE or indicated in dicta how they would have ruled if they had reached that issue. Cases were selected using key word searches and other means on Lexis/Nexis and Westlaw and coded by the authors based on the nature of the issue, potential impacts, the characteristics of the plaintiff, and the successful use of the DFE. Based on these codes, assertion of the DFE succeeded 72% of the time with federal courts of appeals. Seventy-two percent of the appellate court decisions affirmed lower court rulings.

This descriptive overview of cases related to the DFE at the federal appeals courts level indicates considerable consistency. In other words, most cases are related to similar causes, the defense is successful most of the time, and lower court decisions are usually affirmed. However, this consistency reflects appeals decisions over 50 years and obscures patterns and variation over time.

### Growth of the Use of the DFE

Since *Dalehite*, the numbers of cases brought to the federal courts of appeals have fluctuated. For the first 30 years, from 1950 to 1980, the average number of DFE cases is only two per year. The average during the period from 1980 to 2000 is 15 cases. Further, as indicated in Figure 1, there has been exponential growth in the number of cases heard, reaching a high of 27 cases in 1997. This growth tracks the increasing number of cases handled by the federal court system over the last 40 years. Civil appeals in federal appellate courts increased 10-fold between 1960 and 2000 and continue to grow (Federal Court Management Statistics 2000 Krafka, Cecil, and Lombard 1995, 3).

#### Success of the DFE Defense


It is logical to theorize that as the DFE's use grows, its efficacy should also increase. In addition, as discussed above, several landmark cases strengthened the DFE. For most of the period from 1950 through 1985, there are too few cases reported by the federal appeals courts to draw strong inferences. As a result, success rates range from 100 to 0%, and for several years in the 1970s, the success rate oscillates between 100 and about 50% (Figure 2). During the period from 1980 to 2000, the number of cases grows and a more accurate pattern emerges. From 1980 to 1990, the percentage successful invocations of the DFE ranges from 40% in 1982 to nearly 90% in 1985 and then decreases to 50% in 1989. After 1990, the percentage of successful use of the DFE grows rapidly, to nearly 90% in 1992, the year after Gaubert, and then consistently remains over 70%. The average success rate of the DFE is 85% from 1991 to 2000.


We examined three specific dimensions, based on a reading and coding of each of the 377 cases, to shed ad-

ditional light on the DFE. Based on the coding protocol outlined below, we found that the intercoder reliability of these dimensions conducted by the authors was 100%. Issues that might have an impact on the likely successful use of the DFE include the following:

- (1) The number of actual and potential plaintiffs; a measure of the potential financial liability of the federal government. Determining the number of potential plaintiffs is straightforward in the large majority of cases: (a) We add up the number of named plaintiffs in a case; and (b) we determine the number of unnamed potential plaintiffs who could sue the government for the same underlying event giving rise to the case in question. In no instance did we encounter the problem of multiple cases arising from the same event, since federal civil and appellate procedure almost always requires such cases to be merged into a single action.
- (2) Whether a bureaucratic decision involving administrative discretion was minimal or substantial. This information came from the facts of the case and descriptions of the actions of government employees, and we asked (a) Did a federal employee directly participate in or undertake the actions that caused the injury? and (b) If not, was the injury so closely connected to substantial governmental regulation over the subject matter that it met the functional equivalent of direct participation?
- (3) Whether the broader policy implications are minimal, moderate, or substantial. First, we asked if, in the event of a finding of liability, a supervising administrator with control over the environment in question could reasonably make changes in policy to increase safety. This is a threshold question in that if the answer is "no," then ipso facto the effects on policy of a government loss are minimal. If the threshold is met, then we asked if the policy changes would be local, regional, or national in scope. In some cases policy changes would be confined to a particular locale and so would not have moderate or substantial affect on federal governmental policy. If policy changes would be national in scope, the case gained at least a "moderate" classification. If a loss in a case would cause the government to adopt new policies at the national level and would cause major expense or substantially redefine the duties of employees, we classified the case in the "substantial" category.

Number of Actual Potential Plaintiffs. The issue of the number of actual and potential plaintiffs examines whether the federal appeals courts are making considerations of the applicability of the DFE based on the potential scope of the financial impact of liability, rather than strictly on the merits of the case. In cases where the number of people affected is very large, then the successful use of the DFE should increase. When cases are coded based on the number of people affected, in 73% of the cases between one and 10 people are affected, in 8% of the cases between 11 and 100 people are affected, and in 17% of the cases over 100 people





are affected. While these cutoffs are somewhat arbitrary, they suggest a low, middle, and substantial scope of impact.

There is no association between the number of people affected and the successful use of the DFE ( $\chi^2 = 1.02$ , p = 0.602). Overall, the DFE is used successfully 72% of the time. When fewer people are affected, the success rate is slightly lower than average (70% for the low and 72% for the middle categories). When the number of people affected is substantial (over 100) the DFE is successful 77% of the time, but again, this difference is not large enough to reach statistical significance. We note, though, that in class action suits against the U.S. Government under the FTCA, the DFE, when raised, is successful 100% of the time.

Involvement of the Bureaucracy. Because protection of the exercise of administrative discretion is the key principle of the DFE, when there is substantial bureaucratic involvement the DFE should be more likely to succeed. Conversely, when the role of the bureaucracy is minimal, the DFE should be less likely to succeed. In 54% of the cases the level of bureaucratic involvement is minimal, and 46% of the time the level of bureaucratic involvement is substantial. There is no statistical association between the level of bureaucratic involvement and the successful use of the DFE ( $\chi^2 = 0.293$ , p = 0.588). The DFE is successful in 73% of the cases where bureaucratic involvement is minimal and 70% of the cases where bureaucratic involvement is more substantial.

**Policy Implications.** When the policy implications of the case are substantial, the DFE should be more likely to succeed. In 36% of the cases, the policy implications are minimal, in 31% of the cases the policy implications are moderate, and in 33% of the cases the policy implications are substantial. There is a statistically significant association between policy implications and the successful use of the DFE ( $\chi^2 = 16.86$ , p = 0.000). In 65% of cases with minimal policy implications and 64% of cases with moderate policy implications the DFE is successful, compared to 85% of cases with substantial policy impact. This finding indicates that where a governmental loss in a case will work substantial changes on federal policy, the courts are substantially more likely to sustain the government's assertion of the DFE. This result stands in line with traditional New Deal principles of judicial deference to agency action. Where liability threatens "judicial sabotage" of agency independence, the judiciary is more likely to accept assertion of the DFE.

**Predicting DFE Success.** Logistic regression analysis is used to understand better the circumstances in which the DFE is mostly likely to be successful. The likelihood of success is examined as a function of the number of people potentially affected, the extent of involvement of the bureaucracy, and the policy consequences of the case.

When these three variables are included for all 377 cases, the model is statistically significant (model  $\chi^2 = 13.55$ ). As suggested by the bivariate analysis pre-

sented above, only the policy implications of the case are a statistically significant predictor of the likelihood that the DFE will be successful. The coefficient is for the number of people affected and is not in the expected direction. As the number of people affected increases. the likelihood that the government will allow itself to be sued increases (DFE not successful), however, this variable is not statistically significant. Bureaucratic involvement is in the expected direction but also is not statistically significant. Using the logistic regression to predict a "best case" for success, we find that for a case that involves many people and has substantial bureaucratic involvement and policy implications, the likelihood is that the DFE will be successful 80% of the time. The likelihood of success for the least favorable case, where many people are involved, there is little bureaucratic involvement, and there are no policy implications, is 60%.

As noted above, there is a clear difference during the pre- and the post-1980 periods in terms of the number of cases per year and the likelihood of success. Using the same model to examine cases since 1980, we find that the best-case scenario for DFE success is 79%, and in the worst case scenario the probability is 65%. These changes in the findings indicate that the application of the DFE is basically the same for the periods before and after the growth of the DFE began in 1980 (joint log likelihood test;  $\chi^2 = 6.71$ , not statistically significant). The DFE is slightly more successful under the worst-case scenario (from 0.60 to 0.65), which shows that the federal appeals courts have broadened the scope of the DFE to cases that affect fewer people and have low policy significance and bureaucratic involvement.

The same model was also run for the cases between 1990 and 2000. This period represents relative stability in the number of cases decided each year and increasingly consistent and high support of the DFE by federal appeals courts. The period from 1990 to 2000 is statistically different from the years prior to 1990 (joint log likelihood test;  $\chi^2 = 13.93$ , p < 0.05). This logistic regression is not statistically significant ( $\chi^2 = 2.23$ , p = 0.526) and none of the case characteristics are statistically significant predictors of the outcome of the case.

#### CONSEQUENCES OF THE DFE

There are three types of suspect consequences created by the DFE with which we are concerned: constitutional, informational, and policy consequences. Issues of accountability are distributed among these areas in the discussion below.

#### **Constitutional Consequences**

The statutory nature of the FTCA does not mean that it does not fulfill important functions in our constitutional framework. It has, after all, largely taken over the private bill function from Congress. Even before the statutory exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity found in the DFE, the courts had provided for

something similar through the common law and construction of constitutional principles. Indeed, statutes exposing the government to liability that do not specifically contain a discretionary function exemption have been read to contain the provision implicitly. The DFE contained in the FTCA, as it has been fleshed out by the courts, is frequently imported into cases involving the Suits in Admiralty Act (1920), the Public Vessels Act (1925), and other statutes, even though those statutes do not contain a DFE clause. The DFE is not only an exception to a waiver of sovereign immunity, but also a firewall to preserve the doctrine of separation of powers in private actions against the government. The Supreme Court reaffirms time and again that the separation of powers is a "vital check against tyranny" and a "fundamental principle] of the Government established by the Framers of the Constitution" (Buckley v. Valeo 1976, 120-1). In the scales balanced by the Court, it is not just the arcane ancient doctrine of sovereign immunity on one side and injustice on the other. Added to the doctrine of sovereign immunity is concern for the functional integrity of our constitutional structure, and these two together, in the Court's eyes, generally outweigh the admitted injustice caused by the DFE.

But we think that the Court cuts a berth too wide of Congress and the President and ignores that the fundamental motivation behind the FTCA was to shift the burden for determining governmental liability from Congress to the judiciary. As discussed above, the main reason for this shift was to relieve Congress of the annoying and debilitating burden of private bills. But another, barely less substantial, motivation was to see that justice is done for those injured and killed by administrative negligence or malevolence. Congress itself reported that "the United States courts are well able and equipped to hear these claims and to decide them with justice" (U.S. Congress, Senate 1946, 25). Judicial deference in many DFE cases amounts, we think, to abdication by the courts of their constitutional responsibilities for oversight of Congress and the Executive and causes both unnecessary injustice and an unwise enlargement of Executive power.

# **Depriving the Public of Information**

The DFE is a jurisdictional bar; when it operates, federal courts are without power to hear the case. So where the DFE is successful, it prevents not only trial but, much of the time, discovery. This means that there is no opportunity for the plaintiff to force production of evidence from the government. This makes the DFE a useful device to prevent the disclosure of embarrassing or politically explosive information. For example, in Consolidated Atmospheric Testing, in re (1987 [hereafter Consolidated]), the district court dismissed the case under the DFE before any discovery of government documents and witnesses could be accomplished. In this case, a large number of plaintiffs sued government contractors for illness and death due to their exposure to radiation through nuclear weapons man-

ufacture and fallout from aboveground weapons tests. The fallout victims, "downwinders," as Howard Ball (1986, 197) concludes in an exhaustive study of the subject, were "misinformed about their safety, they were trapped in a bureaucratic operation that prevented the truth from emerging about the actual levels of radiation exposure." Congress, in what came to be known as the Warner Amendment, acted to cut off money damages remedies for these victims by making suit against the government under the FTCA the only available legal action for radiation exposure. This meant either that suits against contractors and other nongovernmental businesses and personnel were dismissed or that the government was substituted as the defendant.

Of course, Congress could not but anticipate that the government would prevail in these suits based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the DFE. In Consolidated, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's dismissal of the suit under the DFE, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari (see, sub nomine, Konizeski v. Livermore Labs 1988). Congress's actions funneled victims into a headlong collision with the DFE, which offered little chance for recovery or even the opportunity to find the truth concerning the actions of administrators and contractors. It played out as expected, and when the Supreme Court denied certiorari it cut off legal recovery for over half a million victims and their families.<sup>3</sup>

But not only did the victims lose, but also the rest of the public. In some circumstances, discovery and trial are the most efficient means to unearth information about government practices. In this way, suit against the government complements regulatory goals of the First Amendment by providing important material showing what sorts of things the government is doing or has done in the past. Counsel who authored the unsuccessful Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court in *Consolidated*, later commented,

Had Congress permitted the suits to proceed, the plaintiffs would have been able through civil discovery to compel the production of a great deal of information about the manner in which the government and the contractors carried

<sup>3</sup> This estimate includes 220 thousand military personnel, 150 thousand civilian contract workers, and 170 thousand "downwinders" of test blasts (*Congressional Record* 1990, S12119). The government purposely did not warn these victims in order to facilitate long-term studies of the effects of radiation fallout (see, e.g., Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 1984 and U.S. Deptartment of

Energy 1995, 24-30).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Congress adopted section 1631 of the Department of Energy National Security and Military Applications of Nuclear Energy Authorization Act of 1985, codified at 42 U.S.C. section 2212. This provision holds that an action against the United States under the FTCA shall be the exclusive remedy for injuries "due to exposure to radiation based on acts or omissions by a contractor in carrying out an atomic weapons testing program under a contract with the United States" [sec. 2212(a)(1)]. The Act applied "without regard to when the act or omission occurred" [sec. 2212(a)(2)] and to existing cases that had not culminated in a final, unreviewable judgment (see *Hammond v. U.S.* 1986). A serious threat to eliminate this provision came in the summer of 1990 in debate and amendment on the National Defense Authorization Act. More than 40 senators cosponsored legislation to repeal the Warner Amendment, including Senator Warner. The legislation failed.

<sup>3</sup> This setimate includes 220 the care the Warner Legislation failed.

out the atomic tests, about the numbers and identities of exposed veterans, [and] about what the contractors and the government knew of the hazards of radiation at the time of the tests.... (Fletcher 1990, 308–9)

Although many in Congress were ambivalent about the disclosure of atomic testing information, a few members were decidedly against any disclosure. Senator Pete Domenici, for example, in arguing against a popular, though ultimately unsuccessful, effort to repeal the Warner Amendment, said that "lawyers... are kind of itching, just salivating [about suing the U.S. Government in radiation exposure cases]" and are acting not out of interest for their clients or even for money, "but to get their hands on the documents that are in the national laboratories so they can expose the American people what [sic] went on the past 50 years" (Congressional Record 1990, S12119).

It is difficult to see what damage disclosure of documents in this area would have had except for embarrassment. Most of these documents have now been released, and many thousands are available on the Web through government servers. These disclosures. though controversial, had salutary effects on our society and government. Senator Domenici and those who worked to defeat the repeal of the Warner Amendment were nearsighted. Embarrassment at disclosure is also a means of accountability, a way of controlling administrative behavior, and courts flatly reject potential embarrassment as a basis for prior restraint or criminal prosecution in the disclosure of government documents. As Justice Douglas noted, "The dominant purpose of the First Amendment was to prohibit the widespread practice of governmental suppression of embarrassing information" (New York Times Co. v. U.S. 1971, 723-4).

Unless an injured party, especially after *Gaubert*, already has facts in hand to show that a policy violation occurred or that the decision was not discretionary, he or she will frequently not have the opportunity to force government production of evidence pertinent to the case.

#### Policy and Directive Formulation

Government attorneys and policymakers know that liability will arise when an agent of the government violates a specific and clear directive. As discussed in Berkovitz, the government's negligent release of a vaccine lot that failed to conform to specified standards drew liability. This standard for recovery in some circumstances gives no incentive for administrators and policymakers to develop policies and directives aimed at protecting the public. Administrators can simply opt to write no standards or specific directives in those situations where that is possible. As a circuit court of appeals in a recent case found, "The random and uncodified practices of a local supervisor cannot create the kind of specific obligation that gives rise to liability" (Irving v. U.S. 1998, 168). This finding, and others like it, encourages administrators to adopt vague policies.

The public policy goals of tort law are predicated on a number of effects that liability has on actors. Among these is the aim of increased safety by visiting liability on people best positioned to cause changes in policy and practice. But the DFE preempts these effects, and poor policies, or policies that cause avoidable dangers, go unexposed and unchanged; "[a] predicament...at odds with the FTCA's promise to treat the government like a 'private person' for purposes of tort liability" (Levine 2000, 1542). We do not rule out the possibility that agencies will change their behavior because of attempted yet unsuccessful litigation. But the high success rate of the DFE and the extremely small chance that any suit will be successful provide little impetus for administrators to revisit policies after unsuccessful suits.

Additionally, administrators engage in two practices that further immunize agencies and personnel from accountability. The first of these is founded upon statutes that allow for the United States to substitute itself for named defendants in certain circumstances. The Westfall Act (1988, sec. 2679(d)(1)) allows the government to substitute itself as defendant for a federal worker when the Attorney General certifies that the worker was acting within the scope of his or her employment when the injury occurred. Once the government is substituted as defendant, the problem is shifted from the employee and agency in question to the Department of Justice. The offending employee and his or her agency are not made to internalize the costs of their actions.

The second practice that insulates administrators from accountability is found in the way the United States pays out judgments when it does lose to a plaintiff. Even if a plaintiff is successful in suit against the government or negotiates a settlement, judgments larger than specified dollar amounts for each agency are paid out of a judgment fund maintained by the Department of the Treasury's Financial Management Service (FMS) (1998, 1999). For example, judgments in excess of \$25 thousand against the FBI are referred to the FMS for payment. Further, any judgments paid from the fund do not come out of the offending agency's budget. Thus there is no incentive for administrators to reevaluate policies and procedures in the wake of liability, since they do not have to provide the legal resources to defend their agencies or pay judgments. Former Attorney General Reno (1997) remarked, "I came to Washington to discover that a client agency oftentimes has a judgment paid out of a judgment fund rather than its regular appropriation. It doesn't hurt. So there's not that much of an incentive. Let the Justice Department worry about it."

The Department of Justice Torts Division has become adept at handling problems not its own, injuries it did not inflict. It draws accountability away from offending agencies and flawed or even malicious policies, thus alleviating the need to evaluate those policies in light of the injuries they cause to citizens. Increased success of the DFE, coupled with the Westfall Act and the operation of the judgment fund, leads to precisely the sort of unchecked discretion that thinkers reacting to New Deal administrative theory feared most.

### CONCLUSION

There are often good reasons and uses for the retention of sovereign immunity, even when administrators act negligently or intentionally in harming citizens. But this retention of immunity should be carefully circumscribed so that the beneficial functions of making the government vulnerable to suit are not undermined. Administrators, though, most vigorously assert immunity where the damage imposed on society is greatest. This means that often neither the oversight function of administrative action transferred by Congress to the judiciary in the FTCA nor the ameliorative effects of liability will reach government administrators. By admission of the Chief of the Torts Branch, Department of Justice (Axelrad 2001), when government caused injuries are far reaching, as in the class action suits of Consolidated Atmospheric Testing, in re (1987) and Agent Orange, in re (1987), the DFE is the primary means for preventing liability or discovery. Indeed, the United States won in all eight reported federal courts of appeals cases in which it raised the DFE to protect itself against class actions.

With such a successful tool available, the temptation to use it is understandably strong, and this substantially affects our constitutional system and governmental accountability. In giving too much deference to the separation of powers and the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the federal judiciary created an environment that sometimes does not encourage administrators to use care or to abandon unnecessarily injurious policies. The DFE is an anachronism, a living remnant of New Deal faith in the expert agency that must be free of judicial sabotage. Although the effectiveness and advisability of comprehensive judicial oversight of administrative agencies are a contentious issue, in the case of the FTCA and the DFE many of the standard reasons for deferring to administrative discretion are less convincing than in other circumstances. In the context of the DFE, judges do not order agencies to forgo or modify policies, nor do they substitute their judgment for that of the administrator. Considering the operation of the judgment fund, one cannot even say that imposition of liability is the functional equivalent of replacement of agency expertise by judge-made predilection. No doubt liability does prompt policy changes, but it is unpersuasive to claim that administrators who do not feel the sting of monetary damages under the FTCA are nevertheless under judicial coercion to change or modify policies causing injury.

Reinterpreting the DFE narrowly and expanding judicial power to influence agency policies and practices could expose agencies to greater public scrutiny. Information made public through legal action may also provide impetus and guidance for congressional efforts at agency oversight. As Raoul Berger testified, Congress cannot perform its duty to investigate agencies "from hell to breakfast" (U.S. Congress, House 1972, 3132) without information "as to what is going on in the subterranean depths of the executive branch" (3116). Sometimes one of the best ways of plumbing those "subterranean depths" is by means of a suit in tort.

Above all, we cannot forget the interests of the deserving plaintiffs who nonetheless are cut off from justice by operation of the DFE. Lawrence Friedman (1985, 43), in his book *Total Justice*, claims that "general expectations" of recompense and justice have become "superprinciples" in our society. It would be difficult, though, to find a more severe violation of "total justice" than the DFE, and it thwarts Friedman's "superprinciples" with astonishing frequency.

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# Bringing the State Back In to Civic Engagement: Policy Feedback Effects of the G.I. Bill for World War II Veterans

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merican civic engagement soared in the mid-twentieth century, succeeding an era in which national government had become more involved in citizens' lives than ever before. I examine the effects of the G.I. Bill's educational provisions for veterans' subsequent memberships in civic organizations and political activity. I consider theoretical arguments about how public social programs might affect civic involvement and advance a policy feedback approach that assesses both resource and interpretive effects of policy design. Newly collected survey and interview data permit the examination of several hypotheses. The analysis reveals that the G.I. Bill produced increased levels of participation—by more fully incorporating citizens, especially those from less privileged backgrounds, through enhancement of their civic capacity and predisposition for involvement. The theoretical framework offered here can be used to evaluate how other public programs affect citizens' participation in public life.

merican civic engagement peaked in the midtwentieth century, as memberships in civic organizations soared and political participation reached record levels (Putnam 2000, chap. 1). This "golden age" succeeded a period in which national government had become more involved than ever before in providing rights of economic security and wellbeing to American citizens. Was the sequencing of government-sponsored social opportunity and heightened levels of civic activity merely a coincidence? If not, how did government programs encourage beneficiaries to become more active citizens? Current research cannot tell us, because analysts of civic and political participation focus primarily on individual demographic factors or social conditions. When government programs are discussed, the focus is generally on means-tested welfare programs, which are associated with lower levels of participation among recipients (Mead 1986; Piven and Cloward 1971). We know little about how major social programs that reach broad sectors of the population have shaped civic participation.

This article examines the effects of the G.I. Bill of Rights, one of the most generous and inclusive social

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entitlements the federal government has ever funded and administered, on veterans' participation in civic organizations and political activities during the postwar era. Formally known as the "Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944," the program extended numerous social benefits, including higher education and vocational training, to returning veterans of World War II (Olson 1974; Ross 1969). Fifty-one percent of all returning veterans-7.8 million-took advantage of the educational benefits. By 1947, veterans on the G.I. Bill accounted for 49% of students enrolled in American colleges. Within 10 years after World War II, 2,200,000 veterans had attended college and 5,600,000 had participated in vocational training programs or on-the-job training under the G.I. Bill (U.S. Presidents' Commission on Veterans' Pensions 1956a, 287).

Perhaps one of the most important effects of a public program is whether it promotes or discourages citizen involvement in the day-to-day activities of American democracy. Does a vast commitment of public resources yield only social and economic effects, such as increased education, with no effect on democratic governance itself? Alternatively, might program benefits render recipients less inclined to participate in public life, if being treated as rights-bearing citizens makes them lose sight of their civic obligations? Or could program participation have a positive effect, either by endowing beneficiaries with a sense that they owe something back to society or by more fully incorporating them as full members of the democratic community?

Arguably, the policymaking process should be informed by consideration of questions such as these, which address the effects of policy design for civic engagement. Despite contemporary concern over the decline of social capital and participation, we have not developed a systematic way of investigating the role that government plays in shaping citizens' involvement. Such relationships are complex and must be understood in historical context. This article focuses on the effects of one landmark program for civic engagement and offers a theoretical framework though which other public programs might also be evaluated.

# POLICIES AS INSTITUTIONS: POLICY DESIGN AND FEEDBACK

The role of government programs has received relatively little attention from scholars who study determinants of civic and political participation. Most focus primarily on social and demographic characteristics such as age, sex, income, and free time, evaluating their importance as predictors of participation (e.g., Putnam 2000, chaps. 10–13; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chaps. 10–12). To the extent that institutions are studied, the focus is usually on nonpolitical institutions such as churches, civic associations, and the workplace (e.g., Baumgartner and Walker 1988; Peterson 1992).

When the participatory effects of government programs are investigated, scholars suggest that they do matter: Beneficiaries exhibit higher subsequent levels of involvement with regard to related issues. Noting that farmers vote at significantly higher levels than other citizens, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 32) propose that government agricultural programs elevate "their sense of the personal relevance of politics." Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, chaps. 7, 14) find that the magnitude of participatory effects varies by program: Beneficiaries of non-means-tested programs such as Social Security and Medicare are more likely to get involved in related issues than beneficiaries of means-tested programs. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 101-17) reason that participation by program beneficiaries is higher, as in the case of Social Security recipients, because politicians and groups target those individuals for strategic mobilization. These analyses serve as correctives to the society-centric focus of most studies of participation. While their focus is limited to citizens' instrumentalist efforts to influence the issue area that affects them directly, collectively they point to the broader question of how government programs might shape citizens' orientation toward and participation in public life generally.

Among students of public policy, this question was raised long ago, first by E. E. Schattschneider (1935) and later by Theodore Lowi (1964). Both suggested that policies function as institutions, imposing particular norms and rules on recipients, and thus, in turn, reshaping politics itself. Furthering these ideas, scholars have noted that policies convey to citizens their rights and privileges as well as their duties and obligations as members of the community (Landy 1993; Mead 1986, 7). Through features of their design, policies may shape beneficiaries' subjective experience of what it means to be a citizen, giving them a sense of their role, place, and value within the polity; they may affect the formation of political identity among individuals and groups; and they may unify or stratify society and the political community in new and different ways (Schneider and Ingram 1993, 1997, 78–89, 140–45).


Two recent studies begin to test these claims empirically, offering insights into why government programs vary in their effects on political action. Joe Soss (1999) found that program clients perceived the agency with which they interacted as a microcosm of government itself and extrapolated from their experiences

lessons about their own role in the political system. Given distinct rules and procedures marking program administration, social insurance beneficiaries gained a greater sense of external political efficacy, while public assistance recipients took away negative messages. Andrea Campbell (2000) demonstrates that Social Security has especially salutary effects on program-related participation among beneficiaries from low to moderate income backgrounds, as greater dependence on program resources makes them more inclined to be involved.

Continuing this line of inquiry, I propose a theoretical model of the dynamics through which policies affect civic and political participation, highlighting aspects of policy design that might produce such effects. I build on the policy feedback approach, which views public policy as an independent variable with consequences for politics (Pierson 1993; Skocpol 1992, 57-60). Paul Pierson (1993) has noted that policy feedback analysis to date has focused primarily on effects on organized interests or political elites and has called for more attention to effects on "mass publics," meaning citizens generally. He proposed analysis of two dynamics: (1) resource effects—how the resources and incentives that policies provide shape patterns of behavior; and (2) interpretive effects—how policies convey meanings and information to citizens. To make Pierson's approach more applicable to the effects of policy on civic engagement, I draw on Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's (1995, 270–2) Civic Voluntarism Model, with its attention to the impact of resources (free time, money, and civic skills) and psychological predisposition (attributes such as political efficacy, a sense of civic duty, and a group consciousness of having one's fate linked to others'). In addition, attention to the tools and rules of policy design, as highlighted by Schneider and Ingram (1997, 93–9), permits analysis of interpretive effects of public policy.

The resulting theoretical framework, illustrated in Figure 1, extends policy feedback theory to specify how policy affects civic engagement. First, the resources bestowed on citizens through policy, whether in the form of payments, goods, or services, have distinct resource effects on individuals' material well-being and life opportunities and, thus, directly affect their capacity (meaning ability, aptitude, or faculty) for participation. Second, features of policy design, including the administrative rules and procedures highlighted by Soss and the form and scope of eligibility and coverage, have interpretive effects on citizens. Through such features, individual citizens acquire perceptions of their role in the community, their status in relation to other citizens and government, and the extent to which a policy has affected their lives. As a result, policy design shapes citizens' psychological predisposition to participate in public life. In addition, the resources offered through a policy have interpretive effects inasmuch as citizens

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This study uses the term "predisposition" to refer to such traits rather than adopting Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's term, "engagement." This avoids confusion with "civic engagement," which refers to being involved in civic and/or political life.



perceive those aspects of government programs to affect their life circumstances. Finally, resource effects influence civic predisposition: Education, for example, promotes attitudes of civic duty (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 36). This study uses this theoretical framework to examine the effects of one broad-based, universal social program for civic engagement; potentially, a wide range of public policies can be investigated similarly.

# HYPOTHESIZING THE EFFECTS OF THE G.I. BILL ON CIVIC LIFE

Considering how the educational provisions of the G.I. Bill might affect civic and political participation, existing theoretical approaches would lead scholars to make a variety of predictions. The most common of these, based on society-centered and behavioral explanations, assign little causal significance to public programs. The first, the preexisting characteristics variant, would suggest that any differences in the participation levels of program users and nonusers must emanate from endogenous factors, differences in the prior personal attributes and experiences of those from each group. Proponents might point to the veteran status of program users, noting that those in birth cohorts that were of draft age at the time of major wars have higher subsequent participation levels than other citizens (Bennett 1986, 104-5). Others might stress membership in the "civic generation," Americans born between 1910 and 1940, whose engagement may have been prompted by the shared experience of World War II (Putnam 2000, chap. 14). Still others would suggest that veterans who took advantage of the G.I. Bill's educational provisions were likely to have come from more privileged socioeconomic backgrounds than nonusers (Story 1998), already endowed with factors that facilitate subsequent participation. The preexisting characteristics approach implies that as long as the analysis controls for the appropriate variables, the G.I. Bill will be revealed to be insignificant in explaining participation.

A second type of behavioral analysis, the *by-product* explanation, recognizes that the goods or services ex-

tended through public programs have effects on participation but considers policy design to be irrelevant to such outcomes. This explanation is salient in the case of policies that extend resources, such as education, which are considered to be determinants of civic activity. The fact is well established that higher educational levels are positively related to higher participation levels (e.g., Jennings and Niemi 1981, chap. 8; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 17-24). The institutions of formal education are known to produce a more tolerant and informed citizenry (e.g., Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996; PS 2000). Therefore, the by-product approach would predict increased participation inasmuch as the G.I. Bill allowed people to extend their education. The mechanism through which such education was provided, however, would not be considered determinative of the outcomes. The public program would be understood only as an incidental vehicle for the true source of increased participation, education itself.

Other theoretical approaches assume that policies themselves have causal effects on participation. The passivity explanation implies that social programs are responsible for undermining active citizenship. Adherents assert that the expansion of social rights has weakened civil society and fostered dependency among citizens, advancing a rights-claiming orientation that has displaced attention to civic obligations (e.g., Fukuyama 1995, 313-4; Glendon 1991). In fact, these criticisms are generally leveled at means-tested public assistance programs, not universal programs. Yet, because this literature does not specify differential effects of policy design, it is included in this analysis to test its explanatory value more broadly. Applied to the G.I. Bill, the passivity approach implies that beneficiaries would exhibit lower levels of involvement in public life than those who did not rely on government benefits to fund their education.

Despite their differences, these first three explanations share the common trait of downplaying the significance that public programs may have in citizens' lives and overlooking the intricacies of the relationship between program design and civic outcomes. The behavioral approaches perceive public policy to be epiphenomenal, while the passivity approach treats government programs in an overly generalized fashion. A policy feedback approach, in contrast, offers attention to both resource and interpretive effects of policy design and, thus, provides analytical tools for explaining how program features affect participation.

The G.I. Bill was designed as a broad-based, universal program, with generous educational benefits that were widely accessible to returning veterans (Skocpol 1996). To be eligible, veterans needed only to have an honorable discharge and to have served at least 90 days of active duty (Brown 1946, 13). The policy granted one year of education or training to all veterans who had served for 90 days, with an additional month of education for each additional month of service up to a maximum of 48 months. All tuition and fees were covered up to a total of \$500 per year, and veterans received monthly subsistence payments of \$75 if they were single, \$105 if they had one dependent, and \$120 if they had two or more dependents (U.S. Congress 1973, 20).<sup>2</sup>

Drawing on the policy feedback approach, I propose that these features of policy design had resource and incentive effects that promoted increased participation. Given that G.I. Bill educational benefits were generous, and because education has far-reaching consequences for individuals in terms of occupational status, income, and social networks, the resource effects of the policy were likely to have had a pronounced effect on individuals' capacity to be involved in civic and political life. In addition, to the extent that individuals perceived the G.I. Bill benefits to make a meaningful difference in their well-being and life opportunities, the program may have had interpretive effects that promoted individuals' psychological predisposition for civic participation. These resource and interpretive effects could operate through two dynamics: reciprocity and critical effects.

According to the *reciprocity explanation*, the G.I. Bill's resource effects would have fostered among recipients a sense of obligation, of owing something back to society. In the post-World War II era, the G.I. Bill was not considered a quid pro quo for military service; rather, it was enacted fairly late in the war as a way to convey appreciation to veterans and to prevent massive unemployment by channeling some veterans toward school instead of the workplace (Olson 1974, chap. 1; Ross 1969, chaps. 3, 4). The law's provisions were munificent and broad in scope compared to the meager benefits offered to World War I veterans, which were

geared toward disabled veterans (Kato 1995, 2038–9). Receiving such unexpected and valuable resources may well have promoted a sense of reciprocity among veterans.

The *critical effects explanation* suggests that the G.I. Bill's extension of social rights may have had, through both resource and interpretive effects, a pronounced impact on individuals from less advantaged groups that, in turn, affected their participation dramatically. Scholars have noted that while socioeconomic background plays an important role in influencing the likelihood of political participation, subsequent factors such as participation in religious and social organizations or the workplace may ameliorate such effects and elevate the participation levels of those who began life without generous civic endowments (e.g., Strate et al. 1989; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chap. 13). Comparable results could be expected from the G.I. Bill if the policy incorporated less advantaged citizens more fully into the polity.

How might such dynamics operate? First, the G.I. Bill's resources may have been most consequential for civic capacity among those who could not have afforded advanced education otherwise. This hypothesis draws on the work of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980, 25), which found that while increases in education generally raise the likelihood of voter participation, college education has an especially pronounced effect in promoting participation among those from poorer backgrounds and matters somewhat less for those from higher-income backgrounds. Second, features of program design may have had interpretive effects that enhanced less privileged veterans' predisposition to participate most dramatically. The G.I. Bill functioned as a universal policy, open to any veteran who wished to take advantage of it, regardless of income or class background. The program operated through impersonal, routinized rules and procedures rather than the invasive scrutiny and means testing associated with public assistance programs. Scholars have suggested that such policies may bestow dignity upon individuals, whereas targeted or means-tested policies tend to stigmatize them instead (Skocpol 1991, 414).

#### THE DATA AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Most studies of participation are based on large data sets that include numerous variables regarding demographic characteristics and attitudes but little about government programs. Such data are generally inadequate for examining in depth the kinds of hypotheses discussed above, and they are useless for studying the G.I. Bill's effects because they lack indicators about program participation. Conversely, although a few surveys of veterans conducted shortly after World War II permit analysis of the characteristics of G.I. Bill beneficiaries and the socioeconomic effects of the program, they failed to ask about participation in civic and political life (e.g., Frederiksen and Schrader 1951; U.S. General Accounting Office 1951). Therefore,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Based on the Consumer Price Index, the purchasing power of these amounts, in 2000 compared to 1948, is as follows: \$500 would be worth \$3,573; \$75, worth \$536; \$105, worth \$750; and \$120, worth \$857. These calculations are based on the Consumer Price Index, Urban Consumers, available at the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, web site, http://www.bls.gov/cpihome.htm. It should be noted, however, that tuition and fees at universities and colleges have risen faster than the consumer price index over time. In 1948–49, the average cost of tuition and books and supplies was only \$234 at a four-year public institution and \$418 at a four-year private institution; two-year colleges and vocational programs cost substantially less (U.S. Congress 1973, 29).

to conduct systematic analysis for this study, it was necessary to collect original data.

I used a survey and in-depth, open-ended interviews to collect both quantitative data and qualitative data. A national, random sample of all World War II veterans was not available, so it was necessary to find an alternative means of reaching veterans. Many survivors from World War II military units have formed their own veterans' organizations, groups that typically have mailing lists, generate newsletters, and hold reunions. I contacted several such organizations in an attempt to locate a few that were sufficiently different from each other and large enough to include veterans with a wide range of personal backgrounds, military ranks, and wartime experiences. For the study, I used lists from four military units, two from the U.S. Army (87th Infantry Division, 89th Division) and two from the U.S. Army Air Force (379th Bomb Group; 783rd Bomb Squadron, 465th Bomb Group).<sup>3</sup> These units included only men; also, because the World War II military was still segregated, African Americans served in separate units, none of which were included in this version of the survey.<sup>4</sup>

The quantitative component of the research design consisted of a mail survey of 1,000 veterans. The survey investigated topics such as family background, civic and political activities, military service, education and training, the G.I. Bill, occupational history, and demographics. Most of the questions had been used in prior surveys but never combined in a single survey in a manner that would permit systematic analysis.5 The data permit investigation of the G.I. Bill's consequences for memberships in civic organizations and participation in political activities, while controlling for level of education and various socioeconomic background factors. The survey subjects were randomly selected from 4,000 names on the World War II military unit organizations' lists. In August 1998, each subject received a cover letter, a 12-page survey booklet, and a reply envelope, followed by a reminder postcard one week later. Two subsequent packets were sent to nonrespondents four weeks and eight weeks later, to limit bias from early respondents. The survey yielded 716 completed surveys, a 73.5% response rate.

I considered the possible sources of bias in a sample based on military unit associations. Regional biases were not a concern because World War II units were drawn from the nation as a whole, and veterans who belong to their associations live throughout the nation. Possibly, this research design might target veterans who were predisposed to active participation in civic life if membership in a veterans' organization implied such bias. Interviews revealed, however, that these groups do not demand active participation and

An obstacle to attaining mailing lists is that some veterans' organizations have bylaws that prohibit list circulation; efforts to attain lists from Navy and Marine units were thwarted by such restrictions.
 Among the respondents, 98.5% described themselves as white.

that not all members initiated their own membership status. Rather, the groups have made a great effort to include as many survivors as possible on their lists, while the percentage who actually attend reunions and participate actively is small. Survey questions about participation in each veterans' organization confirmed the wide disparity in degrees of involvement.

The fact that several decades have elapsed since the G.I. Bill was administered necessitated careful attention to constraints upon subjects' memory and recall. Before designing the survey, I conducted several open-ended interviews with veterans. This process, followed by a pretest of the survey instrument and focus group with participants, allowed me to improve question wording and to limit questions to those that veterans typically answer readily and with confidence. Participation in the war and the pursuit of education thereafter constitute landmark events in the autobiographical knowledge of most veterans and, as such, are memorable (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000, 67–83). I used techniques that are known to improve the accuracy of responses: a survey instrument that gave respondents ample time to answer questions and questions organized in a framework that facilitated both forward (chronological) and backward recall (Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000, 94–5, 146). These measures are discussed further in Appendix A.

The timing of the survey made it imperative to pay close attention to the representativeness of the sample. Conceivably, differential death rates among subgroups in the population mean that a sample drawn in 1998 is likely to differ systematically from one drawn in the immediate postwar era. Users and nonusers of G.I. Bill educational benefits provide the primary basis of comparison for this article. Among survey respondents, veterans who used the program constituted 60.8% of the total, 10% higher than among the original population. It is important to note that considerable variation exists among both G.I. Bill users and nonusers in terms of level of education completed prior to military service: Respondents from each of nine educational levels were present in each group. Such variation makes it possible to control for important background variables. Vocational training participants are underrepresented, meaning that it will be necessary to consider the consequences of each type of program usage separately. The representativeness of the sample is considered more thoroughly in Appendix B.

The qualitative component of the research consisted of 28 semistructured, open-ended interviews with veterans in all regions of the United States. Their names were drawn from the same lists as used for the survey. The interviews covered the same basic topics as the survey but offer the opportunity to probe responses in greater depth and to understand their meaning in the context of individual lives (Hochschild 1981). They

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Questions were drawn from the U.S. Census, the World Values Survey, the General Social Survey, the 1990 Citizen Participation Study conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, and various surveys conducted by the U.S. Veterans' Administration.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> To conduct these interviews, I traveled to all regions of the United States. Before each trip. I sent letters, requesting interviews, to about 30 individuals living within a two-hour radius of my base location. Among those who agreed to be interviewed, I selected five to seven individuals who lived in a variety of neighborhoods and areas.

allow exploration of veterans' perceptions regarding the role of military service and education in their lives, civic and political participation in the period 1950–64 as distinguished from the present, why they did or did not use the G.I. Bill, and their attitudes toward the program. Each interview lasted between one and a half and three hours. Analysis of the survey data and interview data is an interactive process: I alternately investigate the survey data regarding questions or patterns suggested by the interviews and return to the interview data for a contextual understanding of how aggregate trends are manifested in the lives of individuals.

The analysis here is limited to the immediate postwar period, 1950–64. This era partially overlapped with and succeeded the time during which veterans had access to the G.I. Bill's educational benefits. Thus, effects of inclusion in the program might be traced most clearly during this period. Also, because the era is considered the high-water mark for organizational memberships in the United States (Putnam 2000, 54), I limit the analysis to assess whether the G.I. Bill contributed to such outcomes.

I have operationalized the dependent variable, civic engagement, in two ways: civic group memberships and political participation. The first of these combines the sum of each individuals' memberships in four types of civic organizations from 1950 to 1964. The rate of memberships in organizations is regarded as a chief indicator of civic engagement (Putnam 2000; Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000). The survey asked respondents to indicate whether they have ever been a member of each of several organizational types and then, if they have, to note the number of such organizations to which they belonged during each of three time periods. The civic memberships variable combines memberships in fraternal groups (e.g., Lions, Elks), neighborhood or homeowners' associations, Parent-Teacher Association (PTA) or school support groups, and a category entitled "any other civic or community organization."

Second, to assess determinants of political participation, I have operationalized the dependent variable as a composite of participation in a range of political activities between 1950 and 1964. One indicator, memberships in political organizations during the period 1950-64, includes the number of memberships in political clubs or political party committees. Five other indicators of participation during the same time period are also included, namely, contacting a political official to communicate concerns about some problem or issue; working on a campaign for a candidate running for national, state, or local office; serving on any official local government board or council that deals with community problems or issues; contributing money to an individual candidate, party, or other organization that supported candidates; and participating in a protest, march, or demonstration. Each of these is coded 1 if the respondent ever participated during 1950–64 and 0 if never.

The analyses include several explanatory variables that are widely considered to be important determinants of participation. Scholars know that individuals' participation in early adulthood is highly influenced by factors such as socioeconomic well-being in childhood, parents' level of participation, and educational level (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chap. 15). As measures, I include level of education (measured on a scale from 1 to 9, from elementary school to advanced graduate work), parents' level of education (coded on a seven-point scale, from no formal schooling to graduate or professional degree),8 standard of living during their childhood in the 1920s (ranked on a scale from 1 to 5), and parents' civic activity and political activity (each ranked from 1 to 5, from not active to very active). Standard of living during the 1960s (ranked from 1 to 5) offers a measure of socioeconomic well-being during the period under investigation. The G.I. Bill variable pertains to nonuse or use of the program's educational benefits (coded 0 or 1, respectively). Because all those in the sample are veterans and members of the same generation, it was unnecessary to control for those variables.

#### **RESULTS**

Did the educational provisions of the G.I. Bill affect participation in public life and, if so, how? To assess this relationship, first I consider a model for predicting the rate at which veterans joined civic organizations in the postwar era. The model contains G.I. Bill use and standard explanatory variables and control variables for participation.

The most striking result of the ordinary least-squares regression (OLS), presented in Table 1, is that use of the G.I. Bill's educational provisions was highly significant in determining the degree to which veterans joined civic organizations in 1950–64. <sup>10</sup> G.I. Bill use had a positive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> From the qualitative data in the survey, I have deduced that this last category included several organizational types: service organizations, health-related organizations, alumni organizations and fraternities, cultural and educational organizations, commercial clubs, and local social, sports, or hobby clubs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> This variable consists of fathers' level of education except in 37 cases in which it was not available and mothers' level of education could be substituted. Given the large number of cases still missing data for this variable, I took the additional step of imputing the unconditional mean (2.83) in such cases. The imputation of the mean increased the number of cases in the civic model by 24%, and that in the political model by 26%. The analyses yield the same results regardless of whether or not data are imputed, though doing so yields lower R<sup>2</sup> figures given that less variance is explained by each model.

<sup>9</sup> Lebes to use the 1020 and the same results regardless of whether or not data are imputed, though doing so yields lower R<sup>2</sup> figures given that less variance is explained by each model.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> I chose to use the 1920s rather than the 1930s because it was a more "normal" time that would indicate more about the persistent socioeconomic status of families than the Depression Era, when so many fell into worse living conditions than they experienced generally.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Because of missing data, the number of cases included in each regression analysis is less than the total number of survey respondents. Respondents were asked to complete a 12-page mail survey that included over 200 individual questions. Although the proportion that answered each question was high, ranging from 558 to 661, enough respondents skipped or provided an unreadable response to an individual question to reduce quite substantially the number of cases that could be included in regression analyses. To assess whether the subsample provides an adequate reflection of the full sample, I compared the bivariate regression relationship between each individual independent variable and the dependent variable within the subsamples with those same relationships in the full sample. I found

TABLE 1. Determinants of Civic Memberships, 1950–64: Results of Ordinary Least-Squares Regression

Least	Least-oquates flegression					
Variable	Э	b	β	Significance		
	f education oleted	0.09	0.13	0.02		
Parents educ	s' level of ation	0.00	0.00	0.97		
Used G educ	i.I. Bill for ation	0.47	0.14	0.01		
Parents activi		0.28	0.21	0.00		
Standa living	rd of , 1920	0.07	0.04	0.45		
Standa living	rd of , 1960	0.23	0.09	0.06		
R <sup>2</sup>		0.14				
	sted <i>R</i> 2 ole size	0.13 393	•			
1	··- ·					

effect: Individuals who benefited from the provisions were members of significantly greater numbers of civic organizations than nonusers. Not surprisingly, given the well-known connection between socialization in child-hood and subsequent participation, veterans whose parents were active in civic activity were significantly more likely to be members of organizations (Jennings and Niemi 1981, chap. 4; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 418–20, 437–8). Level of education and standard of living during the 1960s also proved to be positive determinants of joining organizations, the latter at a lower level of significance. Neither of the two childhood socioeconomic indicators appears to bear a significant relationship to civic organization memberships. 12

While these results verify the importance of the demographic and social factors emphasized by the preexisting characteristics approach, they also reveal that a model that overlooked the role of the G.I. Bill would be deficient in explaining the likelihood of veterans to join civic organizations. Certainly, preexisting characteristics themselves matter. Most notably, veterans raised by parents active in civic activities became socialized to participate at high levels themselves once they reached early adulthood. Similarly, those who enjoyed higher standards of living participated at higher levels, a finding consistent with research that illustrates how the abundant civic resources, skills, and networks

associated with high socioeconomic status lead to greater participation. Yet the most novel finding here is that the G.I. Bill's impact is not reducible to socioeconomic background. Nor can the effect of the G.I. Bill on civic participation be discarded as a proxy for veteran status or belonging to the generation that came of age with World War II. <sup>13</sup> The preexisting characteristics hypothesis, therefore, is incomplete.

The by-product explanation, similarly, proves to be insufficient for explaining veterans' civic participation. Certainly the G.I. Bill facilitated increases in individuals' educational attainment, which is likely to have prompted higher rates of joining organizations. Perhaps the most fascinating finding here, though, is that the G.I. Bill benefits were not merely a conduit for higher levels of education. The policy also had an independent effect on civic membership rates. The form of public provision through which G.I. Bill beneficiaries obtained their education appears to have stimulated civic involvement.

The passivity explanation must be discounted, given that it predicted a negative effect of the G.I. Bill on civic participation. Contrary to expectations, this government program promoted civic involvement. This finding suggests that attention to the features of policy design and the dynamics they engender is necessary for explaining how the G.I. Bill and other government programs might vary in terms of their consequences for participation.

The prediction offered by the policy feedback explanation, that the G.I. Bill would yield significant, positive effects, was the single theoretical argument that proved correct in the case of civic memberships. Next, we examine the effect of the G.I. Bill on memberships in political organizations and activities in the same period, 1950–64. Here the model is similar to the civic version used previously, with the substitution of parents' political activity for parents' civic activity. The OLS regression results are shown in Table 2. Notably, once again, use of the G.I. Bill for education proved to be a significant positive determinant of participation. Parents' political activity had a significant, positive effect on veterans' political activity. 14 The G.I. Bill made a marked difference, even independent of educational level, in promoting participation in a wide range of political organizational memberships and activities during the

the slopes to be sufficiently similar to proceed with the analysis of the subsamples.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Although standard of living in the 1960s, with a 0.06 significance level, fails to meet the conventional test of a 0.05 level of statistical significance, it seems reasonable to regard the coefficient as substantively significant. This distinction is especially important for studies of relatively small samples (Achen 1982, 46–50).

of relatively small samples (Achen 1982, 46–50). 

12 Scholars recognize that the determinants of participation are numerous, and thus it is not surprising to have a relatively low  $R^2$ . It should be noted, however, that the purpose here is not to include all the possible explanatory variables but rather to test those deemed most significant.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Another variant of the preexisting characteristics hypothesis suggests that some behavioral or attitudinal characteristic of G.I. Bill users may have set them apart from non-G.I. Bill users, in turn explaining their different rates of civic memberships. For instance, users may have been more motivated or outgoing than nonusers. Eric Welch and I have utilized a two-stage model to control for such possibilities and found the same results for civic participation, discrediting this hypothesis (Mettler and Welch 2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> I considered including religious denominations as independent variables. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady found that churches play an important mobilizing function in the United States, and they and others have noted variation in the mobilizing effects of different denominations (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chap. 13). None of these variables proved statistically significant, nor did they improve the fit of the model. I dropped them to make the model more parsimonious.

TABLE 2. Determinants of Political Participation, 1950–64: Results of Ordinary Least-Squares Regression

2000: 0400:00 1109:000:011					
Variable	b	β	Significance		
Level of education completed	0.01	0.03	0.67		
Parents' level of education	-0.00	-0.00	0.94		
Used G.I. Bill for education	0.38	0.16	0.01		
Parents' political activity	0.18	0.17	0.00		
Standard of living, 1920	0.11	0.08	0.14		
Standard of living, 1960	0.06	0.03	0.54		
$R^2$	0.08				
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.06				
Sample size	379				

1950s and early 1960s.<sup>15</sup> These findings parallel the results for civic memberships, once again demonstrating the shortcomings of behavioral models that overlook the role of public programs and showing the inadequacy of the passivity explanation.

The fact that the G.I. Bill's educational benefits had an independent effect on subsequent civic memberships and political activity among World War II veterans means that the policy feedback explanation requires more in-depth analysis. The question remains, how might we explain the dynamics through which the G.I. Bill produced such results? Toward that end, I consider the value of the reciprocity thesis and the critical effects thesis.

# POLICY FEEDBACK: THE RECIPROCITY THESIS

The interviews provide an opportunity to explore the reciprocity thesis, the possibility that the G.I. Bill fostered among beneficiaries a sense of obligation that led to higher levels of civic participation. First, I consider whether veterans viewed G.I. Bill benefits as a right or a privilege, a distinction that may have a bearing on their response to the benefits. When asked

about this, nearly all respondents answered unequivocally that they did not regard the provisions to be a right to which they were entitled. The most common sentiments are summed up in the response of Richard Colosimo, <sup>17</sup> for whom the G.I. Bill benefits covered a bachelor's degree at the University of Pittsburgh and part of a master's degree at the University of Southern California:

I considered it a privilege, a sign of gratitude. I thought, they didn't have to do that. They could have just did like they... did in World War I, where they gave them a bonus and that was it. They could have done that. I think this was a really smart idea and I took it with appreciation.... It was an opportunity. I think anybody that didn't take advantage of it missed out on an opportunity because it was rather magnanimous.

Veterans explained that the G.I. Bill could not be considered a right because military service was an obligation of citizenship for which no recompense was owed. As Robert Foster, whose dental school training at the University of California in San Francisco was funded mostly by the G.I. Bill, articulated, "I think it was more of a way of appreciation than a right. We did what we were supposed to do and we really didn't plan on anything special. It was, of course, a very desirable thing when it came along." Veterans often emphasized the significance of the G.I. Bill in their lives as they explained why they viewed it as such a privilege. Stanley Soloman used the G.I. Bill's vocational education provisions to attend the DeVry School in Chicago, where he became a television repairman. Already married when he used the benefits, he answered, "Well, I guess it was a privilege because [sighs] . . . it was great. It paid for my schooling, paid for my upkeep. We had our own little apartment and I was able to keep it up." Another vocational training beneficiary, Sam Marchesi, became a custom builder through four years of on-the-job training and coursework in architectural drawing and estimating at the Alfred Leonard School in New Rochelle, NY. He described the G.I. Bill as an opportunity:

When we were all coming back at that time a lot of boys had to go to school—to college or to finish grade school. I was 17 when I enlisted; you had to be 18. (You had to lie about your age.) When we were discharged we were all in that same kind of boat. It disrupted [our] education to go to war; I think it was a great thing what the government did—to have this opportunity to pick up where we left off. We had to face the world. We had to make a living.

Paul Parisi, who reported that he would never have attended college without the G.I. Bill, sighed and said simply, "It was one hell of a gift, an opportunity... and I've never thought of it in any other way."

The veterans' widely shared attitude that the G.I. Bill was a privilege rather than something owed in exchange for military service was often paired with a belief that, in receiving the benefits, they incurred no further debt to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Eric Welch and I probed the cause for this null finding on educational level. We found that in later time periods-1965-79 and 1980-98—level of education becomes a highly significant positive determinant of veterans' political activity, and G.I. Bill use gradually becomes insignificant. We reason that the interpretive effects of the G.I. Bill were especially strong in 1950-64, immediately following program usage. The program had a democratizing effect on participation, even displacing the traditional role of educational level, in part because vocational training programs did not increase veterans' formal educational level but had salutary civic effects regardless. After more time elapsed, the interpretive effects faded, and the resource effects of the G.I. Bill-increased educational levels-advantaged those who had used it for higher education (Mettler and Welch 2001). <sup>16</sup> I asked them, "How did you consider the educational and training provisions of the G.I. Bill: as a right, a reward for military service, or as a privilege? Tell me why you characterize them as you do."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Actual names are used for those interview subjects who have granted permission; pseudonyms are used for those who have not.

society. When asked, "After receiving the G.I. Bill benefits, did you think you owed anything back to society?" James Murray, who had been a prisoner of war and who later used the G.I. Bill to attend college at a large public land grant university, replied in a manner that captures the responses of many others. He explained, "I have to be honest, I didn't think about it in those terms. I felt more of it as a reward than [as something for which I] owed back. I figured I'd paid for it. Being there, I saw my friends killed."

When veterans did suggest that they felt a sense of owing back, they emphasized that it was not as an explicit quid pro quo. Isaac Gellert, whose G.I. Bill-sponsored higher education enabled him to became a chemist and college professor, responded, "Yes. In the normal sense in which good citizenship demands that you live in the society and make a contribution to it. Make a contribution not only in your community but also in whatever professional life you have. I regard teaching as an important calling." Another veteran, Paul Parisi, wondered aloud during the interview whether his lifetime of extensive voluntary participation in numerous civic organizations might have been his own attempt to give something back to society after receiving the benefits.

The survey data allow us to explore the reciprocity explanation further. G.I. Bill recipients were asked to indicate, on a four-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4), their level of agreement with the statement, "It is fair to say that after benefiting from the G.I. Bill, I felt I owed something back to American society." The mean response was 2.9, very close to the "agree" response, with a standard deviation of 0.87. The question remains whether those who experienced an attitudinal response of owing back afterward actually proceeded to participate at higher levels. To evaluate this, I tested a reciprocity version of both the civic and the political models, replacing G.I. Bill use with the variable measuring attitudes about owing something back. This test must be limited to effects among G.I. Bill users only, given the lack of a comparable measure for non-users.

The results, presented in Tables 3 and 4, suggest that the reciprocity model offers a partial explanation for why G.I. Bill beneficiaries participated in civic organizations but not for political activity. Among G.I. Bill recipients in the civic model, the reciprocity variable was surpassed only by parents' civic activity in explaining civic memberships. In the political model, however, parents' political activity and standard of living in childhood were the only significant variables.

These results suggest that the reciprocity thesis has merit, at least with regard to civic memberships. To the extent that G.I. Bill beneficiaries felt a sense of owing something back to American society in return for program usage, they invested their time and energy in civic organizations, contributing to the blossoming of civic life in the midcentury. Subsequent analysis might explore whether this model is most useful for explaining the behavior of particular groups of recipients, based on the type of educational program from which they benefited or the duration of their benefits.

TABLE 3. Reciprocity Model of Determinants of Civic Memberships, 1950–64, for G.I. Bill Users Only: Results of Ordinary Least-Squares Regression

Ì	Variable	b	β	Significance
	Level of education completed	0.07	0.09	0.17
	Parents' level of education	-0.02	-0.02	0.72
	Vets owed back after G.I. Bill	0.32	0.16	0.01
	Parents' civic activity	0.27	0.20	0.00
	Standard of living, 1920	0.10	0.05	0.41
	Standard of living, 1960	0.25	0.09	0.14
l	$R^2$	0.12		
	Adjusted <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup> Sample size	0.09 258		
ı				

TABLE 4. Reciprocity Model of Determinants of Political Participation, 1950–64, for G.I. Bill Users Only: Results of Ordinary Least-Squares Regression

Variable Significance Level of education 0.05 0.08 0.27 completed Parents' level of -0.01 0.91 -0.06education Vets owed back after -0.02-0.010.87 G.I. Bill Parents' political 0.21 0.17 0.01 activity Standard of 0.20 0.13 0.07 living, 1920 Standard of 0.01 0.93 0.01 living, 1960 0.06 Adjusted R2 0.04 Sample size 246

# POLICY FEEDBACK: THE CRITICAL EFFECTS THESIS

The critical effects hypothesis suggests that the G.I. Bill had a pronounced impact on civic engagement among veterans from less advantaged socioeconomic backgrounds. In the terms suggested by the theory presented earlier, this outcome could be expected if either of two dynamics were operating through the G.I. Bill: (1) targeted resource effects, to the extent that educational benefits were most consequential for those from low to moderate socioeconomic backgrounds; and (2) targeted interpretive effects, if program design, featuring universal eligibility and routinized procedures, may have bestowed dignity on the same group by including all veterans on an equal basis rather than stigmatizing

	of Agreement That Additional Education Would Have Been by Standard of Living during Childhood in 1920s  Standard of living (%)				
Level of agreement with statement	Low	Low-medium	Medium	Medium-high or high	
Agree or strongly agree	76.7	69.5	57.1	43.9	
Strongly disagree or disagree	23.3	30.6	43.0	56.1	
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
N	43	108	156	41	
Note: $\gamma = 0.324$ , $p < 0.001$ .					

less advantaged citizens. Here I consider each of these dynamics in turn, then test the critical effects thesis.

To assess critical resource effects, first I consider whether veterans perceived the benefits to be measures that broadened their access to education. Veterans were asked the extent to which they agreed with the proposition that "If the G.I. Bill or Public Law 16 had not existed, I could not have afforded the education or job training that I acquired after military service." 18 Responses were coded from 1 to 4, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 19 Table 5 presents the cross-tabulation between G.I. Bill users' responses and standard of living in childhood.<sup>20</sup> The table reveals that the lower the veteran's standard of living in the 1920s, the greater the likelihood that he agreed or strongly agreed. From the perspective of majorities of individuals from low to moderate socioeconomic backgrounds, the availability of the G.I. Bill made a marked difference in life opportunities, enabling the pursuit of additional education. Such education is likely to have enlarged beneficiaries' civic capacity appreciably through the skills, income, and networks it fostered subsequently (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 433).

Second, I consider whether the G.I. Bill's policy design had critical interpretive effects among those from low or moderate socioeconomic backgrounds. When I asked interview subjects about program administration, those who used the higher education provisions were unanimous in emphasizing the uncomplicated routines involved in qualifying for benefits. Explained George Josten, a University of Illinois alumnus, "We had to apply,... it was processed through some regional office that we lived near and then we simply got a check. I got a check for \$75.00 and the school was paid (for tuition) directly. It was an extremely convenient arrangement." Said Anthony Miller, who attended Xavier University and Fordham University, "You just enrolled. I didn't have to do anything. I got \$75.00 a month in addition to that. Pretty good!" Several lauded the program as "very well administered." Some who used the vocational training benefits suggested a more cumbersome process. Kermit Pransky, who used the vocational training benefits to learn about motors and subsequently opened his own business in Boston, recalled, "There was a lot of paperwork involved.... It was a lot of red tape, a necessary evil." While the higher education provisions were administered smoothly through the nation's well-established colleges and universities, the vocational provisions necessitated the instantaneous creation of numerous new programs, making implementation more complicated (U.S. Congress 1950, 9, 44–50). Even so, a few mild comments about bureaucratic processes constituted the most negative remarks any veterans made about program administration, and none implied that beneficiaries were stigmatized in any way.

These comments contrasted sharply with veterans' portrayal of social programs targeted for the poor. When asked, "During the Depression, did any New Deal programs affect your family directly?" some who grew up fairly poor stressed how their families attempted to avoid reliance on such programs. Colosimo, who was a first-generation American, commented, "My father did not want to take welfare. He didn't want people to say, 'That foreigner had to come here and take welfare." Richard Werner's father had lost his job in the Depression, causing the family to lose their house on Long Island and forcing them to move to a "coldwater flat" in New York City. He explained, "We were pretty proud. We may have been poor but nobody wanted any of the home relief or any of that." Later, when these same individuals used the G.I. Bill, they experienced a program administered according to standardized, routinized procedures applied uniformly to all veterans regardless of socioeconomic background.<sup>21</sup> The absence of invasive procedures and the universality of coverage elevated the status of less privileged beneficiaries, rather than stigmatizing them in the manner associated with targeted programs for the poor. The highly positive interpretive effects of the G.I. Bill for veterans from less advantaged backgrounds could be expected to have augmented their psychological predisposition most dramatically.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Disabled veterans were covered by Public Law 16, which extended education and training benefits comparable to those in the G.I. Bill.
<sup>19</sup> Respondents could also answer "no opinion," but those 15 veterans who did so were eliminated from this analysis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Here and in subsequent analyses, the medium-high and high standard of living categories are combined, given the small number in each

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> While administration did not discriminate by socioeconomic background, racial discrimination was commonplace. African Americans experienced treatment unequal to that of white veterans, especially in the South, where both institutions of higher education and the new vocational training programs were segregated. See Caudill 1945; Herbold 1994–95; Jenkins 1947; and U.S. Congress 1950, 170–83.

TABLE 6. Critical Effects Model of Determinants of Civic Memberships, 1950–64: Results of Interactive Equation, Ordinary Least-Squares Regression

Variable	b	β	Significance
Level of education completed	0.09	0.13	0.02
Parents' level of education	0.00	0.00	0.95
Low standard of living	0.35	0.05	0.36
1920 * G.I. Bill use <sup>a</sup> Low–medium standard of	0.47	0.11	0.05
living 1920 * G.I. Bill use Medium standard of living	0.47	0.13	0.05
1920 * G.I. Bill use Medium–high or high standard of living	0.71	0.12	0.08
1920 * G.I. Bill use Parents' civic activity Standard of living, 1920 Standard of living, 1960	0.28 0.01 0.24	0.21 0.01 0.10	0.00 0.93 0.06
<i>R</i> ² Adjusted <i>R</i> ² Sample size	0.14 0.12 393		

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>This interactive dummy variable was constructed by multiplying standard of living in the 1920s, where low = 1 and all other values = 0, by G.I. Bill use (coded 1 for use, 0 for nonuse). The three subsequent variables were constructed similarly, in each case with the named standard of living level coded 1 and all others 0. The missing dummy variable features nonuse of the G.I. Bill; this would intersect at the intercept.

Would these resource and interpretive effects of the G.I. Bill boost the civic involvement of those from low to moderate socioeconomic levels? Investigation of this claim, the critical effects hypothesis, requires an interactive version of the civic model. Four dummy variables are included to examine the interaction between each of the separate levels of standard of living in the 1920s, from low to high, and use of the G.I. Bill for education. 22 The results, presented in Table 6, show that the G.I. Bill had an especially significant positive effect on rates of joining civic organizations among veterans whose childhood was spent at a low-medium and a medium standard of living. G.I. Bill users from the mediumhigh and high standard of living backgrounds were also more likely to join, but the relationship registered a lower level of significance. Other results replicated the noninteractive model.

These results suggest that the G.I. Bill had its greatest impact on participation levels among veterans from low to moderate socioeconomic backgrounds. The resources the program extended were likely to have been especially instrumental in enhancing the well-being of such individuals, ameliorating the deterrents to civic activity they experienced in childhood and thus enhancing their civic capacity most dramatically. In addition,

the interpretive effects of the G.I. Bill were especially powerful for such veterans, conveying to them a sense of an elevated status in the polity. As a result, they gained a sharper sense of civic duty, feeling that they owed something back to American society. They proceeded to participate in civic organizations at significantly higher levels than would be predicted, becoming a leaven for the vibrant civic associational life Putnam has identified with the 1950s and 1960s.

Conversely, these dual explanations also shed light on why the G.I. Bill did not enhance participation levels more strongly among beneficiaries from higher socioeconomic backgrounds. The resources and skills that promote civic involvement had already been bestowed upon those who grew up in families with a mediumhigh or high standard of living. The G.I. Bill did not change their life course; it only meant that they did not have to pay tuition that they could otherwise have afforded on their own, anyway. Without the power to alter the life circumstances of these beneficiaries, the G.I. Bill had less potential to bestow interpretive effects. Because of their socioeconomic status, these veterans already viewed advanced education as their right.<sup>23</sup> With its power to alter these citizens' rights diminished, the G.I. Bill was less capable of altering their civic identity in terms of participation.

In the case of beneficiaries from the lowest standard of living level, it is likely that the effects of the G.I. Bill were not powerful enough to make up for having had a childhood impoverished of factors that lead to civic activity. Advanced education is likely to have improved their lives in socioeconomic terms but still to have proven inadequate to foster heightened participation. The success of the G.I. Bill in democratizing participation should not rest, however, on whether it completely overpowered the factors that typically influence participation in early adulthood. To expect it to do so would underestimate the considerable power of childhood poverty in deterring subsequent involvement. Further research will be required to understand more precisely how the educational benefits affected such veterans.

Finally, we evaluate the ability of the critical effects hypothesis to explain heightened political participation among G.I. Bill beneficiaries. Table 7 presents an interactive version of the political model with dummy variables combining the effects of having grown up in a certain standard of living stratum with G.I. Bill use. The results show that G.I. Bill use by those who grew up with a low–medium or medium–high to high standard of living in the 1920s had significant effects on political involvement. Once again, parents' political activity also proves highly significant.

Strikingly, as in the case of civic memberships, G.I. Bill users from the low-medium standard of living background received a great boost in political activity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> While I have retained the "standard of living in the 1920s" variable in the model, "use of the G.I. Bill for education" has been dropped. The reason for this is that the theoretical proposition being tested is that the program had effects for specific socioeconomic groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> This is evidenced by the difference in mean levels of agreement with the statement presented to G.I. Bill users in the survey, "I grew up expecting to go to college." Generally, the higher respondents' standard of living in childhood during the 1920s, the more likely they were to agree with this statement.

TABLE 7. Critical Effects Model of Determinants of Political Participation, 1950–64: Results of Interactive Equation, Ordinary Least-Squares Regression

Variable	b	β	Significance
Level of education completed	0.02	0.03	0.61
Parents' level of education	0.00	0.00	0.97
Low standard of living 1920 * G.I. Bill use <sup>a</sup>	0.17	0.04	0.57
Low-medium standard of living 1920 * G.I. Bill use	0.40	0.13	0.03
Medium standard of living 1920 * G.I. Bill use	0.27	0.10	0.13
Medium-high or high standard of living 1920 * G.I. Bill use	1.22	0.28	0.00
Parents' political activity Standard of living, 1920 Standard of living, 1960	0.19 -0.04 0.09	0.18 -0.03 0.05	0.00 0.71 0.36
<i>R</i> ² Adjusted <i>R</i> ² Sample size	0.11 0.09 379		

aThis interactive dummy variable was constructed by multiplying standard of living in the 1920s, where low = 1 and all other values = 0, by G.I. Bill use (coded 1 for use, 0 for nonuse). The three subsequent variables were constructed similarly, in each case with the named standard of living level coded 1 and all others 0. The missing dummy variable features nonuse of the G.I. Bill; this would intersect at the intercept.

The enhancement of participation among those from the medium-high and high standard of living backgrounds reflects what scholars already know about determinants of political participation: They tend to be strongly biased toward the better-off. What stands out as most impressive in these results is that the G.I. Bill had effects besides the commonplace pattern of bestowing more privilege on already privileged individuals. Strikingly, the program enabled individuals who grew up in less advantaged circumstances to participate more fully in public life.

# INCORPORATION: FROM SOCIAL RIGHTS TO CIVIC ENGAGEMENT

In recent years, matters of citizenship have received considerable attention in academic and public debate. Two separate conversations have ensued: a rights-oriented variant, which focuses on the social, civil, and political guarantees extended to citizens by the state through law and public policy, and a participation-oriented variant, which is mindful of the extent to which citizens take it upon themselves to participate in civic and political life.

Some political theorists have suggested that social rights and participation may be related, connected through the dynamics of incorporation. Incorporation refers to the extent to which citizens, through the bestowal of rights, are included, consolidated, and organized as members of the community. It is a fundamental task of state building, synonymous with what Judith Shklar (1991) terms "inclusion." The extension of social rights may assure citizens not only of some modicum of well-being, but also of a measure of dignity and value as members of the community (Walzer 1983). If coverage is broad and inclusive, it may promote a shared sense of civic identity and solidarity (Beiner 1995; Kymlicka and Norman 1995), with important consequences for civic and political activity.

As such a policy, the G.I. Bill fostered an incorporation dynamic among World War II veterans and, thus, served as a stimulus for the high levels of civic and political involvement that characterized the postwar era. In keeping with the theory of policy feedback for mass publics, the educational benefits of the program had positive resource and interpretive effects. Through these dynamics, it enhanced beneficiaries' socioeconomic circumstances and skills in ways that heightened their capacity and predisposition for civic involvement. In addition, the program had interpretive effects that altered beneficiaries' sense of obligation to the polity. It did this by offering people a highly positive experience of government and public provision, one that provided them with access to education and treated them with dignity and respect in the process. Thus, the G.I. Bill incorporated recipients more fully as citizens, intensifying their predisposition to participate by joining civic organizations and engaging in a wide range of political activities.

The case of the G.I. Bill illustrates how a public policy can function, like any institution, in promoting norms; in this case, it fostered participatory norms and the development of social capital. In contrast to most determinants of participation, the G.I. Bill promoted civic participation among groups that were somewhat less advantaged in the typical prerequisites for participation. As beneficiaries became more fully incorporated through social rights, they responded through more active forms of participatory citizenship.

### **NEW DIRECTIONS**

The civic consequences of G.I. Bill usage warrant further inquiry. Given that vocational education users are underrepresented in the data utilized here, subsequent analysis must be attentive to how program effects might vary by educational benefit type. A cursory examination reveals that while use of either type functioned as a positive determinant of enhanced civic memberships and political memberships and activity, in fact civic engagement increased most significantly among vocational education users.<sup>24</sup> This suggests that, to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> These results came from variants of the civic and political models in Tables 1 and 2 in which the G.I. Bill use variable was replaced by a pair of dummies: a vocational education G.I. Bill use dummy variable and a higher education G.I. Bill use dummy variable. (The omitted dummy variable is nonuse of the G.I. Bill). In the civic version of this model ( $R^2 = 0.14$ , adjusted  $R^2 = 0.13$ ), vocational training

extent that survivorship rates and other factors bias the data used here, the analysis understates both the civic effects of the G.I. Bill and the explanatory power of the critical effects thesis.

Scholars should also examine how the enhanced participation stimulated by the G.I. Bill shaped the character of mid-twentieth-century civic and political life. As individuals became more active in public life, for example, did they participate in cross-class organizations or in groups that reinforced class divisions? Were they more active in widespread, federated organizations that bind members of a nation together through shared ideals and sustain vast leadership networks, or were their affiliations primarily local (Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000)? Finally, given that the generation that came of age with the G.I. Bill appears to have exhibited high levels of civic engagement throughout their lives (Putnam 2000, chap. 14), it is worth examining whether the G.I. Bill had long-term effects beyond the 1950-64 time period. Conceivably, the direct effects of the program for civic involvement may have dissipated over time. They may have been replaced, however, by secondary effects resulting from the greater likelihood of beneficiaries to participate in social institutions that stimulate political activism.

The analytical framework developed here can be used to investigate how the policy designs of a variety of government programs affect civic engagement. Future studies might examine the implications of contemporary approaches to policy design, such as privatization and devolution. Scholars might consider the extent to which the visibility and traceability of government programs affect their civic consequences (Arnold 1990, 47-51; Pierson 1993). Given that tax expenditures constitute a "hidden welfare state" (Howard 1996), does the policy design of generous benefits such as home mortgage benefits, for example, undermine their potential to promote civic activity? Similarly, do federal grants and guaranteed student loans for higher education make recipients more inclined to engage in civic life, or does their delivery system obscure their public origin and weaken their interpretive effects? How do the civic effects of Social Security and Medicare compare to those of market-based pension and health insurance plans? How have the diverse models of welfare reform implemented in the states under the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act in 1996 affected citizens' sense of their role and place in the political community? Studies of recent programs may allow for more powerful tests of the theory because data can be collected without the constraints posed by issues related to memory, recall, and survivorship. This will permit scholars to rely more on attitudinal data, permitting a fuller analysis of the dynamics underlying policy feedback.

G.I. Bill use has a standardized  $\beta$  coefficient of 0.12 (p < 0.05), and higher education use, 0.15 (p < 0.10). In other regards, the results resemble those in Table 1. In the political version of the model ( $R^2 = 0.07$ , adjusted  $R^2 = 0.06$ ), vocational training has a coefficient of 0.14 (p < 0.05), while the coefficient for higher education is insignificant; other aspects of the model were consistent with those in Table 2.

The lively debates over civic engagement have focused, to date, too exclusively on social determinants of participation. It is time to "bring the state back in" to the study of civic life. Government fosters political learning among citizens through a myriad of policies. The question is, What kinds of lessons and messages do public rules and provisions convey, and through which mechanisms of policy design? This study shows positive effects of one generous program organized by universal principles; scholars should turn their inquiry to a host of other programs to specify more clearly which programs enhance and which deter social capital and why and how such dynamics occur.

# APPENDIX A: DEALING WITH MEMORY AND RECALL CONSTRAINTS

Some of the primary potential sources of error in a study of the World War II generation pertain to subjects' memory and ability to recall events that happened several decades ago. These concerns are alleviated to some degree by scholars' understanding that salience matters: That is, people will recall events or activities that were important to them, otherwise known as "landmark events" (Mangione 1995, 34–6; Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000, 67–91). It is not important for this study to ascertain specific details from the past, such as the number of Lion's Club or Parent–Teacher Organization meetings a person attended in a given year or the particular elections in which they voted. Rather, I wanted to know whether the subjects were, generally, active participants or not.

The mail survey format does help to limit such concerns, given that a second chance to answer questions is known to stimulate memory (Fowler 1984, 92-3; Tourangeau, Rips, and Rasinski 2000, 94). Veterans could respond at their leisure. taking time to remember past activities. Several additional precautions were taken to reduce errors of recall as much as possible. First, I decided against asking respondents much about past attitudes, given that responses would likely be affected by intervening circumstances. Second, survey researchers have found that greater accuracy is obtained by framing questions for a specific time period; for this purpose, specific responses were requested for each of three periods: 1950-64, 1965-79, and 1980 to the present. This pairing of questions was intended to prompt respondents to consider how their activities might have changed, if at all, and thus to respond to the questions about the earlier period as clearly and thoughtfully as possible. Asking a number of questions about a given time period has proven to facilitate memory; the questions about the immediate postwar years in the survey should have had a cumulative effect.

# APPENDIX B: REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE SAMPLE

Among returning veterans of World War II, 51% used the G.I. Bill for education; in the sample used in this study, 60.8% used the G.I. Bill for education. Among the general population of World War II veterans, 28.6% of those who used the educational provisions pursued higher education, whereas the survey sample included 63.5% such users.

Death rates may account, in part, for these different response rates. Nearly two-thirds of World War II veterans were deceased when the survey was conducted in 1998 (*New York Times* 2000.) Studies show that in the United States, being better educated is associated with better health and, hence,

a longer life expectancy (Ross and Wu 1995). Demographers report a recent increase in longevity among American males that some consider attributable to the effects of the G.I. Bill, inasmuch as it enhanced individuals' socioeconomic well-being. Differential death rates may also be explained by the age disparity of G.I. Bill users and nonusers. Use of the G.I. Bill was inversely related to the age of returning veterans, and those younger veterans are more likely still to be alive and to have responded to the survey (U.S. President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions 1956b, pt. A, 315).

Nonetheless, for the purposes of this study, it is unnecessary for either the ratio of G.I. Bill users to nonusers or the ratio of higher education users to vocational training users to reflect the original population of World War II veterans. Meaningful results are still attainable as long as each group reflects characteristics of the same group in the original population, and effects for both higher education users and vocational training users are considered separately. Determinations about the original population cannot be ascertained from U.S. Census data because it does not include questions about the G.I. Bill. It is possible, however, to compare the sample used here with that from a government survey conducted shortly after G.I. Bill use and drawn from a nationwide random sample of veterans

The veterans who used the G.I. Bill for programs below the college level in this survey resemble those in the earlier study very closely, suggesting that they closely mirror the original population (U.S. President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions 1956b, pt. B, 32). In terms of premilitary education, 28% of both samples had completed elementary school or less and 4% of both samples had four or more years of college. In the new study, 57% had completed high school, compared to 60% in the government study, and 11% had one to three years of college, compared to 8%.

A comparison of veterans who used the G.I. Bill's higher education benefits in both studies revealed that the respondents in the new study had more education prior to military service than those in the 1956 survey. Only 1% had elementary school or less education, compared to 4% in the government study; 47% had finished high school, compared to 68%; 45% had one to three years of college, compared to 21%; and 6% had four or more years of college, compared to 7% (U.S. President's Commission on Veterans' Pensions 1956b, pt. B, 26). The higher levels of premilitary education among subjects in this study suggests that they may have been from more advantaged backgrounds, on average, than the original universe of veterans who used the G.I. Bill benefits for higher education. This would imply that the findings of this study err on the conservative side: The G.I. Bill may have had stronger salutary effects than the findings here suggest.

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# The Influence of Party: Evidence from the State Legislatures

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merican legislative studies in recent years have been occupied to a large degree with the question of the effects of political parties on the policy behavior of elected legislators, with most of the research focusing on the U.S. Congress. We undertake a comparative analysis of state legislatures for a window into the character and extent of party's effects. Specifically, we compare the impact of party on the partisan polarization and dimensionality of campaign issue stances and roll call voting in the Kansas Senate and the largely comparable, though nonpartisan, Nebraska Unicameral. This comparison offers us a nice quasi-experiment to assess the impact of party by establishing a baseline condition in Nebraska for what happens when party is absent. We argue that party lends order to conflict, producing the ideological low-dimensional space that is a trademark of American politics. Where parties are not active in the legislature—Nebraska is our test case—the clear structure found in partisan politics disappears. This works to sever the connection between voters and their elected representatives and, with it, the likelihood of electoral accountability that is essential for the health of liberal democracy.

olitical parties are widely considered to be necessary for modern democracies. No theorist we know of has, for example, explicitly challenged Schattschneider's (1942, 1) half-century-old proposition that "democracy is impossible save in terms of parties." There is, however, an ongoing controversy among students of legislative policymaking in the United States that implicitly challenges the widespread assumption about the centrality and influence of parties. In his influential book Congress: The Electoral Connection, David Mayhew (1974, 27) offered a theory of congressional behavior based on members pursuing the goal of reelection and he explicitly dismissed the centrality of party. He presents a world of individual political entrepreneurs adapting the rules of the institution to facilitate their primary goal of reelection. At best, parties just assist in this goal. More recently, Keith Krehbiel (1993, 1998) has also challenged the widespread belief that party is central, but from a different angle. His theory is based on the simple assumption that members pursue their personal policy preferences. He concludes that his model—which provides for no role for party at all—accounts for the important observed outcomes and patterns of roll call voting. Indeed, Krehbiel (2000) contends that the findings of most studies that purport to show the strength of partisanship can as easily be interpreted to show that members vote their own preferences. To answer Krehbiel's (1993) question "Where's the Party?" a number of scholars have deployed a variety of data sets and techniques to establish empirically the effects of party (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001a; Cox and Poole 2001; Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith 1999; Snyder and Groseclose 2000), and while

some contend that their analyses demonstrate that party matters, for a variety of methodological reasons, none of these is conclusive.<sup>1</sup>

The remarkable thing about this controversy, given our prior and long-standing beliefs about the importance of parties in legislative policymaking, is how difficult it has been to establish the impact of parties in Congress. Lawrence, Maltzman, and Smith (1999, 1), for example, characterize the debate as an effort "to measure and describe the modest and contingent effects of party on the behavior of members of Congress." This controversy focuses only on the effects of parties in Congress, but the debate implicitly calls into question the centrality of parties more generally. It is hard to imagine that parties are somehow central for the functioning of democracy as Schattschneider and many others argue while, at the same time, the effects of party in the chief policymaking institution in the United States are marginal and episodic.

We see three limitations in how the problem has been framed, each of which decreases the chances of identifying the effects of party. First, party is examined only within the legislature, most often in terms of unmeasured effects of party leadership on legislative outcomes and roll call voting. This is not necessarily a problem for studying the dynamics within Congress, but it is a sharply delimited view of how party can affect legislative processes. The importance of parties more generally lies in linking voters and their concerns with patterns of policymaking within legislature. A focus only on the effects of party within the chamber misses the impact of parties in connecting voters and the policymaking process.

Second, the tendency to take for granted the simple unidimensional structure of conflict in Congress limits the current debate. Krehbiel's (1993) central argument about the importance of preferences assumes that preferences can be aligned along a single dimension and subsequent efforts to estimate party

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Steven Smith (2000) provides an excellent overview of the efforts to demonstrate that party matters in the House along with a thorough discussion of the possible weaknesses of each effort.

effects similarly rely on a single-dimensional characterization of preferences or roll call conflict (Aldrich and Battista 2002; Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Steward 2001a: Cox and Poole 2001). This assumption seems reasonable in light of Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) demonstration that historically, with just a couple of exceptions, conflict in Congress has unfolded along a single (evolving) dimension. Nevertheless, this simple structure itself needs to be explained. It defies the theoretical predictions of rational choice theorists, whose models predict much more chaos and less stability than we find (Arrow 1963; Riker 1980). Shepsle (1979) has provided a name for this unexpected condition of regularized conflict, "structurally induced equilibrium," but why this equilibrium is achieved in Congress has yet to be fully established. We argue that the parties play a central role.

Third, the debate has been largely confined to one institution, the U.S. House of Representatives.<sup>2</sup> The difficulty with this is that a one-chamber design holds constant many of the aspects of "party" that may affect the process. Factors such as partisan elections and organization of the legislature or even leadership powers do not vary for one chamber (or vary only modestly over time and then with numerous other factors), thus making it much harder to gauge adequately the effects of party on the legislative process.

In this paper, we seek to join and expand the debate on the importance of party in American legislative politics by adopting a theoretical approach and a research design that gets around these limitations. First, on the theoretical side, we explicitly look at party in both the electoral and the legislative arenas, which leads to incorporating the parties' efforts to win at the ballot box and the consequences of those efforts for the legislative policy process. Second, our consideration of parties in the electoral arena leads us to theorize about and examine the dimensionality of legislative conflict rather than assuming a commonly observed unidimensional structure. Third, we adopt a research design that takes us beyond the Congress to look at the effects of party comparatively in the American states. Our design incorporates an important variation in party by comparing the partisan Kansas Senate with the largely comparable, but nonpartisan Nebraska Unicameral. This comparison yields a nice quasi-experimental design for assessing the role of party in campaigns and within the legislatures.

#### A WIDER VIEW OF PARTY EFFECTS

Our central premise is that much of the impact of party follows from the central activities of parties in competitive democracies. Of particular concern for an examination of the impact of party on policy behavior is the association between party labels and candidates' issue stances. Many party scholars note that parties are coalitions of more or less like-minded persons pursuing elective office; most studies take this association as a given. But this like-mindedness is not coincidental; the linkage between parties and bundles of issues (which determine who works with which party) is a result of purposive action for political gain (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Karol 2001; Riker 1986). Parties, particularly losing parties, systematically seek out issues that will help them win support from nonparticipants or supporters of the winning party while being constrained by the need to maintain the support of their core constituencies.<sup>3</sup> Thus, over fairly short periods of time, the sides on most any salient controversies become associated with the major parties.

We have seen examples of this through the transformations of the New Deal coalition. Initially defined largely in terms of economics, the Democratic coalition of white Southerners and Northern workers included newly mobilized ethnics. Republicans responded to this majority coalition with their "Southern strategy," which captured many estranged Southern whites who were unhappy with changes in the Democratic party's position on civil rights (Aistrup 1989; Phillips 1969). With Republican appeals to threatened Southern whites, Democrats sought to add newly enfranchised blacks in the South and to mobilize blacks in the North (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Slowly the party coalitions changed to reflect elite issue strategies (Carmines and Layman 1997; Hetherington 2001). And, as part of this change, the issues of civil rights and racial policy came to be tied ideologically, if not logically, with the existing economic concerns and stance of the Democrats, while resistance to increased civil rights legislation became associated with the existing conservatism on economic and welfare policy with which Republicans had long been associated. Subsequently, the parties split on the issues of abortion and the rights of gays and lesbians so that the positions on those issues came to be politically bundled with the parties' existing concerns about economics and race. The association of the various issues the parties have been and are identified with is not perfect and it changes (slowly) over time. We recognize that many citizens are cross-pressured, preferring one of the party's stands on some issues and ... the other party's stands on others. However, these variations from a total alignment of party and issues only underline our major point: Parties link diverse issues, sometimes logically, but also politically as a result of their dynamic searches for electoral advantage.

We now apply this perspective to the role of party in shaping issues stances in campaigns and within the legislatures in the form of roll call voting.

#### Party and Candidates

Candidates make lots of issue pronouncements in the process of seeking office. Indeed, the essence of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Some studies have examined voting in the U.S. Senate, while Jenkins (1999, 2000) compares the House with the Confederate legislature and Aldrich and Battistia (2002) examine "conditional party government" in the states. We draw on the lesson of these studies below.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Robert Rohrschneider (2001) provides an insightful discussion in a comparative perspective of the parties' needs to maintain their base supporters ("mobilization") while appealing to new voters ("chasing").

electoral campaigns in democratic systems is that candidates and parties will present themselves and the policies they will pursue for the voters to choose between. What should we expect of the ideologies of candidates as they are expressed in campaigns? The assumption of our widely embraced Downsian spatial models is that parties, motivated only for election, will take whatever policy positions maximize their chances of getting elected. The effect of the general electorate in this model is to pull the candidate and parties toward the median voter, resulting in a convergence of candidates or parties (Calvert 1985; Downs 1957). There is strong empirical evidence that candidates gain votes when they take more moderate stands in their districts (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001b; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Erikson and Wright 1980, 1993, 1997, 2001; Wright and Berkman

The difficulty with the Downsian accounting is that its predictions for convergence are largely wrong. In most contests there is a considerable ideological distance between Democratic and Republican candidates, both overall and within individual contests. This is obvious to most observers at the presidential level and has been confirmed empirically in elections for both houses of Congress (Erikson and Wright 2001; Fiorina 1974; Sullivan and O'Connor 1972; Wright and Berkman 1986).

Some researchers have suggested that this polarization is due to the influence of policy-motivated party activists and core partisans. They are the loudest and most attentive voices within the parties and provide at least three avenues by which their more ideological policy preferences will create a pull toward the parties' centers of gravity. One is through the selection process of the primaries when candidates are first nominated. Activists' and core partisans' issue preferences, which are key components in defining what the parties stand for, are likely to play an important role in who receives the nominations. All other things being equal, we expect voters, including primary voters, to cast their support for candidates who best mirror their issue preferences. Second, candidates are much more likely to obtain support from the politically active and ideological segment of the citizenry than from the larger, but more quiescent group of moderates, weak identifiers, and independents. Third, the candidates themselves are more likely to emerge from this activist stratum within the parties than from the general citizenry. As such, we fully expect that candidates' personal issue preferences genuinely reflect, for the most part, those associated with their parties. Thus, through the formal mechanism of the primary election and through the informal mechanisms of ideologically contingent support and socialization, we expect that party activists and core partisans exert a pull on candidate issue positions away from the more moderate preferences of the median voters in their districts.

This argument has been laid out formally by Aronson and Ordeshook (1972) and Aldrich (1983; Aldrich and McGinnis 1989) and empirical work has demonstrated that state party elite ideology together with measures of

the ideological preferences of the general public nicely accounts for party differences between candidates for both the House and the Senate (Wright 1989, 1994). Parties pull candidates toward ideological extremes, while the electoral preferences of the median voter pull candidates toward greater moderation. The key in this process is the strategic point at which party activists and core partisans exert their influence—in the socialization that precedes candidate emergence and in the nomination stage, both of which occur before the general election.<sup>4</sup>

We also expect that parties have an effect on the dimensionality of the issue stances candidates take. This influence might occur through two processes—by influencing candidates' issue stances and by affecting which candidates run. In the first process, if a candidate embraces his/her party's positions on issues A, B, and C, but has little strong feeling on issue D, the fact that the party has an expected position on D would make it more likely that the candidate would take his/her party's position on D than that of the opposition. This may be because the party acts as a positive reference group for the candidate, and it could also be that strategically taking the correct and expected position on D increases one's acceptability to party regulars, ideological contributors, and primary voters. The process of being associated with a party—which is publicly defined in terms of explicit policy stances—has the effect of bringing about ideological constraint as one learns to "be a part of the team."

The second process that could affect the dimensionality of candidates' issue preferences is simple selection, including self-selection. Nominations are affected by policy-motivated activists, and thus to the extent that candidate ideology is important, those who have more consistently liberal issue stances stand a better chance of getting the Democratic nomination and more consistent conservatives fare better in getting the Republican nomination. Those with a mixed ideological position who do not reflect a recognizable set of party stances will have a hard time getting nominated. Thus, the selection process yields an "electoral class" that presents issues in a low-dimension issue space—simplified along the traditional partisan/ideological spectrum.

#### Party and Legislators

We next come to the arena that has been more the focus of the "Where's the party?" controversy, the party in the legislature. The contention is over the extent to which the party, as a caucus or through party leaders, can induce would-be moderates or defectors to support the party's position on issues when, left to their own, they would vote their own preferences or those of their constituencies. What has not been widely considered is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> There are many examples of the impact of party activists. For example, the conservative right within the Republican party saved the nomination for George W. Bush in the later primaries over Senator John McCain even though national polls suggested that McCain, who was seen as more moderate and independent, would do better against the eventual Democratic nominee, Al Gore.

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the impact of party on defining the structure of conflict across issues. While there is some attention to agenda control, most observers seem to accept as given the low dimensionality of the issue space documented by Poole and Rosenthal (1997, 2001). Aldrich (1995, 207) identified the problem: "Floor majorities could be fashioned on any number of bases. The trick is to ensure that it is done according to a primarily partisan definition of the alternatives." We believe that the mere existence of competitive parties—in the electorate and in the organization of the legislature—operates to increase the salience of party so that it becomes an effective "default cleavage" for the legislature. Because the parties have prior positions on most important issues, there is likely to be a strong tendency—as members of competing teams—to view policy first, and perhaps foremost, in partisan/ideological terms. This process does not eliminate other considerations—there can always be some issues that cut across party lines—but party as a default cleavage may go a long way in framing the policy choices that legislators make. The result of such a process is a greatly attenuated issue space, with majorities forming most often along one liberal-conservative dimension. The important point here is that by effectively casting policy controversies in "we-they" terms, and where the "we" has a prior association with distinct issue stances, there can be a great deal of cohesion within the parties on substantive issues even without explicit efforts by the party or its leaders to steer members' voting decisions on bills.

Our view of the effects of party encompasses two arenas and two aspects of policy behavior. In the next section we undertake a comparative analysis to assess empirically the operation of party in the contexts of elections and legislative voting, paying attention in each to both levels of polarization and to the dimensionality of the issue space.

#### **DESIGN**

Although most of the work on the impact of party has looked at the House of Representatives, a comparative approach offers distinct advantages. To specify effectively the conditions under which party has certain kinds of effects, we need to look at its operation in contexts in which the character, powers, and perhaps tradition of partisanship vary. Cox (2000) takes such a perspective in addressing the question of when legislative rules make a difference, contrasting the very strong party systems in much of Europe with the weaker but still substantial parties in the U.S. Congress and the much weaker parties in Latin American democracies. We stay closer to home by taking the question to the state legislatures. Specifically, we use a paired comparison in which the chief difference between the legislatures we examine is the presence or absence of parties

Nebraska, with its nonpartisan legislature, provides us with a wonderful test case. Our comparison legislature is the Kansas Senate. The Nebraska Unicameral and the Kansas Senate are about the same size (49 and 40 members) and the states they serve are similar in

demography and overall partisanship and ideological leanings (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001). Three studies suggest that nonpartisanship will make a difference. Jenkins (1999, 2000) finds less structure and less ideological polarization in roll call voting in the Confederate House, which did not have political parties, than in the U.S. House during the Civil War. Welch and Carlson (1973) examine five sessions of the Nebraska legislature distributed across a 50-year period. Using Guttman Scales to establish roll call dimensions, they find a lot of small dimensions, none very strong, that do not correlate with much of anything. They conclude that nonpartisanship in Nebraska leads to numerous majorities. Aldrich and Battista (2002) look at roll call voting in eight state legislatures, including Nebraska. They find that there is little form or definition to the NOMINATE scores of Nebraska's state senators' roll call voting, but party does a good, but variable, job of structuring the main dimension of roll call voting in other chambers.

### **ANALYSIS**

### Partisanship and Ideology in the Campaigns

We first consider the relationship of party to how candidates reveal their issue stances in their electoral campaigns. For the Kansas Senate, we expect the impact of partisanship to reflect the impact we find in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives. We hypothesize that the partisan character of the elections will work to produce an issue space that is dominated by the familiar liberal-conservative continuum and that the pressures of party activists, primaries, and contributors will reinforce socialization patterns to yield polarized candidates. In contrast, in Nebraska, where parties are taken out of the picture, we expect a less structured issue space since the parties are not actively bundling the issues in state legislative elections, and further, we expect that Democratic and Republican candidates will be less polarized than in Kansas.

To assess electorally expressed ideologies we make use of the data collected by Project Vote Smart (PVS).<sup>5</sup> We use the 1996 survey for the Kansas Senate, when all seats were up for reelection, and the 1996 and 1998 surveys for Nebraska because only half of the Unicameral's 49 seats are up in any given election year. There is sufficient continuity in the questionnaires that using respondents from different years for Nebraska does not present any comparability problems.<sup>6</sup> The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Project Vote Smart is a not-for-profit organization devoted to providing objective, unbiased information about candidates to voters and the media. Their main vehicle for this is the information obtained from their candidate questionnaires, which they call a National Political Awareness Test (NPAT). These are administered shortly after each state's primary elections. The NPAT data for candidates during an election campaign or for the winners of the most recent election are available at the PVS web site: http://vote-smart.org/.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> The PVS National Political Awareness Test (NPAT) is composed of two parts for each state. The larger part is a "core NPAT," which asks a large battery of questions common to all the states, and the second is made up of sets of questions that tap controversies particular to

response rates for the PVS "National Political Awareness Tests" (NPATs) are not great. Even with PVS's considerable efforts to follow up with pleas—and sometimes threats—to get candidates to fill out the questionnaires, the response rates for the states nationally are only about 35%, although the rates for Kansas and Nebraska were a better. We have 34 respondents from Kansas and 49 for Nebraska. Here we use a subset of items of the PVS NPAT that were selected for a comparison between Kansas and Nebraska. All items in this subset are constant across the years (1996 and 1998) and the two states. We include 23 items spread across the areas of crime, the economy, education, the environment, gun control, health care, social issues, budget priorities, and abortion (see the Appendix for a listing).

The items for each state were scaled using Poole and Rosenthal's (1997) W-NOMINATE program. NOMI-NATE is similar in some ways to factor analysis, though its foundation is based explicitly on the spatial model. The first step in using the NOMINATE procedure is to determine the number of relevant dimensions of the issue space sampled by the PVS questionnaires. Poole and Rosenthal typically find one, sometimes two, dimension in congressional voting, and in comparative analysis two dimensions are almost always adequate to describe the structure of the space. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart (2001a) apply the Heckman-Snyder factor analysis procedure to a set of congressional PVS NPATs. The Heckman-Snyder procedure yields similar fits with roll call data as does Poole and Rosenthal's NOMINATE procedure. Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart find that one dimension also dominates the PVS congressional NPAT and that this dimension correlates very highly with the major roll call dimension they extract. At least for Congress, incumbents' ideologies as expressed in the campaigns and in roll voting are very similar in value and structure (see also Erikson and Wright 1997, 2001).

Our immediate purpose here is to assess the relative structures of these sets of issues and then to determine the levels of partisan polarization in the two states. Table 1 shows the outcome of applying the W-NOMINATE procedure to the PVS data for candidates in Kansas and Nebraska. First, the percentage correctly classified is just that—the percentage of candidates' NPAT responses that the dimension predicted correctly. The percentage of correctly classified responses in each state gives us our first comparison between ideology in Nebraska and that in Kansas as measured in the campaigns. The first dimension in both states correctly classified just over 80% of the responses.

While somewhat informative, the percentage correctly classified can be misleading. If 25% of Nebraska candidates chose the minority position in these questionnaires, then correctly classifying 75% would not be an improvement over simply guessing that everybody

TABLE 1. Dimensions of Candidate Issue Positions in Kansas and Nebraska

	Correctly		Improvement
Dimension	classified	APRE	in APRE
Kansas	<del>-</del>		
Dimension 1	0.815	0.413	
Dimension 2	0.847	0.516	0.103
Dimension 3	0.892	0.658	0.142
Dimension 4	0.931	0.782	0.124
Nebraska			
Dimension 1	0.805	0.331	
Dimension 2	0.857	0.511	0.180
Dimension 3	0.876	0.576	0.065
Dimension 4	0.912	0.700	0.124

chose the majority position. The second statistic, the aggregate proportional reduction in errors (APRE) takes this into account (Heckman and Snyder 1997; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). This number is equal to one minus the number of errors divided by the number of candidates choosing the minority position. Returning to Table 1, the APRE for the first dimension in Kansas is 0.413, while the APRE for Nebraska is lower, at 0.331. In both states we find one substantial dimension that accounts for 80% of the item responses, followed by smaller dimensions. The second dimension in Nebraska is a bit clearer, adding 5% to the correct classifications. compared to the second dimension, which adds just 3% in Kansas.8 The pattern of candidate positions on the first two dimensions is shown in the plots of Figure 1. We have added letter symbols to the candidates to show the pattern of partisan affiliations in the space (D, Democrat; R, Republican; and I, independents and third-party candidates).9 The first dimension, which we believe reflects the clear liberal-conservative content of the items in the NPAT arrays Republicans against Democrats, with Republicans showing a strong tendency to score higher than Democrats. There is some variation on the dimension among both Democrats and Republicans in the two states. However, the striking feature of the pattern in these findings is the lack of support for our hypothesis of less structured responses as a result of the nonpartisanship of Nebraska elections. On the NPAT responses, the two states are more alike than they are different.

The second hypothesis about partisanship and ideology in the campaign was that the existence of partisan primaries and the overall involvement of the parties in Kansas' elections should have yielded a pull toward the ideological poles of the parties compared to Nebraska, where the parties are barely active in


each state. We construct our scales using the core NPAT items, which stayed virtually the same for 1996 and 1998.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Kansas had a return rate of 39% in 1996, while Nebraska's rates were 67 and 48% for 1996 and 1998, respectively.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> In this analysis we instructed the program to extract four dimensions rather than the two that Poole and Rosenthal typically extract for their analyses of Congress. Limiting the analysis to just two dimensions would not affect our conclusions in any substantively meaningful way, while extracting more dimensions allows the possibility of finding the higher-dimensional space we expected in Nebraska.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> We coded candidate partisanship from the *Omaha World-Herald*, which reports the party with which each candidate and legislator has registered.

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the state legislative elections. Table 2 shows the simple regressions of the first two dimensions on party affiliation (Democrat = 1, Republican = 0) for each state. The results are as striking as they are surprising. Partisan Kansas actually shows a lower party difference on the main dimension (-0.87) than we find in Nebraska (-1.07). Reflecting this, we also see that party affiliation explains much more of the variance on the first dimension in Nebraska (adjusted  $R^2$  value of 0.64, vs. 0.45 for Kansas). On both counts, then, dimensionality and polarization, our hypothesizing was considerably off. In nonpartisan Nebraska, differences between Democrats and Republicans are similar to those in partisan Kansas, and the issue response sets are similarly structured in

the two states. If anything, Nebraska actually shows more partisan polarization on the main NPAT dimension than Kansas does.

As shown in Table 2, party affiliation has virtually no association with the second dimension, which is true for the subsequent dimensions, all of which appear to be more noise collectors than substantively meaningful measures. Below we speculate on what might be going on here, but what is clear is that the nonpartisanship of Nebraska state legislative elections did not affect the dimensionality of candidates' electorally expressed ideology, nor did nonpartisanship in Nebraska yield less ideological polarization between Democratic and Republican candidates.

TABLE 2. Effect of Party on Issue Positions in Kansas and Nebraska				
Variable	Dimension 1	Dimension 2		
Kansas (N = 34)				
Party	-0.87***	-0.17		
	(0.16)	(0.14)		
Constant	0.55***	0.17		
	(0.13)	(0.11)		
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.01		
Nebraska (N = 46)				
Party	-1.07***	0.17		
_	(0.12)	(.14)		
Constant	0.35***	−Ò.06 <sup>°</sup>		
	(0.07)	(80.)		
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.64	Ò.01 <sup>°</sup>		
Note: ***p < 0.001.				

## Partisanship and Ideology in Roll Call Voting

The high level of polarization among Nebraska candidates for the state legislature was not expected since theory suggested, and the earlier research by Welch and Carlson (1973) demonstrated, quite modest correlations of partisanship with roll call voting in the Nebraska legislature. When we found the high campaign issue polarization between partisans in Nebraska, we began to suspect that partisanship had finally found its way into Nebraska legislative politics. Was it possible that Nebraska's legislators, after years of wandering in the confusing maze of unstructured and unstable coalitions documented by Welch and Carlson (1973), had responded to the need for organization and continuity that party provides, even while remaining constitutionally nonpartisan? We can see if that was the case as we test our hypotheses about the relationship of party and roll call voting in the Kansas Senate and the Nebraska Unicameral.

Our analysis includes all even mildly contentious roll calls in the two chambers for the 1999-2000 session, defined here as any roll call in which the losing side constituted as least 5% of those voting. This resulted in 223 votes in the Nebraska legislature and 254 in the Kansas Senate. As with the PVS NPAT data, we calculate W-NOMINATE scores to assess the dimensionality of conflict in the two chambers. Table 3 shows our results from extracting four dimensions. The overall results show that, unlike the NPAT data, patterns of roll call voting are not the same in the two bodies. The percentage of correctly classified votes in each state gives us our first indication of the differences between Nebraska and Kansas. While the first dimension in Kansas correctly classifies over 88% of the votes, the first dimension in Nebraska succeeds less than 76% of the time.

The big difference, however, is found in the APRE scores. The APRE for the first dimension for Kansas is 0.463 and this increases to 0.559 in two dimensions. These are very close to the average values that Poole and Rosenthal (1997) find for the U.S House

TABLE 3. Dimensions of Roll Call Voting in Kansas and Nebraska Correctly Improvement Dimension classified **APRE** in APRE Kansas Dimension 1 0.888 0.463 Dimension 2 0.908 0.559 0.096 Dimension 3 0.919 0.614 0.055 Dimension 4 0.930 0.666 0.053 Nebraska Dimension 1 0.756 0.196 Dimension 2 0.785 0.294 0.098 Dimension 3 0.800 0.343 0.049 Dimension 4 0.821 0.410 0.067

and Senate.<sup>10</sup> The first dimension in Kansas explains a great deal and the second dimension improves on that slightly. There is clearly one dominant dimension to roll call voting in the Kansas Senate.

In contrast, patterns in Nebraska's roll call voting are difficult to find. The APRE for Nebraska's first dimension, 0.196, is much lower than that of Kansas. Indeed. such a low APRE indicates just a nominal improvement over a naive prediction of guessing that everyone voted with the winning side. While the second dimension improves upon that APRE score by 0.098, the APRE after two dimensions (0.294) is still far less than that of just one dimension in Kansas. The unusual character of the Nebraska legislature can be seen against the backdrop of Poole and Rosenthal's (2001) comparative statistics on 12 legislatures including the U.S. Congress, the UN, the European Parliament, and the legislatures of several European countries. The APRE for all four dimensions for Nebraska's legislature is lower than the lowest APRE Poole and Rosenthal find for the first dimension of any of the 12 voting bodies in their study.

Table 4 presents results from OLS regressions of the first two dimensions for Kansas and Nebraska. The independent variables in this analysis are the party of the legislator (1 = Democrat, 0 = Republican) and whether the legislator's district is rural or urban (1 = Urban, 0 = Rural). The inclusion of party is obvious, but many state legislatures, including Kansas and Nebraska are noted for significant urban-rural urban cleavages (Loomis 1994; Welch and Carlson 1973). Therefore, we include this measure to test whether this factor shapes voting in Nebraska and Kansas. 11

The results in Table 4 confirm our hypotheses. The first dimension of voting in Kansas is clearly a partisan cleavage. The coefficient for party in this model is strong and significant. On a scale ranging from -1 to 1,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The APRE values for the one-, two-, and three-dimension solutions for the U.S. House are 0.479, 0.531, and 0.546, and for the Senate they are 0.435, 0.519, and 0.530 (from Poole and Rosenthal 1997, Table 3, 28).

<sup>11</sup> We created our dummy variable of urban versus rural legislative districts by examining the population density of the counties these districts intersected. There were 25 urban and 24 rural districts in Nebraska and 26 urban and 14 rural districts in Kansas.


TABLE 4.	Effect of	of Party	and	ι	Jrbanism on
Roll Call	Voting in				Nebraska

Variable	Dimension 1	Dimension 2
	Diffiction 1	
Kansas ( $N = 40$ )		
Party	<b>-1.27***</b>	0.40***
•	(0.08)	(0.10)
Urban district	_`0.12 <sup>´</sup>	-0.24*
	(80.0)	(0.10)
Constant	`0.53 <sup>*</sup> **	<u>~</u> `0.05 <sup>^</sup>
0011010111	(0.07)	(80.)
Adj. R²	0.87	0.32
Nebraska ( <i>N</i> = 50)	5,5,	
Party	0.21	-0.45***
rarry	(0.17)	(0.11)
Urban district	-0.02	-0.35**
Orban district	(0.17)	(0.10)
		0.34***
Constant	-0.12	
	(0.12)	(0.08)
Adj. R²	-0.01	0.44
Note: ***p < 0.001; **p <	< 0.01; *p < 0.05.	

the coefficient of -1.27 for party (and the adjusted  $R^2$  of 0.87 for the model) represents a substantial difference between Democrats and Republicans. In addition to its impact on the first dimension in Kansas, party also has a significant influence on the second dimension. While this coefficient is not as strong as in the first dimension, it does reinforce the impact of party in the Kansas Senate. In addition to party, the coefficient for urbanism is also significant for this second dimension. Thus, both dimensions of voting in Kansas are highly structured by partisanship, with the second also being influenced by district urbanism.

While the first dimension in Kansas is a clear partisan cleavage, there appears to be no clear pattern to the first dimension in Nebraska. Neither party nor urbanism is a significant predictor of a legislator's position on this spectrum and Figure 2 indicates the lack of any obvious cleavage as well—legislators are evenly spread across the dimension. On the other hand, dimension 2 does appear to be structured to some extent by both party and urbanism. While the coefficient for party in this case is only a third that for party on Kansas's first dimension, there does appear to be some relationship of party with this dimension; a dimension that captures only a small portion of the voting decisions of the Nebraska legislature in any case.

We find, then, convincing evidence of quite different structures of roll call voting in the Kansas Senate and the Nebraska legislature. The two dimensions explaining roll call voting in Nebraska have an APRE of just 0.294, compared to the APRE of 0.559 for Kansas's two dimensions. This difference indicates far less structure in the Nebraska legislature. Furthermore, while the first dimension was clearly partisanship in Kansas, we could find no pattern—partisan or otherwise—that could explain the first dimension in Nebraska. <sup>12</sup> Thus, our find-



ings are clear—cohesive partisan cleavages form in the partisan Kansas Senate, while such partisan divisions are minor and inconsistent in the nonpartisan setting. Our empirical conclusions echo those of Welch and Carlson (1973, 865) "that there is relatively little structure in voting in Nebraska."


### DISCUSSION

From these empirical results, we are faced with an apparent puzzle. In Kansas we find reasonable structure and polarization in the PVS NPAT data and this is reflected even more clearly in the roll call patterns of the Kansas Senate. But in Nebraska, we find the same familiar structure and even greater partisan polarization in the NPAT data, only to see the Nebraska legislators vote with each other across issues almost at random. Many of the votes on bills in the Nebraska Unicameral seem unrelated to any enduring cleavages.

One possible explanation for the findings is that our samples of individuals in the NPAT and roll call analyses are different. This could happen because only a subset of incumbents answers the NPATs. However, when we compare the subsamples of those for whom we have both NPAT and roll call data to those for whom

When we showed a list of names and scores on the first dimension to a colleague familiar with the legislature in Nebraska, he did not see any logic to the dimension. We believe that there is probably some-

thing there, but it is not partisanship or the urban/rural split—and it does not account for much of the voting patterns in the legislature.



we have only NPAT scores and only roll call scores, we find no evidence of any comparability problems. <sup>13</sup> A second comparability problem that could explain our findings is if Kansas and Nebraska simply considered different kinds of issues, with Kansas' being more susceptible to party-line voting. To check this possibility we classified all the roll calls in our analysis by issue area using the categories developed by Welch and Carlson (1979). Figure 3 shows that the distributions across areas are quite similar, and we find nothing in the

<sup>13</sup> To check for the possibility that those in the legislature for whom we have roll call data might somehow be systematically different from those who took the NPAT, we first established three groups determined by the type of data we have for them: group 1, only NPAT scores (17 in Kansas, 20 in Nebraska); group 2, both NPAT and roll call NOMINATE scores (17 in Kansas, 26 in Nebraska); and group 3, only roll call scores (23 in Kansas, 22 in Nebraska). We then estimated

$$N = a + b_1 \text{Party} + b_2 \text{G2} + b_3 (\text{Party} * \text{G2}) + e,$$

where N is the NOMINATE scores for the NPATs or roll calls and G2 is a dummy variable for group 2. When N is the NPAT scores the comparison is between group 1 and group 2 (group 3 is missing data), and when N is the roll call scores the comparison is between group 2 and group 3. This analysis was run for all four of the NPAT and roll call NOMINATE dimensions for both states. Of 32 chances for  $b_2$  or  $b_3$  to be significant, only one coefficient achieved the 0.05 level, and that was on the fourth roll call dimension for Nebraska—easily attributable to chance. Thus, we are quite confident that the explanation for the differences in structure between the NPATs and the roll calls for Nebraska are institutional rather than differences between who answered the NPATS and who cast roll call votes.

few differences in the distributions that could explain the huge differences in patterns of roll call coalitions. If anything, Nebraska should have a higher level of partisan/ideological voting, with its slightly higher proportions of bills in the education, social welfare, and revenue/taxation categories. Based on these analyses, we are confident that the differences in roll call voting are not an artifact, especially in light of the parallel findings from other studies, with Kansas' patterns looking pretty much like Congress and Nebraska's pattern being entirely consistent with Welch and Carlson's and Aldrich and Battista's analyses.

Here we offer an explanation for our findings. It derives from our view of party as a device for creating order among the myriad of conflicts and issues that citizens and politicians face. As we stated earlier, we believe that party, under the right conditions, operates as a default cleavage, and when issues are interpreted in terms of this underlying cleavage the dimensionality of the issue space is reduced. The key, we believe, is in understanding the differential salience of the party/ideology linkage in different contexts. Differences in the context of the gathering of the NPAT data and roll call voting in the Kansas Senate and the Nebraska Unicameral provide a plausible explanation for our seemingly anomalous findings.

Our big inconsistent finding is the high level of structure and polarization among candidates for the Nebraska legislature. These actually make sense upon some reflection as we consider both the character of the PVS effort and the backgrounds of the candidates themselves. Project Vote Smart constructs the questionnaires based on extensive research on the political controversies their researchers locate across the states. Legislators face the issues, from abortion and affirmative action to crime and welfare, over and over again in the states. As such, the parties have already staked out their general positions on the vast majority of these. The items are presented as clear policy choices about which courses of action the candidates endorse. The principle behind the entire effort is to highlight the essential stances of the candidates and what they stand for. Although not intended to do so, by reflecting existing political conflicts in the states, the NPATs probably promote answering items in terms of the underlying and recurring political choices as framed in current American politics. Not answering questions in a way that roughly aligns in a general liberal-conservative dimension would probably mean that the respondent does not accept the common terms of discourse in contemporary American politics.14

This is reinforced by the candidates themselves. The nonpartisan Nebraska legislature exists within a highly partisan context. Almost all of the candidates for the legislature have a recognized affiliation with one of the two major parties. Most are registered as partisans, and the newspapers frequently refer to their party affiliation along with their town or county when identifying members. When one legislator died, the Omaha paper listed 25 people who wanted to be considered as his replacement; 23 were identified by party (Hicks 1999). Hence, the candidates are partisans when they run, but they do not appear to run as partisans (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001). Given the context in which the NPATs are constructed and the emersion of the candidates in the same larger culture, it is no wonder that they respond to PVS questions in the same way that the partisan candidates in other states do.

The patterns we found for roll call voting are sharply at odds with the patterns of the NPAT. Differences in context here also account for the use of party as a default cleavage in the Kansas Senate but not in the Nebraska Unicameral. In Kansas, candidates run as Democrats and Republicans, and once elected, they organize the legislature as partisans. The election and the distribution of power in the legislature are a zero-sum game between the two parties. This fact of an institutional life of recurring partisan conflict and competition makes party a natural and salient default cleavage. Then, as the parties, at least nationally, are already clearly associated with positions and groups on a wide range of issues, it becomes much more likely that the ideological/partisan component of any bill will draw attention rather than other facets of the issue around which alternative majorities might form.

In Nebraska party does not play this role. Members enter the legislature having been Democrats or Republican in the past, but we know that partisan identity plays little part in election to the legislature (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001). By all accounts, the parties play only a modest, if any, role in state legislative elections. Organization of the chamber is accomplished through anonymous vote by all members, not by party caucuses. 15 Thus, members' identities as partisans are not salient to their lives in the legislature, so when bills come up, there is no ongoing default cleavage. It seems almost as though each bill is considered anew rather than in the context of established sides and coalitions. Rather than having a partisan/ideological cleavage to block out other possible bases for division, members can, and apparently do, focus on any aspect that strikes them. As we have seen in the regression analysis, sometimes this pits Democrats against Republicans, sometimes urban against rural representatives. But a lot of the time, it is not at all clear what the lines of division are, and whatever they are, they do not have much continuity from one issue to the next. We believe that the important factor here is that the lack of party organization and agendas means that no one has an incentive to promote a package of legislation on which they as a group will run. Issues do not get tied together around which coalitions form as in partisan legislatures.

Before accepting these results, however, it is reasonable to ask why party coalitions do not form in Nebraska. The answer, we believe, is twofold. First, party labels are constitutionally prohibited, and in subpresidential elections voters do not connect their partisan preferences with candidates unless party labels are actually listed on the ballot (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001). Additionally, candidates seldom emphasize their party affiliations. We know that even candidates running in partisan elections generally avoid mention of their party except when appealing to partisan supporters. It is certainly rare for party to be a central element in this era of candidate-centered elections. This should apply even more where there is a tradition of nonpartisanship. Second, coalitions do not form in the Nebraska legislature because incumbent legislators have nothing to gain electorally from partisanship; incumbency is worth more at the ballot box when it is unaccompanied by party labels (Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001). Nebraska legislators apparently are aware of this, as they have resisted efforts by the state party organizations to return the legislature to partisan elections (Sittig 1997, 196).

#### CONCLUSIONS

Our findings highlight two points about parties in legislatures. First, we believe that party plays a role that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Consistent with this is the finding that third-party candidates, especially those identified with different ways of organizing political choices, do not reflect this alignment. Libertarians, for example, make choices that are systematically conservative on some issues and equally liberal on other (abortion and legalization of drugs, for example [Hetland and Wright 2000]).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> The 1997 state legislature reelected a Democrat as its speaker by a vote of 38–10 despite the fact that the state Republican Chairman actively lobbied Republican members (who held a 26–22 advantage in the legislature) to vote for the Republican candidate (Hord 1997). According to the "A Victory for Independence." 1997. *Omaha World-Herald*. 10 Jan: A-10. "While party-line votes occasionally occur, they are not the rule."

has largely been missed in the literature. Poole and Rosenthal (1997) convincingly demonstrate a very low dimensionality in roll call voting in the U.S. Congress through most of our history. But what brings about this low dimensionality? Most studies have taken this crucial factor as given. Some, however, suggest that this low dimensionality is imposed by party leaders within the legislature (Jenkins 1999, 2000; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). We believe that this explanation is incomplete. The stability and structure of coalitions in the U.S. Senate are every bit what they are in the House of Representatives, despite much weaker party leadership. The explanation, therefore, probably lies elsewhere. Our analysis provides strong evidence that the parties, in vying for electoral advantage, adopt positions on new issues to bring in new voters and, thus, package these with their existing issue stands. This provides a political connection among issues, which works its way into our general ideological way of looking at politics. Without parties, there would be no need to bundle these diverse issues, and legislators, activists, and the media would be much less likely to see any obvious connections among them. Our argument, in short, is that parties produce the ideological low-dimensional space as a by-product of their efforts to win office. Where the parties are not active in the legislature-Nebraska is our test case—the clear structure found in partisan legislatures disappears.

Second, we wish to make the point in our conclusion that nonpartisanship undermines the possibilities for popular control of government. This occurs in several ways. Elsewhere, research has indicted that nonpartisan elections cause lower turnouts, make it easier for incumbents to win elections, and effectively disenfranchise the poorest and least educated citizens (Schaffner and Streb 2000; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001). <sup>16</sup> Our analysis here adds to that indictment.

The disjuncture between the PVS NPAT responses and the Nebraska legislative voting patterns shows that legislators there are not connecting their clear ideological preferences on the issues to the bills that they vote on in the legislature. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how voters could achieve even general policy direction when conflict patterns in the legislature are unstable and unstructured. Together these findings suggest that nonpartisan elections effectively break the policy linkage between citizens and their representatives in the statehouse. Our findings echo and lend solid empirical support to the Schattschneider observation we quoted at the outset about the importance of party for coherence and accountability in democratic politics. Both are lacking in Nebraska's nonpartisan legislature but are evident in Kansas' Senate. The difference is the existence of party.

#### APPENDIX: PVS NPAT ITEMS ANALYZED

We used the following 23 items in analyzing NPAT responses among candidates in Kansas and Nebraska. The

first section of NPAT questions asks the respondent to indicate the statements with which he or she agrees. Because NOMINATE requires dichotomous choices (such as votes), we coded agreeing with the statement as an affirmative response and not agreeing with the statement as a negative response.

#### Crime

- Oppose the death penalty
- Increase state funds for programs that rehabilitate and educate inmates during and after prison sentences

### **Economy**

- Provide low-interest loans and tax credits for expanding, starting up, or relocating businesses
- Reduce state government regulations on the private sector
- Support limits on cash damages in lawsuits against businesses and professionals for product liability or malpractice
- Încrease state funding for programs to retrain unemployed workers

#### Education

- Provide parents with state-funded vouchers to send their children to any participating school (public, private, religious, technical)
- Support sex education programs that stress safe sexual practices

#### Environment

- Require the state to reimburse citizens when statesponsored environmental regulations limit the use of privately owned land
- [Continue to] Provide funding for recycling programs in [state]
- Suspend [state]'s participation in unfunded, federally mandated environmental protection legislation

#### **Gun Control**

- Increase state restrictions on the purchase and possession of firearms
- Maintain all state registration procedures and state restrictions on possessing firearms
- Ease state procedures and restrictions on the purchase and registration of firearms

#### **Health Care**

- Ensure that [state]'s citizens have access to basic health care, through managed care, insurance reforms, or statefunded care where necessary
- Limit the amount of damages that can be awarded in medical malpractice lawsuits

#### Social Issues

Increase state funding for programs to prevent teen pregnancy

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> See Welch and Carlson 1973 and the works summarized in Cassel 1986, as well as the articles cited in Schaffner, Streb, and Wright 2001.

#### **Abortion**

Because the abortion questions are interrelated, we coded five responses into a single dichotomous choice. The following two choices were coded as an affirmative response.

- Abortions should always be legally available.
- Abortions should be legally available when the procedure is completed within the first trimester of pregnancy.

The remaining three choices were coded as a negative response.

- Abortions should be legal only when the pregnancy resulted from incest or rape or when the life of the woman is endangered.
- Abortions should always be illegal.
- Abortions should be limited by waiting periods and parental notification requirements.

#### **Budget**

Candidates were asked to support a particular level of funding for education, environment, health care, law enforcement, and welfare. The funding options were to eliminate, greatly decrease, slightly decrease, maintain status, slightly increase, and greatly increase. Because NOMINATE requires dichotomous data, we bundled responses into eliminate/decrease and maintain/increase.

#### **Taxes**

Candidates were asked to support a particular tax level for alcohol taxes, capital gains taxes, income taxes for those earning less than \$75,000, income taxes for those earning more than \$75,000, property taxes, and sales taxes. The tax options were to eliminate, greatly decrease, slightly decrease, maintain status, slightly increase, and greatly increase. Because NOMINATE requires dichotomous data, we bundled responses into eliminate/decrease and maintain/increase.

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# The Slant of the News: How Editorial Endorsements Influence Campaign Coverage and Citizens' Views of Candidates

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ne of the essential elements of an impartial press in the United States is the "wall of separation" between the editorial pages and the pages devoted to the news. While the political beliefs of newspaper owners and editors are clearly articulated on opinion pages, their views are not supposed to infiltrate the reporting of the news. The analyses presented in this paper raise questions about this claim. We examine newspaper coverage of more than 60 Senatorial campaigns across three election years and find that information on news pages is slanted in favor of the candidate endorsed on the newspaper's editorial page. We find that the coverage of incumbent Senators is most affected by the newspaper's endorsement decision. We explore the consequences of "slanted" news coverage by showing that voters evaluate endorsed candidates more favorably than candidates who fail to secure an editorial endorsement. The impact of the endorsement decision on voters' evaluations is most powerful in races receiving a great deal of press attention and among citizens who read their local newspaper on a daily basis.

he First Amendment and scores of Supreme Court decisions accord newspapers broad leeway about what information to print concerning politics. Not surprisingly, with so few restrictions, the press has remade itself several times during the last 250 years. Today, newspaper coverage of political events and public policy conforms to the canons of "professional journalism." These include, for example, a code of ethics concerning the rights and responsibilities of the press in a democracy, the formation of structured education for aspiring journalists, and a series of norms and rules that define the general practice of gathering the news.

This constellation of characteristics is supposed to produce the fair and balanced reporting of the news. Today, the professional journalist assumes "the role of a politically neutral adversary, critically examining all sides of an issue and thereby assuring the impartial coverage of the broadest range of issues" (Bennett 1988, 120). It is expected that professional journalists subordinate their political leanings in pursuit of professionalism (Davis 1996).

One of the essential elements of an impartial press is the impenetrable wall between the editorial pages and the pages devoted to the news. This "wall of separation" is critical to the establishment of a fair and impartial press. While the political beliefs of newspaper owners and editors are articulated clearly on opinion pages, their views are not supposed to infiltrate the reporting of the news. According to journalistic norms, the information on the news pages is reported objectively and free from pressure or direction by the people who own and run the newspapers. According to the executive editor of the Washington Post, Leonard Downie, Jr., the news department at the Post follows the paper's formal ethics policy that "the separation of news columns from the editorial pages . . . is solemn and complete" (Seib 1994, 119). A routine practice at most major newspapers in this country is for editors and reporters who cover the daily news to have nothing to do with endorsement decisions or other opinions printed on the editorial page. Likewise, the editorial page editors have no involvement in the coverage of the news (Seib 1994).

The concept of the "wall" is preached faithfully in journalism classes across the country and is a widely held norm within the newspaper industry. In this paper, we examine the integrity of the wall by investigating the relationship between newspapers' editorial decisions and the tone of their news coverage. We examine newspaper coverage of more than 60 Senatorial campaigns across three election years.

Our analysis has important implications for the role of the modern press during campaigns. Historically, the press has played two crucial roles during elections. First, it has been a conduit of information between citizens and candidates. Indeed, most of what citizens know about candidates comes from the news media (e.g., Graber 1997; Paletz 1999). Furthermore, candidates often look to the press to disseminate their messages to potential supporters (e.g., Just et al. 1996; Kahn and Kenney 1999).

Second, the press structures the discourse of political campaigns by emphasizing certain topics over others (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder 1997; McCombs and Shaw 1972). Along with candidates and parties, the press has the ability to help define the nation's problems and identify possible solutions. While the press may sometimes echo the discussions of political elites, at other

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The names of the authors appear in alphabetical order and imply that this paper is in every way a collaborative enterprise. We thank Rick Herrera, Benjamin I. Page, Malia Reddick, and Mike Yawn for their comments on an early draft of this paper and Pat Crittenden for her editorial assistance. The data used in for this paper are available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, University of Michigan. Of course, the Consortium bears no responsibility for the analysis herein. The content analysis of news coverage was collected with support from National Science Foundation Grant SBR-9308421.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Only a handful of scholars have examined the relationship between editorial views and news coverage (e.g., Page 1996; Rowse 1957).

times it acts as a dissenting or alternative voice in the political arena.

The press has been performing these roles in the United States for the better part of two centuries. However, how the press performs these functions has changed dramatically. In the early to mid-1800s, the press was unabashedly partisan. Newspapers were viewed not as objective purveyors of information, but as sources of political propaganda. The avowed practice of today's press, in contrast, is to limit displays of political preferences to the editorial pages, while objectively presenting the news in the remainder of the paper.

The editorial influence on news coverage has electoral ramifications. In particular, the endorsement decisions of newspapers, reflected in the news coverage, may affect citizens' attitudes about competing candidates. Citizens may be unaware that the coverage in their daily newspapers is slanted, making them especially susceptible to persuasion (Milburn 1991). Because the modern press claims to be an objective source of information, unlike the partisan press of the past, any bias in the news section of today's newspapers is particularly insidious.

## SEARCHING FOR ENDORSEMENT EFFECTS IN CAMPAIGN COVERAGE

We conduct an extensive content analysis of campaign coverage to see whether endorsement decisions affect news coverage. We then turn to individual-level survey data to determine whether citizens develop more favorable impressions of candidates who are endorsed.

We focus on U.S. Senate elections. Senate campaigns generate much more coverage in the local press. Senate races generate more coverage than House races because of the more efficient "media-market" fit in Senate contests (Clarke and Evans 1983; Goldenberg and Traugott 1984). Most metropolitan newspapers need to cover only one Senate race because all (or most) readers reside in the same state. However, most newspapers are read by voters residing in several House districts. In addition, House races receive less coverage than Senate campaigns because reporters and editors view House elections as less newsworthy (Cook 1989). Because Senate races generate so much media coverage, differences in press patterns in Senate campaigns may have a profound influence on voters' views of Senate candidates (Kahn and Kenney 1999). Examining Senate races is also preferable to an examination of presidential races because, in a given election year, more than 30 Senate races are available for study. However, to examine 30 presidential campaigns, we would need to go back to the nineteenth century. Of course, press coverage of presidential campaigns has changed dramatically over this extended period.

# A CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CAMPAIGN COVERAGE

We examine all Senate races contested between 1988 and 1992—79 races involving incumbents and 17 open

races.<sup>2</sup> To see whether newspaper endorsement decisions influenced press coverage in these races, we selected the largest circulating newspaper in each state for analysis, because this newspaper reaches more potential voters than any other paper in the state.<sup>3</sup> In 12 of the 79 incumbent races, the state's largest newspaper did not endorse a Senate candidate. These races were dropped from our sample, leaving 67 incumbent races available for analysis.<sup>4</sup> Newspapers endorsed a candidate in each of the 17 open campaigns.

For each newspaper in our sample, we examined news coverage between September 1 and Election Day.<sup>5</sup> We examined all articles that mentioned either candidate in the first, state, or editorial section of the newspaper. In total, we examined 5,529 articles.<sup>6</sup>

### **Considering Rival Explanations**

To assess the impact of endorsement decisions on campaign coverage, it is necessary to take the political context into account. Endorsed candidates may receive more positive coverage because news personnel favor the candidates they endorse, showering the endorsed candidates with favorable press attention. On the other hand, endorsed candidates may receive more positive coverage because they happen to be superior in terms of experience, popularity, resources, and other criteria (Fenno 1996). We thus employ a series of indicators of the political context.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> We decided to analyze open races separately from incumbent campaigns for two reasons. First, prior research has documented that these races vary considerably along several dimensions, such as substance of campaign message, tone of campaign message, and voter recognition of candidates (see Abramowitz 1988, Jacobson 2001, and Kahn and Kenney 1999). Second, the number of open races is small during this period (i.e., 17), making an analysis of open races more suggestive than definitive. Nonetheless, we present the findings for the open races in footnote 16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> By concentrating on the larger and therefore more professional papers, we may be underrepresenting the relationship between editorial decisions and news content, the idea being that more professional papers are more likely to separate editorial opinions from news.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Because we are interested in examining whether endorsement decisions influence news content, we eliminate races in which an endorsement decision is not made. Although not making an endorsement may represent an endorsement decision, we cannot be certain. Some newspapers have a policy of not endorsing candidates. In our study, incumbents obtain the bulk of the newspaper endorsements (70%). Furthermore, our data suggest that endorsements of Senate candidates does not simply follow partisan lines. Newspapers endorse the Senate and the presidential candidate of the same party only 55% of the time

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For specific sampling details about the content analyses, see Kahn and Kenney 1999, 36–8.

and Remey 1999, 20-6.

In all, 20 trained coders participated in the project. Intercoder reliability was assessed repeatedly during the coding process. On average, there was 92% agreement across all the content codes. More specifically, intercoder agreement was 0.90 for the tone of the article, 0.94 for the tone of the headline, 0.92 for the tone of the front page, 0.90 for attributed criticisms, 0.88 for unattributed criticisms, 0.92 for the tone of issue coverage, 0.90 for the tone of trait coverage, and 0.96 for the tone of horserace coverage. These measures of tone are discussed below.

Characteristics of the Candidates. To assess the quality of the candidates, we include several measures. First, we assess the seniority of the incumbent seeking election. Senior senators may be more successful in generating favorable coverage than their junior counterparts.<sup>7</sup> In addition to seniority, involvement in scandals and political controversies may influence press coverage of the sitting senators (Abramowitz 1988). Therefore, we include a measure assessing the candidates' involvement in a scandal.

We expect challengers with political "experience" and candidates who are more "skillfull" campaigners to capture more positive press coverage than their less experienced and less skillful counterparts. With regard to experience, others (Green and Krasno 1988; Squire 1989; Squire and Smith 1996) have developed measures that predict challengers' abilities to raise campaign funds and capture votes. Political experience should also explain whether challengers capture the attention of the press. Challengers with electoral and governing experience can rely on established relationships with reporters and editors. These candidates may also be more adept at generating news releases and holding news conferences.

Beyond experience, some challengers are skillful campaigners and are savvy at garnering the media's attention. As Squire and Smith (1996, 236-7) point out, "Campaign skills refer to the personal characteristics of a candidate that strengthen his or her appeal irrespective of party membership or stands on the issues." To measure the quality of the challenger, we combine the elective experience measure with the indicator of campaign skill.

Campaign Spending. Reporters and editors react to campaign activity when preparing stories (e.g., Clarke and Evans 1983). These activities include press releases by the candidates, press conferences, interviews with reporters, and campaign rallies. To stage these events, candidates need money (Cook 1989). Given the expected relationship between campaign spending and coverage, we control for incumbent and challenger spending when examining patterns of news treatment.

Closeness of the Races. The competitiveness of the campaign also influences news coverage. Candidates receive substantially more coverage when the race is perceived as competitive (e.g., Goldenberg and Traugott 1984; Kahn and Kenney 1999; Westlye 1991). In addition, as races become more "hard-fought," press coverage becomes more negative. In competitive races, newspapers publish more criticisms of the candidates and are more likely to use negative traits to describe the candidates. Given the strong relationship between competition and coverage, we control for the closeness of the race by relying on preelection polls published prior to October 1.

### THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENDORSEMENTS AND COVERAGE

Reporters and editors can slant news coverage of campaigns in various ways-some subtle and difficult for casual readers to detect, others unambiguous and easily identified. We borrow liberally from Page's (1996) summary of more common techniques.

### Tone of Coverage

We begin by looking at the relationship between endorsements and the overall tone of press coverage. Not all news stories are neutral in tone. Instead, the content of many campaign stories can be characterized as favorable toward one candidate and unflattering to another candidate. We scored each article as positive, negative, mixed, or neutral in tone and then calculated an average tone score for the articles written about each candidate.8

The ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression results in Table 1 indicate a link between the newspapers' endorsement and how reporters write about sitting senators. In the model for incumbents, the parameter estimate for endorsements is 0.24, with a standard error of 0.09. With all control variables held constant at their means, endorsed incumbents can expect an average tone score of 0.38 (on a scale ranging from -1 to 1), whereas unendorsed incumbents can expect an average tone score of 0.14. In contrast, challengers who secure endorsements do not receive more favorable press treatment than nonendorsed challengers, as indicated by the coefficient of only -0.01, with a standard error of 0.12, compared to nonendorsed challengers.

Among the control variables, competition influences the tone of coverage for incumbents; as races become more competitive, incumbents can expect more critical coverage.9 In the challenger model, as challengers become more experienced and more skillful, they receive more favorable coverage.

### **Tone of Prominent Coverage**

We turn now to the tone of prominent press coverage. Many newspaper readers are attracted to stories because of the content of the headlines or the placement of stories. Front page stories, for instance, are much more likely to be read than articles buried near the back of the newspaper. Newspapers hoping to hurt or help candidates may slant the tone of headlines and the tone of front page stories. To examine the tone of prominent coverage, we calculate an average tone measure for the front page stories about a candidate and

 $<sup>^{7}</sup>$  See Appendix A for descriptions of all variables used in the analyses in this paper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> In Appendix B, we present several examples of news content,

accompanied by our coding decisions.

Throughout this section, we include two additional control variables: a variable measuring each newspaper's endorsement of the presidential candidates in the two previous presidential elections and a variable measuring each newspaper's endorsement decision in the most recent Senate race. These variables failed to reach statistical significance in 15 of the 16 equations in Tables 1-4.

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TABLE 1. OLS Regression Analysis Explaining the Overall Tone of Coverage					
	Incumbent coverage		Challenger coverage		
	Unstandardized coefficient (SE)	β	Unstandardized coefficient (SE)	β	
Endorsement	0.24(0.09)***	0.28	-0.01(0.12)	-0.02	
Competition	-0.009(0.002)***	-0.46	0.003(0.003)	0.16	
Incumbent spending	0.04(0.12)	0.04	-0.08(0.14)	-0.08	
Challenger spending	-0.04(0.13)	-0.04	0.23(0.16)	0.19	
Scandal	-0.03(0.14)	-0.02	0.02(0.16)	0.01	
Seniority	0.002(0.005)	0.04	-0.004(0.006)	-0.07	
Challenger quality	-0.001(0.01)	0.01	0.03(0.01)***	0.30	
Constant	-0.20(0.16)	0.01(0.19)			
R <sup>2</sup>	0.34	0.17			
NN	67				

Note: The dependent variable is the average tone score for all the articles written about the candidate during the campaign. The tone score averaged 0.26(SD=0.32) for incumbents and -0.03(SD=0.33) for challengers. Endorsement is a binary variable coded 1 if the incumbent is endorsed and 0 if the challenger is endorsed. Competition ranges from 24 (in the least competitive races) to 100 (in the most competitive races). Incumbent and challenger spending is logged to base 10 and divided by the voting age population in the state. Scandal is a binary variable where 1 = incumbent involved in scandal and 0 = otherwise. Seniority is measured by number of years in U.S. Senate. Challenger quality is a scale ranging from 1 to 27. All p values are two-tailed. \*\*\*p < 0.01.

an average tone measure for the headlines about a candidate.

In Table 2A, we present incumbent and challenger models predicting the tone of front page articles, and in Table 2B, we present models predicting the tone of headlines for incumbents and challengers. The results indicate that endorsements influence the tone of coverage given to incumbents but not challengers. With all remaining variables fixed at their means, endorsed incumbents can expect an average tone score of 0.27 for all front page articles, compared to an average tone score of 0.06 for nonendorsed incumbents. The same pattern holds for headlines. The tone of headlines is more favorable for endorsed than for nonendorsed incumbents. Other factors being equal, the average tone of headlines for endorsed incumbents is 0.17 higher than the average tone of headlines for nonendorsed incumbents.

Beyond the endorsement effect, the closeness of the race influences the tone of prominent coverage for incumbents. As in the earlier analysis, the most important explanatory variable in the challenger models is the quality of the challenger, which influences the tone of front page articles and the tone of newspaper headlines.

### **Number of Criticisms**

Newspapers can also slant coverage by explicitly criticizing canditates. Journalists often turn to quotations as a way of supporting their point of view. Furthermore, according to the professional norms of newswriting (Cappon 1991), reporters need to identify sources when they offer criticisms of candidates in news stories. However, they sometimes stray from this ideal, criticizing a candidate in a news story without citing a source. When criticisms are linked to sources, readers can employ well-known political cues (e.g., the party identification or ideological view of the source) to place the criticisms in political context. On the other hand,

when reporters make critical comments about candidates without identifying a source, readers cannot depend on common heuristics to help "counterargue" the information.

Table 3 shows two sets of regression results for criticisms of incumbents and challengers. In Table 3A, we develop incumbent and challenger models to explain the number of attributed criticisms published about the candidates. In addition to controlling for the closeness of the race, the amount of spending by the candidates, and the characteristics of the candidates, we include the number of paragraphs written about the candidate during the course of the campaign. This is necessary because as the total coverage increases, so do criticisms.

The results in Table 3A indicate that endorsed incumbents are treated more favorably than Senators who fail to secure endorsements, receiving, on average, nearly 12 fewer attributed criticisms, holding all remaining variables constant. The endorsement decisions of newspapers do not affect coverage of challengers.

For the remaining variables in the model, the number of paragraphs written about the candidates is by far the most powerful factor influencing the number of attributed criticisms. The level of competition influences coverage in both models, with candidates in competitive races receiving more attributed criticisms. In addition, quality challengers who spend more money are successful in creating more attributed criticisms of incumbents.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> To examine more directly whether, by spending more money, challengers encourage the press to cover challengers' criticisms of the incumbents, we analyzed an OLS regression model of the number of criticisms of the incumbent by the challenger. The predictors in the model are the amount of spending by the challenger, incumbent spending, challenger quality, competition, seniority of the senator, the existence of scandal, and the newspaper's endorsement decision. As challengers' spending increases, the number of challenger criticisms of the incumbent increases significantly. The unstandardized coefficient for challenger spending is 34.8 (standard error = 16.8).

	Incumbent coverage		Challenger coverage	
	Unstandardized coefficient (SE)	β	Unstandardized coefficient (SE)	β
	A. Tone of fro	nt page coverage		
Endorsement Competition Incumbent spending Challenger spending Scandal Seniority Challenger quality  Constant R <sup>2</sup> N	0.21(0.09)** -0.008(0.002)*** 0.11(0.13) -0.04(0.14) 0.005(0.13) -0.003(0.006) -0.003(0.01)  -0.19(0.16) 0.30 56	0.28 -0.42 0.13 -0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.03	0.02(0.09) 0.003(0.003) -0.21(0.16) 0.13(0.18) -0.08(0.14) -0.004(0.007) 0.03(0.01)*** 0.21(0.18) 0.20	0.03 0.17 -0.24 0.13 -0.09 -0.09 0.31
	B. Tone	of headlines		
Endorsement Competition Incumbent spending Challenger spending Scandal Seniority Challenger quality	0.17(0.08)** -0.006(0.002)*** 0.08(0.09) -0.06(0.10) -0.06(0.10) 0.001(0.004) -0.002(0.009)	0.27 -0.40 0.11 -0.08 -0.07 0.03 -0.03	-0.09(0.09) 0.002(0.002) -0.10(0.12) 0.25(0.13) 0.02(0.14) -0.006(0.005) 0.03(0.01)***	-0.11 0.12 -0.11 0.24 0.02 -0.13
Constant R <sup>2</sup> N	-0.18(0.12) 0.31 67		0.03(0.16) 0.13 67	

Note: Front page tone is the average tone score for all the front page articles about the candidate during the campaign. The average front page tone was 0.20(SD=0.29) for incumbents and 0.03(SD=0.29) for challengers. Tone of headlines is the average tone score for all the headlines mentioning the candidate during the campaign. The average headline tone was 0.14 for incumbents(SD=0.24) and -0.06(SD=0.28) for challengers. Endorsement is a binary variable coded 1 if the incumbent is endorsed and 0 if the challenger is endorsed. Competition ranges from 24 (in the least competitive races) to 100 (in the most competitive races). Incumbent and challenger spending is logged to base 10 and divided by the voting age population in the state. Scandal is a binary variable where 1= incumbent involved in scandal and 0= otherwise. Seniority is measured by number of years in U.S. Senate. Challenger quality is a scale ranging from 1 to 27. All p values are two-tailed. \*\*\*\*p < 0.01; \*\*p < 0.05.

In Table 3B, we focus on unattributed criticisms. The dependent variable in these models is the number of unattributed criticisms published about the candidate divided by the total number of criticisms written about the candidate. Endorsements continue to influence the tone of coverage for incumbents, but endorsements fail to influence the coverage of challengers.<sup>11</sup>

### **Substance of Coverage**

We now turn to the substance of coverage, seeking to determine whether coverage of issues, traits, or the horserace varies with endorsement decisions. We begin by examining issue coverage, which far outstrips trait and horserace coverage in terms of press attention. On average, 154 paragraphs about issues are published during Senate campaigns, wheres only 54 paragraphs, on

average, discuss the personal characteristics of candidates, and 40 paragraphs, on average, discuss the candidates' chances of victory. 12

We calculate an average tone measure for stories mainly about issues.<sup>13</sup> The results presented in the first and second columns in Table 4 indicate that endorsed incumbents could expect more positive coverage of their policy views compared to nonendorsed incumbents. The endorsement coefficient indicates that the average tone score for issue articles is 0.23 higher for endorsed incumbents compared to nonendorsed incumbents, all other things being equal. In contrast,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> We repeated the same analysis for unattributed criticisms with one change; we made the dependent variable the number of unattributed criticisms. The results are identical to those presented in Table 3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> In research on presidential campaigns, scholars have found much greater emphasis on the horserace, compared to issues and traits (e.g., Patterson 1993; Robinson and Sheehan 1983). In Senate races, coverage of the horserace is much less prevalent (Kahn 1991; Westlye 1991).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> For incumbents, there were five campaigns in which no articles mainly about issues were published during the course of the campaign. For challengers, there were seven such campaigns. We exclude these races from the analysis, leaving 62 races for incumbents and 60 races for challengers in Table 4.

	Analysis Explaining Criticisms in Press Incumbent coverage		Challenger coverage	
	Unstandardized coefficient (SE)	β	Unstandardized coefficient (SE)	β
	A. Number of attribu	uted criticisms		
Endorsement Competition Incumbent spending Challenger spending Seniority Scandal Challenger quality Paragraphs about candidate  Constant R <sup>2</sup> N	-11.63(6.47)* 0.41(0.18)** -4.30(8.28) 20.54(8.99)** 0.66(0.35)* -4.62(8.98) -2.09(0.83)*** 0.08(0.009)***  10.41(12.70) 0.76 67	-0.12 0.19 -0.04 0.16 0.12 -0.04 -0.17 0.70	-1.81(6.03) 0.43(0.17)** -3.86(7.66) 3.50(8.30) 0.30(0.33) 0.55(8.35) -1.14(0.78) 0.06(0.01)***  19.54(11.92)* 0.66 67	-0.03 0.25 -0.04 0.04 0.07 0.01 -0.12 0.65
	B. Proportion of unattr	ributed criticisms		
Endorsement Competition Incumbent spending Challenger spending Seniority Scandal Challenger quality	-0.06(0.03)** 0.0007(0.0008) -0.02(0.05) -0.06(0.05) 0.0001(0.002) -0.07(0.05) 0.005(0.005)	-0.22 0.10 -0.06 -0.16 0.01 -0.18 0.13	0.10(0.07) -0.005(0.002)*** -0.03(0.09) -0.04(0.10) 0.002(0.004) 0.09(0.10) 0.001(0.009)	0.18 -0.38 -0.04 -0.05 0.06 0.12
Constant R <sup>2</sup> N	0.20(0.06)*** 0.12 67		0.009(0.12) 0.19 67	

Note: Number of attributed criticisms is the number of criticisms citing a source published about a candidate during the campaign. The mean for incumbents was 44.1(SD=36) per race and 29(SD=28) for challengers. Proportion of unattributed criticisms is the number of criticisms not referring to a source published about a candidate/total number of criticisms published about the candidate. The mean for incumbents was 0.12(SD=0.12) per race and 0.22(SD=0.25) for challengers. Endorsement is a binary variable coded 1 if the incumbent is endorsed and 0 if the challenger is endorsed. Competition ranges from 24 (in the least competitive races) to 100 (in the most competitive races). Incumbent and challenger spending is logged to base 10 and divided by voting age population in the state. Scandal is a binary variable where 1= incumbent involved in scandal and 0= otherwise. Seniority is measured by number of years in U.S. Senate. Challenger quality is a scale ranging from 1 to 27. Paragraphs about candidate is the number of paragraphs written about the a candidate during the course of the campaign. All p values are two-tailed. \*\*\*p < 0.01; \*\*p < 0.05; \*p < 0.10.

endorsements failed to influence the tone of issue coverage for challengers.

We also look at patterns of trait coverage. While professional standards for modern journalists caution against using evaluative adjective (Cappon 1991), contemporary news coverage is replete with evaluative adjectives (Page 1996). For example, reporters routinely characterize candidates as inexperienced, erratic, out of touch, or ineffective.

We present results for models of the proportion of negative trait coverage devoted to the candidates in the third and fourth columns in Table 4. In a deviation from the pattern we have seen thus far, endorsement decisions are not consequential for incumbents. Reporters are *not* more likely to describe incumbents in unflattering terms when the incumbent fails to impress the newspaper's editorial board. In addition, and consistent with our previous results, critical coverage of the challengers' personal traits does not vary with endorsement decisions.

Finally, we examine patterns of horserace coverage in the fifth and sixth columns in Table 4. Political reporters spend a great deal of time describing the viability of the competing candidates (e.g., Bartels 1988; Patterson 1993). The news discussion of the candidate's viability can be consequential, influencing voters' impressions of the candidates and affecting the candidates' abilities to raise funds (Bartels 1988; Mutz 1995). Endorsements do alter how reporters describe the viability of sitting senators. Incumbents who are not endorsed by newspapers are described as less electable than incumbents who are endorsed, all other things being equal. Reporters are less likely to use phrases such as "way ahead," "big lead," and "safe margin" when covering nonendorsed incumbents. Consistent with all previous analyses in this paper, endorsed challengers do not receive the same "endorsement slant" as incumbents.

The closeness of the race influences the coverage of issues, traits, and horserace for incumbents. Competition also alters the tone of horserace coverage given

	Issue coverage		Trait coverage		Horserace coverage	
	Unstandardized coefficient (SE)	β	Unstandardized coefficient (SE)	β	Unstandardized coefficient (SE)	β
	Α.	Tone of cov	verage for incumbents			
Endorsement Competition Incumbent spending Challenger spending Seniority Scandal Challenger quality	0.23(0.09)** -0.008(0.002)*** 0.03(12) -0.04(0.13) 0.004(0.005) -0.04(0.13) -0.003(0.01)	0.30 -0.41 0.04 -0.04 0.08 -0.04 -0.03	-0.004(0.07) 0.004(0.002)** 0.04(0.09) 0.03(0.10) -0.002(0.004) -0.10(0.10) -0.009(0.009)	-0.01 0.28 0.06 0.05 -0.07 -0.14 -0.13	0.26(0.15)* -0.02(0.004)*** 0.07(0.20) -0.06(0.21) 0.006(0.009) -0.23(0.22) -0.03(0.02)	0.16 -0.61 0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.10 -0.16
Constant R <sup>2</sup> N	-0.20(0.16) 0.32 62		0.38(0.12)*** 0.08 67		3.12(0.26)*** 0.55 67	
B. Tone of coverage for challengers						
Endorsement Competition Incumbent spending Challenger spending Seniority Scandal Challenger quality	-0.10(0.11) 0.001(0.003) -0.05(0.14) 0.14(0.15) 0.0001(0.006) -0.003(0.15) 0.03(0.01)***	-0.13 0.07 -0.05 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.33	0.08(0.06) 0.001(0.002) -0.10(0.08) 0.006(0.09) 0.0007(0.004) -0.10(0.09) -0.01(0.01)	0.17 0.11 -0.17 0.01 0.02 -0.15 -0.20	-0.17(0.15) 0.02(0.004)*** 0.03(0.20) -0.04(0.22) -0.008(0.009) 0.12(0.22) 0.03(0.02)	-0.10 0.64 0.01 -0.02 -0.09 0.06 0.13
Constant R <sup>2</sup> N	0.04(0.18) 0.16 60		0.41(0.11)*** 0.10 67		2.91(0.26)*** 0.52 67	

Note: Tone of issue coverage is the average tone score for all articles mainly about issues for the candidate during the campaign. The average tone for incumbents was 0.24(SD=0.30) for incumbents and 0.01(SD=0.31) for challengers. Tone of trait coverage is the number of negative traits about a candidate/the total number of traits (positive and negative) mentioned about the candidate. The mean for incumbents was 0.27(SD=0.18) per race and 0.33(SD=0.20) for challengers. Tone of horserace coverage is the average viability score based on all the articles written about the candidate. The mean viability score for incumbents was 4.1(SD=0.65) and the mean for challengers was 2.0(SD=0.63). Competition ranges from 24 (in the least competitive races) to 100 (in the most competitive races). Incumbent and challenger spending is logged to base 10 and divided by the voting age population in the state. Scandal is a binary variable where 1= incumbent involved in scandal and 0= otherwise. Seniority is measured by number of years in U.S. Senate. Challenger quality is a scale ranging from 1 to 27. All p values are two-tailed. \*\*\*\*p < 0.01; \*\*p < 0.05; \*p < 0.10.

to the challenger, <sup>14</sup> and the quality of the challenger influences the tone of issue coverage for challengers. <sup>15</sup>

In sum, our results suggest that newspaper endorsements shape newspaper coverage for incumbents. For every measure of coverage, save one, endorsed incumbents receive more favorable coverage than their nonendorsed counterparts. Coverage of challengers, on the other hand, is unaffected by endorsement decisions. Challengers do, however, reap indirect benefits from endorsements: When challengers capture endorsements, their opponents—the nonendorsed incumbents—receive more negative coverage. 16

the elected experience component of the challenger quality model is not a true interval measure. Therefore, we examined alternative operationalizations of challenger quality. First, we recoded the nine categories of experience into three binary variables. Second, we examined a binary experience variable (i.e., elected experience, no elected experience). These operationalizations of challenger quality did not perform as well as the original measure.

As discussed earlier, we replicated all the analyses in Tables 1–4 for open races. The endorsement variable fails to achieve statistical significance in these models. Nonetheless, as noted earlier, our conclusions about open races are only suggestive given the small number of cases.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Competition has been related to the slant of coverage in virtually all analyses. Given its consistent influence, it is possible that the strength of the relationship between the tone of coverage and endorsements changes as competition changes. We conducted two separate tests to investigate this possibility. First, we added an interaction between competition and endorsement to each of the analyses in Tables 1-4. The interaction coefficient fails to reach traditional levels of statistical significance (p < 0.05) in 14 of the 16 tests. Second, we partitioned competition into low, medium, and high levels and then reestimated all of the analyses in Tables 1-4 for each level. In highly competitive races, the endorsement variable reached statistical significance in eight of the 16 tests. In moderately competitive races, endorsement reached statistical significance in two of the 16 tests. And in races with low levels of competition, endorsement reached statistical significance in one of the 16 tests. These findings suggest a modest conditional relationship between competition and endorsement, with the impact of endorsement being the most powerful in the most competitive races. The results of these analyses, as well as other analyses discussed in this paper, are available from the authors upon

request. <sup>15</sup> Although challenger quality has performed quite well, defeating the null hypothesis in four of the eight challenger models (p < 0.01),

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### **ASSESSING TEMPORAL ORDER**

We have argued that the views of newspaper editors influence how the paper covers Senate campaigns. However, it is conceivable that the causal direction is reversed. That is, what appears in the newspaper may influence the endorsement decisions of editors. However, prior research examining how endorsement decisions are made suggests that editorial boards do not simply rely on news reports (Clarke and Evans 1983; Seib 1994). In particular, endorsement decisions at virtually all newspapers come after detailed scrutiny by editorial board members of the competing Senatorial candidates, without the influence of reporters. Most editorial boards conduct face-to-face interviews with the Senatorial candidates, and reporters are not privy to these interviews. In addition, editorial boards routinely prepare detailed reports on potential candidates, intentionally excluding reporters. Nevertheless, to feel confident that endorsement decisions influence news coverage, and not vice versa, we conduct a test aimed directly at assessing temporal order. Our task is made easier because we know the precise publication date of each newspaper's endorsement.

We model coverage patterns over time and determine whether the endorsement decision of the newspaper alters the tone of coverage from early to late in the campaign. To assess the change in the tone of coverage before and after the endorsement decision, we specify and estimate a dynamic OLS model. Based on the date of each news article and the date of the endorsement decision, we develop a change model in which the tone of coverage after the endorsement decision is a function of (1) the tone of coverage before the endorsement decision, (2) the newspaper's endorsement decision, (3) changes in incumbent and challenger spending, and (4) changes in the closeness of the race. This enables us to estimate whether changes in the tone of coverage can be explained by the endorsement decision, controlling for prior coverage and other dynamic campaign forces.17

To measure the tone of coverage, we combine the eight measures of coverage presented in Tables 1–4 into a single global measure of tone. Thus, the global tone measure after the endorsement decision serves as the dependent variable. The results presented in Table 5 indicate that the endorsement decision changes the tone of coverage. Incumbents who capture the

As with the prior analyses, we control for the newspapers' prior endorsements. Consistent with our prior analyses, both measures of prior endorsements fail to reach statistical significance.
More specifically, we normalize each of the tone measures (e.g.,

TABLE 5. OLS Regression Analysis Explaining Changes in the Global Tone of Incumbent Coverage

<

-	Unstandardized	
	coefficient (SE)	β
Endorsement	2.89(1.20)**	0.30
Early coverage	0.46(0.15)**	0.37
(before endorsement)		
Changes in competition	-0.002(0.04)	-0.01
Changes in incumbent	-2.13(2.02)	-0.12
spending		
Changes in challenger	1.80(2.25)	0.09
spending		
•	. ==//	
Constant	-0.77(1.09)	
$R^2$	0.32	
N	60	

Note: The dependent variable is the global tone score for coverage during the late period (after publication of the endorsement. The global measure has a mean of 1.55(SD = 3.62). Endorsement is a binary variable coded 1 if the incumbent is endorsed and 0 if the challenger is endorsed. Early coverage is the global tone score for coverage before the publication of the newspaper's endorsement. Changes in competition is the change in poll standings from polls published in late September to polls published in late October. Changes in incumbent and challenger spending (logged to base 10 and divided by the voting age population in the state) are changes in spending levels from early October (10/1–10/15) to late October through election day. All  $\rho$  values are two-tailed. \*\* $\rho$ <0.05.

newspaper's endorsement receive nearly a three-point increase in positive coverage after the editorial decision is published, on average, compared to incumbents who are not endorsed.<sup>21</sup>

These findings enhance our confidence that the editors' endorsement decisions are influencing the tone of news coverage. Still open, though, is the question of whether slanted coverage alters citizens' views of candidates. If slanted coverage falls on deaf ears, then the relationship between editorial opinion and news coverage is far less noteworthy.

all the variables from the original model as additional independent variables. Finally, we conduct classical tests of significance for the coefficient estimating the errors at time t-1. The results show that the standard error for the coefficient representing errors at time t-1 is almost as large as the coefficient, indicating the lack of autocorrelation in the model. Therefore, no remedial action is needed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> More specifically, we normalize each of the tone measures (e.g., number of attributed criticisms, tone of headlines) and then take the mean of these normalized scores.

mean of these normalized scores.

19 In this section, we restrict our examination to incumbent coverage because we found no evidence of an endorsement effect for challengers and candidates in open races.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable may produce autocorrelation and bias the estimators. We employ a test recommended by Durbin (1970), which requires the following steps: First, we use the original OLS model to estimate the residuals. Next, we regress the residuals at time t on the errors at time t-1 while including

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> We examined the temporal order question with one additional test. We compared the impact of the endorsement decision on the slant of coverage prior to and after the publication of the endorsement. We ran two OLS equations, one predicting the impact of the endorsement on global tone of coverage before the endorsement decision and the other predicting the impact of the endorsement on the global tone of coverage after the endorsement decision, controlling for all the variables in Tables 1–4. The impact of the endorsement decision on coverage increases sharply after newspapers print their endorsements. The unstandardized coefficient is 1.89 (standard error = 0.91) before the endorsement decision and 3.73 (standard error = 1.06) after the endorsement decision. This analysis suggests that once editors' preferences become known, the slant of new coverage in favor of endorsed candidates increases.

### DO ENDORSEMENTS INFLUENCE CITIZENS' VIEWS OF CANDIDATES? A SURVEY ANALYSIS

People rely on and look to newspapers for information about political candidates (e.g., Goldenberg and Traugott 1984; Just et al. 1996). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that slanted press coverage, driven by endorsement decisions, may influence the electoral fortunes of political candidates. To test for the electoral implications of newspaper endorsements, we integrate information about citizens' evaluations of the candidates with information about the newspapers' endorsement decisions, drawing on the 1988–92 National Election Studies/Senate Election Studies (NES/SES) for data on respondents' evaluations of U.S. Senate candidates.<sup>22</sup>

We create a measure of comparative candidate evaluations. We also control for rival factors known to influence evaluations, such as political attitudes, perceptions of national conditions, candidate characteristics, and campaign characteristics.<sup>23</sup>

### **Political Attitudes**

We measure three political attitudes: party identification, ideological characteristics, and assessments of issues. According to Congressional scholars, these three forces consistently influence citizens' views of Senate candidates (e.g., Abramowitz and Segal 1992; Kahn and Kenney 1999). To measure party identification, we rely on the standard seven-point scale; for ideology, we construct a variable capturing the "comparative ideological distances" between the respondent and the two candidates, and we develop a measure of issue evaluations based on a series of spending questions included in the NES/SES.

### **Perceptions of National Conditions**

Voters also consider the prevailing national conditions when casting their ballots (e.g., Ferejohn and Calvert 1984; Stein 1990), blaming candidates of the president's party if the national economy is getting worse or crediting candidates who share the president's partisan label if the economy seems healthy. Because voters may also use their vote for the president as a guide in their choice of Senate candidates (Campbell and Sumners 1990; Ferejohn and Calvert 1984), we include a measure of presidential vote choice in our model. In addition, voters may support the Senate candidate of the president's party if they approve of the president's job performance (Jacobson 2001; Kernell 1977), a possibility we examine.

### Characteristics of the Candidates

We control for three characteristics of the candidates: the seniority of Senators, the quality of challengers, and whether incumbent Senators are considered controversial (Abramowitz 1988; Squire 1989). By including measures of candidate characteristics, we not only develop a more complete mdoel of citizens' evaluations, but also control for forces that covary with the newspaper's endorsement decision.

### Campaign Spending

Citizens may develop more favorable impressions of challengers who spend more, compared to challengers who have few resources (e.g., Green and Krasno 1990; Jacobson 1980). In addition, levels of campaign spending, similar to candidates' characteristics, are likely to covary with the newspapers' endorsement decisions.

### Competition

Finally, we measure the closeness of the race. Because editors may be more likely to endorse incumbents in lopsided races, it is necessary to control for competitiveness. Furthermore, people's impressions of candidates may vary with the closeness of race. For example, citizens may develop more favorable impressions of safe incumbents compared to vulnerable incumbents. Similarly, people may have more positive impressions of competitive challengers than challengers lagging far behind in the preelection polls.

# THE IMPACT OF ENDORSEMENTS ON CITIZENS' VIEWS OF CANDIDATE

In Table 6, we examine the impact of slanted coverage, as conditioned by the amount of news attention devoted to the campaign. We employ a binary endorsement variable to capture the slant of coverage (1 = the incumbent is endorsed by the state's newspaper; 0 = the incumbent is not endorsed by the newspaper). By including the endorsement variable as a measure of slanted coverage, we capture the candidate preferences of the newspapers, thereby measuring the various ways endorsements influence the tone of coverage. We include an interaction term to estimate whether the impact of the newspaper's endorsement decision on candidate evaluations becomes more powerful as the amount of coverage increases.

The results in Table 6 indicate that the newspapers' endorsement decisions, by affecting patterns of press coverage, influence people's attitudes toward the candidates, holding all other factors constant.<sup>24</sup> As

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> We look exclusively at incumbent races because we failed to find that endorsements influenced coverage in open races. For the 67 campaigns examined in our analysis, 4,298 interviews were completed

completed. <sup>23</sup> For information on the operationalization of these variables, see Appendix A.

 $<sup>^{24}</sup>$  We also examined whether the newspaper's endorsement decision, conditioned by the amount of coverage, influences the voting decision. In this analysis, the dependent variable is 1 = vote for the incumbent and 0 = vote for the challenger. The logit coefficient for the interaction between endorsement and the amount of coverage is 0.0005, with a standard error of 0.0002, suggesting that the slant

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TABLE 6. OLS Regression of Explaining Comparative Feeling Thermometer Score: The Multiplicative Relationship between **Endorsement Decision and Amount of** Coverage

Coverage	
	Unstandardized
	coefficient (SE)
Endorsement decision * amount	0.008(0.003)**
of coverage	
Endorsement decision	-6.73(2.43)***
Amount of coverage	-0.008(0.003)***
Citizens' attitudes	
Party identification	5.42(0.44)***
Ideology	2.01(0.27)***
Issues	1.78(0.49)***
National conditions	
Economic assessments	1.05(0.45)**
Coattail voting	5.58(1.06)***
Presidential approval	2.33(0.36)***
Characteristics of candidates	
Seniority	0.005(0.08)
Scandal	-3.05(1.81)*
Challenger quality	-0.28(0.09)***
Characteristics of the race	
Incumbent spending	11.40(3.75)***
Challenger spending	1.61(4.74)
Competition	-0.29(0.04)***
Constant	37.40(3.41)***
$R^2$	0.20
N	4,298

Note: The dependent variable is the comparative feeling thermometer scores, where challenger scores are subtracted from incumbent scores. See Appendix A for the operationalization of the independent variables. All p values are two-tailed. \*\*p < 0.01; \*\*p < 0.05; \*p < 0.10.

expected, the impact of the endorsement decision increases significantly with the amount of news attention, as indicated by the statistically significant and positive interaction coefficient.<sup>25</sup>

To illustrate these effects, we calculate point estimates on the comparative feeling thermometer. For example, when news coverage is at its observed maximum value (i.e., paragraphs = 3,070) and the incumbent is endorsed, the predicted score on the comparative feeling thermometers is 31.1, heavily in favor of the incumbent. However, when coverage is at the maximum value and the incumbent is not endorsed, the average score on the feeling thermometers drops more than 16 points, to 13.5, slightly in favor of the incumbent.

In contrast, the effect of endorsements on citizens' attitudes is virtually nonexistent given sparse cover-

age. With coverage at its observed minimum (i.e., of coverage, conditioned by the amount of coverage, significantly

influences respondents' reported vote decision. The number of cases

amount of coverage increases. The interaction coefficient is positive and statistically significant (0.008, with a standard error of 0.003).

paragraphs = 71) and the incumbent endorsed, the predicted score on the comparative feeling thermometers is 30.4, heavily in favor of the incumbent. When the incumbent fails to secure the newspaper's endorsement and coverage is at the minimum, the predicted score decreases only to 29.8, still heavily favoring the incumbent. These examples demonstrate that the influence of slant of coverage depends on the amount of campaign news. The effect of endorsements increases as coverage increases, while the effects of endorsements are barely detectable when coverage is sparse.26

The control variables in Table 6 perform as expected. Virtually all of the rival explanations are signed in the hypothesized directions and reach statistical significance.

The amount of coverage notwithstanding, some people simply do not read the newspaper as often as others. Some people form a lifelong habit of reading the paper every day, while others pick up the newspaper far less frequently. People exposed to the slanted coverage on a daily basis, almost by definition, should be more influenced than people who pick up a paper less regularly.

To test this expectation, we established two categories of readers: everyday readers and less-thaneveryday readers. We then reestimated the equations in Table 6 for these two types of readers (see Table 7). The parameter estimate for the interaction term is statistically significant in the model for everyday readers but not in the model for people who read the paper less often. These findings indicate that the conditional relationship between slanted coverage and the amount of coverage is more powerful for people who read the paper every day. For citizens who do not read the newspaper daily, even large amounts of slanted coverage fail to influence their attitudes about the Senate candidates.

To illustrate the conditional relationship for everyday readers, we vary the amount of coverage and the endorsement decision.<sup>27</sup> When the incumbent is endorsed and the amount of coverage is at its peak (i.e., paragraphs = 3,070), the estimate for everyday readers is 17.1, favoring the incumbent. However, when the incumbent is not endorsed and the amount of coverage is at its highest point, the estimate for everyday readers is -4.9, favoring the challenger. In contrast, when information is at its lowest point, the estimate for everyday readers changes less than one point as a function of the endorsement decision. When coverage

for the analysis is 2,623. We examined the impact of slanted coverage with an alternative measure: the global measure of tone based on the specific measures of slanted coverage presented in Tables 1-4. The influence of the global tone measure on candidate evaluations escalates as the total

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> The impact of endorsements may be conditioned by other aspects of the campaign environment, such as competition. In particular, the impact of slanted coverage may be greater in competitive races where citizens are more interested in the race and are more likely to seek out news coverage. To test for this possibility, we reestimated the model in Table 6 and substituted the interaction term endorsement \* competition for endorsement \* total incumbent coverage. The interaction coefficient for endorsement \* competition is 0.28, with a standard error of 0.11. The positively signed and statistically significant coefficient demonstrates that the influence of slanted coverage on citizens' evaluations of the candidates increases as competition increases.

27 We do not illustrate the conditional relationship between amount

of coverage and endorsement decisions for less-than-everyday readers because the interaction coefficient and the baseline coefficients are not statistically significant for these respondents.

TABLE 7. OLS Regression Explaining Comparative Feeling Thermometer Score: Exploring How Amount of Coverage and Newspaper Readership Condition the Impact of the Endorsement Decision

Unstandardized coefficient (SE)

	Everyday readers	Less-than-everyday readers
Endorsement decision * amount of coverage	0.01(0.005)**	0.005(0.005)
Endorsement decision	-8.68(3.59)**	-3.71(3.28)
Amount of coverage	-0.01(0.004)***	-0.003(0.003)
Citizens' attitudes	, ,	• •
Party identification	6.83(0.66)***	4.09(0.58)***
Ideology	2.46(0.41)***	1.56(0.34)***
Issues	2.65(0.75)***	1.11(0.63)*
National conditions		
Economic assessments	1.07(0.69)	0.99(0.59)*
Coattail voting	1.44(1.56)	9.29(1.44)***
Presidential approval	2.83(0.54)***	1.65(0.46)***
Characteristics of candidates		
Seniority	0.17(0.12)	-0.14(0.10)
Scandal	-3.92(3.04)	-0.85(2.21)
Challenger quality	-0.39(0.14)* <del>*</del> *	-0.21(0.13)
Characteristics of the race		
Incumbent spending	18.96(5.80)***	6.66(4.81)
Challenger spending	2.18(7.24)	1.66(6.16)
Competition	-0.35(0.06)** <del>*</del>	-0.24(0.05)** <del>*</del>
Constant	43.22(5.11)***	31.09(4.52)***
$R^2$	0.25 <sup>^</sup>	0.16
N	2,047	2,251

*Note*: The dependent variable in both models is the comparative feeling thermometer scores, where challenger scores are subtracted from incumbent scores. See Appendix A for the operationalization of the independent variables. All p values are two-tailed. \*\*\*p < 0.01; \*\*p < 0.05; \*p < 0.10.

is scarce, incumbents are favored by about 16 points, regardless of the newspapers' endorsement decision.<sup>28</sup>

#### CONCLUSION

We have provided the most systematic evidence to date that newspaper coverage of campaigns is affected by editorial positions, which alter the tone of the news coverage given to incumbents. Moreover, endorsement-driven coverage affects the preferences of citizens. In races receiving a great deal of coverage, endorsed incumbents fare far better with potential voters than nonendorsed incumbents, even controlling for several forces known to shape the voting preferences of citizens. Individuals who routinely read their daily newspapers—the people who are most likely to vote—are most affected by coverage patterns.

We must emphasize that our study is limited to Senate campaigns over a six-year period. We encourage research on other races, different newspapers, and different years to assess the validity of our results.

Why do the newspapers' editorial decisions and news content coincide? We can only speculate.<sup>29</sup> The connec-

tion may be the result of the organizational structure of the newspaper (Gans 1980; Sparrow 1999). As Gans (1980, 97-8) explains, "Because news organizations are assembly lines on which people must work together to manufacture a product against a deadline, they almost always generate conformity—insofar as news judgment is filled with uncertainty, and top editors must, by virtue of their position, resolve uncertainty [by setting] tones and sometimes precedents, which then require conformity." Reporters tend not to be independent observers of the political scene. Instead, they are "employees of complex organizations who see their copy go through layers of editors" (Sparrow 1999, 107-8). Accordingly, it seems inevitable that the views of the editors will shape the content of the news. Ambitious reporters learn what to write to please their editors and publishers, who ultimately decide what is to be the news and which reporters are to be hired and promoted (Sparrow 1999). Page (1996) explains that reporters who hold the same political views as their editors and publishers may be more likely to be hired by particular newspapers and may be more likely to succeed at these newspapers. On the other hand, reporters with opposing views, if hired, may be less satisfied with their job and may be more likely to leave. Sparrow goes a step further by contending that reporters who write stories that "threaten the institutional interests" of the news organization feel "the invisible hand" of the news

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> We replicated this analysis with the global tone measure and found the same pattern of results. The interaction coefficient for everyday readers is 0.0008 (with a standard error of 0.0004), easily reaching statistical significance. The interaction coefficient for less frequent readers fails to reach statistical significance (0.0001, with a standard error of 0.0008)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> We do not investigate the causal mechanism that generates the connection between news content and editorial preferences, because

we have no data concerning the inner workings of newspapers across the nation.

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room's social control. These reporters learn to regulate and censor themselves in order to be successful.

Finally, why do the editorial preferences of the newspaper influence news coverage only of sitting Senators? Senators, unlike challengers, are powerful figures whose position in government can promote *or* thwart the interests of editors. When editors view Senators as allies in terms of ideology or party, or even personally, they have clear incentives to foster a friendly and stable relationship with these Senators. If editors provide these Senators with favorable coverage, incumbents may be more likely to push policy agendas that resonate with the media elite. Furthermore, favorable press attention may encourage Senators to be friendly sources of information for reporters and editors as they write campaign and noncampaign stories.

"Unfriendly" Senators, in contrast, will not promote policy changes desired by the editors and publisher of the newspaper. Furthermore, Senators who are at odds with newspapers tend not to be cooperative with reporters and editors (Fenno 1996; Kahn and Kenney 1999). These uncooperative Senators may not hold as many press conferences, may not grant as many interviews, and may not be willing to offer comments on or "off the record."

Challengers, in contrast, are not the recipients of slanted coverage. This may be because they do not muster the same amount of coverage as incumbents (Goldenberg and Traugott 1984; Kahn and Kenney 1999; Westlye 1991). Challengers, perhaps because of their general lack of coverage, escape the slanted coverage due to editorial preferences.

Should we be concerned that news coverage has a political slant? In many other democratic countries, the press is unabashedly partisan. In Great Britain, for example, the major newspapers' partisan preferences are well known and these partisan preferences influence the tone and quantity of campaign coverage (see Semetko, Scammell, and Nossiter 1994). In the United States, in contrast, the press ostensibly strives for impartiality. The newspaper industry collectively assures Americans that news coverage is professionally produced and is free from bias. In fact, one of the "canons of journalism" of the American Society of Newspaper Editors is "a clear distinction between news reports and opinion" (McQuail 1992, 38). Our study shows that this goal has not been achieved.

The "hidden" bias in the United States press may be more problematic than the open bias of many European newspapers. If Americans believe that the news is presented in an objective fashion, free from editorial pressure, they may be more susceptible to media manipulation. Given that citizens rely on the press to bring them the news of campaigns, especially in races for statewide and national office, slanted coverage can have dramatic effects on the outcomes of elections.

# APPENDIX A. CODING AND MEASUREMENT OF VARIABLES

Amount of News Attention: The number of paragraphs written about the candidates.

Attributed Criticisms: The number of attributed criticisms published about the canddate.

Campaign Spending: Spending for both candidates is logged to base 10 and divided by the state's voting age population. Campaign spending is measured early in the campaign (prior to October 1) to limit the chance that coverage patterns influence spending levels. The bulk of campaign coverage (73%) appears after September 30.

Coattail Voting: This variable is coded 1 (the respondent votes for a Republican for president and a Republican incumbent for Senate; the respondent votes for a Democrat for president and a Democratic incumbent for Senate) to -1 (the respondent votes for a Republican for president and a Democratic incumbent for Senate; the respondent votes for a Democrat for president and a Republican incumbent for Senate).

Comparative Feeling Thermometer: The arithmetic difference between the incumbent and the challenger scores on the NES feeling thermometer scales. Respondents who did not rate a candidate are placed at 50 on the feeling thermometer.

Competition: The difference in support of the candidates in preelection polls from 100, creating a scale ranging from 24 in the least competitive (100-76=24) to 100 in the most competitive race (100-0=100). Competition is measured early in the campaign (prior to October 1) to limit the chance that coverage patterns influence competition levels.

Controversial Senator: A Senator is controversial if (1) the Senator was involved in a well-publicized scandal, (2) the Senator ran unsuccessfully for president, (3) the Senator's advancing age was an important campaign issue, or (4) the Senator was newly appointed.

Economic Assessments: The wording of the sociotropic question is, "Now, thinking about the country as a whole, would you say that over the past year, the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?" Economic assessments are measured on a five-point scale ranging from +2 (e.g., the nation's economy is much better and the incumbent is a Republican; the nation's economy is much worse and the incumbent is a Democrat) to -2 (e.g., the nation's economy is much better and the incumbent is a Democrat; the nation's economy is much worse and the incumbent is a Republican).

Endorsement Decision: The variable is coded 1 = end-orsed incumbent (nonendorsed challenger); 0 = endorsed challenger (nonendorsed incumbent).

Global Tone Measure: Each of the tone measures in Tables 1–4 is normalized and averaged.

Ideological Placement: The absolute distance between the respondents' self-placement on the ideological scale and their placement of the incumbent and the challenger is calculated. Then the respondents' distance from the challenger is subtracted from their distance from the incumbent, indicating which candidate the respondents feel closer to ideologically. Respondents not answering the ideological questions are recoded to the middle of the scale.

Issue Evaluations: The issue scale is based on respondents' spending preferences for six federal programs (i.e., the environment, education, welfare, health care, child care, and defense). The candidates' positions on these six issues is estimated by calculating a mean position for all Democratic candidates and a mean position for all Republican candidates, based on descriptions of the candidates' positions in the press. The respondents' position is matched with the candidates' positions on each of the issues. The scale is then recoded so that respondents who hold positions identical to those of the incumbent are given the highest score, and respondents sharing all the same positions as the challenger are given the

lowest score. We adopt this measure because the NES/SES does not ask respondents to place candidates on issue scales.

Newspaper Readership: The NES/SES asks respondents, "How many days in the past week did you read a daily newspaper?"

Quality of Challenger: This measure is based on the challenger's experience and the challenger's campaign skills. Challenger experience is based on a nine-point scale: 9 = sitting governor, 8 = House members and statewide officials serving more than one term, 7 = first-term House members and first-term statewide officials, 6 = mayors of major cities, 5 = state legislative leaders, 4 = state legislators, 3 = other local office holders, 2 = celebrities, and 1 = noncelebrities. The candidates' campaign skills are based on descriptions in the CQ Weekly Report and the Almanac of American Politics. Candidates described as skillful campaigners are scored 3, candidates with a mixture of positive and negative reports are scored 2, and candidates described as poor campaigners receive a score of 1. The experience measure is multiplied by the skill measure to create the measure of challenger quality.

Party Identification: Respondents strongly identifying with the incumbent's party receive the highest score (+3); respondents strongly identifying with the challenger's party are given the lowest score (-3).

are given the lowest score (-3).

Presidential Approval: This scale ranges from +2 (e.g., the Senator is a Republican and the respondent strongly approves of the Republican president's performance, the Senator is a Democrat and the respondent strongly disapproves of the Republican president's performance) to -2 (e.g., the Senator is a Republican and the respondent strongly disapproves of the Republican president's performance, the Senator is a Democrat and the respondent strongly approves of the Republican president's performance).

Seniority: Years in office.

Tone of Articles/Tone of Front Page Articles/Tone of Issue Articles: Negative articles receive a score of -1, positive articles receive a score of +1, and neutral and mixed articles receive a score of 0.

Tone of Headlines: Negative headlines receive a score of -1, positive headlines receive a score of +1, and neutral and mixed headlines receive a score of 0.

Tone of Horserace Coverage: Press assessments are rated on the following scale: 5 = sure winner, 4 = likely winner, 3 = competitive, 2 = likely loser, and 1 = sure loser.

Tone of Trait Coverage: The number of paragraphs describing the candidates' personalities negatively is divided by the total number of trait paragraphs. A variety of negative traits is examined, including dishonest, uninformed, inexperienced, ineffective, part of the Washington establishment, erratic, insensitive, weak leader, and not an independent thinker.

Unattributed Criticisms: The number of unattributed criticisms is divided by the total number of criticisms published about the candidate.

### APPENDIX B. CODING OF NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

Listed below are illustrative examples of how we coded news content from three races: Wallop vs. Vinich, 1988, Casper Star Tribune; Helms vs. Gantt, 1990, The Raleigh News and Observer; and Daschle vs. Haar, 1992; Argus Leader (Sioux Falls).

### **Tone of Coverage**

1. "The Wyoming and National Education Associations endorsed Democratic Senate nominee John Vinich Monday

with the NEA giving him \$5,000 for his campaign against twotime incumbent Sen. Malcolm Wallop." Casper Star Tribune, 9/20/88 (positive for Vinich, neutral for Wallop).

2. "[Harvey B. Gantt] said during a campaign swing through the Triangle that Mr. Helms had spent his 18 years in the U.S. Senate trying to stomp out such 'personal demons' as communists, liberals, and artists rather than worrying about issues that matter to North Carolina families." The News and Observer, 9/23/90 (negative for Helms, neutral for Gantt).

### **Tone of Headlines**

- 1. "Wallop accused of 'Grandstanding." Casper Star Tribune, 9/11/88 (negative for Wallop).
- 2. "Helms urges support for Bush stand." The News and Observer, 9/6/90 (neutral for Helms).

#### **Attributed Criticism**

1. "At a Union-sponsored barbeque at North Casper Park, Democrats Bryan, Sharratt, and John Vinich said in interviews that their opponents—U.S. Rep. Dick Chaney and U.S. Sen. Malcolm Wallop—have systematically failed to address the problems of Wyoming's working people." *Casper Star Tribune*, 9/6/88 (attributed criticism of Wallop).

2. "The Republican candidate for the U.S. Senate repeatedly has attacked Democratic incumbent Tom Daschle for breaking his word on the anti-tax pledge." *Argus Leader*, 10/18/92 (attributed criticism of Daschle).

#### **Unattributed Criticism**

- 1. "Vinich was obviously nervous and fatigued at the beginning of the debate." *Casper Star Tribune*, 10/28/88 (unattributed criticism of Vinich).
- 2. "After insensitively criticizing a TV ad for Democratic Sen. Tom Daschle, her main election opponent, Haar found herself in the spotlight." Argus Leader, 10/13/92 (unattributed criticism of Haar).

#### Tone of Issue Coverage

- 1. "Mr. Gantt says he is willing to consider a tax increase to finance necessary services, but he makes little effort to define how he would tax—what taxes he would choose or not choose." *The News and Observer*, 9/28/90 (negative for Gantt).
- 2. "South Dakota Sen. Tom Daschle says he would lobby a new Clinton administration to rewrite the nation's farm program... Daschle, a Democrat who is running for reelection, wants to boost prices for wheat and other crops by raising government loan rates." *Argus Leader*, 10/28/92 (neutral for Daschle).

### **Positive Trait**

"Quayle also endorsed his friend Sen. Malcolm Wallop calling him a man of 'keen intellect...." Casper Star Tribune, 9/20/88 (positive trait for Wallop).

### **Negative Trait**

"Mal Hinchley of Pierre, a chemical dependency counselor who served with the Navy Seabees in Thailand, said Haar's comments showed a lack of compassion." *Argus Leader*, 10/10/92 (negative trait for Haar).

### Horserace

1. "Democratic challenger John Vinich has drawn to within 10 points of incumbent Republican Sen. Malcolm Wallop, according to a Democratic Party poll..." Casper Star Tribune, 9/10/88 (competitive for Vinich, competitive for Wallop).

2. "Sen. Tom Daschle, a Democrat, leads Republican challenger Charlene Haar 56 percent to 33 percent, with 11 percent undecided." *Argus Leader*, 10/12/92 (sure winner for Daschle, sure loser for Haar).

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### **BOOK REVIEWS**

### **Political Theory**

Civil Society, Constitution, and Legitimacy. By Andrew Arato. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 352p. \$72.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

Andreas Kalyvas, University of Michigan

Recent years have witnessed momentous political transformations across the globe. From Eastern and Central Europe and the former Soviet Union to South Africa, these changes are often described as transitions from state bureaucracies, party dictatorships, and authoritarian rule to liberal constitutional democracies and market economies. Andrew Arato, moving gracefully among the fields of political theory, sociology, history, constitutionalism, and comparative politics, redirects our attention to the originary moment of constitutional creation, when ordinary lawmaking recedes in favor of extraordinary politics and higher lawmaking. It is also a moment when fundamental constitutional norms emerge as the main point of contest within political debate and action. Combining empirical and descriptive analysis with normative considerations, Arato persuasively demonstrates how the mode of creation of new constitutions affects the democratic and institutional content of these transformations as well as the prospects for future consolidation of the newly developed constitutional norms.

By focusing mainly, but not exclusively, on the various forms of constitution-making in Eastern and Central Europe during the early 1990s, Arato not only proposes an original and comprehensive theory of comparative constitutional politics, but also revisits the old dichotomy of revolution and reform that has bifurcated modern politics between the rebellious desire for an absolute break with the past and the piecemeal introduction of gradual changes through already established legal mechanisms. Thus, while he acknowledges the democratic appeal of total revolutionary transformations invoked by theories of extralegal popular constituent power, such as those of Emmanuel Sieyès and Carl Schmitt, he follows Hannah Arendt in denouncing the juridical vacuum caused by absolute legal ruptures. Revolutions, he warns, divest individuals of their legal protections and rights, endangering their security and freedoms. At the same time, however, Arato recognizes that continuity with the past suffers from a democratic deficit and from considerable legitimation problems. Whereas such continuity avoids the perils of violence, permanent dictatorship, and illegality, it often preserves elements from previous authoritarian regimes.

To avoid the hackneyed polarization between revolution and reform, Arato opts for a different alternative for achieving genuine political change. Interestingly enough, given his previous writings, he does not relocate the power of making constitutions in civil society as, for example, Ulrich Preuss does. As he convincingly argues, such an approach poses more problems than it can solve. Because civil society is composed of a plurality of voluntary associations, it can hardly function as the unitary subject of the constituent power. Moreover, these groups not only lack the electoral support that could enable them to play a genuinely representative role. but also manifest significant inequalities of resources. Finally, although Arato does not explicitly mention it, the notion of a constituent civil society entails a dangerous overpoliticization of society by blurring of the crucial distinction between the political and the social. In a similar vein, Arato rejects the parliamentary road to constitution-making

through established amendment procedures by pointing to the logical inconsistencies and political dilemmas that ultimately obliterate the crucial difference between ordinary and higher lawmaking. He also dismisses the more traditional method of constituent assemblies, like that of the French National Assembly of 1789, because of the potential for dictatorial powers, excessive majoritarianism, voluntaristic fantasies, and procedural perplexities, which historically have led to permanent instability, civil wars, and restoration.

In contrast to these flawed models of constitutional politics, Arato, by engaging in a critical but fruitful dialogue with Bruce Ackerman, proposes an innovative theory of dual constitutional origins: He places radical political change in the context of legal continuity. Although the concept of legal continuity could be misinterpreted as just another version of parliamentary constitution-making that Arato has repudiated, in fact it represents one of his most remarkable contributions to the theory of constitutional politics. The call for legal continuity consists of two complementary normative arguments, which are derived largely from the recent political and legal experience in the Hungarian transition. On the one hand, the founding of new legal and political orders should always take place within the framework of the rule of law. On the other hand, it is obvious that in the cases of Eastern and Central Europe, the rule of law did not exist prior to the collapse of state Communism. For this reason Arato conceives of legal continuity as a necessary fiction. The framers should act as if they were operating under the rule of law even if they are not and should treat the inherited constitution as if it were actually a valid basic law of the land although it is not. However, as Arato explains, the appeal to a fictional continuity functions in reality as a break with the illegality of the previous regimes; a strategy of explicit constitutional rupture, in contrast, would represent a continuity with the lawless practices of the past.

It is on this point that Arato's approach runs into problems. He is at pains to find an institutional analogue for the notion of fictional continuity. After rejecting parliamentary transitions and having conceded that the American founding experience is unique and therefore nonreplicable, he is left with only one option: the method of roundtable negotiated transitions. Although he is attracted by the ability of roundtables to be self-limiting, to respect legality, and to institute a modern system of rights, he admits that historically they have taken an undemocratic path to democracy insofar as they are composed of self-appointed elites who negotiate and bargain in secrecy. This explains why he opposes Preuss's move to endow them with the originary power to make constitutions. To rectify these shortcomings, which point to the normative deficit of negotiated transitions, Arato introduces the principles of openess, publicity, deliberation, consensus, and reflexivity. But it remains unclear by which mechanisms the free and open discussion within the public sphere and the deliberations within the roundtables would actually influence one another. If by these five principles he means that the constitutional decisions adopted by the roundtables must be ratified by a popular referendum of an informed and engaged citizenry, I do not see how he can avoid implicitly endowing these instances with constituent powers. This uncertainty regarding how constitution-making would be conducted and by whom reflects a deeper ambiguity in Arato's work toward the notion of the constituent power itself. It is not clear whether he is rejecting it altogether or simply wishes to decenter and dedramatize it so as to allow for a more differentiated and pluralist formulation, which is also free from any voluntaristic and extralegal connotations.

Notwithstanding these doubts, Arato offers one of the most original theories of constitution-making to date. Comprehensive in its range, interdisciplinary in its ambitions, erudite, and challenging, it marks a turning point in the study of democratic transitions that will surely influence future discussions of democratic constitutionalism.

Friends and Citizens: Essays in Honor of Wilson Carey McWilliams. Edited by Peter Dennis Bathory and Nancy L. Schwartz. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. 311p. \$50.00.

Philip Abbott, Wayne State University

Wilson Carey McWilliams is certainly one of the great teachers of American political thought in his generation. The Idea of Fraternity in America (1973), as well as his series on presidential elections and many essays, has captivated both his students and his colleagues. There are, of course, many prominent figures who have addressed the complexity of political thought in America in recent years but few whose influence is acknowledged so centrally on these terms. Of course, it is sometimes difficult for those influenced by a master teacher to convey thoughts once they are removed from the electricity of the seminar or conference. McWilliams is a good example of this phenomenon. At one level his understanding of American political culture is Whitmanesque. McWilliams is not primarily a jeremiadic thinker and much of his writing has the same breezy celebration of America as Whitman's. Added to this perspective is an intense appreciation of Mark Twain's comedic iconoclasm. Both foci are juxtaposed with what is his central preoccupation, a deep attachment to the Puritan vision of the human experience. McWilliams generalized the latter in The Idea of Fraternity in America as a tradition of fraternal politics that was enriched by other European immigrants. Although "Puritanism... was here first," (113) it was superceded, though not replaced, by the powerful symbols of "Enlightenment liberalism." McWilliams' model of cultural dualism offered the first systematic critique of Hartz's liberal society thesis and has since been replicated and expanded by many others including Robert Bellah and Rogers M. Smith. In fact, there is some irony in his alternative to Hartz's singlefactor explanation of American culture, since it returned the study of American political thought to the traditional dualist perspectives developed by Progressive scholars, who are villains in McWilliams' own reading of American political thought. Moreover, McWilliams' focus on Puritan conceptions of community has led him to an attachment to premodern conceptions of politics as well as to a decided antipathy toward the political world of the American founders.

How does this mixture of Aristotle, Calvin, Winthrop, the antifederalists, Twain, and Whitman cohere? An unsympathetic reader might conclude that McWilliams' America is a space occupied more by himself than the political culture he studies. The essays in this festschrift are directed toward explaining this unique perspective. The only essay that directly attempts to answer the question above is Mac McCorkle and David E. Price's fine effort. A powerful vision offered by a teacher can create a hermetic scholarly community. McCorkle and Price offer a corrective by showing how McWilliams' thought can be connected to the liberal/communitarian debate that The Idea of Fraternity in America actually prefigured. Though they admit that McWilliams' political thought is composed of "dazzling eccentricities," they identify him as a religious communitarian who rejects both a "faddish existentialist notion of community" and a "romantic Gemeinschaft dream." While Michael Sandel identifies the problem of modern democratic

regimes as resting upon an "unencumbered self," the authors conclude, "Although writing from Massachusetts Bay, the Harvard professor chooses to bypass Winthrop and his 'Model of Christian Charity,' all successor Puritan divines, as well as the rest of Puritan thought and culture. Democracy's Discontent, moreover, has no Great Awakenings, one passing mention of evangelical abolitionism, no Social Gospel, no Reinhold Niebuhr, and only one reference to Martin Luther King, Jr., as a preacher" (p. 242). William Galston is ostensibly more sympathetic in his Liberal Purposes but the contribution of religion to his conception of community is one of accommodation and management of a stolid "traditional morality" that is "monolithically conservative" (p. 246). McCorkle and Price recommend that Sandel and Galston attempt to incorporate covenant theory into their accounts and that McWilliams engage in "constructive family deliberations" with the secular communitarians.

It is no accident that five of the essays in this volume focus directly upon friendship. Though McWilliams has focused upon fraternity as the key to the submerged tradition in American political thought, he has been uncomfortable with its association with the modern revolutionary project. The Aristotelian conception of friendship is what he really means to uncover and enhance. The theoretical problem with this perspective, of course, is not only finding a space for this kind of friendship in a liberal society but also accommodating the Aristotelian conception to the practicalities of a democratic demos. Patrick Dennen imaginatively explores these issues in his "Friendship and Politics: Ancient and Modern." In the process, he discovers two little-remembered Progressive reformers, H. C. Merwin and Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch, who tempered their commitment to political rationality with a sympathy for the real world of average working men and women. So too does Bob Pepperman Taylor find Aristotelian sensibilities in versions of Progressivism. Taylor presents a well-deserved reevaluation of Jane Addams as a much more complex thinker with regard to democratic citizenship than both the "Saint Jane" interpreters and the revisionists. Jean W. Yarbrough reviews the Jefferson-Adams correspondence and finds an exemplary case of friendship in a liberal republic that "leaves space for noble souls to pursue equal, if not more important private interests" but does not promote philosophy at the expense of politics and political life (p. 77). If the Jefferson-Adams friendship, late blooming as it was, modified the political excesses of both figures, the friendship between Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren, according to Marc Landy, also had beneficial consequences for the republic.

The most profound essay in this grouping is Norman Jacobson's short, eloquent response to Thoreau's discussion of friendship in "A Week on the Concord and Merrimac Rivers." Jacobson titles his essay "'Damn Your Eyes!' Thoreau on (Male) Friendship in America" and he argues that Thoreau judged friendship to be impossible in a society that conceived of all relationships in terms of contract and utility and was "bold enough to hold himself up for scrutiny as an example of one crushed by such circumstances" (p. 123). This is also the only essay that considers the submerged gendered implications of friendship and Thoreau's exposure is an important commentary on masculine identity in America.

Other essays include a treatment of the hero in American political culture by Gerald Pomper that offers a theoretically provocative typology; a brief treatment by Harvey Mansfield of Aristotle and Tocqueville animated by deeply skeptical vision of democratic practice; an analysis of the Creation by Thomas Prangle, which, interestingly, is the only essay devoted fully to a religious subject; a case study of neighborhood activism in Philadelphia by Edward A. Schwartz;

a study of Lincoln as (re)founder by Joseph Romance; and an attempt to apply Aristotelian conceptions of citizenship to modern conditions by Dennis Hale. Two effective essays (one by Tracy Strong on Rousseau and Tocqueville and one by Sidney Milkis on political parties in America) actually seem to be arguing directly against McWilliams' teaching.

Friends and Citizens is a model festschrift. Particularly recommended are the cluster of essays on friendships and politics. Though it cannot be said successfully to bring order to the "dazzling eccentricities" of Wilson and Carey McWilliams' teachings, it does illustrate their capacity to stimulate.

Rereading Power and Freedom in J. S. Mill. By Bruce Baum. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000. 360p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Ronald J. Terchek, University of Maryland at College Park

This is a rich and rewarding book, weaving familiar themes in the literature on John Stuart Mill into a discussion of Mill's conception of power. Bruce Baum convincingly shows that Mill's liberalism requires more than toleration and individualism and invites a broader understanding of liberalism, one which goes beyond noninterference, rights, and neutral procedures. Meaning to show the "emancipatory possibilities of liberal political theory," the author argues that Isaiah Berlin, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick focus too narrowly on negative freedom and do not sufficiently probe how power and freedom are related (p. 15). In contrast, Baum's liberalism aims at the self-development and self-governance of each member of a liberal society.

This book is meant to "challenge the common view that there is an inverse relationship between power and freedom" as well as the idea "that the more society leaves people alone—free from external interference—the greater is their freedom" (p. 5). Baum sees his work as offering an argument for "the emancipatory possibilities in the liberal tradition" that pays attention to "the positive side of freedom," something that he associates with autonomy and that requires enabling conditions (as well as the elimination of disabling constraints). Thus, someone who "lacks powers of self-determination" is not free (p. 6). In this early formulation, Baum offers us a concept that is general and broad; in later chapters, he sets out to give us concrete instances where some lack "powers of self-development."

As Baum's vehicle to unfold this generous liberalism, Mill is said to seek the autonomy of everyone and appreciate how freedom and power are inexorably tied together. We are taken through Mill's examination of the psychological processes that enlarge or contract our capacities for self-development by shaping our desires, beliefs, and identity. These processes are then linked to political and social relationships that nurture or stifle these capacities. For all of his admiration of Mill, Baum recognizes several weaknesses and draws on participatory democratic theory, feminist critiques, and other contemporary theories to fill in the blanks that Mill is said to have ignored.

The author shows the many ways that Mill ties power to autonomy. We find chapters, for example, on gender, economy, and democratic politics in which Baum details how Mill sees asymmetrical power relations diminishing the freedom of many. Mill is not content to rely on or malism or proceduralism to promote and protect freedom. Power has to do with the opportunities as well as obstacles that individuals face when they chose a plan of life and seek to implement it.

However, Baum's parts turn out to be richer than the whole. Take his chapters on public opinion and on Millian economics, for example. In the former, Baum does an admirable

job showing how influential Mill takes public opinion to be and how it can stunt moral development. In the chapter on economics, we find a Mill who seeks maximum economic freedom, meaning "considerable equality with respect to educational and occupational opportunities, income, and property holdings" in which people have a share in the governance of firms. The government's role is to tax (including inheritances), regulate property, educate, and provide poor relief. But from Mill's perspective, all of these economic reforms cannot adequately lead to self-development, or what Baum calls freedom as autonomy, and the reason has to do with the force of public opinion. Baum fails to appreciate in this chapter what he nicely developed earlier—that public opinion as currently constituted is the major obstacle to autonomy. If all of the other emancipatory moves that Baum believes Mill supports were to come to fruition but public opinion remained fixed, then the homogeneity, dullness, and commercialism that Mill detects in liberal society would stifle self-development.

Why should this be so? On Mill's account, a new orthodoxy has replaced the old order, penetrating all sectors of modern life and displacing strong, viable alternatives that might challenge it. The new orthodoxy is commercialism, promising money and mobility as a means to success and ultimately to happiness. However much people give verbal approval to noncommercial standards, Mill believes that their commitments are to making and spending money. Even education is judged by its commercial utility, not by its capacity to build a liberally educated person or promote a critical spirit.

Baum does not spend much time with the Mill who is concerned with how freedom and newly—won power can turn against its beneficiaries. We see this in Mill's critique of public opinion and education, topics about which Baum devotes considerable time but does not push his argument for enough. The problem for Mill is not primarily about curriculum but about the ways the commercial mentality has invaded society, including its schools. For Mill, life is spent learning and the primary teacher is society, instructing people in what is valued and what is not. Mill laments that schools reinforce rather than challenge commercial norms; the lessons learned are about the primacy of production and economics.

Here and at various other places in the book, Baum fails to see that Millian freedom comes with struggle, and it is a struggle not only with those who use their power to dominate but also with ourselves when we succumb too readily to public opinion, especially with respect to commercial norms. Mill's challenge comes not in his particular policy recommendations but in the questions he asks and the issues he raises. He asks us, as Baum clearly demonstrates, to explore how economic inequality can subvert political equality, how domination becomes acceptable through constant use, how the various expressions of power penetrate liberal society, and how we often unreflectively accept the situation in which we find ourselves. Baum's considerable contribution comes with his careful demonstration that a generous liberalism needs to focus on power in its many guises and how it enables or disables the freedom of men and women.

The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics. By Jane Bennett. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 213p. \$55.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Kennan Ferguson, University of South Florida

At first, it may seem that Jane Bennett is attacking Max Weber. Against his famous assertion that modernity has disenchanted the world, rendering it potentially understandable and thus devoid of the power of transcendent meaning, Bennett engages in a traditionally theoretical explication and

critique. She traces those thinkers who arise from this tradition, whether or not acknowledged, and addresses (and celebrates) those whose philosophies of the modern world provide alternative readings, most notably Kant and Deleuze.

But it is quickly apparent that Bennett's goal is much more demanding and rewarding than to summarize and critique. Instead, the purpose of this spirited and absorbing book is to call attention to those sites of contemporary experience that, far from being anesthetizing, continue to make experience meaningful. Indeed, it points to those aspects of contemporary existence that have the potential to reenchant, to recapture meaning from meaninglessness.

Bennett notes what few Weberians are willing to admit: The rationalism that he alleges is overtaking modernity actually conjoins everywhere with inventiveness, playfulness, and excitement. Human lives, far from always being dour, overdetermined existences, are frequently lived in wonder and marvel. The trick, therefore, lies in discovering the sources of this enchantment and encouraging its recognition and continuation.

This creative theorization arises from diverse and eclectic sources. From classic philosophy, Bennett finds the Epicurean notion of the "swerve," the conception that all matter has an intrinsic motility and unpredictability, the most inspiring to contemporary students of politics. From Kant, she takes the recognition that the supersensible world imposes itself upon our purported understanding of nature. And from animals' learning to speak, to Wim Wenders's films, to Deleuze and Guattari's "body without organs," she draws out the exotic and transformative roles that our attachments to the nonhuman can play.

Perhaps most tellingly, Bennett uses Kafka to ambush her reader from odd hiding places and in surprising disguises. This is not simply the Kafka who denounces the hyperbureaucratized, modern life, though; Bennett's attention goes instead to the combinations of the animal and the human, the rational and the absurd, the stultifying and the exhilarating that Kafka introduces to literature. Kafka's characters, who transform from *Homo sapiens* to beast (and vice versa), who ride in strangely animate and politicized objects, and who are entranced by the agencies that entrap them, are the avowed inspiration for Bennett's political vision.

Bennett clearly has an implicit narrative of disenchantment herself here, but it is not the disenchantment of the world as much as it is the disenchantment of those of us who attempt to make sense of the world. Those theorists who depict an impotent humanity in the vise of the modern world, those social scientists who want to hew as close as possible to "science" yet insist on the most sterile, impoverished versions of it, and those who rigorously police the boundaries among ethics, politics, and aesthetics (guarding each from the contamination of the others): These are the nihilistic forces that actually disempower political will and discourage receptivity to difference and inspiration.

At the center of the book stands a chapter dedicated to explaining a materialism that springs, Phoenix-like, from the ashes of Marxist rationality. For Marx and his followers, the fetishization of commodities subtracts attention from the work that has produced them and, thus, ultimately subtracts meaning from humanity. Conversely, Bennett celebrates the ability of commodities, even mass-produced consumer commodities, to transfix and transform us, adding significance and import to human existence. Though this celebration has its dangers, she argues, the reductionisms that view commodities as no more or less than the circumstances of their manufacture (or the institutionalized economies of their exchange) loom far more ominous, for they disparage the bodily, historical, sonorous, emotive, and intellectual engagements that these commodities provide.

Perhaps the highest compliment one can pay to a book (and one that can all too rarely be paid to books in political science) is to say that it transforms the reader's outlook and behavior. For me, Bennett's book awakened what Thoreau (the subject of her 1994 book) also does in his writing: the recognition of how convention and routine are the enemies of creation and engagement. It is customary, toward the end of a book review, to articulate an objection to some aspect of the work. Not only do the strengths of Bennett's book far outweigh any weaknesses, but also, more significantly, the very inspiration that it provides challenges the rote following of normative practices. To tack on an admonishment, even an apophantic one, would be to privilege ritual over innovation. This is a groundbreaking book, encompassing a theoretical commingling of diverse techniques of thought from Lucretius to the inventors of nanotechnology, a profound challenge to traditional critiques of modernity and materialism, and an embrace of the contingent and the marvelous. Bennett not only shows us the way to an enchanted world, she shows us that we are already there.

**Politics Out of History.** By Wendy Brown. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 193p. \$45.00 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

#### Leslie Paul Thiele, University of Florida

Wendy Brown argues that the metanarratives of modernity stories of the historical march of reason, the rule of truth, the fruits of expanding freedom, the benevolence of growing equality, and the prospect of endless peace and progress have been undermined by the experiences of our times. These narratives once provided banisters for political thought and staircases for political life. They are now left in tatters, and there are no viable replacements. Politics Out of History explores the deformities of politics in these times. Despite the heralded triumph of liberal capitalism, the world does not appear to be blessed with an overabundance of stable, just, pluralistic societies in which poverty, environmental degradation, and social cleavages are but faint memories. Confronted with enduring problems and denied consoling ideals, denizens of the postmodernity are left to their own devices. They must negotiate a world where power is without logic, political life is deprived of teleology, nature has become contested terrain, and conviction often appears as a retreat to the indefensible.

For Brown, the theorist is a diagnostician. The chief symptom of decaying life in the wake of the battered narratives of modernity, at least among the liberal left, is moralism. Understood as a self-righteous reproach to (all cohabitations with) power coupled with an unproductive whining about past injuries, moralism is a reactionary gesture. It is the naysaying of (political) life that accompanies the historical loss of teleological support for our ethical impulses. Moralism, Brown asserts, is antidemocratic in that its reproachful attitude deprecates open debate. (There is an intriguing analysis of Brown's own encounter with feminist moralizing, where her critical approach to the status of a women's studies program elicited accusations of collaborating with the enemy.) To the extent that moralism promotes an uncompromising politics of truth, Brown (like Hannah Arendt) condemns it as totalitarian.

In lieu of a retreat to moralism, Brown promotes an agonistic politics that embraces contingency, invention, and compromise. Her theoretical comrades-in-arms in this venture are Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, and their influence is everywhere. Brown is a superb reader of Nietzsche and Foucault. In these essays, she seldom strays from their shadows. Brown's chapter on Marx is more original, as she assesses

Marx's tendency both to dismiss and to rely heavily upon the power of superstructure and culture. (Of course, Lenin already pointed out that ideology was vested with power.) Although the essay bears a noticeable Foucaultian slant, Brown criticizes Foucault's geneaology for "sharing some of the same conceits about power's inherently logical yet hidden operation discerned in Marx" (p. 90). Unfortunately, Brown does not defend this claim. And in a subsequent chapter, she appears to contradict it, eulogizing Foucaultian geneology precisely for its rejection of all continuous histories and its assertion that power does not demonstrate a clear logic (p. 117) but rather develops into "varied and protean orders of subjection" (p. 104). One is left unsure of the status of the former criticism.

Brown believes that the pursuit of practicality hinders intellectual life, at least for the theorist. Hence Politics Out of History offers little in the way of prescription. Yet we may glean a constructive, and hopeful, message from Brown's subtle readings of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud, Benjamin, Foucault, and Derrida. It is a message quite similar to that provided by Hannah Arendt, though Brown largely ignores this linkage. For Arendt, the exercise of judgment allows us to win back our human dignity from what she called the "pseudo-divinity named History." By denying history's prerogative to define our lives and world without denying its importance, Arendt hoped to resuscitate our capacity for judgment and, through judging, to validate the particular and the contingent. (The Life of the Mind (1978) and Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (1982)). Brown suggests that the one-dimensional metanarratives of modernity, however seductive, are much less conducive to the development of sound political judgment than the contested, multifaceted micronarratives that might emerge in their wake. The politics that develop out of enlivened, agonistic historical readings may, Brown concludes, offer "modest new possibilities for the practice of freedom" (p. 173).

Recalling Nietzsche's teutonic motto that "what doesn't kill me makes me stronger," Brown extols the practice of freedom in the space once occupied by the banisters and staircases stabilizing and directing modern political thought and life. Brown assumes contemporary democratic politics to be strong enough to survive such challenges. Should we share her optimism? Helping tattered narratives slide into oblivion may indeed "incite" virtue and, in a technocratic age, challenge domination, as Brown asserts. And I couldn't agree more with Brown's statement that the "permanent resistance" of the state by its citizens ensures their democratic life, even though the state guarantees their freedom to resist. But such resistance, if carried out in the absence of all ideals and principles, may harbor much political malfeasance—malfeasance that makes moralism appear to be, at most, a relatively benign annoyance.

Brown decries moralizers for being parasitic upon the power-infested social order that they spurn, and for which they offer "no real remedy" (p. 60). She's dead on the mark here. Yet, in many respects, Brown's own work nourishes itself upon the ragings of the moralists, and, like them, she does not stoop to offer concrete remedies. Brown also slides into nostalgia. Like the moralists she condemns, Brown occasionally pines for a former day when politics was ostensibly a realm of heightened freedom. She states, for instance, that "we inheritors of a radically disenchanted universe feel a greater political impotence than humans may have ever felt before" (p. 139). This sensibility, though popular among postmodernists, is hard to square with an historical sense. Are we to assume that the level of political impotence felt by various peoples of the past—the slaves of antiquity, medieval serfs, or colonial peasants, for instance—pales in comparison to that experienced by the people of our generation, say those citizens across the globe who regularly surprise the pundits at the polls, or those who helped topple the Berlin Wall? No doubt, the technocultural juggernaut that streamlines our world is an awesome force. Yet we must acknowledge that political freedom and opportunity can, and often do, coexist with increasing cultural homogeneity.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, *Politics Out of History* provides insightful, well-crafted essays addressing many important thinkers and texts. Readers will benefit from its critical exchanges, which extend a perspective developed in *States of Injury*, Brown's (1995) earlier work.

The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects. By Barbara Cruikshank. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 160p. \$41.95 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Clarissa Rile Hayward, Ohio State University

There is a certain comfort, a certain ease, with which many contemporary political thinkers reach for an ideal they call "democratic citizenship" in response to a wide range of problems produced by relations of power: problems of social and political inequality, for instance, problems of injustice, problems of exclusion and marginalization. In The Will to Empower: Democratic Citizens and Other Subjects, Barbara Cruikshank undertakes the important task of disturbing that ease. "Citizen," she argues persuasively, is not the atonym of "subject." Instead, a citizen is a particular kind of a subject, a subject forged in ways that not only enable but also, unavoidably, constrain human social and political possibility. Those who would criticize relations of power need to examine, Cruikshank suggests, the ways in which citizens are made: what she calls the "technologies of citizenship" (for instance, the pedagogic programs, the social services, the social movements) through which modern democratic societies produce members capable of acting politically—and inclined to act politically—to advance their individual and their shared interests.

Cruikshank examines these technologies through four case studies, which she uses to map the political logic of "empowerment" from a Foucaultian perspective. She considers, first, nineteenth-century reform movements led by philanthropists, social workers, and others, who emphasized self-help as a means to promoting the autonomy and the self-sufficiency of the poor. She turns, next, to the American antipoverty movement of the 1960s, in particular, the Community Action Program's mandate for "maximum feasible participation" by the poor in developing and implementing the programs meant to serve them. She considers, in addition, the self-esteem movement of the 1980s and the early 1990s, as well as recent efforts by welfare rights advocates to empower the poor to pursue and promote their own interests and to resist the forms of scapegoating practiced by conservatives since the Reagan years.

Cruikshank uses these case studies to advance three principle claims. First, she stresses that power need not be exercised by the state. Second, she argues that it need not be channeled through the actions of powerful agents who will and intend its effects. Third, she emphasizes that it need not take the form of overt coercion or force. On the contrary, Cruikshank's central claim is that the most effective forms of power solicit people's voluntary participation in efforts to mold them into the right kinds of subjects: to mold them, that is, into self-sufficient, politically active, empowered democratic citizens.

Cruikshank is certainly correct when she claims that "[d]emocratic relations are still relations of power" (p. 18)

and that "empowerment is a power relationship" (p. 86). She gestures toward important distinctions when she writes that self-government can be performed "well" or "badly" (p. 2) and that empowerment, similarly, "can be used well or badly" (p. 86). She fails, however, to do the hard work of explaining and defending her view of what it means to engage in collective self-government "well," or to empower "well," as opposed to "badly."

Consider her treatment of the book's opening vignette, in which she describes her fruitless search for the face behind a local exercise of power. In 1989, Cruikshank writes, the trash dumpsters in her neighborhood suddenly were locked, preventing homeless people and others from scavenging for food and other discarded goods. She details her unsuccessful efforts to locate the agent(s) responsible for the decision, using the story to illustrate how power can operate in anonymous ways, through small decisions not directed by a powerful actor. As she elaborates this story, she alludes to a set of imprecise normative commitments that seem to play an important role in motivating the larger study. For instance, she explains the significance of the locks on the garbage bins this way: "Those struggling to stay out of the arms of the poverty industry now had no recourse but to steal their subsistence or submit to case management in one or another shelter or social service program. It seemed obvious to me that the space of freedom was shrinking..." (p. 10; emphasis added).

However, despite repeated references to freedom throughout the book, neither here not at any other point in the argument does Cruikshank explain how she envisions this "space of freedom." The closest she comes is at the end of a chapter on welfare rights activism, where she rejects as "not an effective mode of resistance" efforts to challenge publicly false claims about welfare fraud (p. 121). It is better, she asserts, to follow Foucault's counsel and "refuse what we are," that is, to probe critically and to resist and to challenge the processes through which subject categories—such as "welfare queen" and "democratic citizen"—are socially constructed, maintained, and policed. But Cruikshank never explains why such probing and contesting is a more effective form of resistance than the welfare rights activists' strategies that she dismisses. She never identifies the criteria she employs to determine that such forms of resistance are the best.

Producing citizens "well," she enigmatically suggests near the close of the book, is a matter of producing them "democratically" (p. 124). It is hard to imagine, however, what "democratically" might mean in the context of Cruikshank's larger argument that the democratic citizen itself is an effect of power. Nor is it clear why one would identify as a specifically democratic practice the Foucaultian notion of "refusing what we are."

Its shortcomings notwithstanding, *The Will to Empower* is an engaging book that raises important questions about social power and democratic citizenship. The text is clearly written and provides Foucaultian insights into these questions that will be accessible even to those not familiar with poststructuralist theory.

Our Sense of the Real: Aesthetic Experience and Arendtian Politics. By Kimberly Curtis. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 224p. \$39.95 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Robert Pirro, Georgia Southern University

Of particular interest in the proliferating scholarship on Hannah Arendt is how her thought has recently attracted sympathetic attention in areas of theoretical inquiry once considered problematic for her. So, for example, the Graecophile Arendt, previously dismissed by many feminist thinkers for failing to take adequate account of the machismo and misogyny of ancient Greek culture, has inspired a volume of sympathetic feminist readings of her work (Bonnie Honig, ed., Feminist Interpretations of Hannah Arendt, 1995). Respectful reconsiderations of the Eichmann controversy at symposia and in a recently published volume (Steven E. Aschheim's Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, 2001) signal that the shadow once cast on Arendt's theoretical and personal integrity as an investigator of the nature and significance of modern Jewish identity has largely been lifted. To these efforts to engage sympathetically what were once considered the most problematic elements of Arendt's thought can be added Kimberly Curtis's highly interesting and rewarding book.

The main premise of Curtis's book is that a notion of aesthetic experience underlies Arendt's vision of political and human affairs, providing an ethical basis for the sort of participatory politics of which Arendt was such a prominent promoter. In casting Arendt as a theorist for whom aesthetic experience was not merely an analogy for politics but a constituent element of political thought and action, Curtis invites objections from several theoretical perspectives. To communitarians of the Left, the "aesthetic-existential drive" called for by Arendt's political vision would seem to lend itself too easily to a politics of self-indulgent, individualistic bluster (p. 34). Feminists might reasonably suspect that Arendt's affirmation of an "ontology of display" encourages an inappropriate attitude of aesthetically informed detachment from, if not contempt for, the material bases and requirements of life (p. 31). Liberal-minded theorists might justifiably wonder about the ethical implications of a polity in which people's relationships to each other and the world are so centrally mediated by aesthetic experience. Curtis responds directly to these and other challenges by theorizing the positive ethical significance of the aesthetic dimensions of Arendt's thought.

For Curtis, the ethical promise of Arendt's aestheticism lies fundamentally in the compelling ways in which her thought fosters a basic attentiveness to difference. "Her aestheticism is mindful-indeed driven-by the need for a world sufficiently common that human particularity and plurality can be cherished and saved, a world in which the tecture of reality is fullness as opposed to force" (p. 20). In Arendt's late reflections in "Thinking," Curtis finds an "ontology of display," according to which "reality in an appearing world is something born out of a highly charged mutual sensuous provocation between actors and spectators" (p. 31). Delineating this ontology against the backdrop of Arendt's encounter with Merleau-Ponty's later writings and her emphasis on the theatricality of the political world, Curtis emphasizes the mutuality of this impulse to self-display. Far from endorsing "a uni-directional, megalomaniacal urge to be admired by others," Arendt's intent is to show that political actors must take account of others because "our capacity to experience a world in common, to constitute a certain worldly solidity is utterly dependent on the engendering ground of plurality itself, on aesthetic provocation among multiple, distinct appearing beings" (pp. 33, 36).

The notion of an aesthetic pleasure founded on, and attentive to, difference and variety also underlies Curtis's insightful discussion of Arendt's "apparent devaluation of bodily existence and the concerns, practices, experiences, and outlooks peculiar to it" (p. 39). Acknowledging the deficiency in Arendt's conception of biological necessity, Curtis nevertheless attempts to wring some positive significance from this conception by considering it in relation to a notion of plurality and difference. According to this notion, appreciation of the unique rewards to be gained in the realm of freedom depends significantly on the existence of a realm of necessity whose

different modalities foster an awareness of what freedom is and provide vitalizing respite from its demands.

The notion that attentiveness to plurality and difference carries with it a sort of aesthetic pleasure also frames Curtis's defense of the ethical relevance of Arendt's notion of thinking. Taking up Arendt's suggestion that the "inherent duality (of thinking) points to the infinite plurality of the earth," Curtis argues that the dialogical activity of thinking conditions us "when... we return to the world of appearances... to feel pleasure in the plurality of meanings that dialogue engenders," with the result that "our attentiveness to the world of particulars is enhanced" (p. 61).

In the middle chapter of the book, Curtis gives central place to the notion of oblivion, arguing that Arendt's theorizing, particularly her critique of modernity for its lack of public spaces, was driven by a recognition of the serious existential injury done to those who are deprived of the reality-enhancing rewards of public action. In aesthetically recasting Arendt's concern for "the insult of oblivion," Curtis rightly reminds us that the effectiveness of claims for social justice significantly rests on an underlying politically conditioned context of attentiveness to the reality of different others (p. 68). The dysfunctions of living in oblivion are especially manifest to Curtis in the examples of economic and social "enclaving"—gated communities and maquiladora-style labor districts—with which she begins her book.

Having emphasized the promise of Arendtian thought and politics to enhance aesthetically our appreciation of plurality and difference, Curtis poses judgment as a faculty capable of enhancing our sense of shared identity; it is the "means by which we join our 'particularized' selves to, and thereby engender... a world we... communicatively share" (p. 116). What Curtis contributes to the extensive secondary literature on Arendt's notion of judgment is a clearer understanding of how judging aesthetically fosters a sense of shared membership (which had in former times been passively dependent on the functioning of authority) by inviting us to "find (each others' judgments) beautiful insofar as they illuminate the profound and difficult need we have for countenancing others..." (p. 121).

In the last chapter, Curtis analyzes two episodes of political judgment from Arendt's life (concerning Zionist activities in the founding years of Israel and actions taken by Jewish councils under Nazi rule) and a story of a KKK official's personal and political transformation to illustrate the links she theorized earlier among the aesthetic, ethical, and political dimensions of human affairs. There are some missteps in the discussion of Arendt's controversial judgment of Jewish councils, including a not insignificant misquote—Arendt felt more grief by the wrongs done by, not "to," her own people (p. 135). Also, Curtis does not consider the complexities of Arendt's "membership in the community of Jews"—To what extent was there one community? and In which respects, if any, was that community "political"? (pp. 132, 135).

All in all, this book stands as an insightful defense and creative articulation of the aesthetic dimensions of Arendt's thought. Whether one is drawn to or put off by Arendt's aestheticism, this book is worth reading.

The Odyssey of Political Theory: The Politics of Departure and Return. By Patrick J. Deneen. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000. 275p. \$35.00 cloth.

Aryeh Botwinick, Temple University

This thoughtful and innovative book seeks to locate the polarities between which the Western intellectual and political traditions move in terms of a struggle within Odysseus's soul between endless departures and explorations and burstings of limits and "homeward returns" to family and polity that register his awareness of the perdurability of limits. In the end, Odysseus identifies (however ambivalently) with those limits, and his struggles and resolutions as recounted by Homer help to establish a framework in terms of which Deneen locates and evaluates the debate between Martha Nussbaum and her critics concerning the attractions and deficiencies of cosmopolitanism as both an ethical and a political program and set of values.

The debate surrounding cosmopolitanism frames the book in its opening and concluding chapters—and the categorial distinction between "homecoming" and "cosmopolitanism" serves as the central organizing framework of the book. I believe that it is theoretically vulnerable. Part of the problematic of the "homecoming" versus "cosmopolitanism" distinction is that some version of localism and communitarianism tinges and links both notions. Cosmopolitans rhetorically promulgate and defend their views to establish a community with other cosmopolitans. Given the variety of voices in the international political arena, ranging from the anarchistic to the most vociferously nationalistic, cosmopolitans (atleast at this stage in the development of their political program) are trying to cultivate a community of like-minded individuals who perceive the world political situation and diagnose the moral imperatives residing within it in ways similar to their

Conversely, for those who give their loyalty to some version of a local nationality or political community, what is at stake is not something concrete in relation to the abstraction of "cosmopolis." As Benedict Anderson and others have argued, because of the variety of ways in which populations can be configured in relation to territorial units, nation-states themselves are imaginary or imagined communities conjured up out of the heterogeneous givens endemic to any recognizable political entity. The idea of any particular nation is underdetermined by the factors conducive to nationhood. In this important sense, nations are as fully abstract and "floating" as is cosmopolis.

The three middle chapters of this book are devoted to Plato's *Republic*, Rousseau's *Emile*, and Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*—where Deneen argues that the character of Odysseus plays an important symbolic and subliminal role in the formulation of the argument. Deneen is interested in the reciprocal relationship between how these theorists construe Odysseus and the interpretive afterglow that those readings cast upon the "Odyssean metaphysic" in making sense of the Western past.

Part of the originality in this conception resides in its displacement of a Jewish Biblical point of origin for Western political and theoretical sensibility with a bipolarity within the Greek thought-world itself-between unbounded "departures" and the irrevocability of "return." The "return" aspect—the fastening upon the unimpeachability of limits (ethical, metaphysical, moral, religious)—is what traditionally has been identified as the Jewish pole of Western origins in works as diverse as Matthew Arnold's "Hebraism and Hellenism," Erich Auerbach's Mimesis, and Leo Baeck's "Romantic Religion." James Joyce, in Ulysses, effects a displacement in a direction contrary to the one pursued by Deneen in his book. The "homeward" drives in Odysseus' personality lead Joyce to translate him into a Jewish Everyman and Everywoman in the persons of Leopold and Molly Bloom. Apparently, Joyce perceives the homeward-bound constitutents of Odysseus's self as having their greatest theoretical, cultural, and political efficacy when embodied in the tenets and practices of monotheistic religion. There is a

cryptic but tantalizing sentence early in *Ulysses* that reverberates with such an understanding. Joyce refers to the medieval Islamic philosopher Averroes and to the medieval Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides as "dark men in mien and movement, flashing in their mocking mirrors the obscure soul of the world, a darkness shining in brightness which brightness could not comprehend" (James Joyce, *Ulysses*, Gabler ed., 1986, p. 23).

Following in the footsteps of Vico in The New Science who also serves as an important guide for Horkheimer and Adorno in their investigations), Deneen (p. 174) says that "the creative poet par excellence is Homer, from whom the West can credit its religious origins." Deneen sees the Odysseus who enjoys an exalted status in Plato's retelling of the Myth of Er at the conclusion of The Republic (presumably because of "the depth of his wisdom and prudence" and his pursuit of "the road of the philosopher") as suggesting on an implicit level a reconciliation of the vocations of the poet and philosopher whose coexistence within the confines of the same polity Plato finds so disturbing on an abstract theoretical level (p. 112). Deneen's reading provokes a question that it is not able to answer. If Plato is reinventing Homer to domesticate him to the requirements of philosophy, what are the background understandings of philosophy impelling Plato in this direction? Far more historically plausible and theoretically satisfying, it seems to me, is Hannah Arendt's reading of Plato's relationship to Homer in The Human Condition as inaugurating a series of unending "reversibility maneuvers" that characterize the enterprise of Western philosophy until the present day. According to Arendt, Plato turns Homer upside down. It is not life after death that is located in a cave, but "ordinary life on earth"; "the soul is not the shadow of the body, but the body the shadow of the soul"; it is those wedded to a cave-like existence here on earth who live a shadowy existence, and not "the soul after death in Hades" (Arendt, The Human Condition, 1958, pp. 265-66). Apparently, these reversibility maneuvers can be engaged in because Plato has detached words from things—has metaphysically identified an unbridgeable distance between words, concepts, and categories and the worldly furniture and phenomena to which they ostensibly refer.

If Deneen, in some not-fully developed way, did indeed want to locate a Greek placeholder for a monotheistic philosophical position that envisions an ever-expanding metaphysical middle, a much more promising source might have been Plato's Parmenides, where the One as the ultimate explanatory factor for phenomena has to be denied reality to preserve the integrity of its Oneness. If the One is accorded reality, it means that there are embodiments and analogues to it in experience that vitiate its Oneness. Tracing a Platonic, rather than a Homeric, source for the idea that our craving for contact with ultimate transcendence is inevitably thwarted, and that we are poised for a "homeward return," would enable Deneen to deal more charitably with Horkheimer and Adorno, and Rousseau, than he in fact does. Horkheimer and Adorno are best understood from a Platonic perspective as rearticulating in a catastrophic twentieth-century context the pathos of attempting to bridge the gap between the One and the Many. The One is now the solitary individual and the Many are the political community—but the solitary individual now harbors within himself traces of all those yearnings for and gropings toward transcendence that Plato prefigures in the Parmenides, and thus the absences and aborted deliverences that he experiences become the only palpable traces and reminders for him of all of those institutions from God to the political community that he is not able to sustain theoretically in a more direct, positive way. The solitary individual becomes the icon of the absent God.

Rousseau's and Horkheimer and Adorno's valorization of a beginning (the early phases of the state of nature a pure moment of enlightenment that does not get mired in the reifying and distorting mechanisms of myth [Deneen, pp. 152 and 185]) to which the imperative to return is overwhelming and the possibility of recovering is close to zero resonates with monotheistic sensibility derivable in one of its strands from Plato's *Parmenides*. This dialogue posits a God who is both the consummation of the intellectual exploratory quest and the existentialist quest for anchorage and who, precisely because He is the consummation of those quests (and logically distinct from our everyday existences), can never be retrieved on a literal level into any human present.

One final note: Perhaps, as Peter Green (The New Republic, July 12, 1999, p. 43) has reminded us, Homer's world (including Odysseus) is representative of a "joyful creed, preserved in oral tradition, of a Bronze Age aristocracy that loved life with a manic fierceness, and treasured it all the more for its brevity and perils." Perhaps there is an historical optical illusion here. What looks like a moment of return, an embrace of the middle, is really a single-minded, ecstatic embrace of life not as a pulling-back from a futile pursuit of transcendence but as representing the highest moment of intoxicating transcendence itself. If this is the case, then Deneen's reading of *The Odyssey* and its shaping influence on Western thought is a deliberately anachronistic reading that is already suffused with those Platonic and post-Platonic subtexts that I have described. In this case, I have (in at least some respects) only rendered explicit what is more submerged and contextual in Deneen's valuable book.

Beyond Tocqueville: Civil Society and the Social Capital Debate in Comparative Perspective. Edited by Bob Edwards, Michael W. Foley, and Mario Diani. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001. 340p. \$25.00.

Steven Johnston, University of South Florida

Tocqueville observed, "I know of no country in which there is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in America." Moreover, he continued, "Freedom of opinion does not exist in America." With the United States committed to a war (not to be called a crusade) against terrorism, these words from Tocqueville seem apt. If indeed the world changed on 11 September 2001, perhaps it became Manichean. Good versus evil, civilization versus barbarism, modernity versus medievalism, freedom versus fundamentalism, us versus them: These are the terms of political discourse. In the new order, you are either with the United States and the World or you are against it. Time to decide. War abhors ambiguity.

I start with 11 September since the future of the American democracy is very much in question. What kind of insight might the "civil society debate" provide on the current situation? Social capital, collective trust, networks of association, social structures: Don't we need these things now more than ever? Robert Putnam would think so. In fact, in a New York Times op-ed piece of 19 October 2001, he says so. Fortunately, Americans are answering the call. They are giving blood, donating money, waving flags, and attending church. Concerned that the "new mood" might not last, Putnam offers recommendations to take advantage of "this resurgence of community involvement." For him, World War II has been recovered. This generation has its Pearl Harbor, and the greatest generation may have a worthy successor after all. The opportunity must not be squandered.

Beyond Tocqueville operates in and around the world according to Putnam. In one sense, the essays collected here challenge it. First and foremost, this means that Putnam's unidirectional causal logic is questioned. He contends that the health of democracy depends on the quality of its associational life. The editors and authors of this volume wish to contextualize this assessment. Edwards, Foley, and Diani, invoking Michael Walzer, argue that "a democratic civil society seems to require a democratic state, and a strong civil society seems to require a strong and responsive state" (p. 18). The essays in part one of this volume make a convincing case that Putnam's analytic needs to be complicated. Of course, I'm not sure that Putnam would object. Certainly the Putnam of the New York Times op-ed piece would not. For him, the state is key.

Where the Putnam debate gets interesting is on the question of politics. By and large, it seems to be missing in action. Ironically, then, Beyond Tocqueville performs the limitations of the civil society/social capital problematic. Thus the essays by Mark R. Warren, Debra C. Minkoff, and Jackie Smith, which seem to have been forced into the collection, stand out. They deal with politics at the local, national, and transnational levels, respectively. Here the struggle with Putnam and his interlocutors heats up. As Warren writes, "Although we need to reestablish a cooperative basis to American politics, the communitarian version of democracy is insufficient because it fails to appreciate politics as the realm of conflict and power as well as collaboration" (p. 172). What is more, the idea of social capital can be problematic, as Putnam concedes when he asks: Does it have a dark side? Is it inimical to liberty and tolerance? In Bowling Alone (2001, chap. 22), Putnam is pleased to report that tolerance actually seems to rise with civic engagement and participation in voluntary associations. If anything, the stay-at-homers are a cause for concern. Curiously, Putnam does not address the question of liberty-at least not what Berlin would call positive liberty. This is no accident. Tolerance can be tolerated because it is compatible with marginalization and exclusion. But liberty as self-determination may prove tougher to control. Social and political life might become messy,

Thus politics is suspect in Putnam's optic because it divides rather than unites. The editors observe, "Neo-Tocquevillian liberals and conservative proponents of civil society tend to ignore or actively exclude from consideration those sorts of organizations and activities that are associated with advocacy and political action ..." (p. 6). Hence the importance of Eastern Europe and Latin America, where contending conceptions of civil society feature contestation, struggle, life and death, politics. This volume suggests that there is a need to go not just beyond Tocqueville but also beyond Putnam. Consider the Times piece. Speaking of World War II, he writes, "Sacrifice was reinforced by popular culture from radio shows to comic strips. All Americans felt they had to do their share, thereby enhancing each American's sense that her commitment and contribution mattered." Yet as he celebrates mass loyalty oaths (16,000 strong in Chicago), he ignores Japanese-American citizens in internment camps who refused military induction and were sent to (another) prison. In short, not all Americans felt the same way. Putnam's wish for the present has become fact in the past, though surely he knows it's untrue—just as it is untrue today regarding Operation Enduring Freedom (not to be called Infinite Justice). Fortunately, pace Putnam, not all American citizens, let alone citizens elsewhere around the world, feel the same way about or agree on "the basic issues."

Nevertheless, America is united, though there seems to be a necessary underside to unity. George Bush redeems the imperial presidency and Congress abdicates its constitutional responsibilities. Homeland security demands the contraction of core liberties and the ACLU monitors the degradation. Be politically incorrect and challenge the dominant war narrative on ABC, and you will have to apologize to save your job, perhaps much more. Speak against the war at a college or university and you can find yourself on a McCarthyite hit list. It might be tempting to say that politics stops at war's edge, but Americans have been trained to hate politics in the best of times; in the worst of times, politics is un-American. What is wrong with this picture of democracy?

In the aftermath of 9–11, Robert Putnam has been pleasantly surprised by the "solidarity" Americans have displayed. "[T]his new period of crisis can make real to us and our children the value of deeper community connections." No doubt. But does Putnam's idealized civil society of blood-donating, flag-saluting, war-bond-buying Boy Scouts make for a healthy democracy? If you equate democracy with representation, stable majority rule, and ordered consensus, perhaps. But if you affirm a Machiavellian ethos and conceive political contestation as constitutive of freedom, you wonder. Where civil society theorists think socialization, democracy theorists suspect normalization.

Matters don't necessarily improve when Beyond Tocqueville takes an economic turn. Essays by Charles Heying, Michael Schulman and Cynthia Anderson, and Lane Kenworthy offer alternative accounts of declining social capital. Reversing the neo-Tocquevillian analysis, they address the dislocations stemming from globalization and economic restructuring. Grant them the primacy of economics in their causal arguments. Assume that production reigns supreme in the order of things and social capital follows. America's citizenship crisis cannot be solved by prosperity or government-induced economic cooperation. The latter are not designed to address the former. Once again, the civil society problematic proves to be of limited value in contemporary politics.

Fortunately, Minkoff and Smith prefer to explore the workings of national and transnational social movement organizations (SMOs). Entities like EarthAction and Greenpeace may or may not be "productive of social capital" (p. 183), but insofar as they embody democratization and pluralization the question becomes moot—especially if you don't presume that democracy invariably tends to anarchy as participation and enfranchisement flourish. These SMOs privilege social justice, human rights, and peace. Not surprisingly, then, the most interesting essays in this volume ultimately leave behind the civil society and social capital framework (as overly liberal democratic and state-centered) to ponder and research new social and political forms. To think about democracy principally in terms of social capital and trust may be to force it into an impoverished theoretical framework. A Mobilization for Global Justice campus chapter would trump a bowling league any day.

Social Rights Under the Constitution: Government and the Decent Life. By Cecile Fabre. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 202p. \$72.00 cloth.

Katherine Fierlbeck, Dalhousie University

The relationship between economic redistribution and democracy has experienced a profound political shift in the past two decades, which we are only now beginning to analyze with any perspicacity or insight. This conceptual shift has consisted primarily in the ability of the administrations of Thatcher and Reagan, among others, to convince even the less well-off to support policies that seemed to widen the income

gap, with the promise of securing greater absolute gains for all. Social reformers, who for the previous century had viewed democratic procedures and institutions as means of achieving a wider redistribution of wealth, were clearly flummoxed.

This book addresses this relationship directly and yet, ultimately, misses the substantial point underlying this shift. Fabre's aim is to explicate the relationship between social rights and democracy and thereby to make the case for the constitutional entrenchment of rights to adequate minimum income, housing, health care, and education. The novel aspect of Fabre's position is her claim that one ought not to base an argument for social rights on their intrinsic necessity to a "democratic" culture (e.g., the argument that social rights are required as a component of democratic citizenship). Indeed, she maintains that social rights are for the most part largely "undemocratic," but that this is nonetheless insufficient reason to reject them.

Instead of making social rights derivative of democratic rights, Fabre constructs her argument for an equal fundamental interest in having a decent life upon the principles of autonomy and well-being. This first step is both the most and the least contentious. It is contentious because her definition of autonomy is made to do a great deal of work. Autonomy, for Fabre, involves having not only personal capacities and the opportunities to choose from various opportunities, but, most significantly, access to opportunities (pp. 9-12). The reason we ought to have rights is not merely because we are autonomous (we generally hold that even nonautonomous individuals such as newborns have rights) but rather because "the kind of person who leads a decent life has special moral value" (p. 17). Thus, "if some of their needs are not met, people cannot be the kind of person who leads a decent life, because they cannot be autonomous and they cannot achieve well-being" (p. 18). The reason this claim is so contentious, of course, is that needs are socially determined (p. 35), and thus we are, in the author's account, obliged to provide something that we cannot clearly define, and that shifts from place to place and from one time period to another. And yet this is not a particularly contentious claim insofar as most liberal democracies do in fact make a sustained effort to provide such social goods at some minimal level precisely to provide a decent life for their citizens.

The real issue, then, is whether such rights ought to be constitutionalized; and the reason this leads to such dissension is because it raises the issue of political control over the monies raised through taxation. Democratic representation was, in both England and the United States, historically the product of a propertied class who felt that they were being taxed without having a say in how their monies were spent. Small surprise, then, that the same issue should raise the hackles of modern liberal democrats. One of the many strengths of this book is the sheer philosophical weight brought to bear by the author to address this single point. Fabre engages a wide range of major theorists in this debate (although, interestingly, Hayek is missing); and she does not hesitate to address the canon of liberal thought on their own terms to make her case.

Disputing the argument that "social rights ought not to be constitutionalized because they are *positive* rights," Fabre argues that social rights ought to be considered for their substantive importance rather than because they are the result of procedural fairness. This is the nub of Fabre's case: Because democracy is essentially a process, rather than a value system, one can coherently hold that social rights ought to be protected while, at the same time, asserting that to do so would be "undemocratic" (simply because such constitutional entrenchment might not be supported by the democratic majority). This is a lively but unconvincing discussion:

Simply to say that "democracies can and often do act unjustly" (p. 114), for example, is not itself persuasive, as one can just as easily (and more precisely) say that countries with democratic procedural systems can come to decisions that do not reflect democratic values. Further, Fabre argues that social rights are not democratic rights, as it is not necessarily true that poverty prevents people from being able to participate politically (except, perhaps, insofar as education allows us to comprehend political issues): Empirically, perhaps, this holds true, although one might object that insofar as a casual correlation can be established at all (i.e., the more indigent one is, the less likely one will be to participate politically), it ought to serve as grounds for the provision of social rights.

Nonetheless, this is not a severe objection to Fabre's case. It is admittedly much snappier to say that "social rights are undemocratic but ought nonetheless to be constitutionalized"; but one can still hold that social rights are a reflection of democratic values and ought to be constitutionalized, without relying upon the democratic nature of these rights. Thus Fabre constructs a lucid, tightly constructed, and intelligent argument against grounding social rights upon democratic criteria. The problem for proponents of social rights (among whom she counts herself) is that she is more persuasive in her defeat of democratically based social rights than in her construction of an alternative basis for social rights (viz., upon the values of autonomy and well-being); as noted above, much of this rests upon a very subjective appraisal of what ought to be required to live an autonomous and decent life. As most states do attempt to provide such necessities, the issue is not the principle of whether to provide them, but the level at which they ought to be provided. Fabre takes aim at this position and, in essence, asks liberals to put their money up front: If in fact they do accept that such services ought to be provided, why not allow nonelected officials (i.e., some level of judiciary) to determine the level? Ultimately, Fabre attempts to walk a middle ground between political representation and judicial protection by attempting to sketch out a system in which judges would determine whether or not the level of provision was acceptable, but elected governments would be responsible for finding a way to correct any deficiencies.

This is an excellent, cogently argued, and intellectually edifying book: and one that thinks about basic principles without divorcing them from the political context. However, the political force of the "new right revolution"—and the point that Fabre misses—is the claim that inequalities are justified (and that the level of taxation can never be taken out of the hands of the political representatives) simply because of the changing way in which wealth is produced: to wit, through a greater reliance upon international trade. Those who produce wealth, on this account, cannot be fettered by the demands of taxation (no matter how just those claims are) simply because by doing so we forfeit the larger social gains to be made if national enterprises can compete effectively internationally (which, again, on this account, requires minimal taxation). The problem, quite simply, is that counterfactual claims play a much greater role today in thinking about redistributive justice. As Fabre herself concedes, a government cannot justly interfere in favor of one beneficiary if by doing so "it undermines other people's prospects for a decent life" (p. 177). In just such a manner, Thatcher convinced a significant part of the electorate that the British welfare state interfered with people's prospects for a decent life and that the markets, rather than the courts or the executive, could provide this. This is not to condone this position, or to dispute the substance of Fabre's articulate and engaging argument. But the political success of this position, for better or for worse, does perhaps suggest that too much comes down to the issue of "Who determines what a decent life is?" and it is doubtful that the majority itself would be willing to let a few appointed officials decide.

Rebel Writer: Mary Wollstonecraft and Enlightenment Politics. By Wendy Gunther-Canada. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001. 224p. \$38.00

Gina Luria Walker, The New School

This is a brave, important book that identifies and responds to the black holes between scholarly discourses and across genres to explain why and how Mary Wollstonecraft's texts should be recognized as "interrupting the fraternal conversation of political thought" (p. 42) among the men she herself described as "canonized forefathers." Reading carefully through selections from Wollstonecraft's writings letters, educational treatises, novels, the Vindications-Wendy Gunther-Canada elucidates the continuum of Wollstonecraft's radical political theory about gender differences. Rebel Writer traces Wollstonecraft's transformation from "arguably the eighteenth century's most rebellious female reader [to] its most revolutionary feminist author," as she contested the portrayal of women in Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Locke, Fordyce, and Gregory, struggling to devise a feminism characterized by "the powerful confrontations between woman and the word, between literature and philosophy" (p. 16).

Gunther-Canada deliberately situates Wollstonecraft in the existing abyss between Virginia Sapiro's (1992) "pathbreaking examination," A Vindication of Political Virtue, and literary theorist Gary Kelly's (1992) Revolutionary Feminism: The Mind and Career of Mary Wollstonecraft. Sapiro, Gunther-Canada advises, attempted to add Wollstonecraft to the lineage of masculine canonical thinkers but failed to examine the reasons for Wollstonecraft's continuing "marginalization" as an authoritative contributor to political theory. Kelly, she opines, "does a better job of theorizing genre, placing Wollstonecraft's works within the discursive context of the period, but he is ... blindsided by the politics of gender" (pp. 6-7). This is somewhat turgid going until Gunther-Canada begins to read out loud, moving through Wollstonecraft's words, demonstrating her openness to fruitful insights wherever they may be found. She is stronger in literary studies than history. For example, she misses Barbara Taylor's ongoing, innovative formulations (Barbara Taylor, "Mary Wollstonecraft and the Wild Wish of Early Feminism," History Workshop Journal 33 (1992); "For the Love of God: Religion and the Erotic Imagination in Wollstonecraft's Feminism," in Eileen Janes Yeo, ed., Mary Wollstonecraft and 200 Years of Feminism, 1997), particularly their focus on the unresolved tension between reason and desire in Wollstonecraft's thought, as in her life. And I assume that Janet Todd's trenchant biography, based on the correspondence, appeared too late to be considered (Janet Todd, Mary Wollstonecraft: A Revolutionary Life, 2000).

Nevertheless, the book overall is concise, brilliant, and readable, with the successive chapters linking and building upon the texts in chronological order. In "A Voice from the Void," Gunther-Canada scrutinizes Wollstonecraft's earliest surviving letters and publications to reveal a developmental approach from girl to woman that anticipates Gilligan. "The Rebel Writer and the Rights of Men" explores her extraordinary response to Edmund Burke's (1790) Reflections on the Revolution in France. "The Feminist Author and Women's Rights" offers a superbly integrated analysis of the nexus of the two Vindications. "Writing the Wrongs of Politics" is a bold exegesis of the posthumously published, uncompleted fiction, The Wrongs of Woman; or, Maria, in which

Gunther-Canada claims that Wollstonecraft's change in literary genre from treatise to novel intentionally "highlighted a critical challenge to the discourse of political philosophy." Wollstonecraft, Gunther-Canada explains, "politicized the relationship of women to both fiction and philosophy by arguing that the sexual distinctions in eighteenth-century discourse structured and reinforced the social distinctions institutionalized by the law. Wollstonecraft radically contested the *very terms* upon which women enter the conversation of political theory" (p. 130).

I emphasize the impulse that compels Gunther-Canada to cast a wider conceptual net than is customary because, in addressing women's texts, it is crucial to acknowledge that they frequently emerge out of no codified, much less canonized, historical tradition and so demand to be considered from multiple directions. *Rebel Writer* demonstrates ably that this can be done.

This approach serves Gunther-Canada well in her analysis of Wollstonecraft's difficulties in writing women into the history of political thought. Interestingly, it is in her detailed analysis of The Wrongs of Woman that Gunther-Canada negotiates most skillfully between and among previous commentators from differing intellectual reference points, filling in what she declares is "missing" from our understanding. Wollstonecraft's final, fragmentary text, she writes, "offers a significant challenge to the foundations of eighteenth-century political thought. Both republican theorists on the Continent and liberal philosophers in England had defined their conception of the good society by constructing a public sphere composed of citizen fathers and an opposing private sphere of patriotic mothers. Wollstonecraft disputed the symmetry of this political cosmos, claiming that the power relationships that structured the institutions and processes of government were coterminous with those existing within the family" (p. 151). Wollstonecraft held the British government culpable, leaving women unprotected in the power struggles within their homes; she also held women responsible for complying with the distorted female representations they found in novels, conduct books, and existing laws that did not accurately or adequately reflect or respond to the realities of their lives.

Gunther-Canada concludes with a critique of two portrayals of Wollstonecraft that she describes as "fictions": Memoirs of the Author of 'A Vindication of the Rights of Woman', written by William Godwin (1798), Wollstonecraft's husband, six months after her death from the aftereffects of childbirth. and Frances Sherwood's (1993) Vindication. In her criticisms of Godwin's Wollstonecraft, Gunther-Canada joins other modern readers who blame Godwin for the repudiation of Wollstonecraft's feminism by women as well as men during the 150 years since his account appeared. Here Gunther-Canada falters, surprisingly. In William Pitt's repressive witch hunt in the late 1790s, Wollstonecraft was identified as the witch even before the Memoirs. That Godwin struggled to articulate what Wollstonecraft had described to her lover Gilbert Imlay as "a new language" that exploded the gendered conversation between men and women about the discursive categories of "masculinity" and "femininity" is an index to how contested the subject was. And why should we expect Godwin to have been better than his male contemporaries at learning or deploying this lexicon? My own research on Wollstonecraft's feminist colleague and intimate friend Mary Hays (1759-1843) suggests that there were other progressive "generous men" who supported the efforts of individual women, but no man embraced "revolutionary feminism" as a necessary part of the male agenda for advancing "unlimited toleration." We may be disappointed that Godwin's Wollstonecraft reflects more his reformist interests than hers, but writing with

Wollstonecraft's manuscripts before him, Godwin achieved a new kind of ventriloquism, incorporating her ideas and phrases—"intellectual beauty," for example—into his narrative. I hope that Gunther-Canada will take another look.

Gunther-Canada's criticisms of Francis Sherwood's recent biographical fiction about Wollstonecraft, however, hit the mark. Godwin was on his own. Sherwood had at her disposal feminist thinking about Wollstonecraft from numerous perspectives over the past 30 years. Given the vagaries of trade publishing, Sherwood wasted a precious opportunity to give common readers access to an accurate amalgam of Wollstonecraft's life and work.

The freshness of Gunther's general evenhandedness as she reads her way along the parallel tracks of primary and secondary texts is welcome. Feminist scholarship is mature enough now to encourage inventive approaches to important thinkers that make use of other disciplines, even as they are grounded in the scholar's own. Joan Wallach Scott proposes a generous litmus test by which to calibrate commentary on Wollstonecraft: "The history of Wollstonecraft as a feminist... is the history of the uses made of her by subsequent generations" (Joan W. Scott, "The Imagination of Olympe de Gouges," in Mary Wollstonecraft and 200 Years of Feminisms, 1997, p. 37). Wendy Gunther-Canada has used her very well.

The Re-Enchantment of Political Science: Christian Scholars Engage Their Discipline. Edited by Thomas W. Heilke and Ashley Woodiwiss. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 266p. \$70.00 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

Jeanne M. Heffernan, Pepperdine University

The postmodern challenge to the rationalist paradigm long regnant in American higher education has shaken the foundations of the secular academy, opening it up to a diversity of voices hitherto unheard. Under this new dispensation, Alan Wolfe observers, "Room can be made for any group, including conservative Christians" ("The Opening of the Evangelical Mind," Atlantic Monthly [October 2000]: 76). Various Christian scholars have indeed received at least a hearing—if not a welcome—in this more open atmosphere. The work of historians, such as Mark Noll and George Marsden, and philosophers, such as Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff, has commanded national attention in secular academic circles; they have brought a distinctively Christian voice to their discipline.

Thomas Heilke and Ashley Woodiwiss endeavor to do the same. In The Re-Enchantment of Political Science, Heilke and Woodiwiss present a collection of essays that attempts to respond to two difficulties that have created a double bind for Christian scholars: first, the lack of a distinctive tradition of intellectual inquiry among evangelicals and, second, the hostility of the mainstream academy to faith-informed scholarship. With the weakening of the philosophical foundations supporting the latter, the editors argue, Christian scholars are now well positioned to remedy the former. Specifically, Christian political scientists can bring their religious commitments to bear on the analysis of various topics within the discipline. The Re-Enchantment of Political Science presents this kind of integrated scholarship on a wide range of subjects in political theory, public policy, and international relations. In the estimation of Heilke and Woodiwiss, the nine essays in Re-Enchantment reflect "an awakening of fresh and creative ways whereby Christian academics are reassessing how their theological commitments inform and shape their responses to the reigning orthodoxies that constitute their disciplines" (p. 3).

The editors themselves present the most provocative essays in the collection. Each proposes a radical alternative to well-entrenched orthodoxies in mainstream political science. Heilke, for instance, argues that social science inherited the epistemological weaknesses of liberalism in understanding human phenomena and in consequence has been "ethically incoherent" (p. 56), unable to render an adequate moral assessment of the American regime. He contends that an Anabaptist perspective, in light of its rich anthropology and social vision, provides a better vantage point from which to critically assess political phenomena. Only a metanarrative like this, grounded in an "ontology of peace" (p. 55) and instantiated in a nonhierarchical, nonpolitical church, can adequately critique the powers that be and offer effective witness of a different model of human relationships.

Woodiwiss, too, delivers a spirited criticism of socialscientific historiography, challenging what he considers the standard Whiggish account of the rise of the liberal state and its purported commitment to religious toleration. If one adopts an "ecclesiocentric narrative" (p. 77) instead, he insists, a very different and more accurate story emerges. According to this counternarrative, the liberal state under the ruse of toleration actually displaced religion from its ecclesial context, thus privatizing it and rendering it susceptible to state manipulation. Such manipulation continues unabated, for Woodiwiss, most obviously in Rawls and Macedo, more subtly in Galston and Perry. The work of these liberal theorists reveals "liberalism's essential, necessary and ineliminable commitment to exclusionism . . . [its] permanent fingering of the Church as requiring scrutiny, surveillance and policing" (p. 79). As evidenced by various "public" theologies, Christians have too often been co-opted by the liberal regime and hoodwinked by its appeal to reasonableness and toleration. Rather than accommodate this view, he argues, Christians should adopt a postliberal democratic theory, recognizing the "agonistic" (p. 157) character of politics as well as their own status as a "subaltern counterpublic" (p. 158) in a post-Christendom world.

Not every essay in the volume offers quite as provocative, novel, and well argued a thesis as Heilke's and Woodiwiss', but the collection as a whole is very strong. Nearly every piece provides a stimulating, sophisticated argument that brings a distinctive theological perspective into dialogic contact with mainstream research. In so doing, the essays make a powerful case for faith-informed scholarship. Ironically, however, they also reveal the difficulty of creating a "Christian political science" (p. 5). While the editors acknowledge that such an enterprise "will not be univocal in its evaluations and interpretations" (p. 9), they may have underestimated the depth of divergence within the collection. Serious and seemingly intractable differences surface in several of the essays. Fault lines emerge along ecclesiological, hermeneutical, and ethical lines. Dan Philpott, for instance, eloquently appeals to "Christ's love expressed as benevolence" (p. 250) as part of a justification for military action in the service of humanitarian intervention, an effort that Heilke's Anabaptism would prohibit. Likewise, Philpott's anthropology, rooted in the Thomistic natural law tradition, would differ markedly from Paul Brink's "relational" (p. 89) conception, informed as it is by Luther, Calvin, and Barth. So, too, would Clarke Cochran's commendation of Roman Catholic ecclesiology draw Heilke's criticism, while Cochran's reliance upon the concept of the "common good" might strike Woodiwiss as a "Constantinian" (p. 159) concession.

Despite these points of difference, the essays also reveal even deeper convergences. The common assumptions they share about creation, the nature and mission of Christ, and the social orientation of the Gospel are profound. From these commonalities exciting possibilities emerge. The work of Timothy Sherratt and Stacy Hunter Hecht, for instance, suggests that in combination the Calvinist and Catholic concepts of "sphere sovereignty" (p. 126) and "subsidiarity" (p. 201) have important theoretical and practical utility in assessing the performance of the modern state. Also, Brink's endorsement of pluralistic politics as best aligned with the relational character of the *imago Dei* dovetails well with the "counterpublic" model of Christian political action espoused by Woodiwiss. These kinds of ecumenical overlap indicate that the Christian "community of scholars" (p. 32) Michael LeRoy anticipates will have much to discuss.

Fortunately, if the essays in *The Re-Enchantment of Political Science* are predictive, this discussion will not simply be intramural. It will engage other scholars from across the discipline in an open and vigorous exchange of ideas. Such an enterprise, as Alan Wolfe suggests, would enrich secular and religious scholars alike.

Public Space and Democracy. Edited by Marcel Hénaff and Tracy B. Strong. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001. 256p. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Margaret Kohn, University of Florida

Until recently space was a highly suspect concept in political theory. The linguistic turn that has dominated the discipline for the past 20 years has multiple roots. Derrida's critique of pure presence, Foucault's discourse analysis, and Habermas's communicative action, in different ways, contributed to an emphasis on language over place. Recent work in geography and cultural studies, however, has begun to reserve this trend.

The essays in *Public Space and Democracy* contribute to this renaissance by exploring "the nature and status of the space in which human beings encounter each other with the intention of determining how their lives should be lived" (p. 1). The editors, Tracy Strong and Marcel Hénaff, pose two questions that link together the diverse essays. Does political life require a space in which collective concerns can be expressed and contested? And do modern technologies such as television and the Internet transform the possibilities of public space? The latter question is motivated by the suspicion that new technologies diminish the importance of space by transgressing geographical borders and undermining the need for face-to-face contact.

Before it is possible to answer these questions, it is necessary to provide a preliminary definition of space. The essays rely on a wide range of approaches; in fact, the editors point out that "the word space has taken on a metaphorical meaning and designates an ensemble of social connections, political institutions, and judicial practices. The literal meaning has almost been wiped out" (p. 35). My question is whether the concept of space can help us draw needed analytic distinctions if it becomes a synonym for such diverse alternatives as representation, discourse, or social relations.

While none of the essays in the collection engages in a sustained consideration of space as a concept, the editors provide a useful framework in their introduction. They distinguish among public, private, sacred, and common space. A public space is a human construct that facilitates seeing and being seen: Public space has both a physical and a social dimension. The social dimension is captured by the term "theatrical," which suggests the importance of visibility and self-presentation (p. 5). A public space also has a distinctive architectural property: openness. Open spaces like the ancient agora and the renaissance piazza are public in a way that back alleys are not. A private space, on the other hand,

is characterized by the way in which individuals or groups can exclude outsiders. Thus private space is a matter not only of ownership but also of regulation and control of access.

Strong and Hénaff wisely present these definitions as poles at opposite ends of a continuum rather than stable categories. It is immediately apparent that some of the most important contemporary sociopolitical sites seem to undermine this distinction. For example, shopping malls (the topic of Benjamin Barber's essay, "Malled, Mauled and Overhauled: Arresting Suburban Sprawl by Transforming Mall into Usable Civic Space") provide a stage for seeing and being seen. Malls are open, theatrical, and constructed and therefore they meet Strong and Hénaff's definition of public space. While malls clearly entice and invite the general public, they are also based on the ability to exclude anyone who potentially disrupts the carefully calculated atmosphere of safety, cleanliness, order, leisure, and desire. As Barber points out, the most urgent problem today is the way that private simulacra come to replace public places; shopping malls and theme parks sell a sanitized substitute "where people can experience the thrill of the different without taking any risks" (p. 206) Similarly, new urbanist developments turn community itself into a commodity that can be purchased for the price of a white picket fence and wraparound porch.

Other sites transgress the line between public and private in politically significant ways. Publicly owned places such as the sidewalk in front of the post office are open and generally accessible but only to consumers and not to citizens. By this I mean that individuals who want to exercise their first amendment rights by gathering signatures, soliciting donations, or handing out leaflets may be forbidden from doing so, even on the publicly accessible portions of government property. Conversely, places such as back alleys and back rooms, which fail to meet Strong and Hénaff's criteria of "openness," are often important political sites precisely because limited visibility prevents surveillance and control. This raises the possibility that semiprivate spaces such as the Masonic lodges that made up Habermas's public sphere may nurture counterhegemonic ideas and practices more effectively than public places. While public space is undoubtedly political, the mass rituals of the Fascist and Nazi regimes suggest that it is not necessarily democratic.

Anne Norton's lyrical essay "Writing Property and Power" effectively captures the ambivalent quality of public space. She takes graffiti as a point of departure for her Heideggerian-inspired analysis of dwelling in urban space. For graffiti artists, writing on walls is a way to acquire "a place of shelter... to persist when one is absent" (p. 198). It is a way to take possession through ownership that is based not on alienable or exclusive custody but on what Henri Lefebvre called a right to the city. Through graffiti, the invisible becomes visible and the silent speak. Norton's discussion provides the ideal counterpoint to Barber's description of the decline of public space. She draws attention to the way that the city serves as a site of contestation over legibility, habitability, and power.

The other eight essays in the collection place less emphasis on the political and cultural effects of the built environment. Instead, they employ space as a metaphor for social relations or the phenomenal world of appearances. In "Voice and Silence of Public Space: Popular Societies in the French Revolution," Shigeki Tominga traces the rise and fall of political clubs in France. He focuses on the contested role of voluntary associations in French revolutionary theory. On the one hand, the political clubs seemed reminiscent of feudal corporate bodies, which constrained the freedom of the individual and decreased identification with the state as a whole. On the other hand, they could potentially contribute to revolutionary praxis by linking print and oral culture, thereby

providing political education and fostering deliberation. However, the radical politics of the Popular Societies, combined with the general suspicion of intermediary associations, ensured their demise. Tominga concludes that the disintegration of the nascent public sphere "suggests that the rational social processes... contained the very seeds of irrationality" (p. 92). The flaw in this otherwise interesting essay is that Tominga fails to explain the descent from deliberation to denunciation (what he calls "voice" and "noise") in the Popular Societies.

In "Theatricality in the Public Realm," Dana Villa provides the explanation missing from Tominga's piece. According to Villa, Hannah Arendt thought that the search for "intimacy and warmth" in the *fraternité* trumpeted by the French Revolution was among the causes of its downfall. The decline of theatricality and the rise of intimacy and community had political consequences. By reconfiguring politics as a function of personal identity, this tendency made "it less likely that one's political opponents will escape demonization on the basis of who *they* are ..." (p. 168). The implication is that coming together in voluntary associations or political clubs does not create a public realm if such places do not reflect an ethos of worldliness.

Since the conceptual boundaries of "space" are not yet established, a wide array of concerns can potentially illuminate the theme of public space and democracy. The unevenness of the collection probably reflects the difficulty of beginning to theorize relatively uncharted terrain. My primary reservation about the book is that its title is something of a misnomer. Perhaps "Theatricality and Representation in Political Theory" would better capture the themes that the majority of the essays explore. For example, in chapter 2 Paul Dumouchel focuses on the issue of representation in Hobbes. In chapter 3 Jacqueline Lichtenstein explains why the French dramatist Corneille is "no doubt the most important political thinker of the seventeenth century." Peter Euben's "Aristophanes in America" (chapter 5) shows how ancient comedy and its contemporary progeny (the Simpsons, the Honeymooners) reinforce a democratic ethos by denaturalizing our most hallowed political conventions. While the latter essay, in particular, was a delight to read, students of political space should not overlook the editors' provocative conclusion that "we should say farewell to the old model of a monumental public space" (p. 230). In nine short pages, Strong and Hénaff raise the most urgent problems in the whole book; most notably they reflect on the way new technologies facilitate "unsited spaces" (p. 224), which transform our understanding of space itself. Had the majority of contributors followed their lead, the book could have done more to advance our understanding of public space and democracy.

**Ecology and Historical Materialism.** By Jonathan Hughes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 219p. \$59.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Terence Ball, Arizona State University

What can Marx and Marxian theory teach us about environmental problems and their possible solutions? One view is: not much, except about how *not* to think about the natural world and human beings' place in it. Marx himself sometimes spoke in the hubristic nineteenth-century idiom of the coming human "mastery" or "conquest" or "pacification" of nature, and most self-described Marxists have assumed that human happiness and social harmony go hand in hand with the human domination of nature. This interpretation of Marxian theory, when put into practice, has produced ecologically dis-

astrous results of the sort described in depressing detail in Judith Shapiro's (2000) Mao's War Against Nature. But there is another way to read Marx that leads to altogether different conclusions, as we see in the work of Alfred Schmidt (The Concept of Nature in Marx, 1971), Howard Parsons (Marx and Engels on Ecology, 1977), Reiner Grundmann (Marxism and Ecology, 1991), and now in Jonathan Hughes's Ecology and Historical Materialism.

While it is true that Marx spoke of the human mastery of nature, he also emphasized humans' dependence on nature, and vice versa. That human beings are a part of nature and can never be apart from it is a view that Marx shares with modern environmental or "green" thinkers. It is this "interdependence" view that provides a point of entry for greens who seek a rapprochement between Marxian theory and modern ecology. A central feature of Marx's materialism, Hughes argues, is the idea that the natural world sets constraints upon what human beings can do and produce while, at the same time, human beings transform the natural world, thereby altering the constraints. But there are natural limits to the degree and kind of such alteration: Nature is malleable and transformable, but not infinitely so. Marx recognized this, albeit through a glass darkly: He had hardly an inkling of what twentieth-century technology might produce. That said, his theory is interpretable and adaptable in ways that allow us to address twenty-first-century environmental problems in a newer, subtler, and more illuminating way than most "green" political theory does. This is the task that Hughes sets himself, and at which he very largely succeeds.

On the whole, Hughes's view of the environmental or green movement is highly critical but broadly sympathetic. He holds that their theorizing is weaker than it would be if it were informed by Marxian theory, properly understood. For example, although greens acknowledge human dependence on nature, they balk at acknowledging that nature as we (can) know it is in turn dependent on human beings. They see nature as pristine, unspoiled, and best left alone by humans. But this, Hughes argues, is not an option. It is the nature of our species to transform nature and thereby ourselves. But such transformation need not—pace orthodox reds and radical greens—be tantamount to human exploitation or domination of nature. Moreover, many greens are (in an older Marxian idiom) philosophical idealists instead of materialists. That is, they think that a particular mind-set—anthropocentrism—is the root cause of environmental problems and that a change of mindset will bring about the desired changes and humans can then live humbly and harmoniously with nature. This, Hughes argues, is to take a too-simple view of the humannature relation and thus of the environmental problems that arise therefrom. A big bracing dose of Marxian materialism can serve as a useful antidote and corrective.

Much of modern environmental discourse is implicitly Malthusian, in that it asserts (or assumes) that a population tends to outstrip the resources required to sustain it. This theme is sounded in the "limits to growth" studies, in the efforts of Zero Population Growth and other groups, and in the work of Garrett Hardin, Paul and Anne Erlich, William Catton, and other environmentalists. Hughes goes straight to the source—Parson Malthus's (1798) An Essay on the Principle of Population-examining the arguments and then turning to Marx and Engels's critiques of Malthus, which, in broad outline, Hughes finds persuasive but in need of qualification. Marx and Engels argued that the growth of scientific knowledge and technological innovation extend the human capacity to produce resources beyond the limits that Malthus foresaw. Hughes turns their argument against the "green Malthusians" but allows that the upshot of the Marxian critique is to (technologically) extend and "relativize" the natural limits to growth (chap. 2). The green Malthusians are right to be worried but wrong to be absolutists and pessimists.

Hughes then considers arguments (or more often assertions) advanced by green thinkers to the effect that the "scientific method" is mechanistic, atomistic, and reductive and is thus unable to grasp the complex interdependencies that characterize the natural world. Insofar as Marxian theory claims to be scientific, it too is tarred with brush. Hughes rejects this as so much outdated metaphysical mumbo jumbo, and defends Marxian theory as being acutely sensitive to complexly causal interdependencies and therefore more adequate than rival theories in addressing ecological problems (chap. 3). He next considers (chap. 4) critics who claim that historical materialism, as developed by the "mature" Marx, abandons the ecological sensibilities of the "young" Marx. Instead of an "ecological break" between the two Marxes, Hughes finds theoretical consistency and continuity.

The remainder of Hughes's book attempts to show that the "productive forces" can, but need not, develop in environmentally destructive directions, thereby paving the way for an "ecological Marxism" (chap. 5). One troubling feature of Marx's vision, however, is his claim that the development of the productive forces is accompanied by ever-expanding human needs. Must the satisfaction of these needs result in further environmental degradation? Hughes strives mightily, and with mixed success, to show that the answer is: may be not, especially under socialism (chap. 6). This is a rather equivocal end to Hughes's sustained and systematic defense of the possibility of an ecological Marxism. He does, however, succeed in forcing readers to reexamine a number of key questions that must be addressed by any adequate environmental theory.

Christian Faith and Modern Democracy: God and Politics in the Fallen World. By Robert P. Kraynak. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2001. 352p. \$49.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

**Politics, Theology and History.** By Raymond Plant. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 380p. \$69.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Clarke E. Cochran, Texas Tech University

Religion and politics is a burgeoning subfield. Liberalism—communitarian literature now includes attention to religious communities. Theorists of civil society recognize that religious organizations implement a considerable range of policies. Since pluralism entails the presence of multiple voices in public conversation, theorists debate how a liberal society should treat religious voices. Theorists within religious traditions debate the bearing of faith on political action and the extent to which churches should cooperate with state institutions.

The present books, both by political theorists, contemplate these topics and others. Raymond Plant delivers the more comprehensive treatment of political theorists (philosophers and political scientists) and political theologians (theologians and clergy). Robert Kraynak offers an iconoclastic account of the relationship of Christian faith to modern democracy. It is the more unified and tightly organized book, but one whose style is more popular and tone more polemical. The same two themes organize each book: (1) Does liberal democracy require a moral foundation? and (2) What is the proper orientation of Christian political theology toward liberal society? Plant and Kraynak answer "yes" to the first question and agree that establishing this foundation is difficult, Plant because there is no single Christian political

theology. Kraynak, on the other hand, believes that there is a single Christian political theology, but it is neither liberal nor democratic. Kraynak's is thus the more stimulating book, rethinking liberal democracy and Christian political theology.

Politics, Theology and History contains three parts. Chapters 2–6 consider the possibility of a Christian political theology. That is, can Christian beliefs be related in a coherent and rigorous way to the problems of politics, economics, and society? Chapters 7–10 ponder the moral foundations on which modern liberal democracies rest. Part III is Plant's theoretical resolution of the issues.

Plant focuses on the tension between universal and particular. A political theology deduced from the doctrine of God, creation, and the human person in principle is universal, but its high level of generality cannot ground particular judgments. On the other hand, political theology grounded in the particular is fragmented (p. 19). Plant finds this dilemma analogous to the liberal—communitarian debate, in which the liberal side achieves universality, but at the price of empty proceduralism. Communitarians achieve particularity but are trapped in cultural relativism.

Plant approaches the problem through accounts of four theological systems and their principal proponents. In the first system *history* mediates the universal and the particular. Its chief representatives are Augustine, Calvin, and Hegel and, more recently among the theologians, John Cobb and Wolfhart Pannenberg. Plant is strongly attracted to the necessity and possibility of a theology of history but concludes that modern theology cannot overcome the limits of Hegelianism. He does not consider Kraynak's strategy of resurrecting an Augustinian theory of history.

If historical theology fails, perhaps systematic theology (represented chiefly by older figures such as Karl Barth and T. H. Green) or narrative theology (represented by contemporary theologians George Lindbeck and Stanley Hauerwas) can ground political theology (chapter 5). Narrative theology, however, furnishes a devastating critique of any attempted systematic political theology, yet it fragments moral community, leaving no foundation for liberal culture. Natural law theology (chapter 6) remains. Plant furnishes a solid, though brief, account of natural law and the contemporary challenges to it, concluding that the fact/value dichotomy, the naturalistic fallacy, and moral diversity undermine natural law's foundational capacity.

Plant's preliminary conclusion is that "there can be no wholly definitive or authoritative political theology and, indeed, no authoritative political praxis associated with it, since the methodological controversies are so profound" (p. 173). This being the case, believers have two unattractive alternatives: either to privatize their most profound beliefs or to become internal exiles within liberal democracy. Yet the most important political, social, and economic issues of modern life call upon moral principles. Plant uses Part II to make this case, showing that markets have moral underpinnings (chapter 7), that neoliberal market theory is inadequate (chapter 8), that rights by themselves cannot supply the basis for a liberal society (chapter 9), and that neither theological nor philosophical communitarians can make community the sole support for liberal society (chapter 10).

Part III promises Plant's account of the contribution of political theology to liberal society. Yet the failure of liberal neutrality (in its utilitarian, contractarian, Rawlsian, and perfectionist forms) occupies most of these two chapters. Only briefly does Plant articulate his own commitment to establishing common moral ground through dialogue among persons situated in particular communities. Such dialogue seems the place for Christian political theology.

There is much to admire in *Politics, Theology and History*. Most useful for political scientists is the careful attention to major political theologians. Those seeking a précis find sure-footed guidance. Nevertheless, the book is very slight on Plant's own proposals, and his conclusions are not always clear among the summaries of a wide variety of theorists. Nor is it evident why certain materials receive major attention (V. A. Demant, in chapter 6) or whether certain "set pieces" are necessary (the dated discussion of communitarianism in chapter 10).

Kraynak's focused polemical argument is more satisfying for those seeking a definite position strongly defended. Where Plant argues that liberal society needs a moral foundation, but cannot find a suitable candidate, Kraynak asserts that liberal democracy "needs God" (xiii) and that Christian foundational beliefs about creation, fall, and redemption supply the hidden intellectual capital sustaining modern democracy. This is the briefer of Kraynak's two main arguments. Its ironic counterpoint is that, looked at a afresh, Christianity is far less liberal and democratic than its proponents realize. Another ironic twist, of which Kraynak is less aware, is that secular liberal democrats readily accept the truth of this second argument, employing it to undermine his first

Kraynak principally targets those who accept the amalgam of Christianity and liberal democracy. He claims that they too readily accept the legitimacy of democracy and the human rights regime, reading such notions uncritically back into biblical concepts such as humanity's creation in the image of God. The amalgam, however good it is for democracy, is dangerous to Christianity. He traces the growth of Christian support for democracy primarily to Kantian enlightenment ideas (chapter 3), founded on principles of human individuality and autonomy at odds with Christian faith.

The core of Christian Faith and Modern Democracy is a review of Scripture and the tradition of Christian theology (primarily Western, but Orthodoxy makes a welcome appearance) to establish that the Christian conception of persons, politics, and church is hierarchical and incompatible with modern human rights. Chapter 2 argues that this position is the Bible's and that it belongs as well to the central tradition of Christian theology, especially Augustine, but also Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin. Augustine's two-cities analogy figures prominently. The image of God, Kraynak admits, exalts humanity, but only in the spiritual realm, not the political. Moreover, the spiritual includes hierarchical degrees of perfection that do not fit modern, democratic principles. The earthly city displays no single, best form of government; rather, prudence points to different forms in different times and cultures.

Kraynak effectively challenges shallow identifications of liberalism with Christianity, but some of his Biblical interpretation is tendential and over simple (covenant in chapter 2). The claim of Christian democrats at their most sensible is not that the Bible touts democracy, but that its view of human dignity, when enriched by historical experience and developing Christian reflection, grows toward modern human rights and political equality.

The heart of the book's positive claim is the argument for the superiority of "Christian constitutionalism" (chapters 4 and 5). There are two separate contentions here, which Kraynak yokes too closely. The first is that liberalism's commitment to Kantian-style human individuality and moral autonomy is antithetical to Scripture and Christian theology. This argument seems correct. Christian social theory is social, not individualistic, and it insists that human freedom, precious as it is, must be oriented to truth and the will of God. Yet this does not entail Kraynak's second claim, that Christian theol-

ogy cannot articulate a strong theory of rights and democratic government on its own terms. Yet even Kraynak admits that Christian democracy, if it could keep Kant firmly in a theoretical box, can be a legitimate expression of Christian theology (pp. 120–24, 163–66).

Kraynak, however, doubts the likelihood of controlling Kantian assumptions, so he argues instead the superiority of constitutional monarchy to modern democracy. His great heroes are Augustine and Solzhenitsyn. Yet he recognizes that, prudentially, democracy is the most likely near-term political system. Therefore, the second-best regime is "constitutional democracy under God," a democracy that recognizes its limits and guarantees independence to divinely ordained institutions such as church and family.

This final argument, despite its appealing challenge to conventional pieties, is perhaps the least satisfactory, for it is rather a hodgepodge of historical and theoretical claims. Too many difficult questions receive little exposition, and other nonliberal possibilities are not explored. Ultimately, Kraynak fails to make clear just how different "constitutional democracy under God" is from a liberal democratic alternative that would restrain its Kantian elements. Moreover, if on Kraynak's assumptions, there is a single normative biblical model of the family and the church, why should Christians not follow also a biblical model of government without any element of constitutionalism? In addition, why does the communitarian alternative appear so seldom? It has appeal for many Christians (Plant, for example) and in some versions challenges the same liberal assumptions as does Kraynak. Finally, the book's appreciation of prudence is a welcome relief from universalist arguments, but the politics of prudence may well be more culture-dependent than Kraynak allows

Each book is a worthy addition to a literature growing in size and sophistication. Plant is the more useful for a graduate seminar; Kraynak, for an undergraduate class. Their serious engagement of theological materials, despite flaws, is a refreshing sign of the revival of political theology. Its reemergence in political science signals a welcome broadening of our discipline's vision.

Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy. By Muhsin S. Mahdi. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 240p. \$37.50.

Joshua S. Parens, University of Dallas

Mahdi's book marks a watershed in scholarship on medieval political philosophy. For the specialist, chapter 5, on the Book of Religion, alone would be worth the price of the book as a whole. The same could be said for the most synoptic chapter, chapter 7. For the more general reader and, especially, the teacher of political philosophy, the introductory section of the book will prove to be an indispensable resource. Introductions to medieval Islamic philosophy have appeared in great profusion in recent years. Part One of this book constitutes the best introduction to medieval Islamic political philosophy and may do the same for Islamic philosophy as a whole. Until now, no one has explained sufficiently why the first truly great efflorescence of philosophy within the Islamic world should be so deeply political. The peculiar character of this founding of medieval Islamic (political) philosophy has much to do with the relative inattention to Alfarabi in Western scholarship, despite his towering role in medieval Islamic and Jewish thought. With this book, we have reason to hope that Alfarabi will begin to garner the attention he deserves.

Recent events underscore the need for us to take great Muslim thinkers, especially underutilized and understudied political philosophers, more seriously. Of course, this is not to say that Alfarabi holds immediate solutions to contemporary problems, but at a minimum he can remind us when we become forgetful of the "broad historical impact of these (revealed) religions" (p. 169). Furthermore, he may offer clues about how better to adjudicate the conflicting claims of politics and prophetic religion in the modern Muslim world, an objective no longer wished for merely by Muslims.

The following are all of special contemporary relevance: Alfarabi's assessment and transformation of the Muslim teaching on war (pp. 139–44), the advantage he takes of the relatively minor role played by prophecy in the founding of Islam to expand the role of reason in guiding the religious community (pp. 164–65), and the difference between Alfarabi's medieval cyclical view of history (pp. 233–35) and the modern effort to "unbend" the circle of history (p. 239).

Of these especially "relevant" arguments, the second is directly linked to the central argument of Mahdi's book. His argument is that Alfarabi's Enumeration of the Sciences (ES) and the Book of Religion (BR) form the theoretical core of Alfarabi's "philosophy of religion." Consequently, the oddities of his Political Regime (PR) and Virtuous City (VC) become more comprehensible as two possible applications of the theoretical teaching of ES and BR. Mahdi's account is superior to Miriam Galston's (1990) in Politics and Excellence because it distinguishes properly between the theoretical role of BR and the lesser, applied role of PR and VC.

The core of Mahdi's argument about BR is that revelation or the royal craft plays the role of "determination" of particulars (p. 103) played by "practical judgment" (phronesis) in Aristotle (p. 105). In contrast, "actions and opinions as universals and general rules... remain the preserve of practical and theoretical philosophy" (p. 103). The only challenger to the preeminent role of phronesis is imagination in VC. Indeed, it would seem that the prophetic imagination lays claim to both the particulars of phronesis and the universals of practical and theoretical philosophy. (Mahdi gives a broad but extremely telling analysis of the roots of this widely-held view in his elegant introduction to this chapter [chapter 5, pp. 147-50].) Yet Alfarabi allows prophecy such pretensions only within the confines of a "pre- or subpolitical" treatment of revelation (pp. 159-61). In Alfarabi's political treatment of "the achievement of a human being's highest perfection and for the excellence of the city he founds and rules," revelation and its philosophic supplement fill the role previously played by prophecy (p. 162). In the light of Mahdi's argument, not only do the apparent redundancies within Alfarabi's teaching fade away but also the apparent absence of a direct treatment of phronesis in Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed (a source of some contemporary scholarly controversy) begins to make

Mahdi describes Alfarabi's political philosophy as a whole as the "philosophy of religion," especially in the central chapter on BR, chapter 5. In contemporary usage, this phrase usually refers to the study of "religious experience" as the subjective experience of the believer. Because this contemporary approach to religion is an inheritance of the Enlightenment's subjectivization and privatization of all religious claims, we will be misled if we expect such a treatment from Alfarabi. In his Introduction, Mahdi gives an appropriately sketchy portrait of Alfarabi's "philosophy of religion" as establishing a connection between Platonic political philosophy and revealed religion (p. 2). In the body of his text, he does not begin to treat it explicitly until page 97, where he contrasts it with the ancient "philosophy of the city" and the modern "philosophy of the state." Here the reader begins to appreciate more fully that Mahdi, following Alfarabi, understands

religion in a sense altogether foreign to most contemporary readers. Religion, in the original, premodern sense of the revealed religions, is a political phenomenon similar at least in genus to the ancient city and the modern state. (For a beautifully nuanced treatment of the relevant Arabic term translated religion [milla], see pages 108–109, especially page 109, note 3.) What, then, distinguishes religion from the city and the state? It is tempting to suppose that the difference is merely one of scale. If so, however, there would be no significant difference between ancient and medieval political philosophy. Perhaps the most significant difference is revealed in the concluding section of Mahdi's book on Alfarabi's cyclical view of history. Although in the pagan world the cycle was returned to its beginnings by natural cataclysms, revealed religion interrupts this cycle at an inopportune moment (pp. 233-35). This fact may account for the characteristically modern effort to unbend the circle by cutting out part of it, indeed, the very part of greatest interest to Alfarabi and his student Maimonides (pp. 237-40). Mahdi's conclusion, in particular, outlines with great clarity the distinction between medieval and modern political philosophy, a distinction that it has become all too popular to efface in recent scholarship.

Politics, Philosophy, Writing: Plato's Art of Caring for Souls. Edited by Zdravko Planinc. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001. 261p. \$19.95

Brent S. Lerseth, Dickinson State University

The edited volume *Politics, Philosophy, Writing* attempts to contribute to the reinterpretation of Plato's dialogues by clarifying some issues they addressed. In each chapter the author attempts to expand on specific mystical, poetic, or political themes in individual dialogues that have not previously received enough treatment. For example, Leon Craig elaborates on the politic elements of Plato's *Meno*, a dialogue usually considered a primarily epistemological work. This reinterpretation of Plato tries to overcome some of the recent misuse of Plato by modern and postmodern thinkers that has resulted in Plato being reduced to "a footnote in the works of other philosophers" (p. 1). The authors of *Politics, Philosophy, Writing* succeed in raising some interesting issues in the dialogues and refuting several prevalent misconceptions as they detail Plato's attention to caring for souls.

Two chapters in this edited volume should be especially interesting to readers of Plato because they address two important debates that cross multiple dialogues. The first, the importance of shame, is discussed in "Shame in the Apology" by Oona Eisenstadt. Eisenstadt describes in detail how Plato's Socrates utilized shame to attempt to instruct his listeners in the Meno and the Apology, and how the two dialogues are connected. She points out how it is in the Meno that we find out why Socrates was brought to trial by one of his accusers, Anytus, because Socrates showed him to be shameless (pp. 44–45).

More importantly, Eisenstadt discusses the importance of shame to understanding the teachings of Socrates. Socrates used shame to overcome the half-truths and misconceptions of his audience by shaming them into realizing how their assumptions were unjust. The shameless, like Anytus, are unchanged, since they cannot be shamed (p. 46). What remained is resentment without improvement, leading to hatred of Socrates. Her discussion demonstrating the use of shame is critical to interpreting Plato because of the political importance of honor and dishonor. For Plato and Aristotle (see the *Republic* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, respectively), honors are critical tools for the statesman

to instruct and alter behavior to improve the soul. Modern thinkers tend to downplay the importance of honors, as individualism has eroded the close connections of the Greek community. Where honors were emphasized, such as in the former Soviet Union, the assumption by Western thinkers usually was that material incentives would always be more influential. One exception comes from the theory of civil disobedience. Martin Luther King, Jr., in his Letter from a Birmingham Jail, discussed how shame must be used to confront moderate America and force it to reexamine the injustice of American laws. It is interesting that he attributed this method to Socrates and compared himself to Socrates. Shame is a tool for politicians and philosophers.

This analysis could help to explain a passage of Plato's Republic that is often much debated. Toward the end of the confrontation between Socrates and Thrasymachus, Socrates remarked about Thrasymachus blushing for the first time he had ever seen (Desmond Lee, trans., 1987, p. 36). This blush could indicate that Thrasymachus felt shame for the first time. He was a sophist, one of the great enemies of Plato's philosophy, and it was unlikely that he ever really considered the justice of his positions. When backed into a corner in the Republic by Socrates he was forced to acknowledge the problems with his expressed views on justice. Perhaps his first-ever display of shame may indicate that for the first time Socrates had succeeded in getting him to question his unjust "convictions." Of course, being the type of man he was, Thrasymachus responded by resentfully withdrawing, not by learning from his shame. At least he was not completely shameless like Socrates' accusers in the Apology. Eisenstadt does not discuss this part of the Republic in connection with her chapter. It would be interesting to see whether she would agree with this proposition.

Eisenstadt also formulates an interesting hypothesis about why Socrates was convicted based on his use of shame. She argues that he relied on shaming the dicasts by appealing to their sense of justice. He could not reach the shameless or the followers of Unjust Speech, but he hoped that he could convince the followers of Just Speech that he was no atheist or sophist (p. 56). He was convicted and judged to die because he failed to convince enough of them through shame and instruction.

"Homeric Imagery in Plato's Phaedrus," by Zdravko Planinc, introduces another interesting topic, the connections between Plato's dialogues and Homer's Odyssey. According to Planine, the *Phaedrus* is intentionally structured to resemble Homer's work, and several other dialogues are also meant to reflect Homer (p. 124). This is interesting because of the animosity that exists between philosophy and poetry in the Republic. Poets are forced out of the just city, and it is clear that education in poetry interferes with instruction in philosophy (Republic, Part Three). However, Socrates repeatedly used references to Homer and other poets to support his assertions in that work. This could indicate that Socrates and Plato were aware that it is important to appeal to the materials with which their listeners are most familiar. Whatever the reason, Planinc's discussion brings earlier assumptions about the relationship between philosophy and poetry into question since Plato utilized such a format.

The other chapters in this volume include discussions of the mystical elements of Plato in the *Republic* and the *Seventh Letter* and elaboration on soulcraft in the *Charmides*. The subjects and perspectives presented in this volume succeed in stimulating further interest in the dialogues of Plato, as demonstrated above. There are other issues that need to be addressed in relation to each of these topics, especially regarding how they relate to the other works of Plato and other

thinkers such as Aristotle, but that is often not the intent of an edited volume. The authors do succeed here in showing that Plato needs to be reexamined to save him from recent misconceptions and misuse.

The Political Philosophy of James Madison. By Garrett Ward Sheldon. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 143p. \$32.00.

Franklin A. Kalinowski, Warren Wilson College

Interpreting the entire body of work of a political theorist as prolific as James Madison is a dicey matter. Perhaps more than any other American of his intellectual stature, James Madison can be viewed as shifting ideological positions throughout his long and active life. Reputable scholars such as Marvin Meyers (1973), in his Introduction to The Mind of the Founder, Ralph Ketcham (1971), in James Madison: A Biography, and Douglas Jaenicke's ("Madison vs Madison: The Party Essays v. The Federalist Papers"), in Maidment and Zvesper's (1989) Reflections on the Constitution, have argued with some effectiveness that it is difficult to garner a consistent set of philosophical positions throughout Madison's life. Other scholars, however, such as Lance Banning (1995), in The Sacred Fire of Liberty, Drew McCoy (1980), in The Elusive Republic, and Richard Matthews (1995), in If Men Were Angels, make a case for a more consistent Madison who, although altering positions on specifics, remained remarkably dedicated to a set of core philosophical positions.

In his latest book, The Political Philosophy of James Madison, Garrett Ward Sheldon combines these positions. Drawing on the recent debate over classical republican and liberal traditions, Sheldon argues that Madison went from liberalism to republicanism and back to liberalism again as the historical situation changed. Throughout these shifts, however, Sheldon sees a consistent philosophical underpinning. According to Sheldon, the political philosophy of James Madison exhibits an unswerving dedication to the premises of Calvinist theology, with its assumptions of human depravity, sin, quarrelsomeness, pride, and envy. Sheldon argues that this fundamental Calvinism, learned during Madison's days at Princeton under the tutelage of John Witherspoon, "displayed a cerebral, intellectual Christianity that did not divorce reason from faith but saw the two working together in complementarity for the greater glory of God (p. 2). Indeed, Sheldon's Madison becomes something of an early American version of Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson: single-mindedly focused on helping humanity struggle against sin, defining "sin" as opposition to his policies, and manipulating the political system to further his theological agenda. Not that Sheldon gives this interpretation of Madison's thought any negative connotation. On the contrary, Sheldon leaves little doubt that he finds this blending of political theory and religious bias both historically accurate and philosophically appealing. More than a few readers will find it neither.

Sheldon takes a perfectly reasonable proposition—there are links between Calvinist assumptions regarding human "depravity" and liberalism's premise that humans are self-interested and conflictual—and extends it far beyond what logic or the evidence will support. While cultural connections between the two most likely exist, one need not be a fundamentalist Calvinist to be a liberal, and there is abundant proof that Madison held positions exactly opposite to those Sheldon advocates. Sheldon associates Witherspoon and Princeton with extreme examples of the eighteenth-century irrational "New Light" theology and then assumes that, since Madison studied at Princeton with Witherspoon, he adopted

these views (even while admitting that "during his years in government service Madison never explicitly mentions his personal beliefs" [p. xvi]). During this hyperbole, Sheldon often uses Biblical citations (none of which can be linked to Madison's political thought) and engages in crude proselytizing that many readers will find intellectually offensive, for example, "Emphasizing the spiritual New Birth that Jesus told Nicodemus was necessary to enter the Kingdom of Heaven (John 3:5-8), this move to the Holy Spirit across America, like that in the Biblical account of Pentecost (Acts 2:3-13), upset many staid religious leaders who preferred highly order, rational worship and experience ... [C]onservative 'Old Lights' like Harvard College rejected the evangelical "enthusiasm" and emotion of this move of the Spirit (and eventually rejected the Spirit of Christ altogether by becoming predominantly Unitarian, highly intellectual, and sophisticated); lively 'New Lights' welcomed the conviction of sin, sincere repentance, comfort of the Holy Spirit, and the personal commitment to Christ..." (pp. 6-7).

The handling of Madison's argument for religious disestablishment in the "Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments" is revealing of Sheldon's distorted thesis. Most analysts hold that Madison distrusted all factions that inflamed the passions, fearing that religious emotion, in particular, led to social instability since it tended toward extremism and intolerance and was not susceptible to resolution by rational argument. Hence, Madison sought to exclude religion from the political sphere. This, at least, is the argument put forth by scholars such as David Epstein (The Political Theory of the Federalist, 1984). According to Sheldon, however, Madison's intentions were exactly opposite. He contends that Madison believed that the established Anglican Church in Virginia had become "lax and decadent" as well as "cold and lifeless" (p. 28). What Madison wanted, says Sheldon, was to free Virginian religion from the influence of dull, rational Anglicans and open it to "those evangelical churches that faithfully taught Christ" (p. 29). Madison wanted Virginian society to experience more sectarian passion, more self-righteous emotion, and more "vital, faithful churches which strive to carry on the work of the gospel and evangelists" (p. 29). It would help if Sheldon produced some shred of evidence to support what many Madison scholars will consider an absurd argument, but no such evidence is forthcoming (probably because it does not exist). James Madison, no doubt, had his share of human faults, but it is difficult to believe that Christian fanaticism was among them.

This bizarre thesis might be considered innovative and interesting if it were supported with some solid research, but unfortunately, the other crippling weakness of The Political Philosophy of James Madison is its dearth of substantial scholarship. Sheldon's discussion of liberalism and classical republicanism is particularly thin and uninformed. He equates liberalism with the most simplistic form of Lockean thought, ignores the equally important Scottish strain of interest-group liberalism, and displays no acquaintance with the considerable work of such noted scholars as Albert Hirschman, Morton White, Garry Wills, Jack Rakove, Forrest MacDonald, or the legendary Douglass Adair. While it is unfair to criticize a book for not being the one the reviewer would have written, it is entirely proper to expect an author to display a familiarity with the literature on the subject. Instead, Sheldon gives us the briefest rehash of Merrill Peterson's (1974) James Madison: A Biography in His Own Words and Ralph Ketcham's (1990) James Madison (over half the endnotes are to these two sources), and while these are fine studies, much more has been written concerning Madison's thought. Richard Matthew's (1995) If Men Were Angels: James Madison and the Heartless Empire of Reason, with its extensive documentation and tightly reasoned logic remains, by far, the best source on Madisonian thought. Readers familiar with Garrett Ward Sheldon's (1993) earlier The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson will find this latest project immensely disappointing. It is not the intention of this review to be mean spirited, but the sad truth is that of the many books on James Madison, this is the one that least deserves to be read.

Conscious Acts and the Politics of Social Change: Feminist Approaches to Social Movements, Community and Power. Edited by Robin L. Teske and Mary Ann Tétreault. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2000. 320p. \$34.95.

Valerie Sperling, Clark University

Rarely does a political science book undertake the simultaneous task of contributing to both scholarship and activism. This edited volume explores the theory and practice of social movements, examining "success" stories, such as the struggle for women's suffrage in the United States, as well as "failures," embodied in this case by an ill-conceived attempt to carry out a charity program in early 1990s Russia. This lens on the lived realities of activism makes it an instructive and unusual book. The volume also discusses how feminist theory and practices influence social movements and power relations. The explicit intention of the editors is to contribute to theory-building, as well as to help design more effective activism. To that end, the contributors include social change activists as well as academics, several of whom combine both identities.

The well-written introductory chapter discusses several concepts to which all the chapters in the book are, in one way or another, tied: feminism, power, civil society, social movements, and community. Although each chapter brings its own interesting perspective to the volume, the volume's coherence might have been improved had the editors pushed their contributors to tie their chapters to these central concepts more closely and explicitly.

At the outset, the editors pose a number of thoughtprovoking questions surrounding the interaction of gender and social movements. These include, Do social movements differ from each other when the activists in them are predominantly male or female? and Why do feminism and nonviolence seem to go together? They also seek to explore the concept of "interests" beyond the liberal conception of selfinterest. They raise questions about community, and how or whether self-interest, differences, and power differentials between people can be overcome. In the volume, these issues are taken up in part in a few theoretically and philosophically oriented chapters exploring the spaces "in between" people—in other words, the realm of human interaction that comprises politics, economics, and nearly the entirely of societal life. These spaces are often filled by relationships of hierarchy and domination, where miscommunication and manipulation are rampant. Can such spaces be converted through the application of agape, one of the Greek concepts of love, and nonviolence? Such are the far-ranging questions raised by this volume.

The book is divided into two parts. Part I contains six chapters, largely concerning social change at the theoretical level. These somewhat disparate chapters range from theoretical analysis of social movements to the utility of "testimonies" as a means of making marginalized voices available in the study of international relations and globalization. Several chapters in this section problematize boundaries, reconceptualize human interaction, and consider nonviolence as a source of power. The successes of human rights movements in bringing

down violent repressive states in Eastern Europe and South Africa are brought in as examples of the latter.

Part II turns to concrete cases of feminist (and not explicitly feminist) social movements and modes of activism. Only some of the case study chapters build on and illustrate or develop the nonviolence issue explicitly, while all are directly or indirectly related to the editors' desire to derive lessons of effective activism from scholarship on that subject. One of these discusses the women's suffrage campaign in the United States and derives from that experience lessons about the later, unsuccessful campaign for the ERA. The next chapter contains an interview with an ERA activist, wherein she provides her response to the scholar's suggestions. The pairing of these two chapters makes for an insightful combination of activism and scholarship in dialogue with each other.

Several of the volume's most successful chapters bring alive women's movement activism in Kuwait, the United States, Russia, and Czechoslovakia. Chapter 8 provides a fascinating history of women's activism in Kuwait, of state cooptation of women's groups, and of state encouragement and sponsorship of divisions among women to its own advantage. It also addresses how changes in political opportunity structure gave certain women's groups differing degrees of voice at different times (such as after the Gulf War, for example). Similarly based on empirical research is Chapter 13, which explores, in lively ethnographic style, the power dynamics between Western and Russian activists engaged in charity work in early 1990s Russia. This chapter illustrates the power relations between the Western leader of the organization and the Russian women who carried out the charity work on the ground. The penultimate chapter concerns the largely unrecognized and uncelebrated activity by women dissidents under communist-ruled Czechoslovakia. There, a Czech activist reveals first-hand stories of how the regime was subverted at the ground level through networks and the type of power that relies on trust rather than dominance. This chapter fleshes out the stories of how "underground" materials were secretly replicated and spread by women taking advantage of traditional gender roles (such as exchanging dissident literature hidden in shopping bags while queuing at stores). This chapter, as well as one on women's activism in Chile, makes the point that "conventional stereotypes" were thus used "for unconventional ends" (p. 274).

One of this volume's main themes concerns the varied types of power. Relying on Marilyn French, Hannah Arendt, Simone Weil, and other theorists, the authors show how nonviolent movements use "power-to" (or mutual empowerment through collective action) instead of striving for "powerover" (the classic understanding of power, where A compels B to do something that B would not otherwise do). Several contributors eloquently link feminism and nonviolence, explaining why a social movement's means and ends must be consistent: If the goal is to eliminate domination and oppression that rests on hierarchies of ostensible superiority and inferiority, then movements must use means that are in keeping with those ends or risk replicating an oppressive system. Several of the case study chapters illustrate the alternative understanding of power. Chapter 12, for instance, describes a Virginia-based grassroots organization called Common Ground, which foments coalitions and, thereby, eschews a classic hierarchical pyramidal structure. Instead, they apply a "wheel" model (with hub, spokes, and rim), illustrating the differences in power dynamics between a hierarchical and a coalition-style organization and the consistency of the latter with the principles of feminism and nonviolence.

While undergraduates would find this book challenging, it would serve well in a graduate course on social movements,

providing both theory and wide-ranging examples for discussion and analysis. This is a thought-provoking text whose editors offer a radical vision of the world, one in which domination, discrimination, and hierarchy can be replaced by nonviolence and where revealing the gendered nature of social movement activism provides clues to both how this vision could be accomplished and what pitfalls lie before it on the path.

**De Tocqueville.** By Cheryl B. Welch. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 294p. \$21.95.

Joshua Mitchell, Georgetown University

It is a testimony to his greatness as an author that Tocqueville has emerged in a new light with each of the more significant events of the twentieth century: the New Deal, the Cold War, the Post-War years. In the last decade, in particular, American scholars of all political persuasions have seen in Tocqueville a point of departure for their consideration of the rudiments of robust democracy and the associational life it seems to require. Democracy perhaps being the only genuine alternative for the future, American scholars have tried to learn from Tocqueville what might be necessary to make it thrive, in places where the political alternatives have been exhausted and the rhetoric, but not yet the substance, of democracy now prevails. In a race to establish democracy before the rhetoric of democracy becomes a hollow caricature, Tocqueville studies have had an urgency about them that the study of other canonical figures in the history of modern political thought-Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, etc-simply have not. We shall see, of course, whether the Post-War years were merely a hiatus and whether we more properly live in an Inter-War period, perhaps in perpetuity. We shall see, as well, whether the recent military confrontations in Afghanistan are able to be contained under the category of politics rather than of religion. Whatever the future holds, however, we can be sure that the writings of Tocqueville will not be exhausted by the events whose outlines we cannot yet foresee. Tocqueville had a great deal to say about war and, most readers may be surprised to discover, a few very interesting and provocative things to say about Islam as well. But these matters, as I say, must wait for the future.

Welch's book is not about these future possibilities. Rather, it is a superb account of the political terrain that shaped Tocqueville's thinking, the internal logic of his writings, and the current state of Tocqueville studies. Her book is nuanced and insightful throughout, and considered as a whole, it makes several important contributions to the current debate that warrants attention here.

First, there is the matter of the sort of project in which Tocqueville is involved. Tocqueville has never found a completely comfortable place in political philosophy or political theory, notwithstanding the many fine efforts to educe ideas from his writings that would do so. Political philosophers have yet to make up their minds about Tocqueville's place in the cannon of great writers, as the many efforts to situate him against the backdrop of Aristotle, Augustine, Pascal, Montesquieu, and the American founders, among others, attests. Tocqueville's observation about philosophy, that "there is nothing so infertile as an abstract idea," certainly does not help their case, though it does not wholly argue against it either. Political theorists have been equally frustrated by Tocqueville because it is so difficult to glean a theory of democracy from his work. He uses terms in nuanced and sometimes contradictory ways, which makes operationalizing his ideas difficult, if not impossible. As Welch points out (p. 51), Tocqueville himself never took the time to define what he meant by "liberty." How can democracy be theorized at all if this key idea remains unspecified? In Welch's words, "Tocqueville considers collective rather than individual attitudes, the thoughts of typical people rather than elites, unspoken general assumptions rather than elaborate philosophical theories, and the general structure of beliefs rather than their specific content" (p. 104). This observation helps us understand why Tocqueville was never enamored of the suppositions of political economy, since individual "preferences" cannot explain the larger contours of a culture, and why he never set forth a deterministic theory of history, since what rules a society is never univocal, easily identified, or reducible to formulas.

The second important contribution Welch's book makes is to remind readers about what might be called "the weight of history" (p. 234) in Tocqueville's writings. Oakeshott once said, with some disdain, that "the American cannot help but think of himself as a self-made man." Much of the scholarship on Tocqueville in America, in both political philosophy and political theory, has not given sufficient attention to this burden, perhaps because Oakeshott was right: The weight of history has never much seemed to bother Americans, who are themselves generally optimistic about the future. Only a civilization that looks backward rather than forward is attentive to the weight of history. Americans do not look back. Tocqueville did. American scholarship has tended to focus on the "new beginning" about which Tocqueville writes in his account of the New England Puritans—a thought that preoccupied writers during the Cold War, who sought a way out of the supposed iron logic of Marxism. Marxism could not take hold here, Hartz and others said, because the categories of experience were not feudal, as they were in Europe. Yet the obverse Tocqueville's "new beginning" was the legacy of the durable and perhaps intractable patterns of relations between blacks and whites. (This is Tocqueville's usage, so I invoke it here.) Welch has a keen eye for this matter. My one small quibble would be that while the burden of history seems to be the final word in volume I of Democracy in America, the very first thoughts in volume II move in a contrary direction: The "philosophical method" of the Americans, Tocqueville says, abrades all things inherited and ancient. Indeed, one way to understand both volumes as a whole is as a gloss on the question, "Which is more powerful, the atavisms of history, or what could be called a sort of 'logic of equality' through which all inheritances are overthrown and only abstract universals prevail?" If the latter eventually dominate, then indeed the burden of history would be lifted, and Tocqueville's assessment of the intractability of race relations would give way to a more benign arrangement, in which race was trumped by universal rights and equality under national—not local law. This is, as I say, a minor quibble, which is not meant to diminish the importance of Welch's insights into Tocqueville's thinking about the burden of history.

The third contribution made by this book is its recognition of the importance of mood in Tocqueville's writings. Tocqueville, as I said, was not much enamored by philosophy. Neither is he a social scientist, or a moralist. Yet, as Welch says, "Tocqueville's particular combination of sociological, historical, and moral insight has played a unique role in uncovering certain fault lines in contemporary democratic life" (p. 218). Moments of penetrating insight in Tocqueville's writing have this luminous and sometimes maddening quality about them, which blurs the line among social science, prophecy, and confession. Tocqueville scholarship has not paid enough attention to this aspect of his writing, in no small part because the perceived task has been to excise from this unified whole coherent ideas that suit the purpose of one or another narrow investigative community. Welch resists this temptation, and the result is a book that does not try to bend Tocqueville to her own purposes.

### **American Politics**

The Politics of Language in Puerto Rico. By Amilcar Antonio Barreto. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001. 221p. \$55.00.

Steve C. Ropp, University of Wyoming

Puerto Rico has often fallen between the cracks of the subfloor that undergirds not only the study of American politics but also the field of political science in general. Although it has certain nation state-like properties, the fact that it is not a nation state de jure means that those who study international and inter-American relations have given it little attention. This also holds true for Latin American comparativists, who treat it as one of the many small and nonindependent territories that dot the Caribbean. If it had been incorporated into the federal structure of the United States, it would be studied by those within the field of American government who focus on comparative state politics. But its special status as a semiautonomous commonwealth prevents this from happening.

The primary goal in this book is to explain a puzzle relating to a 1991 decision that briefly made the commonwealth a "Spanish only" territory. Puerto Rico had been officially bilingual (Spanish and English) since 1902, following the Spanish-American-Cuban War. Although there had long been efforts by adherents of the separatist Puerto Rican Independence Party (PIP) to promote a "Spanish

only" policy, they had never before had much success. This was due to a combination of factors including resistance to such change by the leadership of the commonwealth-backing Popular Democratic Party (PPD) and the statehood-backing New Progressive Party (PNP). Moreover, public opinion polls indicated that a majority of supporters of all three major parties supported the continuation of official bilingualism.

How, then, is one to explain the fact that the Puerto Rican legislature passed "The Official Language Act of 1991" and that it was subsequently signed into law by Governor Rafael Hernandez Colon of the dominant and centrist PPD? The general unpopularity of this measure is attested to by the fact the PPD and it candidates (including Governor Hernandez Colon) were severely punished in the next election, and the Language Act was subsequently repealed.

Barreto attempts to solve this puzzle by using a somewhat modified version of Anthony Down's classic vote maximization model to appeal to voting constituencies. While it at first seems puzzling from a Downsian rational actor perspective that the PPD would "irrationally" support a language bill that would risk alienating not only its own constituents but also potential defectors from the PIP and PNP, Barreto sees a second level of rationality at work. He believes that the PPD was involved in a two-level game in which Spanish language preservation was such a cherished goal for the Puerto Rican "culture state" that a higher rationality overruled normal

electoral expediency. Here, Barreto relies in part on George Tsebelis' (Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics, 1990) nested games approach as it has been applied to solve puzzles associated with seemingly irrational patterns of legislative cooperation in consociational European democracies.

A major strength of this book is that Barreto grounds his analysis of Puerto Rican politics in the work of a highly respected scholar and student of American politics. Since Downs first wrote his seminal An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) close to half a century ago, the debate among those who study American legislative behavior has been not so much about the merits of the rational choice approach but rather about how various differences in institutional structures influence and affect legislative outcomes. Thus, by using such a mainstream approach to study political behavior in Puerto Rico, Barreto's book helps to bridge the gap between comparativists, who would attempt to understand commonwealth politics through the use of theories that stress factors such as dependency, ethnicity, and cultural nationalism, and the broad community of students of American politics.

At the same time, this use of Down's rational choice theoretical framework to solve this particular puzzle seems to place rather severe limits on the range of alternative explanations for passage of the Official Language Act that Barreto might otherwise have considered. For example, the very fact that the preservation of a Spanish linguistic heritage became such a "vital objective" and "cherished goal" that it required a second and higher level of rational action begs the question of why this might have been the case. From a constructivist perspective (what I want and thus rationally attempt to get depends on who I consider myself to be), this apparently irrational act might be explained in terms of individual and/or collective shifts in the Puerto Rican sense of identity. Indeed, there is much evidence in recent studies such as those by anthropologist Arlene Davila (Sponsored Identities: Cultural Politics in Puerto Rico, 1997) that Puerto Rican identity was being radically transformed during the 1970s and 1980s through various forms of party and corporate related cultural activity. Such a radical transformation of national identity could have hypothetically then been "externalized" in the form of new kinds of voting behavior such as that which made the Official Language Act of 1991 possible.

Fundamentally, Barreto views the PPD leadership (and, for that matter, the leadership of Puerto Rico's two other major political parties) as using language and other identity-related issues as tools to achieve rationally calculated goals related to vote maximization. Those who study the politics of identity sometimes call such usage "strategic essentialism"—the deployment by leaders of symbols of identity as part of a broader rational (and sometimes cynical) calculus aimed at maximizing leadership goals, whatever these goals might be. It is unfortunate that Barreto did not choose to explore some alternative avenues of explanation, particularly those that relate to values and associated identities as causally consequential in their own right.

Barreto's book is a welcome addition to the literature on American politics not only because it takes the long-dominant Downsian approach to the study of legislative action seriously but also because it broadens the debate concerning what Puerto Rico is actually all about. While there are many excellent books that treat it as fundamentally a social and cultural entity (*el estado jibaro*), this book suggests that we should treat it as a normal American state with a few special historical characteristics.

Olympic Dreams: The Impact of Mega-Events on Local Politics. By Matthew J. Burbank, Gregory D. Andranovich, and Charles H. Heying. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 203p. \$49.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Michael A. Pagano, University of Illinois at Chicago

Cities' pursuit of economic development activities sits at the interstices of the economic marketplace and political power. Private-sector investment is not realized in a power vacuum; political institutional and politicians' behavior influence, alter, and in many ways determine the kind and location of those private investment decisions. It is no wonder, then, that both economists and political scientists have much to say about the efficiency, effectiveness, equity, and impact of urban economic development. And it is no wonder that volumes have been written on the vast array of urban development projects from a comparative or idiosyncratic perspective. Attracting the quadrennial Olympic games is no exception. Matthew Burbank, Gregory Andranovich, and Charles Heying have performed an impressive task of compiling documents and accounts on the politics and economics surrounding the successful efforts of Los Angeles, Atlanta, and Salt Lake City in luring the Olympics to their cities and regions.

They begin their account with a lengthy review of the theoretical and empirical literature on cities, urban development, and regime politics. They argue that declining federal aid in the early 1980s and global competition for businesses have meant that cities were pushed to compete on a world stage, that they had become more entrepreneurial in a "postfederal" environment, and that they chose aggressive economic development strategies. Further, the authors argue that cities with strong growth regimes and an interest in creating an image of their city were characteristic of these three cities' pursuit of the Olympic games, an economic development project they refer to as the "mega-event strategy." Case studies on each of the three cities are presented serially and are informed by a wealth of secondary sources, from journalistic accounts of the bidding, negotiating, and unfolding of the games to feasibility and postgame studies by city agencies and scholars. Each case is carefully described, the motivations and behavior of key actors and institutions are explored in detail, and lengthy discussions of winners and losers in the siting and financing of the games are presented. They conclude that image-building and revenue generation are important motivations to hosting the Olympic games, but they also contend that mega-events "establish a pattern of treating the city as a commodity" (p. 161). Their argument, then, is that the commodification of the city ignores the people who live there. A mega-event, they conclude, "serves only narrow purposes" (p. 171).

The strength of the narrative about three cities and their pursuit of the dream of hosting the Olympics is that they put a political and corporate face on the nonathletic side of the games. Their study places city governments and private-sector investors in the broader picture of development projects, even if the Olympics are on a grander or what some might call an extreme scale. The limitations of the study inhere in its reliance on secondary sources and its most similar-city design. Instructive to our understanding of the political and economic dimensions of hosting the Olympic games would be a comparative assessment of those cities that failed to attract the games. The authors provide some information about the failure of Denver and Seattle in bidding on or attracting the games, even though those cities appear to have the same needs and criteria of the successful cities (growth regime, image creation, loss of federal funds, global linkages). Do "failed" cities ignore the people who live there? Do the "narrow purposes"

of hosting a mega-event transcend Olympic cities, or are these outcomes peculiar to the successful cities only? The evidence from a similar-cities research design raises many questions for future research. As it is, however, the three cases establish a useful baseline of comparison for future work.

Rethinking Democratic Accountability. By Robert D. Behn. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2001. 317p. \$41.95 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Peter Kobrak, Western Michigan University

Everybody seems to talk about accountability but no one ever does anything about it, Robert Behn argues in this thought-provoking book. This is scarcely due to a lack of enough overseers. Behn rattles off the innumerable "accountability holders"—including the GAO, lawyers, journalists, and inspectors general—who dish it out while the wretched public administrators take it. These accountability adversaries exclusively pursue either accountability for finances or accountability for fairness, doling out punishments where rules are inadequately met and feeling no obligation to consider those performance considerations that may have driven managerial choices. Public managers may be confronted by an "accountability dilemma" in pondering the trade-offs between finances and fairness and performance, but that is not the accountability holder's problem.

Behn supplies an even-handed discussion of why the "traditional public administration paradigm," with its concern about corruption and laws governing finances and fairness, evolved, along with a balanced, though critical, explanation of the work of Max Weber, Frederick W. Taylor, and James Q. Wilson and their accountability holder progeny. Furthermore, even as a supporter of the new public management and its emphasis on a "culture of performance," Behn concedes that the paradigm requires its own theory of democratic accountability.

While fuzzy about just what accountability is, Behn is clear on what question a performance-based paradigm must answer: "How will we hold whom accountable for what?" It is fine for new public management paradigm supporters to say that agencies should be held accountable for results, but that is hardly enough. Who decides what results? Behn answers that elected officials, political appointees, members of the accountability establishment, and, yes, citizens too must consider "how empowered, entrepreneurial, responsive civil services can make innovative decisions in a decentralized yet democratic government" (p. 64).

The problem is that most of the existing mechanisms evaluate administrative fairness or financial irregularities rather than performance, which, as Behn reminds us, is the fundamental purpose of administrative agencies. The solution must be some form of "collaborative accountability"—where accountability is not merely hierarchical or focused on one organization but instead engages all of the relevant stakeholders in mutual and balanced evaluation of not only finances and fairness but also performance. Rather than relying on an overabundance of rules to anticipate violations in finance and fairness before they occur, such collaborative accountability would evaluate retrospectly whether public entrepreneurs achieved their goals and consequently should be allowed more discretion and trust. Indeed, the "accountability catch" is that without such discretion, there can be no real accountability. James Madison and William Proxmire notwithstanding, a "culture of mistrust" creates a "fear of discretion" that permeates the world of Congress and the overhead regulators. While there then must be some tradeoff between discretion and accountability, Behn joins Ronald Reagan in proposing that we must "trust but verify."

If public agencies are "to convince the citizens that government performance is not an oxymoron" (p. 119), stakeholders concerned with performance must form a "new compact of mutual, collective responsibility." Those public managers, citizens, and accountability holders willing to weigh fairness, finance, and performance must voluntarily join in making an informal ethical commitment to accept responsibility for the pursuit of democratic accountability. Everyone in the accountability environment thus assumes some responsibility for agency performance.

Behn works hard to show that this "cooperation challenge" can be met. He supplies successful case studies and even draws on advanced versions of the prisoner's dilemma and the tragedy of the commons to overcome the problem of collective action. He also feels that such cooperation can be fostered through altering professional norms and public expectations. The cooperation challenge must be met by enforcing the necessary reciprocity.

One product of such a mutual compact could be a "charter agency" that would accept additional accountability for performance in exchange for fewer rules and other constraints on its efforts to comply with finances and fairness. Such agencies would not be created but rather would evolve over time. Volunteers among the stakeholders would initially enter into such compacts and then gradually seek to expand their membership through incremental performance achievements.

In concluding his argument, Behn takes the high ground by distinguishing between accountability as merely answerability to justify actions and responsibility as "the moral obligation to work collectively with public employees, collaborators from nonprofit and for-profit organizations, and citizens in pursuit of the public interest" (p. 196). Such responsibility requires "360-degree evaluation" akin to those corporate efforts to evaluate personnel by seeking the views not only of superiors but also of subordinates, peers, and other internal and external stakeholders. Such multiple perspectives provide a more accurate view of performance and stand in contrast to the "360-degree harassment" that too often today masquerades as accountability. Such 360-degree accountability holds out the potential to engage citizens actively in goal setting and evaluation. It can thus enlarge citizen trust through informed consent and produce "institutions motivated less by personal, self-interest than by our mutual, collective public interest" (p. 217).

The book requires considerable optimism in that democratic accountability assumes that numerous individual and institutional actors will do the right thing. The discussion of Congressional professional norms depends heavily on Donald Matthews' 1960 discussion of the folkways of the Senate and neglects the more recent literature that shows a decline in such Congressional professional norms. Behn's reliance on the public interest in making his case is unusual for a new public management advocate and requires more than a limited discussion in the Notes. And his interchangeable discussion of charter schools and charter agencies is curious in that the charter schools rely on an end run around rules governing finances and fairness, while charter agencies would presumably seek a creative tension among finances, fairness, and performance.

Behn, however, provides in *Rethinking Democratic Accountability* a well-reasoned and original contribution. His lively writing, balanced assessment, and ambitious recommendations are rare in the well-plowed field of accountability literature. The book would be suitable for advanced undergraduate and graduate seminars in public administration, American politics, and organization theory.

In making a vigorous case for mutual and collective accountability, Behn moves the accountability debate to a new level. The approach is well calculated to stimulate debate at a time when the nation appears to be serious about a change in strengthening government capacity.

Mediated Politics: Communication in the Future of Democracy. Edited by W. Lance Bennett and Robert M. Entman. Cambridge University Press, 2001. 489p. \$74.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Tali Mendelberg, Princeton University

Nothing energizes a field of study more than a revolution. The explosion of new forms of mass communication is just such a revolution for the field of political communication, to judge by this volume. As its 22 chapters demonstrate, profound changes in the technology and institutions of mass media have prompted a wide-ranging and stimulating effort to document, interpret, and theorize.

The volume demonstrates like no other that the changes in communication technology and in the media industry over the past 15 years have been great in number and in kind. On the technology front we have witnessed the sharply increasing availability and use of cable and satellite television, with their explosion of channels; the proliferation of VCRs and devices that allow people to select what they wish and ignore all else; and Internet communication, which allows people to connect with either like-minded or foreign strangers in virtual communities or opinion forums, offering people the chance to disconnect from their immediate surroundings. Media businesses too operate differently in kind from what they were doing 20 years ago: They are conglomerating more and competing less; they target finely segmented audiences at the expense of unifying citizens; they treat audiences as simple-minded consumers to be entertained with sordid scandal, campaign horse-race coverage, or speculative melodrama rather than as educable citizens to be neutrally and fully informed and politically empowered; they are increasingly blurring the lines between the genre of news and that of entertainment; and they ignore federal guidelines meant to ensure fair access on matters of public concern. A revolution, it would seem, has arrived.

This revolution demands answers to a host of important questions: Does the new technology affect citizens' engagement in politics? Are the quantity and quality of information available to citizens truly different than before? Is the public indeed more Balkanized than before, and have people's social allegiances and civic sensibilities really eroded? Are market forces dissolving the glue that binds individuals into a public? Have traditional sources such as local newspapers survived? Has inequality between social and informational classes been exacerbated or remedied? What does all this portend for the health of democracy, and what standards should we use in determining the prognosis? Lending greater urgency to these questions is the possibility that the answers can shed light on what appear as concomitant trends in citizen politics: a decline in nationalism in postindustrial societies; growing cynicism and distrust of government; and, more controversially, falling voter turnout rates. (Some point to an erosion of partisanship, but recent work shows otherwise. See Larry M. Bartels. "Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952-1996." American Journal of Political Science 44 [2000]: 35-50; Marc Hetherington. "Resurgent Mass Partisanship: The Role of Elite Polarization." American Political Science Review 95 [2001] 619-32; John Zaller, in reviewed volume.)

Lance Bennett and Robert Entman have gathered together many of the eminent authorities on political communication

to puzzle over these questions. The ambitious introductory chapter lays out general themes that go some way toward binding the chapters into a coherent whole. The book then proceeds in several parts, from general essays on the interplay of mass communication and public affairs, to examinations of new and old institutions of mass communication, to systematic studies of the intersection of mass communication with public opinion, to a focus on political campaigns.

Common to many of the chapters is a sense that political communication should be civic-minded rather than market-driven. The concept of the public sphere plays a prominent role here. In the ideal construction of theorists such as Habermas, the public sphere is the set of informal gathering places in which free conversation thrives. This mutual exchange is in turn expected to help citizens to understand their common goals and to motivate and enable them to participate in public affairs. Pear Dahlgren and Colin Sparks provide useful discussions of the concept and then apply its normative standards to the case of the Internet, with mixed conclusions. Underwood argues against the widely held claim that news outlets seeking profit must treat audiences as customers rather than citizens.

These and similar chapters (such as that by Don Slater) illustrate a strength and a weakness of much of the volume. While they pose questions central to democracy and seek to understand important new trends, the conclusions often rest on less than robust evidence. To be sure, some chapters stand on much stronger ground than others. Michael Delli Carpini and Bryce Williams, for example, offer a compelling analysis of the blurring lines between news and entertainment. Kathleen Jamieson engages in a detailed analysis of the content of issue-advocacy ads, a phenomenon of the 1990s designed to circumvent spending limits. While explicitly avoiding candidate advocacy as required, many ads implicitly violate important deliberative requirements. Several other chapters, however, testify to the need to analyze more and better evidence about how people actually communicate in the public sphere and how communication actually affects citizens.

There is a productive tension in the volume between the pessimism of many chapters and optimism, the minority view. Pessimists tend to believe that contemporary democracies do not allow enough public participation or influence. Elites, increasingly abetted by the media, have latitude in a representative system and can ignore many types of public opinion. The new media trends exacerbate social inequalities, further limiting citizen influence. Increasingly sensationalist or commercialized news coverage fosters political ignorance or quiescence. Often, pessimists predict a great impact on politics from the massive changes in communication.

Optimists are not as wedded to a civic conception of democracy. They worry less that people may not participate heavily in politics, that discourse may be uncivil, that the public will may go unheeded, or that some citizens have less say than others. Often, optimists argue that the changes are less than they seem or carry few consequences.

Among the pessimists are Entman and Susan Herbst, who provide an original and vigorous challenge to the way scholars conceptualize the public opinion, with important implications for our understanding of the media and democratic governance. While others no doubt will challenge the empirical analysis of defense spending presented here (e.g., Larry M. Bartels. "Constituency Opinion and Congressional Policy Making: The Reagan Defense Build Up." American Political Science Review 85 [1991]: 457–74), any student of public opinion will have to grapple with the argument. Bennett and Entman as well as oscar Gandy worry about the gap between "the electronic haves and have nots" (p. 19). Gadi Wolfsfeld's

pessimism is born of his fascinating study of waves of news coverage, with their sudden, confusing dissipation. Doris Graber argues that young people are the most politically disengaged, that today's youth are more different from their elders than were previous young generations from theirs. However, according to the evidence, there may not be a bigger generational gap for today's young people (Table 20.1). Rather, there seems to be a long-term disengagement that has affected several cohorts, and if anything, the oldest generation appears distinctive (Tables 20.2 and 20.3). Thus the pessimists tend to offer provocative and original frameworks, although the empirical analysis is sometimes not as persuasive as it might be.

Among the optimists is Timothy Cook, whose distinctive argument, developed elsewhere and persuasively presented in chapter 9, is that despite the many changes, the media continues to function as always. The media has never served the citizenry primarily. Rather, the media is used by and serves the needs of elites John Zaller's systematic argument, with attendant evidence, convinces that even the highly sensationalist coverage of the Clinton-Lewinsky scandal need not-and perhaps cannot—alter the public's criteria for evaluating the president. Partisanship and the president's performance on the basics—the nation's pocketbook and its physical safety govern the public will even in the face of sensationalism. Rodevick Hart offers a multifacted look at letters to the editor, with data on thousands of letter-writers and on editorial decisions and readers' perception about them. The study is on the optimistic side, showing no across-the-board decline toward political apathy (Table 19.2).

So which is the more accurate way to characterize the media trends and their consequence: revolutionary change or seamless continuity? And does political communication enable democracy to work effectively, or do the flaws fail to pass a critical threshold? The evidence so far is with continuity and democratic health. But that may be due not so much to a closer fit with reality as to the disadvantage of advocates of the change thesis in conducting systematic empirical analysis.

In any case, perhaps the dichotomy is a bit too simple. A notable chapter that does not fit the dichotomy and in some ways benefits from it is William Gamson's, in which he summarizes his extensive empirical work on media frames. Gamson finds that some issues generate media frames that, by highlighting citizens' agency, promote the kind of collective action lauded by participatory theorists. Under some conditions pessimism is warranted; under others, optimism is. An interesting question provoked by this study is whether agency really comes from the nature of the issue or instead is heavily influenced by the tactics and alliances of activists.

Also stepping outside the dichotomy are Wendy Rahn and Thomas Rudolph. They argue—with persuasive survey evidence—that young people are less attached than older people to national identity and politics in part because of trends in communication. The Internet acts as a globalizing force that erodes citizens' identity with the nation-state and engagement with its political system, though the consequences need not be negative if a supranational organization (the European Union) is on the rise.

This volume proves that questions about audience segmentation, use of the Internet, and the merger of entertainment and news not only shed light on the nature of media change but also prompt us to revisit the meaning of basic democratic requirements. While one hopes to see more systematic analysis in future work, this volume is notable for the big and worthy questions it tackles. Much useful theorizing awaits the reader.

The Debate over Slavery: Antislavery and Proslavery Liberalism in Antebellum America. By David F. Ericson. New York: New York University Press, 2000. 216p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.

Democracy and Slavery in Frontier Illinois: The Bottomland Republic. By James Simeone. Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2000. 290p. \$38.00.

Manisha Sinha, University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Both the books under review deal with the development of a distinctly American political tradition of liberalism and liberal democracy and its relationship to the thorny issue of racial slavery. However, the authors employ very different means to explore this common goal. While David Ericson, as in his previous work, concentrates on the level of national politics, James Simeone examines the local political culture of "bottomland republicanism" in early Illinois.

In his book, Ericson seeks to revive Louis Hartz's "liberal consensus thesis" or the idea that ideological consensus rather than conflict marks American history by exploring its "toughest [test] case" (p. 8), the sectional conflict over slavery and the Civil War. According to him, antislavery and proslavery advocates, despite their differences on slavery, shared an underlying belief in liberalism. In bringing the Old South's defenders of slavery under the umbrella of liberalism, he goes further than Hartz himself, who had dismissed the South's reactionary defense of slavery as a short-lived feudal dream. Interestingly enough, he presents us with a far closer, textual reading of proslavery than of antislavery works. Perhaps the author is well aware of the skepticism that will greet his attempt to portray proslavery ideologues as nineteenth-century American liberals.

Ericson's classification of antislavery and proslavery arguments as deontological, consequentialist, and contextualist is limiting rather than illuminating. Historical arguments are far messier and complicated, as he sometimes seems to acknowledge, than the neat categories social scientists would assign to them. Labeling Lydia Maria Child's abolitionist pamphlet as mainly consequentialist, he fails to do justice to its pioneering antiracism arguments. And while he does discuss the writings and speeches of his subjects ably for the most part, the historical context in which they were uttered is at times lacking. James Henry Hammond's conditional unionism, for instance, was a product of the increasingly pro-Southern Democratic Party's domination of the federal government throughout the 1850s and not due to some primordial loyalty to the Union, which he supposedly shared with Calhoun.

Most problematic is Ericson's attempt to push renowned conservative proslavery thinkers into a liberal straitjacket. His differentiation of liberal, or slavery is the best state of liberty for African Americans, and nonliberal, or African Americans as a race are suited to slavery, proslavery arguments is not very convincing. Both arguments in fact are decidedly racist. In their open celebration of social hierarchy and stability and denunciation of the principles of the Declaration of Independence, men such as George Fitzhugh and Hammond sound more like followers of Sir Robert Filmer than Locke. Making a somewhat strange argument, Ericson claims that proslavery thinkers were liberals simply because they believed that slavery was a progressive institution. Nor can we view Calhoun's concurrent majority theory and Southerners' demand for the extension and perpetuity of racial slavery as merely pleas for tolerance and pluralism. Perhaps the one way in which many proslavery thinkers followed classical liberalism was their insistence on the sanctity of human property and their upholding of the slaveholders' right to property over the slaves' right to liberty. Here Ericson misses an opportunity to explore fully how much in common

champions of slavery had with bourgeois conservatives outside their section.

Ericson's portrayal of abolitionists as irresponsible, antiinstitutional agitators is decidedly old-fashioned and revisionist in tone. At times, he fails to distinguish sufficiently between the more opportunistic arguments of antislavery politicians and those of abolitionists. To blame abolitionist arguments that allegedly "marginalized the freed slaves" rather than the violent opposition of white southerners to racial equality for "the failure of Reconstruction" (p. 89) is ahistorical and untenable. In his concluding chapter on the Civil War, Ericson, while claiming to develop a synthesis between the revisionist needless conflict school of Civil War historians and those who view the war as inevitable and irrepressible, leans far too much on the revisionist side. For example, he repeatedly characterizes Lincoln's famous house divided speech as a self-fulfilling prophecy rather than a perceptive statement on the sectional conflict and its underlying causes. Somewhat contradictorily, he then tries to enlist Lincoln for his liberal consensus view of the Civil War. But Lincoln viewed the Southern demand for the liberty to hold slaves as political tyranny and the essence of immorality, and not simply as a different version of liberalism.

Like Ericson, Simeone tries to rehabilitate the reputation of the advocates of slavery. If Ericson's proslavery writers were liberals at heart, those who fought for the introduction of slavery in Illinois in 1823-24, according to Simeone, were really champions of democracy. In his book, they emerge as the descendants of an antielitist, backcountry political culture extending back to the Old World. The fight for the introduction of slavery represented a battle between "white folk" and "big folk" such as Edward Coles, a former Virginia slaveholder whose apparently "aggressive antislavery views" (p. 17) offended the plain folks. Simeone explains that many of these white folk were slaveholding yeoman farmers rather than "plantation aristocrats" (p. 24) but slave ownership in antebellum America, as the economist Gavin Wright has pointed out, already put one in the ranks of the wealthy. Most self-working farmers in the mid-west ranked below in capital than a southern farmer who owned even one slave.

The white folk, Simeone argues, fought against the class above them, the race below them, and the "Yankees," Northerners who personified antislavery and promarket forces. The white folk sought to preserve their economic independence and political equality by fighting for democracy in the name of slavery. They led a democratic revolution against men such as Ninian Edwards and Jesse Thomas, who dominated the territorial and state governments of early Illinois. However, as Simeone acknowledges, the white folk themselves were divided over the advisability of introducing slavery into Illinois. Indeed, some of his evidence points to a democratic republican critique of racial slavery. In short, the forces for democracy and slavery were hardly neatly aligned in this state. The author's explanation of the division among white folk over slavery as a cultural cum religious one—"whole hog Calvinists," or strongly democratic and proslavery, versus "milk and cider Arminians," or weakly democratic and antislaveryis less than convincing. He fails to explore the more obvious sectional or North-South division over slavery in Illinois fully, which, as he points out, does presage the sectional conflict of the 1840s and 1850s.

Simeone contends that Illinois' proslavery bottomland farmers were exponents of revolutionary republicanism and precursors of antebellum champions of majoritarian rule and popular sovereignty. They redefined the universalism of revolutionary republicanism in a particularistic fashion and became champions of the white folk in the Jacksonian

era. While Jacksonian democracy was indeed a white man's democracy, it was not an explicitly proslavery movement. Rather it was based on a national consensus on slavery and around the economic issues that Western republicans held so dear. Otherwise, the conflict between the staunchly proslavery John C. Calhoun and the champion of the plain folk, Andrew Jackson, would be inexplicable. Perhaps Illinois' advocates of slavery, like Ninian Edwards, were more Calhounite than Jacksonian. Moreover, the author does not explore the final conflict between the Western majoritarian, democratic vision represented by popular sovereignty and slavery during the Kansas wars. Despite his moral insensitivity to the issue of slavery, Stephen Douglas, to whom the author alludes throughout the text, finally had to confront slavery to save the white man's democracy.

Finally, for a book that purports to deal with the politics of slavery and racism, Simeone fails to explore either of these issues in any depth. The fight between the proslavery conventionists and the antislavery nonconventionists in Illinois sounds more like a battle of tin swords. His discussion of bottomland republicanism also tends to obfuscate rather than clarify these issues. All caveats aside, this book is well researched and Simeone is no doubt right in arguing that political development in Illinois foreshadowed Jacksonian democracy and the sectional conflict over slavery in the late antebellum period. He correctly concludes that the axis of political conflict in early America was republicanism and democracy against liberal constitutionalism and institutions but his effort to link proslavery forces with the cause of democracy is questionable. This is especially pertinent when one considers the fact that proslavery advocates in antebellum America relied far more often on formal constitutionalism and a supposed respect for tradition and institutions to make their case than their antislavery opponents.

By attempting to incorporate slavery in a broader liberal or democratic political tradition, Simeone and Ericson fail to deal sufficiently with the political significance of slavery and its impact on the politics of pre-Civil War America. Any account of this period of political history that does not explore how racial slavery affected the ideologies, political processes, and very nature of politics in early America is incomplete.

Corporate Power and the Environment: The Political Economy of U.S. Environmental Policy. By George A. Gonzalez. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 160p. \$60.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Clyde W. Barrow, University of Massachusetts, Dartmouth

George A. Gonzalez has authored a lucid and well-written book with a sharp thesis. He challenges the conventional claim that environmental policy is "an oasis of democracy" by developing a series of case studies to demonstrate that "members of the nation's economic elite—corporate decision-makers and other individuals of substantial wealth—are the dominant influences in the formation and development of U.S. environmental policies" (p. ix). In constructing his theoretical argument, Gonzalez combines G. William Domhoff's method of power structure analysis with James Weinstein's and others' historical analysis of corporate liberalism.

Gonzalez has selected environmental policy as a "hard case" for promoting the well-deserved and long overdue "rehabilitation" of Domhoff's method of power structure research. He observes that "environmental policies are widely perceived to be arenas where business influence is weakest" (p. 18) in American politics, but Gonzalez deploys a wealth of historical evidence to suggest that these policies are in fact "largely shaped by capitalist elites and generally serve

the political and economic interests of corporate America" (p. ix). As controversial and counterintuitive as this may seem, Gonzalez marshals an impressive array of historical evidence. Unlike many political scientists who have turned to history, Gonzalez does not merely rely on extant writings by historians but makes an original historical contribution to the subject by delving into the personal correspondence of key actors, government archives, the proceedings of professional associations, obscure government documents, and archival materials from leading organizations in the policy planning network.

Gonzalez draws on these sources to conduct a relentless and unequivocal polemic against theories of pluralism and state autonomy and, in doing so, provides a unique counterpoint to the conventional wisdom that business interests and environmental policy are necessarily antagonistic interests in the political arena. To illustrate his thesis, Gonzalez selects four environmental policy areas: management of the national forests, management of the national parks, federal wilderness preservation, and federal clean air policies. In successive chapters, Gonzalez analyzes the origins of the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Park Service, Redwood National Park, Yosemite National Park, and the Jackson Hole National Monument. His final case study examines the adoption of the Clean Air Act of 1990.

Gonzalez's analysis also builds on the previous work of Murray Edelman by emphasizing that environmental policy has been deployed by political elites as an important symbol of democracy that helps legitimate the state by presenting these policies to the public "as a means to control economic interests and hold corporate powers in check" (p. ix). However, Gonzalez insists that a closer examination of these policies reveals that their implementation has "historically altered the operation of the economy to the benefit of capitalist concerns" (p. ix), while explicitly rejecting alternative, if poorly organized, conceptions of ecological policy.

Within this general theoretical framework, Gonzalez develops a distinct argument in each case study. For example, in his analysis of the origins of the U.S. Forest Service and the national parks system, Gonzalez examines the political conflict between the ideals of scientific forestry (wilderness preservation) championed largely by university professors and the ideals of practical forestry championed by Gifford Pinchot and other corporate liberals. In recounting the triumph of practical forestry, Gonzalez concludes that practical forestry was favored by "an upper-class and corporate-based policy network promoting the use of particular forestry practices in both private and public forests in the United States" (p. 23). However, Gonzalez's argument is not merely a democratic critique of elite dominance. He also uses these case studies to illustrate the significant differences in policy outcomes that result from such dominance.

In the case of practical forestry, Gonzalez not only concludes that corporate interests triumphed in the policy arena, but finds that their policy planning network "intervened directly to mold the profession of forestry into a discipline that served the needs of the U.S. timber industry" (p. x). Thus, when the Redwood National Park was created many decades later, the form in which it was preserved "both accommodated and served the profit goals of the large timber firms involved" in the controversy (p. x), while defeating the plans of serious preservationists. In a similar vein, Gonzalez argues that "in the case of the park service, its centralized management, resources, and professionalism have been historically deployed to convert the national parks into a profit generating system of tourist centers" (p. 45).

Gonzalez's thesis is less sharp in the case of wilderness preservation (e.g., Jackson Hole Monument), where he argues only that "active economic elite political support is a necessary condition" (p. 61) of its adoption, but it is the one case where he cannot link the policy to an unequivocally economic class interest. Similarly, Gonzalez argues that Clean Air Act of 1990 "was the result of industry efforts to create uniformity in clean air regulations" by having the 1990 Clean Air Act stave off and supplant more stringent and costly air pollution regulatory regimes enacted on the state and local level (p. 95). In this instance, the Clean Air Act served to "rationalize air pollution regulations to the benefit of business interests" (p. 95). While its adoption certainly removed the threat of more stringent and costly state and local legislation, it is not clear why such legislation should not be viewed as a "second-best" compromise for business that also defeated it first preference (i.e., no legislation).

Gonzalez has carved out a unique perspective on environmental policy that also has implications for the state theory debate. It is an important contribution to the emerging trend among many new political scientists of returning to works of Domhoff, Miliband, and the corporate liberal historians, while extending that work into new policy areas. It is also part of what some of us hope is a renewed interest in the study of corporate power by political scientists.

The Presidential Difference: Leadership Style from FDR to Clinton. By Fred I. Greenstein. New York: Free Press, 2000. 282p. \$25.00.

Nicol C. Rae, Florida International University

The overriding theme of this very insightful work from distinguished presidential scholar Fred I. Greenstein is stated in the opening pages: "The United States is said to have a government of laws and institutions rather than individuals, but as these examples remind us, it is one in which the matter of who occupies the nation's highest office can have profound repercussions" (p. 2). Greenstein's analysis of presidential leadership styles from FDR to Clinton corroborates his theme by demonstrating the extent to which the aggrandizement of the presidency since the New Deal has left the American polity at the mercy of the skills and personalities of the holders of the office. As Greenstein himself points out (p. 3) parliamentary systems, with their more collective leadership, place more partisan and institutional constraints on the head of government. In contrast, the centrality of the presidency to the American system of government since the New Deal and the extent to which the institution is driven by the individual style of respective officeholders provide a recurrent and pervasive element of instability in American national government. Yet this very instability is also perhaps the office's most useful attribute. In a system characterized largely by gridlock it provides intermittent and necessary innovation and dynamism. The presidency's' greatest shortcoming, its highly protean nature, is also, ironically, its greatest value as a political institution.

This should be a highly accessible and informative volume for undergraduate students, scholars of the presidency, and politically interested general readers alike. Having established the extent to which individual personality and leadership style are critical to the modern presidency, Professor Greenstein proceeds to provide the reader with succinct but absorbing sketches of the presidential styles of FDR and his successors. Each president is assessed in terms of what Greenstein sees as the six components of an overall presidential leadership style: "public communicator," "organizational capacity," "political skill," "vision of public policy," "cognitive style," and "emotional intelligence." The great advantage of

utilizing such a large number of factors is that it allows for a more nuanced analysis of presidential leadership than the traditional narrow focus on "political bargaining" or "personality." A consistent and rigorous framework of analysis also enables Greenstein to avoid the perennial problem for works on the presidency: the tendency to lapse into simple narrative and anecdote. The recognition of the significance of communication skills and vision to the conduct of the modern presidency also reminds us of the curious nature of an office that demands the political skills of a head of government coupled with the demeanor and bearing of a head of state. Another strength of the book is the background information on each president both in the individual chapters and in the even more useful Appendix, which provides basic but essential information—cabinet members, family biographical information, and significant events—on each officeholder and his administration.

The subtlety and comprehensiveness of Greenstein's framework for analyzing leadership style enable him to reveal shortcomings in the styles of presidents generally regarded as "successful" and, by the same token, the strengths of presidents usually dismissed as utter "failures." Greenstein is critical, for example, of Franklin Roosevelt in one area that most presidential scholars (following Richard Neustadt) have always perceived to be one of Roosevelt's greatest strengths—his organizational practices. According to Greenstein, FDR's vaunted "chaotic organizational methods" were simply "chaotic" and generally got in the way of the objectives of his administration. In contrast, he finds more to admire in the more structured and formal presidential advisory and decision-making practices of Eisenhower and Gerald Ford. Greenstein also gives FDR relatively low marks for cognitive skills and, perhaps more surprisingly, vision, arguing that in domestic policy the New Deal was less effective simply because FDR's improvisational approach to policymaking never allowed his administration to articulate an overall concept to the public of what it was trying to do. Professor Greenstein has played a major role in the rehabilitation of President Eisenhower among presidential scholars and he again provides a largely positive portrait here. His attribution of "vision" to Eisenhower is unconvincing to this reviewer, however. Greenstein argues that Eisenhower had "clarity" in his individual policy goals (p. 56)—such as the Interstate Highway System—but it seems to be stretching the concept rather far to say that this amounted to a "vision" in the same sense of Ronald Reagan's mantra that "government is the problem."

Greenstein's framework also better enables us to understand the reasons for the "failures," and *The Presidential Difference* includes a fair and measured discussion of the two presidents who constituted the most dramatic "failures"—LBJ and Nixon. Both of these men had high congnitive capacities and strong political skills, yet while both had extraordinary records of accomplishment in office, LBJ escalated America's involvement in the most disastrous war in its history and divided the nation, while Nixon became the first presidential incumbent to resign in disgrace after exposure of his illegal actions in the Watergate cover-up. Greenstein attributes much of the blame for these disasters to the flawed "emotional intelligence" of both incumbents, that is, their inability to prevent their emotions from undermining the political goals of their administrations.

Ultimately this is a deceptively useful and insightful book. What initially appears to be a simple collection of biographical sketches on FDR and his successors turns out to challenge some of the prevailing tools of presidential analysis and to provide new ones that help illuminate the actual operations of the office. The focus on individuality and instability in the

institution of the Presidency is a welcome reminder of what a strange and volatile office it is. By reminding us of the degree to which the functioning of the contemporary political system is contingent on the styles, personality, and even emotional stability of individual presidents, *The Presidential Difference* should further enhance our regard for the wisdom of James Madison and John Marshall in establishing effective legislative and judicial checks on presidential power.

Wealth in America: Trends in Wealth Inequality. By Lisa A. Keister. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 307p. \$59.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Marilyn Dantico, Arizona State University

Lisa Keister's work offers students of research methods, and of public policy, an ideal model. It also offers, albeit indirectly, a study that should inform policy makers as they discuss proposals to alter inheritance and estate tax policies and privatize Social Security. Wealth in America explores the distribution of household resources from 1962 through 1995. Questions regarding the distribution of wealth in the United States are seldom addressed directly because readily available data do not permit a straightforward approach. Because it is easier to deal with questions related to the distribution of income than with the distribution of wealth, research generally focuses on income distribution and we assume that there is a relatively straightforward relationship between the two. Keister tackles the data problems associated with measuring household assets allowing her to evaluate the distribution of wealth. Since measuring assets at any point in time is a challenge, it is all the more remarkable that she is able to examine changes in the distribution of household assets over time.

Her painstaking assembly of data, her resourceful use of simulations to supplement existing data sources, and her skilled analysis are the foundationstones of her contribution. They are the basis of her argument, and permit her to accomplish her goal of producing "a longitudinal picture of household wealth distribution and accumulation processes" (p. 260). Keister's database, comprised of historic data, surveys, aggregate household wealth data, estate tax records, simulation estimates, and experiments based on simulated data, is massive. She draws on government documents for the period 1962 to 1995. Her simulation model allows her to answer a variety of questions, including the questions related to the effects of stock market fluctuations or boons in the housing market.

This work addresses basic questions regarding social structure, some of which have been examined empirically by others. But no other work is as painstakingly thorough. Consistent with studies of income distribution, Keister reports that the top 1% of wealth holders expanded their holdings over time. What is surprising is that the maldistribution of wealth far exceeds the maldistribution of income. Some of the change is attributable to individual choices, or, one might argue, to the limits set on less-well-off individuals by their access to choices. She points out, for example, that the poor, especially the nonwhite poor, have fewer and more expensive banking services than other segments of the population. Thus, their debt load is increased relative to others' when they borrow money for a mortgage or when they conduct routine banking transactions. Moreover, the wealthy, unlike those with few assets, keep relatively much of their money in "high-risk" assets; middle-class and low-income families have relatively much of their money invested in housing and cash accounts, which are low-risk and low-reward assets. Demographic variables account for some differences; wealthy Americans, for example, have smaller families than other Americans. Raising children, while clearly necessary and sometimes eulogized by policy makers, is inconsistent with asset accumulation. More important than family size, though, is where one starts out in the system; while education may improve one's earning capacity, it is not sufficient to change one's position relative to the wealthy. Keister argues that the wealthy control so many assets that for any change in the distribution of wealth to occur, they must hold fewer assets.

While these findings may seem obvious to some, her exploration of race effects is less so. She reports that there are virtually no nonwhite families among top wealth holders. Keister's simulated data inform an experiment removing the direct effects of race from wealth accumulation. The experimental data indicate that variables such as education and family size, which interact with race, are sufficient to sustain patterns of wealth inequality. When the question of family wealth is entered into the question of well-being, racial inequalities are greater than research on income, education, and other social status indicators suggests. The effects of race on wealth accumulation are shockingly robust.

Keister's work draws from a number of traditions, and it speaks to each in turn. those familiar with the life cycle studies of Franco Modigliani, and Edward Wolff's explorations of the distribution of wealth, will be intrigued by Keister's additions to the field. Those who have followed the efforts of Melvin Oliver and Thomas Shapiro to examine the effects of race will be drawn by the scope of Keister's undertaking as she examines the wealth distribution among African-American and Latino families, and with her speculations about wealth accumulation among Asian-American families. Those interested in the impacts of age on wealth accumulation will also benefit from a careful review of Keister's work.

Keister's work leads to some painful conclusions. She documents wealth inequalities far in excess of income inequalities and an increase in wealth inequalities over time. She is bold in her evaluation of some of the impediments to wealth accumulation, noting, for example, the negative impacts of inconsistent banking practices and casting a shadow over the promise that education and thrift will lead to social mobility. Yet her evaluation of policies intended to move middle-income wage earners into long-term investments is somewhat timid; she argues that more time must lapse before we can reach conclusions regarding social experiments such as Individual Retirement Accounts.

This is not a book for the untrained. It is a sophisticated methodological treatise suitable for classroom use in upper-division undergraduate seminars and by graduate students. It will also serve staff members for policymakers, who will be able to use this work to point to the persistent causes of inequalities that require attention as policies are developed.

Tangled Up in Red, White, and Blue: New Social Movements in America. By Christine A. Kelly. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 192p. \$67.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Karen Beckwith, The College of Wooster

Research on political movements remains peripheral to the discipline of political science, or, to put it more optimistically, outstanding research on political movements has relied upon interdisciplinary and intersubfield research strategies and is building an increasing presence within the discipline. The importance and emergence of this arena of scholarship make it difficult not to celebrate Christine Kelly's Tangled Up in Red, White, and Blue, a work that offers a synthesis of political theory and empirical political movement research, employing

comparative case studies of several new social movements in the United States.

Christine Kelly's thesis is that broad structural explanations for social movement emergence, form, and success are insufficient for understanding new social movements in the United States and that "national institutional settings and ideological traditions" (p. xii) are essential components that shape the context within which movements act. Accepting the construct of "new social movement" for the U.S. case, Kelly argues that the U.S. movements have been trapped between a co-opted liberal interest group model, on the one hand, and marginalization and defeat, on the other, a "bifurcated pattern [that] has its roots in the early Civil Rights movement" (p. 103). Kelly's goal is to provide the theoretical basis upon which U.S. movements can escape this pattern, engage in greater ideological reflexivity, and, ultimately, succeed.

Kelly begins by recuperating liberal democratic tenets of modernism—"rule of law, public accountability, and autonomy"—against modernism's "instrumental modes—concentrated capitalist accumulation, administrative rationality [and] natural resource exhaustion" (p. 4). She offers accounts of Hobbes's, Kant's, and Dewey's notions of reason and citizen responsibility in the state context to position her arguments concerning the value of Enlightenment traditions of freedom, moving to an evaluation of Habermas' contributions to democratic practice and renewal, particularly his concept of "communicative action." On the basis of her theoretical analysis, Kelly concludes that "the only practical arena [for social movement action] is... the state itself" (p. 65) and that social movements, in targeting the state, must ensure the institutionalization of radical democratic processes.

Three U.S. movements—Populist, Progressive, and Socialist—serve to exemplify the historical dimensions of antidemocratic resistance and cooptational strategies. Kelly employs these case studies to demonstrate the persistent failures to institutionalize radical democratic processes that would ensure a meaningful, progressive, and "class ethic"-based mass politics (pp. 161–64). She then turns to three post-1968 new social movements—the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Youth International Party (Yippies), and Redstockings, the New York City-based women's liberation group—and, finally, to two Reagan-era movement campaigns—the antiapartheid organizing and the anti-Gulf War protests—both of which are treated as student-based.

These multiple and various cases are employed to demonstrate the weaknesses of U.S. new social movements (NSMs), with their emphasis on identity, their antistate stance, and their "overemphasis on the prefigurative" (p. 139). Characterized by "opposition to representative institutions and universal (or shared) values and [relying] heavily on the symbolic" (p. 139), new social movements have been unable to challenge the state or to find ways of institutionalizing processes that would sustain mass citizen democratic participation. They have also failed, Kelly argues, to "[present] a coherent theoretical alternative to the dominant order" (p. 173). Kelly's solution to the ineffectiveness of the new social movements she examined is to embrace a "class ethic," to organize "a democratic confederation of the social movement base with parliamentarian capabilities" (p. 171), and to engage in procedural institutional reform that would concretize mass democratic participation (p. 172)

Tangled Up in Red, White, and Blue has flaws that should give the reader/scholar/movement activist pause. Kelly's conclusions, for example, raise questions about the standards she employs to evaluate movement strategy and success. She concludes her book with a plea for a "more reflexive

ideology" and "constitutionally established procedures ensuring accountability (and recall) [that] must bind participants" (p. 161) and urges social movement activists "to thematize the impact of the accumulation process generally and in relations to NSM aims" (p. 162). Yet her emphasis on "electoral and related institutional reforms" (p. 171) is a call for procedural change, a move the Progressive movement advanced a century ago, resulting, according to Kelly, in its co-optation (p. 93). Although Kelly makes such a call in the context of "a class ethic and . . . a democratically structured confederalism" (p. 171), she does not explain how new social movements would escape the cooptation that she claims the Progressive movement experienced.

More serious is the outdated nature of the research and the citations. Chapter One's concern with resource mobilization versus new social movement theory focuses on a 1980s-1990s debate that has been superceded by political opportunity theorizing, claims about the role of emotions in social movements, and a clear cultural turn among many social movement scholars, as evidenced by Mary Fainsod Katzenstein (Faithful and Fearless: Moving Feminist Protest Inside the Church and the Military, 1998), Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield (eds., New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity, 1994), Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (eds., How Social Movements Matter, 1999), and Nancy Whittier (Feminist Generations: The Persistence of the Radical Women's Movement, 1995), among others. Moreover, a major theoretical work by Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato (Civil Society and Political Theory, 1992) is missing from Kelly's discussion and from her references; now a decade old, this work is a critical analysis of civil society, social movements, and democratic theory and is highly relevant to Kelly's arguments.

Kelly's insistence, in Chapter Six, that political opportunity theory is overly deterministic (pp. 164–67) has long been recognized. Political scientists and sociologists have theorized and documented the creation of opportunities by movement activists (see, e.g., Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement, 1998; Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 1996; and Lee Ann Banaszak, Why Movements Succeed or Fail, 1996). It is unfortunate that an energetic and passionate treatise such as Tangled Up in Red, White and Blue has failed to incorporate these major contributions to political movement research.

More generally, however, Tangled Up in Red, White, and Blue commits two major (and common) errors of political movement research. The first is movement omniscience, the unstated and often unrecognized assumption that a correct strategy and a correct set of choices are always available to political movements. To borrow a phrase from a famous leftist theorist, movements may not do exactly as they please, nor do they always have (nor can they always create) opportunities for success. In her discussions of specific movements, Kelly identifies missed opportunities, mistakes, and failures of social movements, without providing the context within which movement decisions might be evaluated. Omissions include the active strategizing of committed movement opponents, the violent and repressive actions of the state (a notable omission in the discussion of SNCC), the lack of support in public opinion, and disruptive historical events (such as assassinations). Kelly's claim that the U.S. student movement of the 1980s dissolved due to "its inability to discern and engage...the institutional and economic context in which it is enmeshed" (p. 128) suggests that a proper discernment might have led to its success, regardless of other factors. Similarly, her suggestion that "the eventual failure of the socialist movement...resulted from the

inability of movements to recognize" the political and ideological, rather than purely economic, nature of their struggle (p. 161) places the burden of proof solely on movements and employs the very determinism that she earlier rejects.

The second error is that of movement myopia, or generalizing from the scholar's own political involvement in or close experience with a specific movement. In Kelly's case, her activist history concerns campus-based anti-nuclear weapons and antiapartheid campaigns (pp. ix-xi); her selection of new social movement cases relies heavily on student movements. This emphasis obscures the strength and successes of national organizing in movements such as CISPES (the Committee in Solidarity with the People of EI Salvador); the reader is given little sense of its national scope, the widespread involvement of nonstudent communities, especially churches, and the multiracial aspect of the coalition. Despite examples of antiapartheid organizing and of SNCC, there is too little discussion of race—perhaps the most distinctive "exceptionalism" of U.S. politics. Antiracist movements are discussed without reference to the long history and continuity of antiracist struggles and their different manifestations as these movements have responded to changing political conditions, shifts in electoral power, and alternations of support from and attack by state authorities. The lack of citations of the recent literature on SNCC, such as Cheryl Lynn Greenberg's (ed., 1998) A Circle of Trust: Remembering SNCC and Clayborne Carson's (1995) In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s, is particularly lamentable.

Across the last decade, political movement scholarship has increased its presence within political science, incorporating methods and perspectives from a variety of research traditions, developing a sophisticated, interdisciplinary theoretical repertoire, and relying on and speaking from scholars' experiences of movement activism. Tangled Up in Red, White, and Blue—ambitious, wide-ranging, and passionate about new social movements—makes less of a contribution to this endeavor than it might have.

Bitter Fruit: The Politics of Black-Korean Conflict in New York City. By Claire Jean Kim. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000. 300p. \$37.50.

Richard M. Merelman, The University of Wisconsin—Madison

In this case study of the 1990 Red Apple Boycott of two Korean-owned produce stores in Brooklyn, New York, Claire Kim narrates a complex story of resurgent Black Nationalism, the rise of Korean resistance to blacks, and the fateful temporizing of Mayor David Dinkins, whose belated crossing of the boycott picket lines deeply injured his mayoralty. Kim has high ambitions in telling this story; she wishes to use it to displace a flawed "racial scapegoating" theory of black—Korean relations and to advance in its stead her own theory of "racial ordering" in the United States.

Kim's narrative of the Red Apple Boycott is more effective than is her theoretical analysis. While she offers an engrossing study of racial politics in New York City, her larger theory does not persuasively explain the events she describes.

Kim's 69 interviews, her extensive analysis of primary sources, her depiction of media coverage, and her sociodemographic data support her contention that the Red Apple Boycott was indeed an episode of resurgent Black Nationalism. Kim effectively connects the boycott to Black Nationalist activism during the Koch administration and black reactions to white racist attacks in Howard Beach and Bensonhurst. She demonstrates that well-known Black

Nationalist leaders quickly took over the leadership of the boycott, which emerged after an altercation between a Korean store owner and a Haitian woman customer. The leaders of the boycott did indeed intend their action to further Black Nationalist goals. Moreover, the boycott was part of a long tradition of Black Nationalist politics in New York City. That the boycott persisted for eight months sustains Kim's argument that previous Black Nationalist efforts had effectively prepared the black population for sustained political action.

Nevertheless, Kim does not quite achieve her goal of establishing that the Red Apple Boycott was an example of "purposive, collective action" (p. 3). Kim argues that the boycotters aimed to "punish the offending merchants, to defy and disrupt the power structure, to bring Black immigrants under the Black Power umbrella, and to raise Black people's consciousness about racial oppression in America" (p. 125). But these purposes emerged at different moments, and often appear as much to be rationalizations after the fact as established goals prior to the events. True, the boycott did harm the offending merchants (but not other Korean shopkeepers); however, its clumsy elevation of African Americans over immigrant Haitians seems unlikely to have extended Black Power to these immigrants. Nor did the boycott disrupt "the power structure," since, if Kim is correct, Koreans are not part of the power structure. Nor could it have raised black people's consciousness of racial oppression in America, since most American blacks probably knew nothing of it, and those in New York City hardly needed a boycott to confirm their consciousness of racial grievance.

And what, as a case of purposive collective action, did the boycott actually accomplish? Little good. The boycott alienated Koreans, who for the first time engaged in serious political countermobilization. The boycott helped bring down the first elected black mayor in New York City, David Dinkins, whose departure elevated to power the hostile Rudolph Giulani and his police-friendly policies, which specifically targeted blacks. And the boycott further diminished the already reduced stores of Jewish liberalism in New York City politics. Of course, these facts don't demonstrate that the boycotters were *not* engaged in purposive collective action; however, they do make us question the rationality of these actions.

Need the boycott have faltered? Kim implies so; she states that "racial power cleans up after itself. It inevitably generates protest by subordinated groups, but it also names, interprets, and ultimately silences that protest" (p. 219). Kim draws this conclusion largely because of the theory of racial power she advances as antidote to a flawed theory of racial scapegoating, which marginalizes episodes of black-Korean conflict as irrational, decontextualized, emotional outbursts. In contrast, Kim asserts that a distinct structure of racial power in the United States consistently "racializes" new immigrant groups, orders racial minorities hierarchically, and utilizes such devices as "color-blind" language, myth (i.e., Koreans as a "model minority," blacks as an "underclass"), political exclusion, economic stratification, spatial segregation, and media bias to contain the inevitable episodes of conflict that racial ordering spawns. Within this order Koreans are a "triangulated" group; they possess a favored cultural position as a model minority, and they enjoy relative economic success, but they are permanently foreign and "unassimilable" (p. 45). As the failure of the Red Apple Boycott demonstrates, this racial order effectively resists disruption.

Although Kim's theory has virtues, it suffers from inaccuracies, nonfalsifiable propositions, exaggerations, anthropomorphism, and, most important, a gap between structure and agency. Kim inaccurately argues that the racial order "excludes Asian Americans from civic membership" (p. 16). This is historically false and, worse, denies to the Koreans in

her story their own repeated avowals of American civic nationalism. Perhaps such statements are part of the false consciousness bred by color-blind language, but the concept of color-blind language is itself problematic, for it makes Kim's theory nonfalsifiable. If color-blind language is, like explicitly racial language, a part of racial power, there is no empirical condition that could disconfirm Kim's theory of racialization. Also, Kim consistently exaggerates her arguments; for example, she repeatedly refers to unfavorable media coverage of the boycotts as the "official line" (p. 193ff), though she never identifies any "officials" who direct this coverage.

Most important, the theory of racial power produces a kind of anthropomorphic determinism that simply doesn't account for actors' interpretations of events. "Racial power" is a general structural concept, which operates only through the actions of real people. It is too far from Kim's structural theory to Sonny Carson's (a Black Nationalist leader) explanation of the boycott ("the reason for the boycott was that a Black woman was slapped" [p. 124]). Nothing in the theory accounts for either the slap or the reaction to it; moreover, little that is resonant of the theory surfaces in actors' statements of their own motives. A satisfying theory of racial politics must connect structure to agency more closely than does Kim's theory of racial order.

The Politics of Automobile Insurance Reform: Ideas, Institutions, and Public Policy in North America. By Edward L. Lascher, Jr. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1999. 160p. S69.00

Martin Lubin, Plattsburgh State University of New York

Why do policymakers in any one given jurisdiction choose one approach rather than another for dealing with the common public policy challenge of deciding how to revise state and provincial automobile insurance regulatory regimes? And even within any one specific political jurisdiction (of a North American subnational "universe" of 50 states plus 10 provinces), why do policy outcomes change over time? What determines legislative policy decisions?

This readable and well-reasoned study examines how Canadian provincial and U.S. state levels of government, which exercise primary jurisdiction over the regulation of private passenger automobile insurance within each of these neighboring First World democratic federations, have tried in a variety of ways to lessen the extent of significantly increasing rates over the past 20 years. Among the people of both Canada and the United States, the automobile is widely believed to be a necessity. Given that auto insurance is virtually compulsory everywhere in North America, whenever insurance premium costs rapidly rise, citizens so burdened look to their elected politicians to provide some relief.

Conventional wisdom as well as a substantial amount of scholarship reviewed in chapter 2 highlights the impact of interest groups on elected policymakers. The existing literature on auto insurance politics per se claims that policy outcomes can be sufficiently understood as the result of varying pressures by a multitude of competing interested groups. Policy choices are explained in terms of responses to demands of politically relevant actors other than elected officials themselves. Thus, from a pressure politics perspective, auto insurance policy is understood as the end product of competition among insurance companies, consumer groups, and trial lawyers. In contrast, Lascher argues that power politics alone is insufficient to explain longitudinal variance over time within single jurisdictions whenever legislators enact or block reforms. Rather, adoption of major no-fault reforms stems from many policymakers' beliefs that such policy

initiatives are likely to bring about desirable consequences, i.e., lower rates, and, simultaneously, no significant decline in the number of insurance providers.

Beliefs about the practicality of specific reform proposals emanate from two competing stories. The latter furnish to elected officials divergent "villains" to blame, explanations as to why past efforts to control rates failed, elements needed to effect successful reform, and predictions of the likely effects of adopting one proposal rather than another (p. 40–41). The "Profiteering Story" portrays the insurance industry as inefficient, noncompetitive, and unaccountable to the public. Conversely, the "Pogo Story" attributes the premiums crises to sharply rising medical reimbursements and the machinations of trial lawyers. Politicians who embrace Pogo opt for some variation of no-fault; adherents of Profiteering prefer tight regulation or rate rollbacks.

There are also differences in public policy between provinces and states because the provinces' parliamentary legislative systems make it easier to adopt as well as reverse far-reaching reforms whenever the problem diagnosis of party leaders shift. Westminster-style unicameral legislatures in Canada concentrate authority in fewer hands, and as a consequence, fewer points of interest group access exist than in separation of powers-style U.S. bicameral (except Nebraska) legislatures. Therefore, provincial governing majority party leaders have a greater ability to impose losses upon powerful vested interests opposed to drastic reforms than U.S. governors and legislative party chieftains do.

Chapters 3 through 7 distill and analyze information from the following sources: previously published aggregate data; surveys of people familiar with auto insurance reform throughout the 60 North American subnational jurisdictions (only five states failed to respond); and case studies based upon review of stories in newspapers of record as well as interviews with politicians, regulatory agency personnel, newspaper reporters, interest-group representatives, and academics involved with the issue.

The Pennsylvania case study in chapter 4 describes how, for the first time since the mid-1970s, a traditional tort state adopted any sort of no-fault system. This package also imposed mandatory rate reductions and a medical cost containment system. Three major groups considered to be highly influential in the Quaker state, all of whom opposed Act 6 (1990) were losers—namely, trial lawyers, insurance companies, and medical providers. In this jurisdiction, the legislation represents an instance where major change was effected despite opposition by well-entrenched interest groups. Moreover, the actual effects of the policy do in fact appear to be consistent with the claims of the sponsors of Act 6. On the other hand, the Rhode Island case study in chapter 5 examines the failure in 1993 to secure legislation similar to Pennsylvania's Act 6. Instead of pressure theory, which appears to be insufficient to explain the divergent trajectories of policymakers in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, Lascher hypothesizes that Pennsylvania legislators more readily internalized the Pogo Story and rejected the Profiteering Story than did lawmakers in most other states including Rhode Island, because the facts support Pogo more than Profiteering. Chapter 6 describes and explains the Ontario Liberal government's move from a rate control to a no-fault insurance approach between 1987 (when the industry's advice was ignored) and 1989 (when its advice was followed) and the successor Ontario NDP government's decision between 1990, upon coming to power, and mid-1991 to abandon plans for a public auto insurance system. Ontario Liberal leaders were unconvinced that a public system would be effective because it did not really address the real source of the problem— Pogo. Similarly, the NDP government's abandonment of a traditional ideologically driven party plank on public auto insurance is explained in terms of changes in what the NDP leaders believed about consequences of policy choices; they lost faith in the Profiteering Story while confronting the full reality of the costs of a public takeover.

In conclusion, I must concur with the author that politics is not always reducible to a "bargaining game" between powerful groups and politicians. We students of comparative politics and policy should "pay more attention to the stories decision makers tell about the nature of the problems they are asked to address" (p. 122), although such stories may well be deliberately put into the heads of elected officials by various political actors, including influential interest groups.

The Politics of Force: Media and the Construction of Police Brutality. By Regina G. Lawrence. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 254p. \$45.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Fred Meyer, Ball State University

Regina Lawrence makes a major contribution to the criminal justice policy literature in her book, The Politics of Force: Media and the Construction of Police Brutality. She helps observers of the criminal justice system understand one of the reasons the crime control model is the dominant one in the United States. To do this she studies two major police departments, New York and Los Angeles, and the reporting of police use of force incidents in the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times, respectively. Generally, the viewpoint of the police is presented in the newspaper accounts of the incidents. The police explanation involves blaming the individual wrongdoer without any serious discussion of systemic problems in the operation of the police department. In other words, the police view reinforces the crime control model, with its stress on the rapid and efficient removal of wrongdoers from the streets of this country. Thus Lawrence helps the reader understand why the views of police critics do not receive the same level of coverage as does the official view presented to the press by the police bureaucracy. In her concern with the definition of public problems, she contributes to a theory of issue construction. The significance of her findings is reinforced by her data sources: two major American newspapers including the New York Times, which is read by political elites throughout the United States. The data in the book are based on a content analysis of the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times from 1984 to 1995. Also, an extensive analysis of the Rodney King case is presented. The information about the King case was garnered from a variety of newspapers and magazines. In addition, Lawrence gathered information for her study by interviewing reporters and police experts in New York, Los Angeles, and other cities.

In introducing the reader to her research design, Lawrence combines two literatures: that of political communication and that of political science and public policy. Thus the social construction of the news is seen as part of political competition to designate and define public problems. She looks at the problem of police brutality through this social constructionist lense. Thus the social construction of public problems in the news allocates resources in such a way as to benefit the owner of the problem. The political significance of the news is that it validates the view of reality of some players and marginalizes the reality of others. In the context of this study, the reality of the police bureaucracy is the one that is validated most frequently according to the data presented. One of the distinct disadvantages of nonofficials and grassroot groups is that they are rarely drawn upon as a primary news source by reporters. The major opportunity for such groups to present systemic critiques of the police occurs when an unplanned event such as the Rodney King incident takes place. Then the alternative reality will be presented. Accidental events have the potential to reshape the public policy dialogue surrounding a particular problem. As Lawrence points out in her extensive discussion of the Rodney King incident, the public dialogue ultimately led to the dismissal of Chief Gates in Los Angeles. However, empirical confirmation is presented that the official view of issues predominates. It is the exception to the rule to find the article with extensive systemic critiques of police departments.

A variety of factors limits the ability of the critics of police in having their criticism presented. Lawrence points out that generally these people will not present an alternative explanation to that presented by the police. The police critics will stress the unreasonableness of the police use of force but will generally not have data to substantiate claims of a recurring pattern of violence based on race or socioeconomic status of the victim. The police response involved preemptive damage control. Lawrence found that the police would assert that the suspects who were killed were uncooperative, combative, violent, or threatening. The official explanation involved individualizing the causation and denying that the brutality is patterned.

The official explanation is reinforced by the norm of journalistic professionalism. Lawrence points out that the beat system used by reporters involves the use of officials as a source of news. Those at the top of the large bureaucracies such as the police have a distinct advantage. The norm involves the notion that the views of officials should be presented in as unbiased a manner as possible. Thus the reporter will present the views of the police bureaucracy since the most competent news sources are perceived to be the official sources.

The prevailing public discourse of crime control also is cited as a significant limit on the critics of the police. The predominant public view is that crime is a problem of the moral failings of weak and deviant individuals. Swift punishment is seen as a necessary response for the society to deal effectively with the behavior of these deviant individuals.

Lawrence presents a typology of critical story cues that influence how use-of-force incidents are presented. Competing accounts of events are greatly influenced by families of the victim. The accounts of witnesses are very important. The race of the victim is also a very important cue since it engages the norm of media reformism. The King case presented a combination of these cues. Of course, the videotaping of the event was of particular importance. Generally, those alleging police brutality do not have the resources to present their views in such a manner as to be considered newsworthy, however.

The style of presentation in this book is very engaging. Lawrence cites much of the significant literature in criminal justice policy. Also, her analysis is presented in such a way that the reader can make inferential leaps between her theoretical analysis and events that are currently taking place in police operations. The reader obtains insight into the Louima and Diallo incidents. When official explanations of such incidents do not involve a systemic analysis of the behavior, one might expect additional incidents such as these since the official explanation lacks a sanction for the behavior.

This book would be ideal for use in courses dealing with criminal justice policy, public policy, urban politics, and the media. It is written in a lively and interesting manner so that undergraduates should generally find it intriguing.

This reviewer would hope that Lawrence continues her work in this area. Specifically, her next book could look at political decision makers such as mayors and city council members to identify the relationship between media portray-

als of use-of-force incidents and the salience of the issue in the decision-making process of the political elite of a city.

Sizing Up the Senate: The Unequal Consequences of Equal Representation. By Frances E. Lee and Bruce I. Oppenheimer. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. 304p. \$48.00 cloth, \$17.00 paper.

Michael Bailey, Georgetown University

The principles of state-based representation in the Senate and "one person, one vote" reside comfortably, yet incongruously in the American political psyche. Few of us have lectured on the Senate without raising this point. We carry on about Wyoming and California and their equal number of Senators. Perhaps our lectures extend to discussion of policy issues: Would Clarence Thomas have been confirmed if the Senate were apportioned based on population? and so on. But seldom does the discussion go much further. And, strikingly, this has been true even in the academy. We have 1,001 ways to measure committee preferences, but we know relatively little about the effects of state-based representation in the Senate. Lee and Oppenheimer's book changes this state of affairs and offers an excellent account of the importance of state-based representation for the Senate and beyond.

The book is unflaggingly solid. The authors raise interesting questions and methodically parse them out and look to the data for answers. The opening section is on Senate apportionment in a historical perspective. Lee and Oppenheimer make the case that historical contingencies rather than functional design explain equal apportionment in the Senate. The strength here is not the novelty of the argument—for the main thrust is common in historical work—but the useful summary of the constitutional origins of the Senate. This provides helpful background for what is to come and, in fact, would provide excellent material for debate on the merits of the state-based representation in the Senate.

The next chapter discusses Senate apportionment and the representational experience. Do constituents in smaller states have different experiences with their Senators? Here, the authors show exactly what anyone would expect. Of course small-state Senators are more likely to know their constituents than large-state Senators. This kind of pattern emerges no matter how the data are sliced. But it is useful to know, rather than assert, this fact. And, what is more, the chapter makes our knowledge more specific: 38% of Delawarians had met Joe Biden, while only 3% of New Yorkers had met Al D'Amato. It is up to the reader to decide which state is better off.

Lee and Oppenheimer then turn to studying the effects of differential population on elections and fund-raising in the Senate. There are several interesting findings. Their statistical analysis indicates that small-state elections tend to be less competitive, but not because there is a larger incumbency advantage in them. This is fascinating in light of the earlier findings that small-state Senators have much closer personal ties to their constituents. What is the explanation for this? Elections are about differences and voters know that whomever they elect will have (or may already have) the close ties that the current Senator has. The authors also show that small-state Senators raise money much, much more easily. There appears to be a pretty fixed amount of PAC money that can be raised by all Senators. This ripe fruit falls to the ground easily and small-state Senators need little more to run effective campaigns. Large-state Senators need much more and so spend their time on ladders high up in the trees, struggling for every last contribution they can pull in. Little wonder, then, that Senate leaders hail from small states.

Representation in the Senate also matters for policy outcomes. The authors argue that policies are designed to benefit a majority of states, not necessarily a majority of House districts. This translates into more spending for small states. This effect is particularly strong for distributive programs, in part because, as the authors showed earlier, small-state Senators tend toward service-oriented committees rather than policy committees. For formula-based programs the advantages to small states accrue due to Senate efforts to ensure that any population-based funding formula sets a minimum level for each state, in effect ensuring disproportionate spending in small states.

In summary, this book succeeds at its stated goal of attracting attention to an important and understudied topic. They show that even though Madison has generally been right that politics has seldom divided big states against small states, the unequal power of small states in the Senate has, nonetheless, had important implications. As the authors say, state-based representation in the Senate "leaves no aspect of the institution untouched" (p. 225). Now that politics may be dividing more along state size lines (consider the famous red-blue divide in the electoral map of the 2000 presidential election), these questions will only increase in importance.

It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the United States. By Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks. New York: W. W. Norton, 2000. 379p. \$26.95 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

Martin Shefter, Cornell University

Although It Didn't Happen Here addresses a rather familiar question—Why is there no socialism in the United States?—this is an exciting book. Its central chapters discuss the major explanations for American "exceptionalism" that have been proposed over the past century—namely, the distinctive character of U.S. political institutions, the ethnic heterogeneity of the nation's population, the divisions between labor unions and the socialist party, the sectarianism of American socialists, the repression that radicals encountered, etc. Political scientists will find the topics of many of these chapters familiar too.

I say that the "topics" of these chapters will be familiar—rather than their "contents"—because there is much that even knowledgeable readers will learn from this book. Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks are extraordinarily erudite and productive: The list of their books at the beginning of this volume runs to 27 titles. Even more impressive than the breadth of the authors' knowledge of political and labor history is the ingenuity of the comparisons and contrasts they use to assess the various theories of American "exceptionalism" discussed in their book.

For example, Theodore Lowi suggests that federalism explains the absence of socialism in the United States. He argues that in the United States, "[e]ven as the economy became national... the states remained the source and focus of politics. There was, in effect, no national pattern of law, legitimation, or repression to confirm a socialist critique ("Why Is There No Socialism in the United States? A Federal Analysis," in Robert T. Golembiewski and Aaron Wildavsky, eds., The Costs of Federalism 1984, p. 37.)

Lipset and Marks deploy both cross-national and withincountry comparisons to challenge Lowi's argument. They note that federalism did not preclude socialism in Australia. The several British colonies on the Australian continent— Queensland, Victoria, New South Wales, etc.—formed a national government only in 1901. And the new national government of Australia was granted less power than the national government of the United States. In other words, in Australia there was less of a "national pattern of law, legitimation or repression to confirm a socialist critique" than in the United States. Yet, contrary to what Lowi's argument would lead one to expect, within a decade of its founding, the Australian national government came under the control of the world's first labor administration.

Lipset and Marks also note that federalism enabled a number of socialistic or quasi-socialistic political movements to come to power at the provincial or state level in both Canada and the United States. In Saskatchewan, the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation and its successor, the New Democratic Party, controlled the provincial government for all but a dozen years from 1944 to the present; in British Columbia, for all but a half-dozen years between 1972 and 1999; and in Manitoba, for all but four years between 1967 and 1986. In the United States, the "semi-social democratic" Nonpartisan League (NPL) gained power in North Dakota in 1918. Upon gaining power, the NPL established state credit banks and state-owned grain terminals, flour mills, packing houses, and cold storage plants. Similar movements won elections in Oklahoma, Minnesota, Wisconsin, California, Oregon, and Washington in the 1920s and 1930s. In other words, federalism did not preclude socialism in Australia, Canada, or even the United States. Although socialists never won control at the national level in either Canada or the United States, in both nations federalism made it possible for socialistic or quasi-socialistic political forces to exercise substantial governmental power in those regions of the country where their support was concentrated.

By analyzing arcane cases—cases that, they readily acknowledge, may be extreme or deviant-Lipset and Marks do more than simply challenge the arguments of other social scientists; often they are able to refine these arguments. For example, it has often been suggested that radicals found it difficult to unite the American working class behind the doctrine of socialism, because many industrial workers were recent immigrants to the United States. But what was it about these immigrants that made them deaf to socialist appeals? Does the very fact that they had moved from their home countries to the United States indicate that immigrants believed America to be a land of opportunity and, hence, were not receptive to socialism? Or was it that the linguistic and cultural divisions between immigrants and other Americans were more salient than whatever economic problems they shared with their new neighbors?

Lipset and Marks assess these and other possibilities by analyzing deviant cases—cities where socialism was unusually strong. The socialist party dominated politics in Milwaukee for a longer period of time than in any other large American city. During the half-century of socialist strength (1910–1960), Milwaukee had a large population of first- and secondgeneration immigrants, but the great majority of them came from a single country, namely, Germany. That is, despite its large immigrant population, Milwaukee was fairly homogeneous ethnically. This suggests to Lipset and Marks that divisions flowing from ethnic heterogeneity, more than impediments stemming from immigration itself, created problems for socialists. They note that several other cities where socialists were unusually strong—such as Minneapolis, Minnesota, and Reading, Pennsylvania—had large, but ethnically homogeneous, immigrant populations. Surely, there are few sources to which political scientists can turn for an illuminating discussion of interactions among socialist parties, labor unions, and local singing groups in Milwaukee, Minneapolis, and Reading other than this volume by Seymour Martin Lipset and Gary Marks!

Rediscovering the Democratic Purposes of Education. Edited by Lorraine M. McDonnell, P. Michael Timpane, and Roger Benjamin. Lawrence: The University Press of Kansas, 2000. 280p. \$40 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Christine Rossell, Boston University

The public discourse on the purpose of education is dominated by functionalist or human capital theory, which argues that the primary purpose of schools is to impart to citizens skills that will be needed to compete and win in the U.S. marketplace and the global economy. This edited volume attempts to correct this imbalance by emphasizing civics education and political socialization as important functions of schools.

The nine chapters are authored by distinguished scholars who share a common concern for the scholarly neglect of schooling's political dimensions. There are three sections: (1) "The Philosophy and Practice of Civic Education," which contains five chapters on the historical origins of civic education and its current practice; (2) "Approaches to Studying the Politics of Education," which contains three chapters on school governance; and (3) "Focusing on Democratic Purposes: Implications for Education Policy," which contains one chapter on the extent to which school practices or strategies to increase educational equity have succeeded.

McDonnell argues in the introductory chapter that a strong case can be made for emphasizing the democratic purposes of education because we are at a low point in political participation in American civic life and perhaps in a crisis of legitimacy with regard to schools and government institutions. As McDonnell herself points out, however, it is easier to make the case that the current low levels of political participation and civic identity require a greater emphasis on schooling's democratic purposes than on demonstrating that such attention will solve or ameliorate these problems. McDonnell nevertheless presents evidence that suggests that it would.

This introductory chapter is followed by a chapter on the history of civic education by Lorraine Pangle and Thomas Pangle, another on that topic by Carl Kaestle, a chapter on the importance of civic education by Amy Gutman, and a chapter by Pamela Conover and Donald Searing on current levels of political socialization and knowledge among high school students. This first section, in short, focuses on the civic education or political socialization of American students.

The next section, "Approaches to Studying the Politics of Education," deals with the politics of school governance. The three chapters that comprise the section, one by Terry Moe, another by Ames March and Johan Olsen, and the third by McDonnell and Stephen Weatherford, are interesting and thoughtful analyses of the institutional structure of education and the process of school politics, but this book may attempt to do too much by including them. Without them, the book is about the democratic purposes of education—how and why schools teach students to be citizens and the extent to which school practices facilitate that. With them, the book is not only about the democratic purposes of education, but also about school governance and politics, that is, the democratic functioning of education—a much broader, and I think too broad, topic.

From my perspective as an empiricist, the most interesting chapters are Conover and Searing's "A Political Socialization Perspective," in section 1, and Hochschild and Scovronick's "Democratic Education and the American Dream," in section 3. The former presents research findings on what we know about students' political knowledge and the latter presents evidence on the extent to which schools, and school practices, achieve educational equity.

Conover and Searing detail the findings of a study of 15 year olds in four kinds of communities across the United States. They found that most students lacked a clear sense of their future selves as adult citizens and tended to believe that being a good citizen requires only that one obey the law, vote, and act patriotically.

What is especially interesting for our understanding of how to politically socialize students is their analysis of the Hispanic community in San Antonio, Texas. There students lived in the midst of grassroots community organizing and were socialized into a citizen ethos that stressed the importance of community ties and loyalty to the nation. In a conscious effort to make its citizens into "super-Americans," this community instilled a deeper understanding of citizenship than did the other three communities. From these findings, the authors derive several sensible and creative recommendations on improving civic education so that students engage in active, rather than passive, political learning.

The final chapter, by Hochschild and Scovronick, skillfully summarizes the research on the extent to which specific educational strategies—school desegregation, equitable school funding, distinctive group treatment, school choice, and tracking-achieve educational equity, another democratic purpose of education. There are, unfortunately, several significant omissions in the works cited, including a number of important studies that do not fit the "politically correct" position, although the authors do note in the text that such positions exist. Their overall conclusion seems to be that these reforms have not achieved much educational equity, which they typically blame on administrative incompetence or venality or lack of public support. I would argue, however, that there is a serious possibility that we ask too much of the schools and the reforms. For one thing, in the first 18 years of life, children are in school only 13% of their waking hours. For another, although racial differences in achievement can theoretically be eliminated, class differences in achievement cannot in a world in which social class is not randomly assigned to individuals but is, at least in part, a result of differences in intellectual ability as defined by an elite. Indeed, our means of measuring intellectual ability-standardized achievement tests, years of schooling, and prestige of school-magnify rather than reduce racial and social class differences and are constantly refined to maintain these differences. Under such conditions, no reform should be expected to have more than a small impact on eliminating inequity, even before taking into consideration the possible incompetence of administrators and lack of public support for educational reforms.

Overall the research and theory presented in this volume are impressive, and the recommendations sensible and creative, but it seems to me that another very important question was not given proper attention. How do you get educators to care about teaching students to be better citizens when they are constantly criticized for low test scores and for failing to prepare students for a global economy? Perhaps, more importantly, how do you get the public to care about civic education when they feel that students are not attaining the skills needed for success in the marketplace? It strikes me that the public must be properly educated about the actual quality of American education-for example, the facts that standardized achievement tests are designed so that only half of all students can be reading at or above grade level no matter how excellent American education is and that not only are international tests misleading given the differences in population and curriculums, but there is no evidence of any connection between economic productivity and technological innovation, on the one hand, and a country's average score on an international test, on the other. Perhaps civic education will rise to the place of importance it should occupy in a

country with an abysmally low rate of political participation and knowledge when the public is made aware of these facts.

The Political Party Matrix: The Persistence of Organization. By J. P. Monroe. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 156p. \$49.50 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Andrew J. Taylor, North Carolina State University

It used to be an axiom in political science that American parties were weak. Now we are not so sure. During the 1980s and 1990s, the profession produced a great deal of theoretical and empirical work suggesting that U.S. political parties were "resurgent." J. P. Monroe's book, *The Political Party Matrix: The Persistence of Organization*, provides an interesting twist on the new literature. It argues that party change is the result not so much of strengthening but of adaptation.

Specifically, Monroe uses interviews with campaign consultants, party chairs, and congressional and state legislative staffers from southern California conducted in the early 1990s to argue that political scientists have missed critical characteristics of the contemporary American party. Trained to apply rigidly the "bureaucratic model" to our thinking about parties, we inevitably see them currently as highly decentralized and amorphous institutions. This infers that they must be ineffective at accomplishing their objectives. Monroe offers a different way to conceptualize the party as organization, suggesting that it should be understood "in terms of the activities it performs, using this as a guide to its structure" (p. 29). In other words, we should utilize a party's critical functions and not least what E. E. Schattschneider considered the raison d'être, that is, winning elections—to drive our thinking about its physical appearance.

This leads Monroe to believe that "the parties' adaptive properties continue to make them effective agents in the political system" (p. ix). They are still tremendously proficient at electoral politics, but the personnel who undertake this task, because of our strict adherence to the bureaucratic model, are not conventionally thought of as being within the party. Consequently, political scientists incorrectly conclude that parties no longer dominate elections. According to Monroe, the dramatic rise of office budgets and member salaries at both the state legislative and the congressional levels has meant that the personal staff of lawmakers are the parties' new source of labor in the pursuit of electoral victory. These professional staff should therefore be thought of as an "informal" component of the party.

Monroe's data show that legislative staff form a candidate "farm league" for the party and work regularly on election activities for their patron's partisan colleagues as well as for the boss herself. The author also reveals that legislative staff cooperate with counterparts in the same party on casework, political issues, and outreach to community groups. This is collaborative work on behalf of the party undertaken by individuals generally believed to be "hired guns" working for self-interested and individualistic politicians.

The book's central problem is the theoretical wrapping in which the author ensconces the empirical work. It is simply too glittery and adorned with too nice a bow for its modest contents. Monroe uses a long and detailed discussion of the party resurgence literature—complete with excursions into comparative politics and the puzzling debate about how party organizations can have strengthened as the electorate has dealigned—as his starting point and clearly believes his work is a significant contribution to this important development in American politics. But when it comes down to it, interviews with and surveys of political staff in the Los Angeles area cannot really move the debate sur-

rounding such "big" questions along very far. This same criticism can be aimed at the book's title. *The Political Party Matrix*—whatever that really means—is too grandiose for this study.

There are a few other theoretical problems, too. First, by choosing to focus on California, Monroe cannot really reject his null hypothesis that the personal staff of professional legislators are not replacing traditional personnel and organizational components in the performance of electoral functions for parties. California state legislators, with the exception of their counterparts in New York, have more personal staff than any other state legislators in the country. Moreover, because of the state's Progressive tradition, California parties are weak in the bureaucratic sense. It is no wonder, then, that Monroe found what he did in California. But for this development to be important, we need to see it elsewhere.

Second, this is essentially a study of party response and adaptation. As such it needs to describe the political party at points  $t_1$  and  $t_2$ , prove that it looks different at these two times, and then show that it has responded in the interim to some kind of exogenous stimulus. Monroe does a super job of showing us what the party looks like at  $t_2$ , but there is only a brief survey of the literature of the party at  $t_1$  (the "Golden Age of Politics" or his "party benchmark") and the external element (the modernization of politics, including the rise of the media and professionalization of legislative and campaign staff). In addition, there is so much distance between  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  (about 100 years) that any adaptation or change is inevitable. Perhaps the 1950s would have provided a better "benchmark" to reveal the magnitude of the parties' present adaptation.

It is the empirical part of the book that is the real contribution. As Monroe says, "The incumbents' enterprises-in-office, and more specifically the linkages created and maintained between them, are reshaping the political process in profound ways" (p. 97). He makes a strong case that the party is still doing the heavy lifting in campaigns, it is just doing it with different people. The next step is to take this argument further. A detailed look at the collaborative and partisan work undertaken by congressional staffers in Washington would be beneficial, for example. Such activity includes working with the parties' campaign committees, supporting and organizing fundraisers, and coordinating with presidential campaignssomething that has taken people around the country; recall the Republican staffers in Florida protesting recounts and wearing their "Sore-Loserman" buttons. Furthermore, the Bob Squiers, Frank Luntzs, and Richard Viguries of the world show that self-described "consultants" have become integral and permanent components of the political party. Such people also need to be brought into a more complete conceptualization of the new party structure.

Still, there is interesting material here for scholars of American political parties and Monroe's argument is important. The book is worth a look, even if its contents may have been more effectively presented in two or three journal articles.

Building a Legislative-Centered Public Administration: Congress and the Administrative State, 1946–1999. By David H. Rosenbloom. Tuscaloosa: The University of Alabama Press, 2000. 199p. \$34.95 cloth.

John S. Robey, University of Texas at Brownsville

In 1946, Congress passed the Administrative Procedure and Legislative Reorganization Act. In this legislation, Congress purposefully provided for itself a prominent role in the administration of the federal government. David Rosenbloom writes that the "... purpose of this book is to explain how and why Congress adopted that role, its underlying coherence, [and] its durability . . . for seemingly ever-increasing congressional involvement in federal administration... (p. ix). The author maintains that Congress was uneasy about this endeavor but was forced by the "federal administrative state" to reposition itself. Some even believed that Congress' place in the constitutional scheme-of-things had been altered. For example, it was asserted that Congress was abandoning constitutional principle if it allowed unelected governmental administrators to make rules (i.e., administrative law). The 1946 legislation has resulted in a merger between Congress and the federal bureaucracy. The author contends that federal agencies became "extensions" of Congress' authority to make law. In addition, this legislation resulted in the view that the administration of the bureaucracy was no longer to be seen as the private preserve of the executive branch of government. The concept of "legislative-centered public administration" is used to describe the results of this legislation.

Congress very reluctantly accepted the rise of technocrats. The growing complexity of many public policies gave it no choice but to share policy-making power. Rule making became a common way for Congress to delegate to federal agencies the authority to make policy. To retain some control, however, Congress provided that it would have supervisory authority over many of these agencies on an ongoing basis. The result of this decision has been "legislative-centered public administration." The cooperative effort by legislators and federal administrators to make policy has not always been peaceful. There has been conflict, for example, over the administrator's values of efficiency and economy and political/legislative needs for openness and responsiveness. The author maintains that the critics of Congressional oversight wrongfully charge that Congress "micromanages." To demonstrate the development of legislativecentered public administration, Rosenbloom presents the reader with an analysis of an alternative view of policy making, or what he calls the "legislative process by other means.

Federal agencies had traditionally been looked upon as the implementers of public policy. They were allowed some discretion in the implementation of law, but they were not policy makers. With the passage of the 1946 legislation, there evolved a "... collective understanding by Congress that because agencies exercise legislative powers to regulate the economy and society, they should be considered as adjuncts" (p. 21). It followed that Congress should specify how "... legislation by other means—that is administration—should work" (p. 21). The author defends legislative-centered public administration as "... the only deliberate answer the nation has tried..." (p. 155) to answer the question, What is the correct role for Congress in the administration of the federal government?

Professor Rosenbloom is critical of those who view public administration as a "business endeavor" that should be controlled by the President and his cabinet. He contends that one supporter of this view was Al Gore, who championed liberating agencies from Congressional "micromanagement" in his National Performance Review. Legislative-centered public administration rejects the politics-administration dichotomy. Rosenbloom writes, "There is no politics-administration dichotomy. Nor can constitutional structure and procedure be separated from administration. Public administration includes legislative functions..." (p. 58). Legislative-centered public administration also views governmental oversight more positively. The "executive-centered" public management model viewed much public reporting as

time-consuming, inefficient, and meddlesome. Legislative-centered administration sees legislative intervention and reporting requirements "...in the federal agency decision making process as producing, rather than encumbering, proper results" (p. 102).

Rosenbloom contends that one of the results of legislativecentered administration has been the adoption of legislative values (i.e., openness, public accountability, representativeness, and responsiveness) by many public agencies. Another result has been the transfer of much constituency work from Congress to the agencies. When the Legislative Reorganization Act was passed, some members of Congress complained that three-fourths of their time was spent running errands for constituents. To solve this problem, Congress transferred "...some particularly unproductive forms of constituency service and infrastructure decision making to the agencies" (p. 105). The purpose of this was to make Congress more efficient and to strengthen it as an institution. Professor Rosenbloom contends that it has worked so well that, over time, the role of the agencies regarding constituency service has become even more important.

In the last chapter, the author provides a listing of the major principles of legislative-centered public administration (e.g., "administration involves legislative functions)" as well as an analysis of legislative-centered public administration and its relationship with the principle of separation of powers. He also ties together arguments that were made in previous chapters so that logical relationships and connections are made between the topics that were addressed.

This text contains an interesting and well-documented and reasoned analysis of the evolution of Congressional/federal agencies relationships for the last half of the twentieth century. The author skillfully presents the rationale for viewing the structure of the federal government from a less rigid perspective than the traditional executive-judicial-legislative point of view. Although the arguments are thoughtfully presented, none of the author's propositions is ever quantified or empirically tested in any way. This is a volume that should be of interest to a wide variety of academics and practitioners. Students of Congress, public administration, and public policy analysis, as well as scholars of modern public history, will all find the volume to be a valuable addition to their library. Those desiring a more rigorous (i.e., quantitative) analysis of the topics presented may wish to pass on the volume. It is recommended for those who value a fresh and well-reasoned descriptive analysis of an important aspect of the evolution of the modern administrative state.

The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton's Legacy in U.S. Politics. Edited by Steven E. Schier. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 304p. \$45.00.

Shirley Anne Warshaw, Gettysburg College

Steven E. Schier's latest book, *The Postmodern Presidency: Bill Clinton's Legacy in U.S. Politics*, provides a much-needed assessment of the Clinton presidency. Throughout the eight years of the Clinton administration, surprisingly few scholarly books were written that either assessed presidential performance or examined the political implications of the Clinton presidency. The few books that did emerge from the Clinton era focus on impeachment and on Mrs. Clinton, most in a less than scholarly way. Steven Schier has begun to fill this scholarly void by putting together an edited volume that examines both performance and political repercussions of the Clinton presidency. This volume of 12 articles offers

perspectives on the domestic, international, and economic policies of the administration. The contributors are all well-known scholars in presidential research and all have written significantly within their fields (i.e., domestic policy, international relations, electoral politics, etc.). Schier's choice of contributors is excellent and ensures substantial command of the subject matter within the chapters.

Schier approaches the Clinton presidency from the view-point of politics as he seeks to explain whether the Clinton presidency had an impact "on the future of American politics and public policy" (p. 15). Each of the essays in the volume offers a varying perspective, with no clear consensus reached. The volume is divided into four broad parts. The first part includes three essays on the institutional presidency and its impact on economic and foreign policy. Following the institutional presidency chapters are three essays on the mobilization of public opinion to support presidential positions. Three more chapters are devoted to electoral politics, and the final three chapters provide a rather broad look at "the culture war" in which Clinton engaged, as Schier calls it (p. 16).

The theme of politics is examined partly through the lens of Steven Skowronek's theme in The Politics Presidents Make (1993), in which the argument is made that presidents try to construct some "new political arrangements that can stand the test of legitimacy with other institutions" of government (pp. 20-21). Schier asks whether Clinton was able to construct new political relationships as a means to forge new institutional relationships. In other words, could Clinton construct new relationships with Congress, with state and local government, with the Democratic Party, and with other nations that were productive to his policy goals? The question is particularly relevant given the constraints of 12 years of Republican control of the White House (Reagan-Bush) in which smaller government, increased state programmatic control, and greater defense spending were the watchwords. Schier's answer is yes, Clinton was flexible and able to alter his governing style and his political relationships as the climate demanded. He was forced, in his first two years in office, to construct a political coalition that moved his domestic and economic programs forward, as defined by his 1992 campaign. During the remainder of his term, as the Republicans gained control of Congress, he was forced to develop completely new political alignments and new policy goals within the confines of such new alignments. Thus Schier neatly provides a broad array of substantive support for his central theme that Clinton was able to move policy forward in spite of a series of political roadblocks. These roadblocks were overcome as Clinton constructed variations on his policy positions to satisfy the shifting political coalitions he dealt with throughout his eight years in office.

I have two comments on the direction this book takes. First, not all of the 12 essays provide a clear and concise statement of Schier's theme. Some of the essays seem to be pulled from other venues and incorporated into the volume. It would be helpful if each essay established quite succinctly how Clinton's political relationships influenced the policies at hand. Second, the final section, on culture wars, seems somewhat out of character with the theme of the book. While racial issues and gender issues are an important part of the Clinton policy legacy, there is little within the three essays on these subjects in this volume to tie them to the other chapters. Perhaps they should have been incorporated into the domestic policy section—but even then there appears to be a lack of continuity within the thematic base.

In summary, I would commend this book for audiences on the presidency and American politics in general, with regard both to leadership and to institutional issues. Schier has provided a well-grounded analysis of this rare two-term presidency, concluding that Clinton regularly refocused his broad goals within a changing political climate. Schier also notes that Clinton never lost his core policy goals in spite of broad refocusing and thus meets Skowronek's test of a preemptive president. This volume should spark considerable discussion of Clinton's meeting the test of a preemptive president, as other volumes seek to agree or disagree with Schier's central theme.

Constitutional Process: A Social Choice Analysis of Supreme Court Decision Making. By Maxwell L. Stearns. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2000. 420p. \$65.00.

Timothy M. Hagle, University of Iowa

A not uncommon complaint concerning social choice models is that they tend to assume away everything of interest, leaving a model with little relation to the real world. The usual response is that one must start with the basic elements of a problem before moving to more complex and inclusive models. Unfortunately, few social choice models applied to legal studies have achieved sufficient complexity to be of significant value. Maxwell Stearns recognizes this problem and, in *Constitutional Process*, systematically presents a comprehensive social choice model and applies it to a complex legal doctrine.

The process of introducing, explaining, and applying the model makes Constitutional Process an integrated book whose six main chapters form a definite progression that must be followed from beginning to end. The introductory chapter presents the problem: cases that are considered anomalies in terms of legal doctrine. After a detailed description of these cases, chapter 2 presents the basics of social choice theory. Stearns starts with fundamental notions of rationality, progresses to the voting paradox, Condorcet winners, and three fallacies of social choice, and ends with a presentation of Arrow's theorem. In Part II (chapters 3 and 4), Stearns first examines several individual cases in the context of social choice. The goal is to identify and examine the decisional rules used by the justices to cope with, for example, potential intransitivities and issue multidimensionality. He terms this "static constitutional process." Chapter 4 carries the analysis forward to the consideration of an entire legal doctrine, which he terms "dynamic constitutional process." Stearns uses the legal doctrine of standing to illustrate the social choice model he is developing. In Part III (chapters 5 and 6), he provides a fuller examination of standing and tests his social choice model using the standing cases of the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.

It is important to emphasize that Stearns does test his model. He approaches social choice from a scientific viewpoint. For social choice analysis to be of value to legal scholars as well as political scientists, it must explain more than current constitutional or political approaches to court decisions. By beginning with detailed descriptions of cases considered anomalies under prevailing constitutional doctrine, he lays the groundwork for the later test of his model. He then works to expand our overall understanding of the Supreme Court and its decision-making process by explaining these cases in a social choice context.

Even so, there are some difficulties with the analysis. Stearns first faces a dilemma in how much weight to give the opinions written by the justices. Legal scholars may give great weight to the opinions, while political scientists may be more likely to see them as rationalizations for the justices' votes. Stearns recognizes this problem and indicates that although the opinions should be taken seriously, they nevertheless cannot be taken at face value. Despite this recognition of

the potentially self-serving nature of opinions, an argument can be made that Stearns relies a bit too heavily on them. Moreover, some of the anomalous cases may be the result of a somewhat selective reading of the opinions.

For example, Stearns' analysis of Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981), suggests that an anomaly occurs when one considers the two issues in the case: whether to apply a rational basis or a balancing test and whether evidence not considered by the Iowa legislature when drafting the regulation can be admitted at trial. On an issue-by-issue basis, Stearns argues, the regulation should have been upheld. Five of the justices thought rational basis to be the appropriate test, and a different six that the additional evidence should be allowed. These are the two conditions required for the regulation to have been upheld, and separate majorities supported each, but the regulation was overturned because only three justices took the position satisfying both conditions. Arguably, the perceived anomaly was the result of Justice Brennan's opinion, which suggests that the rational basis test is appropriate, but new evidence should not be allowed. On closer examination, however, one might be inclined to discount this interpretation of Justice Brennan's opinion. Although Justice Brennan mentions rationality twice, each instance is in relation to the purposes of the legislature. At the same time, Justice Brennan twice mentions that the Court must balance the burdens imposed on commerce with local benefits. Thus, one could read Justice Brennan's opinion as applying the rational basis test at one stage and the balancing test at another. Moreover, Justice Brennan also indicates that a third question to be asked is whether the regulation at issue is protectionist. If so—and he finds that it is—then even a balance in favor of local safety will not save it. Thus, rather than a bidimensional analysis that produces an anomaly, perhaps there are three dimensions to the case.

Similar criticisms could be raised regarding the approach to the other cases selected as anomalies, but such concerns do not significantly detract from Stearns' overall argument. His systematic analysis argues that cycling in individual cases is avoided by outcome voting (as opposed to issue voting). Although this sometimes produces doctrinal anomalies, these are minimized through the use of stare decisis. Stare decisis, in turn, invites ideological litigant path manipulation, which is minimized through the use of doctrines such as standing. In applying a social choice model to Supreme Court decision making, Stearns provides an explanation of the doctrines adopted to cope with vote cycling and related problems at several stages in the process. Those who study judicial politics have long recognized that the justices act strategically. Stearns has taken this a step further by demonstrating that not only do the justices act strategically, but they do so in ways that both avoid vote cycling problems and preserve the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's decision making.

From the Puritans to the Projects: Public Housing and Public Neighbors. By Lawrence J. Vale. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 460p. \$45.00.

R. Allen Hays, University of Northern Lowa

There is an unfortunate tendency for much public policy analysis to be ahistorical in its perspective. A program or policy is evaluated in terms of its success or failure in achieving its stated goals, and only the most immediate social, political, and economic factors are brought into the analysis to explain policy outcomes. In the case of public housing in the United States, an analysis of its failure to meet its stated goal of providing decent housing for the poor might lead us to blame (1) the federal government for poor design of the program,

(2) local governments for poor implementation, or (3) the recipients themselves for engaging in antisocial behavior that undermined the intent of the program.

Lawrence Vale's brilliant analysis of the development of public housing in Boston clearly reveals how limited and inaccurate such conclusions would be. To be sure, all of these actors have contributed to the problems of public housing, but Vale's work shows how their roles were played out in a much broader and deeper historical context, the roots of which can be traced to the earliest European settlers in North America. He shows that the failure of public housing is rooted in cultural attitudes toward the poor that have made it extremely difficult to develop rational and humane programs to meet their needs.

The central dilemma in dealing with the poor is what sort of aid society is obligated to provide them and who among them is most deserving of such aid. The individualistic values that support capitalism tell us that each individual is responsible for his/her economic fate and that each of us should evaluate his or her personal worth in terms of economic success. However, Americans have been reluctant to leave the poor entirely to their own devices for three reasons. The first two are pragmatic: (1) It is obvious that many people become poor for reasons not in their control (i.e., sickness, layoffs) and (2) chronically deprived persons trying desperately to survive may threaten social stability. The third reason is a moral imperative to help the less fortunate that is rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition.

Beginning with the Puritans who founded Boston, Vale traces the contradictions in public policy toward the poor that these conflicting values produced. Because he is dealing with housing, which necessarily involves the allocation of physical space, he focuses, in particular, on the spatial dimensions of the treatment of the poor. He argues that public housing, like the almshouses that preceded it, "encodes" society's conflicting attitudes in its distribution of physical space to the poor.

Vale tells us that in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Boston, as elsewhere in America, the poor were divided into two groups. The "deserving" poor (for example widows) were considered legitimate members of the community and were given relief in their own homes ("outdoor relief," in the terminology of the times). The "undeserving" poor (for example, itinerant laborers or alcoholics) were isolated in an almshouse ("indoor relief"), where they would not contaminate the rest of society. As Boston expanded, the almshouse was pushed farther and farther toward the periphery of the community, since no residents wanted to compromise their own social status by living next to it. In the mid-nineteenth century, almshouses took on another responsibility, that of "reforming" the poor through work and discipline, in hopes of returning them to society as productive workers.

As another antecedent to public housing, Vale traces the development of environmental and architectural determinism in American values. From Thomas Jefferson's belief in the virtue of the yeoman farmer to the Homestead Act's creation of individual plots of land for settlers, Americans have tended to assume that where one lives shapes how one lives. This idea influenced the development of the residential rings that grew around American cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Single-family houses located on individual plots of land were viewed as encouraging positive family values. At the same time, however, living in such areas was also seen as a reward for families who already possessed the values these developments were said to encourage. People who deviated from these norms were considered unacceptable neighbors.

The private housing industry fought long and hard to keep the federal government out of the provision of housing, but when the Great Depression finally provided sufficient impetus for the creation of a federal program, its implementation clearly reflected the values Vale describes. It its early years in Boston, occupancy of public housing was seen as a reward to be given only to the most deserving poor. Careful screening of applicants was aimed at keeping out "undesirables," and many public housing complexes were sought-after residences for people of modest income. Architects tried to design public housing in ways they thought would further enhance the virtue of those living there.

Vale's account goes on to show how the role of public housing began to change after World War II. The rapid growth of suburbia created affordable housing for many of the white working-class families that had once occupied public housing. Moreover, the massive destruction of low-income neighborhoods by urban renewal flooded public housing with the more desperately poor, and screening of applicants ceased. Finally, low-income African Americans, excluded from the suburbs by discrimination, became increasingly ghettoized in public housing. In the face of these changes, public housing ceased to be a reward for the deserving poor and became a reservation for people considered undesirable by the rest of society. This new reservation status contributed greatly to its decline, to the point where many public housing projects are now being demolished.

Vale is clearly critical of the way the poor have been treated in American society, but if his analysis has a flaw, it is that he does not articulate an alternative vision of how the housing needs of the poor might have been addressed more justly. I am not suggesting that he should have provided "policy recommendations" for that is clearly beyond the scope of a historical work. Rather, the articulation of an alternative set of values that would result in more just treatment of the poor as legitimate members of society would have made it clearer what yardstick he was using to measure the failings of the policies that did emerge.

On balance, however, Vale's work is an extremely insightful historical analysis that deepens our understanding of how flawed public policies emerge. It well deserves the award it received from the Urban Affairs Association as the Best Book in Urban Politics of the Year.

**Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives.** By Gregory Wawro. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 193p. \$39.50 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Sean M. Theriault, University of Texas at Austin

Why would any legislator in the U.S. House of Representatives invest the time and energy to pass good public policy? This simple question drives Gregory Wawro's investigation of legislative entrepreneurship, which he defines as "invest[ing] time, staff, and other resources to acquire knowledge of particular policy areas, draft[ing] legislation addressing issues in those areas, and shepherd[ing] their proposals through the legislative process by building and maintaining coalitions" (p. 2). His introduction and description of the puzzle are exemplary. His answer, unfortunately, is wanting.

Wawro finds either nonexistent or weak results when he investigates the relationship between constituents and legislative entrepreneurs. Again, he reports nonfindings for the relationship between political action committee campaign contributions and legislative entrepreneurship. Only in the chapter where he investigates the connection between advancement in either political parties or committees are legislative entrepreneurs rewarded. When representatives need to fill committee or party leadership positions, Wawro finds that they turn systematically more often to legislative entrepreneurs. This robust finding is consistent across parties.

To introduce the subject of legislative entrepreneurship, Wawro describes, among others, Representative Dick Armey's early legislative accomplishments. In the conclusion, he returns to Armey's career to show, anecdotally, how his investigation rings true with our current political situation. Throughout the book, Wawro stays true to the question and politics as practiced in modern America. As such, his book—even when describing the minutia of statistical procedures—is an enjoyable and provocative read.

Chapter 6 most forcefully illustrates this strength. After completing the more rigorous statistical analysis, Wawro analyzes his theory and results in light of the Republican takeover in 1994. Again, anecdotally, he shows how legislative entrepreneurship can account for party and committee leader selection. That his argument works under a different regime is important; however, the most impressive thing about this chapter is Wawro's concern for the real-world application of his argument.

Wawro's question and his concern for explaining political realities are the book's biggest strength. Its biggest weakness is the nonfindings that pervade most of the tables. Wawro is careful to embed his study in the long tradition of explaining congressional behavior by starting with the assumption made popular by David Mayhew (1975), in *Congress: The Electoral Connection*, that members of Congress are singleminded seekers of reelection. Yet when he explores the connection between reelection and legislative entrepreneurship, he comes up shooting mostly blanks.

Three explanations could account for the absence of a relationship between reelection and entrepreneurship. First, quite simply, there is no relationship between the two. Second, the relationship is confounding and contradictory. In sketching out his argument, Wawro outlines two arguments with opposite predictions. Constituents could either punish legislative entrepreneurs for taking controversial stands and trading off case work with legislation (àla Fiorina, in *Congress: Keystone to the Washington Establishment*, 1977) or reward them for being important legislative players. These two explanations could cancel each other out by being equally powerful and offsetting.

Third, Wawro's operationalization of legislative entrepreneurship or the specification of his multivariate regressions may be inadequate to uncover the true relationship. With regard to the former, his comprehensive tables and extensive footnotes indicate that he considered many other functional forms. If a positive relationship between entrepreneurship and reelection exists—as I suspect—the nonfinding culprit must be the operationalization of legislative entrepreneurship.

Rather than pan Wawro for his measure of entrepreneurship, I praise him for putting something on the table. He develops an "entrepreneurship scales score" based on five independent measures: the average numbers of cosponsors, leadership cosponsors, titles, and index terms for each member's introduced bills and policy knowledge scores based on the number of testimonies the member has in committees. Admittedly, his measure is not perfect; but it provides congressional scholars with a starting point to quantify and to analyze, rigorously, the rather complex concept of "legislative entrepreneurship."

Early on in the book, Wawro explains that his investigation is going to be concerned with legislative entrepreneurship as an independent variable. This direct approach leaves unanswered, perhaps, some of the most interesting questions. With null findings on the consequences of entrepreneurship, an investigation of the causes becomes all that more important. If part of that answer leads us to the representative's district (àla Fenno's *Home Style*, 1978), we might begin to discover a more complete answer to Wawro's question.

In the end, the reader is asked to believe that legislative entrepreneurship is worth it for members because it increases their probability of obtaining committee and party leadership positions. A more complete examination would, in turn, impact this finding with the propensity of securing reelection. If this connection is true, what would propel some member to eschew more traditional reelection activities (such as gaining pork and servicing constituent case work) to engage in entrepreneurship? I look forward to reading part II of this research program, whether from Wawro's pen or someone else's.

The demand for a book to be both path breaking and conclusive is too high. Wawro's contributes mightily to the first of these. Legislative Entrepreneurship in the U.S. House of Representatives is a must read for anyone doing research on Congress. Although he does not resolve many major debates in the field of Congressional research, Wawro's evidence certainly impacts some of the most important debates about the institutions of Congress. Wawro's clear thinking and writing make this a good read also for those doing sophisticated quantitative methods—perhaps it is even better for those just beginning more formal training in econometrics. His multivariate analysis tool chest-including probits, instrumental variables, simultaneous equations, maximum likelihood equations, and ordered probits—provides quality examples of modifications and alternatives to ordinary least squares (OLS). He is careful to explain why he employs these various corrections or alternatives to OLS.

Wawro's findings are important for all of American politics and political science at large, but the preponderance of inconclusive findings probably makes reading an article version of his argument both cheaper and a more efficient use of time for those not explicitly interesting in congressional questions.

Racialized Coverage of Congress: The News in Black and White. By Jeremy Zilber and David Niven. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 160p. \$60.00.

C. Richard Hofstetter, San Diego State University

Jeremy Zilber and David Niven bolster a brief but cogent argument with evidence that news coverage of Congress has been "racialized" to the detriment of African-American congressmen and congresswomen, that African-American members of Congress are less favorably portrayed, less likely to be associated with a diverse agenda, and portrayed as more marginal than Caucasian members, factors other than race being equal (p. 90). By implication, the argument extends to all minority political activists and public officials. It also implies that constituencies represented by African-American politicians are greatly disadvantaged in the political process.

Written in an engaging style and using a multimethod approach, the study presents data from several perspectives and purports to show how coverage works against the personal and political interests of African-American members of Congress. Noting that the existence of dramatic racial differences between whites and African Americans in public opinion and political power poses a problem in America, the authors argue that the news media have contributed to the situation. News media "racialize" coverage of African-American politicians by nearly always highlighting race and emphasizing how they differ from white counterparts. Zilber and Niven organize the book around three themes: (1) the extent of news racialization concerning members of Congress, (2) the causes of racialized news coverage, and (3) the effects of racialization.

Content analysis of 1998 news coverage of three groups of members of Congress was conducted: 20 African-American members of Congress, 20 white Congressmen with "similar ideology" (liberal) and service, and 20 white Congressmen selected to represent the entire Congress who tend toward conservative and Republican dispositions (pp. 18–23). Up to 10 articles (N=2524) "focusing on" the 60 members of Congress from major newspapers were selected for analysis during 1993–1999. When more than 10 articles about a Congressman appeared, 20% but no fewer than 10 were randomly selected.

Analysis revealed that no large differences in news coverage appeared among the three groups in number, length, or placement of articles (p. 23), but coverage of race was a different matter. The race of African-American members was stressed consistently compared to the white groups, whether it was mentioned in connection to the member or about an issue position implying that African American politicians are concerned solely with African American issues and constituents, rather than national issues and collective concerns. Coverage is also more locally oriented, failing to link members with national and international issues or with bases of power and leadership roles in Congress, and considerably more negative in tone

Zilber and Niven conducted interviews with press secretaries and content analyzed member web sites to examine how members present themselves and the concerns they wish to stress. Despite common aspirations in how members wanted to be covered by the media, press secretaries for African-American members were much more likely to report unfavorable treatment, for instance, not being taken seriously, ignoring actions, and negative stereotyping, at the hands of the press than press secretaries for other members (p. 54). However, African American's web sites were much more likely to highlight civil rights, education, human rights, and poverty.

Drawing data from two survey samples of reporters who cover Congress, one of 100 political reporters and another of 10 reporters who were intensively interviewed, Zilber and Niven found support for a "distribution effect" that influences the content of what is reported about African-American members of Congress and may be a prime mover in racialization. The low number of African-American members of Congress influences news coverage; the commonly held view of disparity in race between reporters and members does not. Reporters from areas with few African Americans provide less favorable coverage (p. 91). Lack of familiarity may breed an unfavorable image of African-American members of Congress, if not contempt.

Analyses of 1994, 1996, and 1998 NES survey data from Congressional districts in which the 60 sampled politicians reside provide support for a "racial priming" hypothesis that white voters provide higher approval for Caucasian candidates, while African-American voters provide equal approval for African-American and Caucasian candidates. These dispositions parallel racialized coverage that incumbents receive bolstering the image of Caucasian politicians but undermining the image of African-American candidates, thus working to the detriment of African Americans who challenge Caucasian opponents (p. 102).

Zilber and Niven conclude that reports of racial issues coupled with the racial identities of African-American candidates alienate Caucasian voters and help to keep African-American politicians out of higher office (p. 113). The very sensitivity to diversity issues that appears in news coverage makes the racialized coverage worse. News will improve only when racial identification of minorities is reduced. They recommend that reporters permit politicians to speak for themselves rather than over interpret positions and that politicians should selectively punish reporters who identify race when unwarranted.

This thin volume by no means exhausts research on the question of adequate coverage. It has limitations in the scope of questions raised, breadth of data, and little multivariate analysis. It does, however, provide a near-textbook job of posing intriguing theoretical questions, collecting and applying data to answer these questions in a direct and relevant manner, and eliminating many of the most likely alternative explanations for what is observed. Zilber and Niven's work would be of particular interest to those interested in

racial politics, news media coverage of politics, and political behavior. It contributes to a research agenda about the coverage of minority officials by raising questions and suggesting requisites for analysis in studying media coverage. It skillfully demonstrates the utility of a multimethod approach by drawing on various kinds of data to study the role of communication media in political behavior. Like all good research it raises important questions that beg further study.

## **Comparative Politics**

Communities and the Environment: Ethnicity, Gender, and the State in Community-Based Conservation. Edited by Arun Agrawal and Clark C. Gibson. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001. 232p. \$60.00 cloth, \$23.00 paper.

Pamela Stricker, California State University, San Marcos

Common pool (or property) resource studies attempt to address the puzzle of managing natural resources highlighted by Garrett Hardin's (1968) *Tragedy of the Commons* dilemma. In that scenario of an unmanaged commons, a resource (e.g., pasture) made available to a multiplicity of users will result in a free-for-all leading to the destruction of that natural resource. Traditionally, solutions to this resource overuse problem have come in the form of privatization or state control of natural resources.

Within the property rights regime, rights can be assigned to an individual via private property rights, or to the state through the use of public lands, or to a collection of individuals, usually a "community," through common property rights. However, the latter option has become problematic in the view of the editors and contributors of this edition, due to the treatment of community as homogeneous.

In a thought-provoking volume of case studies from the Global South, Arun Agrawal and Clark Gibson have delved into how governments have gone astray in decentralizing natural resource management. Knowingly or not, many policymakers have, in their bid to return control of a given area's resources back to the local inhabitants, shaped the results of the devolution policy by allowing outdated conceptualizations of "community" to inform the manner in which they distributed this political power.

The editors and their contributors have put forth, for the most part, a convincing argument backed up by the empirical data outlined in the six cases from Africa, South Asia, and North America for a more nuanced conceptualization of "community." They posit that the outmoded definition of community "as a small spatial unit, social structure, and set of shared norms" stymies meaningful decentralization of political power vis-à-vis full participation of all members of the subgroups within a given "community" over a particular body of natural resources.

Calling for a shift in perspective to one that considers divergent interests of multiple actors as well as consideration of the processes through which these interests are expressed, along with analysis of the institutions that affect these political outcomes, the authors collectively set forth a new set of criteria for natural resource management devolution programs.

Additionally, in their cases the contributors call on policymakers to factor in the diversity within the populations, be it gender, ethnicity, religion, class, or other identifiable subgroup category, when structuring what such policies will

look like "on the ground." A particularly interesting chapter (chapter 2) analyzes the problematic nature of crafting policymaking with gender concerns in mind. Many of those approaches have been colored by shortcomings in resource management concerns such as how traditional norms frame gendered relations of land access and ownership, but also how contemporary analyses have too frequently overlooked subgroup differentiation as in the intricacies of how caste, class, and ethnicity affect how both women and men utilize natural resources.

Also illustrative of the need for rethinking of "community" is Bettina Ng'Weno's chapter on Kenyan natural resource conservation. Government efforts to conserve more than half of the nation's rare plants were cloaked in the "mythic indigenous preservation model" that fell short of the conservation plans given the multiple interpretations of the sacredness of the kaya (coastal forested areas) as well as the not so homogenous nature of the Mijikenda or the subgroup Muslim Digo peoples.

Other contributors examine how differing social structures and relationships within communities and government representatives can affect natural resource conservation in Morocco (chapter 3) and Indonesia (chapter 6), respectively. Hughes McDermott's examination of the Philippine government's conflicted definition of community in forest management programs in Palawan is well crafted. This case dramatizes how networks can offer indigenous peoples support in their efforts to overcome the legacies of colonial pasts and resource control of authoritarian elites.

Community control of natural resources can reveal class, ethnic, religious, or gender lines. Resources will be controlled by elites who dominate these communities if the state simply passes the resource management baton to the local governing structure and turns its attention back to the capital. The state's role in ensuring that natural resource conservation takes place requires a consciousness on the part of the state of the various subgroups in the community as well as the political, economic, and social hierarchies existent in a given locus. Neither the editors nor the contributors fully answer the question raised by this proposed multiactor conceptualization of community. If a state is cognizant of the various players and their particular characteristics and the social, political, and economic hierarchies that underpin a community's governance (thus shaping the distribution of natural resources), then how far should the state go in the facilitation of democratic or equalitarian distribution of the resources so that a cohesive plan of management can be enacted? A conclusion drawing together the lessons of these cases and outlining how states could update their conceptualization of community based on the concerns raised would have strengthened this otherwise solid edition.

Nonetheless, *Communities and the Environment* takes the common pool resources literature as well as the practice of managing the commons in an important new direction,

a locally informed multilayered one. This volume calls on academics and practitioners alike to recognize the various members and their identities, actions, and access to participating in the design and implementation of conservation policies. While the book does not broadly guide states into that new direction, it sets forth a significant challenge to government policymakers and practitioners to factor in the multiplicity of interests and potential participants in community-based conservation programs. Further, it helps us get at the underlying conflicts underpinning many decentralized resource conservation programs that have been designed to limit the powerless from seeking to expand their demands in contested areas of valuable resources, fertile land, irrigation access, and, most importantly, political and economic power.

Bounded Missions: Military Regimes and Democratization in the Southern Cone and Brazil. By Craig L. Arceneaux. University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2001. 262p. \$35.00.

Harold A. Trinkunas, Naval Postgraduate School

This book provides a solid contribution to our understanding of regime transitions, although from an unusual perspective: that of the armed forces of an outgoing dictatorship. Since its inception, the literature on democratization has argued that modes of regime transition (and the actors empowered during this process) have a substantial impact on the success and quality of a new democracy. Craig Arceneaux's central insight is that who retains control of the process in a transition from a military dictatorship depends to a great degree on the cohesion of the armed forces and the coherence of their economic and political strategy. To establish this proposition, Arceneaux adopts an institutionalist approach to examine five cases of transition in South America, all drawn from the period of prolonged military rule that characterized the region during the 1960s and 1970s.

At least since the seminal work on democratization by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, 1986), political scientists have noted a strong relationship between the issue of who is empowered by a political transition and the quality and quantity of democracy available in a new regime. Where the security forces are able to maintain control over the timing and sequence of the transition process, they are often able to embed checks on the power of elected officials into the institutions a new democracy. Commonly, these constraints are aimed at protecting members of the armed forces from prosecution for human rights abuses committed during a dictatorship, but they can also be designed to preserve institutional prerogatives and might even include limits on budgetary and economic policy, as in the case of post-Pinochet Chile. In the long run, the persistence of military-backed limits on the power of elected officials calls into question the very degree to which a regime can be considered democratic.

In this book, Arceneaux seeks to understand the circumstances in which the armed forces are able to carry out a controlled transition following a period in which they had directly ruled a country. He argues that two factors, military unity and strategy coordination, increase the likelihood that a military regime will succeed in controlling a transition. Arceneaux defines military unity in relation to the ability of the armed forces to maintain cohesion in the face of the challenges of participating in a military dictatorship; strategy coordination refers to the ability of a military regime to develop a successful and effective government program that achieves support from important social and political actors. Where both factors are high, he argues that we should expect to see armed forces

that retain control over transitions to democracy and are able successfully to defend institutional privileges in a new regime. In other words, where the armed forces have remained internally cohesive and authoritarian regimes are perceived as successful by the larger society, we should expect that the institutions of a new democracy should be strongly influenced by the preferences of the outgoing military government.

Arceneaux adopts an explicitly historical institutionalist approach to explaining military success and failure in achieving transition control. In this book, variation in the two independent variables is largely a product of the institutional rules of the game of the authoritarian regime, which means that transition control is largely predetermined even before the actual process of moving to a new regime begins. As Arceneaux correctly reminds us, all military dictatorships are caught on the horns of a dilemma: Greater direct participation in government increases the stake of the armed forces in a dictatorship's success (and their willingness to defend it), but such participation also politicizes the armed forces and reduces their ability to coordinate political and economic strategies that are likely to lead to regime success. Arceneaux finds that the ability of a military government to manage this dilemma successfully is a product of its internal institutional arrangements.

In each of the five authoritarian regimes examined in this book (Argentina, 1966-73; Argentina, 1976-83; Brazil, 1964-85; Chile, 1973-89; Uruguay, 1973-85), Arceneaux conducts a detailed analysis of the "rules of the game," and he successfully shows how variations in these rules affected the ability of the armed forces to maintain high levels of unity and strategy coordination. At one extreme, the institutional arrangements developed during the Pinochet regime sustained high levels of military unity and led to successful strategies that allowed the armed forces to place numerous constraints on the power of democratically elected Aylwin administration following the 1990 transition. On the other hand, the Argentine armed forces' thorough penetration of the state apparatus during the 1976-83 dictatorship politicized the officer corps and produced internal conflicts over strategy, leading to poor decision making that eventually plunged the country into an unwinnable war with Great Britain in 1982. The resulting disarray in the armed forces initially placed them in a very weak position vis-à-vis the democratic government that followed. An interesting intermediate case is that of the military-backed "Argentine Revolution" (1966-73), where even though military institutional unity was sustained by excluding the bulk of the officer corps from a day-to-day role in government, poor strategy coordination led to a worsening economic and social crisis and the collapse of the regime. Given the paucity of studies focusing on this level of analysis of authoritarian regimes, each of the country cases analyzed in this book represents a valuable contribution in and of itself to our understanding of this period in Latin American politics.

However, the almost-exclusive focus on the institutional level as a source of explanation is also one of the few drawbacks of this book. By concentrating in such detail on the organizational arrangements and decision making processes within each of the dictatorships, Arceneaux dedicates little space to addressing the impact on his variables of external shocks, such as changes in world economic conditions. Also, given his attention to the success or failure of strategy coordination in military governments, the absence of substantial discussion of counterstrategies pursued by their opponents seems odd. For example, the Chilean military regime's strategy for winning a referendum in 1989 on extending General Pinochet's rule arguably foundered on the counterstrategies of the democratic opposition, forcing the regime to accept a transition to democracy at an earlier date than it had

originally planned. What is also likely to prove controversial is the degree to which Arceneaux believes that transition control is predetermined by the institutional arrangements of a military regime. Two of the central findings in the literature on democratization are that authoritarian regimes often lose control of liberalization processes and that transitions to democracy are often characterized by a high degree of uncertainty due to the fluid strategic interaction among the participants. It is not clear that the determinacy of Arceneaux's arguments and the institutionally centered explanations are compatible with these findings or provide sufficient evidence to disprove them.

Civil Society Before Democracy: Lessons from Nineteenth-Century Europe. Edited by Nancy Bermeo and Philip Nord. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000. 320p. \$79.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

Michael Bernhard, Pennsylvania State University

The Polish philosopher and diplomat Piotr Ogrodzinski has described "civil society" as a weasel word. It is hard to disagree, given that neo-Tocquevillians, Weberians, critical theorists, Christian fundamentalists, and World Bank analysts all unabashedly sing its praises while having completely different referents in mind for the term. Because it concerns itself with the historical development of civil society, rather than with some abstract idealized notion of it, this collection of essays by historians and social scientists is a sorely needed addition to the literature.

The editors have brought together a distinguished group of historians and social scientists to consider the issue of the development and emergence of civil society in nineteenth-century Europe. The conception of the nineteenth century is that of the long century running from the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815 to the end of World War I in 1918. The focus here is on the evolution of autonomous social actors in Western Europe beginning with the emergence of nineteenth-century liberalism.

The main question considered in the essays is how the emergence of civil society affected the transformation of liberalism into modern mass democracy. The first two sections of the book, overwhelmingly devoted to Western Europe, divide the cases considered according to whether the transition to mass democracy was successful or initially failed. The cases of failure considered are Portugal, Russia, Italy, and Germany. The second section is devoted to the success stories, Great Britain, France, Belgium, and The Netherlands. The third section, somewhat awkwardly titled "The Meaning of the Nineteenth Century Today," is a bit less coherent, composed of a learned historical essay by Valerie Bunce on the historical origins of the weakness of civil society in Eastern Europe (citing factors that go as far back as Roman times), an essay by Jan Kubik on the classic case of the reemergence of civil society under communism (Poland), and a nice syntheti conclusion by Nancy Bermeo.

Several broad lessons emerge from the essays. First, civil society is not inexorably linked to democracy, but historically has emerged in concert with several other forms of regime including monarchy, oligarchic liberalism, and mild or enfeebled types of authoritarianism. In certain European cases civil society emerged or held its own during the age of reaction in the first part of the nineteenth century, thrived in concert with liberal hegemony, and reemerged and challenged communism in its posttotalitarian phase. Second, civil society is not always good for democracy. Sometimes, in fact, its bestorganized elements may be ambivalent or even antithetic to democracy. Elements within civil society often major players

in its breakdown. On this point the essays by Adrian Lyttelton on Italy and Klaus Tenfelde on Germany are quite good and build on the existing work in this vein by Sheri Berman and by Simone Chambers and Jeffrey Kopstein.

Third, the essays on the cases of failure all point out the difficulties in incorporating rural and traditional social formations into civil society. This observation both confirms and expands on the well-established insight that social formations with labor repressive and noncommercialized agriculture pose particular problems for democracy. Fourth, the essays that discuss cases of democratic success show very diverse patterns. Clearly, there is no single pattern by which civil society successfully connects with a democratic regime and/or promotes it. Britain represents one of the classic cases of how an associational culture developed and expanded in a slow and sure fashion. Whereas Robert Morris' essay in this volume does a very nice job of describing this, he does not whitewash the considerable failures of Britain in this regard, particularly with regard to Ireland. Raymond Huard's essay on France describes how civil society there eventually thrived despite the periodic attempts of the upper and middle classes to impede the ability of other social actors to organize and the relatively late institutionalization of freedom of association. And Thomas Ertman's essay on how democracy in Belgium and The Netherlands succeeded through the process of the "pillarization" of civil society points out how potentially strong social division and impediments to democracy and a robust civil society can be overcome. Kubik's essay on postcommunist Poland (based on his book with Grzegorz Ekiert) demonstrates that protest can function as a way to link the state and civil society in situations where the party system is weakly institutionalized and in flux.

Fifth, the connection between state and civil society emerges as a key variable in whether civil society plays a constructive role in building democracy. This is a point strongly made by Bermeo in her conclusion to the volume. This insight indicates that the role that political society plays in mediating between the state and civil society is a key area that demands more attention.

If I have one complaint about the book, it is that some of the essays by the historians are undertheorized. When I was reading them I was struck by how they could have been improved by a greater awareness of comparative historical social science on the origins of democracy and modernity or even the work of well-known historians who have participated in these debates such as Geoff Ely and Charles Maier. This is a strategy that, to my mind, succeeds admirably in the introductory essay by Philip Nord.

This is the sort of edited collection that merits wide reading because it treats an important concept that has suffered lately (from both overuse and conceptual stretching) in a nuanced, historically complex, and theoretically sophisticated matter. It reminds us about what is strongly problematic about doctoral dissertations using only canned data on NGOs and polity scores to generalize about the relationship between civil society and democratic consolidation. Finally, the case studies on their own are quite useful as a resource reference for those doing comparative historical research on modern Europe.

Power and City Governance: Comparative Perspectives on Urban Development. By Alan DiGaetano and John S. Klemanski. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. 328p. \$57.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper

Michael Jones-Correa, Cornell University

The field of urban politics has been in the theoretical doldrums for some 20 years now. This is not to say there has been

a dearth of scholarship; on the contrary, empirical case studies taking political economy, policy, or institutional approaches have been common. But unlike the heyday of the study of the field through the 1970s, there has been no compelling debate that has held the attention of students of American politics and political scientists more generally. Alan DiGaetano and John Klemanski set themselves up for no small task, then, by seeking not simply to establish comparisons between cities in the United States and Great Britain, but to build a new theoretical foundation for the study of city politics and for urban political economy more generally. On the whole, while the authors provide a sweeping vista of the state of the field, the theoretical edifice they build is not solid enough to sustain the weight of their own hypotheses and claims.

The arguments in *Power and City Governance* are constructed around paired case studies in the United States and the United Kingdom. The authors pair Boston and Bristol, two seaport cities now turned toward advanced service economy, with Detroit and Birmingham, two industrial centers still struggling with their economic and civic redevelopment. The paired cases are designed not only to illustrate how differences in state structuring entail very different possibilities and constraints for cities in the two countries, but also to illuminate differences in the approaches cities have taken within each country.

The broader picture presented by the authors is that metropolitan areas in both countries have gone through fundamental economic restructuring over the last generation, leading to the deindustrialization of cities. In the United States, cities have dealt with this transition largely on their own, relying heavily on local resources to restructure their economies. In Britain, on the other hand, cities have been relatively insulated from the swing of the economic pendulum by substantial grants from the state. The flip side to this financial cushion is that cities in Britain have less autonomy in policy arenas, while the relative fiscal self-sufficiency of American cities also gives them greater autonomy in the political sphere.

Power and City Governance focuses on the period of the 1980s and 1990s, when urban policy in Great Britain and the United States seemed to be converging. The British government at this time encouraged an increasingly entrepreneurial approach in local governance, turning, for instance, to competitive grants to encourage policy innovation at the local level. This meant that there was room for British cities, like their American counterparts, to take a greater variety of approaches in their response to economic restructuring. (Note, however, that for differences within countries to become salient, differences across countries become less so. It is less than clear, at the book's conclusion, what difference national distinctions make.)

Through the 1980s and 1990s the redevelopment policies cities pursued in these two countries were very much shaped by the coalitions that governed them. These coalitions were led largely by city officials, business elites, and community activists and in different configurations pursued different kinds of agendas. DiGaetano and Klemanski posit at least four: growth coalitions, social reform coalitions, growth management coalitions, and caretaker coalitions. In addition, each of these coalitions has different characteristics. For one, they have different power structures, so they can be composed of rival factions, contingent coalitions, enduring coalitions, or prevailing coalitions, as well as by regimes. The power structures determine the power arrangements of coalitions, which can be dominant, bargaining, or preemptive. DiGaetano and Klemanski discuss nine cases in their book, a case being where a city changed governing coalitions. However, each of these coalitions also had at least one of three power arrangements and one of five configurations of power (besides, of course, being in one of two countries). In their attempt to capture the nuance of urban power arrangements, the authors quickly plunge the reader into a bewildering array of coalitional possibilities and outcomes, resulting in a situation where the possible combinations of variables far exceeds the number of cases that can explain the outcomes.

To be fair, the purpose of the authors' careful and nuanced account is to avoid falling into what they feel has been the pitfall of much of the recent literature in urban politics, which is an overreliance on political economy as the principal explanatory variable for political outcomes. Political and economic variables need not be correlated, in their view. What DiGaetano and Klemanski wish to show is that the agendas pursued by coalitions are not necessarily linked to the economic fortune of their cities. However, a closer look at their cases shows otherwise. Birmingham and Detroit, the two cities most constrained economically during the period of the study, only ever had progrowth coalitions. Boston and Bristol, with middle-class constituencies in diversified highend service economies, pursued a greater variety of developmental agendas. But these varied outcomes actually followed a pattern: In times of recession both cities pursued progrowth policies, while in times of economic expansion, both cities had room to experiment with slow-growth or reform agendas. Judging from the cases presented here, it seems that economics may explain rather a lot of the variance in political outcomes after all.

Alternative explanations that might have helped bolster their argument, in particular, greater attention to institutions and institutional variance and their impact on policy outcomes, receive rather short shrift in this study. Given the parameters of the book, then, the simpler and more elegant explanation for urban agendas is that cities are constrained by the imperative of economic growth, but once this growth is achieved, cities with greater resources have more room to pursue other alternatives, a situation nicely illustrated by David DeLeon's (1992) case study of San Francisco, Left Coast City: Progressive Politics in San Francisco; 1975–1991 as well as by DiGaetano and Klemanski's descriptions of Boston and Bristol. However, the stories of Boston and Bristol versus Detroit and Birmingham in Power and City Governance are obscured, in the end, by the book's unwieldy theoretical construct.

Radical Women in Latin America: Left and Right. Edited by Victoria Gonzalez and Karen Kampwirth. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. 352p. \$55.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Georgina Waylen, University of Sheffield

In recent years more attention has begun to be paid to the different forms of women's engagement with the conventional political arena in Latin America. This interest partly reflects the impact of transitions to democracy and the demobilization of social movements. But it also reflects a change of approach by many of the scholars examining women's political activities as they have reassessed the importance of institutions and the salience of "politics."

This volume reflects these trends. Some of the contributions look at women who are organizing as women, but around political goals (using a narrow definition of what counts as political), not gender issues. Margaret Power, for example, examines right-wing women organizing for a "yes" vote in support of Pinochet in the Chilean plebiscite of 1988. Lisa Baldez looks at two groups of political women (often prominent members of political parties) organizing as what she

calls "political outsiders" in groups that operated outside the conventional political arena in Chile. One group, Poder Feminino, mobilized in support of military intervention to remove the Allende government in the early 1970s. The other, Mujeres por la Vida, mobilized to get the Pinochet regime out of power in the 1980s.

A number of the articles in the collection also look at women who are active within a range of political parties, although there is probably more discussion of those on the left, such as the ex-revolutionary parties in Central America and a new party like the PT, the Brazilian workers party, than those on the right. Indeed this is perhaps the book's greatest novelty. It analyses women identified with both the left and the right of the political spectrum, sometimes even in the same chapter. Karen Kampwirth, for example, examines women fighting for both the Contras and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. This juxtapositioning has been done only very rarely in the past. This is partly, as hinted at in the collection itself, because until now most of the analysis of women's organizing has focused on women's "progressive" organizing rather than organizing in favor of the status quo or right-wing political projects.

The focus on radical women of both the left and the right allows some important themes to come to fore. Many of the articles engage with the possibilities for and limits to coalition building—How far is it possible for women of different political persuasions to unite around certain issues? This notion of conjunctural coalition building is one that is currently also being explored by other scholars. Many of the articles demonstrate the limits of that coalition building. The coalitions that Baldez examines are possible only over relatively limited segments of the political spectrum. Only women from the right and center-right united to oppose Allende and only women from different parts of the left and center came together to oppose the Pinochet regime. It is often thought that more unity is possible around "gender issues." However, a number of the articles in this volume reinforce the argument that gender rights are not one issue but many and different actors can take up a variety of different positions depending on the issue. Patricia Hipsher, in her analysis of postrevolutionary El Salvador, demonstrates that although there are some campaigns, such as those for child support, against domestic violence, and even for quotas, over which a range of women could unite, there are others, such as abortion and women's economic rights in Free Trade Zones, that remain too divisive.

The second theme that runs through many of the articles is the relationship of feminism to political parties, again not only on the left but also on the right of the political spectrum. Treading some quite well worn ground, Hipsher shows how the El Salvadorean feminist movement emerged out of the left and Liesl Haas argues that, despite problems, many Brazilian feminists have found the PT a more hospitable environment than the other political parties. How far the political left can be a constraint or an enabler for feminism therefore remains contentious question. More unusually, Victoria Gonzalez looks at the ways in which the Somocistas absorbed the Nicaraguan feminist movement that had emerged in the first half of the twentieth century and thereby also challenges the commonly held belief that Nicaraguan women did not organize until much more recently. In an extension of this theme of the relationship between feminism and politics, more discussion of whether there is any continued relevance to the old feminista/politica split might have also been useful.

In their introduction, the editors identify autonomy—defined as independence from political parties and guerilla organizations—as another theme that they believe is central to many of the contributions. The use of the term autonomy is perhaps to state the argument too simplistically. The more

complex issue of what should be the nature of the relationship with political parties and, more broadly, with the state and policymaking bodies has preoccupied many women activists and scholars. In her discussion of the decision not to have a women's section in the PT, Haas highlights some of the debates that have surrounded the question of how women should organize within political parties. The contributions in this volume therefore serve to reinforce the argument that the question of women activists' goals and how they are shaped by the institutional context in which they are operating is an important one that deserves further investigation.

Maternalism is the final theme that the editors identify. Again, this is an issue that has already quite rightly received a great deal of attention. The contribution of this volume is to challenge some of the more simplistic analyses by showing some of the ways in which motherhood has been used by the left at the same time as demonstrating that right-wing women do not always mobilize as mothers as is sometimes assumed. Power, for example, shows how some right-wing Chilean women wanted to be active in the public sphere as citizens rather than as mothers.

Although the focus on radical women of the left and right allows a number of key questions to be addressed in novel ways, it is perhaps too dichotomous, thereby obscuring some other important themes. Populism, for example, does not fit easily within this framework. As well as making the volume more balanced in terms of the number of contributions in each of the South and Central American sections, a discussion of postwar Argentina could have considered the relationship of women activists to Peronism in the 1950s and its contemporary legacy. This would also have provided some continuity with the article by Sandra McGee Deutsch that examines Brazil, Chile, and Argentina between 1900 and 1940. Unlike the first two countries, it is not followed up later in the volume with a more up-to-date discussion of Argentina.

These comments not withstanding, this collection is grounded in extensive research and contains a number of timely and thought-provoking articles that will make a useful contribution to the increasingly sophisticated literature on women and politics in Latin America.

Constructing Sustainable Development. By Neil E. Harrison. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 175p. \$55.50 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Rodger A. Payne, University of Louisville

Nearly 15 years has elapsed since the World Commission on Environment and Development—the so-called Brundtland Commission—popularized the idea of "sustainable development." The phrase turned out to be unusually slippery, providing both political cover and ammunition for almost anyone engaged in debates about the global environment and/or development. Indeed, scholars and policymakers of all theoretical or ideological stripes found creative ways to employ the phrase "sustainable development" to support a wide array of arguments in these discussions.

Neil Harrison has written a clear and concise book that addresses important questions related to the ambiguous and multiple meanings. He analyzes, in the postmodern tradition, three dominant, yet often conflicting, policy narratives of sustainable development. These are efficiency, equity, and ethics. For each narrative, Harrison explains and evaluates the premises and arguments borrowed from various social, economic, or political theories. Then, over the course of five short chapters, he highlights logical inconsistencies that make viable policy goals literally impossible to achieve. The author reveals the conceit often hidden in these narratives and, in

turn, promotes greater humility. His arguments are sharp, but his purpose is not mere deconstruction. In fact, Harrison often notes the elements of a narrative that might be made to work and that should be preserved in some fashion.

Still, Harrison concludes quite forcefully that "sustainable development is a Holy Grail that does not exist. It is a legend, a myth.... [The term] cannot be objectively defined, cannot be known" (p. 99). So what would people have to do to make development sustainable, which is the goal the author establishes on the book's first page (p. vii)? The answer is certainly not found in traditional literatures on economics, politics, or environmental ethics. The chapters on efficiency, for example, describe and critique biases in the neoclassical vision of the market and then dissect alleged technological fixes, which are not likely to be developed in the current political-economic context. The chapters on equity likewise explain why neither redistribution of wealth nor international cooperation is about to occur. Finally, Harrison demonstrates that no society can embrace ecologically ethical policies without first embracing environmental ideals. This presents a bootstrapping dilemma, since ideas cannot be changed absent education policies that promote ecology.

Harrison offers his own recommendations in the final chapter. He borrows from the postmodern tradition to find metanarratives that might be able to transcend barriers across the political, economic, and social divides he has identified (p. 101). From this perspective, the author derives a need for a far more participatory politics and an ecological view of science that values flexibility and adaptability. Data need to be accumulated, and education promoted, he asserts, so as to match the most appropriate policy initiatives to local needs. Perhaps most controversially, Harrison wants sustainable development to be "the central concern of political discourse" (p. 118).

If most of these prescriptions seem somewhat vague and (at least to the informed reader) mundane, Harrison is unapologetic. On the last page, he returns to an earlier admonition (chapter 2) that policies supporting sustainable development (or virtually any policy goal) "are always stabs in the dark, best guesses in an uncertain world" (p. 118). Harrison's broad challenge to "rational" economics, science, and policymaking, however, might tempt readers to question whether his preferred choices are better than those he critiques. After all, the author warns that sustainable development seems to be "the ultimate 'postmodern' issue" and "can be interpreted to support any agenda, or objective" (p. 102).

Consider Harrison's plea for education. While the author means his claims to be taken differently, it is difficult to imagine that college administrators will be persuaded to build their general education or liberal arts curriculums around the idea of sustainable development precisely "because it can mean everything to everybody" (p. 118). Harrison stresses that education should be sensitive to ambiguity and that teachers should take diverse perspectives into account when considering something as elusive as sustainable development. In practice, however, his warnings literally seem to imply that nothing is valid and that everything is valid.

Why should an idea like the precautionary principle (pp. 16, 111), for example, presumptively favor environmental goals? A probusiness advocate might argue that caution demands favoring jobs and economic well-being over "risky" policies to defend the environment. During the Cold War, "worst-case planning" meant spending hundreds of billions of dollars on nuclear weapons to promote "security." No one should assume that environmental goals would come out on top if the most basic societal goals started to be compared. Harrison's argument for community and participatory politics could even subvert environmental objectives. In actual

debates about forest policies, loggers of the U.S. Pacific Northwest apparently prefer retaining their jobs to preserving owl habitats.

Anyone who has perused the right's antienvironmental literature (e.g., see Ronald Bailey, *Eco-Scam*, 1993), quickly learns how postmodern insights and arguments can be turned against environmentalists. Scientists have often been wrong about past warnings of ecological or resource collapse, the skeptics assert, so why should anyone make costly policies based upon their latest warnings about global warming? The problem is magnified when a scientist or two challenges the environmental views.

Postmodernists, ironically, might fault Harrison for failing to embrace their project more fully. He acknowledges that his "approach is not specifically postmodern" (p. 112) and at times he seems to favor the employment of both material and instrumental measures. For instance, he advocates substantial increases in aid to poor countries, which would essentially bribe them to support sustainable development. He also supports higher taxes on consumption to influence consumer demand for resources. Yet material levers distort dialogue and would not necessarily promote an ecological mindset.

Harrison's book seems most useful for educators who teach undergraduate or master's-level courses about the environment. Students would benefit from the author's succinct and lucid critique of prevailing economic, political, and ethical theories and from his application of postmodern theorizing. No doubt, Harrison's arguments would provoke interesting and useful classroom exchanges.

Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets. By Evelyne Huber and John D. Stephens. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 368p. \$54.00 cloth, \$18.00 paper.

Alexander Hicks, Emory University

This is surely the most ambitious and the most accomplished study of affluent post-World War II democratic welfare states. It uses statistical, case study, and comparative historical methods to describe and explain the course of social welfare policy over the second half of the twentieth century in 16 nations. Quantitatively, the study examines social insurance and service programs, major public expenditure and revenue aggregates, and an array of fine-grained indicators of state redistributive and safety net outcomes, from 1960 through 1994. Somewhat more qualitatively, the study extends its reach to encompass job and gender, labor market, and educational policies over the whole 1945-1996 period. Using both quantitative and qualitative methods of explanatory analysis, the work assesses various accounts of welfare state development and crisis, in particular, its authors' institutionally amplified, class-analytical political resource theory.

The effort provides us ample explanatory and theoretical news and sets the benchmark for future work on its subject. The book's central thesis, in broad strokes, is that partisan choice—grounded in partisan political economic mobilization and state governance and exercised under the constraint of constitutional structures and policy precedents (or "legacies")—determines welfare policy. In more detail, the thesis is that over the long run—during the three-decade "Golden Age" following World War II most particularly—accumulated Left and Christian rule, aided by labor union mobilization and coordinated (as opposed to pure market) economic organization, drove a largely irreversible development of post-War welfare policy. The development is cumulative in the sense that causal forces largely are

limited to ratcheting up or containing welfare state advance. Importantly, Left/Christian prominence in directing the expansion of welfare states is unequivocally claimed only into early in a post-1973 "crisis" that transforms relentless development into adaptive slowdown, or reactionary devolution. Cumulative Christian—not social—democratic government is seen as relatively important for social insurance and transfer-payment programs, while Left government is seen as relatively important for social services, overall state scale, and income redistribution and poverty reduction. Left/Christian forces expanding welfare states are complemented by constitutional structures insofar as these engender consensual policy and few veto points. They are also complemented by female labor force participation, especially to the extent that this is politically aided by Left governance. Although the book's Left/Christian thesis is hardly original (dating back to 1970s works by David Cameron, Walter Korpi, and Stephens), its program and period specifications of the thesis, as well as its institutional and female-labor force amplifications of it, cap Huber and Stephens' innovative 1990s work.

Complementing the book's core developmental thesis is its account of crisis. Here Huber and Stephens argue that it is not economic globalization that has driven welfare-state "retrenchment." In particular, economic stagnation, rooted less in globalization than rising real interest rates (plus such conjunctural factors as the 1990-ish strains of German unification and collapse of Soviet imports), has—at least where neoliberal modes of economic thinking have been relatively circumscribed as in northern and Continental Europe. There stagnation, via a crisis of high and recalcitrant unemployment, has occasioned small downward adjustments of the welfare state. Where neoliberal views have been more hegemonic, neoliberalism itself, especially when facilitated by Conservative party government and majoritarian and unitary polities as in the 1980s United Kingdom and 1990s New Zealand, has driven deep and reactionary retrenchments. The book's account of these matters, while not systematic enough to provide a final word, should influence much opinion and further investigation.

As regards the particular hypothesis that female entry into the labor force buoys welfare policy, especially where left parties tend to rule, Huber and Stephens' important statistical case for this very plausible thesis is qualified by two statistical glitches. Estimates of female effects on policy might, due to simultaneity bias, be artifacts of policy effects on female labor force participation; and the cumulative measure of left rule is questionable. As regards state structure, the book's claim for "constitutional" constraints on the welfare state is very convincing.

The claim for Left and Christian Democratic rule as the prime determinants of post-War welfare-state policy is strongly suppoted by the convergence of findings across a range of outcome measures. In the crucial Tables 3.2–3.5 of 1960–1985 long-run analyses, this range encompasses both social security benefits and (more narrowly) transfer payments, government revenues as well as expenditures, and civilian public consumption spending—all as shares of GDP—in additions to measures of public civilian employment, the public share of health spending, and the per-retiree public share of GDP. Across these eight regressands, support for "Left cabinet" effects emerges at least six times, seven if social security benefits (analyzed under six notably varying explanatory specifications and apparently prowelfarist in all but a case or two) is judged supportive, and nearly as much support for Christian Democratic effects is marshaled. (Further evidence is provided by a dozen more fine-grained safety net measures.) Case studies of nine relatively advanced welfare states, each specified to both "Golden Age" and "crisis" periods, is richly informative. Though lack of case detail on less generous welfare states limits systematic comparison (posing nagging puzzles about the likes of feckless British Labour and progressive French Conservatives), processes of welfare expansion and contraction are very valuably detailed for all of the most generous welfare states.

Despite all these strengths, some readers' assent to Huber and Stephens' claims for the explanatory preeminence of Left and Christian partisan government for welfare-state policy (especially prior to 1970s troubles) will be clouded by the authors' hardly compelling attempts to distinguish partisan rule from a few potentially competing, collinear explanatory factors. These include labor union strength and interest organization (e.g., neocorporatism), as well as political-ideological legacies (e.g., midcentury consolidation of welfare precedence and opinion) and broad secular trends in industrialization, aging, statism, and the like. They connote more technical issues of model specification (e.g., partisanship versus ideological climate interest-organization), measurement choice (cumulative versus noncumulative cabinet indexation), and estimation (e.g., static or dynamic) that can be neither ignored nor settled here. In summary, the book's core cases for the explanatory predominance of Left/Christian partisan governance—not merely of a broader amalgam of classlinked and labor- and left-centered forces—commands the most serious attention if not unanimous and full agreement.

In the social sciences major works are seldom definitive. This book will become an important political economic text and a mainstay of welfare-state and comparative political and policy studies for specialized students of the welfare state and comparative political economy. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State may lack the closure and elegance to settle its issues for social scientists or to reconcile humanists to its analytical density. It has the power to influence strongly belief and controversy in the fields of welfare-state, political economic, political sociological, and comparative historical investigation for years to come.

East Central Europe in the Modern World: The Politics of the Borderlands from Pre- to Postcommunism. By Andrew C. Janos. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. 488p. \$65.00.

Ilya Prizel, University of Pittsburgh

This is a learned and intriguing book covering the span of modern history of East Central Europe as well as the Balkans. The scope of the book is broad, including various theoretical approaches, historical analysis, and a rich discussion of economics. There is a particularly interesting description of technological innovations' impact on the region's economic and political structure. Unlike some earlier books on the region, which tended to treat Eastern Europe as a region outside the international context, Andrew Janos's work does an excellent job of both relating the impact of events in the "center" of the international system on the region and providing an outstanding comparison to Latin America, the other quasi-"peripheral" region of the international system during the last 300 years.

Given the scope of the book and its intellectual depth, it stands to reason that it is bound to raise questions, some of which go unanswered and thus warrant further discussion. Although Janos provides the reader with a detailed discussion of the decline of liberalism in Central and Eastern Europe and the rise of nationalism, several issues could benefit from greater elaboration and elucidation. First, the term "Liberalism" is never fully defined. While reading the book the reader is often confused about whether the author's use of

the term "liberalism" is the classic usage, which grew out of the Scottish and later enlightenment and culminated in the rise of the "Manchester School," with its emphasis on tolerance and economic laissez-faire, or the French version, which is associated with rationalism and etatism but does not call for either cultural tolerance or a minimalist state (Gertrude Himmelfarb, "The Idea of Compassion: The British vs. French Enlightenment," *The Public Interest* 145 (Fall 2001)).

The discussion focusing on the collapse of liberalism would have very much benefited from an analysis of the impact of the economic crash of 1873 and the ensuing economic depression, which, among other things, saw the birth of "racial" rather than "religious" anti-Semitism. Similarly, when dealing with the political radicalization in late nineteenth-century East Central Europe, there is, in this reviewer's view, insufficient emphasis on the impact of intellectual trends emanating from Germany or the intellectual roots of modern political clericism; neither Johann v. Herder, Wilhelm Marr, German Romanticism, nor Rerum Novarum are even mentioned in the book.

When dealing with the interwar period, Janos gives us an outstanding and insightful account of the political strategies of Ion Antonescu in Romania, Miklos Horty in Hungary, and Rev. Jozef Tiso in Slovakia. However, the lack of explanation of the intellectual origins of the political forces that shaped Central Europe in much of the twentieth century makes the otherwise lucid and interesting analysis of nationalism, clericism, and fascism somewhat incoherent.

In discussing events surrounding World War II, Janos gives one of the most coherent and substantive descriptions of the complex relationship of the conservative corporatist regimes of Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Croatia with Nazi Germany. A clear and detailed picture is presented of how the various axis regimes attempted to pursue their national interests within the "New European Order" without being fully dragged into the Nazi agenda, particularly after the German reversal at the battle of Stalingrad. In his discussion of the relationships between Germany and its allies, Janos gives a vivd account of the economic exploitation of the various axis powers by Nazi Germany, with Romania alone being able to avoid economic exploitation by the Reich. While Janos's point that the agenda of Hitler's Central European allies was far from identical to that of Berlin, the discussion of the collaboration of the regimes in the implementation of the "Final Solution" is puzzling at times. The Tiso regime is presented as one that is fighting rear-guard action to slow and possibly prevent the deportation of the Jews from Slovakia; however, there is no attempt to reconcile the fact that Slovakia was willing to pay to the Reich RM500 per person in "removal fees" for Slovakia's Jews. Furthermore, most historians do accept Raul Hilberg's typology, which claims that before the Final Solution could be implemented, a prolonged isolation and the dehumanization of the Jews had to take place. Given the various strategies, such as the "Numerous Clauses" pursued by Miklos Horty in Hungary and the economic war against the Jews declared by Poland's ruling "Sanacja," a strong case can be made that much of the preparatory work for the Final Solution was carried out by the Central European regimes long before they fell into the orbit of Nazi Germany. Another puzzling statement in the book concerning World War II is the notion that Stalin did not grasp the importance of nuclear weapons (p. 330). While it is true that, when told by President Truman at the Potsdam Conference that the United States had managed to detonate a nuclear bomb, Stalin appeared to be oblivious, given the fact that the USSR had its "Manhattan Project," presided over by Laverntii Beria, as early as 1942 and given the intense Soviet spying on the Manhattan Project, there is

empirical evidence that Stalin grasped the importance of the nuclear age early.

The last third of the book is devoted to the dynamics of communization and the collapse of communism in the late 1980s. Janos gives one of the most lucid analyses and descriptions of the progressive decay of the Soviet imperial system and the rise of the corrupt rent-seeking elite in Brezhnev's USSR and other countries of the socialist bloc. The last chapters present an excellent discussion of the dynamics of communist disintegration and a wealth of economic as well as sociological data, giving the reader a clear three-dimensional picture of the late communism and early postcommunist period.

The book concludes with a poignant and elegiac discussion of the emerging relationship between the East Central European "periphery" and the new "Center" in the guise of the patronizing European Union. This thoughtful conclusion is powerfully argued and should be read by all those who are interested in the "New Europe" and the particularly painful transition inflicted on the people of the periphery—once again, in the name of a "brilliant future."

Despite the reservations noted above, which any book of this length and intellectual depth is bound to provoke, I believe that this book is an important scholarly achievement that will be of scholarly interest for a long time to come.

Election Studies: What's Their Use. Edited by Elihu Katz and Yael Warshel. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001. 285p. \$36.00 paper.

Mark N. Franklin, Trinity College Connecticut

In 1999, Kathleen Hall Jamieson of the Annenberg School for Communications, University of Pennsylvania, was awarded a large grant to fund a survey-based study of the 2000 presidential election. In anticipation of that study, and to help in its design, a colloquium was held in the Fall of 1999, titled "What's a Good Election Study, and What Are Election Studies Good for?" The chapters contained in *Election Studies: What's Their Use?* are the product of that colloquium.

The title of the volume is provocative, but the contents are much less so. Though many of the chapters contain suggestions for ways in which election studies could be improved, all of them are addressed first and foremost to describing (and sometimes defending) existing procedures and past findings. Readers looking for a thoroughgoing critique of election studies in general and American election studies in particular will have to look elsewhere.

But the fact that *Election Studies: What's Their Use?* does not live up to its title is not to say that it is a bad book. Rather, the reverse: This is a useful compendium of information about election studies that, though eclectic and somewhat haphazard, would be hard to come by in any other single publication. It is well written and engaging, and even someone who is steeped in the literature of election studies will find much that is interesting and useful in every chapter.

After an editors' introduction that explains how the book came to be written, there are two chapters (by William McGuire and Larry Bartels) that focus on voting research in the United States. Though the first purports to be an assessment of past achievements and the second an agenda for future research, both are concerned mainly with summarizing (from different and complementary viewpoints) the major achievements of the American National Election Studies (ANES) since they were founded in 1948, and both contain a number of suggestions for directions in which future research might move. My problem with both chapters (as with most of the chapters in this book) is that they are

highly personal and idiosyncratic to the interests of each author. These are well-regarded scholars, and their viewpoints are certainly worthy of study, but there is no pretense of covering all aspects of ANES's achievements, and at the end of these two chapters one wonders what has been left out.

There follow four chapters (by Juan Linz, Seymour Martin Lipset, Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, and Richard Johnson) that might have been placed together as being "election studies from around the world," since they focus on Spain, Israel, Canada, and (Lipset's excellent contribution) the early history of voting research in the United States. In these chapters we learn about some of the concerns that have guided election studies other than the ANES, though the choice of which election studies to include in this section is not just idiosyncratic but arcane. The topics covered, with the exception of the Canadian chapter, which describes cuttingedge methods for studying election campaigns, do not include any that currently take center stage in major journals, and though several of the approaches discussed in these chapters could fruitfully be incorporated into American election studies, there is no reason given for focusing on these particular approaches at the expense of others. In particular, the failure to include any mention of Dutch election studies, which have been at the forefront of multiple innovations over the past 30 years, is incomprehensible.

The book closes with three chapters on rather more specific topics. Actually, the Canadian chapter might as well be included in this set, making four such chapters: campaign research (by Richard Johnson), issue voting (by Merril Shanks), communications research (by Jay Blumler and Denis McQuail), and news management (by John Zaller). Of these, the last is a characteristically outstanding piece of original research that should probably have appeared in a professional journal; the others are largely surveys of what has been done, in the same vein as the book's earlier chapters.

These final four chapters are directed, more than any of the others, at making suggestions for innovations that might be incorporated in future election studies (particularly in future ANESs). However, again the reader is left with the questions, Why these topics? and What other topics might have been addressed?—questions which provide the leitmotif of my concerns about this volume.

Let me briefly address those two questions by summarizing three linked concerns: (1) the endogeneity problem that arises when dependent and independent variables are derived from interviews with the same people; (2) sampling problems in most election studies that make it hard for us to measure effects of the magnitude that often determine election outcomes in real life; and (3) the difficulty of fitting into any one survey all the questions that would need to be asked if all the research topics of interest to the academic community were to be addressed. These three concerns are linked in that a single solution can be imagined that addresses all three of them, but not one of these three concerns is specifically addressed in any of the chapters in the volume under review. (For those interested in research that does address these questions, see the special issue of *Electoral Studies* [21:1, 2002] edited by Mark Franklin and Christopher Wlezien.)

Overall, this is a volume that is well worth reading for the surveys it provides (which hardly overlap) and the ideas it contains. One ends the book with a fine appreciation for what survey research (particularly American survey research) has achieved in 50 years of studying electoral behavior. The fact that one does not learn much about the emerging crisis in electoral research would have been a fairly minor omission had the book's title not led one to expect some attention to that topic.

The Red-Green Coalition in Germany: Politics, Personalities and Power. By Charles Lees. Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 2001. 157p. \$69.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

M. Donald Hancock, Vanderbilt University

Charles Lees has produced a succinct yet compelling assessment of the Greens' "long march to power" in Germany through a succession of state governments to the Social Democratic–Green national coalition formed following the 1998 Bundestag election. His account is conceptually sound and (apart from several omissions) highly informative. It provides useful insights into the dynamics of SPD–Green politics that will interest German specialists and comparativists alike.

Lees's book is divided into nine chapters, including an introduction and a brief conclusion. He bases his narrative explication of the decisions by the SPD and Greens to share power on the state and national levels of government in Germany—as well as their record in office—on a coalition theory model of party politics. To this end, Lees begins with a nuanced review of coalition theory as initially formulated by Anthony Downs, William Riker, and William Gamson. Echoing criticism by Eric Browne and others that these early formulations lacked sufficient predictive power, Lees builds on arguments by Robert Axelrod, Abram de Swaan, and Kenneth Shepsele to construct his own model of coalition formation and maintenance. His empirical focus is on SPD-Green coalitions, but conceptually his formulation has heuristic value with respect to governing coalitions in general. Lees's "ideal type" of a Red-Green model embraces a selective emphasis on ideological affinities and policy-related priorities among parties, a leadership preference for minimal connected winning coalitions as a means to facilitate cabinet stability, and multiple institutional dimensions that include the distribution of ministerial portfolios and varying degrees of expertise among administrative officials serving each of the coalition partners.

Lees proceeds to a brief account of the origins of the SPD and the Greens, noting the persistence of ideological divisions within both parties and recounting the Greens's transition during the 1980s and 1990s from a grass-roots "antiparty party" into a mainstream party affirming basic tenets of postwar Germany's prevailing democratic and social market consensus. He then briefly describes the succession of SPD-Green coalitions formed since 1982, beginning with a short-lived cabinet in Hamburg and continuing through subsequent coalitions in Hesse, Lower Saxony, West Berlin, and ultimately the Federal Republic.

Lees utilizes the experience of the SPD-Green coalitions in West Berlin (1989) and Lower Saxony (1990-94) as chapterlength case studies to test his model of coalition formation and performance. Characterized from their appearance on the German political scene by a deep cleavage between fundamentalist (fundo) and pragmatic (realo) ideological factions within the party, the Greens managed to join the SPD in both state governments only because adherents of the latter faction managed to find common ground with the Social Democrats on a selective range of policy orientations. Among them were a shared concern with environmental and gender issues. Persisting tension between the fundo and the realo wings, however, complicated governance for both the Greens and the Social Democrats. Contributing to the Greens's frustration in office was their limited allocation of cabinet seats in comparison with the larger SPD and their difficulty in staffing "their" ministries with party loyalists sufficiently versed in administrative politics. Both coalitions thus unraveled—quickly in West Berlin because of a rapid escalation of policy conflicts, at the end of a four-year interval in Lower Saxony when the

SPD won a majority in the 1994 state election and could therefore dispense with Green support.

The larger, more populous state of Hesse constituted a more successful model of SPD-Green collaboration (and deserves a chapter in its own right) in the long runup to the 1998 Bundestag election. There, the two parties governed jointly from 1985 to 1987 and again after 1991; the coalition was reelected in 1995 (a first for the Greens). A key explanation for the party's success lies in the political competence of Joshka Fischer, their regional leader and Germany's first Green minister of the environment. Firmly identified with the pragmatic faction of the party, Fischer's moderation and solid achievements in office helped legitimize the Greens' claim to national power and pave the way to the formation of an all-German coalition government in 1998.

Lees's account of Fischer's rise to national preeminence prior to his appointment as foreign minister underscores a key subtext of his book, namely, the importance of personality in politics (which cannot be easily factored into a formal model of coalition formation). He provides an even more probing analysis of Gerhard Schröder, who began his own political ascent as leader of the SPD in Lower Saxony. Lees astutely dissects Schröder's attributes as a populist pragmatist with probusiness sympathies, his record (in both Lower Saxony and Berlin) as a tough negotiator, and his ideological embrace of a "new center" in German politics reminiscent of electoral politics pursued by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair. Lees is equally observant in his assessment of Schröder's principal rival within the SPD, Oskar LaFontaine, former ministerpresident of the Saarland who served as minister of finance in the SPD-Green coalition until his dramatic resignation in March 1999. Their conflict, Lees correctly contends, epitomizes the SPD's own internal cleavage between neoliberal and Keynesian factions. Lees is less charitable about the depth of Schröder's ideological convictions, contending that the chancellor's triumph over LaFontaine and his turnaround in public esteem after a desultory first year in office are products more of Fortuna than shrewd political behavior.

Lees's well-informed and thoughtful analysis would have been strengthened if he had broadened the scope of his inquiry to include an account of the East German Greens and a more detailed treatment of the effects of German unification on party politics. He makes only a passing reference to the former when he notes resistance on the part of many West German Greens to a merger of the two parties and restricts his discussion of unification primarily to its immediate impact on the short-lived SPD-Green coalition of 1989 in West Berlin.

The continuing fluidity of German politics as the nation struggles to define a new international role for itself while managing complex domestic economic and social issues poses serious risks for the Greens as they compete for electoral survival between the more moderate Social Democrats and the more radical Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). A companion volume to Lees's study might well focus on the conditions and prospects of conceivable SPD-PDS coalitions on at least the regional level of German politics.

Mexico: The Struggle for Democratic Development. Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, with Emilio Zebadúa. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001. 362p. \$48.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Roderic Ai Camp, Claremont McKenna College

Daniel Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, leading Mexicanists, use their scholarly expertise to provide a welcome addition to the literature on contemporary Mexican politics. This work is a lucid, well-integrated interpretation of Mexico's recent transformation economically and politically. It benefits from the past research of both authors and from the insights of their Mexican colleague. The book's primary focus, as they argue in the introductory chapter, is the fundamental role of democracy in altering Mexico's developmental path and political discourse.

They argue that instead of Mexico shifting from an authoritarian to a democratic model in July, 2000, in the aftermath of Vicente Fox's election, it moved from a "semidemocracy," in the last two decades, to a democracy. The authors do not suggest that Mexico is a complete democracy, however, only that when using three common measures of democracy, these measures, including basic citizen rights, remain fragile and incomplete. One of the important underlying themes they explore is the relationship between a stable and an undemocratic political system. They correctly suggest that Mexican failures socially are numerous and that most Mexicans, despite certain macroeconomic benefits associated with North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), have failed to improve their personal economic situation. In fact, they conclude that Mexico gained more jobs than the United States as a result of the free trade agreement. Nevertheless, they emphasize the irony of this severe economic gap occurring simultaneously with political liberalization, noting that the poorest Mexicans have been decisively excluded from the decision making process.

The other major theme they introduce, and revert to throughout the work, is the United States' changing role in Mexico and its bilateral relationship with Mexico. In their specific chapter on "Mexico in a U.S.-Led World," they analyze three important issues on the bilateral agenda in considerable detail: NAFTA, drugs, and migration. They argue that, generally speaking, international influences appear to be having a net positive impact on democracy.

The authors provide a foundation for analyzing political changes in the last decade, laying out important legacies of postrevolutionary development, the most significant of which are the lack of democracy and social/economic inequality. They provide an accurate and helpful interpretation of the rise of political competition, and they identify and give appropriate attention to newly active institutions under the rubric of organizational freedom. The Catholic Church deserves somewhat more attention in relation to its impact on the changing electoral process, as distinct from its recent, critical voice as a political actor, which they develop insightfully.

One of the strengths throughout this book is that it creates a careful structure for analysis by outlining and identifying, through chapter headings and imaginative subtitles, the fundamental issues that have molded the recent democratic process. The coherency of their overall arguments is linked strongly together throughout all of the chapters. Despite Mexican achievements to date, the authors see two major obstacles to a functioning democracy. First, it still must confront profound social inequalities (half of Mexico's population can be classified as poor). Second, the consolidation of democracy relies on institutions that have not yet developed democratic roots as deep as those that sustained authoritarianism for seven decades.

Any reader hoping to understand political developments in Mexico through 2000 will find this book invaluable. The authors were able to incorporate Fox's electoral victory into the text, given the publication date, but unfortunately they did not have an opportunity to analyze his surprise win at the polls or the consequences of PRI's defeat and the installation of a new administration. Despite the major changes the National Action Party (PAN) administration now poses for Mexico, domestic and foreign, this work is a gold mine of thoughtful interpretations of the Mexican experience, placed effectively

within the larger setting of the democratic transformation literature.

Market and Community: The Basis of Social Order, Revolution, and Relegitimation. By Mark I. Lichbach and Adam B. Seligman. University Park: Pennsylvania State Press, 2000. 177p. \$35.00 cloth, \$14.95 paper.

Mark Blyth, Johns Hopkins University

Market and Community is both more than the sum of its parts and less than what it promises. The book is more than the sum of its parts since it is a more a sequence of independent thoughtful essays than a unitary thesis. It is, however, less than what it promises because the links between the analytic and the empirical chapters are less than perfectly specified.

Market and Community revisits Brian Barry's distinction between economistic and sociological understandings of order. The authors argue that, for rationalists, order is traditionally seen as a function of individual choices and unintended consequences that generate invisible hand pressures for spontaneous order. Meanwhile, for culturalists, order cannot be generated from such methodologically individualist premises and is instead seen as a property, not of markets, but of community. Such a division is a well-established one, and here the conversation usually ends. To the authors' credit, this is where they begin.

The core of the book is the second chapter, "Analytic Approaches to Social Order." Beginning with an excellent discussion of why different explanations of order ultimately rest upon very different conceptions of the "self," the authors develop a typology of alternative solutions to the problem of order along two dimensions; deliberation (Is order planned or unplanned?) and ontology (Is such an order spontaneous or contingent?) Mapping this out, four solutions to the problem of order present themselves: market, community, contract, and hierarchy. The key contribution of this chapter is to show why each of these solutions fails to explain order adequately. Market solutions fail since they presuppose the society they seek to explain; community solutions fail since common values rest upon prior exchanges and contracts; contract approaches fail since they rest at base on prior notions of what is legitimate—a community property; while hierarchy fails for the simple reason that force alone never works. This chapter is an excellent theoretical primer and tour de force on the limits of different social theories.

Yet after this impressive beginning the book becomes less than what it promises, for the next two chapters sit rather oddly with the foregoing discussion. Ostensibly, chapters 3 and 4 attempt to locate these insights in the study of revolution and regime building. However, here the authors fall short. While chapter 3 provides an excellent summary of the main theories of revolution and a critical exegesis of their shortcomings—a chapter that is sure to become a comps exam review classic—the point of doing so remains opaque. Having already specified why partial theories logically cannot provide sufficient explanations in the previous chapter, showing why everyone from Charles Tilly to Jock A. Goldstone indeed makes such errors adds little to the analysis, unless one is going to provide an alternative, which the authors do not do. Instead they provide a theory of postrevolutionary regime consolidation, which is something rather different from a theory of revolution. Given this, one cannot help but ask exactly how this is related to the previous chapters or even if this is a fair criticism of other theories of revolution. For example, does a theory of the origins of empires have to account for their dissolution too? Nonetheless, chapter 4 provides us with a very interesting theory of how postrevolutionary stability is created. Postrevolutionary stability is explained utilizing a metaphor of entering, negotiating in, and exiting a "room." In this room, if elite expectations are congruent, resources are fungible, and if the bargains struck can be maintained, then a liberal type polity results. If not, an authoritarian reaction develops. These propositions, and the subsequent brief case studies, fail to satisfy on two levels. First, how this approach obviates the problems discussed in chapter 2 is unclear. It is unclear if the authors are attempting to transcend the four perspectives analyzed previously or are simply rehashing them. Second, some of the explanatory variables seem more descriptive than analytic. To take one example, the authors argue that to get into the "room" one must have "a statistically normal distribution of elite opinion" (p. 100). Moreover, size matters. The more "moderates" there are, the more agreement there will be. But this raises the question, Isn't a statistically normal distribution of elite opinion (where most people are moderate) precisely a description of a nonrevolutionary situation? If so, is this an explanation of how one constructs order, or a description of order?

While the empirics of the book fail to satisfy completely, its analytic strength comes roaring back in chapter 5. This chapter takes the form of a dialogue between the authors that ranges across issues of identity, preference falsification, reductionism, practice versus choice, the historicity of markets and self-interest, and a host of other topics. The dialogue is a joy to read and the passion of the authors shines through. If one ever wants a piece that explains to students what is at stake in the debates over rational choice theory and its alternatives, I can think of nothing better. However, the placement of the dialogue, coming as it does it at the end of the volume, adds to the sense of disconnect from the middle chapters and, thus, strengthens the sense of *Market and Community* being less a single argument and more two different conversations.

In fact, it is a shame that the dialogue ends the book rather than begins it. It would be a wonderful setup chapter for why market, community, contract, and hierarchy solutions are seen as alternatives and, indeed, what is at stake, or better, what is missing, in each of these perspectives. This would make the second chapter even more powerful and perhaps support the sections on revolution and relegitimation a bit better. Market and Community pushes the "rationalist" versus "culturalist" debate beyond the usual long-range oratorical bombardment and into truly fertile ground. And while it fails to satisfy completely as a theory of revolution and relegitimation, as an analytic discussion of order, it is superb.

The Social Movement Society: Contentious Politics for a New Century. Edited by David S. Meyer and Sidney Tarrow. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997. 282p. \$68.50 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Social Movements in Politics: A Comparative Study. By Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh. London: Addison Wesley Longman, 1997. 288p. \$32.00

Jillian Schwedler, University of Maryland

What does protest means in industrial societies? To answer this question, David Meyer and Sidney Tarrow bring together political scientists and sociologists from Europe and the United States to build on comparative insights. The 17 contributors include some of the most prominent voices in the study of contentious politics as well as a few new ones. Some chapters are organized around case studies (Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier on the African National Congress; Rucht on protest in Germany; and McCarthy and McPhail on protest in the United States), while others compare across cases (Crozat on Western democracies; Della Porta, Fillieule,

and Reiter on policing in France and Italy; Kubik on Central Europe; Hipsher on Latin America). The editors' introduction and the final two chapters (Katzenstein on feminist movements; Keck and Sikkink on transnational advocacy networks) advance cross-regional comparisons.

The editors advance three claims: (1) Protest is a more routine part of life in industrialized societies, (2) more protests address more diverse constituencies, and (3) professionalization of movements has led to a fundamental change in the character of protest in industrialized societies. They argue that new repertoires of contention have emerged, ranging from spontaneous protests by students and laborers advocating greater social justice and economic equality to carefully planned demonstrations led by party leaders and wealthy industrialists and supported by middleclass actors (pp. 1–4). Tactics have also spread geographically, within nations as well as cross-nationally and into transnational spheres.

Many of the contributors agree that protest has become institutionalized and professionalized, but with some interesting twists. In Kubik's study of four cases from Central Europe, she argues that the institutionalization of protest has not resulted in a shift from direct collective action (e.g., protests, strikes) to strategies of lower mobilization and less disruption (e.g., petitions); rather, direct action has itself been institutionalized (p. 148). In his study of Germany, Rucht argues that professionalization has not resulted in deradicalization. While it is true that "demands for fundamental social and political change" were largely absent from protest movements by the 1980s (p. 49), the proportion of illegal and violent protests actually increased. Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier reach similar conclusions. South Africa's political transition has brought decreased overall levels of political engagement, including within political parties, but this has not meant a "demovementization" of society (p. 191). For those who remain engaged, the level of participation is likely to be much higher.

Katzenstein presents a comparison of feminist activism within the military and the Church. She critiques conceptions of institutionalization that suggest a cessation of fundamental challenges to the system. Instead, the character of institutional location (habitat) may structure the form that protest takes, but it does not necessarily deflate its potential to bring about significant change. Hipsher also focuses attention on context. In Chile and Brazil, more disruptive and contentious forms of protest gave way as movements began to work almost entirely within state structures to achieve their goals (p. 168). In Chile, however, the institutionalization of dissent has resulted in more exclusionary politics; Brazil has seen the incorporation of movements within the system. This conclusion illustrates that the institutionalization of protest is fundamentally linked to state responses.

Two chapters focus explicitly on the changing role of the state, particularly the evolving policing practices. Della Porta, Fillieule, and Reiter argue that in France and Italy, police management of protest events has indeed changed over the past decades, from practices of intimidation to "minimalistic bargaining" with protestors (p. 125). As McCarthy and McPhail illustrate in their study of protest in the United States, the police tolerate minor violations of the law, and often even cooperate and coordinate with protestors to ensure "successful" events for all involved. Not only has the social organization of protest evolved into institutionalized forms over the past decades (p. 100), but so has policing of protests, from "escalated force" to "negotiated management" (p. 96).

This volume makes an important contribution to our understanding of contentious politics in industrialized societies and offers some counterintuitive conclusions. For the most part, the contributors agree that protest in industrialized societies has indeed become largely institutionalized but not tamed.

Rather, societies appear to be more accustomed to protest, and many states work hard to ensure the rights of citizens to express their diverse views. However, Crozat provides an important check on the enthusiasm such conclusions might evoke. Routinization of protest activities in everyday life, he argues, has not produced a corresponding change in public attitudes toward protest. In fact, tolerance of protest activities has perhaps decreased, rather than increased (p. 60).

What are the implications of these developments for civil society globally? Della Porta, Fillieule, and Reiter's conclusions suggest that policing trends strengthen civil society, particularly as antagonistic relationships, even between protestors and police, are framed as engagements among citizens (p. 128). Kubik's study cautions that institutionalization may not mean a strengthening of civil society if the latter is defined by the primary resort to democratic means to address political grievances. Yet if protest itself is considered part of civil society, then the institutionalization of protest is a positive force. Hipsher's conclusions imply that institutionalization of social movements can have contrary effects on civil society: If movements are institutionalized into only forms such as political parties, the outcome is less democratic than if a wide range of movements and tactics are institutionalized. And as Keck and Sikkink's study suggests, transnational social movement networks are already changing the shape of global civil society.

In another recent work on contentious politics, Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh provides a fascinating comparative study of three social movements in very different contexts: the West German Greens (an electoral party movement), Poland's Solidarity (a movement that emerged under an authoritarian system), and Peru's Shining Path (a movement that emerged in a nonurban and nonindustrial context). The author states that the book is intended both as a primer on the current state of social movement theory and as a comparative study aimed at advancing a new theory. It is only partially successful on both counts, but the comparative study provides much rich ground that clearly merits serious attention.

In the first section, Zirakzadeh characterizes what he sees as three generations of social movement theory over the past century: Social movements have been theorized as (1) responses to modernization, (2) responses to structural inequalities, and (3) products of identity struggles. The second section (actually three parts) examines each of the cases in light of these three generations of social movement theorists. The final section highlights the comparative findings, assesses the weakness of existing theoretical approaches for making sense of these cases, and argues for a foruth generation of theorizing. This new approach would "focus on (1) the plural viewpoints, interests, and ambitions that exist within any movement; (2) the conflicts over goals, priorities, and activities that naturally arise from members' different interests and aims; and (3) the methods that leaders use to reduce friction among activists and to promote agreement and unity" (p. 239).

Zirakzadeh overstates the originality of this approach, and he seems to suggest that only scholars of "identity-formation theory" have systematically attended to the importance of cultural factors. As much earlier work (e.g., Bert Klandermans, Hanspeter Kriesi, and Sidney Tarrow, International Social Movement Research, Vol. 1, 1988; Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action, and Politics, 1994; Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, and Meyer Zald, Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements, 1996) illustrates, the trend among social movement theorists since at least the early 1990s has been to combine the insights of political opportunity structures and resource mobilization with the study of cultural factors, not only identity but also

ideology, beliefs, dominant narratives, discourse, and framing processes. Few, if any, argue that any of these earlier "generations" of theorizing alone provide a sufficient explanatory model, though they may focus attention on different explanatory factors.

However, the strength of Zirakzadeh's analysis is in stressing the need to pay close attention to the internal dynamics of social movements ranging from militants to political parties and across diverse contexts. Particularly valuable is his detailed examination of ideological debates within each party. Without attention to internal party politics, one would not recognize the extent to which debates over ideological orientation structure the behavior of these diverse movements. One would have liked to see more of the book focus on the details of his proposed "fourth generation" theory, which is implicitly developed in the case studies but formally stated only in the last 2.5 pages of the book. Nevertheless, this study is an important contribution to the growing and extremely important body of scholarship that compares social movements in very different contexts (e.g., Gay Seidman, Manufacturing Militance: Workers' Movements in Brazil and South Africa, 1994; Elisabeth Wood, Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador, 2000; Misagh Parsa, States, Ideologies, and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of Iran, Nicaragua, and the Philippines, 2001).

Conservative Parties, the Right, and Democracy in Latin America. Edited by Kevin J. Middlebrook. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000. 408p. \$59.95 cloth, \$21.00 paper.

Nancy R. Powers, Florida State University

Given the Right's historic record of undermining democracy in Latin America, Kevin Middlebrook organized a conference in 1996 to examine its adjustment to the democratic rules of the posttransitions, post-Cold War era. This work began in that conference and is part of the editor's larger research program.

Middlebrook begins with an extended introduction to the research problem and the contributors' findings. Case studies by prominent country specialists follow, encompassing Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Peru, and Venezuela. The editor's conclusion identifies questions for future research, followed by a marvelous appendix.

Edited volumes are notoriously tricky. This one's occasional flaws are outweighed by its many contributions. One strength is the consistent structure across the chapters, each of which gives an historically grounded account of the Right's place vis-à-vis the larger party and political systems.

In content, the chapters are largely unified by a focus on how socioeconomic elites accommodate themselves to democracy. (The major exception is the Brazil chapter, added after the initial conference.) Middlebrook's underlying premise, drawing from Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber, and John Stephens' work (Capitalist Development and Democracy, 1992) and also consistent with Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter (Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, 1986), is that democratic survival requires competitive conservative parties or other means within the party system, so that elites feel able to protect their class interests (cf. pp. 5 and 110). Scott Mainwaring, Rachel Meneguello, and Timothy Power argue that the Brazilian case only partially supports the premise (see pp. 217-19). Atilio Borón, Michael Coppedge, and John Dugas each argue that the Right has not necessarily needed its own party to protect itself in Argentina, Venezuela, or Colombia, respectively. In Argentina, the Right has counted on the military and other proxies. In Venezuela and Colombia, the Right protected its interests via clientelistic relationships with centrist party politicians—although in both cases, the decline of those centrist parties threatens the Right's continuing capacity to protect itself without its own party. Middlebrook concludes that while post-Cold War conditions may help the Right feel less vulnerable than in the past, nevertheless, a viable party would be the best means to its long-term sense of security under democratic rules. At the same time, he acknowledges the concerns of several contributors that the quality of that democracy may suffer when elites are electorally strong and able to use the democratic process to restrict civil liberties or social policy reforms (see pp. 286–88).

A key finding in the work is the variation, across both time and region, in the ways in which and degrees to which socioeconomic elites access power. Manuel Antonio Garretón argues that backward-looking extremists attached to the *pinochetista* past pull Chile's two Rightist parties outside the mainstream. This makes them a "permanent electoral minority," poorly able to represent elites' interests (although oddly, his last paragraph calls into question the permanency of this minority status [pp. 72–79]). Elisabeth Wood explains how most Salvadoran elites came to be forward looking—discovering democracy as a feasible means to defend their new interests in the post-civil war economy, via the successful ARENA party.

In Peru, the Peruvian transnational business sector managed to convince former President Fujimori to enact their economic policy priorities, but Catherine Conaghan says that they then found themselves discombobulated by Fujimori's popularity and locked out of decisions by his authoritarianism. Argentine business elites likewise used an electorally popular agent, Carlos Menem, to enact their economic program. Atilio Borón, however, sees them as contentedly ruling from behind the scenes, without need for a political party, thanks to their capacity to pressure the state and to control key institutions of civil society.

Michael Coppedge argues (controversially) that Venezuela had no conservative party, but he shows how voters became alientated by the factionalism, clientelism, and economic failures of the long-established centrist parties. Those parties virtually disappeared, supplanted by Hugo Chavez's populism, and leaving elites with neither informal nor formal representation. For similar reasons, but less severely, Colombia's traditionally strong Conservative and Liberal parties are losing electroal support. John Dugas argues that the National Front system they created to share their power and defend the elite economic interests has resulted in a self-preserving political class deaf to the interests and alienation of the popular sectors.

While largely unified in focus, the chapters are not unified on the meaning of the title concept, "conservative parties." Inconsistent terminology is problematic for readers who believed Middlebrook's introductory statement that "conservative parties are defined here as parties whose core constituencies are upper social and economic strata but that mobilize multiclass electoral support in a common political project" (p. 3). Readers eventually discover (e.g., in Coppedge's chapter, footnote 18) that "here" does not refer to the entire book. Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power are, at least, explicit. They reject the core constituency definition, because the parties that Brazilians perceive as advocating conservative positions often draw disproportionate support from lower-class voters, not elite strata (pp. 165–67).

This conceptual pluralism not only is confusing, but also impedes the kind of cross-regional theorizing that Middlebrook

attempts in the first chapter. How can we draw conclusions about the formation of conservative parties from case studies that did not define those parties in a consistent way?

Middlebrook's focus on elite core constituencies comes from an innovation proposed by Edward Gibson (Class and Conservative Parties, 1996). The innovation in focus is a good one—elites protecting their economic and social interests, not conservative norms per se, were the key threat to Latin America's liberal democracies in the last century, making a compelling case for research on those elites' "accommodation" to democracy. Yet calling elites "conservatives" is a serious semantic problem, because it flies in the face of conventional usage. Even the editor does not use "conservative" solely to indicate the party's core of support. For example, both liberal and conservative parties in the nineteenth century were dependent upon and protective of socioeconomic elites. What made one "conservative" was its alliance with the Catholic Church on moral issues and church prerogatives. As I read Middlebrook's introduction, their ideological and programmatic positions, not their core constituency, distinguished them as "conservative."

This is a nuanced and sophisticated book. While it repays a close reading, it also requires one, particularly chapters 1, 2, 5, and 6. Readers not well versed in the parties literature may be frustrated, as key points are easily missed amid jargon, detail, and sometimes rather nonlinear argumentation.

This book does not yet build a theory of the Right under democracy but, rather, seeks to identify the essential empirical and conceptual elements of such a theory. All of the chapters are insightful in their own ways, some drawing more heavily on their author's previous work than others. Mainwaring, Meneguello, and Power's unusually long piece is a tour-de-force on the Brazilian Right, including substantial new statistical analyses of its social bases.

This should be an essential reference for any scholar or graduate student studying party systems, conservatism, economic elites, or democratization in Latin America. The statistical appendix alone (pp. 293–328) is an asset. Prepared by Eric Magar and Kevin Middlebrook, the 19 tables provide hard-to-find election results for every national-level democratic election of the 1980s and 1990s in the seven countries, including very minor parties and identifying which are conservative (using Coppedge's definition).

Coalition Governments in Western Europe. Edited by Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 602p. \$90.00.

Christopher S. Allen, University of Georgia

This comprehensive volume analyzing Western European government coalitions from 1945 until 1999 is an impressive and meticulously researched work. Using a uniform, crossnational collection of data the authors examine both the governing institutions and the patterns of conflict resolution in the 13 Western European democracies that have experienced coalition government during the post-World War two years.

In a series of standardized tables that the editors established for the contributors, this volume provides clear comparable data on electoral performance, cabinet formation membership, and termination of these countries governing coalition's for the last half-century. In addition to this extremely valuable data, the contributors also placed their empirical findings within an analytical framework that recognizes the significance of political institutions and their role in both enhancing and constraining the performance of governing coalitions.

The editors began this study with the observation that 13 of the 16 major parliamentary governments in Western Europe have relied upon coalitions to govern their societies for anywhere from 20% to 100% of the post World War II period. Thus, any systematic comparison of developed democracies requires a comprehensive understanding of coalition performance.

The two primary goals of the volume are, first, to alleviate the 10-year absence of comparable data on coalition politics since the last wave of similar studies was completed over a decade ago and, second, to make a theoretical contribution to the study of coalition bargaining and politics in the tradition of game theoretical and rational choice methodologies. The editors specifically state that, while they will be happy to fulfill the first objective, their major ambition is to accomplish the second.

Unfortunately from the editors' perspective, they are much more successful with the former than the latter. The editors state in their introduction that the book is based on general and fundamental notions about the politics of coalition, namely, that it is (1) strategic, (2) manifested as a game between political parties, (3) institutionally conditioned, and (4) governed by anticipation. With such a goal, a reader might have assumed that the editors would position their work to evaluate political parties—the building blocks of coalitions within an explicitly rational choice perspective. Yet rather than examine the individual motivations of cabinet members, provide a horizontal evaluation of intraparty politics, or use a hierarchical model in which followers impose constraints on their leaders, the editors opt for the more traditional, nonrational choice approach of treating parties as unitary collective actors (pp. 6-7). They state that explicit rational actor models would prove "daunting" due to the "complexity" of the exercise, making theoretical analysis "intractable."

Ultimately, they conclude that "empirical knowledge of the real work of cabinet politics firmly suggests that party unity is so much more the rule, rather than the exception" (p. 7). Thus they assume that "leaders of a political party may have a collective interest in cohesive behaviour vis-a-vis other parties." Why is this surprising? Isn't this what parties do? More specifically, why raise rational choice theoretical expectations that will be addressed only in "future studies"? If a rational choice perspective has something compelling to offer the study of coalition politics, why not offer it here?

These theoretical shortcomings notwithstanding, this volume is a superb reference work that scholars of developed democracies will cite for years. In their concluding chapter, the editors report several significant findings for understanding governance in parliamentary democracies. Among these are

- that coalitions account for 69% of the cabinets among the countries studied in the postwar period;
- that minority governments represent 37% of the cabinets and that the median legislator thesis—a common component of rational choice findings in similar, but more limited, studies—does not prove robust in this one, since coalition politics is not always unidimensional;
- that minority governments have been less likely to include the median position than majority ones and that the formation of coalitions—and the formation process leading to them—is often as important as the final results;
- that the formation attempts can be grouped in three categories—ones in which elections largely decide coalitions (Portugal, Germany, Sweden, Ireland, Norway, France), ones in which coalitions are made after elections but with expectations about the likely outcome (Italy, Luxembourg, Denmark), and ones in which the

- postelection negotiation process among parties with a wide range of choices is significant (Belgium, Finland, The Netherlands); and
- that the dissolution of cabinets can take both technical and discretionary forms—the former representing 39% and the latter 61%—and the differences are cross-nationally significant, with Ireland, Belgium, and—of course—Italy having more than 75% of the latter.

While all of the individual country chapters are expertly done, with rich attention to detail in developing comparable data, several stand out for their analysis of counterintuitive phenomena. Thomas Saalfeld's chapter on Germany tells the story of a party system with a healthy dynamic tension; one that has produced stable governing coalitions that only alternate power after several successful terms in office. At the same time, new parties have attained representation and—in the case of the Greens—participated in coalition formation that few would have predicted when the party made its entrance into the Bundestag 15 years earlier. Also insightful is Hanne Marthe Narud's and Kaare Strøm's chapter on Norway, a country with a "fragile constitutional order" comprised of minority governments with comparatively few coalitions. Törbjörn Bergman also offers a compelling explanation for the stable minority Social Democratic hegemony in Sweden. Arco Timmermans and Rudy B. Anderweg examine the apparent erosion of the legendary accommodationist coalitions in The Netherlands due to both the complicated negotiations over policies (aside from the knotty question of which parties actually form the coalitions) and the difficulties in enforcing the coalition agreement. Finally, Luca Verzichelli's and Maurizio Cotta's chapter on Italy provides a well-argued treatment of the country's remarkable transition from one of "constrained coalitions" to one of (apparently) more stable alternating governments.

In short, this is an exceptional piece of empirical scholarship that could have been enhanced theoretically with either a more courageous attempt to employ rational choice methodology or, perhaps, no mention of it at all.

Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America. By Maria Victoria Murillo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 250p. \$59.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Heather L. Williams, Pomona College

In February of 1995, following the disastrous December 1994 devaluation of the Mexican peso, which sent incomes down temporarily by as much as 60% and threw more than a million laborers out of work, the nonagenarian labor leader Fidel Velasquez issued a curious statement. He declared that each Mexican worker (earning on average at that time about six dollars a day) should pledge one day's pay toward Mexico's external debt to show solidarity with Mexico's 24 ailing billionaires, some of whom were now merely several-hundred-millionaires. In a country where jokes are often the most telling form of popular political commentary, nobody knew whether to laugh or cry at doddering Velasquez's exhortation. After all, his long record as an advocate of painful wage caps and government downsizing suggested that he actually might be serious.

Labor Unions, Partisan Coalitions, and Market Reforms in Latin America lends new insight into the question of why leaders like Fidel Velasquez could be so publicly loyal to government administrations presiding over the long neoliberal rout of the working class and labor unions in Latin America during the late 1980s and 1990s. Punishing programs of mon-

etary stabilization, privatization, and trade liberalization hit working people the hardest—sending prices of basic goods skyward, eliminating some of the best blue-collar jobs, and downsizing many popular services. One paradox for political analysts is why any rational labor leader would acquiesce to policies that threatened his or her base of power and political leverage. The answer, according to Maria Victoria Murillo, lies in a multilayered theater of political games and tradeoffs in which labor leaders make choices about costs of the cooperation versus militance and consider the relative dangers of their own replacement by rival union leaders.

Murillo takes up three cases of neoliberal transition: Argentina under President Carlos Menem, Mexico under President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, and Venezuela under President Carlos Andres Perez. Elected in 1989, 1988, and 1989, respectively, the three Carloses presided over sweeping programs of fiscal reform, financial liberalization, and deregulation of their economies. What is particularly notable about these rapid neoliberal reforms, argues Murillo, is that all three presidents came from labor-based parties. In past decades, Argentina's Peronists, Venezuela's ADistas, and Mexico's PRIistas had been associated with protectionism, large bureaucracies, food and fuel subsidies, and ambitious programs of state-led industrialization. One might have expected the party bases of any of these presidents to dissolve from under them as they attacked the strongholds of popular support and, more importantly, the founts of patronage that kept party bosses loyal and voting urns stuffed with votes for their own. Rather than provoke widespread unrest, however, market-oriented policies in each country produced a number of responses over time, ranging from protest to cooperation. This variation in labor responses, contends Murillo, is not well explained by current models of the politics of market transition.

Taking issue with structural theories that rely on macroeconomic factors to explain labor militancy and corporatist theories that point to organizational properties of unions and peak organizations as determinants of labor quiescence or unrest, Murillo argues that the choices of labor leaders in mobilizing dissent reflect labor unions' historical weakness in Latin America's less-industrialized and weakly capitalized economies. Labor leaders who owed their careers to ties with political elites rather than vast support from rank-and-file union members faced an ugly dilemma when their patron parties betrayed their interests. Labor leaders had to choose between keeping laborers quiet and hoping that their party allies would at least mitigate some of the losses to union members during transition or flexing what muscle was left in partybased labor unions by striking or taking to the streets. The problem with the former option, cooperation, was that the government still might throw a sucker punch and leave union leaders with nothing; the problem with the latter, militance, was that resistance might well be overpowered by management or even undermined by rival unions or parties.

Murillo's work usefully expands the literature on labor and market-oriented economic transition, much of which has concentrated on single industries or single countries. A good deal has also been focused on European case studies, whose conclusions often do not model Latin American outcomes well. Murillo's research design, encompassing five industries and their labor centrals over time, is elegant and ambitious, and many of her conclusions about the importance of party and union competition in determining labor choices are quite convincing. For example, there is little question that in Mexico, where labor confederations competed against one another in key industries but operated inside a context of party monopoly, party elites could usefully play union centrals against one another, rewarding only the most pliant. In

that country, most sectors remained quiet during the most difficult years of adjustment, and Murillo's framework helps us understand why that was the case. In contrast, labor leaders in Venezuela, who operated in an increasingly partisan-competitive environment in the early 1990s, had greater fears that staying quiet during adjustment would lose them their jobs to party rivals. As a result, they were more likely to mobilize protest, even against their patrons in the ruling Democratic Action government. This helps explain the more halting nature of Venezuela's market liberalization with regard to issues important to labor.

The scholarly conversation on labor's choices in hard times having been widened with Murillo's book, much remains to be done on the subject. The original premise of this study—the paradox of labor-based parties' political durability through round after round of salvos lobbed at the working class and at union power-has fallen apart. A decade or so after the initial events Murillo examined have passed, two of the three parties discussed are out of power. The third, Argentina's Justicialists, reassumed power by default after the meltdown of the country's international credit line and the resignation of its president, Fernando de la Rua, at the end of 2001. Mexico's PRI has been in disarray since PANista Vicente Fox triumphed in the summer 2000 elections, and the AD was left in pieces in the tumultuous new landscape of populist excoup leader Chavez' Fifth Republic Movement in Venezuela. What indeed explains this?

This threefold party collapse points to one problematic assumption in Murillo's study, which is that the labor leaders in question were legitimate representatives of the rank-and-file and that they acted on behalf of their union members while attempting to keep their jobs as labor bosses. In this framework, quiescence is always interpreted as a rational bet on the part of labor leaders that loyalty to the government would earn gains for their membership. This is highly questionable in any number of contexts in Latin America. Certainly in the cases I know best in Mexico, union elections are perennially rigged and union leaders enjoy lifestyles grossly out of step with their official incomes. Even more disturbing, in the fastest-growing portion of the manufacturing workforce—the partial-assembly sector—the most prevalent form of union today is the infamous "ghost union," or false union contract registered with the labor board. This arrangement fills the coffers of national labor confederations but, in fact, serves to keep workers from actually unionizing. In these instances, it may not be as accurate to call people labor leaders so much as extortionists. Until the field of comparative political economy is able to account for relative levels of corruption and lack of democracy in the ranks of labor unions, there will be certain hypotheses about labor leaders' choices that we are unable to test.

National Minorities and Citizenship Rights in Lithuania, 1988–93. By Vesna Popovski. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 255p. \$65.00.

Mark A. Jubulis, Gannon University

Compared to neighboring Latvia and Estonia, there has been little attention paid to nationality issues in Lithuania, a country with fewer ethnic minorities (making up approximately 20% of the population) and a more inclusive citizenship policy than her Baltic neighbors. Also, Lithuania's main problems have concerned relations with its Polish minority, whereas Latvia and Estonia have large numbers of "Russian speakers." This means that Russia has been less critical and has not sought to draw international attention to minority issues in Lithuania. As a result, the international community

has praised Lithuania's laws for meeting international standards and has given a "pass" to Lithuania when it comes to the treatment of its ethnic minorities. Vesna Popovski seeks to challenge this positive assessment and is motivated by a concern for the actual *implementation* of laws, as opposed to the mere letter of the law, and seeks to discover the *perceptions* that minorities have toward their state and its policies.

Popovski's analysis contains many fresh insights based on dozens of interviews and she skillfully presents a detailed portrayal of the key differences between Lithuania's ethnic minorities as well as the subtle differences within each minority group. Popovski's analysis therefore serves as an important warning against the trap of ethnic nominalism: the assumption that ethnic groups have monolithic identity structures and that we can know an individual's outlook simply by knowing his or her group membership. As Popovski clearly illustrates, many different perceptions and goals existed within Lithuania's Russian, Polish, and Jewish communities. Indeed, the heterogeneous character of these groups provides a key explanation for the weakness of collective action on behalf of minority interests during Lithuania's transition from communism.

Popovski's point of departure is that Lithuania's ethnic minorities were unprepared for the emergence of a Lithuanian national revival in the late 1980s and that they felt threatened by the radical nationalism of Vytautas Landsbergis, the leader of Sajudis (short for Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sajudis, or "The Lithuanian Movement for Restructuring"; the word *Sajudis* means "movement," not "restructuring" as Propovski suggests on page 51). The various minority responses to the nationalism of Sajudis "... differed in accordance with their support for Lithuanian independence" (p. 79). For example, Popovski identifies one segment of the Russian minority as "Lithuanian Russians" who were integrated into Lithuanian society and supported independence, but another group of "Soviet Russians" opposed independence and supported the pro-Soviet movement called Edinstvo (Unity). These pro-Soviet loyalists were not the largest group of Russians, but they were the most vocal. Most of the Russians in Lithuania shared a common difficulty in perceiving themselves as minorities at all, since they considered themselves to be part of the Russian nation, which was the dominant core of the

The Polish minority has been more active in seeking to protect its rights because this group is territorially concentrated in southeastern Lithuania and many Poles have ancestral roots in this area, which was ruled by Poland from 1920 to 1939. Popovski identifies a split between urban and rural Poles and states that the main cultural concern of Poles is to receive education in their native language. A small rural segment of the Polish community sided with the pro-Soviet Edinstvo movement and Popovski explains that as a result of their actions, Sajudis leaders often referred to the entire Polish minority as "Red Poles" and did not try to win their support for Lithuanian independence (p. 115). Unfortunately, Popovski does not address the interesting question of why a common religious heritage did not create a stronger bond between Poles and Lithuanians.

Popovski sympathizes with the plight of Lithuania's minorities, who were forced to react against the nationalist policies of *Sajudis*, and she criticizes the leaders of *Sajudis*, ... who did not push for the development of a democratic culture that would include respect for the rights of national minorities" (p. 73). However, the author does not adequately explain why *Sajudis* would have adopted inclusive citizenship legislation in 1989 and 1991 if it subscribed to such an intolerant form of nationalism. Furthermore, Popovski believes that democracy represents principles of "plurality, difference and

heterogeneity" (p. 11), but she does not consider a minimum set of traits or values that citizens of a state should share in common. Most states are concerned with the loyalty of their citizens, but Popovski does not believe that the actions of pro-Soviet minorities diminished their claims for rights in Lithuania.

The book would be strengthened by placing more focus on the context of Lithuania's struggle for independence. The emotional and liberating atmosphere of Lithuania's "reawakening" period as well as the drama of the tense confrontation with Soviet troops in January of 1991 are completely absent from Popovski's account. The author makes passing reference to these events while noting the radicalization of Sajudis, but she offers little criticism of the attempts by Soviet forces to crush Lithuania's drive for independence. Popovski argues that the emergence of pro-Soviet sentiments among some of Lithuania's Russians and Poles was to be expected due to a justified fear of Sajudis as a radical nationalist organization (p. 100). However, the reader is left puzzled as to why even a small segment of the Poles in Lithuania would trust the CPSU or the pro-Soviet Edinstvo organization more than Sajudis. Even if Sajudis was becoming less democratic during this period, it was clear that Edinstvo rejected all of the democratic values that Popovski hoped to see victorious in Lithuania. A more detailed and realistic treatment of the events of January 1991 would lead Popovski to a more positive assessment of Sajudis as a force for democratic

Furthermore, Popovski explains that the Polish minority had many demands for various cultural rights that it expected to receive from the Lithuanian government, but none of these rights had been granted by the communist government of the Soviet Union. Popovski fails to explain why the emergence of Lithuanian nationalism was perceived to be a greater threat than communist internationalism, which denied basic democratic rights and emphasized the "blending" of different nationalities into a Russified "Soviet people." Popovski also interprets the electoral victory of former communists in 1992 as a victory of tolerance over "the Sajudis policies of conflict and differentiation" (p. 58), whereas most observers at the time interpreted it as a victory of "technocrats" who were more qualified to tackle the problems of Lithuania's economic transition. Perhaps this is one accepted belief that needs to be reassessed in light of Popovski's interviews with representatives of minorities in Lithuania.

In the end, Popovski maintains a critical position toward Lithuania's treatment of ethnic minorities and therefore casts doubt on Lithuania's democratic credentials, arguing that these rights are "the litmus test of Lithuania's orientation towards democracy" (p. 3). However, it must be pointed out that Popovski embraces a maximalist definition of democracy that creates extremely high expectations for a state that recently emerged from decades of communist rule. Following John Keane (Democracy and Civil Society, 1988), Popovski states that democracy "... represents a striving to be openminded, uncompromisingly pluralist, cosmopolitan and historically informed" (p. 9). Therefore, post-Soviet Lithuania fails to live up to these standards because "there was less and less respect for diversity and there was a tendency towards homogeneity" (p. 159). With such high standards, however, we are left wondering whether any self-proclaimed nationstate can also be democratic.

Moreover, by focusing entirely on the negative aspects of nationalism and the *Sajudis* era, Popovski overlooks the positive legacy established by Landsbergis in leading a nonviolent struggle for Lithuania's independence. Popovski may have reached a more positive conclusion if she had adopted

a broader comparative perspective. Although Popovski reminds us that Lithuania has unresolved nationality questions, Lithuania's protection of minority rights appears much better compared to other postcommunist states or perhaps even some West European states, and Lithuania is far more democratic today than it ever was under Soviet rule. We must remember that Vytautas Landsbergis and *Sajudis* deserve much of the credit for ushering in this new era of freedom and democracy.

**Fuzzy-Set Social Science.** By Charles C. Ragin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 352p. \$48.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

Philip A. Schrodt, University of Kansas

The department where I did my graduate training in the early 1970s was bitterly split between advocates of case-study and statistical approaches. At the time, both sides thought the other would fade away—statistical analysis was a fad; case studies, a relic from a prescientific past. But 30 years later, both methods persist, and the debate has recently intensified in response to King, Keohane, and Verba's (1994) assertion in Designing Social Inquiry that the methodology of case studies could be subsumed under that used in statistical research. The polite names for the two positions have changed—"case study" versus "large N" is more common now than the "traditional" versus "scientific" monikers of the 1960s and 1970s; the epithets—"slow journalism" versus "mindless number crunching"—remain much the same.

Into this debate comes a new contribution by University of Arizona, sociologist Charles Ragin focusing on the middle (and thinly populated) ground between the N=1 of the classical case study and the large-N statistical studies. It significantly extends the set theoretic "quantitative comparative analysis" techniques that Ragin (1987) developed in The Comparative Method and is presented as a graduate-level textbook.

The work makes three arguments. The first, constituting about a third of the book, is a sophisticated discussion of case selection—explicitly framed (p. 14) as a rebuttal to King, Keohane, and Verba-using Lazarfeld's concept of "property spaces" (Paul F. Lazarfeld, "Some Remarks on Typological Procedures in Social Research," Zietschrift für Sozialforschung 6 [1937]: 119-39). Qualitative researchers, almost without exception, argue that some cases are more interesting than others and see informed case selection as a critical element of the qualitative method. Large-N researchers, in contrast, see this process as "selection on the dependent variable" that can only attenuate the strength of the underlying relationships. Ragin's arguments for the property space approach are not dependent on fuzzy-set methods and could stand on their own as a contribution to this debate. (Ragin also provides some cautionary notes on the prevailing canonical justification for case selection, John Stuart Mill's "method of agreement," noting (p. 204) that Mill explicitly said that this should *not* be applied to the study of social behavior.)

The second focus of the book is an extended discussion of logical necessity and sufficiency as an alternative to the additive models that characterize most large-N statistical work. These arguments largely parallel those made earlier by Ragin (1987) and mirror a larger body of work on logical conditions such as Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr's (1989) Inquiry, Logic and International Politics.

The remainder of the book extends these set-theoretic arguments to the more recent paradigm of "fuzzy sets," introduced in the 1960s by artificial intelligence (AI) researcher Lotfi Zedah (Lofti A. Zadeh, "Fuzzy Sets," *Information and* 

Control 8 [1965]: 338–53). The method has been employed in international relations research for quite some time—for example, by Claudio A. Cioffi-Revilla ("Fuzzy Sets and Models of International Relations," American Journal of Political Science 25 [1981]: 129–59) and Gregory S. Sanjian ("Fuzzy Sets Theory and U.S. Arms Transfers: Modeling the Decision-Making Process," American Journal of Political Science 32 [1988]: 1018–46)—although Ragin has apparently developed his applications independently. Within AI, fuzzy sets have settled into a utilitarian role as one of several methods that can represent deliberately vague decision-making heuristics. For example, many of the microprocessor-controlled components found in contemporary automobiles use fuzzy logic.

Fuzzy logic formalizes degrees of set membership, avoiding the strict "either-or" assessments of conventional set theory. For example, most observers would classify France as a democracy and North Korea as not a democracy. But what about Russia? Russia in 2001 is more democratic than the Soviet Union of 1937, and arguably more democratic than the Russia of 1994, but it is still not as democratic as contemporary France, Germany, or Sweden. Fuzzy-set theory allows the membership of Russia in the set of "democratic states" to be given as a number between zero and one. The theory then specifies a number of operations that can be done with these sets. Some of these operations parallel conventional set theory; others approximate "common sense" reasoning.

The attraction of fuzzy-set theory (to both Ragin and AI researchers) is the ability to deal formally with ambiguity. The disadvantage is the absence of a clear underlying theoretical justification—many fuzzy-set operations are essentially rules of thumb, albeit rules of thumb that allow a car to start smoothly on a cold morning. Epistemologically, fuzzy sets are still at a pragmatic level comparable to the status of large-N statistics in the late nineteenth century, before the intense philosophical debates of R. A. Fisher, Jerzy Neyman, Egon Pearson, and others in the first decades of the twentieth century led to our current norms for statistical inference. On the positive side, the recent "qualitative research methods" movement-instantiated in the Inter-University Faculty Consortium on Qualitative Research Methods (http://www.asu.edu/clas/polisci/cqrm/; accessed 28 December 2001)—may be providing such a debate.

Most of the examples in the text are simplified hypothetical cases. While pedagogically appropriate, the resulting models are more parsimonious than usually will be the case when real data are analyzed. Chapter 10, however, provides two fully developed empirical examples, on protests against IMF austerity measures and on the level of generosity of welfare states. (Ragin's examples generally involve such broad social-political phenomena rather than, say, the life of street mimes in San Francisco.) The methods have been implemented in a software package that can be downloaded from http://www.nwu.edu/sociology/tools/qca/fsqca.html (accessed 28 December 2001). There is no fee for the software, although the code is not open-source and works only on the Windows operating system.

I see two barriers to the wider adaptation of this approach. The first is the sheer complexity of the set-theoretic models, whether classical or fuzzy. Large-N statistical models appear to be parsimonious: Thousands of observations on dozens of variables are reduced to a few simple tables, and most readers only look to see which t-statistics are greater than 2.0. This apparent parsimony actually conceals the incredibly complex assumptions of the estimation methods, but it is familiar. Set-theoretical generalizations, in contrast, tend toward mindnumbing intricacy, particularly when one is not accustomed to Boolean (or fuzzy) algebra.

Second, the least satisfying aspect of the book was the question of measurement. While Ragin mentions the issue, measurement does not receive the same detailed attention accorded to case selection, and one is left with an impression of "Hey, what the heck, it's just an approximation." The implicit assumption seems to be that fuzzy sets represent such a dramatic improvement in validity over the dichotomous classifications of classical sets that their merits are obvious, but an explicit "theory of fuzzy data" would be helpful.

Ragin's set-theoretic work is an important contribution to formalizing the issue of the scientific status of small-N studies. After more than 30 years of debate, the need for multiple approaches is likely to remain. Case-study researchers are always at risk that their cases may not be representative; large-N researchers are at risk that their data consist of subpopulations that behave in a fashion exactly opposite of that implied by an aggregate analysis. In addition, many interesting phenomena (for example, twentieth-century revolutions, states in the European Union, and U.S. third-party presidential candidates) provide far too few examples to generate robust statistical estimates. While Ragin's fuzzy-set methodology is certainly not the final word on this debate, it is an important and accessible addition to the literature.

**Timber Booms and Institutional Breakdown in Southeast Asia.** By Michael L. Ross. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 237p. \$49.95.

Alasdair Bowie, George Washington University

With his systematic study of the effects of timber windfall booms on the institutions of four Southeast Asian states, Michael Ross informs the often emotional debate about the relative costs and benefits of "openness" to international trade. Ross investigates the effects of such windfall booms in the Philippines, Indonesia, and the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak on state institutions and finds that their openness to international trade has rendered these states institutionally vulnerable. In so doing, he makes an important extension to the contributions of Peter Gourevitch and Peter Katzenstein, who have focused on the effects that different state institutions have had on national responses to exogenous—usually unpleasant—shocks in European countries (e.g., see Peter A. Gourevitch, Politics in Hard Times, 1986, and Peter J. Katzenstein, Small States in World Markets, 1978). Contrary to expectations, Ross finds that positive shocks (revenue windfalls) have generally corrosive effects not only on the economy (the "Dutch disease" syndrome) but also—and this is the heart of Ross's contribution—on the very institutions of the state. How this institutional corrosion sets in, why it does so, and why the effects prove to be so debilitating are the principal foci of this book.

Ross hypothesizes that when windfall revenues accrue to the state, state officials seek to control the allocation—in the form of economic rents—of these windfalls to others (Ross terms this rent seizing). By control, Ross means establishing direct, exclusive, and discretionary authority to allocate. In seeking to control the allocation of windfall revenues in this way, public officials will weaken those state institutions that restrict windfall use (p. 42). In short, an exogenous international shock leads to changed behavior of state officials at the national level, which in turn weakens state institutions. Ross sensibly limits his study to assessing the validity of these arguments in the four cases, rather than attempting to test their general applicability (p. 43).

In the Philippines, which lost 55% of its forest cover between 1951 and 1986, a combination of increased volume of timber exports and higher prices (in pesos, adjusted for

inflation) resulted in windfall profits that state officials in successive governments sought to allocate (p. 83). In so doing, they bypassed institutions created in the early part of the century to ensure the sustainable exploitation of the nation's forests, such as the Bureau of Forestry. Marcos, for example, appointed a series of cronies to direct the Bureau and wield control over the allocation of logging licenses (p. 72). Ross argues that the politicization of the state's forestry institutions and their adoption of policies that led to logging at rates many times higher than the maximum sustainable yield did not result from irrational, short-sighted euphoric behavior on the part of policymakers (p. 3), or from overwhelming rent-seeking pressures from companies or interest groups wanting to capture the windfall. Rather, it resulted primarily from the efforts of policymakers in both executive and legislative branches during the administrations of Presidents Magsaysay, Garcia, Macapagal, and Marcos to seize control of the windfall.

While the Philippines case offers convincing evidence for the undermining of state forestry institutions following a timber boom, Ross's argument that this resulted primarily from rent seizing, and not so much from a "get rich quick" attitude of politicians or from rent-seeking pressures from the industry, is less convincing. Indeed, Ross himself writes, of the period from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, that "officeholders held incentives to exploit their influence, and to spend the [timber] windfall, as quickly as possible" (p. 64). Moreover, the treatment of rent seeking per se is cursory, and the reader is left wondering whether the counter thesis (that rent seeking, rather than rent seizing, was the most important intervening variable) has been given adequate play. In addition, for the period under Marcos, the fact that all state institutions—not just those associated with forestry-were politicized (see Garry Hawes, The Philippine State and the Marcos Regime, 1987) undermines Ross's claim that timber windfalls specifically, operating through rent-seizing behavior, caused the politicization of state forestry bodies. Absent this broader context of institutional change, the reader may feel that sector-specific windfalls and rent seizing have been overplayed in Ross'

While the Malaysian state of Sabah in the 1950s and early 1960s had "an unusually sound set of forestry institutions" (p. 88), state officials dismantled these institutions beginning in the late 1960s and seized the authority to allocate rents to others (mainly forestry licenses) so that, by 1991, the World Bank was warning that Sabah's forests were so badly overlogged that the state faced a path to "destitution" (p. 88). Was this a case, then, of the timber windfalls of the 1960s and 1970s stimulating rent seizing, which contributed to institutional decline? Perhaps, but as Ross himself points out, Sabah enjoyed timber windfalls before 1963 (when it ceased to be a British colony) without experiencing the phenomenon of rent seizing or the reduced autonomy of state forestry agencies. This suggests that certain conditions must hold before a resource windfall will result in rent-seizing behavior. Ross argues (p. 114) that such conditions amount to a lack of security of tenure on the part of the chief executive. Implicitly, resource windfalls under conditions of party/leader insecurity (e.g., Sabah under Chief Minister Mustapha, 1967-75) will result in high levels of rent seizing; under conditions where leadership is secure (e.g., Sabah under British rule), resource windfalls will result in no or modest rent seizing. Other potential variables that might further condition the relationship between windfalls and rent seizing are unfortunately omitted. Ross ends the chapter with his strongest case, without expanding upon the significance of such variables for his original hypotheses.

More troubling for Ross's central thesis is the fact that the windfall in Sabah resulted primarily from increased volumes logged, rather than from international price increases, and these increased volumes in turn resulted from policy initiatives on the part of the Sabah government that greatly expanded two categories of logging licenses—annual and special licenses (p. 107). Thus, it appears that the windfall resulted from *endogenous* rather than exogenous factors. Since rent seizing also is endogenous, this suggests the possibility that the hypothesized windfall/rent-seizing relationship in Sabah is in fact spurious, both developments having resulted from other variables not specified among Ross's initial hypotheses.

The cases of Sarawak and Indonesia also pose dilemmas for Ross's schema. Specifically, while his third hypothesis links rent-seizing activity by state officials with the weakening of institutions that restrict windfall use, in both Sarawak and Indonesia such state institutions were weak or nonexistent from the outset (pp. 137, 157). While Ross argues that adat, or customary law, acted as a constraint on windfall use in Indonesia, and it was this "institution" that deteriorated in the face of rent seizing during the period of Suharto's rule, it is difficult to evaluate this claim. How does one measure the effect of adat as a constraint on windfall use in any particular area? Moreover, Ross's schema is clearly based on the experiences of the Philippines and Sabah, where the institutions in question are indeed state institutions. Unfortunately, this means that those seeking to understand the causes and consequences of the current rapid deforestation of Indonesia may be disappointed by the present volume. As Ross admits, Indonesia fits less well his thesis about rent seizing and its corrosive institutional effects than is the case for the other states covered here (p. 187).

As with all systematic attempts to assess the validity of propositions across a variety of state settings, Ross's study finds the validity to be greater in some settings than in others. The author deserves considerable credit for developing hypotheses that are clear and then seeking to apply them across a broad swath of empirical data covering half a century and four states. To be sure, there are omissions—e.g., the counter hypotheses ("get rich quick," rent-seeking pressures) are not seriously addressed after the first case—and the time frame ends around 1996 (there is little data later than this). And the poor quality of the copyediting in the volume (see, for example, fig. 6.I; "effect" on p. 35 and p. 36, fn 14) will no doubt prove an irritant to author and reader alike. Nevertheless, this book will be found valuable by scholars, practitioners, and graduate students with interests in the effects of globalization on national-level behavior and institutions.

The Search for Good Government: Understanding the Paradox of Italian Democracy. By Filippo Sabetti. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2000. 288p. \$34.95.

Franklin Hugh Adler, Macalester College

Filippo Sabetti has written an important book, not just for specialists in Italian politics, but also for those more generally interested in comparative politics. Poor government performance has often been associated with the Italian state, so much so that foreign scholars often used Italy as an ideal locale to probe the seminal causes of political pathology. Edward Banfield's (1958) *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, for example, attributed poor political performance to the particular beliefs and attitudes of Italians, to an inadequate moral basis he identified as "amoral familism." The village Banfield studied, Chiaromonte (which he called Montegrano), soon became a model for "backward societies" in the comparative literature and later was woven into game

theoretic concerns, such as the tragedy of the commons and the prisoner's dilemma. Banfield's "culturalist" approach was later refined in Robert Putnam's (1993) Making Democracy Work. Rather than condemning all Italy to pathological status, as Banfield's Montegrano writ large, Putnam compared the "unsuccessful" South with the civic-minded North, where a density of associations and an abundance of "social capital" not only made "democracy work," but also contributed to economic prosperity. Putnam later extended this analysis of associability and social capital to the United States, most famously in his work on "bowling alone."

Sabetti vigorously argues that the "culturalist" analyses of Banfield and Putnam not only are flawed with respect to Italy, but represent myopic general approaches to the study of politics. More than 30 years ago, formative voices in comparative politics, such as Roy Macridis and Giovanni Sartori, lamented a growing tendency to treat politics as a dependent variable, "explained" by economic, social, or cultural factors. From an institutionalist stance, Sabetti similarly argues against the implied neutrality or even benevolence of governmental forms; these, he argues, not only frame the context within which social intercourse takes place, but are formative in their own right—they serve to capacitate or incapacitate self-government. As the mantra goes, "Institutions count"; they are more than simple backdrops for the political activity of citizens. Some institutional arrangements promote trust and self-government; some do not.

Sabetti forcefully argues that the creation and development of a federalist Italian state, rather than the centralized, unitary one that emerged from the Risorgimento, would have provided precisely that institutional architecture that might have encouraged good government, locally and nationally. Instead, liberal leaders such as Camillo Cavour chose, among hotly debated alternatives, to emulate the monocentric French state model. In the aftermath of the Parisian "June days," which he personally witnessed, Cavour was more interested in unitary, effective social control than local self-government, particularly given the centrifugal potential represented by diverse communes and regions. As Raymond Grew once quipped, types like Cavour sounded like Gladstone but acted like Guizot. Sabetti's hero is Carlo Cattaneo, Cavour's contemporary, who passionately argued for a federalist constitution, a United States of Italy, which would be based upon and draw sustenance from Italy's long-standing, heterogeneous communal traditions. Francesco Ferrara, another advocate for the American model, warned that the preemptory annexation of Sicily, subjecting it to unmediated rule from Rome, would create "the Ireland of Italy" and noted, "It is a common error to attribute more cohesion to a state whose central government takes on tasks that subaltern bodies or individuals can do better" (p. 46).

After reconstructing the constitutional debates that preceded the creation of the Italian state, Sabetti develops and updates Cattaneo's analysis to critique the performance of the contemporary state with respect to the delivery of public services, central planning, and the war on crime. As all fundamental decisions were made in Rome, with little knowledge or sensitivity to local interests, policy tended to be bureaucratic, arbitrary, arrogant, and inefficient. Why? Not because political agents were necessarily incompetent or ill intentioned, but because Italy's institutional arrangements were structurally defective, not because of cultural pathologies or an absence of social capital, but because Italy's institutional architecture inhibited local self-government. Moreover, excessive legislation (often cumbersome, incompatible, and contradictory), emanating from Rome, left individual office holders with tremendous discretion for interpretation and implementation. This discretion, linked to the presence of a large public sector and the dynamics of intraparty competition and fund-raising, led endemically to the clientelism, kickbacks, and pervasive corruption for which Italy became infamous, especially with the dramatic Tagentopoli scandals of the early 1990s. A strongly federal system, Sabetti notes, has firebreaks, as corruption in one unit has a greater chance of being contained and not spilling over into others. He cites Burnett and Mantovani's comparison between Italy and the United States: "Corruption in the letting of contracts for building the Milan subway went from high to low on both the paying side and the receiving side. On the other hand, President Clinton's problems with campaign donations have not engulfed state and city Democratic parties nor endangered Democratic mayors and governors" (p. 262).

A student of federalism in Italy and Canada, Sabetti is also a specialist on the Italian South. In this regard, he questions not only the culturalist arguments of Banfield and Putnam, but the latter's "path dependency" scheme in which North-South differences are deeply rooted in distinctive patterns beginning in the eleventh century (monarchy in the South, communal republicanism in the North). Sabetti argues that Putnam's historical model is overly deterministic and factually inaccurate, oblivious to Southern patterns of associability that continued under monarchy and expanded during the nineteenth century. The truth probably lies somewhere in the middle, as Sabetti does recognize greater social capital and civic-mindedness in the North but cannot convincingly account for it. Perhaps, had he been less polemically inclined toward Putnam, Sabetti would have recognized at least a partial affinity between Putnam's explanation and his own institutionalism, for Putnam's argument, stripped of its excessive determinism, is that communal republicanism was an institutional form that encouraged self-government, whereas monarchy was a form that discouraged it. Be that as it may, Sabetti has written one of the more stimulating books on Italy to have appeared in recent years, and one of the very few in English that reflects the contemporary Italian fascination with federalism that followed from the Tagentopoli crisis.

**Religious Minorities in Iran.** By Eliz Sanasarian. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 249p. \$59.95.

Haleh Esfandiari, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Eliz Sanasarian's book is a welcome addition to the growing number of books on Iran since the Islamic Republic replaced the monarchy in 1979. She deals with an important yet little-covered subject: how religious minorities fare under an Islamic government. Just as Sanasarian's first book. The Women's Rights Movement in Iran, broke new ground and added much to our knowledge about of the status of women under the monarchy and the first few years of the Islamic Republic, Religious Minorities in Iran also fills a gap in scholarship. Some books and articles have been published since the Islamic revolution on Iranian Jews and Bahais, but little has appeared on Iran's Zoroastrian and Armenian communities, and virtually nothing on Iran's Chaldeans and Assyrians. No one has treated all the religious minorities in one volume. (Sansarian is, of course, dealing with religious minorities, not ethnic communities such as the Arabs, Kurds, Baluchis, Turks, and others.)

Sanasarian gives us a concise and useful summary of the history of these communities until the 1979 Islamic revolution, before addressing the major subject of the book, the fate of these communities under the Islamic Republic,

particularly in the first decade after the revolution. Sansarian notes the continuities but, more importantly, the contrasts in official attitudes toward the religious minorities before and after the revolution. The constitution during the monarchy specified Shi'ite Islam as the official religion of the state. But under the Pahlavi dynasty (1924–1979), religion was being gradually pushed into the private sphere. Under the Islamic Republic, in contrast, religion became a dominant element of state polity, affecting the life of religious minorities as much as of the Muslim population.

Under the Pahlavis, according to Sanasarian, the Shi'ite clerical hierarchy and the government did try to interfere in the affairs of the religious minorities, and harassment was greater in the provinces than in the capital, Tehran. However, she notes, in the Pahlavi period the religious minorities enjoyed improved working and living conditions and a large degree of toleration; they benefited from the Pahlavi emphasis on nation-building, nationalism, and forging Iran's disparate populations into one people. Under the reign of the second Pahlavi monarch, for example, members of the religious minorities were free to practice their religions and cultivate their cultures. Although no member of a religious minority could serve as a cabinet minister or ambassador, in the last years before the revolution there were, for example, a substantial number of Jews teaching in the universities. Members of the minority communities were prominent in business, commerce, and industry. The minorities had their own representatives in parliament (a practice continued under the Islamic Republic). Sansarian devotes an informative chapter to the discussions on the status of the religious minorities during the drafting of the constitution of the Islamic Republic. Zoroastrians, Armenians, Jews, Assyrians, and Chaldeans sent representatives to the Assembly of Experts, or constituent assembly, and participated in these debates. They were urged not to limit their comments to matters related to their communities. (Members of the Bahai faith, which emerged from nineteenth-century sectarian differences in Shi'ite Islam, were not represented, since the Islamic Republic does not recognize Bahaism as a legitimate religion). In practice, these understandably cautious minority representatives played little role in the drafting of the constitution. Article 13 of the constitution granted the religious minorities the same rights they had enjoyed under the previous constitution: the right to political representation and freedom in matters of religion, personal affairs, and religious education. (Reflecting the enormous hostility of the Shi'ite clerical community to the Bahais, they were not even mentioned in the constitution). However, according to Sanasarian, upholding Article 13 was not a priority for the new regime.

Sanasarian notes that the Islamic government continued to afford the religious minorities a relative degree of freedom in matters of religious practice and allowed the minority communities to follow their own customs in the area of family law, where it touched on marriage, divorce, and inheritance. But it interfered in the social, cultural, and educational life of the religious minorities in a major way. Minority schools were forced to place boys and girls in separate schools, since segregated education became the law of the land. The state appointed a Muslim principal and Muslim teachers to each minority school, and the teaching of religion was supervised by the state, creating tension between the community and the school staff. Protests, especially from the Armenian community, failed to change government policy. All teaching had to be done in Persian, a major source of concern for Armenians, who had long kept Armenian alive in their community by using it as a language of instruction in their schools, although the government later relented and allowed language teaching a couple of hours a week.

Members of the religious minorities enjoyed no immunity from the general tendency of the Islamic state to interfere in the social and private life of Iranians. The Islamic headdress was imposed on all Iranian women irrespective of religious persuasion. A substantial number of Armenian and Jewish employees in the private sector and civil servants were dismissed, demoted, or forced to resign. The religious concept of "pure" and "impure" was revived by the Shi'ite clerical hierarchy and non-Muslims were once again described as impure, at least by some of the clergy. The Islamic penal code (stoning for adultery, amputation for theft, lashings for various violations of the social code) was applied to Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Social gatherings of Jews and Armenians were not immune from harassment. The establishment of the Islamic Republic, the imposition of Islamic law, and the focus on religious identity, Sansarian writes, widened the separation between Iran's religious communities and the Muslim majority. Members of the religious minorities tended to stick to their own communities and refrained from mixing with Muslims to avoid controversy. Of course there were individual exceptions.

There were other problems. Sansarian is especially good at explaining the reasons why the minority communities fared differently under the Islamic Republic. The Jews were regarded with suspicion because of the Islamic Republic's hostility to Israel and Zionism. Jews were subject to property confiscations, arrests, and even executions. Over the years a great number of Jews emigrated from Iran. Under Islamic law, conversion from Islam to another religion was punishable by death, and if found out, Christian converts from Islam were treated harshly and in some instances were killed. The Armenians, Assyrians, and Chaldeans fared better but often were not immune from discrimination and interference. Of the religious minorities, the Bahais fared the worst. Agents of the state embarked on a campaign of arrests, kidnappings, and executions of Bahais. Bahai property was confiscated, and Bahais were subject to forced conversion to Islam. Bahai marriage and death certificates were not recognized and had no standing under law.

Sansarian depicts the religious minorities as communities that managed in difficult circumstances. They learned to live with a theocratic system. In the two decades of the Islamic Republic, she writes, the religious minorities "adjusted but also resisted, they bent but stood firm, they educated but realigned themselves with the new circumstances" (p. 155).

The Soldier and the State in South America: Essays in Civil-Military Relations. Edited by Patricio Silva. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 212p. \$59.95.

Cynthia Watson, The National War College

This nice, tight volume offers a novel approach to looking at the civil-military issues that have been a major focus of political science and Latin American studies over the past four decades. Using 10 short essays by predominantly Europebased scholars (Frederick Nunn of the United States, Celso Castro of Brazil, and Francisco Rojas Arevana of Chile are the exceptions), this collection stretches the evaluative process of civilian-military interactions in the region. Not merely accepting the bureaucratic-authoritarian model of Guillermo O'Donnell or others, it uses a much broader measure of the relationships in society to evaluate the health of Latin America today. It is a short collection that would be an excellent challenge for new graduate students in the subfield of civil-military relations or Latin American politics.

A notable strength of the volume is the use of multiple disciplines rather than merely political science or civil-military

relations to study the transformation of Latin America. Europeans tend to value regional studies, which retains a legitimacy that has been largely dismissed in the United States since the advent of behavioralism; this volume goes a step farther in bringing a variety of disciplines into each of the essays, allowing the authors to highlight rarely considered aspects of civil-military issues. Robben's use of Erikson's basic description of the relationship between a parent and a child in the development of trust is an interesting way to discuss the violations that the Argentine forces perpetrated against their own citizens between 1976 and 1983. His conclusions are much different from traditional political scientific or even sociological views of why this was such an insidious period for Argentina; he deserves credit for pushing us to think about the entirity of the societal and political effects of the mass arrests that violated so many people's safety and sense of well-being during this period. Similarly, Kooning's discussions of the corporate nature of the Brazilian military's view of its role in nation-building is a refreshing look at this behavior that requires the reader to think more holistically about the phenomenon.

With great emphasis on the "national security states" of Brazil (1964–85), Uruguay (1972–85), Chile (1973–90), and Argentina (1976–83), the authors have the luxury of teasing out historical, societal, and political reasons why these states have suffered through periods of such severe and enduring upheaval. Much of this volume's story line is concentrated on Chile, probably because General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte's October 1998 arrest and subsequent detention in London seemed impossible to observers in the region only a few years earlier. While Pinochet would likely never have been considered for arrest in Chile, changes in the invulnerability of the armed forces to civilian reproach had taken place.

The brevity of the essays makes them direct in their approach but does not tie them together very well. The reader requires some familiarity with the importance of civil—military issues in the Latin American context to make the most effective use of this volume.

Although this is an interesting volume, bringing history and theory on civil-military relations together in a refreshing manner, there are a couple of nagging irritants. First, the title includes the term "Essays in Civil-Military Relations" and purports to cover the region. In fact, the collection is focused almost exclusively on the southern cone states and is almost an answer to Guillermo O'Donnell's Bureaucratic-Authoritarian states of the 1960s–80s. Only Cammack's concluding chapter lives up to the volume's title by looking at the whole of the region. Nunn does address the broad range of issues that Latin American specialists have considered during the five decades of interest in this topic but focuses mostly on the southern cone states.

While one could argue that civil—military relations are most interesting over the decade of the 1990s in Chile and Colombia, the latter is mentioned only incidentally and peripherally. Colombia's pattern is quite different from that of any other states in the region but it would seem that a book on the whole of the Latin American context would mention this important case study more prominently.

Additionally, while Hugo Chavez Frias, erstwhile coupmaker and now President of Venezuela, is mentioned in passing, this instance of a coup that came close to succeeding receives no formal treatment. Chavez is the brunt of much joking in the United States but this misunderstands the tragedy of Venezuela today. In a country with a relatively small population and vast petroleum resources, societal conditions have deteriorated markedly over the past 20 years. This is precisely the type of case that would be expected to clarify the uniformed-civilian relationship, and why it has not led to a series of coup attempts—but this goes unnoted by the authors.

The topic is, as several contributors note, not completely closed in South America. As Argentina, in particular, faces yet another bout of economic insolvency, few people expect the military even to contemplate returning to power as they did repeatedly between 1930 and 1983. The questions of civilian competency still remain. As Nunn notes, "It may come to pass that civilian institutions prove incapable of coping with Latin America's various dilemmas" (p. 33). Has history been altered so that these militaries will not take the reins of power again to replace inept civilian counterparts? This book is not entirely encouraging that the militaries will stay in the barracks.

Social Movements and Economic Transition: Markets and Distributive Conflict in Mexico. By Heather L. Williams. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 239p. \$54.95.

Judith Adler Hellman, York University

Students of social movements have long struggled to explain why insurgencies occur where and when they do. In this excellent study, Heather Williams examines two contemporary Mexican movements—one rural, one urban—as a means to explain why unrest develops, when movements form, and what movement activists are likely to do once they manage to construct an organization and articulate a set of collective demands. Expanding on the work of Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly, and other scholars who have wrestled with these questions, Williams is concerned with the way in which Mexico's successive economic crises, and the implementation of neoliberal policies in response to these crises, influence the manner in which the dispossessed organize and press their demands on the state.

While the literature on social movements and contentious politics is already very extensive, Williams advances the discussion in this field with her recognition that the liberalization of the economy and contraction of the state provide a new context in which popular unrest may be expressed, even as they shape the form that association takes among underprivileged social groups. Not only do protest organizations find new ways to negotiate with government over the classic distributive issues of prices, wages, employment, housing, subsidies, and social spending, but Williams finds that "movements have continued to pressure the state in historically recognizable ways, but have adapted to changes by organizing along new lines," building alliances with new forces, and "even changing their identities . . . to maneuver more adeptly" (p. 6). Thus, she argues, not only does market transition stimulate many highly visible changes in the direction of policy and the character of public institutions, but the same process of change may alter the nature, location, and stakes of informal protest politics.

To illustrate these changes, Heather Williams examines the development of two Mexican movements. The first is a labor struggle provoked by the privatization of the Las Truchas Steelworks in Lázaro Cárdenas, Michoacán, a megaproject on the west coast of Mexico that represents the fullest expression of the postwar period of concentrated public investment and large-scale urban planning to achieve full import substitution industrialization. Williams shows that the privatization of this steel mill set off a prolonged battle to save jobs and preserve the contractual benefits won over a period of decades by the steelworkers' union. However, when the mobilizational capacity of labor began to flag after 18 months.

the location of protest shifted from the workplace to the neighborhood, where protest movements led by steelworkers and ex-steelworkers centered on housing, environmental, and urban infrastructural issues.

Far better known outside of Mexico is the second case that Williams details. El Barzón, a debtors' movement that originated among farmers in the north-central state of Zacatecas, began by protesting high interest rates and low commodity prices. The movement captured the imagination of Mexicans across the social spectrum (even as it created great excitement among students of insurgent politics!). Incorporating tens of thousands of Mexicans, ranging from industrialists to small farmers, shopkeepers, mortgage holders, street vendors, taxi drivers, small business owners, and credit card users, El Barzón, like the labor and neighborhood struggles in Lázaro Cárdenas, was a response to neoliberal policies and market-related shocks that had dramatically reduced both the income and the prospects of those who joined the protests.

As Williams notes, in both cases, the implementation of a radical new economic policy not only changed the political and economic environment in which protest movements developed, but altered protestors' sense of what was possible or useful to demand and shifted contentious politics out of the traditional corporatist channels and onto a far less stable and predictable political terrain. The feeling that no one can say what may happen next in Mexican politics—a feeling that has greatly intensified since the election of President Vicente Fox in July 2000—is revealed in William's study to be a feature of the Mexican political landscape that can be traced to the development of movements such as that of Lázaro Cárdenas and El Barzón in the years before the outbreak of the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas in 1994 or the defeat of the governing party in 2000.

Thus, in this insightful study, Williams recognizes and explains the highly fluid situation in which wage-based and consumption-based demands mix, even as political actors inside and outside of the formal economy find ways of connecting their protest organizations. In addition, she underscores the irony of a situation in which the conceptual language used to describe the parameters of protest often obscures the texture of the actual activities involved. While social movement theorists speak of opportunity or opportunity structures, Williams's fieldwork reveals that "the term is quite distant from what people in movements experience emotionally or physically as they engage in public assemblies or occupations." In fact, Williams finds that "protest, for most people, is at best inconvenient and at worst terrifying" (p. 21).

Indeed, this is one of the many strengths of this excellent book. Not only does Williams recognize the critical importance of political economy in structuring, if not actually determining, the shape that insurgency will take, but she also identifies the range of strategies and tactics most likely to bring positive results. With an extremely sharp eye for the telling detail, Williams manages to capture the character of a social movement on the ground, noting that the key questions are not always the big theoretical ones but, rather, Who paid for what? Who brought the food and water? Who knew a doctor? Who called the lawyer? and Whose contact leaked the crucial documents?

The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan. By Teresa Wright. Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 2001. 192p. \$48.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Chris Lee, University of Minnesota at Morris

Teresa Wright provides a well-researched in-depth comparative analysis of student movements in China and Taiwan.

Although this is not the only work to look at these movements, this book is a useful addition to the literature because it (1) contains information about the political environment in China and Taiwan in the late 1980s, (2) presents thorough accounts of events from the beginning to the end of both movements, (3) provides valuable information about organizational decision making and conflicts within the student protest groups, and (4) puts forth several hypotheses about dissident behavior that can be applied to other cases. China's Democracy Movement of 1989 and Taiwan's Month of March Movement of 1990 are cases that cry out for comparison. Both movements were preceded by conflict regarding a change or shift of power in their governments, and students in both movements exhibited similar behavior. However, the Democracy Movement of 1989 was ended by the state with the use of violent repression, while the Month of March Movement concluded peacefully and successfully. Both of these cases share a variety of similarities with the exception of their outcomes; therefore Wright seizes the opportunity to review the genesis and effect of student behavior in 1989 and

The book begins with a brief description of the political environment students faced in China and Taiwan in 1989 and 1990. Wright points out similarities in both cases and notes that although the Taiwanese government was less repressive than the Chinese leadership, the illiberal regimes in both counties created atmospheres of fear and distrust, which greatly influenced the behavior of student protestors. The author also discusses internal divisions within the Communist Party of China (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) that affected the outcomes of both student movements.

The next portion of the book includes very detailed accounts of student group's organization and protest activities. Wright first discusses the Chinese case, documenting student activities from April 15 to June 4 1989. She then describes the actions of student protest groups in Taiwan in March 1990. One of this books's greatest strengths lies in this section; the benefits of the authors's interviews with student leaders are apparent. In both cases the author's meticulous descriptions and analyses illuminate the decision-making calculus of the student leaders and indicate how the political environments created by illiberal regimes influenced the behavior of student groups in understandable ways. Wright argues that the political realities produced by the CCP and KMT influenced student groups to isolate themselves from potential allies, created organizational instability, and fostered protest radicalization

Wright concludes by offering suggestions that allow the extension of this work's findings on China and Taiwan to other cases. She finds that certain protest traits are exaggerated in more illiberal and repressive environments, therefore Wright suggests that it may be practical to examine political context as a spectrum ranging from the most oppressive and illiberal environments to those that are the most open and pluralist. "As one moves across the spectrum toward more oppressive regimes, intervening variables of fear and distrust become more pronounced, such that crucial collective action resources of organization and mobilization are stymied" (p. 130). Therefore, the more repressive the regime, the more fear and distrust by dissidents increase, which results in the diminishment of dissident organization and mobilization capacity. A large part of this book's value lies in theoretical arguments that seem to be supported in these cases. Both in China and, due to a lesser degree, in Taiwan, the great likelihood of repression and infiltration by the governing parties created an environment that impacted the realities of student organizational behavior and tactics in three ways.

First, in both cases successful organization was possible only when it was founded on personal friendship networks. Wright argues that in political environments like those in China and Taiwan, organizational networks that are not based on prior friendship are less trustworthy and tend to be plagued by internal suspicion, resulting in organizational instability and ineffectiveness.

Second, an environment of great distrust and fear leads to protest radicalization. The author asserts that protest radicalization occurs in such environments because behavior that is more confrontational is perceived as proof of an individual's commitment to the cause, while moderation is seen as suspicious. The radicalization of behavior can lead to organizational instability and can prolong or exacerbate already tense situations.

Third, dangerous political environments limit protest mobilization efforts. Protestors have to protect themselves from the threats of repression and slander by representatives of the state. Therefore protestors in illiberal regimes may find it necessary to keep their groups from forming recognized ties to outside groups whose membership and tactics are uncertain or to groups who have been targets of state repression in the past. Put differently, the political environment created by illiberal repressive states tends to force protestors to avoid forming connections with other groups, which inhibits a movement's ability to mobilize across various social groups. Hence tactics employed by protest groups to protect themselves ironically may actually weaken the movement's potential influence.

Both of the cases the author focuses on in this book support the three arguments above. She successfully contends that the political environments created by the CCP in China and the KMT in Taiwan greatly influenced the behavior of student protestors in both states. However, she also states that the protest and organizational behavior described above can also be applied to other cases with illiberal repressive regimes. The fact that she derives several generalizable hypotheses from her extensive analysis of student protest activities in China and Taiwan adds to the value of this book's contribution to the literature.

Although this book provides a very comprehensive account of student protest group activity, there could have been more discussion of the impact of the political environment on the overall success or failure of the movements. The author does point out that elements within both the CCP in China and the KMT in Taiwan wished to use the student movements to their benefits. Conservative governing elites in both China and Taiwan wanted to use the student movements to garner support for slowing the pace of reforms, while liberalizing elements wanted to exploit the students' activities to advance their arguments for the expansion of reforms. However, she could have devoted more space to emphasis of the fact that members who favored liberalization in Taiwan's KMT party held more influence within their party and played a major role in the "success" of the student movement in Taiwan, while liberalizing elements were less influential in China's CCP party. greatly contributing to the lack of success of the Chinese student movement. Despite the aforementioned criticism, this book provides several valuable contributions to the examination of student protest behavior in China and Taiwan and to the study of social movements and contentious politics in general.

#### International Relations

The Dynamics of Global Dominance: European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980. By David B. Abernethy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001. 536p. \$35.00.

Giovanni Arrighi, Johns Hopkins University

In The Dynamics of Global Dominance David Abernethy advances four main propositions concerning the rise and demise of European overseas empires over the last half-millennium. The first proposition is that the unprecedented and unparalleled success of European states in building overseas empires in the two long phases of expansion (dated with questionable precision from 1415 to 1773 and from 1824 to 1913) was due primarily to the cumulative, synergistic effects of the extended geographical reach, functional specialization, and ability to work in mutually reinforcing ways of European governmental, business, and religious institutions. In each sphere Europeans faced highly effective non-European competitors. But no such competitor could match the European combination of mutually reinforcing advances in all three spheres. This combination was critical in sustaining not just expansion but also colonial consolidation.

The second proposition is that initially non-European resistance to the triple assault of European specialists in power, profit, and proselytization tended to be ineffectual or even counterproductive. This led to collaboration or, more often, accommodation on the part of non-European actors—"an intensely pragmatic response to circumstances considered unlikely to change whatever one did or thought" (p. 302). Collaboration and accommodation facilitated the expansion and consolidation of European dominance. Over time, how-

ever, they gave way to rebellion and a phase of contraction/disintegration of overseas European empires. The book's third main proposition is that eventual contraction was the result not so much of the overextension as of the contradictions of empire. "Consolidation of colonial rule had the unintended effect of magnifying and highlighting problems inherent in systems of overseas governance. These problems made it more difficult for administrators to know what to do and became sources of conflict with colonial residents. Consolidation eventually undercut itself" (p. 327). Problems of overseas governance developed unevenly among different empires. But the multiple political crises triggered by "hegemonic wars"—an exogenous and unexplained variable in Abernethy's scheme of things—had a powerful synchronizing effect across space on the transformation of contradictions into successful independence movements.

The book's fourth main proposition is that each cycle of expansion/contraction left in its wake a very different world from the one existing when the cycle began. The geographical scope of the regional European interstate system expanded, reaching its present global dimensions at the end of the second cycle. Long-distance trade was stimulated enormously, resulting in today's global economy. Populations were reshuffled across the globe, giving rise to communities far more differentiated and stratified racially and culturally than in the past. Last but not least, rapid national economic development became a universal goal, mounting an unprecedented assault on the world's physical environment.

There is much to be commended in Abernethy's story. The systematic comparison of the forces at work in the two phases of expansion and in the two phases of contraction of European overseas empires generates manyinsightful,

illuminating, and original observations, such as the analogy drawn between the British North American colonies and India as "precedent-setters" of the first and second phase of decolonization, respectively, and the analogy drawn between the Haitian Revolution and the Rhodesian white settlers' Unilateral Declaration of Independence as "deviant cases" of the phase of decolonization in which they occurred. It is, above all, the details of Abernethy's comparative analysis that make *The Dynamics of Global Dominance* compulsory reading for anyone interested in the rise and demise of European colonial imperialism.

The weaknesses of the book are, for the most part, the obverse side of its strengths. Abernethy is well aware of the fact that the two cycles of expansion and contraction that he compares present not just similarities but also differences. Indeed, he probably spends as much time highlighting differences as he does highlighting similarities. Nevertheless, the overall emphasis is on similarities. More important, some of the differences between the two cycles that have been most significant in shaping the dynamics and legacy of European dominance do not receive the attention they deserve or are not discussed at all, I limit myself to two omissions that in my view are particularly problematic.

The first concerns the agency of European expansion. In Abernethy's story this agency is pretty much the same in the two phases of expansion, consisting of the combination of governmental, business, and religious institutions noted above. In the case of religious institutions Abernethy does note the change in agency between the first and the second phase of expansion due to the emergence of Protestant churches as competitors of the Catholic church. But he pays little or no attention to the far more fundamental transformations that occurred in the governmental and business agencies that led expansion in the two phases. Like many others before him, he presumes a system of national states and related business enterprises that expands quantitatively but remains basically the same qualitatively. In reality, the system could expand quantitatively only through recurrent fundamental qualitative transformations that created governmental-business complexes of increasing size and complexity. Neither the dynamics nor the legacy of European overseas expansion can be fully understood except in the light of these qualitative transformations—transformations that, among other things, resulted in the relocation of the primary political, economic, and cultural center of "European" global dominance outside geographical Europe, that is, to North America.

Closely related to the above, Abernethy pays little attention to a fundamental difference between the settler colonialism prevalent in the first cycle of expansion and contraction and the colonialism of occupation prevalent in the second cycle. European settlers were not colonized peoples but the colonizers themselves—in most instances the primary agency of European overseas expansion. The peoples of non-European descent who lived in the colonies of occupation prevalent in the second cycle, in contrast, were colonized and no amount of collaboration and accommodation vis-à-vis European rule made them colonizers. At least implicitly, Abernethy does take this difference into account when he compares the processes that led to the independence of former colonies in the two phases of contraction. But he ignores it completely in assessing the legacy of the two rounds of European overseas expansion. The fact that settler colonialism added three and a half additional continents (Australasia, North and South America, and the half-continent of Siberia) to the possessions of peoples of European descent—who, after independence, continued to speak European languages and to welcome the inflow of European people, capital, and ideas—while occupation colonialism left behind no such possessions is hardly ever mentioned; nor is the fact that settler colonialism for the most part eventually resulted in the formation of comparatively or absolutely wealthy nations, while occupation colonialism for the most part eventually resulted in the formation of comparatively or absolutely poor nations.

These are serious weaknesses that are reflected in many dubious judgments concerning the dynamics and legacy of European dominance. On balance, however, they are overshadowed by the book's strengths. There is much one can disagree with in *The Dynamics of Global Dominance* but at least as much to be learned from it.

Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. By Amitav Acharya. New York: Routledge, 2001. 234p. \$90.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

David Arase, Pomona College

Amitav Acharya has produced an innovative and stimulating evaluation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) at a crucial juncture in that organization's development. Acharya does not shrink from the challenge of measuring ASEAN's rhetoric of regional cooperation against its actual accomplishments, and the theoretical and empirical sophistication that Acharya displays makes this book sure to be a key work on the security and political aspects of ASEAN for academics and policymakers.

At its inception in 1967 ASEAN's commitment to peaceful and cooperative relations among its members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand) inspired some skepticism because there were festering disputes left over from the decolonization period as well as the threat of communist insurgency spreading beyond Indochina. With some encouragement from the West, ASEAN managed to survive its first few years. After the Vietnam War, ASEAN's members sought to become something more than pawns in Southeast Asian security affairs. Although ASEAN failed to mount effective resistance to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in 1978, it did subsequently help to isolate Vietnam and the Khmer Rouge regime diplomatically. As the Cold War came to a close ASEAN helped to broker a peaceful settlement in Cambodia. It then created the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to discuss security matters, and it produced the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) initiative. Borne by the self-confidence produced by these initiatives as well as by the rising tide of prosperity among its members, ASEAN set out at middecade to become a regional organization with comprehensive membership that presumably would allow it to rank in importance with the United States, China, or Japan in determining regional affairs.

What distinguishes Acharya's analysis of ASEAN's development is his use of the constructivist approach to understanding international relations similar to that of Peter Katzenstein in his recent work. In contrast to neorealist and neoliberal approaches (which use models of actors making rational calculations of utility under conditions of objective and external constraint), the constructivist approach gives new life to behavioralism by giving transnational relations an essential importance due to the effect they can have in changing norms, perceptions, and identities. Through this process a state, or relations between states, may be peacefully changed or take on a particular character. In taking this approach Acharya goes back to Karl Deutsch's transactionalist analysis of regionalism and adapts the concept of pluralistic security community (i.e., a transnational region comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain dependable expectations of peaceful change) to the task of understanding ASEAN as a socially constructed security community.

Acharya's constructivist approach is helpful in putting the spotlight on the peculiar nature of ASEAN. It commits member governments to the informal discussion of issues rather than to formal negotiation processes, to decision making by consensus rather than by voting rules, to noninterference in each other's domestic matters rather than adherence to common values and practices, to the nonuse of force between members, and to the avoidance of collective defense measures. Together these and other norms constitute what is called the ASEAN Way, and according to Acharya this has provided the foundation for ASEAN as a security community. Thus, ASEAN is really not a formal rule-making and rule-enforcing organization, yet it has developed common aims such as protecting regional stability against disruption by external actors, as well as norms and a distinctive sense of "we-ness" among its members.

The question, however, is how significant these norms have been. Acharya tackles this issue by comparing the actual individual and collective behavior of ASEAN's members to the rhetoric of the ASEAN Way, and he asks, To what extent has the ASEAN process affected member identities and loyalties over time? The answers are found in chapters in which he discusses how members have dealt with key episodes such as resolving the Cambodian conflict (chapter 3) and agreeing to admit Vietnam, Myanmar (Burma), and Cambodia (chapter 4). Chapter 5 is devoted to intra-ASEAN tensions over disputed boundaries, competitive military modernization (which undercuts the notion of ASEAN as a true security community), divergent economic priorities, and growing differences over human rights. Chapter 6 deals with ASEAN's attempt to manage its security environment through the ARF. Each chapter identifies troubling disparities between ASEAN norms and stubborn facts that have already or may in the future damage ASEAN's prospects. These chapters also contain insightful treatments of the political maneuvering behind the facade of ASEAN unity and are well worth reading on their own.

Acharya concludes that ASEAN has taught its members norms that help to preserve peace between them. In this sense ASEAN-style regionalism has produced a nascent security community. Acharya finds that ASEAN has not been particularly successful, however, in reconfiguring the loyalties and identities of its members, who remain sovereignty-bound actors. And he is not particularly sanguine about ASEAN's future given the internal strains evident since membership expansion and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98, as well as the external pressures generated by Western human rights lobbies and a more assertive and ambitious China. Looking to the future he reckons that "ASEAN...now is in serious need to reinvent itself" (p. 208).

With respect to the theoretical framework of the book there are two minor points one could raise. One is the invocation of Deutsch's concept of a pluralistic security community while discarding his broader theory of transactionalism. That is, Acharya notes that ASEAN preceded, and did not follow as a result of, intensifying transnational interactions and cultural convergence between member societies and that there is little popular support for ASEAN within member countries. On the question of what then created the ASEAN security community absent the conditions Deutsch imagined, the author refers to the learning and socialization to norms that occur within international institutions, which then may lead national elites to redefine their notions of interest and identity. One supposes that here Acharya could have done more with the elite-led, cognitively based neofunctionalism of Ernst Haas.

The other point has to do with evaluating alternative explanations of ASEAN. The constructivist approach does put the focus on norms, but is this approach in the end better at explaining ASEAN as a security community than, say, Michael Liefer's realist characterization of ASEAN as a diplomatic community serving the separate interests of its members in maintaining stability or Donald K. Emmerson's neoliberal characterization of ASEAN as a security regime dedicated to preserving member sovereignty in conditions of peace? It is true that such characterizations tend to rule out the possibility of weakening sovereignty or the formation of a collective identity by individual states engaged in cooperation, but by Acharya's own account the sovereignty-bound national identities of ASEAN's members remain stubbornly intact over 30 years after ASEAN's inception.

Despite these minor quibbles, Acharya has written a vivid and cutting-edge work on ASEAN and the problems of security cooperation in Southeast Asia.

Organized Crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the U.S.-Mexican Borderlands. Edited by John Bailey and Roy Godson. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000. 271p. \$50.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

William O. Walker III, Florida International University

Organized Crime and Democratic Governability offers an insightful look at one of the most critical and vexing questions of the contemporary era: To what extent is democratic governance possible when it coexists with organized crime? John Bailey and Roy Godson's edited volume analyzes the many dimensions of the deeply entrenched obstacles to democratic stability in modern Mexico, perhaps an ideal case study for such an inquiry. The reach of organized crime there has long tended to undermine the very lifeblood of democracy, namely, its procedures. As a result, throughout the sweep of Mexico's postrevolutionary history, the roots of democracy have not been firmly planted. This chronic condition cannot quickly be remedied. Consequently, the editors conclude, organized crime in its various manifestations will continue to present "a significant challenge to democratic governability in Mexico" (p. 218).

Democracy is not necessarily a lost cause in Mexico, however. Problems with historical origins have knowable and explainable causes and, hence, are not wholly at the mercy of quasi-immutable external forces. Yet as the essays in this volume indicate, the effort to bring effective democracy to Mexico is more difficult than explaining its relative absences. The book's contributors neither engage in model building about the interplay between organized crime and governance nor exactly offer a theory derived from the relationship between the two. Nevertheless, as the editors point out, there exist demonstrable analytical patterns, or images, that might point toward possible corrective action by a Mexican state with the will to address its problems. There are four typologies that help elucidate the crime-governance nexus within Mexico and two that illuminate the nature of conditions near the border with the United States. The former are identified as Contained Corruption, whereby law enforcement at the subnational level is ineffective, even compromised, in the face of criminal activity; Centralized-Systemic (formal), whereby corruption within the central government extends to virtually all levels of law enforcement; Centralized-Systemic (formal plus shadow), whereby a parallel structure exists alongside the central government and abets corruption; and Fragmented-Contested, whereby centralized bureaucratic incapacity tends to compromise local efforts at law enforcement. The other two images or

typologies, which pertain to the borderlands, are identified as Marginal Corruption, whereby a professional law enforcement structure keeps corruption relatively in check; and Decentralized, Targeted Corruption, whereby corruption tends to overwhelm efforts at law enforcement in select border regions.

The Fragmented-Contested image is the one found most often within Mexico and along its northern border. Given the historic prevalence of bureaucratic incapacity and the persistent inability or unwillingness of the nation, particularly during the reign of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), to address that situation, it is not surprising that Mexico is a site of extensive contestation. At the same time, asserting the primacy of contestation without probing more deeply into, for instance, the structure-agency issue, tends to limit the range of analysis to which these case studies can be subjected.

While the typologies provide a useful angle of vision on crime and politics in Mexico, they do not directly raise several critical questions. It is worth asking whether the democratic processes in Mexico can survive apart from the economic underpinning provided by organized crime. In other words, if Mexico, now under the leadership of Vicente Fox, is positioned to move beyond the PRI's inclusive, authoritarian style of governance, what kind of democracy is possible without the nexus between crime and politics? A related concern is whether the set of relationships between the governing classes and crime is too entrenched to displace. Finally, and more specifically, is the demand for drugs-for profit at home through illegal trafficking and consumption abroad, most notably in the United States—the dependent variable that historically allowed organized crime to penetrate the process of governing in the Mexican state?

Luis Astorga, in examining the long-standing relationships between drug-related crime and the political system, finds that such linkages helped to provide the political system at local levels with a kind of stability that it might not otherwise have possessed. Likewise, Leonardo Curzio sees drug trafficking as responsible for "the evolution of organized crime into a national security problem" (p. 84). Without a hint of irony, Curzio fears as well that the gradual opening of the Mexican political system after elections in 1985 in the state of Chihuahua, which began the process of removing politicians with a sense of entitlement to hold office, might further enable organized crime "to cultivate," (p. 102), that is, destabilize the political system. Indeed, even when non-PRI politicians join the political system at the highest levels, as was the case when the National Action Party's Antonio Lozano Gracia took charge of the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic from 1994 to 1996, it proved difficult to challenge "the ruling elite's impunity and abuse of power" (p. 106) argues Sigrid Artz. Artz finds, too, that administrative incapacity blocked Lozano's efforts to put comprehensive reforms into place, which, in effect, highlights the influence of extralegal relationships upon the nation's political processes. Perhaps no recent event shows the negative consequence of such linkages than the revelation in February 1997 that Mexico's chief drug official, General Jesús Gutíerrez Rebollo, was providing protection for the Juárez cartel. Nor has Mexico's military escaped the taint of association with organized crime, a situation that is not likely to diminish as the army becomes increasingly involved in all manner of issues related to domestic security. Maintaining domestic order, a constitutional mission of the military, has led to the professionalization of the military but not its depoliticization. In fact, contends Raúl Benítez Manaut, at the end of the twentieth century the military was so active in security matters that it raised fears of a militarized state; it did not matter how open the political process appeared to be. Moreover, the Mexican-U.S. border constitutes an attractive environment in which to revitalize relationships between organized crime and local officials of both countries. As Francisco Javier Molina Ruiz shows, there exist "ample opportunities and fertile ground" for the rapid growth of crime along the border because of "the lack of control mechanisms, the dynamics of the border's economy, and the flexibility of the authorities" (p. 199).

While Organized Crime and Democratic Governability may not be the seminal guide for analyzing its subject, when used together with other volumes in this genre, such as Peter Andreas's (2000) Border Games: Policing the U.S.—Mexico Divide, it goes a long way toward charting the contours of that important enterprise.

From Tribal Village to Global Village: Indian Rights and International Relations in Latin America. By Alison Brysk. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. 400p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Margaret E. Keck, Johns Hopkins University

From Tribal Village to Global Village does an excellent job of showing how indigenous peoples in Latin America have gone from victims to protagonists in struggles to control their own fate. Like Alison Brysk's previous work on human rights activities in Argentina during the "dirty war," this book investigates political dynamics involving nonstate actors at the interface between international relations and comparative politics. Key to these dynamics is the idea that "above all, globalization involves the growing presence, use, and salience of information both in national and local struggles and as a newly significant arena of international relations" (p. 12).

Following a strategy that Brysk calls "identity plus internationalization," since the beginning of the 1980s the new Indian Rights Movement has won changes in international regimes and domestic law in such areas as land rights, legal status, political representation, and language issues (especially bilingual education). It has facilitated both market access for indigenous products and greater negotiating clout with mining and oil companies prospecting on Indian lands.

Brysk's fieldwork for the book focused on Ecuador as a "most likely case," because of its large indigenous population, its strong and internationalized Indian Rights movement, and the presence of a variety of international forces. However, the book also presents case studies from Bolivia, Brazil, Nicaragua, and Mexico and refers frequently to Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, and Chile.

The book's theoretical framework combines elements of constructivism with critical theory, yielding what Brysk calls a "critical constructivist" approach. This includes a "normative view of political power in which interaction, learning, and persuasion can transform dominant behavior and institutions—including the state" (p. 29). Within this normative view, Brysk focuses on "the power of meaning" and on a dynamic construction of identity that involves both strategic and symbolic aspects" (p. 39). At the same time, from critical theory she draws a focus on the structural conditions of communication and a recognition that "communication is not merely a transparent and transferable vehicle or resource, but a mode of domination" (pp. 50–51).

Domestic actors deployed transnational resources nationally or took their demands for self-determination, land rights, and cultural survival to external arenas for adjudication. They did so because they had no support at home. International actors—foundations, multilateral institutions, professional associations, and foreign government assistance programs, as well as wealthy individuals—were convinced to support indigenous causes for a variety of reasons. Besides indigenous activists and anthropologists, these included mainly

human rights groups and environmentalists. Thus, "modern resources are deployed to defend traditional identities, and traditional identities construct different responses to modernization" (p. 58). At issue is not the desire to remain frozen in time but, rather, who manages "the pace and content of cultural change" (p. 60).

The Indian Rights Movement most often mobilized in the presence of external threats (such as World Bank projects in Brazil). Essential resources included external supporters (the Catholic Church, anthropologists, international aid agencies) and a small cadre of educated Indians, "confident enough to expect equality, frustrated when it was not forthcoming, and skilled enough to lead modern movements in national political systems" (p. 67). The book does a good job of describing the origins and growth of panindigenous organizing and the development of the external network of support.

The problems I found in the book came, oddly enough, both from the book's breadth and from its narrowness. If one of the book's strengths is its broad overview of the phenomenon under study, the fact that it almost never breaks the narrative with a different kind of standpoint is also one of its weaknesses. After a few chapters of thumbnail sketches of particular indigenous groups, institutions, and struggles in relation to the topic in question, the eyes glaze over. I would have liked to zoom in on a few of these examples, closely enough actually to see the nuts and bolts of mounting an international campaign or winning international support. That never happens.

The other problem with the book is its narrow focus on indigenous politics per se, as if that alone could explain how and why indigenous groups were successful in making their claims. I do not know well most of the cases Brysk discusses and cannot comment on them. However, I do know some of the Brazilian cases. I know that the treatment of the Yanomami issue at the level of relations among the Yanomami, the national government, and both national and foreign supporters misses a lot of the story. It misses, for example, the way President Collor attempted to win foreign accolades for dynamiting an illegal miners' airstrip in Yanomami territory before visiting Washington, only to discover when he got there that the airstrip had been rebuilt immediately and that President Bush knew it. It misses the migration dynamics of itinerant placer miners, recently pushed out of other mineralrich areas by the advent of more mechanized production. It misses the crucial role of state politics in the case, in that the government of Roraima vehemently supported the gold miners, and the federal government did not want to alienate the government of Roraima. It misses the great difficulty that indigenous activists had in explaining to ordinary Brazilians why a group of 9000 Indians should be granted a territory "the size of Scotland" (p. 135), while the landless movement had tried vainly for years to win land reform. The fact that in 1997 a Brazilian court found five miners guilty of genocide probably says much less about changing attitudes toward Indians than it does about changes in the judiciary due to the institution of a meritocratic system for selecting judges. In other words, elements of the broader political context—federalism, political economy, institutional change, and symbolic politics, among others, in the Brazilian case—are simply absent from this narrative. We hear almost nothing about what else was going on in these countries at the time these conflicts were being adjudicatedwhat the determinants of the national mood were, what other things would intervene in whether national support was available.

Granted, these are the complaints of a comparativist looking at a study of international relations involving the increasing contact between global and local spheres. However, as more studies investigate transnational linkages and sources

of leverage over domestic problems, it seems important to remember that these linkages do not occur in isolation; they are interpenetrated by elements of political life, at levels ranging from local to transnational.

That said, let me return to the fact that for anyone interested in understanding the process by which indigenous peoples have taken a place on the world stage, as well as what they are fighting for, *From Tribal Village to Global Village* is an essential source.

Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms. By Ann Marie Clark. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 183p. \$39.50 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Peter Willetts, City University, London

The claim is often made by political activists that the international human rights system is dependent upon nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Ann Marie Clark documents this claim with respect to Amnesty International's achievements. The core of the book is a set of three case studies: the development of the Convention against Torture; the creation of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, along with the unfinished story of attempts to produce a convention against disappearances; and the creation of the Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions, followed by the drafting of a UN "Manual" on prevention and investigation of extrajudicial executions. These case studies are not simply presented as empirical accounts of the diplomatic history. They are structured by portraying each as a four-stage political process, in which Amnesty International collated information on the nature of human rights abuses, built consensus around the principle that the pattern of behavior was morally unacceptable, constructed international norms to express this principle as standards of behavior, and then sought to have application of the norms monitored at both the domestic and the international level.

It is an extraordinary comment on the state of political science that it has taken 40 years since their foundation for the first academic book on Amnesty International to be written. The reason is that its activities do not fit into the orthodox study of either comparative government or international relations. Merely to claim that a transnational actor is important breaks the boundary between domestic and global politics. Clark goes much further by clearly asserting that a focus on norm creation is a theoretical challenge to the Realist approach. It is not supposed to be possible for moral principles to have any impact upon the pursuit of power. Unfortunately, despite the depth of her empirical analysis, Clark makes her challenge in the weakest possible manner, "The moral aspects of international norms cannot be completely subordinated to state purposes" (p. 23). The full application of an analysis of the mobilization of support for principles and norms would recognize that traditional state interests do not have any objective status. The pursuit of security and economic wealth is just a different choice of normative priorities than support

While this is a book about Amnesty International, it does not make the mistake of concentrating solely on Amnesty's activities. The strength of the case studies is that the politics of human rights at the UN is put in the context of changes in world politics, the significance of changes within particular countries, and the nature of the different structures of different UN fora. While Amnesty has a leadership role, so too do other NGOs, UN secretariat officials, UN rapporteurs, and particular governments, notably the Scandinavians. Amnesty is portrayed as having three strengths: its loyalty to the moral principles of human rights, its independent status,

and its expertise. Nevertheless, it is just one actor in a complex system.

Clark should have the courage to recognize that her work is a denial that we live in "a system dominated by states" (p. 30). Governments have taken the final decisions, but the decisions they took would have been utterly different if Amnesty had not been part of the diplomatic system. Because of the work of Amnesty, in collaboration with the other actors who promote human rights, governments are now constrained by a complex web of international standards, including legally binding treaties. (However, Clark is wrong to suggest, on pages 24 and 31, that they are bound by signing, rather than ratifying, treaties.) An odd omission from the book is any mention either of the way in which the Convention against Torture overrides the principle of sovereignty immunity or the introduction, under the Optional Protocol, of the right of appeal of individuals to international bodies. These two changes were a revolution in the very nature of the international system. It ceased in law, as it had long before ceased in politics, to be simply an interstate system.

It should be noted that by "principles" Clark is referring to what others might call values, and her use of "norms" is in the relatively narrow sense of generally accepted specific rules for behavior. For example, we have had general acceptance of the principle that "Everyone has the right to life" since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in December 1948, but there was no international norm for the conduct of autopsies, to investigate extrajudicial killings, until the UN Manual was produced in May 1991. This distinction, between principles and norms, is central to the book and its most valuable contribution to theorizing about the nature of the political processes in international regimes. Although it is derived from Stephen Krasner's standard definition of a regime (Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes, 1983, p. 2), Clark's use of the distinction goes way beyond that envisaged by Krasner and opens up the possibility of a nonrealist theory of regimes.

Clark has produced a powerful and important work that should be read widely, not just by those interested in human rights. However, if it is to be used for teaching purposes, students should be cautioned that several general statements downplaying the significance of NGOs in the early years of the UN are not valid (pp. 6, 8, 9, 13, 124). Clark falls into a common trap for subject specialists of believing that the role of NGOs in their field is unique and unprecedented. It is precisely because NGOs have been important at the UN since the foundation and because their role has been expanding on all issues that Clark's work has general importance for theorizing about principles and norms in international policymaking. Indeed, if the early NGOs had not succeeded in the first five years of the UN in translating the principle in Article 71 of the Charter, allowing NGO consultations in an interstate forum, into a set of norms for the exercise of participation rights, then Amnesty would never have had any access to the Commission on Human Rights and the standardsetting processes.

The Global Political Economy and Post-1989 Change: The Place of the Central European Transition. By Elizabeth de Boer-Ashworth. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 203p. \$65.00

Peter Gowan, University of North London

This book attempts to draw upon some heterodox, mainly Marxist, approaches to Western influence on Central European political economies in the 1990s. It also argues that the European Union's (EU's) role in the Central European

transformation was qualitatively more positive than the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank.

In her first two chapters Elizabeth de Boer-Ashworth suggests that various Marxist or neo-Gramscian approaches to the influence of the West on peripheral economies offer valuable insights. But this interesting survey of the ideas of such authors (including the present reviewer) is not then followed through with an attempt to employ concepts from this quarter to studies of the changes in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia (and the Czech Republic) in the 1990s. These chapters instead offer a descriptive narrative of changes in the three Central European states unguided by any very obvious analytical/theoretical framework.

Instead, as the book progresses, a second main contention acquires increasing salience. This is that while the baleful influence of the international financial institutions, pressing neoliberalism, was dominant in Central Europe from 1989 to 1993, the stronger involvement of the EU since then has tended to ameliorate the conditions within the Central European political economies, shielding them "from the worst pressures of international capital and the prescriptions of the IMF" (p. 27).

This second contention, that with the signing of the Europe Agreements between Central European states and the EU their transition was ameliorated, is not convincingly argued. Boer-Ashworth does not make distinctions between macroeconomic trends and microeconomic changes. She therefore does not distinguish the IMF's macroeconomic prescriptions from the microeconomic and institutional changes put forward by the IMF and World Bank. This failure is then linked to her failure to understand the nature and economic significance of the EU's trade regime for economic outcomes in the transition. The IMF macroeconomic policy involved a deliberate and harsh deflation combined with a currency devaluation. This was a macroeconomic policy mix very much along the same lines as IMF Latin American policies in the 1980s, though its impact was exacerbated by the collapse of Central European trade with the USSR. This combination gave the Central European economies one path toward strong economic recovery: export-led growth to the EU market. But the EU trade regime seriously blocked this recovery path by blocking imports in key existing Central European export sectors. Boer-Ashworth entirely misses this pincer effect.

One source of this failure may derive from her apparent belief that the trade aspects of the Europe Agreements kicked in only in 1994 (instead of 1992) (p. 157). The long-term consequences for the Central European economies from the combination of the deep slump and the EU's trade policies are evident in the chronic trade deficits of most of these economies. The main exception, Slovenia, proves this rule: Its export insertion in the EU market had been built up since the 1960s. Boer-Ashworth is aware of the chronic problem of current account deficits. But she seems unaware of the EU's role in causing them.

Boer-Ashworth's lack of familiarity with key economic issues and with the EU's economic program also vitiates other parts of her analysis. She views domestic financial liberalization and the dismantling of capital controls as an IMF/World Bank policy rather than as a policy equally championed by the EU. And although she stresses the importance of financial crises, she does not clearly identify the causes of the main financial crisis in her study: that in the Czech republic in 1997. On page 124 she makes a connection between the Czech current account deficit and the collapse of the koruna, followed by the banking crisis. But she ignores the crucial mediating mechanism between the deficit and the koruna collapse: the fact that the Czech republic had dismantled its capital

controls faster and more fully than its neighbors. It had done so partly to take the lead in that field in the race to get into the EU but also to attract hot money into its financial system to compensate for its current account deficit. While missing this key mechanism she later does what she criticizes others for doing in her first chapter—blaming crises derived from the new international regime on domestic failures within the country hit by the crisis: She blames the crisis on instability and corruption in the domestic banking system (p. 127). These problems were universal in the East at that time. What was specific to the Czech republic in 1997 was the faster dismantling of capital controls in line with EU (as well as IMF) norms.

But the most egregious example of the book's blindness to the baleful effects of EU policies lies in Boer-Ashworth's chapter on EU enlargement. She specifically singles out the problems of Central European agriculture as the one sector that she studies in detail. Yet she manages to discuss its problems without any reference whatever to the EU's fierce protection against Central European agricultural exports combined with its vigorous dumping of EU agricultural products in Central European markets.

In sum, after spending her first two chapters packing her bags for a journey into a critical theory of the European transformations in the 1990s, Boer-Ashworth actually travels in a quite different direction: toward an attempted advocacy role on behalf of EU policies toward Central Europe. But her advocacy is weak and flawed. The main work defending (critically) the EU's role, Alan Mayhew's (1998) *Recreating Europe* is not cited.

At a deeper level Boer-Ashworth tends to conflate the norms that legitimized the various Western policies toward Central Europe in the 1990s with the policies themselves. This basic flaw is no doubt partly responsible for her preference for EU activities: She prefers its legitimating norms and values to those of the International Financial Institutions. But her aim of evaluating Western impacts on other political economies requires a study of actual policies, not just normative theorizations.

In Search of Greatness: Russia's Communications with Africa and the World. By Festus Eribo. Westport, CT: Ablex, 2001. 256p. \$79.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Laura Roselle, Elon University

In this book, Festus Eribo gives a broad historical view of Russian—African relations and the role of newspapers in communicating Russian and Soviet perceptions of Africa and its people. Not surprisingly, Eribo argues that ideology drove the content of coverage as the Soviet Union attempted to shape opinion according to Marxist—Leninist principles. In taking on the very broad topic of communication, Eribo notes the presence of multiple audiences but describes the content of Russian domestic newspapers in much greater detail than the story of how Russia communicated with African people. While the topic is important, because this book is descriptive and not theoretical, it leaves the reader with more questions than answers about the role of the media in communicating images of Africa.

Eribo begins with a sweeping overview of Russo-African relations that covers pre-Soviet Russian history and the Russian revolutionary press. He notes that by the 1920s and 1930s, Soviet leaders were determined to recruit Africans to the socialist cause and that they encouraged African youth to study in the Soviet Union, a tactic that continued into the 1980s. Eribo raises interesting issues but tends not to develop his discussion beyond a narrative description. He mentions

the Sino-Soviet rivalry for political influence in Africa, for example, but devotes only one sentence to it.

Africa was significant to Soviet foreign policy, particularly within the context of the Cold War. In chapter 4, on Cold War political communication and Africa, Eribo argues that Soviet newspapers portrayed Africa "as a tragic, horrible, dangerous black continent" even as the Soviet Union was perceived as an ally of "oppressed nations" of Africa (p. 103). Eribo notes the theme of Russian racism in a number of places, but some readers will undoubtedly want some elaboration on the conflict between Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and racist rhetoric and the relationship of the Soviet press to this. Noting the number of revolutionary democracies in Africa during the Cold War period, Eribo misses the opportunity to analyze more deeply how the media depicted and contributed to the ideological struggle in Africa. For example, Eribo says that while the Voice of America was broadcasting in five languages for a total of 56 hours a week, Radio Moscow was broadcasting in more than 64 languages for 1940 hours a week. But, beyond supplying these numbers, he does not analyze Soviet propaganda in Africa in a more detailed and complex

Similarly, Eribo argues that nonaligned countries did not criticize Soviet information content and policies during the United Nations' New Information and Communication Order debate, focusing attention instead on a critique of Western media. Some readers may want a fuller explanation of how the Soviets were able effectively to gain allies against Western media images of Africa in a way that deflected criticism of their own coverage.

In another chapter, Eribo describes the content of Soviet newspaper coverage through a systematic content analysis of four newspapers from 1979, 1983, and 1987. The data show that *Pravda, Izvestia, Trud*, and *Selskaya Zhizn*, at least in the samples taken, covered political news and news from prosocialist African countries more than other types of news or news from other African countries. These data confirm the ideological nature of the Soviet media, yet this is hardly a surprise. In addition to his discussion of what Soviet newspapers covered, Eribo could have expanded considerably on the differences in coverage among the four newspapers. There is a critical absence of interviews and archival data on how and why Soviet media officials constructed the news as they did. There is also no discussion of the racism he mentions in other parts of the book.

This lack of context is particularly glaring when Eribo considers newspaper coverage during glasnot and following the Soviet Union's collapse. Data from additional content analyses (from 1990 and 1992) show coverage to be less partisan, as one might expect. The 1992 data also show that Africa was covered less frequently than it was previously, a fact that Eribo attributes to issues of ownership and financial constraints but for which he presents no evidence. A decline in news about Africa would be expected after the ideological struggle ceased, especially because Eribo argues that that struggle was the foundation on which coverage was shaped. The author predicts that, in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, Russian nationalism will replace Soviet ideology in shaping media images, but again, he offers no substantive discussion of this issue.

Although the book has significant shortcomings, the issues under discussion are important to political scientists for a number of reasons. First, as Eribo correctly points out, media images are created, in part, according to specific political and economic contexts. The Soviet mass media apparatus was based on an elaborate system of centralization and control, through which Soviet political officials attempted to shape domestic public opinion. The degree to which they were

successful is a matter of dispute and, as students of public opinion know, is a complicated issue. Second, leaders use various means for presenting their views abroad. Understanding the conditions under which public information successfully influences opinion is important to the study of foreign policy and alliance building. Finally, political change in the Soviet Union was fostered by Gorbachev's policy of glasnost, which abrogated the one-party line of the mass media. That said, the old institutional structures of the media did not disappear entirely with the new political context and changes in political norms. One of the more interesting questions for political scientists studying media systems and change is how, exactly, old structures change when confronted with new political ideas. So, while this book may be less than satisfying, it raises important issues for future study.

Cuba's Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World. By H. Michael Erisman. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. 336p. \$49.95.

Cuba, the United States, and the Helms-Burton Doctrine: International Reactions. By Joaquín Roy. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2000. 281p. \$55.00.

Joel C. Edelstein, University of Colorado at Denver

In *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (2nd edition, 1993), Walter LeFeber analyzes the extraordinary continuity of U.S. policy in Central America. Indeed, from the Rio Bravo all the way to Tierra del Fuego, for more than a century, the United States has refused to tolerate leftist governments when recourse to other options has been available. Thus even in 1959, it didn't take a political scientist to predict that the United States would not accept the Cuban revolution.

These monographs by Joaquín Roy and by Michael Erisman complement each other to provide a comprehensive view of Cuba's international relations. Roy's study, limited to the decade of the 1990s, sets out to analyze and explain the Helms–Burton law (HB), passed in 1996, in relation to U.S. domestic politics, the U.S.–Cuba relationship, and the wider international picture. "The global dimension is my principal focus, deriving from the internationalization of the original feud between Havana and Washington" (xvi).

Roy utilizes an admirably broad range of sources in his analysis of the interaction of the United States with the EU and its NAFTA partners in response to HB. His study is a valuable contribution to our understanding of, in Roy's words, "... how unilateral sanctions applied by one country (that is, the United States) can ripple beyond their main target (Cuba) to generate serious complications in its international relations" (p. xvi).

HB codified the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba, which had been maintained by executive order since 1962. A change in this policy would henceforth require positive Congressional action. HB brought near-universal condemnation from other countries because of a provision of the law allowing U.S. citizens to sue foreign nationals in U.S. courts for dealing with properties that Cuba had allegedly confiscated improperly in the early 1960s. Controversial within United States was a provision of the law that included in the definition of U.S. citizens those, almost exclusively Cuban-Americans, who had become citizens after the expropriation of their property in Cuba.

HB has failed to bring down the Cuban government by discouraging nationals of other countries from investing in Cuba. Its most important provision, Title III, which asserts extraterritoriality, has not been put into effect because of determined resistance from the EU, Canada, and Mexico.

When, in response to HB, the EU threatened to take the United States to the WTO, the Clinton administration agreed not to enforce Title III. This was in contrast to the conflict over Central and American and Caribbean bananas controlled by U.S. growers. Roy explains, "... Cuba is less important for the United States and the Euopean Union than the banana market—they risked confrontation at the WTO over this agricultural marketing disagreement, but they avoided a clash in the same place because of Cuba" (p. 179).

The Cuban economy has certainly been hurt by the embargo and sources in Cuba acknowledge that some foreign investors have been scared off. However, since the passage of HB, foreign investment in Cuba has increased and Cuba's economic recovery has continued. Nonetheless, Roy sees HB sees as quite significant, asserting that "... the law is more than a policy—it is an amorphous (although historically coherent) tool for updating the Monroe Doctrine. It is the Helms-Burton Doctrine" (p. xiv; original italics). He cites Jorge Domínguez: "The Helms-Burton Act is quite faithful to themes of the Monroe Doctrine and the Roosevelt Corollary .... [It] rediscovers the ideological brio of imperialism. At the end of the 20th century, as in centuries past, the United States is demanding the right to set the framework for the political and economic system it would tolerate inside Cuba" (p. 6).

Roy's analysis considers strategic, institutional, political, and legal aspects of U.S. policy toward Cuba. He notes that the goals of HB reflect the growing influence of Cuban exiles in the United States. Accordingly, he cites Samuel Huntington's statement that "the institutions and capabilities created to serve a grand national purpose in the Cold War are now being subordinated and redirected to serve narrow subnational, transnational, and even nonnational purposes." Huntington warns that American foreign policy is becoming a policy of "particularism increasingly devoted to the promotion abroad of highly specific commercial and ethnic interests" (p. 7). Roy goes on to note that foreign critics suggest that, contrary to Huntington's thesis of an idiosyncratic foreign policy, HP may reflect a U.S. will and strategy to control the future restructuring of global trade and investment.

Cuban foreign policy is not a focus in Roy's work and there is little substance in his comments that do address this subject. Erisman focuses on Cuba's foreign relations over four decades. In the course of his study he offers a valuable analysis of Cuban foreign policy, including Cuba's relations with the Soviet bloc and with nonaligned countries.

Erisman asserts that counterdependency has been the core organizing principle of Cuban foreign policy. He defines this policy agenda as one "... in which the government assigns top priority to cultivating the capacity to prevent exogenous penetration of its decision-making processes and thereby reduce its vulnerability to external power centers to the point where its sociopolitical and developmental dynamics are not basically the product of a subordinate relationship with a stronger industrialized country, but rather are a reflection of a series of formally or informally negotiated relationships on both horizontal (South-South) and vertical (North-South) axes" (p. 42; original italics). Erisman proposes a two-stage model of counterdependency politics in which the initial step is enlarging political/economic space by geographic and geopolitical diversification of trading partners. Diversification establishes a set of preconditions that place a developing country in an optimal position to proceed to "the second and more crucial phase of the counterdependency agenda—the acquisition and especially the assertive use of collective bargaining power" (p. 45).

In the 1960s, Cuba sought protection from a hostile United States by engaging with the Soviet Union and by encouraging

revolutionary movements, especially in Latin America. It was hoped that creating "many Vietnams" would diffuse the focus of U.S. hostility, help Cuba to break out of isolation in the Americas, and reduce dependency within the Soviet bloc by creating more Third World Marxian Socialist governments (p. 74). The effort failed to produce additional revolutionary governments. Moreover, it was a source of stress in Cuba's relationship with the USSR, which opposed actions it regarded as adventurist with respect to the United States.

Cuba was much more successful in harmonizing foreign policy goals in the 1970s and 1980s, through a strategy that Erisman characterizes as "Cold War dual tracking" (p. 79). Cuba gained substantial economic resources as well as large infusions of military aid from the industrialized socialist bloc, enabling an increase in its influence vis-à-vis the Third World. Cuba's leadership of the nonaligned movement, and its international prestige in general, served to make it more valuavle to the Soviet Union and thus deserving of additional resources, while protecting Cuba to some degree from the United States. Erisman points out an unusual instance in which the two tracks were not synergistic, when Cuba's support of the Soviet Union's actions in Afghanistan carried great political costs in relations with the nonaligned movement. The crisis of the Soviet bloc reduced and then eliminated what had been a source of valuable resources and ended the two-track policy.

The revolutionary government initially sought to end dependence by plowing under sugar, following a debt-financed import substitution industrialization strategy. When debt mounted too fast, the road to independence seemed to go though an extreme focus on sugar to create a source of foreign exchange to finance industrialization. This strategy failed in 1970, leaving Cuba more dependent on the USSR.

In the early 1980s, based on its successes in medical care, Cuba began to develop a biotechnology industry in the hope that it could lead and finance a new, diversified economy. Progress has been made, but not nearly enough to avoid the disaster brought on by the demise of the socialist bloc. Erisman observes that "... Cuba's economic health, like that of practically any small island society, is heavily dependent on foreign trade .... By the early 1980s, ... Cuba had become extremely dependent on its CMEA connection .... Putting practically all one's economic eggs in a single basket is an extremely risky proposition, as would become painfully evident in the late 1980s and early 1990s" (p. 108).

Economic decline brought discontent, and according to Erisman, "Remarkably, despite all this adversity, Cuba continued its tradition of following the road less traveled, stubbornly maintaining its basic commitment to Fidelista socialism and refusing to compromise its nationalistic principals in any way in order to curry favor with the United States. Such defiance would not come cheaply, but as always Havana was willing to pay the price" (p. 107). Certainly, the options available to Cuba in this situation have been quite limited. I would suggest that Erisman has understated the amount of compromise that Cuba has accepted. For example, significantly greater inequality has resulted from an unavoidably dollarized economy, and this constitutes a real threat to the Fidelista vision of socialism.

Erisman's elucidation of the counterdependency strategy is a valuable contribution to our understanding of Cuban foreign policy. The conceptualization might be still more useful if it included the problematic role of the domestic economy. Without Soviet support and facing stronger U.S. efforts to isolate the island in the '90s, Cuba has welcomed foreign investment to survive. This could turn out to undermine the counterdependency strategy, if this new foreign sector outpaces the domestic sector of the economy and, thereby, becomes capable of commanding the Cuban state (and party) to favor its interests when conflicts arise between foreign enterprises and the Cuban people.

Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China. By Rosemary Foot. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 308p. \$65.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests. By Ming Wan. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001. 192p. \$39.95.

Samuel S. Kim, Columbia University

Human rights as a focus of both theoretical and practical concern came alive in the last decade of the twentieth century. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the "third wave" of democratization, and the globalization-cumtransparency revolution have all played a part in the widening and deepening of global human rights norms. The revitalization of human rights norms has profound implications for the complex interdependence between China and the global community. Indeed, human rights diplomacy is one of the most novel but generally overlooked aspects of international relations in post-Mao China, where it has finally come of age, whatever the motivation.

Sino-global interaction in the domain of human rights remains, however, one of the most perplexing and least studied questions in post-Cold- War global politics. It is a puzzle of both theoretical and practical significance that challenges scholars and policymakers concerned about the shape of postinternational life in the future. China's human rights diplomacy has not received the scholarly attention it deserves: Ann Kent's (1999) China, the United Nations, and Human Rights: The Limits of Compliance is the most conspicuous exception. Rosemary Foot's Rights Beyond Borders: The Global Community and the Struggle over Human Rights in China and Ming Wan's Human Rights in Chinese Foreign Relations: Defining and Defending National Interests go a long way toward filling the lacunae in the literature on this important but neglected subject, and they are welcome additions.

While both address China's theory and practice in human rights and the nature and impact of external pressure on China from key international actors, these two books proceed from different levels of analysis. Rosemary Foot-one of the leading British authorities on East Asian international relations—takes up China as a case study of global human rights politics in this latest work. The main focus is on global actions in response to China's practices in human rights rather than on China's reactions to external pressure. In contrast, Ming Wan examines China's human rights diplomacy as a case study of its foreign relations with four select groups of international actors—the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the United Nations.

The major premise of Foot's book is that the issue of human rights has become an integral part of global politics, particularly so in the case of the global community's relationship with China. Drawing theoretical insights from international law and international relations literature, Foot provides an excellent and generally reliable analysis of the this complex and evolving relationship and considers, in particular, how normative concerns about the conditions of human rights in China have influenced the behavior of key international actors (e.g., selected nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], some national governments, and the human rights institutions of the United Nations) in the period since the Tiananmen carnage of June 1989. She adopts a chronological narrative approach to examine how seemingly powerless

human rights norms—norms not backed by real enforcement mechanisms—have the power in a state like China to change external behavior and, to some extent, even internal behavior. China's reactive behavior, internal and external, to its role as the focus of so much global attention in this area is meticulously delineated and analyzed.

According to Foot, China's human rights behavior presents a kind of double or mutual challenge of legitimation. On the one hand, because of China's economic, strategic, and demographic weight in world politics, its compliance and cooperative participation are important to the credibility, viability, and legitimacy of the global human rights regime as a universal promoter of human rights. On the other hand, adherence to human rights norms has come to be associated with a state's political legitimacy in the post-Cold War era. China's willed national identity as a "responsible great power" is linked—by those acting as gatekeepers for entry into the exclusive great-power club—with compliance with these human rights norms.

Foot's principal argument is that China has been nudged along a meandering path that has led to a slow but steady involvement in the global human rights regime, consequently locking the Chinese government into discursive human rights formulations, not irrevocably but to a degree sufficient to demonstrate that China remains an integral part of the global human rights solution. What accounts for such forward movement in China's norm diffusion and enmeshment? Here Foot offers a rather long list of external and internal factors: U.S. power; the activities of United Nations (UN) human rights institutions; NGO pressure; the new criteria for membership in international society; the new processes of persuasion, argument, and shaming; and Beijing's great-power status drive, its concerns about its international image, and its understanding that the basis of legitimation has changed.

Despite such forward moves, Foot cautions, China's human rights norms have not progressed far enough for domestic internalization or implementation. Even at the level of policy discourse there are wild swings in Chinese human rights rhetoric, ranging from references that emphasize the universality and individuality of all rights to statements that stress cultural and developmental relativism. Foot cites several major sources of instability in policy pronouncements, of ambiguities in revised or new domestic legislation, and, especially, of the failure to follow through to full implementation: the structural statist underpinnings of the international human rights regime, the competing or conflicting interests of participating states within it, China's strategic and economic weight in world politics, and domestic factors associated with the maintenance of party and state control. Foot concludes, however, that the transformation of China's normative discourse, its deepening enmeshment in the global human rights regime, and domestic policy reform in the fields of criminal and other related legislation do indeed represent significant steps toward full acceptance of international human rights

Wan examines the role of human rights in China's relations with the United States, Western Europe, Japan, and the UN human rights regime, focusing on both the nature and the impact of the external pressure on China from these key international actors and on the tactics Beijing has adopted in response to such external pressure. Wan's main argument is simple and strictly realist: Although the issue of human rights is important in Western policy toward China, it has seldom prevailed over traditional economic and security interests, and Beijing, after a decade of external pressure, still treats human rights diplomacy as an integral part of traditional power politics. Further, China's dialogues with international actors on the subject of human rights have brought

about only adaptive learning about how best to obviate Western pressure, rather than cognitive or normative learning about the importance of human rights per se. The different degrees of commitment to human rights and the respective importance of human rights norms relative to economic and strategic interests explain why Japan, Western Europe, and the United States, in that order, have gradually retreated from a confrontation with China on issues of human rights. Washington's high-pressure approach has become increasingly ineffective, with the exception of winning the release of high-profile intellectual dissidents. Beijing has also successfully neutralized Western European criticism, effectively sidelining human rights issues in Sino-European relations. Except for a brief period after Tiananmen (1989-90), the human rights debate has remained a nonissue in Sino-Japanese relations. Given Japan's imperial-era atrocities such as the rape of Nanking and biological-weapons experiments in Northeast China, China holds a trump card of another kind in its relations with Japan.

The most telling argument in Wan's book is that the UN human rights regime has played a useful mitigating role in Sino-Western relations in the domain of human rights. For the West, the UN human rights regime offers a more legitimate and less costly alternative to bilateral clashes. For China, the human rights regime offers a more congenial arena to seek and mobilize support of Third World member states to demonstrate that China is not really isolated in the international community on the issue of human rights. Wan also argues and concludes that "by successfully resisting external rights pressure, powerful target nations like China weaken the importance of human rights in the foreign policy deliberations of the Western countries that initiate pressure" (p. 143). The most interesting and illuminating part of the book is a background brief on Chinese views of human rights (chapter 2). Drawing from public opinion surveys, field interviews, and a wide range of Chinese-language sources, Wan defines the primary parameters for the possible and the permissible in relation to Chinese theory and practice in human rights: (1) That although views among government officials and social groups are becoming increasingly diverse, there is nonetheless a broad consensus on "developmental authoritarianism" (2) that the party-state is widely considered a necessary evil for the achievement of economic growth and well-being; and (3) that given the considerable public support in China for stability, any interventionist human rights diplomacy is both unwise and counterproductive.

Although these two books make significant contributions to the understanding of the complex and shifting relationship between China and the outside world, through excellent country-specific and issue-specific descriptive analyses, the shortcomings of both volumes stem from the lack of sustained theoretical rigor and some empirical/analytical omissions. Wan makes it clear at the outset that his book "is not designed to test international relations theories" (p. 11), so there is no point in assessing his book in theoretical terms. Foot's book reveals a keen conceptual mind for defining the puzzle of norm diffusion and enmeshment, if not that of norm internalization, an admirable command over international law and international relations literature, and an accessible and elegant prose. But she seems of more than two theoretical minds. As with her previous work—The Practice of Power: U.S. Relations with China Since 1949 (1995)—she seeks to supplement, not reject, realism "by paying attention to both the power and the symbolic elements in [her] explanation of behavior and discourse" (p. 6). As earlier noted, however, she catalogues a long list of the seemingly causal independent variables without providing a priori an aggregate weighting formula or prioritization.

Both authors overdo statism by omitting any discussion of the NGO-led struggle to extend the rule of law to crimes of state, especially U.S. and Chinese reactions to the Khmer Rouge genocide from 1975 to 1979 and the most important law-making conference since Nuremberg—the UN Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), held in Rome from June 15 to July 17, 1998. In the Khmer Rouge case, the United States and China embraced a realpolitik partnership of the worst kind, giving strong diplomatic and indirect economic and military support to the Khmer Rouge and opposing the Vietnamese invasion that toppled the genocidal regime and ended the genocide in Cambodia (Kampuchea). In the UN Rome Conference, Chinese and American statismcum-unilateralism intersected once again when China, along with five rouge states including Iran and Libya, opposed the establishment of the ICC. The NGO-led global campaign to establish a permanent ICC eventuated in a treaty signed by 120 states in a vote of 120 to 7, despite the strong objections made by powerhouses like the United States and China. In several respects, the Rome treaty is ready-made for testing the outer possibilities and limitations of Sinoglobal interaction on human rights issues. Hence, by ignoring Chinese empirical and behavioral referents in the making of the ICC, both authors leave a gaping hole in their books.

Finally, neither volume pays any attention to the impact of globalization on the global human rights regime, on China's norm diffusion, enmeshment, and internalization, or on the "Asian values" debate. This omission stands out as another weakness, since the forces of globalization in the 1990s have transformed both the context and the conditions under which Sino-global interaction can be played out. There are today some 22.5 million Chinese with on-line access, and it is projected that by 2005 some 200 million will be Internet users. China must worry not only about military power but also about the economic power, cultural power, and knowledge power needed to survive and prosper in a world that is becoming increasingly globalized and competitive.

Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century. By John W. Garver. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001. 447p. \$50.00.

Mark W. Frazier, University of Louisville

India's nuclear tests in May 1998 came as a surprise to many observers and proved all the more puzzling when Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee, in a letter to President Clinton, singled out China as the focal point of Indian security concerns. This statement and others led some, including Beijing's own foreign policy community, to view the tests as an effort to boost India's status internationally and to shore up domestic support for a new coalition government. John Garver's book challenges this domestic-driven interpretation of the tests by chronicling in detail a half-century of contentious relations between the world's two most populous states. Seen in historical perspective, India's nuclear tests were another episode in what Garver terms a "protracted conflict" (p. 3) between Beijing and Delhi. (The milder-sounding "protracted contest" serves as the book's title, but "protracted conflict," a term Garver uses with some frequency, better captures the book's thesis.)

While Garver acknowledges that there have been cooperative dimensions in Sino-Indian relations, he argues that conflict has been the predominant theme. The book's chapters are organized around specific manifestations of this conflict over the status of Tibet, the still unresolved border dispute, the

exercise of leadership among the developing world, the expansion of naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean, and the development of nuclear weapons. Individual chapters also cover various states in which Chinese and Indian interests have diverged considerably: Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, Burma, and, most significantly, Pakistan (to which two chapters are devoted). While overt military conflict between China and India has occurred only once (in 1962), Garver argues that this is a relationship in which both sides have been absorbed by the possibility of one day having to use military force against one another (p. 4). Garver concludes his portrait of this understated yet substantially conflictual relationship with a chapter on how it might change in the future toward more cooperative directions.

Garver's presentation proceeds in a well-structured, straightforward manner that achieves the right balance of detail and thematic focus. He documents his case using ample Chinese and Indian sources, both secondary and primary. Garver also reminds us of the significance of terrain and topography in several chapters, putting proper emphasis on the "geo" in the term "geopolitical conflict" (p. 22). The well-balanced presentation of problem areas in Sino-Indian relations does come at a sacrifice to the sort of hypothesistesting that some readers are likely to desire, which would help isolate the causes of this longstanding rivalry and its apparent intractability. Is the "protracted contest/conflict" a straightforward case of two neighboring states invariably competing as they seek to expand their capabilities and influence? To what extent is this rivalry the product of broader systemic forces during and after the Cold War? For that matter, why did the end of the Cold War and the decline of the Soviet Union not ameliorate the Sino-Indian conflict or at least push it toward more cooperative directions (as some have in fact asserted)? Garver states at the outset that one might analyze Sino-Indian relations within the framework of the Soviet-American conflict, and from the perspective of domestic development goals and processes specific to each state. The approach he favors, as he explains it, is to center his analysis on the "geopolitical conflict in the arc of land and waters lying between and alongside China and India" and to address these other factors "only to the extent that they impinge on their geopolitical rivalry" (p. 5).

With that said, readers must draw their own conclusions as to what is driving this pattern of conflict and competition between India and China. Garver does offer, in the introductory chapter, two explicit and rather intriguing "taproots" of the conflict. One is the fact that China and India have strong "nationalist narratives," in which their respective civilizations are seen as having extended a political, social, and economic influence well beyond their current borders as contemporary states. A map on page 15 shows the substantial overlap in the historic domains of Chinese and Indian influence (an overlap that includes Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, and peninsular Southeast Asia). How such "nationalist narratives" work to shape modern foreign policy and the articulation of national interests is an intriguing question that deserves more sustained treatment than it gets in subsequent chapters. The second source of the Sino-Indian rivalry Garver identifies will likely prove more satisfactory to security specialists. He says that a security dilemma has arisen from India's need to exercise a kind of unstated "Monroe doctrine" in South Asia in which it exerts sole influence over states in the region. China, on the other hand, attaches great importance and derives its security from establishing cooperative links with its neighbors, including those in South Asia. As China seeks to enhance its security by developing such ties, it actually worsens the situation by undermining India's security.

Garver's conclusion that the relationship remains basically conflictual in the post-Cold War era is an important challenge to a prevailing view among specialists that Sino-Indian relations improved substantially after China allegedly acknowledged an Indian sphere of influence in South Asia in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Garver cautions us to distinguish between China's restraint in objecting to India's expanding power in South Asia versus an actual acceptance of Indian hegemony in the region. China has indeed refrained from providing overt support that India's neighbors have sometimes sought during various diplomatic and military confrontations with India, but China would not accept being shut out of the region, especially from its robust ties with Pakistan and Burma, Garver argues. The other dominant trend in the 1990s has been for India and China to attach added importance to fostering a security environment conducive to economic growth, expanded trade, and foreign investment. While such approaches might presage more cooperative relations, Garver suggests in his final chapter that the vast gaps in economic performance to date (with China far outpacing India) make it likely that any future cooperation between the two states will be highly asymmetric—and that, based on current trends. India might one day have little alternative to acknowledging China's preeminence in the South Asian region.

The sustained economic performance of India and China, and their expanding diplomatic and military clout, has prompted some scholars and policymakers to rethink the traditional boundaries that have long demarcated "East Asia" from "South Asia" and their respective communities of specialists. Garver's timely contribution to the understudied relationship between China and India will likely serve as a milestone in such efforts, and specialists on both sides of the Himalayan divide will benefit greatly from this book.

The Palestinian-Arab Minority in Israel, 1948-2000: A Political Study. By As'ad Ghanem. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 238p. \$62.50 cloth, \$20.95 paper.

Alan Dowty, University of Notre Dame

This study, a volume in the SUNY Israel Studies series, represents a new stage of maturity in academic research on Israel's Arab minority: a serious and scholarly (if rather severe) overview from within that community. Ghanem, a lecturer at Israel's University of Haifa, has, within a few short years, emerged as a leading academic analyst of Israeli Arab political issues, and the book at hand will cement his reputation. It combines an insider's feel for his subject with a critical, but reasonably restrained and balanced, presentation of a topic that has too often generated apologetics or polemics. Ghanem does not focus on the history or substance of relations between the Jewish majority and Arab citizens of Israel, or on official policies and practices. On these issues he briefly redraws the picture sketched by previous studies, most of them by Israeli Jewish scholars: Israeli Arabs/Palestinians (the latter designation is increasingly preferred) have formal rights of citizenship, but are in fact second-class citizens both in law (given legal expressions of the Jewishness of the state) and, even more, in practice. While they have made great absolute progress by most measures in the half-century of Israeli statehood, a huge gap between the two communities remains. Furthermore, they are doubly marginalized, first, as Israelis and, second, as part of the broader Palestinian Arab community in which their position is also problematic.

The main thrust of Ghanem's book, however, is a systematic analysis of the various political "streams" (camps or movements) among Israeli Palestinians. Ghanem faults Israeli Jewish scholars for classifying these groups by the self-centered criterion of their attitudes toward Israel and, quite reasonably, posits instead a set of more objective criteria. As it turns out, the resulting categories do not actually differ greatly from previous ones. Ghanem identifies an Israeli–Arab stream (those groups working within the system), the Communists (for a long time the major established party giving full expression to Arab demands), the nationalists (divided between the pan-Arabists and those with a Palestinian focus), and the Islamists (more moderate than their counterparts elsewhere).

Ghanem's clear explication of the thinking of these "streams" makes this the book of choice for those interested in the political divisions among Arabs in Israel. His account confirms the widely noted growth of a Palestinian identity in this community and adds many other observations worth noting. Ghanem notes, for example, that the chances of the Islamic Movement attracting new members "are rather slim, given the wave of modernization and secularization among the Arabs in Israel" (p. 125). He calls attention to the resurgence of clan-based politics at the local level, presenting it as an alternative (and decidedly retrograde) political grouping. Another observation of special interest is the remarkable growth of civil society; according to Ghanem's own research, there were 180 public societies among Israeli Arabs in 1990 but another 656 were added in the next nine years.

Could the grievances of the Israeli Arab minority be corrected within the existing system—or would it require a basic redefinition of the Jewish state (that is, "deJudaizing" or "deZionizing" Israel)? This is the defining issue in the political divisions among Palestinians in Israel, but it is also a question that calls for more extensive scholarly comparisons to experiences of minorities in other democratic states. It would be very useful, in particular, to compare the situation of Israeli Palestinian Arabs to that of other embattled minorities in conflict, rather than trying to set standards and expectations in a vacuum. This is not to single out the book at hand for special criticism, as there are lamentably few comparative perspectives generally in studies of Israel, on this issue or on others.

Ghanem does make brief references to the consociational power-sharing models of Belgium and Switzerland in the framework of making a case for the explicit recognition of a group identity for Israeli Arabs. He argues, very persuasively in this reviewer's judgment, that the liberal model with no mediation between individual and state will not work in the ethnically charged environment of the Arab–Israel conflict. On the other hand, group bargaining and power-sharing between Jews and Arabs enjoys the overwhelming support of Israel Arabs (p. 182).

Ghanem pursues this approach, however, with a twist that gives it an entirely new significance. In a final chapter that is certain to provoke much debate, he urges consociationalism not in the framework of current Israeli borders but in the former Palestine mandate as a whole, that is, including the West Bank and Gaza strip, the occupied territories, which are not a focus in earlier chapters. Thus, rather than consociational accommodation of a minority, he shifts to a binational version in which Jews and unified Palestinian Arabs stand in rough numerical, legal, and political parity. This reflects a revival of interest in a binational state solution among Palestinians in the occupied territories, arguing (as Ghanem does) that separation into two states is not workable because of Israeli unwillingness to grant true independence to the West Bank

and Gaza or (Ghanem's focus) true equality to Arabs within Israel.

The separation implied in a two-state solution does indeed face many obstacles, including Jewish settlements in the territories, shared resources such as water, environmental issues, and economic interdependence. But skeptics will point out that the obstacles are not necessarily made easier to overcome by living together. The same problems of sharing water and distributing public goods would remain but would have to be dealt with on a continuing basis rather than in one decisive denouement. A binational state would be vastly more complicated, as Ghanem indicates when he notes that it would require substantial changes "in nature of relations between the two peoples . . . in the two entities, the Palestinian and the Israeli...[and] in the nature of the two national movements" (p. 198). Just to take one immediate problem that comes to mind: What would the immigration policy be? Would the binational state continue to welcome all Jews? Would it be open to the 3.8 million registered Palestinian refugees? The potential for a demographic war seems explosive. Perhaps, for all that, a difficult divorce is better than hostile cohabitation.

Tying their fate to that of the Palestinians in the territories is, of course, attractive to Palestinians in Israel because they would no longer be a minority. But this could also be accomplished in a two-state solution to the conflict, by allowing Israeli Arab areas to opt for incorporation into the Palestinian state. This may seem an extremely radical idea in the current context—but perhaps no more so than binationalism, which would require Israelis to give up the basic Zionist vision of a Jewish state. Ghanem has, however, posed exactly the right dilemma for the Jewish majority in Israel. Eventually they will have to choose: Will they give up territory, settlements and hegemony over Palestinians? or Will they give up the idea of a Jewish state? Data presented in the book (pp. 160-163) underline the basic attachment of Israelis to a Jewish state, providing grounds to argue that when the crunch comes, most will choose separation over binationalism. But however it falls, the necessity of choice has seldom been posed so compellingly.

After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars. By G. John Ikenberry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000. 293p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

K. J. Holsti, University of British Columbia

Forty years ago Arnold Wolfers lamented that scholars had failed to examine those rare occasions, following great wars, when statesmen gather to refashion the norms and institutions of international politics. He noted in his (1962) Discord and Collaboration (pp. 137–38) that creating a new order after the close of war is "one of the trickiest tasks of diplomacy," for how that order is fashioned will have a profound impact on the subsequent pattern of war. Charles Doran's (1971) The Politics of Assimilation, Robert Randle's (1973) The Origins of Peace, and my (1991) Peace and War: Armed Conflict and International Order provided empirical support for Wolfers' insights, but G. John Ikenberry offers the first study that links peacemaking to specific types of international order.

Since Vienna (1815), the leading victors have pursued increasingly expansive proposals to establish intergovernmental institutions that bind the great powers together and institutionalize their relations after the war. These order-building arrangements derive from a fundamental bargain between the leading postwar power and its allies. The leading state agrees to restrain its use of power. Others states in turn

agree to join the winner's institutional arrangements that are designed to "lock in" its wartime gains.

Ikenberry hypothesizes that the greater the power disparities following major armed conflict, the greater the probability that the leading power will avoid abandonment or domination strategies and instead seek to create a legitimate, institutionalized order. The success of that effort also depends upon the character of the states partaking in the great bargain. Democracies can make commitments to restrain the use of power that can be trusted by others. Ikenberry argues, for example, that the Soviet Union accepted German reunification and the expansion of NATO between 1989 and 1991 because its policymakers had few fears of democracies and appreciated that major post-1945 institutional arrangements such as the UN, NATO, and WTO are essentially benign and nonthreatening. "Institutional logic" thus helps to explain not only how orders get created but why they endure.

Ikenberry's larger purpose is to explore the bases of political order in general. How to transform raw power into legitimate authority is the central theoretical question of the book. It is essentially a question of how to manage winning. He argues, challenging conventional ideas of international theory, that the international realm and domestic polities do not have two fundamentally different structures. International orders can take on "constitutional" characteristics by "limiting the returns to power" (p. 6). Just as elections and other constitutional devices guarantee that winners cannot rule by pure domination within states, international treaties and institutions can limit the power of war victors. Ikenberry suggests that the crucial distinction between domestic and international orders is not anarchy and hierarchy, but among three strategies for power management: domination (hegemony), balance of power, and the great bargain entailing a winner's self-limitation in exchange for general commitments to institutional arrangements.

Ikenberry embeds his analysis in the theoretical debate between realists who insist that order derives from power and those who argue that it is the result of institutions and ideas. He suggests that this is a false dichotomy. Power is an essential source of order, but international institutions inherently limit it. Liberal institutional theories have not explored the ways the leading state uses intergovernmental institutions to restrain itself and thereby dampen the fears of domination and abandonment by secondary states (p. 15).

The historical chapters explore the origins of the great settlements of 1815, 1919, and the more amorphous post-1945 arrangements. The discussion of wartime peace planning in each of the episodes is particularly rich. Ikenberry focuses on the elements of the "great bargain," how power disparities helped or hindered institutional arrangements, and how democracies were able to make commitments acceptable to the lesser states. The cases fit the model quite well. Post-1945 institutions have come closest to resembling a constitutional order. They have endured and expanded despite the collapse of polarity and the end of the Cold War. International institutions, Ikenberry (p. 273) concludes, "can make the exercise of power more restrained and routinized, but they can also make that power more durable, systematic, and legitimate."

The analysis addresses some key issues in realist, liberal, and constructivist approaches to international relations in general and international order specifically. Its innovative erasure of the distinction between anarchical and hierarchical orders merits serious consideration. The model, however, contains limitations. It is basically a power and rational choice device. Ikenberry discusses ideas and the role of leadership, but these are not linked specifically to the model. Ideas, in particular, have no independent influence. Nor does the model

include the handling of the defeated powers after the great wars. Vienna succeeded and endured for almost 40 years in large part because the winners incorporated France into the peacemaking process. Paris in 1919 failed in part because the victors unilaterally imposed a punitive peace on Germany and in effect eliminated two important actors of the system. The fate of defeated powers is a major source of the durability of peace and the elements of international order. The model leaves no space for such normative dimensions of order-building. Justice as a foundation of international order receives no attention.

The focus on power and the logic of choice after major wars also precludes consideration of broader sources of international order. As Hedley Bull (*Anarchical Society*, 1977) and followers of the English school emphasize, international order derives from the interplay of interests, practices, ideas, and norms over long historical periods. Order is less the result of one power's policies than the habitualized practices of many powers. Bull and his followers speak of international order; Ikenberry addresses the question of *the* order.

The erasure of the line between domestic and international orders also raises issues. International orders, in Ikenberry's sense, are created and sustained by negotiated deals between the leading states. This is a realm of power, influence, commitments, and trust. The domestic realm, in contrast, is one of authority—a consensual right to rule and the corollary obligation to obey. Except for WTO decisions and some policies in the European Union, no party in international relations wields authority. Ikenberry duplicates the common error of conflating power and authority. Finally, Ikenberry speaks repeatedly of the "leading state" that formulates the essential bargain. But in 1815 and, to a lesser extent, in 1919, it is not clear that there was a single leading state. Russian troops patrolled Paris streets, while the diplomats bargained in Vienna. Many Europeans were more concerned with Russian than British domination. Ikenberry gives short shrift to the role of Russia and Austria (particularly Metternich) in the formation of the post-Napoleonic order. Similarly, while Wilson played a key role in the formation of post-1919 institutions, the Versailles treaty reflected French and British, more than American, paramountcy. The historical evidence does not always match the model's crude representation of

Ikenberry's volume nevertheless presents a persuasive explanation for the formation and endurance of specific international orders and explores some questions not sufficiently addressed by Bull and his successors. It also does much more. It provides interesting historical evidence. It couples the problem of international order to questions of political order in general. It raises issues of contemporary American foreign policy. What will be the consequences of the Bush administration's proclivity to threaten, rescind, abandon, and scorn major order-creating international agreements? Are the looming abrogation of the ABM treaty and the militarization of space consistent with the idea of the self-limiting leading state? And the study offers major challenges to contemporary approaches to international theory. It is an exemplary positivist theoretical effort and rightfully can claim to be one of the major contributions to international relations in the past decade.

**African Foreign Policies: Power and Process.** Edited by Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Terrence Lyons. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 260p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Timothy M. Shaw, University of London

The analysis and practice of foreign policy are in flux on the African continent as elsewhere at the turn of the century.

The combined forces of the end of bipolarity, then apartheid plus exponetial liberalization(s) and globalization(s), have changed the balance of power, not just between states externally but also between states and nonstate actors (e.g., civil societies and private sectors) internally. The eight regional or national case studies in this collection capture the latter dynamic well-foreign policy is no longer, if it ever was, the monopoly of regimes—but the pair of end pieces by the coeditors is, alas, more cautious and realistic. Thus, this original volume, by nine mainly younger scholars, encapsulates the debate about the sources and causes of, actors and interests in, inter- and transnational relations in this distinctive region with relevance for broader discourses about local to global governance. So chapters 1 and 10 could have been written a decade ago, whereas the central eight very much reflect the profound changes in relations and analyses of the 1990s, especially that by William Reno, "External Relations of Weak States and Stateless Regions in Africa," with resonance for comparable regions such as Central Europe and Central Asia.

Nevertheless, if, like Reno, you are interested not only in weak states but in the real political economy of transitional countries, then you would want mention of a range of current issues affecting human development/security such as AIDS/HIV, biodiversity, blood diamonds, drought/floods, drugs/guns, illegal/informal sectors, mafias/militias, and new technologies. Alas, on such contemporary issues, except for Reno's contribution, this volume is largely silent. Nevertheless, Peter Schraeder does note the growing role of diasporas in Northern host's foreign policies (p. 53).

The dramatic shift in perspective or paradigm from old to new framework is apparent in chapter 2 from a hitherto determined realist, Clement Abide, who now asserts that "the foreign policy context of Anglophone West Africa in the past decade has assaulted the state-centric model of classical international politics" (p. 27), leading to "the proliferation of actors and issues," which compels a "redefinition of interests and alliance...consistent with the globalizing tendencies of late-twentieth century neoliberalism" (p. 17). Rene Lemarchand offers an equally revisionist account of "a power shift of seismic proportions throughout the central African Great Lakes Region" (p. 87), suggesting that the fleeting new regional alliance reflected certain historical ethnicitiesa latter-day "Hima empire"?—though he comes to overplay the Rwanda card, asserting that in the 1990s, it emerged "as something of a regional hegemon" (p. 92). In contrast, from a more metropolitan viewpoint, Peter Schraeder indicates that Parisian policymakers worried that the coming to power of Paul Kagame represented the rise of Anglo-Saxon influence in Central Africa. But the most compelling and challenging (for a variety of assumptions and approaches) of the chapters is the more comparative one by Reno, who turns state-centrism on its head.

In developing his increasingly powerful and popular redefinition of the character and interests of the actors involved in African conflicts, Reno asserts that "regimes that preside over the disintegration of formal state institutions use private actors to conduct interstate diplomacy and to garner external resources to ensure regime survival" (p. 185). He highlights how the "private diplomacy" of mining companies can serve failing regimes so that both weak and strong states may have mutual interests: "Private global actors are indeed central to the survival of Africa's system of states and the regimes that rule these states" (p. 186). In contrast, while dealing with much of the same terrain as Reno, John F. Clark argues that "foreign policy in central Africa is marked more by continuity than change" (p. 67). And both he and Ruth Iyob indicate how, in terms of both actors and relations, the definition of regions on the continent is fluid, with conflicts in, say, the Great Lakes and Horn, and central and southern Africa, impacting on each other over time (p. 82).

Several contributions also present an interesting set of comments about nonstate actors, primarily NGOs, derived from different regions; regrettably, companies, unions, even media hardly appear here. Khadiagala treats NGOs appropriately: They "have emerged on the margins of Southern African Development Community (SADC) as alternative purveyors of norms and policies that have a regional reach" (p. 150). In contrast, Adibe cautions that "the unregulated operation of diverse NGOs and transnational organizations is worrisome in West African diplomacy and nation-building processes" (p. 35).

Coeditor Gilbert Khadiagala laments that SADC has lost direction postapartheid, indicating that now "the foreign policy choices of southern African states are constrained by weak state structures, economic despair, and social dislocations" (p. 131). He outlines interregime disagreements over treaties about free trade, security, etc., in the region while noting the resilience of nonstate actors such as NGOs, think tanks, and trade unions: "Weak states furnish fragile bases for regionalism .... SADC is incapable of meeting problems of internal implosion and civil wars, and its role in building values and norms has been equally problematic" (p. 149).

Reinforcing attention to the southern subcontinent, Denis Venter offers the only case study of a single country rather than a region: the regional center of South Africa, which, postapartheid, is "clearly suffering an identity crisis in its external relations" (p. 177). Change for it is compounded by the combination of democratization and globalization along with unrealistic expectations at home and abroad, especially in the region. Venter points to the broad range of state and nonstate actors in its foreign policy nexus, cautioning about the danger of NGO cooptation through consultation, though he favors more open and representative decision making. The Mbeki regime has attempted to balance interests and resources by articulating a range of ambitions around the notion of an "African renaissance" (p. 170).

In short, if you want more critical approaches see Peter Vale, Larry A. Swatuk, and Bertil Oden (eds.) Theory, Change & Southern Africa's Future (2001), and if you want more comparative perspectives see Philip Nel and Patrick J. McGown (eds.) Power, Wealth and Global Order: An International Relations Textbook for Africa (revised second edition, 1999), even if both of these concentrate on southern Africa. As the coeditors belatedly recognize in their final paragraph, "With the multiplicity of actors, amorphous targets, and uncertain outcomes, African foreign policy has entered uncharted territory" (p. 21).

Migrants and Citizens: Demographic Change in the European State System. By Rey Koslowski. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. 232p. \$39.95.

Patrick Ireland, Georgia Institute of Technology

Every scholar likes to think that what he or she studies is of capital importance. For that reason alone, this ambitious book would have to please immigration specialists. "Demography is destiny" is Rey Koslowski's thesis, boiled down, and in his view it is almost impossible to overrate migration's impact on international politics. While guilty of overreaching in a few spots and failing to appreciate the role of politics in quite a few more, he makes a compelling case overall. His bold work both brings a stimulating perspective to a multidisciplinary area of study that is still seeking its center of gravity and serves to remind the field of international relations (IR) that migration deserves its full attention.

The author has a two-pronged objective. At the theoretical level he hopes to advance understanding of contemporary global politics. Advanced through the "thought experiments," secondary data analysis, and historical evidence characteristic of the IR field, his argument poses a challenge to prevailing international relations and democratic theories. Throwing into doubt the notion of nation-state sovereignty, migration belies the assumption current in much of the literature on democracy of a bounded collection of citizens comprising the demos. Nor does it fit the dichotomy between domestic hierarchy and international anarchy that underpins realism or always act as a force for international cooperation as neoliberalism holds. Koslowski sees the nation-state as a transitory, atypical social construct, forged within a unique set of demographic circumstances. Since 1945, changes in that context have transformed domestic politics and, in turn, the international system.

Mass migration has most clearly begun to flush out the problems latent in modern national political institutions in Europe, and at a more substantive level the author's goal is to retell the European migration story. The book takes an expansive historical sweep, which should be eye-opening to social scientists not well versed in migratory movements within and to the continent before the Second World War. In fact, it is easy for anyone caught up in trying to understand contemporary immigration to forget the essentially nomadic nature of human existence (chapter 3) and the historical sources of the distinctions between nationality and citizenship (chapter 4). There are a couple of surprising omissions in the literature reviewed—Lars Olsson's work on immigration as a cause of World War I, for instance, would only bolster the author's argument—and few revolutionary insights are offered. Nevertheless, the material is packaged and pointed in a novel way that promises to stir useful discussion among immigra-

The central thesis, certainly, will fuel debate: Long marked by polyethnicity, Europe constructed nation-states in response to unprecedented population growth and emigration in the midnineteenth century. Recent demographic changes have heralded a shift back to polyethnicity and have thus created a "mismatch" between resident populations and political institutions (p. 8). The presence of durable immigrantorigin communities, the emergence of an EU labor mobility regime, the negative effects of unilateral national actions, the (domestically driven) proliferation of individual rights and their acquisition by noncitizens (most notable in the spread of dual nationality)—the challenges to nation-state sovereignty in Europe have been relentless. They have also tended to act at cross-purposes, as migration has stirred up a titanic clash among democracy, citizenship based on bloodline (jus sanguinis), and federalism (pp. 133-34). In this light European Citizenship signals a toleration of complexity that might result in new institutional setups. They would mean no less than a reconfiguration of democracy and the international system.

A robust contention, to say the least. In fact, the author's mission to put forward demography as an all-purpose explanation occasionally takes him too far. Neoliberal institutionalism may well err in relegating migration to the status of a garden-variety regime issue (p. 17); yet surely transportation, communications, capital flows, and the like have played a more considerable role in undermining nation-state sovereignty than this study would allow. Not surprisingly, there are several approving references to Hedley Bull's "new medievalism" idea. European authorities and loyalties do seem to have been returning to the functional differentiation of the past. Even as patterns of labor market segmentation by ethnic origin and gender emerge, however, capitalism itself has become more globally integrated. With the economists' push–pull model still at the heart of many immigration

studies, it will be a tough sell to convince most specialists that no first-order relationship exists between the global economy and the multiple identities exhibited by immigrants.

Even more likely to raise eyebrows is the near-absence of domestic political struggle here. Demography pushes all before it, and the progression from polyethnicity to ethnically homogeneous societies (and nation-states) and then back to polyethnicity appears as natural as the swing of a pendulum or the ebb and flow of the tides. Whenever the causal link between population movements and actual policies is at issue, the vague, passive language of constructivism crops up. Thus, for example, we learn that our "thinking about politics" has been "reified in the reproduction of practices that make possible territory as an institution" (p. 23) and that the European migration regime has been "influenced by the agenda setting of dueling epistemic communities" (p. 161).

Similar caginess attends the discussion of citizenship laws. Thus as nation-states developed into "containers" for political institutions, they apparently had no choice regarding their nationality laws, as demography ruled out alternative outcomes (pp. 25-27). With politics bled out of the story, the truism that the distinction between jus sanguinis and jus soli would have no import in a world without migration becomes evidence of demography's explanatory force (p. 80). Part of the problem here may be an overreliance (on the European side) on scholarship from Germany, whose political class obsesses over formal citizenship and jus sanguinis. In that country alone, though, tens of thousands of resident noncitizens have not applied for naturalization, despite their eligibility and official efforts encouraging them to do so. Nor, as the author admits but underplays, have naturalization rates proved significantly higher where dual nationality is permitted (p. 190). In short, one should guard against assuming that "demographically determined" legal restrictions are the only impediments to inclusion.

"We easily forget that people make political institutions happen," the author rightly reminds us (p. 186). He himself tends to lose sight of the trees for the forest, however. Immigrants matter not merely because their collective presence sparks a spontaneous policy response. It would hardly detract from demography's causal power to stress its impact on the size, composition, and resources available to various groups, who then engage in a political battle over policy. The impressive array of rights enjoyed by resident noncitizens in Europe did not appear automatically. Trade unions, social movements, and immigrants themselves fought hard to win them. It is necessary to consider immigrant integration, which is an unavoidably political process involving far more than just citizenship laws and formal rights. The EC Commission recognized as much in its Communication on a Community Immigration Policy in November 2000. Even if demography loads the dice, the conflicts and small victories of daily coexistence on Europe's increasingly mean streets affect policy outcomes. Then neighborhood is the spatial site in which the contradictions so eloquently presented in this book are finding their resolution.

So, this book overshoots and lapses into demographic determinism at times. That said, perhaps such overkill is justifiable when trying to effect a correction in a field of political science that has for too long neglected the consequences of population movements. It is hard to read this book and not be convinced that Grotius has finally triumphed over Hobbes and that those of us who study immigration really are onto something. Maybe it is our destiny.

Being Useful: Policy Relevance and International Relations Theory. Edited by Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 416p. \$80.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Mary Durfee, Michigan Technological University

Thucydides, one of the intellectual fathers of international relations (IR), wrote a postmortem of a great war. In the process he also served as a general and was banished from Athens when he arrived too late to save a battle. Fortunately for us, the banishment improved his data and his analysis. Such are the delicate complications of analysis, theory, and practice. Being in the world of action provides crucial questions; distancing oneself from that world provides insight into the questions. This volume edited by Miroslav Nincic and Joseph Lepgold explores the variety of problems and prospects associated with linking theory and practice in international affairs. They do not argue that theory should be rejected for praxis. Rather they and their contributors argue that the isolation of the two unnecessarily oversimplifies the political world. The world of academic IR theory can benefit from closer contact with the world of policy and the world of policy will do better if it uses more theory.

After a foreword by Alexander George, the collection begins with a chapter by Nincic that addresses whether contact with the policy world makes for bad science. While neither this chapter nor the entire book put together would convince those most dedicated to the proposition that science and relevance are antithetical, it does lay out a landscape of theory and practice with identifiable landmarks. As a result, those actually interested in engaging the issue will be able to navigate the issue more readily. The basic argument is developed by Arthur Stein, who makes the strongest case against policy relevance. He succeeds in showing, however, that if IR can help distinguish quackery from serious "medical" advice, both worlds will be better off. Lepgold refines the discussion further by suggesting a continuum from "pure" or general IR theory, to issue-oriented puzzles, to case-oriented scholarship, to policymaking. He notes that policymakers are unlikely to be able to use general theory directly (and vice versa) but that interactions between the parts of continuum can improve all the forms of scholarship as well as policymaking. Moreover, seen this way, the chasm between pure theory and policy is less daunting, because it can be bridged in stages.

Section two of the volume offers chapters by individuals who have been, as Bruce Jentleson puts it, "professors in government" and seen successes and failures in using IR theory in policy. Next, the book moves to chapters on how better characterization of the domestic setting can improve the understanding of foreign policy. As real decision makers look at both the domestic and the international scenes in making choices, this was a useful decision by the editors. The remaining two parts of the book take up specialized approaches to issues and the particular intersection of rational choice with policy relevance, respectively. Each chapter in the volume ends with notes and a strong bibliography, thus readily allowing for additional research into the issues presented in the chapter. There was a modest effort at indexing the book, but the index will prove less useful than the chapter endnotes and bibliographies.

The editors reiterate Alexander George's insight that policy-relevant theory is contingent proposition-based, which is another way of saying that it is process-oriented. Process shows up throughout the volume. Yet the editors make too little of that commonality in the volume. Policy-relevant theory is process theory first and causal theory second. This suggests that IR scholars with theoretical bents might do well to think about what movement in theory might look like and how

best to model it. The need for process theory is presented most forcefully by Emily Goldman in her chapter on the diffusion of military technology and by Steven Brams and Jeffrey Togman in their application of the theory of moves. But it appears in the work of the professors in government (Jentleson and Ernest Wilson) and in Donald Rothschild's discussion of ethnic conflict as well, when they talk about linking knowledge and action and explicating consequences of different choices. Even the rational choice perspective of A. F. K. Organski, writing about the status of Jerusalem negotiations, presents the model over time.

More thought about process questions as they relate to the central problematic of political science—how insides and outsides of polities become linked—might have afforded a better home to the chapters on the domestic setting. As it is, the two chapters on the domestic setting, one by Robert Lieber, on the Madisonian features of the U.S. system, and the other by Eric Larson, exploring different theories of public opinion relative to Bosnia, are interesting on their own but seem out of place in the volume. It was also hard to know what to do with Donna Nincic's geopolitics chapter, in part because it does not apparently fit the general pattern of process theory.

General Patton once remarked that the perfect plan is the enemy of the merely good one in hand. Their next volume should pursue theories of process; in the meantime, Nincic and Lepgold have given us a good start for exploring the ties between IR theory and practice in our teaching and research. The diligent among us who hope to court the Prince will learn how to communicate better by considering the range of things policymakers want to know at different points in policymaking. For those of us devoted to life in the academy, the book clearly shows that theories connected to empirical referents will get better and better over time. Most important, the book reminds us that IR has room for all kinds of scholars and the variety of journals that goes with that diversity.

Extradition, Politics, and Human Rights. By Christopher H. Pyle. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2001. 445p. \$89.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Mark Gibney, University of North Carolina-Asheville

I approached this book with the dreaded sense that the subject matter of extradition would not hold my interest for very long, certainly not a hefty book of this size, and doubting the connection with human rights advertised in the title. I was decidedly wrong on both counts. Perhaps the first prejudice can be excused on the grounds that scholarship on this subject has indeed been "relentlessly academic," as Christopher Pyle himself acknowledges. This book, however, is anything but this. Instead, it not only has very impressive scholarship and is certainly pertinent to world events (especially after September 11), but also is a wonderful read.

With respect to human rights, Pyle immediately and convincingly shows the manner in which extradition is centered around issues of individual liberty, due process of law, and humanitarian concerns. In short, extradition is—or at least should be—all about human rights. Yet what Pyle catalogs in this historical account is the manner in which extradition principles have come to be degraded. In essence, we have moved away from justice all in the name of pursuing justice.

For the so-called "rusty" reader, extradition is the process by which one state surrenders to a requesting state persons accused (or convicted) of crimes against the laws of the requesting state for prosecution (or punishment). Extradition was viewed with a jaundiced eye by the new American republic for the simple reason that the world's first democracy felt a deep concern for returning even the most notorious criminals and political offenders to the unjust and undemocratic regimes of Europe. In addition to this, because of the British policy of impressing American seamen, there was a deep concern for protecting those who were taken to other lands against their will. And, finally, at the time of this country's founding, extradition was generally treated as a legal, not a political, process. And for this reason, extradition was naturally viewed as the preserve of judges and not political actors.

Given the obscurity to which nearly all extradition cases have now been relegated, it was surprising to learn that many of the earliest extradition cases, most notably those involving Thomas Nash, Jonathan Robbins, and the revolting slaves on the *Amistad*, captured both national and international attention. And what springs to life in these pages is the manner in which extradition brought together a veritable Who's Who of American statesmen—Washington, Jefferson, Adams, Lincoln, and Webster—with the not so famous, even the infamous. But the larger point is that, at one time in American history, extradition was taken very seriously. And the reason for this is that extradition represented certain American values.

Extradition still reflects American values, but these values are different from those that existed earlier in this country's history. One of the great ironies at work here is that those who have been so quick to invoke the founding fathers are invariably those who have done so much to corrupt the principle of extradition that the founders sought to establish. What we have at present is the business of extradition. And like its economic counterpart, the United States will do business with just about any state, which means that the U.S. government has willfully ignored the brutality and corrupt nature of any number of states in the name of pursuing "justice." The prime reason for this callousness is the hope that these states will reciprocate, as they have. But as Pyle so effectively documents, under such a system the rights of individuals have come to be completely submerged to larger political ends.

Another reason for this cavalier approach is that we assume that extradition only affects "others." However, anywhere between 10 and 20% of those extradited by the U.S. government are American citizens. And yet the manner in which we have treated our people (as well as "others") has at times been nothing less than criminal, best personified by the efforts of certain segments of the U.S. government (the Office of Special Investigation in the Department of Justice, in particular) essentially to frame John Demjanjuk as Ivan the Terrible. Given the failures of American justice, the only thing that saved Demjanjuk's life was a courageous Israeli Supreme Court that withstood tremendous public pressure and held that the extraordinarily weak (and incomplete) evidence that was relied upon to extradite Demjanjuk was really no evidence at all.

From the opposite end, the U.S. government has steadily expanded the extraterritorial reach of American law. What has not followed, however, is any of our constitutional protections. Because of this, the manner in which an individual has come into custody in a foreign land has been treated, somehow, as being irrelevant. This has led to all sorts of human rights abuses, including torture and kidnapping (by foreign and American officials alike), and yet our judiciary reasons that violations in other lands are different in kind from violations committed within the United States. And the business of extraditing and prosecuting continues apace.

Pyle presents a number of proposals for reforming extradition, and given the litany of abuses that he presents, one would be hard pressed to disagree with any one of these. All of these are premised on the idea that we are speaking of individuals who possess certain legal rights that need to be protected. One problem that Pyle glides over is that he wants to reestablish extradition as a legal process and to remove political considerations. Yet the judicial heroes whom he invokes are, for the most part, several centuries removed from the present, which is also to say that in matters of extradition the judicial branch has come to align itself solidly with the political branches. Pyle states at the outset that his focus will be squarely on United States law and not international law. However, what is one to do when there are so few (if any) checks and balances in the domestic realm? Given the fact that extradition is, by definition, justice beyond our national borders, perhaps it only makes sense to look to international solutions and mechanisms. This, however, is not the approach that Pyle would adopt.

Pyle's book is, at bottom, a plea to take extradition as seriously as it was taken at the time of the creation of the United States. This will not be easy, especially given the mood and the need for "justice" following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11. In fact, things are likely to get much worse before they ever become better. Yet if there is a book that will make us sit up and take notice of how lawless and inhumane our actions have been in this realm, it is this book.

Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy: Foreign Economic Policies as Strategic Instruments. By Lars S. Skålnes. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 272p. \$54.50.

Brian M. Pollins, The Ohio State University

To date, the main body of research on the economic dimensions of foreign policy has focused on narrow, tactical considerations alone. Are sanctions effective tools of diplomacy? Do governments try to sway the nation's trade away from enemies and toward allies due to relative gains concerns? Does foreign aid win compliance? Lars Skålnes's new book refocuses the attention of the field greatly by asking us to consider foreign economic policy as a core component of greatpower grand strategy. The purposeful manipulation of foreign economic ties by national leaders, he argues, is not merely an ancillary instrument in the diplomatic kit of foreign policy elites. Indeed there may be times in which it is the central tool used by powers to secure their strategic objectives. Moreover, Skålnes's framework seeks to identify the specific politicalstrategic conditions that make it more likely or less likely that great powers will build their grand strategies around such policy. This idea should not seem strange to us when we recall initiatives over the past 30 years such as Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, Henry Kissinger's notion of détente with the Soviet Union, and current American attempts to moderate Chinese behavior by integrating that emerging power more fully into the global economy. While these examples are not treated in the book (Skålnes examines German, French, British, and American cases over different years between 1879 and 1967), they stand as additional instances that might be understood in new ways. Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy makes a persuasive argument for permanently removing the "low politics" label from foreign economic policy and viewing it instead as coequal with military strategy in the realm of "high politics."

The book's central argument is stated clearly and succinctly in the introductory chapter. It builds directly upon Joanne Gowa's (1994) Allies and Adversaries, in which we learned how great powers will quite purposely structure foreign commercial policy in ways that channel the gains from trade away from adversaries and toward allies. The puzzle, Skålnes tells us, is that careful examination of cases reveals great varia-

tion in such policy; i.e., there are times when great powers behave just as Gowa tells us and other times when military and economic policies are divorced from one another and the latter is treated more as a "low politics" tactical tool or is ignored altogether. The author contends that the switching mechanism between these two conditions is the "strategic need" of the country in question. If leaders believe that the nation needs no help in resisting their adversaries, they will not offer favorable economic terms (i.e., access to their own markets in the form of tariff or other concessions) to their allies. If they believe that allies are needed to accomplish their larger objectives, they will select the kinds of policies described by Gowa. Indeed, Skålnes predicts such policies will then become central to their grand strategy.

The author examines the cases of German-Austro-Hungarian relations and French-Russian ties during the decades preceding the World War I; Britain's relations with its Dominions, the United States, France, and Germany during the interwar period; and U.S. relations with Europe and Japan from the end of the World War II until 1967. Alex George's method of structured, focused comparison and George and McKeown's process tracing are employed to test hypotheses derived from the author's central claim. The cases were selected to gain ample variance, both within and between cases, on the independent and dependent variables (strategic need and commercial policy, respectively). Skålnes also provides clear, reproducible, and operational definitions of his key variables (p. 39)—a vital component of good empirical work found all too rarely in case studies. The detailed case material itself is written clearly and well. Skålnes sticks to the point and allows the reader to see when the evidence does and does not fit his main claims. Far too many case studies tell us that "the model fits the data perfectly" (a feat typically accomplished by fuzzy definition of key concepts or selective ransacking of historical materials), but Skålnes's design and careful presentation allows us to learn from his model's failures as well as its successes.

The book's limitations derive from its near-exclusive focus on great-power alliance relations. Aforementioned examples beyond this study—Ostpolitik, détente, and U.S. policy toward China concerning Most Favored Nation status and World Trade Organization accession-all pertain to the use of foreign economic policy toward rivals and adversaries, not allies. Skålnes touches on relations with adversaries when he examines British policy toward Germany in the 1930s (chapter 5) and briefly describes U.S. economic overtures toward the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar years (pp. 156-160). But his twists on the British-German case to make it fit his model are awkward and unworthy of the overall study, and treatment of the U.S.-Soviet case is unsystematic. Regarding economic policy toward adversaries, many readers will conclude that the predictions made by Skålnes's model are simply wrong (Table 1, p. 3). It would also be interesting to contemplate whether the degree of strategic need correlates with the extent of concessions (as the logic of the argument would suggest). The importance of this point is raised when we see that some of the "concessions" identified by Skålnes in certain cases appear quite marginal even though the strategic need was clear (viz., French-Russian relations described in chapter 4.) More consideration of relations between great and small powers would also have been interesting. During the Cold War, for example, one would expect by Skålnes's own criteria that both the United States and the Soviet Union experienced high strategic need. Yet U.S. concessions toward Third World nations were virtually nonexistent, while Soviet subsidization of its small-power, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance partners was very high. Nazi Germany's economic penetration of Hungary and the Balkans, detailed in A. O. Hirschman's classic study (1945), also comes to mind. While I am again pointing to cases outside the scope of this study, consideration of instances like these—perhaps in the concluding chapter—could have prefigured the expansion of Skålnes's framework beyond the limited confines of great-power alliances.

Limitations notwithstanding, *Politics, Markets, and Grand Strategy* is a solid effort. Skålnes rightly calls for recognition of foreign economic policy as a grand strategic instrument, at times equally if not more important than military plans and programs. As we contemplate the present struggle against global terrorism, one could argue, the United States finds itself in great strategic need of allies—among small and middle powers, recent rivals, and its historic, great-power partners alike. It will be interesting to see whether the United States formulates a new grand strategy that makes meaningful, long-term economic concessions in trade, aid, investment, and technology transfer—especially toward poor nations now on the front lines of this conflict. Skålnes's model, in my reading of it, would predict that the United States will indeed move in that direction. We can all hope that he has it right.

The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism. By Daniel C. Thomas. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 308p. \$49.50 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Lawrence J. LeBlanc, Marquette University

The Helsinki Final Act was adopted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in 1975. Among the basic principles for relations among states that were affirmed in the document were the apparently contradictory principles of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Should a collision between these two principles occur, which one would prevail? It was widely assumed at the time, of course, that the principle of nonintervention would win out. The Soviets and their bloc members apparently had no intention of complying with the human rights principles enshrined in the Final Act, and even Western statesmen such as Henry Kissinger downplayed their importance.

There were actually good reasons for skepticism and even cynicism regarding future compliance with the human rights principles of the Helsinki Final Act. After all, by 1975 the international community had adopted numerous human rights instruments of global and regional scope going back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948. Although it would be an exaggeration to say that nothing had been achieved by those efforts at norm creation, the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of states remained a very powerful one and was, in any case, more often than not invoked by authoritarian and totalitarian governments with great effect to ward off "intervention" in their internal affairs in the name of human rights.

Yet only 15 years after Helsinki, by the end of the decade of the 1980s, communist regimes in Eastern Europe and even in the Soviet Union itself were crumbling and the end of the Cold War was in sight. Realist explanations of these developments looked to economic and military factors and trends—the inability of the Soviet system to deliver basic goods and services and/or to compete in an arms race with the United States. In *The Helsinki Effect*, Daniel Thomas provides a powerful and compelling argument to the effect that the human rights norms of the Helsinki Final Act set the stage for the demise of communism. He draws on a large body of literature and interviews with many important governmental and

nongovernmental actors in the United States and Europe to take us through a comprehensive analysis of the evolution, framing, and effects of the human rights norms of the Helsinki Final Act. This analysis is set in the context of an assessment of the explanatory power of Liberal and Constructivist theories of international relations.

The theoretical sophistication of this book is one of its main strengths. There is no effort here to marshal evidence in such a way as to demolish one theory and to argue that another provides the only plausible explanations. On the contrary, the analysis is balanced, though Thomas concludes that Constructivist theory is a more powerful explanatory tool overall. Still, at first glance, Liberal theory, which sees actors as choosing "behaviors that appear most likely to satisfy their preexisting interests within an interdependent international environment" (p. 10), would seem to have provided the best explanation as regards the evolution, framing, and effects of the human rights norms of the Final Act. As far as the evolution of the norms was concerned, throughout most of the CSCE negotiations the Soviet Union and the West European states, as one might have expected in view of their historic positions on such matters, stood at opposite poles regarding incorporating human rights norms in the Final Act. In the end, however, the Soviet Union accepted the norms. and the EC states seemed not to expect much to come of

How does one explain a radically different situation only a few years later, one in which the human rights norms had become very important and even set the stage for the collapse of communism? Thomas argues that the Soviets were, in effect, "trapped" into compliance with the human rights norms. This outcome was surely not intended, but it occurred nonetheless. At the end of the day, the norms mattered. Among other things, they had stimulated the growth of, and given credibility to, dissident groups within the Soviet orbit and provided a basis for external criticism of their human rights policies as well. These developments are best explained in terms of Constructivist theory, which sees actors behaving "in accordance with norms relevant to their identities" (p. 13) and which emphasizes "the intrinsic value that states place on recognition and legitimation by international society" (p. 264). The Soviets wanted legitimacy, and a price they had to pay was compliance with the Helsinki human rights norms.

In the excellent concluding chapter, Thomas summarizes the relative strengths and weaknesses of Liberal and Constructivist theories in explaining the evolution, framing, and effects of the human rights norms of the Helsinki Final Act, and he provides a broad assessment of the implications of his findings. It seems to me that some developments, not mentioned by Thomas, actually make more sense in light of his analysis. Examples include Mikhail Gorbachev's address to the United Nations General Assembly in 1988, in which he called for a strengthening of respect for international law and institutions, thus revamping the traditional Soviet "theory" of international law that stressed national sovereignty and nonintervention in the internal affairs of states; the fundamentally different nature of the debates over human rights issues, at least along East/West lines, that have occurred in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights since the late 1980s; and the much greater willingness of the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation to accept, and react to, external criticisms of their human rights policies. These developments, too, are arguably part of the Helsinki "effect."

Books of such high quality as this one are relatively rare, and Thomas should be commended for executing it so well. The scholarship is superb. The book is theoretically sophisticated and substantively sound. It is systematically organized and very well written throughout. Indeed, Thomas has an engaging writing style and gets his points across clearly and concisely. It was a pleasure to read this book.

The book will be of interest to a large group of scholars, not only those interested in human rights, but also those concerned with international relations theory, the process of international organization, the development and growth of international regimes, and the impact of norms and social movements in international relations. Historians and others interested in post-Soviet politics will find Thomas's discussion of the breakdown of the communist one-party states fascinating. International lawyers could see in this book the value of interdisciplinary cooperation in understanding how international norms are created and take hold. The book is surely to be required reading in graduate seminars on international action on human rights and many core seminars in international politics. And, because of its excellent coverage of governmental as well as nongovernmental actors in the norm creation process, it would be a very good addition to required reading lists for advanced undergraduates interested in international organizations.

Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice. By Katja Weber. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 195p. \$21.95.

Jeffrey D. Berejikian, University of Geogia

While there are numerous examples of transaction cost analysis in the literature on international cooperation, little of this scholarship concentrates on military collaboration. Indeed, studies like Weber's that explain the varying density of military agreements are rare under any rubric. Weber's offering thus begins to fill an important void in the scholarship on military cooperation.

Weber's main contention is that while traditional realism can explain the distribution of preferences for military cooperation by level of external threat, such arguments cannot predict or explain variation in the level of commitment embodied in final agreements. The existence of an external threat is therefore a necessary condition for military agreements, however, threat alone is not sufficient to explain when and why states agree to curtail significantly their sovereignty in response security challenges. Instead, we understand variation in cooperative forms only when realist insights about threats are integrated into an analysis that also examines the transaction costs unique to military cooperation.

After a brief introduction and overview, chapters 1 and 2 articulate the main argument. The presentation here is concise and logical. Beginning with the assumption that states covet independence, Webber highlights an often underdeveloped distinction between military alliance and confederation. A confederation demands more integration and coordination between partners and, thus, impinges more heavily upon state sovereignty. Then, drawing upon economic arguments regarding the role of transaction costs in cooperation between economic agents, Weber derives an analogous set of costs for states considering military cooperation. These include, uncertainty, asset specificity, technological development, and level of heterogeneity between states. For a given level of security threat, the density of cooperation between states increases as the transaction costs of collaboration rise. Thus, "the higher the level of transaction costs, the greater the likelihood a country will prefer a more binding arrangement" (p. 19).

Importantly, the analysis produces some counterintuitive results. For example, given symmetrical external threat perceptions, binding and dense cooperation (confederation) is more likely between heterogeneous states. The transaction costs between such states are greater because they lack a "similar degree of trust" compared to states that share common cultural or sociological roots (p. 27). Such partners therefore "favor structurally binding security arrangements" as a hedge against opportunism (p. 26). This argument runs counter to much cultural and constructivist scholarship arguing that common identities pave the way to deeper cooperation.

Weber further develops this framework in four empirical chapters. Chapters 3 and 4 examine agreements during and subsequent to the Napoleonic wars. Chapter 5 examines the founding of NATO, while chapter 6 focuses upon the attempt to form a European Defense Community (EDC).

Of these, chapter 3 is the weakest. Webber claims that the cooperation among Austria, Prussia, and Russia—in response to the immediate threat posed by Nepoloanic France—took the form of alliance rather than confederation because of the moderate to low level of transaction costs between partners. While the empirical discussion documenting the transaction costs is well done, the alliances of this period were forged during crisis. Such an immediate threat precludes the possibility of more extensive confederation agreements that would have taken considerably longer to complete. We are then left with a counterfactual case. Webber acknowledges the problem, for example, in the discussion of the Quadruple Alliance, when asking, "Would the allies have sought greater commitments, that is, chosen to confederate" if they had the luxury of more time? Perhaps, but with a counterfactual argument we can only speculate.

The remaining empirical work is stronger. Chapter 4 explains the German and Swiss confederations following the Napoleonic wars in a convincing way. Chapter 5 focuses upon the formation of NATO. The alliance was a compromise between Europe and the United States and is a nice example of the subtly possible under Weber's framework. Both sides agreed on the need for increased military cooperation, however, Europe desired greater formalization to restrain American autonomy. These asymmetric preferences are traced to asymmetric transaction costs. France, for example, faced the highest transaction costs and was most forceful in demanding "ironclad" assurances about U.S. protection (p. 87).

The final empirical chapter examines the attempt to form a European Defense Community. Webber nicely traces the positions of the various participants back to their exposure to transaction costs. However, the EDC seems a curious case from which to derive conclusions about the nature of cooperation given that it failed under French objections. Further, realism alone is the simplest explanation for French obstinacy. The failure of the EDC rests largely in the perception by French leaders that the threat posed by the Soviet Union had diminished. The French government, after downgrading the immediacy of the Soviet threat, concluded that "the costs of a binding security arrangement like the EDC...clearly outweighed the benefits" (p. 106).

As a result, while the theoretical edifice is strong, the empirical work is uneven. Ultimately, the attempt to integrate transaction cost analysis into realism represents important progress, but this potential is often unrealized. The problem here is case selection. The exigencies of the Nepolonic conflict precluded confederation, so no real test is possible, and the EDC failed under French objection.

Still, as an initial attempt to develop an argument about the transaction costs inherent to *military* cooperation, this is an important and needed contribution that alone justifies the book. The analysis also raises several new issues worthy of further investigation. For example, what role do changing transaction costs play in the evolution and/or devolution of institutions? What are the mechanisms by which they become perceptible to decision makers? How do leaders weight each type of cost? and How do they resolve competing assessments about the nature of such costs? *Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy* lays important groundwork for a fruitful examination of such questions.









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
Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground

#### JULIA E. SWEIG


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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


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
# International Human Rights and Authoritarian Rule in Chile


By Darren G. Hawkins

What is the influence of international human rights activism on authoritarian governments in the modern era? How much can pressure from human rights organizations and nations affect political change within a county? This book addresses these key issues by examining the impact of transnational human rights organizations and international norms on Chile during Gen. Augusto Pinochet's regime (1973–90) and afterward.


Darren G. Hawkins argues that steadily mounting pressure from abroad concerning human rights did, in fact, make Pinochet more vulnerable over time and helped stimulate Chile's movement to a liberal democracy. Such international expectations could not be ignored by Pinochet, and they gradually and cumulatively made themselves felt. By 1975 some Chilean officials were adopting the discourse of human rights and claiming their adherence to international norms; two years later the government's security apparatus responsible for the reign of terror was reorganized, and disappearances in Chile nearly ceased. In 1980 the regime abandoned its insistence on unlimited authoritarian rule and approved a constitution that set term limits and promised future democratic institutions; Pinochet lost a constitutionally mandated plebiscite in 1988 and ultimately left office in 1990. Hawkins contends that these changes not only were internally driven but reflected an ongoing response to an international discourse on human rights.

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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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




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# American Political Science Association

# American Political Science Review

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# **Notes from the Editor**

The first thing most readers will notice about this issue is the cover, which is colored blue this time and is adorned by a clock to signify "Taking Temporality Seriously," the first article in the issue. After noting the cover (admiringly, I hope) and browsing through the table of contents, readers are hereby invited to shift their attention briefly to the roster of editorial board members inside the cover. There they will see something new: as previewed in an earlier "Notes from the Editor," an executive committee of the Review's editorial board is now in operation. The six-member executive committee consists of four representatives of major subfields of the discipline (Darren Davis for American politics, James Morrow for international politics, Kirstie McClure for political theory, and Sven Steinmo for comparative politics) and two "at-large" members (Neta Crawford and Robert Goodin). The members of the executive committee are intended to be the "first among equals" in advising me on matters of editorial policy, serving as an initial sounding board and source of new ideas before issues come to the full editorial board. Pertinent examples of the committee's responsibilities include planning an appropriate commemoration of the Review's centenary and revisiting our procedures for handling "Forum" submissions and responses. Executive committee members also constitute a first line of defense in advising me when issues arise concerning particular manuscripts, though such responsibilities tend to be infrequent and, given the diversity of the manuscripts we consider, are fairly widely dispersed among members of the editorial board rather than confined solely to executive committee members. All editorial board members also share responsibility for "recruiting" promising manuscripts within their areas of expertise, but executive committee members are asked to be especially active in this regard. Finally, it is the executive committee that will, early in 2003, review the performance of our editorial office in general and my performance as editor in particular. With the latter point in mind, I want to emphasize (1) that I selected the executive committee with an eye toward diversity of various sorts (substantive, theoretical, methodological, demographic, and so on), and (2) that the executive committee consists of individuals with whom I have not been associated professionally or personally, apart from my familiarity with their work, and with whom I have no more than a nodding acquaintance, if that.

Let me also take this occasion to alert or remind readers that the December issue of the *Review* will be the last one in which book reviews appear. The book review operation, under the continuing editorship of Susan Bickford and Gregory McAvoy, is shifting over to the APSA's new journal, *Perspectives on Politics*, the first issue of which is scheduled to appear during the first quarter of 2003. Jennifer Hochschild, the editor of *Perspectives on Politics*, has announced ambitious plans for a journal that will, in her words, "enable members of different subfields of political science to speak to one

another—and with knowledgeable people outside the discipline—on issues of common interest."

Of course, that is a worthy aspiration for the Review as well, notwithstanding differences between its mission and that of the new journal. Besides book reviews, Perspectives on Politics will feature review essays, research articles that are more broadly focused than standard reports of individual research results, and "intervention" essays (brief commentaries on some political phenomenon or problem, exchanges about substantive or methodological issues, and introductions to or assessments of new ideas and trends). The advent of the new journal is an exciting development for our discipline, and I look forward to its appearance early next year.

### IN THIS ISSUE

In this issue's first article, Tim Büthe takes political scientists to task for their inattention to the historical dimension. The proper role of history in political analysis has been a source of heated debate, and oceans of ink have been spilled in attempts to determine where and how history "fits." Going beyond this debate in "Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of Narratives as Evidence," Büthe suggests ways to improve models by incorporating historical narratives. This exploration of the use and abuse of historical analysis by political scientists, though unlikely to settle major issues with finality, impressed our reviewers as having the potential to direct the ongoing debate in productive new directions.

Also likely to spur controversy is Arash Abizadeh's "Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four Arguments." In this essay, Abizadeh challenges the idea that liberal democracy is viable only within the context of a single cultural nation. Drawing from diverse approaches to political theory, he contends that the identity derived from a cultural nation (defined in linguistic-cultural terms) may undermine democratic principles and may fail to take into account multinational and post-national contexts. By systematically reconsidering widely accepted ideas about cultural requisites, this analysis should constitute a fine starting point for creating a broader normative theory of liberal democracy.

In contrast to many political scientists who study the American judicial system, Howard Gillman perceives the courts as enmeshed within party regimes rather than as an outside force constraining or balancing political parties. In "How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891," Gillman details the changing and expanding role of the federal courts in advancing the long-term Republican goal of altering America's economic foundations. In a study whose implications extend far beyond the courts and

Notes from the Editor September 2002

the U.S., Gillman addresses key issues of constitutionalism, institutionalization, and political development.

Whereas Gillman focuses specifically on a particular period and place, the question of "What is virtue?" knows no temporal or spatial boundaries. This question is at the center of a lively and often heated debate among contemporary political theorists. However, as Robert Bartlett argues in "Socratic Political Philosophy and the Problem of Virtue," the responses that have been offered to date are problematic. Virtue, he contends, cannot be reduced to a dichotomy between public and private good, individual and community, duty and happiness. Based on his intensive exegesis of Plato's *Meno*, Bartlett suggests that including nobility in the definition of virtue will bridge the dichotomies of previous scholarship.

Two contributions to this issue focus on gender politics. In the first, Eileen McDonagh tries to explain how women win the rights to vote and hold office and how much representation they gain in national legislatures. In "Political Citizenship and Democratization: The Gender Paradox," McDonagh challenges conventional wisdom by arguing that liberal principles that protect individual rights, such as suffrage and equality, do not explain the extension of political rights to women. Analyzing the constitutions of 190 countries and presenting an in-depth case study of the process through which women won suffrage in the United States, McDonagh shows that national differences in extending greater rights to women reflect the extent to which constitutions embrace both group and individual rights. Paradoxically, the political inclusion of women stems from a dual emphasis on what defines them as a group (i.e., their difference from men) and their status as individuals who deserve the same rights as all other individuals.

In "Lipstick and Logarithms: Gender, Identity, Institutional Context, and Representative Bureaucracy," Lael Keiser, Vicky Wilkins, Kenneth Meier, and Catherine Holland shift from McDonagh's focus on the "descriptive" representation of women to the next logical question: Does "descriptive" or "passive" representation lead to "substantive" or "active" representation? Evidence of gains for racial minorities through passive representation has been abundantly documented, but gains for women are not well documented. As a test case, Keiser and her colleagues ask whether female students in schools with more women math teachers perform better on standardized math tests. Their analysis brings new data to bear on an issue that has important policy implications, while speaking to an array of issues in feminist, democratic, and neoinstitutionalist theories.

In "Self-Interest, Social Security, and the Distinctive Participation Patterns of Senior Citizens," Andrea Louise Campbell's point of departure is the well known positive correlation between personal income and political participation in the United States. Although that relationship is well established, Campbell uncovers an intriguing exception: It reverses for senior citizens when Social Security comes into play. Social Security occupies a unique status as a government policy that

the poor depend on more than the rich, but also as one to which no "welfare" stigma is attached because it is considered earned. Thus, Social Security mobilizes the elderly segment of the poor population to act politically in their own self-interest in a way unmatched by other economic policies. This study will have to be taken into account in future analyses of the socioeconomic bases of mass political behavior and of the role of self-interest in shaping political attitudes.

A simple account of the timing of elections in parliamentary systems rests on the idea that officeholders behave strategically, calling new elections when they think their party's prospects are brighter than they are likely to be in the future. In "Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution," however, Kaare Strøm and Stephen Swindle contend that the matter is not nearly that simple, for the conventional account ignores institutional arrangements imposed on leaders by their countries' constitutions. By cataloguing the diverse set of pertinent constitutional provisions, constructing and solving games in which payoffs to the incumbents are based on these provisions, and using data on 192 elections in 18 parliamentary democracies to test hypotheses derived from these games, Strøm and Swindle greatly enrich our understanding of this familiar parliamentary tactic. More broadly, they provide superb demonstrations of the impact of institutional arrangements and of the fruitful interplay between formal theory and em-

Finally, in "Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation," Michael Hiscox notes that at some points in U.S. history, conflict over international trade has centered on broad class divisions. At other times, though, the conflict has been between narrower and more fluid coalitions of industries. Hiscox invokes factor mobility—"the ease with which owners of factors of production (land, labor, and capital) can move between industries"—to identify the points at which an industrybased coalitions model has been a better predictor of congressional voting on international trade issues than a class-based model. His analysis helps us understand the divisiveness of tariff and trade issues, and has direct implications for pluralist and Marxist models of political conflict.

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## Taking Temporality Seriously: Modeling History and the Use of Narratives as Evidence

TIM BÜTHE Columbia University

Social scientists interested in explaining historical processes can, indeed should, refuse the choice between modeling causal relationships and studying history. Identifying temporality as the defining characteristic of processes that can be meaningfully distinguished as "history," I show that modeling such phenomena engenders particular difficulties but is both possible and fruitful. Narratives, as a way of presenting empirical information, have distinctive strengths that make them especially suited for historical scholarship, and structuring the narratives based on the model allows us to treat them as data on which to test the model. At the same time, this use of narratives raises methodological problems not identified in recent debates. I specify these problems, analyze their implications, and suggest ways of solving or minimizing them. There is no inherent incompatibility between—but much potential gain from—modeling history and using historical narratives as data.

cross the empirical subfields of political science, we find in recent years a renewed and growing interest in "historical macro-analysis" (Katznelson 1997, 82), which seeks to understand and causally explain processes with an important temporal dimension, such as the formation and evolution of formal and informal social institutions. This trend has given rise to "historical institutionalism" (for overviews see Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Robertson 1993; Thelen 1999), which manifests itself in much of the newer literature on the welfare state and state formation in comparative politics and in the literature on American political development. In international relations, manifestations of this trend toward historical scholarship range from the interest in domestic and international institutions to the postmortem debate over the nature of the Cold War. Does this interest in historical processes merely expand the subject matter of political science or does it raise particular methodological problems that require a distinct approach to theorizing and to the presentation of empirical information to test the plausibility or validity of our explanations?<sup>1</sup>

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To advance and extend the methodological debate on this general question, I examine two sets of specific issues. First, what defines "history" as a distinct object of study? What are the implications of such a conception of history for developing explicit theoretical models? Is there an inherent incompatibility between modeling and the quest for explanation and narration of "history," as some observers suggest (e.g., Elster 2000)? Based on an inclusive conception of modeling and an explicit conception of "history" as processes rendered distinctive by the importance of temporality, I argue that modeling such processes is particularly difficult but, nonetheless, possible and desirable. Far from being inherently futile, modeling history is extremely useful, not least because models, by emphasizing the general, help us clarify what is historically and contextually specific when we examine the historical record. Consequently, the "historic turn in the human sciences" (McDonald 1996a) need not lead us away from what scholars of very different persuasions have identified as the particular strength and source of progress of American political science: the explicit modeling of the political phenomena we seek to explain, so as to facilitate scrutiny of the deductive logic of the explanation (see, e.g., Milner 1998, and Wæver 1998).

Second, because most historical work in political science is narrative in form, I examine the relationship between models and narratives and, more generally, the strengths and weaknesses of narratives as a type of "presentation of the results" of our analysis (Skocpol 1995, 44). Here, my focus differs from much recent work that concentrates on narratives as a source of empirical information for the analyst, either broadly, conceptualizing all empirical information as "text" to be interpreted (Ricoeur [1971] 1979), or more narrowly, concentrating on specific oral and written "histories" in the form of narratives as constitutive elements of ideas and norms (e.g., Anderson [1983] 1991; Finnemore 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) with interesting implications for policy (e.g., Van Evera 1994, 36f). These works have been joined by predominantly methodological contributions (e.g., Heise 1993; Lustick 1996), which often seek to raise social scientists' awareness of historians' carefully developed methods to discern

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Throughout this paper I subsume epistemological issues under "methodological" ones.

internal validity through the "critical use of sources." All of those works are concerned with narratives as the raw material—as (primary or secondary) sources—for the analysis. In contrast, I focus on narratives written by scholars to present the results of their empirical analysis, providing information about actors, institutions, events, and relationships in "a single coherent story, albeit with subplots" (Stone 1987, 74) to provide empirical support for a theoretical argument. Insofar as they are independent of the information used to construct the model, these narratives can serve as data to test the model or as "evidence" to support the model's plausibility.<sup>2</sup>

Using narratives to provide empirical support for one's model has a number of benefits, especially when we seek to examine explanations for historical processes with an important temporal dimension, but it also raises methodological questions that warrant closer attention. Specifically, how do we delineate a sequence of events so as to justify the imposition of a narrative beginning and end onto a continuous empirical record? How does the imposition of a narrative closure affect the generality of our conclusions? What is a narrative's "truth claim?" How useful are narratives for the assessment of alternative explanations? These questions—and how we answer them—matters not only for scholars interested in historical work. The evidentiary status that we attribute to a narrative as a consequence of our conclusions about the relationship between author-scholar and narrative, for instance, affects our reading (and writing) of all work that uses prose to present its empirical results.

I analyze the problems identified by these questions and suggest ways of minimizing their impact on the validity of our findings and the confidence we can have in them. I show how the theoretical model can help structure narratives in ways that make them more suitable as tests and how the use of multiple narratives can increase our confidence in the model, illustrating my arguments with examples drawn from the literature on the state and regime change. I conclude that a careful combination of models and narratives yields clearer insights with greater confidence than a return to untheorized history writing with its often vast hidden causal assumptions and claims. It thus allows the integration of rigorous theorizing and the study of historical processes in a manner that is attentive to, and respectful of, the historical record (cf. Evans 1995, 3f).

#### **MODELING**

Any attempt to answer the question of whether modeling and the study of history are incompatible should start with explicit definitions of modeling and history. I take a model to be a schematic statement of a theoretical argument, a hypothesized parsimonious abstraction or simplification of "reality" that depicts a deductively sound, systematic, regular relationship between specified aspects of reality and helps to explain that relationship. Modeling to provide causal explanations, we customarily start by designating the explanandum as the "dependent variable" and its hypothesized causes as the "independent variables." Modeling, however, must go beyond identifying regularities in a Hempelian fashion by also specifying the causal mechanisms through which the elements are linked in a regular way (Coase [1981] 1994; Elster 1989, 3–10; Tilly 1997). The resulting models allow us, with the help of specified assumptions, to derive specific hypotheses about the explanandum, given particular "values" for the independent variables—though the specificity may be restricted to predicting the direction of change in the explanandum.4 Whether employing the logic of instrumental rationality or not, whether assuming perfect strategic and computational capabilities or more limited ones, whether working quantitatively or qualitatively, we model to emphasize what we consider to be the most important, systematic, and in that sense generalizable elements of the phenomena we seek to explain.

Insofar as the nature of the explanandum permits, a more formal exposition of the model tends to facilitate checking "a system of causal generalizations...for internal consistency and for conclusions that are not intuitively obvious at the outset" (McClelland 1975, 114), as Robert Powell (1999, 99–102) illustrates in his spirited defense of the promise and practice of formal modeling in security studies. The language of mathematics is particularly suited for scrutinizing the deductive logic of an argument—and using it does not require making rational choice assumptions, as Barry O'Neill's (e.g., 2001) work illustrates—but it also imposes costs on author and reader, which may or may not have corresponding benefits for particular questions and individuals. In short, formalization has some advantages, but a model need not be formal. Rather, the defining characteristic of a model is that it provides an explicit, deductively sound statement of the theoretical argument, separate from a particular empirical context.

By forcing us to specify the elements of our arguments, such as actors and their goals, modeling should

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The historical narratives discussed here are therefore in many respects similar to case studies, discussed in a number of books and articles on methodology in recent years (e.g., Achen and Snidal 1989; Bennett 1999; Collier 1995; Fearon 1991; Geddes 1990; Jervis 1990; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994; Przeworski 1995; Rogowski 1995; Tetlock and Belkin 1996). However, these narratives are not used as "interpretative" (Lijphart 1971, 692) or "disciplined-configurative" (Eckstein 1975, 99ff) case studies; rather, historical narratives are intended to provide empirical support for original theoretical propositions. Moreover, historical narratives differ from typical case studies in that they trace historical processes over long periods of time to test a theoretical argument with an important temporal dimension—which raises methodological problems not discussed in the case study literature.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> To be sure, not all political science and certainly not all historical scholarship seeks to provide causal explanations (Calhoun 1998, 863ff; Latin 1995, 455; Somers 1998, 745ff). But much of contemporary political science scholarship does, and as Max Weber ([1906] 1978) noted long ago, almost all explanations of political phenomena make at least implicit causal claims. I therefore concentrate on the methodological problems involved when seeking causal explanations for historical processes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Specificity decreases, for instance, when Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, (1998, 89) relaxes the assumption of a unitary elite in his model of early modern regime change.

increase clarity and explicitness, reducing ambiguity and vagueness. That said, in practice, models often are not explicit about all elements of the analysis. Particularly when one mode of analysis dominates a discipline, its core assumptions are often dropped from discussion. These assumptions remain a central part of the analysis, but they are no longer mentioned and may be "smuggled in" and thus become "immune to rational criticism" (Barry 1985, 282). Yet, although modeling can be a rhetorical device to hide one's values or other assumptions (McCloskey 1998), it need not be; and explicit modeling surely makes it easier to detect hidden assumptions than leaving the theoretical argument implicit.

Modeling as such, then, does not require any particular ontological, epistemological, or substantive assumptions, though any specific model will have to make them and should make them explicit to facilitate their empirical as well as their analytical scrutiny. By definition, assumptions must be "unrealistic" or "inaccurate" in the sense of being incomplete. But if assumptions are manifestly empirically wrong—as in Milton Friedman's ([1953] 1979, 30) (in) famous example of the leaf-growth pattern on a tree—they cause two major problems. First is the familiar problem of the joint hypothesis test: It will be impossible to tell whether empirical disconfirmation of a hypothesis derived from a model with such assumptions is due to a flaw or omission in the model or due to the erroneous assumptions. Second, when predictions that are based on manifestly wrong assumptions are confirmed empirically, such findings are not very useful, because the models based on such assumptions provide little insight into how the outcomes came about (Coase [1981] 1994, 17). Policy that seeks to achieve or avoid these outcomes, if based on such models, is likely to be ineffective and might be outright dangerous.

The final point to be made before turning to a definition of "history" concerns the roles of deduction and induction in modeling. Deduction is of central importance for the ex ante identification of the elements—the types of (f)actors—that constitute the building blocks of a possible model. It is also the central heuristic tool for formulating logically sound relationships among these elements, consistent with the model's core ontological assumptions and consistent with the assumptions driving the causal mechanisms, which themselves are usually derived from very general theories of the constraints, motivations, and cognitive processes employed in decision making and thus shaping human agency. But a model based solely on deduction from assumptions is a shell consisting of "empty theoretical boxes" (Bonnell 1980, 162; see also Smelser 1967, 22ff, 32); it needs empirical content in order to make predictions about what we should observe in a particular instance. To be sure, this content could be supplied by further assumptions that are only subsequently subjected to empirical scrutiny (Kiser and Hechter 1998, 799ff, 802ff), but if we truly had no empirical knowledge at all, what would be the basis for such conjectures? In practice, therefore, the empirical content will

probably be supplied inductively.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, induction often has a further role in the modeling process, especially when empirical disconfirmation of our initial model leads us to the inductive discovery of additional explanatory factors that can account for the anomalies. Integrating these factors systematically into the model is surely preferable to having them remain extraneous and theoretically irrelevant (cf. Smelser 1967, 33, 35), as long as we keep in mind that the inductive addition of "auxiliary hypotheses" without subsequent separate tests leads only to hypotheses, not conclusions (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 21f, 101ff; Lakatos [1970] 1974, 117f).6 That said, even works that are entirely inductive would benefit in two ways from making their argument explicit and separating it as a model from the particular case on which it is based. First, such a separation forces the author to distinguish between the conceptually abstract elements of causal relationships and their particular manifestations. This distinction is a prerequisite for assessing validity (see Adcock and Collier 2001): Investigating whether we are indeed "measuring what we think we are measuring" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 25) is nearly impossible if the argument is presented exclusively in operationalized form. Second, such a separation induces the author to specify which parts of the explanation are strictly historicallycontextually specific and to differentiate them from the parts that constitute a "potentially generalizable model" (Sewell 1996, 270) in the sense of capturing insights that should, under certain conditions, be applicable more broadly. This differentiation, in turn, facilitates the identification of other cases, if any, on which the argument could subsequently be tested.

6 The implied oversight of this caveat renders problematic the following methodological advice by Bates et al. (1998, 16): "The authors derive [testable hypotheses] from theory; but when the case materials do not confirm their expectations, they do not respond by rejecting their models. Rather, they respond by reformulating them and by altering the way in which they think about the problem."

7 This is not to say that historical works that do not use models cannot

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For instance, in a paper on popular support for European Union membership in the 1994 Austrian referendum (Büthe, Copelovitch, and Phelan 2002), we start deductively from general theories of European integration and political economy to model support as a function of, among other factors, the economic interests of industrial sectors. We then work inductively from a qualitative analysis of the public debate before the referendum to specify those industrial sectors whose interests had salience for the public and might therefore be expected to have affected the outcome of the referendum. We test the resulting specified model quantitatively, using referendum results from Austria's 121 districts as the dependent variable.

be very insightful. Barrington Moore's (1996) classic, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, for instance, presents an argument that is so highly contextualized that Victoria Bonnell (1980, 170) finds that "his generalizations...cannot be reduced to ... models." And yet, it has provided insights and inspiration to several strands of research on regime change, class formation, and processes of social transformation. Similarly, the theoretical model remains largely implicit in Philip Nord's (1995) The Republican Moment. Yet its rich and vivid account of the transformation of Parisian civil society from the 1860s to the 1880s, focusing on the emergence of democratic cultures and norms of conflict resolution in autonomous spheres of civil society prior to the successful political democratization of 1871, is surely very insightful for theorists and practioners of democratization

When success breeds success, when variables feed back into themselves, we have an exciting story to tell, but unless we know its metaphors [its model] . . . we have no way to tell it.

McCloskey (1991, 36)

## MODELS AND HISTORY: THE PROBLEM OF TEMPORALITY

Several scholars have suggested in recent works that the social scientific study of "history" raises particular methodological problems (e.g., Bates et al. 1998; Elster 2000; Lustick 1996; Pierson 2000). Yet none of them defines what he means by history, not even Terrence McDonald (1996b), in his programmatic essay, "What We Talk about When We Talk about History." So what is it that makes history distinctive?

Conceptualizing history as "what historians do" seems not very fruitful. Notwithstanding some real differences in stance and approach to evidence separating political scientists and political historians (Ingram 1997), what historians study is often studied with similar methods by political scientists, sociologists, economists, and others. Whether or not the study of history raises particular methodological problems for modeling or the presentation of empirical information would then become a matter of contested disciplinary conventions rather than of characteristics of the subject matter (Tilly 1990).

A conception of history as the study of "things of the past" is also not very promising. Studying past events may—but need not—require the researcher to work with sources that call for particular methodological, historiographic tools (McNeill 1998, 4f). Moreover, everything that we can study empirically must already have happened and, in that sense, is a "thing of the past." If "history" is distinctive, then it must be conceptualized as a set of phenomena with distinct characteristics.

I submit that history—as an object of study that may require a distinct approach to theorizing and to the presentation of empirical information-must consist of macroprocesses that cover an extensive temporal space. How does this definition raise particular methodological issues? If the process itself is our explanandum, then isolating events from the historical process within which they occur risks depriving us of understanding because any one event in such a temporal sequence, far from being an independent observation, is meaningful only if seen as part of the larger process (Elias [1937] 1997, 80ff, [1939] 1997, 390; Mink [1966] 1987, 64f, 67, 80, 82f). Temporality thus becomes the defining characteristic of "historical" explananda. There are, to be sure, several ways of conceptualizing temporality (Aminzade 1992; Griffin 1992; Sewell 1996), not least since time itself can be understood as a social construct; and the significance of the passing of time depends upon the level of abstraction at which we work.8 But whichever specific conception of temporality we adopt, it calls our attention to the issue of sequence, and it injects a dynamic element. Dynamics complicate the modeling task; sequence enables it.

#### **Dynamics**

The institutions within which actors interact are social constructs, as are the aggregate actors that populate so many of our models in political science. Due to factors such as uneven growth, increasing or diminishing marginal utility, and accumulation or ratcheting effects (e.g., Fearon 1998; Pierson 2000; Thelen 1999, 392ff) as well as the tendency of actors to attempt to manipulate or escape constraints (Almond and Genco 1977, 493, 518f), the passage of time makes it, ceteris paribus, more likely that institutions, actors themselves, and their preferences may change. Recognizing this dynamic aspect of temporality does not mean that everything is constantly in flux. In fact, institutions and aggregate actors can be extremely stable for a long period of time (Sewell 1996, 264). But the possibility of change implies that explanations of temporally large processes must allow for change in the constitution of actors (e.g., Ertman 1997; Spruyt 1994; Tilly 1998, 7ff) as well as for change in their preferences. In the sense of the inherent dynamism of temporality, then, history is "the study of changes of things that change" (Herbert Butterfield, as quoted in Schroeder 1997, 67). Models of "history" must explain stability rather than assume it.9

Because changes in preferences are all too easily invoked to explain changes in behavior and to claim the unsuitability of models that hold preferences constant, it is important to specify what I mean by preferences. 10 I follow Jeffry Frieden in defining preferences as those interests of a given actor that determine how the actor rank-orders the possible outcomes (1999, 42). Preferences thus must be differentiated from the actions that the actor may undertake to achieve any particular outcome ("strategies" in game theory parlance), but they should also be sufficiently specific to the situation that they can unambiguously yield a rank-ordering of the outcomes that would result from the conceivable actions in that situation. Consequently, "what are considered preferences in one [context] might be strategies in another" (Frieden 1999, 41).

A change in preferences becomes more likely over time for two reasons. First, new ideas arise over time. While Mark Blyth (1997) rightly warns against a facile attribution of causal force to ideas, ideas can indeed

Hintze [1906] 1975; Tilly 1975, 1992) will surely differ from those that might be relevant when we are concerned with the decision-making process that leads to a particular policy decision.

9 This is one of the strengths of Barry Weingast's chapter in *Analytic* 

alike. I submit, however, that those insights would be clearer and more accessible if the authors had also presented an explicit theoretical model.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The conception and increments of time that are relevant when the process we want to explain is a vast sweep of state formation (e.g.,

Narratives: His model of U.S. federal institutions allows him to explain why policy remained stable over several decades despite major economic and demographic changes that significantly increased the numerical strength of groups opposed to the status quo and changed some of their preferences (Weingast 1998, esp. 161ff, 184f, 188).

10 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for thoughtful suggestions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for thoughtful suggestion for clarifying this issue.

cause a change in preferences by making altogether new outcomes available, which forces a reordering of the outcomes. The rise of Keynesianism provides an illustration of this phenomenon. At the outset of the Great Depression, certain social actors failed to rank first among their preferences a Keynesian demand-side stimulus policy and failed to influence policymakers accordingly, even though with hindsight the adoption of such a policy would have been the outcome that maximized their material utility. Later, similarly situated actors indeed preferred such a policy over alternatives and employed various strategies to achieve the adoption of Keynesian policies by governments. This finding does not suggest that, at the earlier point in time, the actors were less instrumentally rational in ranking the outcomes and selecting their strategies accordinglythe "outcome" of Keynesianism just had not been formulated yet (Hall 1989).

Second, ideas and especially norms, being social constructs, can change (Ball, Farr, and Hanson 1989; Ruggie 1983; Wendt 1999, esp. 113ff). An example from the literature on regime change illustrates the resulting change in preferences nicely: Assume that policies are at least in part a function of regime type, and assume further that regime type has no effects on the citizens other than through policy (there are no normative commitments to a particular regime type). Social actors (individuals or groups) may, under these conditions, be expected to have preferences over (i.e., rank-order) the regime types based on which regime type affords them the greatest impact on policy (e.g., Bracher [1955] 1971; Hallgarten 1952; Lepsius 1978; Przeworski 1991, passim, esp. 51ff). If actors now develop over time a normative commitment to a democratic form of government, they will probably rank-order the possible outcomes of a regime change differently because the utility that they assign to the outcome "democracy" has increased relative to all other outcomes (e.g., Bermeo 1992; Di Palma 1990; Weingast 1997). The actors may still rank-order their strategies as before and may therefore choose the same action (for instance, acquiescence to the rule of the current nondemocratic regime if the perceived risks and costs associated with doing anything else render other possible strategies prohibitive), but their preferences have changed.<sup>11</sup>

The dynamic quality of temporality suggests that models based on assumptions of stable institutional contexts, stable preferences, and constant units for which we record variable, independent attributes at any given point in time would be unsuited if we are concerned with explaining history, understood as a macroprocess. Yet taking temporality seriously does not require abandoning modeling as such. In fact, standard game theoretic models can incorporate dynamic elements (for an introduction, see Brams 1994, and

Gibbons 1992, 55ff, 173ff), and the extensive form used to depict and analyze such dynamic games indeed "take[s] sequence into account" (Bates et al. 1998, 14)—although it is based on a truncated conception of temporality in that, within such game models, "actual chronology is important only insofar as it influences what one player knows about the actions of the second" (Kreps 1990, 18). Models of historical processes, in contrast, need to derive the constitution of the actors and explanatory variables such as actors' preferences within the model in order to allow for change (cf., e.g., Jackson and Nexon 1999, 302ff). At the same time, such endogenization of explanatory variables to capture dynamic change (and explain stasis where it occurs) does not require a fundamentally different approach to theorizing. Some recent work in economics, for instance, relies on only minor modifications of rational choice assumptions to develop dynamic models of preference formation (e.g., Becker 1996), which could be used as a building block of a larger model of an historical process. Evolutionary models developed in biology seem to be well suited to being adapted to explain the sociopolitical processes of persistence and change in the knowledge, values, and habits to which we customarily refer as "culture" (Boyd and Richerson 1985). In sum, endogenizing explanatory variables does not require a fundamentally new approach but can be achieved through building on, or adapting, various existing types of models.

Endogenizing explanatory variables, however, comes at the expense of parsimony or worse: Scholars who seek causal explanations usually frown upon endogenization because when the dependent variable is not only explained by, but also (partly) explains the independent variables, we run the risk of circular reasoning. Can we avoid this problem? Sequence provides the answer.

#### Sequence

Sequence allows us to endogenize the explanatory variables without having to abandon modeling and scientific aspirations because it enables us to avoid circular reasoning. Endogenization involves incorporating into the model some variation of causal feedback loops from the *explanandum* to the explanatory variables. In a static model, such feedback loops make the argument circular. Determining causality then becomes impossible. The sequential element of temporality, however, gets us around this problem, because it allows us to have causal feedback loops from the *explanandum* at one point in time to the explanatory variables at a *later* point in time only.<sup>12</sup>

The enabling effect of sequence is nicely illustrated by an example of a causal feedback loop in the chapter on education in Abram de Swaan's (1988) *In Care of* the State, where the author seeks to explain the historical process by which elementary education, once seen

Higher-level preferences surely remain the same (in this case, for instance, the preference for longer life or safer possessions, which may be threatened by the current regime's sanctions against prodemocracy activists). But—and this is the key to the differentiation between preferences and strategies used here—those unchanging higher-level preferences are insufficient by themselves to explain the rank-ordering of outcomes in the situation at hand.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Note that anticipated reactions can undermine the assumption that events at time t are independent of events at time t+1.

as an individual and local responsibility, came to be provided through nationwide collective and compulsory arrangements, administered or at least regulated by the state. In de Swaan's model, an initial, partial success in increasing the scope and raising the quality of public education increases the opportunities for cross-regional commercial activities and the effectiveness of the state bureaucracies by raising the uniformity of language and knowledge. Over time, both of these consequences of increased and improved education should be expected to swell the ranks of the "metropolitan elites" (supraregionally trading entrepreneurs and central state bureaucrats) who favor the provision of elementary education as a public good. A change in the explanandum, education, thus leads to a change in the relative power of the actors in the conflict over the scope and quality of education at a *later* stage. It strengthens the proponents of widened and improved elementary education at the expense of the opponents, such as local elites and clergy, and in turn should lead to a further increase in the scope and quality of education.

Time itself thus becomes an element of the causal explanation, a factor in the model. But time does not function as a standard explanatory variable that directly affects the *explanandum*—otherwise, its effect could easily be expressed through a linear differential equation (McCloskey 1991, 22ff). Rather, it operates in the background to affect several explanatory variables in a variety of ways. Models that seek to help us explain historical processes *qua* processes therefore must explicitly incorporate a temporal dimension and consider carefully how each explanatory factor is affected by the passage of time in the process that we are trying to explain.

In sum, the importance of temporality is the distinctive characteristic of "historical" phenomena as objects of study, which raises particular methodological issues. The dynamic element of temporality complicates the modeling task by demanding that our models allow for the possibility of change (and hence explain rather than assume stability), but the incorporation of a sequential element enables us to do this without running the risk of the circular reasoning often associated with endogenizing the independent variables. Yet temporality raises additional problems when we move to empirical testing.

Model building is important for working out the internal logic of a chosen set of assumptions and relationships. But rigorous empirical analysis is needed to ensure the relevance of those assumptions and relationships.

Lazonick (1991, 303, emphasis added)

### CONFRONTING MODELS WITH DATA: HISTORICAL NARRATIVES

Ways of confronting a model with data range from showing the consistency of the theoretical argument with one empirical observation of the *explanandum* (Eckstein's [1975, 108ff] "plausibility probe") to a test on a large sample that meets the criteria of statistical analysis (irrespective of whether we employ a

quantitative or qualitative methodology). Where on this continuum a given work falls does not affect its usefulness or insightfulness but should affect our confidence in its conclusion, keeping in mind that any single work usually exists in the context of larger theoretical and empirical literatures. At any given point along the continuum, multiple analytical techniques are at our disposal. From the viewpoint of the presentation of empirical information, we can differentiate broadly between a primarily quantitative presentation, based on statistical analysis, and narratives, based on qualitative techniques such as process-tracing. In this section, I spell out what makes narratives a particularly suitable form of presenting empirical information when we want to test models about historical processes, and I suggest ways of structuring narratives to attain this

Why narratives? Practical constraints, such as too few instances of a given macrohistorical process, may inhibit the use of statistical techniques. Yet time series analysts have long used lagged variables, and in recent years some scholars have begun to develop more sophisticated procedures to control for time dependence in political phenomena (Beck and Katz 1996; Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). In short, we have very suitable statistical tools for the empirical analysis of models with dynamic and sequential elements, although if the nature of the explanandum indeed is such that all stages within each instance of the historical process (the explanandum) are interrelated, one would need to incorporate into the statistical model a lag for each variable at each stage of the process prior to the final stage, with a corresponding rapid decrease in the degrees of freedom.<sup>13</sup> Moreover, various elements of the model and additional implications may be separately tested using statistical techniques. Statistical methods can thus be used in the empirical analysis of historical processes and may be particularly valuable when complementing and reinforcing insights gained from qualitative techniques (cf. Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Berg-Schlosser and Quenter 1996; Mahoney 1999).

A preference for narratives, then, is due not to the unavailability of analytical techniques that lead to other forms of presenting our results, but to particular strengths of the narrative form. The most important of these strengths is that narratives, in addition to presenting information about correlations at every step of the causal process, can contextualize these steps in ways that make the entire process visible rather than leaving it fragmented into analytical stages. Moreover, narratives allow for the incorporation of nuanced detail and sensitivity to unique events, which may be necessary to understand the particular manifestation of an element of the model but which are beyond the model.

<sup>13</sup> The problem here is neither a lack of information, since information about the pertinent variables at each stage of the process is equally required for qualitative-narrative techniques such as process-tracing, nor quantification per se, which, at least at the basic level of more versus less, is usually possible. Collaborative database projects show that such complex information can be gathered for many cases. All of these techniques of course require carefully specifying the functional equivalents across different instances of the process.

In de Swaan's narrative of the introduction of state-provided education in The Netherlands, for instance, he notes how the Napoleonic invasion made the central metropolitan elite suddenly exceptionally independent of local elites and clergy, thus strengthening them in the societal group conflict over the expansion of the state, including the expansion of public education. This unique event affected the speed of change and thus the particular manifestation of the process, but it did not change the general dynamic of the process as captured by the model.

At the same time, narratives must not revert to untheorized historical accounts, invoking extraneous factors in an ad hoc fashion, because such accounts are not useful as a test of the causal propositions. How can we avoid this problem? The model itself can help us write narratives that are useful as a test of the argument.

The theoretical model can be used to structure the narratives. As we know from Arthur Danto's (1965. 149ff) thought experiments, even the imagined "ideal chronicler" who records every action and event in perfect chronological order cannot provide a complete history, let alone a causal explanation. Any historical narrative therefore must simplify "reality" by designating some elements as salient and omitting many more as not significant (McClelland 1975, 75ff). The model can help by providing the criteria for what is salient: The actors identified in the model constitute the actors of the narrative, which traces their goals, beliefs, and actions. Within each narrative we thus employ processtracing (Bennett 1999; George and McKeown 1985). The influence of other elements of the model, such as how temporal progression affects the actors and their preferences, should be systematically described. 14 Beyond the elements identified in the model, however, additional context-specific information should be minimized. Information that is extraneous to the model should be provided only insofar as it affects salient elements and is needed either to understand the relationship between these elements or to appreciate the contingencies of a particular historical process. If the narrative cannot be written in terms of the model, something is wrong with the model.

Using the model in this way to discipline the narrative ensures equivalence in the sense that each narrative contains the same (or at least functionally equivalent) elements. Each narrative thus becomes a unit or "observation"—a "plausibility probe" to test the causal argument, though we may not be able to assume independence for testing purposes (Sewell 1996, 258f). And most importantly, the model allows the analyst to overcome the problem of deciding what matters for the narrative (cf. Mink [1978] 1987, 187f)—the problem

that leads to the ad hoc-ness of many inductive historical explanations.

### HISTORICAL NARRATIVES AS DATA: FOUR PROBLEMS AND (PARTIAL) SOLUTIONS

Notwithstanding the above strengths of narratives, their use as data brings to light four problems and limitations not identified in recent methodological work and debates on history, narratives, and social science theory. The first two problems are particular to the use of narratives as data in conjunction with models of historical processes; the third and fourth apply to any use of narratives as data.

The first problem concerns defining or delineating historical sequences as distinct, or what Bearman, Faris, and Moody call "casing" (1999; see also Mink [1966] 1987). If we conceive of history as a continuous stream of interrelated events, then at the logical extreme there is no beginning and no end. A narrative, however, inherently imposes a beginning and end onto the historical record. To be sure, all empirical work—whether large-N statistical or small-N case study work—needs to justify the boundaries of its units of analysis, especially when proceeding on the assumption of independence of observations (cf. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 222). But the emphasis on the interrelatedness of events across time makes this problem particularly acute for the empirical testing of models of history, while the literary and "aesthetic" (Topolsky 1998) qualities of the narrative tend to obscure it.

The model can provide a deductive, albeit only partial, solution to this problem. By specifying the explanandum in general terms and theorizing temporality explicitly, the model delineates a sequence as distinctbased on our research objectives—in the potentially infinite space of time. Note, however, that the explanandum itself provides a justification for choosing the starting and ending points of the narrative only insofar as the historical process we seek to explain can plausibly be said to have had a clear starting point (e.g., an exogenous shock) and to have "run its course." A number of sociologists have in recent years developed alternative inductive procedures, often grounded in the boundary specification approach of network theory, for delineating an event sequence as a distinct process and hence justifying a distinct narrative with clear end points: "event structure analysis" (Heise 1993), "abstraction and generalization of interactions" (Abell 1993), "interaction process analysis" (Kosaka 1993), and "bicomponent analysis" of event populations (Bearman, Faris, and Moody 1999). However, questions remain about the logic underpinning these procedures (see Abell et al. 1993), and I doubt their general applicability to macrosocial phenomena. This leaves us with a clear specification of the explanandum as the only generalizable, methodological justification

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Carefully tracing the positions taken by each of the actors identified in his model, de Swaan shows, for instance, that over time (for reasons consistent with the model, such as a growing cohesion of a group-social actor), the demands of working-class parents intensified, whereas "time" reversed the preferences of industrialists.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> I address the issue of independence below, when discussing the use of multiple narratives as a remedy for what I identify as the "third problem" of historical narratives as data.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> For prominent contributions to those debates see Abell et al. 1993, Elman et al. 1997, King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, Kohli et al. 1995, Laitin et al. 1995, Mahoney 1999, Ragin, Berg-Schlosser, and Meur 1996, Schroeder 1994, and Somers et al. 1998.

for making choices about where to begin and end a narrative.

De Swaan (1988), whose use of historical narratives is exemplary, achieves such a delineation of a temporal sequence by defining his explanandum as the process by which elementary education was transformed from a private and local affair into a responsibility of the state, provided at a basic level throughout the territory within its reach, according to certain standards (e.g., a uniform language) and financed through compulsory measures. This definition of the *explanandum* suggests that the narrative must start with the initial moves (ideational or practical) away from the previous local and private system of schooling but need not be concerned with that system's prior history. And the narrative can end when uniform, state-financed elementary education has been established in the country in question, without needing to concern itself with the subsequent evolution of the educational system or other related aspects of the welfare state. The specification of the explanandum thus provides the criteria for choosing the beginning and end of the narrative.

The second problem concerns the need to "conclude" the narrative while the process may be ongoing, which restricts the "generality" of our conclusions (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 137). If we use feedback loops in our models, through which a change in the value of the dependent variable is hypothesized to change the value of some or all of the explanatory variables at a later point in time, time itself acquires an explanatory role (in interaction with the original explanatory variables). As long as only the explanatory variables, and not the explanandum itself, are affected by time in this way, truncating time by setting an end point for the narrative does not introduce the selection bias that is caused by truncating the range of the dependent variable (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 128ff). But more than with conventional independent variables, of which we may restrict the range, we have to be very careful about assuming consistent continuity of the relationship between the explanatory variables and the explanandum beyond the investigated period. When time itself becomes a factor in the model, as discussed above, we have to consider carefully how each explanatory factor is affected by the progression of the process that we are trying to explain. The extent to which we can expect the effect of time on the explanandum (through the other independent variables) to continue as observed during the time period covered by the narrative depends on the tenability, beyond this time period, of the assumptions that we had to make to model the effect of time. This limitation of historical narratives affects the confidence we can have in the generalizability of the insights we gain from them. The solution, however, lies not in modestly claiming that our conclusions cannot be generalized but, rather, in paying careful attention to temporality in both the model and the narratives and specifying the implications for generalization accordingly.17

Third, what is the status of any narrative's *truth claim*? As Mink ([1978] 1987, 199) put this "dilemma of the historical narrative":

... As historical it claims to represent, through its form, part of the real complexity of the past, but as narrative it is a product of imaginative construction, which cannot defend its claim to truth by any accepted procedure of argument or authentication.

The problem here, as Andrew Norman (1991, 131) points out, is not that "a discursive representation has a structure that that which it represents does not." There is no necessary link between discursive structure and misrepresentation. Moreover, some objective criteria for assessing a narrative's truth claim exist, such as the extent to which an author is able to provide from the historical record evidence that, after having been subjected to standard historiographic procedures, supports the author's "story." It is therefore hardly necessary to equate historians with novelists or fiction writers (Gaddis 1992/93, 56). Rather, the problem is that, because facts never speak for themselves (Lustick 1996), there is an interpretative element that cannot be evaluated from within the narrative without circular reasoning. To assess this aspect of the narrative, the reader will have to draw on knowledge from sources external to the narrative at hand; i.e., the reader will need to know something about the historical period in question from other sources—sources that themselves are bound to have narrative qualities. Consequently, it is more meaningful to endorse good narrative work as "plausible," "persuasive," or "compelling"—as seems to be the practice among historians—rather than "true" or "right," though we certainly may find some narrative work that is poor and even plain "wrong," such as when its interpretation is marred by logical inconsistencies or makes incorrect assertions about the chronology of events.

Moreover, that the truth claim of a narrative cannot be assessed from within the narrative itself also has important implications for the utility of narratives as data on which to test hypotheses derived from models. Presumably, no one will consciously publish a model with empirical information that directly contradicts it. Except for discarded alternative explanations (see below) and possible oversights, then, the vulnerability of the model to empirical disconfirmation is ultimately also external to the narrative.

However, the use of multiple narratives may increase our confidence that the model indeed captures the key dynamics of the process. Using multiple narratives is appropriate because models should be applicable to more than a single instance if they have the benefits

 $<sup>^{17}</sup>$  The applicability of a historical model by no means needs to end with the time period on which it was empirically tested. Otto Hintze

<sup>([1906] 1975),</sup> for instance, long ago provided a fascinatingly simple example of what we would today call a "second image reversed" (Gourevitch 1978) model of state formation, capturing an essential element of a causal mechanism that might explain not only the various transformations of the "organization of the state" over the thousand-year stretch of European history to which he applies it, but also phenomena that occurred many decades after the formulation of his model, such as European integration and the later parts of the "third wave of democratization" (Huntington 1991, esp. 85ff).

of capturing what is generalizable. Having assured that each narrative contains the same elements, we can employ each narrative as a unit or "observation" to test the causal argument. To be sure, we are unlikely to be able to furnish sufficiently many historical narratives to perform statistical tests, and by virtue of treating each historical narrative as a self-contained unit so as to incorporate temporal progression into each "observation," we have to reject any attempt to make "many observations from few" (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 217ff). Moreover, there is the problem of independence.<sup>18</sup> As William Sewell and others point out, if separate historical instances of a process are treated like ideal-typical scientific experiments, such treatment assumes that they are independent of each other. This assumption is problematic because, unless there is a perfect informational separation between the instances, actors in one (later or perhaps contemporaneous) instance will have knowledge of the constitutive actions and the outcome of the other instance(s) (Sewell 1996, 258f). Such knowledge will violate the assumption of independence—for purposes of testing a model—only if it changes elements of the process as modeled (e.g., the preferences of actors), which is by no means a necessary, though a possible and indeed quite likely consequence of having knowledge of prior or other instances. <sup>19</sup> Where empirical analysis suggests such an effect, we therefore cannot rely upon the statistical logic of the traditional comparative method (Lijphart 1971). But as "plausibility probes" multiple narratives are very useful. Increasing the number of confirming narratives does not in any way "prove" the model (Mohr 1996, 118ff), but in light of the temptation of inductivist modifications of a given model, the ability of a model to withstand the difficult test of application to different occurrences of the explanandum without ad hoc alterations makes more plausible that it has captured the central, generalizable dynamics rather than unique elements of a particular case.

In fact, it is the use of multiple narratives that makes Theda Skocpol's (1979) States and Social Revolutions, Margaret Levi's (1998) "Conscription: The Price of Citizenship" (1998), and, especially, de Swaan's (1998, 52-117) "The Elementary Curriculum as a National Communication Code" so convincing. To be sure, the extensive methodological debate about Skocpol's book has produced "little consensus" about the status of her narratives (Mahoney 1999, 1156), and her consciously inductive approach makes it questionable to treat her narratives as data to test a model, but the book derives most of its persuasive power precisely from her ability to narrate three instances of social revolutions in the same terms. Multiple narratives work even more effectively in Levi's "Conscription." Though it is sometimes difficult to see how the various parts of her complex model structure the three narratives, each of her three

accounts of the abolition of "buying one's way out of military service" (Levi 1998, 109), in France, the United States, and Prussia, shows the same, separately theorized process at work. Finally, de Swaan uses five separate narratives (for the United States, France, Britain, Germany, and The Netherlands) to test his—separately theorized though not fully explicit—model of the historical process by which elementary education becomes the domain of the state. In all of these works, what persuades the reader of the validity and usefulness of the model is that for each of the countries, as Sewell (1996, 262) puts it with respect to Skocpol, the specific historical process "can be narrated convincingly in terms of the operation of analogous causal processes, which...[thus] make sense of numerous details that otherwise would seem purely accidental." In this sense, providing multiple "plausibility probes," far from being "fruitless[ly] repetiti[ous]" (Skocpol and Somers 1980, 191), should enhance confidence in the explanation. This way of combining models with narratives allows us to provide a "scientific" causal explanation of historical processes, without depriving them of their process character.

Fourth, due to the limited truth claims of narratives, those who use historical narratives as empirical evidence for a causal explanation will probably fail to assess alternative explanations and, if they try, will fail to convince skeptics. Trying to assess alternative explanations would entail providing a second set of narratives. similarly structured by the underlying model of an alternative explanation for the same phenomenon. To be sure, such alternative narratives could conceivably be supplied by the same author just as those working quantitatively often operationalize and test alternative explanations. In fact, Graham Allison (1971) employed three separate narratives to test three alternative, competing models of foreign policymaking in Essence of Decision.<sup>20</sup> But alternative narratives by the same author serve primarily as a rhetorical device in support of the primary, favored explanation. The interpretative freedom of the author makes it unlikely that less convincing alternative narratives would be accepted as sound evidence of the failure of the alternative explanations. This, however, is not a serious problem. As Morris Fiorina notes, meaningful alternative explanations are much more likely to be advanced by others whose "perspectives and commitments" allow them to argue as strongly as possible in support of those alternatives. All such explanations must then be subjected to the collective assessment of the scholarly community at large (Fiorina 1995, 92).

#### CONCLUSION

I have pursued two objectives: (1) I have sought to clarify, based on a broad conception of modeling and an explicit definition of "history," the difficulties—and possibilities—of modeling historical processes; and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for thoughtful comments on this issue.

<sup>19</sup> Statisticians therefore speak of seeking "independence of the error terms," which is a purely empirical matter, rather than "independence of observations."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> I thank Steve Solnick for reminding me of Allison's use of alternative narratives.

(2) I have sought to make the case for narratives, identify four overlooked problems with their use as data to test models about historical processes, and offer at least partial solutions to these problems.

I have argued that modeling is rendered more difficult when dealing with "history" due to the importance of the dynamic and sequential aspects of temporality for processes that can be methodologically meaningfully distinguished as "historical." But social scientists interested in the study of such "history" need not return to narratives that, detached from any explicit causal model of the historical process they seek to capture, implicitly make—often sweeping—causal claims based on hidden assumptions and unspecified causal mechanisms. There is no inherent incompatibility between the deductive modeling of causal relationships and the study of history. Quite to the contrary, for social scientists—and historians—who seek causal explanations of historical processes, making their models explicit and subjecting them to separate theoretical examination have several advantages. Most importantly, the greater transparency of a model (compared to a purely "operationalized" argument) facilitates the scrutiny of the argument's assumptions and internal logic, which is particularly desirable for inherently complex historical phenomena. Further, models help clarify what insights the author suggests to the reader, by inducing the author to specify which elements of the argument are, in the author's mind, uniquely specific to the historical setting and which parts of the argument are potentially generalizable. In fact, the model should be epistomologically prior to, and independent of, the narrative(s) used to "test" it, in order to enable the model—rather than the narrative—to do the explanatory work (cf. Somers 1996, 79ff).

Regarding the benefits of using narratives, I have emphasized the ability of narratives to contextualize any given stage in the process, which is essential when we seek to capture empirically the process for which the model stipulates an explanation. To be useful as a test of a deductively sound model, a narrative should be structured by the model in that the presentation of empirical information follows the model's identification of actors, their preferences, etc., so as to minimize the ad hoc character of the empirical account.

At the same time, using narratives as data to test a model that seeks to capture an entire historical process raises four problems not identified in recent debates. I have specified these problems and analyzed their implications for the usefulness of narratives as data. I have suggested ways of solving or minimizing the problems, including the use of multiple narratives to increase our confidence that the model indeed captures the key elements of a causal explanation of the processes that we are seeking to explain.

So does the study of history, understood as the analysis of processes that span a large temporal space, require a distinct approach to theorizing and to the presentation of empirical information? I conclude that it indeed engenders particular problems and requires us to be attentive to issues that may not arise in analyses of phenomena where temporality plays no role. But the

study of history does not require a fundamentally different approach. Notwithstanding some remaining limitations, historical narratives can provide strong support for the plausibility of a historical model, maintaining a basic commitment to a scientific approach while overcoming several of the problems of the compatibility of historical narrative and social science identified by critics of the "protoscientific" ambitions of historical analyses. And it may be that at the level of broad historical phenomena, where the temporal dimension is crucially important to any explanation, providing such support for the plausibility of the argument is the best we can hope for, at least from any one scholar. Science is, after all, a collective enterprise (Weber [1919] 1946).

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# **Does Liberal Democracy Presuppose a Cultural Nation? Four Arguments**

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This paper subjects to critical analysis four common arguments in the sociopolitical theory literature supporting the cultural nationalist thesis that liberal democracy is viable only against the background of a single national public culture: the arguments that (1) social integration in a liberal democracy requires shared norms and beliefs (Schnapper); (2) the levels of trust that democratic politics requires can be attained only among conationals (Miller); (3) democratic deliberation requires communicational transparency, possible in turn only within a shared national public culture (Miller, Barry); and (4) the economic viability of specifically industrialized liberal democracies requires a single national culture (Gellner). I argue that all four arguments fail: At best, a shared cultural nation may reduce some of the costs liberal democratic societies must incur; at worst, cultural nationalist policies ironically undermine social integration. The failure of these cultural nationalist arguments clears the way for a normative theory of liberal democracy in multinational and postnational contexts.

he thesis that liberal democracy is viable only against the background of a single nation, understood in linguistic-cultural terms, has gained a conspicuous respectability recently. The thesis is advanced not only by social and political theorists,1 but also by advocates of Quebec's separation from Canada, by American antimulticulturalists who champion a strong national culture and identity, by those who oppose viewing Germany as a country of immigration, and by Euro-skeptics who argue that Europe is doomed to a perpetual democratic deficit because of the absence of a single national public culture.<sup>2</sup> In this paper, I critically examine four arguments purporting to justify, by appeal to the problem of integration, the cultural nationalist thesis. The key cultural nationalist claim is that the nation-particularly its shared cultural core-is necessary for effecting integration in liberal democratic societies and that the nation, culturally understood, is therefore necessary for well-functioning liberal democracy. I argue that all four arguments fail. My purpose in demonstrating this failure is to open the door for a theorization of liberal democracy in multinational and postnational contexts.

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## THE TWIN PROBLEMS OF MOTIVATION AND INTEGRATION: THE COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE

It is a commonplace in modern social theory that social integration, and the processes of cultural reproduction and socialization that it requires, cannot be explained solely by the empirical sanctions that structure strategic forms of action,3 i.e., purposive-rational social action that involves seeking the most efficient means to antecedently given ends. This commonplace enjoys at least a prima facie plausibility. First, and least controversially, neither cultural reproduction nor socialization, which must be invoked to explain the antecedently given ends of the social actor, can themselves be explained by sole appeal to the empirical sanctions that structure strategic action. This is because strategic action itself cannot, at a societal level, explain the antecedently given ends that such action presupposes as a motive in the first place. In the language of rational choice theory, strategic action cannot itself be the basis for a theory of preference formation. Second, both social and system integration require that social action be coordinated such that the actions x of some actors not systematically undermine the actions y of others whose performance is necessary for the performance of actions x by the original set of actors. (Social action is dependent on others' actions.) Coordinated strategic action thus requires institutional rules that structure the incentives for action in such a way that renders them mutually compatible. But strategic action itself cannot fully explain the provision of such institutions (Bates 1987; March and Olsen 1989). Furthermore, even if provision is assumed, in many contexts the empirical

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The thesis is advanced by, among others, Barry (1991, chap. 6), Miller (1995), and Schnapper (1994). See Barry (1999, 54–57) for his more recent statement. Moore (2001, chap. 4) defends a weaker version of the thesis. Connor (1994, 22) argues that "diversity of cultures tends to preclude political unity" in general and that, more specifically, "postwar developments indicate a link between multinationalism and pressure for nondemocratic actions." For recent critiques of the cultural nationalist thesis, see Stepan 1998 and Mason 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For an examination of Québécois nationalist ideology, see Handler 1988; for an example of American antimulticultural nationalism, see Lind 1994, 1995; for the German case, see Habermas's (1998, 132ff.) discussion of Ernst-Wolfgang Bökenförde; and on Europe, see Shore 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Durkheim 1960, Book 1, chap. 7. Contemporary social theorists such as Habermas (1984–87) distinguish between system integration (which coordinates action via strategic interaction) and social integration (which coordinates action via linguistically mediated norms and processes of reaching understanding) and claim that the social solidarity required by well-ordered societies depends at least in part upon social integration. I follow Habermas' definition of strategic action but here remain agnostic as to whether nonstrategic action should be equated with his account of communicative action.

sanctions imposed by an institution are insufficient fully to explain its capacity for coordinating social action (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott and Meyer 1994). In sum, strategic action cannot explain (i) the motivational content of social action as such, (ii) the provision of institutional forms that coordinate social action, and/or (iii) the full coordinating power of institutions. If social integration is to obtain, social actors must possess a motive to act such that their social actions are structurally compatible with each other. Strategic action can fully explain neither the requirement of motivational content (i) nor the requirements of institutional structure or form (ii, iii). The motivation for strategic action is straightforward: It is, by definition, the antecedently given ends of the actor. But if social integration requires nonstrategic action, then explaining at the macro sociopolitical level what accounts for social integration requires explaining, at the micro philosophical/ psychological level, the motivational basis for nonstrategic social action. I call these two related problems the twin problems of motivation and integration.

Political societies are often understood to have solved these twin problems via a shared affective identity that inspires its members' loyalty. Many writers have further maintained that motivating and integrating the polity's members have required appeal to shared ethnicity (i.e., myths of common descent), to provide an affective identity capable of motivating nonstrategic social action and serving as the (ostensibly) prepolitical basis for the polity's social integration (e.g., Smith 1986). But the problem for liberal democratic polities, of course, is that the racist overtones of ethnic nationalism sit uncomfortably with liberal democratic normative commitments (to say the least). The question is whether and how modern liberal democratic societies can solve the twin problems.

At the other end of the spectrum from the ethnic nationalist position, neo-Kantian liberals such as Jürgen Habermas argue that modern polities today can (and should) solve the twin problems by bypassing ethnicity and indeed nationality altogether. Motivating and integrating the democratic citizenry, Habermas (1989, 227, 1998, chaps. 4, 5) argues, no longer requires a basis in a shared national culture or history (much less a shared ethnicity); in an open, postconventional society, it is sufficient for political institutions to be subjected to the scrutiny of reflexive discursive practices that grant them presumptive validity in the eyes of those subject to them. What is required is a "constitutional patriotism," through which the citizenry identify with their polity thanks to what they take to be the rationally defensible principles its institutions embody.<sup>5</sup> As Ingram (1996, 2) puts it, "The idea of a post-national identity is of a political identity founded on recognition of democratic values and human rights as these are contextualized in a particular constitutional tradition."

But even communitarian critics who reject the ethnic nationalist position have argued that neo-Kantian liberals fail to identify an object of collective attachment strong enough to motivate the affects and, thus, fail to solve the twin problems of motivation and integration. The charge is that neo-Kantian liberalism does not place enough emphasis on the affective bases of democratic politics required to motivate adequately the democratic citizenry, which are to be found in such emotive virtues as community, loyalty, and/or a shared cultured life or history. For these critics, if values such as democracy and freedom are to be sufficiently realized, citizens must be situated within an affective or cultural horizon they could realistically call their own. While the ethnic nationalist answer is too thick, neo-Kantian constitutional patriotism is too thin: The fact that we find the principles embodied by political institutions rationally defensible is simply not enough to ground our identification with them in the sense required.6

If liberal democratic theory can be thought of as an attempt to reconcile freedom and political rule by ensuring that politics respect the basic requirements of justice and be legitimated via consent, communitarians argue that both justice (and particularly distributive justice) and democratic legitimation presuppose a thicker sort of shared affective community and/or identity. Two types of argument are offered in favor of this thesis, and, importantly, both rely partly on the imputation of the motivation problem to their neo-Kantian targets. One argument operates at the level of moral/political philosophy; the other, at the level of social theory. In other words, the two types of argument correspond to the twin problems of motivation and integration: at the level of the motivational force of practical reason and at the sociopolitical level of integration.

The philosophical arguments often take one of two related forms. The first appeals to an intuition some hold that the content of morality is such that significant moral obligations (e.g., those of distributive justice) obtain between individuals only to the extent that they share social relations. The specifically communitarian claim is that the social relations must constitute a community in a strong sense (e.g., not reducible to a contractarian scheme of social cooperation). So one of Sandel's (1982, 77ff.) major criticisms of A Theory of Justice was that Rawls's difference principle, which treats people's talents, powers, and resources as collective assets undeserved by individuals, necessarily presupposes a community (whose collective assets they are) with which individuals identify in a suitably strong

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For a trenchant sociohistorical critique of Smith's thesis that modern nations have required ethnic solidarity, see Zubaida 1989.

<sup>5</sup> On constitutional potential and a viving a viving and viving a 
<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> On constitutional patriotism, see Habermas 1998, Part III, and Markell 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> For a critique of the Habermasian position in the Canadian case, see Houle 1999.

<sup>7</sup> Taylor (1985, 289-90, 294) provides a clear country of this case.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Taylor (1985, 289–90, 294) provides a clear example of this sort of argument, in its most general form, in relation to obligations of distributive justice: "a principle of distributive justice ... presupposes that men are in a society together, or in some kind of collaborative arrangement ... there is no such thing as distributive justice in the State of Nature ... any social view sees a certain kind or structure of society as an essential condition of human potentiality.... This structure itself, or order, or type of relation thus provides the essential background for any principles of distributive justice." See also Walzer 1983, 31ff.

sense, and which is prior to any contractarian account of social cooperation (cf. Taylor 1995, 184). The second, related philosophical argument banks on the claim that morality has an irreducible moment of partialism, i.e., that strictly impartialist moral theories cannot account for all of our moral duties or obligations. By partialism I mean a theory that holds that sometimes the fact that someone can be characterized as "mine" (my child, my coreligionist, my fellow national) provides an irreducible ground for special duties I owe to that person and not others (duties not dependent upon, for example, my consent).8 Communitarian partialism, then, would hold that I have special obligations to (the members of) my community, which I do not have to others-and that I must favor those members in (at least some) cases of a conflict of interest. One of the arguments in favor of partialism makes direct appeal to the motivation problem. David Miller (1995, 57-58) writes that what I'm calling impartialism (he calls it "ethical universalism")

rests upon an implausible account of ethical motivation. When I act on moral principle, I am supposed to act simply out of a rational conviction.... I am not to be influenced by my sentiments.... But it seems unlikely that rational conviction can carry the weight required of it. (emphasis added)<sup>9</sup>

We can also find in Miller the second sort of argument, at the sociopolitical level, linking the concern with justice to that of motivation and democratic consent. Here Miller advances an empirical claim about social theory: we can only expect citizens to consent to institutions that redistribute resources according to, say, need, "if they regard themselves as bound to the beneficiaries by strong ties of community" (1989a, 59). For a just system of welfare to "be democratically supported," it must be "backed up by a popular consensus about the distributive principle in question," and this requires a "common identity" (1989b, 236-37). To "motivate people to make the sacrifices that social justice requires" is empirically more feasible when citizens "share a common identity or common values" (1998, 48, emphasis added). 10 (Note the equivocation.) Others emphasize that shared community and identity are relevant not just for mobilizing citizen support for programs of social justice, but for mobilizing democratic participation as such. Taylor (1996), for example, argues that free societies, relying as they must on the spontaneous support of their members, need the strong sense of allegiance that Montesquieu called vertu....[Democratic] participation requires not only a commitment to the

common project, but also a special sense of bonding among the people." So both the philosophical and the sociopolitical sorts of argument made by communitarians ultimately appeal to the motivation problem, and to the role of affect and community in solving it.

Now, if what explains and motivates the nonstrategic action by which social integration is incurred is a shared affective identity, then the obvious question is where this common identity comes from, i.e., What are its sources, grounds, or preconditions? In other words, what requires explanation is the shared affective identity itself. As I understand it, the contemporary communitarian answers come in two forms; republican and nationalist. Both construe a shared affective identity as being in part constituted by the common sentiment/belief that "we" belong together. What I call (civic) republicanism denotes the view that the required object of affective loyalty that grounds this sentiment/ belief is a particular community with shared political institutions, territory, and (politicoinstitutional) history, i.e., a patria (e.g., Maurizio Viroli, Charles Taylor), while civic or territorial nationalism denotes the position that the relevant object of and ground for affect is a national community understood in terms of a shared culture with a territorial homeland but not necessarily a shared ethnicity (e.g., David Miller, Dominique Schnapper).<sup>11</sup> In the rest of this article, I take up this specifically (civic-territorial) nationalist version of the communitarian position. If ethnic forms of nationalism have proven to be ethically indefensible, these communitarians have accordingly sought to criticize neo-Kantian liberalism from an appropriately "liberal" nationalist perspective, one that presumably is capable of winning the hearts of liberal democratic citizens in a way that neo-Kantians and cosmopolitans cannot, while avoiding the pathologies of ethnic nationalism.

#### THE CULTURAL NATIONALIST THESIS

Consciously seeking to place himself in the tradition of liberal nationalism associated with such nineteenthcentury thinkers as John Stuart Mill, David Miller

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See, e.g., Cottingham 1986. For doubts about whether it is helpful to explain the relevant intuitions in terms of a debate between two competing metaethical positions, see Deigh 1991.

It is not at all clear who actually subscribes to the view that Miller is attacking here. Not even Kant himself could be saddled with such a view: He thought that to act morally was to act out of *respect* for the moral law—respect being, of course, a feeling (*Gefühl*) (Kant 1996, 56, 201). For his defense of partialism see Miller (1988).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See also Tamir 1993, 118. See Mason 1995, 243, for discussion of an ambiguity in Miller's position on the relation between social justice and national identity.

<sup>11</sup> To sum up, (1) ethnic nationalists appeal to the nation understood as a community of shared culture but also of common descent; (2) civic nationalists appeal to the nation understood as a community of shared culture with a territorial homeland, but not of shared descent; (3) civic republicans appeal to a patria understood as a community of shared political territory, institutions, and history, but not of shared national culture; (4) and neo-Kantians appeal to shared political institutions as such, which embody rationally defensible principles. I follow Kymlicka (1995) in assuming that both (1) ethnic and (2) civic-territorial nationalism are instances of cultural nationalism. (See also Nielsen 1996-97 and Brubaker 1998, 299.) I take communitarianism to refer to positions 2 and 3. It should be said that not everyone relates communitarianism and nationalism in this way. The French, for example, often understand communitarianism and nationalism to be two fundamentally opposed projects: Whereas the first term denotes loyalty to particularistic, subnational communities (what anglophones might call communalism), the second represents an attempt to transcend such particularisms by grafting citizens' loyalties to an overarching national identity. I follow anglophone usage here. For a classificatory scheme similar to mine, from which I have drawn, see Mason 1999, 2000. See also Keitner 1999 for a clear distinction between civic nationalism and constitutional patriotism.

embraces the thesis that liberal democracy presupposes the nation. The classic liberal nationalist thesis is that what motivates the citizenry to act beyond the domain of strategic action—what secures their integration—is an affective identity that stems from a shared national culture. We have already seen Miller's claim that the combination of social justice and democracy requires a shared community and identity. His further claim is that "this common identity must exist at the national level" (1989b, 237), that "the relevant communities are nations" (1989a, 68). The realization of "democracy and social justice... presupposes national communities in which mutual trust stems from a shared identity" (1998, 49).

Why is the nation the necessary matrix for liberal democracy? According to Miller, nations are necessary for solving the twin problems of motivation and integration, particularly at the level required by a democratic polity. On the one hand, nations are objects of affective attachment strong enough to inspire people to sacrifice on behalf of others and to participate in democratic politics. On the other hand, nations are of large enough scope to make distributive justice and democratic self-rule meaningful: "Although smaller-scale forms of community may provide the most intense experiences of solidarity, these communities will have little power to shape their environment" (1989b, 236).

Nations are the *only* possible form in which overall community can be realized in modern societies.... Without a common national identity, there is *nothing to hold citizens together*. (1989b, 245, emphasis added)

So, in modern states, a common nationality is a necessary condition for social integration: "Among large aggregates of people, *only* a common nationality can provide the sense of *solidarity* that makes this [good faith democratic deliberation] possible" (1995, 98, emphasis added).

But Miller's substantive cultural nationalist thesis is obscured by an ambiguity in his argument. In the face of empirical examples of multinational democratic states with important redistributive policies, such as Canada and Switzerland, Miller (1995, 96) is forced to argue that insofar as they do have such policies, "they work as they do because they are not simply multinational, but have cultivated common national identities."13 But here Miller is trading on an ambiguity between two senses of common nationality: (1) sharing a common culture constituted in part by common beliefs, a common language, etc., and (2) sharing a common identity constituted by shared sentiments or an affective sense of belonging and commitment. Officially, Miller stresses that two of the defining features of the nation, as he uses the word, are shared beliefs and a common public culture (1995, 22-25) and that what "holds nations together are beliefs" transmitted through a common culture (1995, 32). This is in fact his substantive

<sup>12</sup> This is because "nationhood is a very important source of common identity" (Miller 1998, 48).

thesis: that democracy presupposes a shared nationality understood in *cultural* terms. But when, confronted with cases such as Canada and Switzerland, he concludes that they each possess a shared nationality after all, here he means that Canadian citizens and Swiss citizens each have a shared *affective identity*: He cites John Stuart Mill approvingly, for "Mill was well aware that a common *sentiment* of nationality could coexist with linguistic and other cultural differences" (Miller 1995, 98, emphasis added).

The dilemma is that either Miller's argument must equivocate between these two senses of common nationality or it avoids being logically fallacious at the cost of being empirically undermined by cases such as Canada and Switzerland. To eliminate the equivocation, we must make explicit the connection Miller presupposes between the two senses of nationality. First, Miller assumes that the relevant motivational source of nonstrategic social action is affective, i.e., that solidarity in the sense of a shared, affective identity ("a common sentiment of nationality") is what motivates nonstrategic action and secures solidarity in the sense of social integration. 14 Second, Miller presumes that the source of this affective identity—i.e., the source of national sentiment, the basis for an identity capable of motivating nonstrategic action—is a distinct, shared national culture: "The fostering of national identity" requires "creating and maintaining a common public culture" (1988, 658). Thus democracy presupposes the nation, and the nation presupposes a shared public culture, "a public culture that is shared by all who belong to a particular nation... 'national character' must be interpreted in cultural terms—in terms of beliefs and attitudes, ritual observances, and so forth" (1989b, 244). (So the Swiss/Canadian cases pose a problem for Miller insofar as they are democracies lacking a single, overarching national public culture.)15

<sup>14</sup> Miller (1995, 58, note 11), it should be noted, consciously understands himself to be arguing against Kant and his heirs.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Miller (1995, 96, note 23) recognizes that this move comes close to rendering his claim vacuous.

<sup>15</sup> It is significant that in discussing Canada and Switzerland, Miller (1995, 96) states that they have "common national identities" by virtue of certain kinds of shared political "institutions" and is silent on the requirement of a shared national public culture that he emphasizes throughout the rest of this book and his other writings. The fact that elsewhere he considers a shared culture necessary (and shared institutions insufficient) is what distinguishes his civic nationalist argument from republican or neo-Kantian ones (as I have defined them in footnote 11). Of course it might be argued that, despite appearances, Canadians or the Swiss in fact do share a national public culture, albeit of a "thin" kind. I do not pursue this empirical question here; but even if it were true that Canadians or the Swiss shared some sort of thin national public culture, this "thin" culture could not do the work that civic-territorial nationalists like Miller demand of it. First, to serve as the basis for social integration, they believe that the national culture must ground "a people with a distinct and common character of its own" (Miller 1995, 25, emphasis added). Whatever this putatively shared Canadian/Swiss national public culture is supposed to consists in, it is difficult to see how it could serve to distinguish the Canadian/Swiss "nation" from a host of other liberal democratic "nations." Second, this move completely deflates the concerns typically expressed by nationalists (including Miller) about a shared language, shared beliefs, shared rituals, etc. (e.g., Miller 1988, 657), and would thus, for example, fully undermine the motivation for Miller's (1998) Euro-skepticism.

I here formally state the cultural nationalist argument, which purports to identify a series of necessary conditions for social integration. The key cultural nationalist conclusion is Thesis 3b.

Thesis 0: The social integration, cultural reproduction, and socialization necessary for a well-ordered democratic society can be effected only if there exists a motivationally efficacious form of nonstrategic social action.

Thesis 1: The required motivation for nonstrategic social action obtains only if there exists a shared affective identity, constituted by the sentiment or affectively sanctioned belief that we belong together.

Thesis 2: This (motivationally efficacious) shared affective identity, constituted by the sentiment or affectively sanctioned belief that we belong together, can stem only from a shared, national, public culture.

Therefore.

Thesis 3a: The required motivation for nonstrategic social action can obtain only if there exists a shared, national, public culture.

and

Thesis 3b: The social integration, cultural reproduction, and socialization necessary for democratic society can be effected only if there exists a shared, national, public culture.

In logical form,

Thesis 0:  $s \rightarrow m$ . Thesis 1:  $m \rightarrow i$ . Thesis 2:  $i \rightarrow c$ .

Therefore,

Thesis 3a:  $m \rightarrow c$ .

and

Thesis 3b:  $s \rightarrow c$ .

where

s = the social integration, cultural reproduction, and socialization necessary for democratic society,

m = the motivation for nonstrategic social action,

- i = a shared affective identity, constituted by the sentiment or affectively sanctioned belief that we belong together, and
- c = a shared, national, public culture.

">" stands for "only if." (One may, alternatively, interpret ">" to mean "implies," "requires," "can be explained only by," "finds a necessary cause in," or "finds its relevant source in.")

The reader should feel free to add the premises implicit to the argument (e.g., "under modern industrial conditions"). The formulation in terms of necessary conditions is designed to be agnostic among three interpretations: one that takes a necessary condition to be a necessary and preceding cause, one that takes it to be a necessary constituent, and one that takes it to be a necessary effect. Thus the claim about the neces-

sity of the cultural nation to liberal democratic society need not be construed as a *conceptual* claim but can be (and most plausibly is) construed as an empirical causal claim.

The concluding cultural nationalist Theses 3a and 3b follow logically from the three premises; to attack the cultural nationalist position, one may call into question any of Theses 0, 1, and 2. Thesis 0 is the commonplace of modern social theory; having argued for its prima facie plausibility above, I take it for granted here. Thesis 1, which construes the required shared affective identity in terms of the common sentiment/belief that "we" belong together, is the shared communitarian thesis. Though I take both Thesis 1 and Thesis 2 to be problematic, the critical energies of this paper focus on Thesis 2, which distinguishes the nationalist from the republican position. In other words, I wish to demonstrate that even if we grant Theses 0 and 1, the nationalist arguments for 3a and 3b fail. This paper considers four such arguments: (1) the shared norms/beliefs argument, (2) the trust argument, (3) the transparency argument, and (4) the industrial society argument.

#### THE SHARED NORMS/BELIEFS ARGUMENT

The first argument can be found in the works of Dominique Schnapper. She says that if Italy is having trouble mobilizing projects of redistribution, it is because its "national solidarity is no longer founded on a common political project, stemming from a common political culture." Instead, whatever ostensible solidarity it continues to enjoy is "founded only on material interest" (1994, 193). (This is Thesis 3a, that nonstrategic motivation requires a shared national culture.) Citing Durkheim approvingly, Schnapper (1994, 40) argues that

the process of internal integration implies... that the common goals of the collective enterprise be defined and accepted, that individuals share a certain number of common practices and beliefs, and that there exist interactions among the members of the group. In the case of the nation, it is a matter of political goals, practices, and beliefs, but these cannot be independent of social reality.

Speaking in the vocabulary of the "traditional sociological concept of socialization," and referring to "la capacité, socialement constituée, des hommes à acquérir par l'éducation—au sens large du terme—les moyens de participer à la vie commune," Schnapper (1994, 40) appeals to a

process by which the individual, born in a particular society, internalizes its exigencies, acquires its common values, and adopts its norms of behavior by which the collectivity maintains itself.

This internalization of shared beliefs, values, and norms is crucial to the development of a common affective identity: The sense of

belonging and national sentiment are born of this internalization of knowledge, of norms, and of common values... which indissolubly tie personal identity to a collective identity. Henceforth the individual finds the nation within his very being [Désormais l'individu trouve sa nation à l'intérieur de soi] [!] 16 (Schnapper 1994, 41).

It is no wonder that Schnapper hails the school system, which socializes and forms individuals, as a key instrument for national integration.17

So on Schnapper's account, the shared culture that integration requires (Thesis 3b) is one that includes common collective goals, common practices, common beliefs, and common norms and values, because a shared affective identity requires the internalization of these shared goals, beliefs, norms, and values. This internalization is what solves the twin problems of motivation and integration.

How plausible is Schnapper's argument? Not very. It is true that shared values or shared norms can be and often are one basis for a shared identity. But neither is a necessary condition, as a multitude of identities, whether Jewish, Québécois, Scottish, African-American, or Iranian, testifies. 18 What is the "norm," for instance, that all Jews, or even all Israeli Jews, share? As some of these examples further suggest, even affective identities that are presumed to be based on a shared culture do not require shared values or norms. 19

If the premise that shared affective identities require shared beliefs is true, it is true only in the constitutive but trivial sense that part of what it means to have a shared collective identity is to believe that the members of that collectivity in some sense belong together. But this shared belief is not a precondition for shared identity in any causal sense; it is simply the subjective component that is constitutive of collective identities. But it does not follow that other shared beliefs, say about the world or even about the specific nature or history of the identity in question, are necessary for there to be such an affective identity. In other words, either Schnapper's thesis that shared identity requires shared beliefs is trivially because conceptually true or it is false. To think that shared identities and hence social integration require other sorts of shared belief ignores the fact that the coordination of social action does not require all actors to have the same interpretation of the (inter)actions in question. What coordinated social action requires is not actual consensus about the meaning of the practice, but compatibility in the weak sense that each actor's interpretation of a particular practice, and the individual actor's corresponding actions, be such that they can persist in the face of the actions of other individuals, who may or may not share the same interpretations. In the face of the hermeneutical indeterminacy of meaning, consensus is at once unfeasible and unnecessary. For example, many social theorists have thought that symbols are an important facet of affective collective identity. But symbols' capacity to help affectively bind individuals together is neither conceptually nor empirically dependent on those individuals' consensus about the meaning of the symbol. A flag might symbolize the country's military victories for one citizen, their Olympic glories for another, the federation of the country's constituent regions for another, and the country's tradition of humanitarianism and peacekeeping for another, yet still help bind them all together (military buff, sports fan, federalist, and peacenik) in flag-waving pride. Indeed, one reason symbols can be such an important facet of unity at the level of practice is precisely the indeterminacy of their meaning.

It may be retorted that the beliefs that must be shared are of the following sort: For an electoral system or market to function properly, for example, the actors must share the belief that it is wrong to kill each other when a vote or transaction turns out to have gone badly for one party. This is true. But if this is what is meant by shared beliefs, then the nationalist argument gets the underlying intuition backward. This gloss on the nationalist thesis is that a shared belief qua constituent part of a culture is a necessary condition for (causally explaining) a shared affective identity. But the intuition at work here is that when you share an affective identity x, you will be motivated to believe that it is wrong to kill your fellow x-members and, accordingly, to refrain from carrying out such killings, even if it were strategically to your advantage to do so. In other words, the intuition here supports something like Thesis 1, which I have taken for granted, and not Thesis 2, which the retort purports to be justifying.20

#### THE TRUST ARGUMENT

Miller's own argument—the trust argument—slightly complicates the steps leading to Thesis 3a. (It initially attempts to establish its conclusions without resort to Thesis 2.) According to Miller, a well-functioning democracy needs its citizens to have some level of trust for each other. Social integration, to be fully democratic, requires citizens who not only fulfill their legal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> The un-self-consciously ominous tone of the final sentence should

be a moment for pause.

17 Compare Schnapper 2000, 154–56. It is in part for this reason that Miller (1995, 143) approves of France's aggressive assimilationist cultural policies—it is a functional imperative for democracy to forge a common national qua cultural identity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Compare Kymlicka 1996, 131: "Social unity cannot be based on shared beliefs... What matters is not shared values, but a shared

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> One response here might be that a "shared culture" is not constituted by one set of values and norms but that to share a culture simply means that there is a range of values and norms some combination of which all members of a shared culture might hold. Two points should be made here. First, if that is the response, then we have moved dramatically away from a recognizably cultural nationalist worldview: The porousness of boundaries and the internal diversity urged by the antinationalist is now being incorporated into the very definition of what it is to "share" a culture. Such a concession immediately invites a second one: that cultures are not bounded "things" that can be coherently thought of in terms of shared possession. As Shore (2000, 23) puts it, "Rather than assuming 'shared meaning', anthropologists and other critical social scientists increasingly take culture to be a site of struggle and contestation: an ongoing processes [sic] of continually negotiated meanings... 'cultures' are themselves culturally constructed through the very processes that purport to describe and objectify them.'

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> I say something like Thesis 1 because Thesis 1 says that a shared affective identity is a necessary condition for (socially integrating) nonstrategic action, while the intuition behind the example here supports the (possibly supplementary) proposition that a shared affective identity may be a sufficient (causal) condition for motivating some types of nonstrategic action (and the corresponding beliefs).

obligations and enjoy liberal rights and freedoms, but also are active citizens voluntarily motivated to deliberate about the common good and to make sacrifices for it. (Miller calls this a "republican" conception of citizenship [1999].) But to secure "the voluntary cooperation of citizens...each person must be confident that the others will generally comply—and this involves mutual trust" (1995, 91).21 And "ties of community are an important source of such trust between individuals who are not personally known to one another" (1995, 92). Miller adds that democracy understood as a deliberative mode of political decision making requires trust because only then would people "be willing to moderate [their] own demands in order to reach a compromise," and "Trust of this kind is much more likely to exist among people who share a common national identity, speak a common language, and have overlapping cultural values" (1998, 48). Miller (1995, 92) goes so far as to suggest that national community not only facilitates trust, but is, in modern states, a necessary condition for it:

In states lacking a common national identity...politics at best takes the form of group bargaining and compromise and at worst degenerates into a struggle for domination. Trust may exist within the groups, but not across them.

So according to Miller, one reason the democratic state (and fully democratic citizenship) presupposes a cultural nation is that a common national culture is the basis for trust between citizens, and trust is needed for citizens to act on bases other than narrow, strictly strategic considerations. Trust is not so much a positive source or motive for action, as it is a necessary condition for the removal of barriers to nonstrategic social action. So the trust argument for Thesis 1 (that nonstrategic action requires a shared affective identity) is that nonstrategic social action implies trust between the actors (Premise 1a), and trust in turn requires a shared affective identity (Premise 1b). Furthermore, a shared affective identity is not sufficient for trust; rather trust also requires (an identity grounded in) a shared culture (Premise 3a). Thus we may conclude that nonstrategic action requires a shared culture (Thesis 3a).22 Miller's argument echoes Barry's (1991, 174-75) argument that "co-operation on common projects" and "redistribution within the polity" are facilitated not only by "the

of trust—at the very least, between what scholars commonly call "social trust" (in, e.g., institutions) and "interpersonal trust" (Rose-Ackerman 2001; cf. Sztompka 1999, chap. 3). I would wager that, given the choice, informed Iranian journalists accused of some crime would "trust" a German judge to grant them a fair trial far more than they would trust an Iranian judge, with whom they presumably share a common culture. Certainly, in debates about where to try Pinochet, there were many Chileans who "trusted" British and Spanish judges far more than they did Chilean judges. It is difficult to see a shared culture as the key explanatory variable, much less as a necessary condition, for social trust in institutions. Nor is shared culture necessary for interpersonal trust: We can all presumably think of cases in which consumers from a certain cultural

presence of fellow-feeling" and a "sympathetic attach-

ment to the interests of all those within the polity" (this

is Thesis 1), but also by "trust in the willingness of oth-

ers to reciprocate benefits when the need arises" (this

is Premise 1<sup>a</sup>). Furthermore, according to Barry (1991,

177), "there is a strong causal link between cultural

premise (3<sup>a</sup>) that trust requires, or is largely a function

of, a common culture very persuasive. First, we need to

be attentive to the distinction between different types

How plausible is the trust argument? I do not find the

similarity and trust" (this is Premise 3<sup>a</sup>).

The counterexamples I have just given obviously trade on the intuition that trust consists in the belief that the other person or institution is trustworthy in general and will, thus, treat others with impartiality and fairness. Such belief in another's general trustworthiness may be better explained by the other's previous reputation for trustworthiness, rather than by the fact of a culture shared by the two parties.<sup>23</sup>

group have "trusted" some class of merchants from a

different cultural group far more than their own, be-

cause the "alien" merchants had a reputation for being

trustworthy, while their "own" merchants were seen as

scoundrels.

But this argument, it may be objected, misses the point. The sort of interpersonal trust that Miller is invoking is not a belief in the general trustworthy character of the other in treating others impartially, but a belief that she cares enough about me in particular to take my best interests to heart. She may be a scoundrel, but she would never betray the brother she loves. And what explains that fraternal affection is our common culture.

Two things have happened in this refinement of the trust argument. First, the trust argument is forced to establish Premise 3a by asserting Thesis 2 after all (that a shared culture is necessary for a shared affective identity). Second, the counterexamples I gave above still hold force against the rejoinder; they force the concession that a shared culture is not a necessary condition for trust (even granting Thesis 2). The claim now would have to be a general empirical one that a shared

In sum, the trust argument is as follows.

Premise 1a:  $m \rightarrow \text{trust.}$ Premise 1b: Trust  $\rightarrow i$ .

Therefore,

Thesis 1:  $m \rightarrow i$ .

Furthermore,

Premise 3a: Trust  $\rightarrow c$ .

Therefore,

Thesis 3a:  $m \rightarrow c$ .

<sup>21</sup> In other words, strategic considerations that derive from the logic of repeated games are insufficient; a well-functioning democracy requires nonstrategic action.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> Sztompka (1999, chap. 4) identifies three "grounds" for what he calls primary trustworthiness: reputation, performance, and appearance.

culture is a fairly important explanatory variable for mutual (presumably interpersonal) trust. But what exactly would such a claim involve? Miller and Barry are using the term "trust" to refer to (a) a belief that one can reliably predict the actions of another, combined with (b) the prediction that the individual or group in question will treat one fairly, take one's best interests to heart, etc.<sup>24</sup> So to result in greater trust, a shared national culture would have to do two things: (a) foster a (belief in one's) capacity to predict the actions of others better and (b) result in others who are (or seem) more likely to treat one fairly (etc.). (It needs to do both because sometimes rendering another's actions more transparently predictable would make that person less trustworthy to me, insofar as it becomes apparent how untrustworthy or hostile to me that person really is.) Presumably the argument is that a shared national culture (a) enables prediction by facilitating transparent communication and mutual comprehension and (b) solicits fair treatment (etc.) by fostering a common affective bond of goodwill among conationals. But in that case, the trust argument is parasitic upon (a) what I call the transparency argument and upon (b) Thesis 2, which it asserts without argument. We need to know what the argument for Thesis 2 is.

#### THE TRANSPARENCY ARGUMENT

Let us first turn to the transparency argument, which purports to demonstrate in its own right that democracy necessitates the cultural nation. According to the transparency argument Miller (1998, 50) offers, a common national public culture, and particularly a common language, is a necessity for democratic deliberation, because otherwise there would not be a single, unified public: at best, there would be "separate bodies of public opinion that could then be fed into elite negotiations."<sup>25</sup> Again, Barry (1991, 178) had made this point as well: He argued in favor of "linguistic homogeneity" on the grounds that "for democratic politics to work, the citizens must be able to communicate with one another, and have access to the same forums of political debate." Schnapper (1994, 78) in turn argues that the "espace communicative et intersubjectif" that Habermas thinks democracy requires, in which "citizens, politicians, and experts can speak with, understand, and try to convince each other," cannot exist unless "all the members share a language, a certain culture, and at least a few common values."26 A common culture is needed to enable a transparent, unified public sphere of deliberation. And, in turn, this is necessary for democratic forms of social integration as Miller suggests, social integration might still occur without such deliberation in a unified public sphere, but

it would not be consistent with fully *democratic* society and citizenship.<sup>27</sup>

While there is a kernel of truth to the transparency argument, it remains unconvincing as an argument about the necessary conditions for liberal democracy.<sup>28</sup> Such an argument tacitly draws much of its force from rather implausible views about what it means to "share" a culture. (1) One way to motivate this argument might be to assume that (a) insofar as a culture is "shared," it makes possible a realm of almost fully transparent mutual comprehension and communication within its boundaries<sup>29</sup> and that (b) democracy requires the unified, transparent public sphere thereby made possible. Be that as it may, the argument does presume that (2) there cannot be significant (i.e., politically relevant) mutual comprehension or communication beyond the boundaries of a shared culture. Thus, without a unified culture, there only would be "separate bodies of public opinion" (Miller), while democracy requires "access to the same forums of political debate" (Barry). This is a billiard ball view of culture—one that anthropologists have fully discredited—which takes particular cultures to be (mutually exclusive) "entities" whose boundaries are neatly specifiable and overwhelmingly impenetrable.30

It is true that difference may erect barriers to communication and mutual comprehension between individuals (Sommer 1999). This is the kernel of truth in the transparency argument. But such barriers of difference never fully correspond to a single specifiable collective boundary. Any attempt to specify the boundaries of a "shared" culture faces the insurmountable problem that further difference can always be found within the boundaries that were supposed to mark off difference, such that any cultural "entity" so specified will inevitably appear to the analyst to be a hybrid. It is,

Thesis 0:  $s \rightarrow m$ .

Premise  $0^a$ :  $m \to \text{transparent deliberation}$ .

i.e., one form of social action that must be **motivated** is transparent deliberation in a unified public sphere, if social integration is to be democratic.

Premise  $3^b$ : Transparent deliberation  $\rightarrow c$ .

Therefore,

Thesis 3a:  $m \rightarrow c$ .

and

Thesis 3b:  $s \rightarrow c$ 

 $^{28}$  Specifically, Premises  $0^a$  and  $3^b$  in the previous footnote are problematic.  $^{29}$  I doubt that thinkers such as Miller would actually endorse 1.a

explicitly. The point is, rather, that the thesis in question derives some of its plausibility from an unexamined assumption such as this one.

30 As Handler (1994, 29) puts it, "The most significant development in culture theory of the past twenty years has been the attack on reifying and essentialist models of culture... Many scholars now agree that there is no unchanging "essence" or "character" to particular cultures; indeed, that cultures are not individualized entities existing as natural objects with neat temporal and spatial boundaries." See also Clifford's (1988) discussion (particularly at pp. 337–44).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> In sum, the transparency argument is as follows:

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> See Sztompka 1999, chap. 2, for a conception of trust in terms of prediction in the face of risk

prediction in the face of risk.

25 Miller is specifically raising doubts about European-wide democratic citizenship here.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Compare Schnapper 1994, 141: "La langue est ... l'instrument essentiel par lequel s'instaure et se maintient la vie démocratique." Her more recent statement (2000, 258–60) is only slightly more cautious.

moreover, impossible to specify fully the boundaries of a "shared" culture on wholly nonarbitrary grounds.<sup>31</sup>

Once we recognize that any attempt at boundarydrawing is always undermined by a remainder of difference, and that the final determination of those boundaries must rest on some arbitrarily fixed ground, then both assumption 1 and assumption 2 become problematic. Difference within the boundaries of a so-called shared culture undermines the assumption that (1.a) such a shared culture could realize the Rousseauist fantasy of fully transparent communication and comprehension. Full transparency to others, and perhaps even to oneself, is a chimera (Taylor 1992). Fortunately, democracy does not require, either in practice or in principle, (1.b) a single, fully unified, transparent public sphere. It is obvious that, in practice, well-ordered democracies function with multiple, crisscrossing, overlapping, public spheres (Fraser 1997). And in principle, even if one held the quasi-Rawlsian view that wellordered democracies necessarily rest upon a regulative principle that there be, at the most abstract level, a single, unified, transparent, overarching public sphere (one that corresponds to an overlapping consensus), it does not follow that citizens should have access to all the same "forums"—only that there be at least one overarching public sphere to which all had access. The requirement that all citizens have access to all forums would come close to Rousseau's banning of "partial associations." And even the view that there need be at least one overarching public sphere that holds, as it were, all the others together overlooks the possibility that instead there may be a whole network of overlapping public spheres, no single one of which spans the entire network, but all of which are either immediately or mediately linked through overlapping or porous boundaries.<sup>32</sup> Assumption 1 is by no means selfevident.

Assumption 2 either is false or collapses into solipsism: If mutual comprehension is possible, i.e., if some level of transparency is possible between human beings, then it must also be possible across cultures. This is because if the demarcation of culture boundaries is to some extent arbitrary, then wherever the boundaries are in fact drawn, it will remain the case that they could have, with reason, been drawn differently, such that some individuals who do not share a culture according to the first demarcation do so on the second, and vice versa. But either these individuals can attain some comprehension of each other or they cannot. If they can, then on the first way of demarcating the boundaries, there is cross-cultural understanding; if they cannot, then on the second way there is no comprehension between some members of the same culture. Since the culture boundaries could always be redrawn in such a way to divide any two individuals who on one account are united by a shared culture (by drawing the bound-

<sup>31</sup> For a vivid illustration of this point about classification and typologies in general, see Foucault's (1966) discussion of Borges in the preface.

aries of culture according to the difference that exists between those two individuals), then it follows either that a shared culture is not necessary for mutual comprehension or that there cannot be any mutual comprehension between any two individuals, even if they share the same culture.<sup>33</sup>

But it might be retorted that this abstract philosophical discussion relies too heavily on "marginal" cases, in such a way that it leaves intact the general sociological point that transparency is significantly a function of something like a shared culture, particularly a shared language. After all, distinguishing between cultures is not wholly arbitrary, so that one may roughly but meaningfully speak of more or less transparency according to the degree of cultural "distance." So everything would hang on the political significance of the degree of communication possible. Miller's (1998, 50) concern, for instance, is that citizens who do not share a language cannot deliberate together, because their debates would be "opaque" to each other. But while this point seems to be straightforward common sense when we think of two individuals communicating at the face-to-face level-individuals who have needed to communicate face to face but who did not speak each other's language have often been responsible for creating pidgins—things are more complicated at the societal level. Democratic deliberation at a societal level is often mediated via the media, and multilingual media personnel can and do serve to bridge the communicational gaps at the societal level between individuals who do not speak the same language. So language is not an impermeable barrier at the societal level. (Translations, a frequent feature of multilingual democracies, are only one of many strategies people employ for coping with other languages. Another, of course, is becoming functionally multilingual: Why should we suppose that individuals are or must be monolingual?)3

However, even here Miller's point is not wholly without merit—witness the continuing resonance of describing Canadians as comprising "two solitudes," despite the presence of a bilingual telecommunications and political elite. So Miller's (1999) point might be that the demanding requirements of what he calls "republican" citizenship and deliberation rest on the greater transparency afforded by linguistic-cultural homogeneity. But we need to be clear about the baseline of comparison here. Miller's claim that without a common language there would be only "separate bodies of public opinion that could then be fed into elite negotiations" would resonate only if with a common language

preface.

32 For a work that makes a similar point in relation to constitutional politics, see Tully 1995.

 $<sup>^{33}</sup>$  See Luban 1985, 241, for a more empirical argument that draws similar conclusions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> As the anthropologist Richard Handler (1988, 159) puts it, "Cross-cultural comparison shows, contrary to Western common sense, that social solidarity need not be conceptualized in terms of linguistic homogeneity. In the Northwest Amazon, for example, people in small villages routinely speak three, four, or more languages. Residents in a village, or even within a single longhouse, do not all speak the same set of languages and, most interesting... people do not consider their multilingualism to be at all remarkable." Whether there is something about the logic of modern industrial societies that distinguishes them is something I consider in the next section.

there could be a single, unified body of public opinion, which could also bypass elite mediation and directly determine legislation. Perhaps this might happen in some exceptional political moments—they are likely to be dependent upon some unique crisis, not upon a common language—but the suggestion, implicit to Miller's critique, that with a common language this would be the regular state of affairs is sheer Rousseauist fantasy—one whose possibility, it should be added, Rousseau himself gave us much reason to doubt (Saccamano 1992).

To sum up, we must conclude that, at the societal level, shared culture is neither necessary nor sufficient for mutual understanding. It may be true that greater cultural and especially linguistic distance between society's members may in some contexts necessitate greater effort and resources to achieve the same levels of communicational transparency, all other things equal. But all this would mean is that relative transparency might be attained more efficiently with a shared culture/language. So heterogeneity has its costs-which must be weighed against, among other things, the costs of imposing homogeneity. The thesis that a shared culture is a necessary condition for liberal democracy would be plausible only if it were the case that forgoing the costs of heterogeneity is absolutely indispensable to it. Why should we think this?

#### THE INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY ARGUMENT

Ernest Gellner offers an argument for the claim that cultural homogeneity's efficiency gains for communicational transparency are indispensable to modern, industrial liberal democracies. This is the fourth and final argument—call it the industrial society argument that I consider in support of the thesis that democracy requires the cultural nation, and this argument purports to provide a theoretical justification for the crucial Thesis 2. Gellner argues that modern industrial societies—and this would include industrial liberal democratic societies—objectively and functionally require a shared national culture.<sup>35</sup> The crux of Gellner's argument is that modern industrial societies, whose ultimate commitments are to economic growth, are dependent on innovation and hence on a "changing occupational structure" and "mobile division of labour." Furthermore, industrial economies are dependent on individuals who are capable of "sustained, frequent and precise communication" with strangers, in which meaning is "transmitted in a standard idiom and in writing when required." Thus there must be a societywide possibility of context-free, fairly transparent communication. This means that if members of this society are "to be properly employable and enjoy full and effective moral citizenship," they must possess a "level of literacy and technical competence, in a standardized medium, a common conceptual currency." Furthermore, the level of the standardized education required to instill this "is so high that it simply *cannot* be provided by the kin or local units.... It can only be provided by something resembling a modern 'national' education system" (Gellner 1983, 32–34; cf. Gellner 1996, 107).

Modern society is one in which no sub-community, below the size of one capable of sustaining an independent educational system, can any longer reproduce itself. The reproduction of fully socialized individuals itself becomes part of the division of labour, and is no longer performed by sub-communities for themselves. (Gellner 1983, 32)

Gellner (1983, 38; cf. 46) concludes that "cultural homogeneity" is a functional and hence objective systemic imperative faced by industrial societies:

It is not the case...that nationalism imposes homogeneity; it is rather that a homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable imperative eventually appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.

Thus, according to Gellner, modern *industrial* liberal democracies objectively require a single national culture.<sup>36</sup> This is the basis for Gellner's adherence to Theses 0–3a. Gellner is working with a categorization of social action that is analogous to the strategic vs nonstrategic distinction I have employed, and he repeats the commonplace of social theory that strategic action is generally insufficient to explain social integration (Thesis 0):

Two generic agents or catalysts of group formation and maintenance are obviously crucial: will, voluntary adherence and identification, loyalty, solidarity, on the one hand; and fear, coercion, compulsion, on the other.... A few communities may be based exclusively or very predominantly on one or the other, but they must be rare. Most persisting groups are based on a mixture of loyalty and identification (on willed adherence), and of extraneous incentives, positive or negative, on hopes and fears. (Gellner 1983, 53, underlining added, italics in original)

While this passage only implicitly signals Gellner's commitment to Thesis 1,<sup>37</sup> his adherence to Thesis 2 and Thesis 3a is explicit:

When general social conditions make for standardized, homogeneous, centrally sustained high cultures, pervading entire populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which [Thesis 2] well-defined educationally-sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> A standard criticism leveled against Gellner is that the specification of industrialism's "functional need" cannot causally *explain* the rise of nationalism (Tambini 1996). The objection could be potentially met by specifying a "causal mechanism" or "filter explanation" by which the functional need produces what it needs (Mouzelis 1998; O'Leary 1998). But my focus at this point is less on Gellner's putative causal *explanation* for the rise of nationalism than on his specification of the functional need itself.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> A variant on Gellner's argument, proposed by Mouzelis (1998, 160), is that cultural nationalism somehow accompanies modernization, not industrialization.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Notice that I have underlined the very telling "and," which allows Gellner to remain silent on the relation between the terms to its left (will, voluntary adherence) and the terms to its right (identification, loyalty, solidarity), with the ostensible implication that they are synonymous. But in terms of Thesis 1, the terms on the right are the affective basis that motivate the terms on the left. I take it that Gellner separates the two sides with an "and," but does not make his syntactically signaled distinction (repeated in the final sentence by the parentheses) explicit to his argument, because he implicitly adheres to something like Thesis 1.

only kind of unit with which men willingly and often ardently identify.... In these conditions, [Thesis 3a] men will be politically united with all those, and only those, who share their culture. (Gellner 1983, 55)

What motivates social actors to act upon the basis of nonstrategic action ("will"), and so to effect integration ("be politically united"), is ultimately a shared culture, the only thing with which, in industrial societies, social actors affectively identify.

The key to Gellner's argument, and the point that I take to be most problematic, is the claim that homogeneity is an inescapable *objective imperative* of industrial society:

It is not the case that nationalism imposes homogeneity out of a wilful cultural *Machtbedürfniss*; it is an objective need for homogeneity which is reflected in nationalism...a modern industrial state can *only* function with a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, interchangeable population.... (Gellner 1983, 46, my emphasis)

To draw this conclusion, Gellner explicitly relies on Weber's notion of rationalization, which, according to Gellner (1983, 20) implies consistency (treating like cases alike) and efficiency (instrumental meansends rationality). Gellner's (1983, 21) thesis is that industrial society requires Weberian rationality, and Weberian rationality presupposes a "universal conceptual currency" provided by a shared culture. Part of the problem with Gellner's argument is that it is caught up in the old assumptions of modernization theory, whose exponents thought that the changes associated with modernity, such as technological advances, industrialization, urbanization, and, above all, the instrumental rationalization of economy and state bureaucracy, are detrimental to "traditional" cultural forms. Modernization represents, in this view, a sort of triumph of instrumental reason, a triumph whose progress required the overcoming of traditional, parochial cultural forms and the incorporation of all members of industrial society into a single overarching national culture (Hobsbawm 1992, 39). Only such an incorporation could make possible the instrumental efficiency gains required by the modern industrial market and the modern bureaucratic state.

But it is now recognized that those cultural forms that the old modernization theorists labeled "traditional" often flourish precisely because of modernization (Gusfield 1967).<sup>38</sup> Similarly, there is no reason to think that, even if industrial society requires an education system that trains its students in a set of common technical and communication skills, these competencies require a single culture or even language. Indeed, increases in the levels of education and communication in industrial societies may decrease the need

for cultural homogeneity, because of an increase in people's skills in dealing with the new or unfamiliar—pace Gellner's assumption, the knowledge imparted by education is not simply a matter of some formulaic content that all must share, but of skills that may amount to an ability to recognize Wittgensteinian family resemblances.<sup>39</sup>

So even if we grant that, ceteris paribus, cultural homogeneity is the most efficient means to secure the requirements of industrial society,<sup>40</sup> it certainly does not follow that "nationalism as such is fated to prevail" (Gellner 1983, 47). Despite Gellner's own well-known antinationalist proclivities, his version of economic determinism—which is no more credible than the other economic determinisms that have historically preceded it—ironically verges on normative political philosophy masquerading in the guise of social theory:

We do not understand the range of options available to industrial society... but we understand some of its essential concomitants. The kind of cultural homogeneity demanded by nationalism is one of them, and we had better make our peace with it. (Gellner 1983, 39)

When Gellner says that we "had better" make our peace with it, does he mean that we "must" or that we "should"? It is not and never has been the case that we must accept maximum industrial economic growth just because we want some growth; industrial society does not collapse just because its efficiency goals are moderated or balanced by other, conflicting values. Cultural homogeneity may or may not be an "essential concomitant" for an industrial society committed to the maximum physically possible levels of economic growth irrespective of other values, but there is little evidence that industrial society as such requires such a commitment. So we should "make our peace" with nationalism only if we should accept maximum industrial economic growth as a value that trumps all others. But why should we do this? What recommends sheer capitulation to the systemic colonization of the lifeworld, to the thoroughgoing triumph of instrumental over practical reason? Even faced with the discipline imposed by a competitive global market, efficiency is never the only value that liberal democratic industrial societies must realize. When Gellner (1996, 105) says that "economic growth is the first principle of legitimacy of this kind of society," what he says may be true of Brazil's bureaucratic-authoritarian regime in the 1960s, but the governments of few liberal democratic societies could,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> "Tradition and modernity are frequently mutually reinforcing... The technological consequences of increased transportation, communication, literacy, and horizontal mobility, in furthering the spread of ideas, also intensifies the spread and influence of the "great tradition" into more and more communities... the quest for modernity depends upon and often finds support in the ideological upsurge of traditionalism" (Gusfield 1967, 356–58). Compare Caton 1990, chap. 9, especially p. 247.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Gellner's assumption that education systems are incapable of imparting communication skills for the industrial economy unless they foster a single culture is not convincing. We can see the logic of the argument at the global level: Dutch schools may teach students how to work in English, the language of global industry, but they do not teach them to become Britons or Americans, or even anglophones. Nor would Europe's common market face collapse because of this. <sup>40</sup> Notice that Gellner is not necessarily committed to the position that the more homogeneous the culture, the more efficient the economy; rather, he is committed to the position that there is a minimum baseline of cultural homogeneity that is required, falling below which baseline results in efficiency losses in the achievement of economic growth. It is just that that baseline is very high. It requires, among other things, a shared language.

in the name of *economic growth* or global competitiveness, commit the gross human rights violations the Brazilian regime so justified and leave their legitimacy intact. The bases of their legitimacy are rather more diverse. The burden of proof lies with the philosopher who wants to argue that the material goods of industrial society are the only constituents of the good life.

If it be objected that Gellner's point is that all of the goods of industrial democracies, material or not, are contingent upon a standardized education of large enough scope to sustain the economy, and that this standardized education wipes out localized cultures that cannot reproduce themselves because they lack access to the institutions of state education, then one might plausibly point out that while there may be a minimum size requirement, diverse cultural practices can be (re)produced via substate educational institutions. (In numerous countries, for instance, cultural diversity is in part reproduced by the fact that education is not under jurisdiction of the central government.) Viability need not require uniformity at the state level. It may be retorted that Gellner's point is simply that, given industrial conditions, those who resist cultural homogeneity at the state level will always be faced with nationalist demands to render the boundaries of politics coterminous with culture, i.e., that Gellner is simply explaining the sources of nationalism. (So not surprisingly, Canada has been hardest hit by Québécois nationalism, one of whose primary focuses has been the education system, precisely after Quebec industrialized.) But this rejoinder amounts to this: The struggle to accommodate cultural difference in modern industrial democracies is not a prisoner to an iron cage of cultural homogeneity; it is simply most likely to be confronted by nationalists who struggle against such accommodation, and whose political project of rendering the boundaries of politics congruent with those of culture ultimately draws much of its strength from (and is empirically explained by) the efficiency requirements of industrial societies. But who wins that struggle in a particular state is not a fait accompli. There is more hope for Gellner's antinationalist normative commitments than his own determinist social theory allows.

In other words, the so-called objective imperative to cultural homogeneity is hardly a scientific truth that enjoys what Gellner (1996, 111) tongue-in-cheek calls, with characteristic wit, "Euclidean cogency." Rather, it is a bit of nationalist ideology par excellence; Gellner is guilty of good old-fashioned reification in the Marxist-Lukácsian sense of the word. Such claims to provide an account of "objective" imperatives are highly suspect by virtue of the hermeneutical predicament faced by all social theory: All such theories are themselves part of the social phenomena they purport to explain. This implies that we cannot simply and solely appeal to the "empirical outcomes" in a positivist manner to settle questions about the "essential concomitants" of industrial liberal democracies, because the empirical outcomes themselves (which are the results of purposive, meaning-endowed actions) may turn out to depend upon certain beliefs about these "essential concomitants": Thus rather than the empirical outcomes telling us which social theory to believe, it may, on the contrary, be the case that the very fact that certain social theories are believed helps explain the empirical outcomes. This is not to say that empirical analysis is useless—quite the contrary. The point is simply that interpreting the empirical evidence is anything but straightforward, because the theories that purport to explain the social "facts" are themselves part of those facts. This phenomenon is exacerbated in the case of social-scientific theories of nationalism, because, as Handler (1988, 8) has argued, nationalist ideology and social science theory have been especially interpenetrated by each other. Nationalist beliefs about "imperatives" of homogeneity may turn out to be self-fulfilling.<sup>41</sup>

This becomes clearer once we specify for Gellner's theory—as we must, if his theory is not to lapse into teleology—the causal mechanisms by which a functional "need" for nationalism is supposed to result in nationalism. As Brendan O'Leary (1998, 52) puts it, "One obvious way to reconstruct Gellner's argument" to avoid the charge of teleological functionalism is to provide a filter explanation of the following form:

Modernising elites believe that nationalism is essential for modernisation, precisely because it breaks down barriers to modernising success. Nation-building nationalists recognise the beneficial consequences of nationalism, and this fact helps explains [sic] its political diffusion. (emphasis added)

But the hermeneutical predicament outlined above suggests that O'Leary takes too much for granted when he speaks of "recognition." First, as O'Leary himself would acknowledge, even if the fruits of industrial society were most efficiently won, all other things equal, via cultural homogeneity, usually all other things are not equal: There are serious social, economic, political, and other costs in trying to impose cultural homogeneity upon individuals who resist. (Witness the disasters of forced assimilation policies vis-à-vis Aboriginal populations in settler countries such as Australia, Canada, and the United States). Second, and most importantly, once we go beyond Gellner's reification and acknowledge, as O'Leary and others have urged, the political

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> The lack of attention to this hermeneutical circularity is the decisive shortcoming in Connor's (1994, 4–27) attempt to cite the twentieth century's historical record as evidence that there is an inverse relationship between multinationalism and democracy. For a philosophical critique of positivist method, see Fay 1975. The philosopher is perhaps much too generous when he concludes that "only the most unreflective social scientist would fail to realise that the very basis of the positivist account of the social sciences has been severely shaken" (Fay 1975, 68).

<sup>(</sup>Fay 1975, 68).

42 Hall's (1998, 9) particularly nuanced formulation of the implication of O'Leary's argument is instructive: "The seeming necessity of the equation between social homogeneity and the modern world... is an ideology, and an ideology which may not be completely true: for all that modern social organisation may be easier given social similarity, policies to engineer social homogenisation forcibly may... have grave disadvantages."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> The point is not, of course, that Gellner's social theory normatively commits him to nationalist assimilationist policies. The point is, rather, that his economic determinism predicates a key thesis of his social theory (that homogeneity is in fact the most efficient means for realizing industrial goods) on a problematic, if not false, premise.

nature of nationalism's genesis and/or diffusion,<sup>44</sup> we are naturally led to ask to what extent even the "beneficial consequences" of a homogeneous national culture are an antecedently given objective economic fact of the matter and to what extent they are a matter of sociopolitical contingency. O'Leary is too committed a nationalist to take this further step, but this is an empirical question: To what extent is believing cultural homogeneity to be essential to modernizing success simply a recognition of an antecedently given socioeconomic or systemic fact, and to what extent is this socioeconomic "fact" a product of widespread sociopolitical actions based on belief in this putative fact?<sup>45</sup>

We can get a better sense of this problem through some historical sensitivity. The thesis that industrial or liberal democratic society requires cultural homogeneity has an even more extreme ancestor: the thesis that integration, indeed social order and peace, in any society requires religious homogeneity. In the twentyfirst century the thesis seems rather absurd; but in the seventeenth century, it was the heartfelt belief of many an Englishman. The Arminian Bishops of the Church of England believed that uniformity in form and ceremonial was required; the Puritans in Parliament went further, arguing that society required uniformity of belief (Tanner 1971, 81). The various religious disputes and attempts at enforcing uniformity played a significant role in bringing about the Civil War, and if there were social scientists in seventeenth-century Britain, they may very well have concluded that social order does indeed (objectively) require religious homogeneity. In fact, one of the precursors to modern social science did conclude something to this effect. Despite the fact that Hobbes (1996, 479-80) implicitly embraced religious toleration in his endorsement of Independency, he also believed that ultimately any secure society requires a public consensus on the meanings of all words, and most pressingly, of moral and religious language. In other words, social order required that everyone in the realm publicly defer to the religious theology determined by the sovereign. But with hindsight, we might conclude that far from religious homogeneity being an objective requirement for social order, it is the belief in that thesis and the concomitant attempts at enforcing homogeneity that pose the threat to social order. We can discern Hobbes's (1996, 471) own tacit recognition of this in his attempts to endorse toleration and freedom of conscience as a means to calm the religious zealotry that sought to impose a homogeneity of belief merely a few degrees thicker than that deemed necessary by nationalists such as Schnapper. The point was

explicitly recognized by Locke in his Letter Concerning Toleration. 46

So perhaps the empirical trouble faced by culturally heterogeneous liberal democratic societies is explained not by heterogeneity *perse*, but by the fact that there are too many nationalists running around crying out, "Objective imperative!" At most, Gellner's theory shows that it is an objective imperative that there will always be such folks in industrial societies, but not that the rest of us should believe them. If there is a Euclidean cogency to Gellner's theory, it is that it predicts the very fact of its own existence.

#### CONCLUSION

I have argued that, even if we grant (Thesis 0) that social integration requires nonstrategic action and (Thesis 1) that the requisite nonstrategic action necessarily depends upon a shared affective identity, it does not follow (Theses 3a and 3b) that the nonstrategic action indispensable to social integration requires a shared national public culture. Four of the most common arguments for the cultural nationalist conclusions fail. People can affectively identify with each other despite not sharing particular norms or beliefs; the trust indispensable to social integration is not dependent upon shared national culture; national-cultural diversity may raise the costs of, but does not rule out, achieving higher degrees of communicative transparency; and the higher economic costs of national-cultural diversity, even if not fully balanced by diversity's economic benefits, do not render homogeneity an "objective imperative" for industrial liberal democracies.

Moreover, there is also reason to be skeptical of Thesis 1, which construes a shared affective identity in terms of a common sentiment/belief that "we" belong together. We might, for instance, follow Andrew Mason and distinguish between two kinds of shared identity. The first depends upon "a sense of belonging together," where people "believe that there is some special reason why they should associate together, such as that which might be provided by the belief that they have a common history or distinctive culture." The second involves "a sense of belonging to a polity," which obtains if and only if a person "identifies with most of [the polity's] major institutions and some of its central practices, and feels at home in them." Mason (2000, 127-29; see chap. 5 as a whole) then goes on to argue that "the citizens of a state might in principle have a sense of belonging to their polity without thinking that there is any real sense in which they belong together" and that a shared identity based on a sense of belonging to the same polity may be sufficient to buttress liberal democratic practices. So Thesis 1's construal of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>44</sup> See, e.g., Mouzelis' (1998, 158) point that "it was geopolitical competition between European states that... finally destroyed political, economic and cultural localism" (rather than simply economic factors). Compare Breuilly 1994, Brubaker 1996, and Hobsbawm 1992. <sup>45</sup> Charles Taylor (1997, 34) suggests that "the reason bilingual solutions are hard isn't because they're so complicated and expensive but because they're resisted (for example, under the bad faith pretext that they're complicated and expensive) on fundamentally nationalist grounds. That is, nationalism is still figuring in [Gellner's] account as an explanans, not as a successfully accounted for explanandum." See Dobbin 1994 for a critique of accounts that take for granted the objective status of putative instrumental-rational economic laws.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> See Locke (1983, 52), where he argues that instead of religious diversity being a threat to the social order, social order is threatened by religious persecution that is motivated by the fear that religious diversity is a threat to social order. The persecution *itself* is the threat to social order, and *makes* its premise (that religious homogeneity is required for social order) true, since the persecution causes individuals to mobilize against the state on the basis of their religious differences.

a shared affective identity in terms of "a sense of belonging together" may be unduly restrictive. Even if social integration requires a shared affective identity, that identity might center upon a shared set of political institutions—and citizens may affectively identify with their polity (and, by extension, its citizens) for different reasons.47

These are only suggestions; it is not my intention here to provide a full-blown theory of liberal democracy. Rather, my purpose in demonstrating the inadequacy of the cultural nationalist answer to the twin problems of motivation and integration has been to open up the possibility and demonstrate the need for a normative theory of liberal democracy in multinational and postnational contexts. My argument suggests, for instance, that Europe's democratic deficit is not the inevitable concomitant of national heterogeneity: Euro-skeptics are mistaken to think that cultural nationalism provides their skepticism with liberal democratic credentials. The argument here also suggests that integration in liberal democracies is not contingent upon cultural nationalist assimilation policies. To the contrary, faced with cultural heterogeneity, state-sponsored nationalist projects of cultural assimilation, speciously justified by reference to some supposed need for homogeneity, have increasingly proven to be not just ineffective, but positively counterproductive to the goal of integration. Thus, ironically, the hard-nosed French republican version of cultural nationalism, which tirelessly presents itself as the solution to France's continuing anxieties over its failure to integrate fully its citizens of North African origin, is perhaps the primary ideological obstacle.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> "In a culturally diverse society, the forcible and comprehensive imposition of the majority's cultural norms on minorities is only likely to aggravate the latter's sense of cultural alienation. Projects of cultural assimilation... are bound to undermine rather than further their avowed objectives" (Laborde 2001, 730-31). Laborde's article provides a useful overview of French republican ideology.

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# How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United States, 1875–1891

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This case study of late-nineteenth century federal courts in the United States sheds light on two seemingly unrelated questions of general interest to political scientists: What tools are available to party leaders who seek to institutionalize their policy agendas or insulate those agendas from electoral politics? and How do we account for expansions of judicial power? Using an historical-interpretive analysis of partisan agendas, party control of national institutions, congressional initiatives relating to federal courts, the appointment of federal judges, judicial decision making, and litigation patterns, I demonstrate that the increased power, jurisdiction, and conservatism of federal courts during this period was a by-product of Republican Party efforts to promote and entrench a policy of economic nationalism during a time when that agenda was vulnerable to electoral politics. In addition to offering an innovative interpretation of these developments, I discuss the implications arising from this case study for our standard accounts of partisan politics, political development, and the determinants of judicial decision making.

The history of the relations between Congress and the Supreme Court during the twenty-five years following the Civil War is most telling proof that the various organs of government are not mechanically set apart from each other.... The practical workings of the Supreme Court in the scheme of our national life may be as decisively determined by the extent of appellate jurisdiction allotted to it by Congress, the issues open on review, the range of jurisdiction of the inferior courts, and the machinery available for the disposition of business, as by the learning and outlook of the Justices, the quality and the training of the bar.

Frankfurter and Landis (1928, 86)

n this article I offer a case study in American political development—the dramatic and controversial expansion of federal judicial power in the late-nineteenth century—to illuminate two seemingly unrelated questions of general interest to political scientists: What tools are available to party leaders who seek to institutionalize their substantive policy agendas or insulate them from electoral politics? and How do we account for expansions of judicial power?

Exploring the relationship between these questions requires an integration of two relatively distinct traditions of political science research. The first tradition focuses on the motives and methods behind the creation or empowerment of potentially autonomous policy-making institutions by legislators or other power-holders who have a presumptive interest in maintaining tighter control of policy. The literature on this question typically looks at the origins of bureau-

cratic agencies or regulatory commissions, at decisions to delegate powers to such executive or quasi-executive bodies, and at the process by which oversight or control of these institutions is maintained. Studies have attributed institutional empowerment to a variety of political motivations including a desire to shift decision-making responsibility on issues that elected officials consider politically sensitive, enhance credible commitments to favored constituencies, reduce cycling effects or decision-making costs, and protect favored policies against reversal (for an overview see Voigt and Salzberger 2002).

The second research tradition looks at expansions of judicial power (see Tate and Vallinder 1995). Many scholars who have examined this topic have tended to attribute judicial empowerment to factors other than the short-term self-interest of elected power-holders acting on the basis of conventional political agendas.1 Many constitutional historians and law professors often take a law- or court-centered view and discuss judicial power as if it were a by-product of essentially legal choices that relatively independent judges make about the proper scope of their own authority. Other legalist interpretations suggest that nations may simply reach a point at a certain stage of their development when they begin to appreciate the systemwide advantages of the judiciary's enforcement of agreed-upon rules (Stein 1980). Some scholars who have studied the European Court of Justice (ECJ) have argued that the expanding role of the ECJ is a product of the efforts of various supranational and subnational actors pursuing their shared self-interests (e.g., Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet and Brunell 1998). Others have treated judicial empowerment as reflecting a more

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This may be due to a number of questionable assumptions: that the nature and scope of judicial power are a preconstitutional decision rather than a by-product of ongoing political construction; that courts are often policy-making competitors to legislators and thus less likely to be candidates for political empowerment by those legislators; and that courts are not best conceptualized as conventional policy-making institutions, at least not in the same way as bureaucratic agencies or regulatory commissions.

general interest in promoting "rule of law" governance, dispute resolution, or consensus politics (e.g., Elster and Slagstad 1988; Stone Sweet 1999; Tsebelis 1995). Relatedly, rational choice scholars have attempted to explain expansions of judicial authority in terms of establishing efficient mechanisms for the maintenance of investor security (e.g., Olson 1993; Weingast 1997, 1993), the oversight of bureaucracy (e.g., McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987), and the desire to maintain policy stability in competitive party systems (Ramseyer 1994). (For a more complete overview of this literature see Hirschl 2000, 96–102.)

Unlike most of these accounts of judicial empowerment, I argue that the expansion of federal judicial power in the late-nineteenth century is best understood as the sort of familiar partisan or programmatic entrenchment that we frequently associate with legislative delegations to executive or quasi-executive agencies. In this case, however, the institutional beneficiaries of this entrenchment were courts rather than agencies or commissions.

It is generally acknowledged that federal judicial power in the United States, and the power of the Supreme Court in particular, expanded toward the end of the nineteenth century. A system of lower federal courts that at midcentury was understaffed and underpaid, was lacking in courtroom facilities (and thus was often forced to rent space from state governments), attracted men of little prominence, and had only limited jurisdiction had become by century's end a real third branch of government, with expanded personnel, a new layer of appellate courts, and dramatically broader jurisdiction (Hall 1973, 29–87; Purcell 1999, 687). A Supreme Court that only fleetingly, and insecurely, exercised power at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and that had undermined its reputation and authority among many former supporters with the Dred Scott decision in 1857, began after the Civil War to strike down laws with greater regularity and to involve itself in more significant national policy disputes (Graber 1998a, 1999; Griffin 1996, 97). The Chase Court voided at least eight federal laws between 1865 and 1874; another eight were struck down by the Waite Court up through 1888. An important troika of cases by the Fuller Court in 1895—on the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, the Income Tax, and the use of labor injunction—drew critical attention in the 1896 Populist and Democratic Platforms (Westin 1953).2 While the pre-Civil War Court struck down state laws at a rate of less than one a year (41 laws through 1864), the Chase, Waite, and Fuller Courts established a rate of about three laws a year between 1864 and 1895.3 By the 1890s, a "muted fury" toward federal courts had already begun to build among those who felt the need to resist what had become a bastion of conservative policy making (Ross 1994). Some prominent legal scholars also felt compelled to advise federal judges of the virtues of restraint (Thayer 1893).

In accounting for this expansion it has been common for scholars to argue that judicial activism was initiated by conservative judges who objected to the regulatory policies being pursued by other branches of government, with the goal of either constraining progressive legislation or (more generally) imposing conservative values on an increasingly tumultuous industrial order. Some versions of this argument assume a class-conscious and coordinated response by the bench and bar (e.g., Jacobs 1954; Paul 1960; Twiss 1942); others focus more simply on individual judges pursuing their policy preferences (Segal and Spaeth 1993, 304-5). Either way, the explanations assume that judicial power is best seen as arising in opposition to conventional political power in a zero-sum battle of control over policy making; in other words, an expansion of judicial power is treated as inconsistent with the preferences of legislators. On the basis of this assumption some normative constitutional theorists have even depicted these late-nineteenth-century developments as the moment when the judiciary began illegitimately to assert unprecedented policy-making claims against the elected branches, thus giving birth to the modern preoccupation with "judicial supremacy" or the "countermajoritarian difficulty" (e.g., B. Friedman 1998, 2001; Haines 1932; Jackson 1941).<sup>4</sup>

However, there are good reasons for thinking that late-nineteenth-century developments are best viewed as "politically inspired" rather than "court-inspired" (on this distinction see Sunkin 1994). As I demonstrate, much of the expansion of power resulted from the passage of two key pieces of legislation—the Judiciary and Removal Act of 1875 and the Evarts Act of 1891—that were part of the Republican Party's efforts to restructure national institutions better to facilitate national economic development (see Bensel 2000). The more familiar parts of this political agenda involved currency policy, tariff policy, and (eventually) national bureaucratic expansion (Skowronek 1982). However, the expansion of federal administrative capacity became necessary only after economic nationalists were successful at promoting large-scale enterprise by extending more reliable legal institutions to investors and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Of the 1895 cases—U.S. v. E. C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, and In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564—only Pollock struck down a federal law. Still, the decisions to prohibit the application of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to intrastate production and to uphold the power of federal courts to issue injunctions against unions represented significant policy statements on the scope of national industrial policy.

<sup>3</sup> This information is taken from Factoric at al. (1994, 2014).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This information is taken from Epstein et al. (1994, 96–110, Tables 2-12, 2-13). The Fuller Court's rate of reversal of state laws increased to four a year between 1896 and 1905 (41 cases striking down laws),

and the Fuller, White, and Taft courts continued this development (111 cases striking down laws from 1906 to 1915 and 123 from 1916 to 1925).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The language of judicial supremacy and claims of unprecedented judical activism overstate late-nineteenth-century developments. For example, key legal doctrines used by the Supreme Court were not as unprecedented as some of these authors suggest (Gillman 1993; Rowe 1999). Also, the "restraint" associated with the antebellum Court probably had more to do with the few opportunities to exercise judicial review (especially over federal laws), and with the Jacksonian Court's more oblique approach to voiding statutes, than with a change in the justices' attitudes about the appropriateness of striking down laws (Graber 2000a, 2000b).

producers who operated within a national market.<sup>5</sup> Federal judges became the principal agents of this agenda after Republicans in the national government retooled the federal judiciary by changing its jurisdiction, reforming its structure, and staffing courts with judges who were reliable caretakers of this new mission.

This account is consistent with the view that judges take on those powers, responsibilities, and agendas that are assigned to them by other power-holders in the political system (Peretti 1999, 133). Moreover, given that the two key legislative initiatives leading to federal judicial empowerment were passed by lame-duck Republican Congresses immediately prior to losing control of all or part of the Congress, this argument echoes Hirschl's (2000) "hegemonic preservation thesis," which assumes that elected politicians have a motivation to empower courts when their control over policy outcomes is challenged in majoritarian decisionmaking arenas. This account is also broadly consistent with what De Figueiredo and Tiller (1996, 438) call a "political efficiency" argument for judicial expansion, which holds that the House and Senate have an interest in enacting legislation "expanding" federal courts when they "expect the nominating president and the confirming Senate to appoint judges who will have political preferences consistent with those of the enacting Congress." However, rather than view late-nineteenth-century developments as merely an effort by Republicans to achieve short-term political advantages in the staffing of an existing institution, the account developed herein emphasizes the goal of establishing more long-term adjustments in the role or mission of the federal judiciary in American politics.7

<sup>5</sup> Skowronek (1982) provides an exemplary account of the development of national administrative capacity; but because the judiciary was also not a focus of that analysis, he relies too much on accounts that simply stress the conservative orientation of legal elites. No effort was made to analyze the actual steps taken by Congress and the presidency to facilitate judicial power. While he mentions in one sentence the Congress's expansion of the jurisdiction of federal courts, too much of his account leaves the impression that expansion was driven by judges as a natural response to industrialization: "The expansion of federal judicial power in the late nineteenth century was the natural response of the early American state to demands for national authority in the industrial age. Gradually over the 1870s and 1880s, the federal judiciary molded its new powers into an aggressive discipline for ordering governmental affairs." Still, he is fundamentally correct that "with nationalism, the Court recognized the continental scale of the new economic order and facilitated a concentration of governing authority.... [The Court sought] to sharpen the boundaries between the public and private spheres, to provide clear and predictable standards for gauging the scope of acceptable state action, and to affirm with the certainty of fundamental law the prerogatives of property owners in the marketplace" (Skowronek 1982, 41). I would add that this agenda did not originate with the Court and would not have emerged unless it flowed out of the regime politics of the period.

<sup>6</sup> During the period discussed in this essay Congress expanded the size of the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal seven times (adding nine judges in 1869, one in 1887, nine in 1891, three in 1893, one in 1894, and one each in two separate acts in 1895), and in all but two cases (1887 and 1893) the House, Senate, and president were of the same party.

<sup>7</sup> See also Barrow, Zuk, and Gryski (1996) for a discussion of judicial expansion and appointment politics. For my purposes, though,

Within the more familiar judicial politics literature the approach I am advocating is most closely related to research that links national court behavior to the interests of dominant coalitions and to broader changes in the political system (e.g., Dahl 1957; Graber 1993, 1998a; Klarman 1996; Gillman and Clayton, 1999). However, rather than focus on the *constraints* imposed on judicial decision making I want to highlight how the decisions of nonjudicial actors reconstructed and *empowered* the institution of the federal judiciary.<sup>8</sup>

### THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM BEFORE RECONSTRUCTION

To understand the significance of postbellum developments some reminders about antebellum understandings are useful, since during this period the limited nature of federal judicial power also reflected the influence of conventional political considerations.

Early nationalists understood the relationship between strong central authority and a strong federal judiciary that was resistant to local influence—but so did opponents of strong national power, and one of their principal accomplishments in 1789 was preventing the creation of a truly nationalist judiciary (Marcus 1992). Federal judicial districts and circuits were tied to state boundaries.9 In almost all states only one federal trial judge was assigned (Virginia and Massachusetts received two), and these district court judges had to be residents of their districts. Federal district courts had remarkably limited jurisdiction. They were essentially authorized to hear only admiralty cases plus penalties and forfeitures under the laws of the United States. Circuit courts also acted primarily as trial courts and heard mostly cases involving diversity of citizenship. Importantly, federal district courts had no authority to hear trials on "federal question" suits, which meant that

their definition of "institutional change" is overly narrow. They define institutional change as "a function of three components—bench expansion, replacements created by voluntary and involuntary departures, and elevations" of lower court judges to higher courts. This makes quantitative data collection more manageable, but it does not allow for an investigation of the ways in which judicial power may expand as a result of jurisdictional changes and evolving conceptions of the role of federal courts in the political system. While they acknowledge that institutional development may be "either quantitative (increase in 'business') or qualitative (enlargement or upgrading of mission), often connoting alterations of status within the political system as well," they do not provide an assessment of qualitative "mission upgrades" that alter an institution's status in the political system (Barrow, Zuk, and Gryski 1996, 7).

<sup>a</sup> Also, unlike rational choice analyses of the dynamics of interinstitutional politics (Epstein and Knight 1998; Epstein and Walker 1995; Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; Gely and Spiller 1992; Knight and Epstein 1996; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000; Spiller and Gely 1992), the emphasis here is on how state-building led to an adjustment in the judiciary's "mission" or role in the political system (Gillman 1999) rather than on mapping out short-term and discrete strategic calculations in a given case.

<sup>9</sup> Federalists in the early-nineteenth century tried one last time to create districts independent of state boundaries. The District of Champlain would have covered parts of New York and Vermont, and the District of Cumberland would have covered western Maryland and Virginia. But the measure was predictably defeated (Wheeler 1992, 5).

most conflicts over national policy would have to be litigated in state courts. <sup>10</sup> The Supreme Court was given the authority under the infamous Section 25 of the Judiciary Act to review decisions by a state's highest court in which a claim based on federal rights was denied, but it took more than a quarter-century before that power was asserted in *Martin* v. *Hunter's Lessee*, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) and that authority was immediately subjected to a prolonged siege by resistant states (Warren 1913). <sup>11</sup>

To mitigate further the centralizing potential of the Supreme Court the six justices were required to spend most of their time traveling in the states over which they had circuit responsibilities, where they would serve primarily as trial judges with very limited jurisdiction.<sup>12</sup> When they heard appeals while riding circuit they were required to participate with the local federal judge who made the original decision. Their circuit responsibilities ensured that these national officeholders would feel deep connections to their assigned states, and antebellum appointment norms solidified these connections by encouraging presidents to choose justices from the region of the country over which they would have circuit responsibilities (O'Brien 2000, 32-103). This tendency to view Supreme Court justices as representing regional interests was reinforced by the Judiciary Act of 1837, which increased the size of the Court from seven to nine while also expanding and realigning the circuits to account for Western expansion. To reinforce sectional influences no circuit contained both a free and a slave state; to ensure the protection of Southern regional interests (a goal of the second-party system) the slave states were divided into five circuits, meaning that they would enjoy a majority on the Supreme Court (Hall 1973, 18, 19, 448, 451; for a general discussion of the issues raised in the previous two paragraphs see Frankfurter and Landis 1928, 6–55, and Wheeler 1992).

There were minor adjustments in the structure before the Civil War, but they did not affect the central point: The organization of federal courts was related to larger political considerations about the limited role of the national government in American politics (see Skowronek 1982, 29). More specifically, one of the principal ways in which national power was kept in check was by ensuring that the principal agents of national law would be appointed with local or regional considerations in mind and (for good measure) would be overworked, poorly paid, and authorized to enforce only a

subset of federal law (the rest of which would be filtered through state proceedings). Given that this was the goal, it is not surprising that when federal courts experienced serious caseload pressures in the decades before the Civil War, Congress felt no obligation to offer relief.<sup>13</sup>

These courts did do some work for the union (mostly in diversity and admiralty suits) and after Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), they managed a small break from state influence when federal judges were freed from having to follow state law in diversity cases, thus creating a more national forum for interstate economic policy.<sup>14</sup> They were also able (with some difficulty) to enforce some federal policies, most significantly those relating to rights under the federal fugitive slave acts, which were enforced against antislavery forces in the North (Cover 1975). In the Compromise of 1850 Congress also vested the federal judiciary (through the action of federal commissioners) with the responsibility of deciding the status of runaway slaves; when we combine this decision with later partisan urgings to have the Supreme Court address the disintegrating slavery problem in the Dred Scott case, it is safe to say that there was a consensus among some party leaders that it was politically expedient to channel some aspects of national slavery policy into the federal courts (Graber 1993; Kutler 1968, 32–33). Still, the perceived utility of federal judicial power was very issue-specific, and all antebellum efforts to expand the general significance and power of federal courts in the political system were ignored or rebuffed.15

When the slavery interests separated from the national government at the beginning of the Civil War Republicans had their first opportunity to break Southern domination of federal judicial power. They also had their first opportunity to create a strong and effective national court system that could be the agent of Republican interests. But during this period reformers thought more in terms of reworking the traditional model to their partisan advantage rather in terms of serious institutional reconfiguration. Some influential historians of this period argue that Republican efforts in the 1860s represented a strong commitment to the expansion of judicial power to serve the ends of Reconstruction (Kutler 1968; Wiecek 1969), but it is probably

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> As Casto (1997, 67–73) points out, there was relatively little substantive federal law in the early republic, and so this limit on the authority of federal courts may not be as remarkable as it might first appear (see also Purcell 1999, 691–93). At the same time, the decision to channel cases arising out of federal law into state courts demonstrates the level of distrust of national authority and the prevailing understanding of the relationship between federal court jurisdiction and national power.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Just to complete the record, with respect to other suits, no appeals could be made to the Supreme Court when the parties in alienage or diversity suits decided to litigate in state court; moreover, an overall amount-in-controversy limitation of \$2,000 was placed on diversity and alienage appeals to the Supreme Court.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> In 1816 Justice Story wrote a "Judge's Bill" that would have conferred on circuit courts the full sweep of judicial power conferred in the Constitution, but Congress never acted (Frankfurter and Landis 1928, 36).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Hall (1973, 36) reports that in 1841 the Supreme Court had 106 cases pending but disposed of just 42; in 1842, 107 pending with 52 disposed of; in 1843, 118 and 36; in 1844, 168 and 46; and in 1845, 173 and 64. Congress debated reform in 1847 and 1848 but did not act. The situation was even worse in the lower federal courts. In 1849 the Court took matters into its own hand by limiting the amount of time litigants had to make their arguments (two hours per side).

<sup>14</sup> The Taney Court extended this in *The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh*, 12 Howard 443 (1852), which overturned an 1825 decision that had limited the jurisdiction of federal courts in admiralty cases to the ebb and flow of the tide. This allowed greater centralized control over commerce on American inland lakes and rivers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> By the early 1850s Southern Democrats attempted to consolidate the protection of slavery by making the first real efforts since the short-lived Judiciary Act of 1801 to nationalize the federal courts and expand their staffing and jurisdiction, but these efforts were successfully resisted by the forces that became the Republic Party, led mostly by Salmon P. Chase (Hall 1973, 107–8, 118, 263, 452).

more accurate to view these early steps as constrained attempts to change marginally the bias inherent in existing structures. While there were some calls from judges, prominent lawyers, and newspapers to increase the number of district courts, create an intermediate court of appeals, and eliminate circuit riding by justices, the Congress was still controlled by representatives committed to localism and regional representation on the Supreme Court (Hall 1975, 180-81). The Judiciary Act of 1862 succeeded in rearranging the circuits so that there were only three wholly Southern districts (a number that was reduced to one in 1866) and also gave Ohio and Illinois a prominent role in newly formed Northern circuits; Lincoln quickly cemented this traditional model by appointing Samuel Miller of Iowa, David Davis of Illinois, and Noah Haynes Swayne of Ohio to the Supreme Court. A year later regionalism was reinforced again when California and Oregon were brought into the system as a tenth circuit, with Stephen J. Field of California receiving an appointment. The new system ensured that the South could not dominate the federal courts and, thus, brought an end to "the judicial embodiment of Calhoun's concurrent majority," but it did nothing about circuit riding and it made no effort to assist with overburdened dockets at all levels of the federal court system (Hall 1975, 181; Kutler 1968, 16–21).

By 1865 Northern commercial and financial interests were pressuring Republicans to do something about docket overload. The bill that Lyman Trumbull introduced in late 1868 addressed the problem primarily by creating nine new circuit court judges who would have the same powers and jurisdictions as the assigned Supreme Court justice (who would still be required to attend at least one term of the circuit court during each two-year period). The decision to make these new positions circuit court, rather than district court, appointments was considered a modest way of mitigating traditional local (state-based) biases in the lower federal courts. Still, as Hall (1975, 182-85) summarized these developments, the federal judicial system "ended the decade of the 1860s in much the same condition they had begun, characterized by administrative decentralization and individuality.... At least in their institutional structure the federal courts proved resistant to the impact of the Civil War and the first years of Reconstruction. For their part, the Republicans emerged as at best reluctant nationalizers" (see also Fairman 1987; Kutler 1968, 50–63).

#### FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO ECONOMIC **NATIONALISM**

Initial and tentative efforts to expand the role of federal courts began during the War with the passage of the

1863 Habeas Corpus statute, which, for the first time since the "nullification crisis" of the 1830s, 17 authorized the "removal" of judicial proceedings from a state court into a federal court if the state proceeding appeared to a defendant's counsel to be prejudiced by reason of the defendant's status as a national officer. 18 The precedent was quickly built upon: Over the next few years Congress passed 12 removal measures extending federal court alternatives to state court defendants (especially blacks) who were not federal officials but who claimed that the protection of federal rights was being jeopardized by local prejudice. Removal also became an option in suits against all corporations (except banking) organized under a law of the United States, suits against common carriers for loss or damage to goods through the hostilities of the Civil War, and diversity suits exceeding \$500 where the nonresident party could show local influence or prejudice (Frankfurter and Landis 1928, 61-63; Hyman and Wiecek 1982, 261-63; Kutler 1968, 143–60). 19

Reconstruction politics also led Congress to engage in piecemeal expansions of the role of federal courts in promoting or protecting national policies. The Federal Enforcement Act of 1870, a.k.a. the Force Bill, reenacted the 1866 Civil Rights law through the enforcement authority of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and also prohibited state election officials from enforcing discriminatory state laws or interfering with voting on the basis of race. While enforcement was assigned to the brand new Department of Justice, the jurisdiction of federal courts was expanded to hear prosecutions brought under the statute, and removal authority was granted to protect federal officials and rights-holders from prejudicial state court proceedings. Federal judges were also authorized to call for troops to maintain peace at elections, having become now the first line of defense or offense-for the federal government when confronting challenges to national authority (Hyman and Wiecek 1982, 467). The following year another enforcement act was passed that was aimed primarily at Klan violence.20

<sup>16 &</sup>quot;...The revisionists' view [which correctly emphasizes that the Republican party was not hostile to judicial power] fails to emphasize sufficiently the local and regional pressures operating on a Republican party squeezed between a traditional commitment to the idea of judicial representation [of regional interests] and the need for more and better administered courts" (Hall 1975, 179).

 $<sup>^{17}</sup>$  Congress enacted the first removal statute in 1815 after many New England states resisted enforcement of federal embargo and nonintercourse statutes passed during the war of 1812. Federal customs officials who searched ships and seized cargo found themselves either sued in state courts by local citizens or criminally prosecuted by state officials, and Congress responded by providing for removal to a circuit court of "any suit or prosecution. . . commenced in any state court, against any collector. . . or any other officer, civil or military. . . for any thing done by virtue of this act or under colour thereof" (Ziegler 1995, 719-20).

 $<sup>^{18}</sup>$  Even though a case might be removed into federal court, the judge was obligated to follow the procedures of the state, except Negroes were allowed to testify even against whites and court officers (including lawyers and jurors) had to swear to their past and future loyalty to the Union (Hyman and Wiecek 1982, 261).

The Supreme Court upheld such removal jurisdiction in *Mayor* v.

Cooper, 73 U.S. 247 (1867).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Later, in *United States* v. *Harris*, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), the Supreme Court struck down part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 on the grounds that the protection of individuals from private conspiracies was a state function rather than a national function. The same year the Court had also declared unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of

However, despite a spate of activity culminating in the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, by the mid-1870s the national enthusiasm for the vigorous protection of civil rights was diminishing (Keller 1977, 146; Stampp 1967). President Grant had effectively halted civil rights enforcement by 1873. Freedmen's Aid Societies in the North disbanded, racism became overt again in the North, and the language of reconciliation became more prominent. Federal patronage flowed from Grant to "respectable" Southern Democrats and convicted Klansmen were pardoned. Many Republicans attempted to kill the Civil Rights Bill, but the advocacy of a dying Charles Sumner led congressional leaders simply to put it off until after the 1874 elections. After stripping the bill of its most controversial feature (the clause requiring integrated schools), an unenthusiastic Republican party passed the bill (Foner 1988, 524-55).

In sharp contrast to their disintegrating commitment to civil rights was the party's increasingly clear focus on nationalism, and especially economic nationalism (Keller 1977, 181).<sup>21</sup> If Keller (1977, 285) is correct that, beyond patronage impulses, "public life in the years immediately after the Civil War was dominated by the conflict between the impulse to foster an active state and a broader national citizenship on the one hand, and deeply rooted countervalues of localism, racism, and suspicion of government on the other," then as a general rule it is fair to say that the former impulse frequently found its center of gravity in the national Republican Party leadership of the period, while the latter impulse often found expression in the resurgent Democratic Party.<sup>22</sup> The Republican Party's special focus on economic nationalism intensified after the violence of the Paris Commune in 1871, the rise of the Granger movement, and the Panic of 1873; according to one leading historian of the period it "marked a major turning point in the North's ideological development" as "older notions of equal rights and the dignity of labor gave way before a ... preoccupation with the defense of property" and "economic respectability" for largescale enterprise (Foner 1988, 517, 522). Ultimately the goal of Republican Party leaders was the creation of "a political economy in which central state power could sweep aside regional and local barriers to the development of a national capitalist market and directly assist in the construction of the physical and financial infrastructure necessary for that market" (Bensel 1990, 4, 11; see also Woodward 1966, 35, and Bensel 2000, xix).

This infrastructure was made up of a variety of elements, including tariffs, monetary policy, and railroad subsidies. Republican national party platforms during this period were distinguished by their consistent support for tariff protection and the gold standard, while Democrats consistently opposed "all three legs of the Republican developmental tripod, substituting free trade for protection, silver for gold, and government regulation for market-led economic integration" (Bensel 2000, 193). However, the new business practices and social structures generated by postwar economic forces also resulted in new legal issues and disputes, for example, between partners operating across state lines, interstate corporations and local governments, railroads and farmers, and innovators of new corporate and financial structures. Given that these various issues arose piecemeal in the context of litigation, it was clear that the only way to ensure that this activity remained within the province of national control and direction would be to rethink long-standing convictions about mission and authority of federal courts in the political system.

Federal courts were thus functionally well suited to play an important role in promoting a policy of economic nationalism. The construction of this market required sympathetic supervision of individual transactions rather than general regulative or administrative capacity; federal courts were institutionally positioned to "span the divide between state and national authority" and "constitutional principles provided an effective framework for monitoring federal and state attempts to regulate corporate consolidation and interstate commercial transactions" (Bensel 2000, 9-10). There was also a political advantage to the development of a more active role for federal courts. Federal judges were politically insulated from "hostile popular sentiment," and to the extent that they would act as agents of national economic development, it would be unnecessary for state Republican Party leaders to incorporate into political platforms explicit policy positions on the construction of a national market that might put a strain on regionally specific political coalitions (Bensel 2000, 190–93; for an overview of state party platforms during this period see Bensel 2000, chap. 3).

Consequently, in the wake of the midterm elections of 1874, where Democrats regained control of the House of Representatives, Republican leaders in 1875 quickly brought up for consideration in one lame-duck legislative session a subsidy for the Texas and Pacific Railroad, a repeal of the 10% tariff reduction of 1872, a mandate that specie payment be resumed within four years, and a bill to expand the jurisdiction of federal courts.

In contrast to earlier removal legislation, which focused on beefing up enforcement of a limited set of civil rights, the main purpose of the Judiciary and Removal

1875. As I discuss momentarily, by this time the national government had lost interest in these Reconstruction-era concerns.

by the Federal Government."

22 This nationalist-localist labeling of the parties at this time works as a general rule—especially in relation to the issue of federal judicial empowerment—but the point should not be overstated. As Bensel (2000, 101-2) puts it, "Ambitious [state] politicians constantly formed new party organizations, broke up old ones into factions, and led both into cross-party fusion agreements or coalitions."

As Frankfurter and Landis (1928, 57–58) put it, "National authority had to liquidate the institution of slavery, hitherto recognized by all the leading parties as the local concern of the states. By an easy transition other interests previously left to state action were absorbed by federal authority. The central government exerted power in fields which, in the past, would have aroused bitter opposition as encroachments upon the states. Transportation [mostly in the form of land grant aids to railroad and telegraph lines], education [mostly land grant colleges, a form of aid that had been vetoed by Buchanan in 1859 on the grounds that it was unconstitutional], commerce [homestead acts, postal expansions, harbor and canal construction, the encouragement of mining and timber exploitation], were actively promoted by the Federal Government."

Act of 1875 was to redirect civil litigation involving national commercial interests out of state courts and into the federal judiciary. Technically this meant granting the federal judiciary general "federal questions" jurisdiction—that is, the authority to have original jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases "arising under" the laws of the United States—and removal jurisdiction in state civil cases that raised issues of federal law or that involved parties from different states.<sup>23</sup> The Act attempted to prevent obstruction of removal by authorizing federal judges to hold plaintiffs in default if a state court blocked removal; it also provided that a state court clerk who refused to effectuate a removal was guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a year of imprisonment and a \$1,000 fine (Purcell 1992, 15).

This reconfiguration of federal judicial power was finalized just as Republican Party domination of national politics was coming to an end. The recapture of the House by a more localist-oriented Democratic Party in 1875 (Keller 1977, 252–53), in combination with growing Midwestern and Western hostility to eastern financial interests and national corporations, led to various proposals to repeal or curtail newly expanded federal judicial power. However, given the partisan makeup of Congress and the presidency during this period of intensified two-party competition, these efforts at rollback were unsuccessful. For more than 10 years the pattern was for the House Judiciary Committee to report a reform bill favorably and for the Senate Judiciary Committee—now firmly in the hands of the Republican Party—to kill the proposal.<sup>24</sup> As long as Republicans controlled the House, the Senate, or the presidency, the new role for federal courts would remain entrenched; and given the power of "Eastern capital" in the Senate this veto point remained strong throughout the period (Frankfurter and Landis 1928, 91).<sup>25</sup> The most that was

accomplished at the federal level by opponents of federal judicial power was an elimination of provisions that allowed plaintiffs to remove, a shortening of the time for filing removal petitions, and an increase in the jurisdictional threshold from \$500 to \$2,000 (Collins 1986, 738-56; Frankfurter and Landis 1928, 56-102; Purcell 1992, 15). More effective resistance took place at the state level, with some legislatures passing incorporation acts that required corporations to maintain offices in the state (thus ensuring that litigation would not be removable into federal courts under their diversity jurisdiction) or that required nonstate corporations to waive their rights to resort to federal courts (Bensel 2000, 324).

### CONSOLIDATING ENTRENCHMENT THROUGH RELIABLE STAFFING AND INSTITUTIONAL RESTRUCTURING

If federal courts were going to facilitate the Republican agenda of economic nationalism it was necessary not only to expand their jurisdiction, but also to staff them with judges who were ideologically sympathetic to this new mission. Fortuitously, the appointment of federal judges did not require the cooperation of the House of Representatives, which was controlled by the Democratic Party for 10 years during the span from 1875-1891.26 Throughout this period, until Grover Cleveland's inauguration in 1885, the Republican Party controlled the presidency, and combined with their hold on the Senate, this meant that Republicans controlled the power to appoint federal judges. Even when Republicans (temporarily) lost the White House, they found that Cleveland's agenda for the Democratic Party was perfectly consistent with their goal of economic conservatism and nationalism.

It was because of this combination of Congressionally driven structural changes and executive-driven appointment politics that a system of federal courts that had recently been considered bastions of localism within the federal government were transformed into "forums of order" for national commercial interests seeking a hearing free from the interests and perspectives that dominated state proceedings (Freyer 1978, 1979). Grant alone made a total of 41 appointments to the federal bench, which by the end of his term resulted in a lower federal judiciary where 64% of judges were Grant appointees (posted to 21 of the 37 states) and 85% were nominally Republican. After Hayes the bench was 91% Republican, with 28% being Hayes appointees (Barrow, Zuk, and Gryski 1996, 29-30).

Of special importance in fortifying this agenda was the decision making of the United States Supreme

<sup>24</sup> For 15 years before the Civil War the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee was a Democrat. In contrast, between 1861 and 1892, a Republican chaired the committee for every Congress except the Forty-sixth (1879-1881) (from the web site of the Federal Judicial Center, http://air.fjc.gov/history/topics/topics\_congress\_bdy.html [last visited May 15, 2002]).

A page later Frankfurter and Landis report a speech on the floor of Congress in 1880 by George D. Robinson of Massachusetts: "...In the West there have been granger laws and granger excitement that have led people to commit enormities in legislation and extravagances in practice; and in the South-why, sir, history is too full for me to particularize. Capital is needed to restore the waste places of the South and to build up the undeveloped West; it must flow largely

from the old States of the East and from foreign lands. But it will not be risked in the perils of sectional bitterness, narrow prejudices, or local indifference to integrity and honor. I say then, let us stand

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> The short-lived Judicial Act of 1801 also bestowed general federal questions jurisdiction, but this last-minute Federalist measure was quickly repealed by the Jeffersonians. While Frankfurter and Landis (1928, 64-65) argued that the 1875 act granted to "federal courts the vast range of power which had lain dormant in the Constitution since 1789," Ziegler (1995, 736-40) claims that the act was perhaps slightly less bold than is suggested by this characterization, mostly because federal courts were not given general removal jurisdiction for state criminal cases where defenses implicated federal law. He speculates that Congress may not have thought that federal rights would play an important role in state criminal prosecutions and that the Supreme Court's continued appellate jurisdiction in such cases would be sufficient to address those rare cases.

by the national courts; let us preserve their power." This position was "effectively entrenched in the Senate" by virtue of "numerous appeals to that body from manufactures, from business organizations and their lawyers" (Frankfurter and Landis 1928, 92).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Democrats controlled the House during the Forty-fourth Congress (1875-77), the Forty-fifth (1877-79), the Forty-sixth (1879-81), the Forty-eight (1883-85), the Forty-ninth (1885-87), and the Fiftieth (1887-89). They regained the House during the Fifty-second and Fifty-third Congresses.

Court. The justices would not have the day-to-day responsibilities of administering this policy in individual cases, but their decisions would establish the legal and ideological framework within which these other judges would be operating. A review of the 15 justices who were appointed between 1870 and 1893 confirms that they "were selected by presidents and confirmed by senators who carefully noted both their devotion to party principles and 'soundness' on the major economic questions of the day," especially their "attitude toward regulation of interstate commerce by the individual states" (Bensel 2000, 7).<sup>27</sup>

- President Grant started the trend of focusing on conservative economic nationalists by appointing two railroad attorneys and directors, William Strong and Joseph P. Bradley. Two years later he appointed Ward Hunt, who was also identified with railroad interests. Grant's replacement for Chief Justice Chase, Morrison I. Waite, had no prior judicial experience and never held national office, but he had a record as a successful railroad lawyer and director and, also, enjoyed the support of the Vanderbilts.
- After appointing John Marshall Harlan and William Woods, President Hayes attempted to nominate Thomas Stanley Matthews while he was serving as Midwestern chief counsel to financier Jay Gould. The Senate took no action, but Matthews was renominated by President Garfield and finally confirmed in 1881 by a vote of 24 to 23, with opposition arising mostly because he was considered too openly associated with railroad and corporate interests.
- President Arthur had two appointments: Horace Gray, an experienced state jurist and economic conservative from Massachusetts, and Samuel Blatchford, an experienced circuit judge with connections to New York's business and political elite.
- The conservative Democrat Grover Cleveland appointed two: Lucius Lamar, another railroad director and a former professor of political economy who, as a Senator, chaired the Standing Committee on the Pacific railroads, opposed free silver, and vigorously defended Matthews during his controversial nomination (he met strong Senate opposition as the first nominee who had been active in the Confederacy and was finally confirmed by a vote of 32–28, with 16 senators not voting); and Chief Justice Melville Fuller, a corporate lawyer and sound money advocate who left the Democratic Party after Bryan was nominated on a free silver platform.
- President Harrison had four appointments: David Brewer, a conservative judge with experience in the lower federal courts and the nephew of iconic conservative Justice Stephen J. Field; Henry Brown, with almost-identical credentials as an economic conservative; George Shiras, Jr., a Pittsburgh lawyer with an influential clientele of railroad, banking, oil, coal, iron, and steel interests (and who was supported by

Carnegie); and Howell Jackson, a Democratic who was a former colleague of Harrison's in the Senate and a family friend.

• Finally, Cleveland had two more nominations: Chief Justice Edward White, a senator and an economic conservative, and Rufus Peckham, a former judge, corporate counsel for New York, and "confidant of tycoons" including Morgan, Rockefeller, and Vanderbilt.

These nominees were not always of one mind on all issues relating to economic nationalism. Still, it still worth emphasizing that all of these nominees fit within a fairly narrow ideological space that supported the assigned mission of federal courts during this period.<sup>28</sup>

Not surprisingly, these justices did not resist Congress's invitation to have federal courts more involved in supervising litigation involving large-scale enterprise. Just a few years after passage of the 1875 statute the Court held that Congress could authorize the removal into federal courts of any case that raised an issue of federal law or that otherwise fell within the federal judiciary's Article III jurisdiction (such as diversity jurisdiction) (Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 [1878]).<sup>29</sup> A year later, Justice Bradley wrote a concurring opinion in which he expressed the view that "no cases are more appropriate to this jurisdiction or more urgently call for its exercise than those which relate to the foreclosure and sale of railroads extending two or more states, and winding up the affairs of the companies that own them" (Removal Cases, 100 U.S. 457, 480, 482 [1879]). By 1880, in another railroad case, the Court declared that in cases of removal the "only inquiry" was whether the suit was one "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States' (Railroad Company v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135, 136 [1880]).30 Two years after the Court voided part of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 on the grounds that the protection of individuals from private conspiracies was a state function rather than a national function (U.S. v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 [1883]), a seven-two majority on the Court ruled, in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885), that a suit against federally chartered corporations could be removed into a federal court

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> The information on these 15 appointments reviewed in the following paragraphs is compiled from Abraham (1999), Bensel (2000), and Myers (1918).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> The failed nominees during this period were as follows: Grant's consideration of Senator George H. Williams and Caleb Cushing (another railroad lawyer) to replace Chief Justice Chase (both names were withdrawn because of opposition to their qualifications or character); Hayes's nomination of Matthews (which was successfully resubmitted by Garfield); Arthur's nomination of New York Senator Roscoe Conkling (who was confirmed by the Senate after a bitter fight but who then declined the position); and Cleveland's 1893 nominations of conservative corporate lawyers William B. Hornblower and Wheeler H. Peckham (brother of the person who was successfully nominated two years later), each of whom was unacceptable to the leader of New York's Democratic machine, Senator David Hill (Abraham 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> In this case, however, the Court rejected the removal on the grounds that the defendants who were seeking the removal did not plead facts that demonstrated that their defense actually implicated federal law.

<sup>30</sup> Justice Miller dissented on the ground that removal should not be available in cases where the reliance on federal law was merely "incidental" to the defense.

even if the legal issues implicated ordinary state law claims and defenses. In other cases the Court did impose some minor jurisdictional limits,<sup>31</sup> but the overall record demonstrates that conservative Supreme Court justices were quite willing to support Congress's efforts to expand the control of federal courts over commercial litigation (Collins 1986, 730; Kutler 1968, 157).

Predictably, businesses flocked to these courts seeking more favorable case outcomes and legal doctrines.<sup>32</sup> By January 1, 1878, the federal circuit court in Chicago had 3,045 suits pending, 10 times the antebellum average. According to a House of Representatives Report in 1876, diversity cases were "the largest and most rapidly-increasing class of Federal cases," arising from rapid economic development and "the formation of numerous great corporations whose business connections extend into many States" (Purcell 1992, 20). In part this flood of litigation was motivated by reasons made explicit in the removal language of the 1875 statute, such as a desire to avoid local prejudice. But other advantages should not be overlooked, such as the control that federal judges had over juries (generally regarded as dangerously proplaintiff), which included the right to "comment" on the quality or weight of the evidence and direct or set aside verdicts. Verdicts in federal court also required unanimity among 12 jurors, and this was preferable for defendants in comparison to state rules that often allowed smaller or nonunanimous verdicts. Removal also allowed for more "forum shopping" by litigants looking for more sympathetic courthouses. This was particularly important given that the social and professional background of most Republican-appointed federal judges disposed them toward the viewpoints advocated by corporations (Fritz 1991; Hall 1976; Presser 1982, 69-127; Purcell 1992, 24-25). In a nutshell, they were "a remarkably similar, if not insular, social group" that was closely tied to "powerful political and economic actors, ... trained and experienced at the bar, steeped in the revered common law, and coming largely from the ranks of the corporate elite" (Purcell 2000, 320).

<sup>31</sup> The most important limit was the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, which held that the federal question must appear in the plaintiff's cause of action (see *Louisville* v. *Mottley*, 211 U.S. 149 [1908]).

In a relatively short period of time, with the assistance of an increasingly professionalized bar that viewed itself as obligated to "supervise, direct, and promote the great business interests of the country" (Keller 1977, 350; Twiss 1942), the federal judiciary articulated legal principles that were consistent with the promotion of a more unfettered national market. Federal judges presided over corporate reorganization and addressed problems of railroad finance through the practice of equity receiverships, all with an eye toward promoting more nationalist solutions over regional approaches (Berk 1994; Gordon 1983, 108; Purcell 1999. 732–33). At the top of the hierarchy the Supreme Court increased its supervisory authority over local economic regulation by invoking the commerce clause with unprecedented frequency and interpreting it to require courts to eliminate barriers to the free flow of interstate goods and services (Bensel 2000, 325-49; Freyer 1979; McCurdy 1978). The justices interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to make it a constitutional violation for a state to regulate a person or a corporation in a way that prevented either from earning a reasonable return on invested capital, thus expanding the supervisory responsibilities of the entire federal judiciary over state regulations of business (Bensel 2000). 334). More generally, the Supreme Court insisted that all levels of government stifle tendencies toward favoritism or prejudice and instead adopt neutral and impartial regulations that were consistent with national standards of due process and equal protection for all (Gillman 1993).<sup>33</sup> In all these cases, doctrines proved extremely beneficial to large-scale enterprise; in fact, by 1890, the Commercial and Financial Chronicle commented that "the findings of our highest court are such as to put to rest" the dangers of "Socialistic legislation" and thus mark "an epoch in the industrial and constitutional history of the country" (Bensel 2000, 335).34

<sup>33</sup> Many of these doctrines were also being developed in state courts (Gillman 1993). The argument herein is not that federal judges were alone in elaborating business-friendly doctrines or that they were consistently more conservative than all state courts. Instead, the point is to explain the innovative inclination of federal courts to federalize certain kinds of precedents that promoted economic nationalism.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> Purcell (1992, 21–22) cites L. Friedman's (1987) study of litigation in Alameda County, California, between 1880 and 1900, in which he found that of 340 personal injury suits, plaintiffs initiated only 29 in the local federal court. Of the 110 personal injury suits heard in federal court, 81 were there by way of removal. This meant that plaintiffs instituted 90% of their actions in state courts, and for every one case that plaintiffs brought in federal court three ended up there by defendants on removal. A similar pattern existed for insurance suits, with companies preferring the federal forum at least five times more frequently than plaintiffs. Plaintiffs discontinued about 45% of federal cases they initiated in federal courts, but their dropout rate rose to 64% for cases that had been removed to federal court. McCurdy (1978, 632-33) reports that "instead of responding to an existing free market of continental dimensions, producers of sewing machines and dressed beef actually ignored legal barriers devised by state governments and instructed their local marketing agents to invite arrest and conviction. At that point, the companies' headquarters mobilized the substantial financial resources necessary to press the Supreme Court for relief....

certain kinds of precedents that promoted economic nationalism.

34 It would be misleading to suggest that this agenda unfolded smoothly. The story of federal courts versus the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), created in the mid-1880s, represents what Orren and Skowronek (1994) call 'intercurrence," conflicts between or among institutions that represent different interests within historical periods. Berk (1994, 178) suggests that for a time the ICC represented a kind of "regional republican" conception of railroad regulation but that in the end "the corporate liberal alliance of federal courts and national carriers. . . proved more powerful," and this characterization of the motivation of federal courts is consistent with the analysis in this essay of the mission they were promoting in the years after 1875. Compare Skowronek (1982, 151): By the 1890s "both the commission and the Court posed as bastions of intellectual and professional leadership insulated from the unstable and threatening forces of democratic politics. Both the commission and the Court sought to develop principles of regulation that would protect the railroad industry and promote further industrial development. Sharing this much in interest and orientation, the Court's emasculation of the ICC takes on the added dimension of an institutional conflict between two ideologically charged instruments of economic control.' The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the railroads in 15 of 16 cases it reviewed between 1887 and 1905; as early as 1897 the commission

However, the new mission of the federal judiciary was in such great demand that rising rates of litigation threatened a general collapse. Before institutional reconfiguration the Supreme Court's October Term of 1870 opened with 636 cases on the appellate docket. By comparison, the October Term of 1884 opened with 1,315 cases on the appellate docket; a year later it was 1,340; a year later, 1,396; in 1887 it was up to 1,427; in 1888 it was 1,563; in 1889 the docket was 1,635; and by 1890 the number was an astonishing 1,800 cases—an almost 300% increase in 20 years. The story in the lower courts was the same: In 1873 there were 29,013 cases pending in the circuit and district courts; by 1890 the number had risen to 54,194. One result of this caseload overload was that the traditional duty of the justices to attend circuit was practically a dead letter, since a Supreme Court term that went from October to May left only a few months to perform circuit duties that, in the belief of one contemporary, could not be performed in thrice that time (leaving that writer, Walter B. Hill, to lament that "It may well be doubted whether it is a wholesome example for Congress to pass laws relative to the highest judicial tribunal in the land which can only be intended in a Pickwickian sense") (Frankfurter and Landis 1928, 60, 86-87). Nine circuit judges (10 after 1887) were expected to hold circuit courts in 65

In these circumstances reform legislation might be considered an uncontroversial response to an obvious workload problem. However, during the antebellum period, a Congress that had little interest in promoting federal judicial power was often happy to keep federal judges overworked. Moreover, the caseload pressure of the 1880s resulted from institutional reforms that were still controversial. In fact, the preferred Democratic response to these pressures was not an improvement in the ability of federal courts to manage this workload; it was "complete elimination of all jurisdiction based on diverse citizenship" (Frankfurter and Landis 1928, 98).<sup>35</sup>

Given the opposing views of the two parties on the virtues of broad jurisdiction for federal courts, the caseload problem would remain uncorrected as long as divided government prevailed. It was not until 1889, with the start of the Fifty-first Congress, that Republicans once again controlled the House, the Senate, and the presidency and were thus in a position to respond as they saw fit to the pressures on federal courts. By late in 1890 Chief Justice Waite and Justices Harlan and Field each spoke out to urge Congressional action. The American Bar Association influenced President Harrison—who won the presidency with fewer popular votes than Grover Cleveland—to add a plea for an intermediate court of appeals in his annual message in December 1889.

In April 1890 a reform bill introduced by Congressman John H. Rogers came out of the House Judiciary Committee (Frankfurter and Landis 1928, 97–98). Of the 118 members voting to schedule debate on the bill, 115 were Republicans, two were Democrats (including Congressman Rogers, who in 1896 would later be appointed as a District Court judge by President Cleveland, confirmed by a Republican Senate), and one was a member of the Labor Party; every one of the 101 votes against debating the bill came from Democrats (Congressional Record—House, vol. 21, April 15, 1890, 3400).<sup>36</sup>

The bill's chief sponsor in the Senate, and the eventual namesake of the legislation, exemplifies the political and social forces that were behind judicial empowerment. William M. Evarts was a prominent New York lawyer before the Civil War with a sufficiently impressive reputation that he was retained by the national government to help argue The Prize Cases. In 1864 Lincoln was urged by many luminaries (including the Massachusetts governor and some Supreme Court justices) to appoint Evarts to replace Chief Justice Taney. He argued a number of cases before the Chase Court, defended Andrew Johnson in the Senate impeachment trial, and then became Johnson's attorney general. When he went back to New York he was a leader of the bar association and helped smash the Boss Tweed ring. He continued a very prosperous law practice, representing mostly railroads and other large commercial interests. He was the lead counsel for Republicans before the electoral commission looking into the disputed Hayes-Tilden election, and not long thereafter he was appointed by Hayes to be Secretary of State, as which he advised the president on (among other things) the use of federal troops to put down the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad strike of 1877. When he returned to New York he was instrumental in pushing the state's highest court to adopt due process interpretations that would prove emblematic of the so-called "Lochner era;" such as the decision in *In re Jacobs*, 98 NY 98 (1885), striking down the state's Tenement House Cigar Law on the grounds that it amounted to a class-based deprivation of the freedom to labor without any reasonable public health benefit (with Evarts adding that tobacco was a useful method

itself reported to Congress that because of the justices the ICC had "ceased to be a body for the regulation of carriers" (Bensel 2000, 311–12). For an insightful discussion of how the final ICC bill incorporated Democratic Party concerns in the four swing states of the electoral college (New York, Indiana, New Jersey, and Connecticut), as well as its rural base, see James 1992.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> When a Republican-controlled House was finally able to force consideration of a bill establishing a new layer of federal appellate courts, Representative Richard Parks Bland (D-MO) inquired whether the bill "in any particular decreases the jurisdiction of the Federal courts and leaves to the State courts many questions that ought to be left to them... I hope the House will deal with that point, because the best way to relieve Federal courts is to leave many of the matters with which they are now burdened to the State courts" (Congressional Record—House, vol. 21, April 15, 1890, 3398–99; see also 3406–8 for the remarks of Alabama Democrat William Calvin Oates, a member of the Judiciary Committee who led the opposition).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> Information on the party identification of those voting on the bill was obtained by searching the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress at http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (last visited May 15, 2002). The other Democrat voting in favor of debating these reforms was Littleton Wilde Moore (D-TX), a former judge. The Labor Party vote came from another Arkansas representative, Lewis Porter Featherstone.

of fumigation). He was elected to the Senate the following year, just in time to lend his reputation, connections, and worldview to the cause of judicial reform (Barrows 1941).

The resulting legislation was patchwork reform rather than reinvention, but it solidified the developments of the previous decades.<sup>37</sup> The original bill introduced by Rogers would have fused district and circuit courts, created nine intermediate circuit courts with final decisions in cases arising solely through diversity of citizenship, and added two additional circuit judges for each circuit. Evarts's alternative, which he had first circulated for comments to the justices of the Supreme Court and selected circuit court judges (Barrows 1941, 481), formally kept both the district and the circuit courts but abolished the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit courts, thus leaving them to operate as trial courts alongside the district courts. It also identified defined classes of cases that could be appealed directly from federal trial courts to the Supreme Court and then channeled all other appeals through nine newly created circuit courts of appeal, which would have the final say in virtually all diversity suits unless the appellate judges certified that the case should be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The three-judges panels on these courts of appeal would be made up of one new court of appeals judge for each circuit plus available circuit or district court judges. Evarts's alternative satisfied some traditionalists who wanted to be able to say that elements of the old structure had been maintained (including circuit riding, which under this proposal would in effect be circuit visiting, since the actual work would be done by the new intermediate courts).

At conference the House yielded to the Senate's version and the Evarts Act was finally passed in March of 1891 by the lame-duck Fifty-first Congress (Frankfurter and Landis 1928, 97–102). As with the 1875 legislation, this reform came just in time for Republicans. The Fifty-second Congress that would start later that year had a House of Representatives that was dominated by 235 Democrats and contained only 88 members of the GOP.

The legislation was effective in reducing the Supreme Court's caseload. The number of cases before the justices fell from 623 in 1890 to 379 in 1891 and 275 in 1892. More importantly, the act—the first significant restructuring of the federal judiciary since the Judiciary Act of 1789—made it possible for the 1875 jurisdictional changes to persist. It also helped remove some of the traditional localizing pressures on Supreme Court justices caused by circuit riding. As a consequence, the Supreme Court could continue its development as a truly national institution, pursuing national political agendas by exercising those expanded powers and responsibilities that had been assigned to it as a result of the postwar political construction of federal judicial authority (Purcell 2000, 40).

#### CONCLUSION

The idea of political entrenchment in the judiciary, if not yet adequately incorporated into contemporary political science treatments of partisan politics or judicial empowerment, is nevertheless familiar to students of American constitutional history. When the Federalist Party lost control of the national government in 1800, their lame-duck Congress responded by passing the Judiciary Act of 1801, which expanded the size and jurisdiction of the federal judiciary and gave outgoing President Adams the opportunity to appoint loyal Federalists to the life-tenured federal bench. Incoming president Thomas Jefferson reacted by uttering his infamous lament: "The Federalists have retired into the judiciary as a stronghold and from that battery all the works of republicanism are to be beaten down and erased." As it turned out, though, Jefferson's fears never materialized. The Judiciary Act of 1801 was quickly repealed, with the subsequent approval of a besieged U.S. Supreme Court in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. 299 (1803). When Congress began targeting judges for impeachment the remaining Federalists on the bench quickly learned that to survive their political climate they had to give up on the hope of using their office as a partisan forum (Whittington 1999). Over the years, John Marshall's Supreme Court was very careful about tailoring its decisions to the evolving preferences of the dominant partisan coalitions in the national government (see Graber 1998b and Klarman 2001).

In this case study I have tried to show why the sense behind Jefferson's lament is more appropriately directed at the actions of the postbellum Republican Party. These partisans were much more successful than the Federalists at transforming the judiciary into a programmatic stronghold. Why? The principal reasons have to do with some fortuitous political circumstances and a more advantageous institutional environment. Entrenchment was made possible because the Republican Party's post-Reconstruction commitment to an agenda of conservative economic nationalism congealed just as the Party was forced to hand over the House of Representatives to a resurgent Democratic Party, which means that the federal judiciary was one lame-duck session of Congress away from remaining as relatively weak and marginal as it had been before the Civil War. Republicans were able to control the staffing of these newly empowered courts only because a resurgent Democratic Party was able to win the House but not the Senate, and because two Republican presidents (Hayes in 1876 and Harrison in 1888) were able to win the White House with fewer popular votes than their Democratic opponents. Repeal was avoided throughout this formative period because Republicans maintained a political veto over such efforts by holding onto at least one institution of the national government. The consolidation of this agenda was made possible only because of the Republican's short-term control of the entire federal government during the Fifty-first Congress.

The fragile and contested nature of the Republican Party's agenda for economic nationalism provides a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> The vote in the Senate to consider the House bill was 36 to 12, with all opposition coming from Democrats and 29 favorable votes coming from Republicans (*Congressional Record—Senate*, vol. 22, September 18, 1891, 10194).

new perspective on the controversies surrounding the federal judiciary's more active commitment to conservative constitutionalism during the so-called "Lochner era"-a perspective on both why these judges adopted this agenda and why their place in American politics became increasingly controversial as they encountered emergent progressive politics in the twentieth century (B. Friedman 2001; Gillman 1993; Ross 1994). While the story of the overall development of federal judicial power in the United States does not end with the passage of the Evarts Act in 1891, the lessons of this account may help frame inquiries of later stages. The Evarts Act raised new issues that needed to be cleared up, such as unexpected increases in criminal appeals (addressed in subsequent criminal appeals acts) and the increasingly discordant position of the old (now nonappellate) circuit courts within this new system (leading to their elimination in 1911). The increasingly conspicuous role of the Supreme Court in the political system would be further advanced by the Judges' Bill of 1925 (which gave the justices more control over their decision-making agenda) and the subsequent construction of the Court's own building, the so-called "Marble Temple," in the 1930s.

At about the same time, two prominent law professors wrote an influential account of the political construction of federal judicial power as a way of advancing a different conception of the role of the federal courts in American politics, an agenda that focused on "constraining the reach of the conservative Supreme Court" (Purcell 1999, 684).<sup>38</sup> As one of these writers, Professor Felix Frankfurter, confessed in a letter to his friend Herbert Wechsler, "My central concern and the driving motive of my interest in the field [was the fact that] under the guise of seemingly dry jurisdictional and procedural problems, majestic and subtle issues of great moment to the political life of the country are concealed" (cited in Purcell 1999, 685-86). If we make Frankfurter's concerns our own, we might encourage students of party politics or delegation of powers to focus more attention on the ways in which executives and legislators use judges as extensions of conventional political or policy agendas. Conversely, students of law and courts might be encouraged to locate the scope and direction of judicial decision making into a broader analysis of party systems and partisan control of those institutions that are responsible for the jurisdiction and staffing of courts.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> According to Purcell, this agenda involved "limiting the ability of corporate litigants to exploit federal jurisdiction, abolishing the doctrine of *Swift v. Tyson*, 41 U.S. 1 (1842), blocking passage of the proposed federal declaratory judgment act, expanding substantially the issues on which the lower federal courts would defer to state courts, and justifying a series of progressive legislative proposals to restrict the jurisdiction and alter the structure of the national judiciary."

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# Socratic Political Philosophy and the Problem of Virtue

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Plato's Meno deserves careful examination today because it highlights two facets of the concern for virtue neglected or obscured by the current revival of virtue among liberal theorists: the devotion to a good that cannot simply be reduced either to individual flourishing or to communal well-being—what Plato calls "nobility" or "the noble"; and the complex relation of virtue so understood to the concern for religion or piety. If the sought-for incorporation of virtue into liberal thought and practice today fails to grapple with these profound human concerns, in the first place by recognizing their existence, the language of virtue and its attendant moral sentiments will remain a matter more of scholarly debate than of lived practice.

ccording to a view of long standing, the liberal polity seeks to protect individual rights rather than to promote collective duties and maintains its vigor through institutional mechanisms that exploit selfish passions rather than elevate moral character; to such a polity, virtue is all but superfluous. As Montesquieu ([1748] 1951, 11.4) concisely put it, even virtue "is in need of limits": the noble virtue of the ancient republic is ultimately incompatible with and must be replaced by liberty as the rational goal of political life, and the maintenance of liberty requires, not an extraordinarily demanding education that culminates in self-abnegation, but institutional arrangements on the level of the state and a vigilant attention to what one is rightfully owed on the part of each citizen.

Reacting against this apparently impoverished and impoverishing conception, a diverse group of scholars today-classical liberals, communitarians, and neo-Aristotelians among them—seeks to elevate liberalism by returning to the idea of virtue. So it is that, from having been either an object of neglect or the subject of merely historical recollection, "virtue" is now among the liveliest and most controversial topics in political theory. Classical liberals, for example, discern in the founding documents of liberalism the concern to cultivate, if not the virtue of ancient Sparta or Rome, at any rate those character traits most needed by an independent citizenry in a free, commercial republic: The attention to moral character on the part of John Locke. Adam Smith, and the Federalist Papers, for example, has recently been brought to the fore (Grant 1987; Mansfield 1987; Tarcov 1984; Terchek 1986; see also Galston 1988, 1278-79). Others have followed up on this insight by delineating the contemporary "liberal virtues" understood either as the set of those characteristics that citizens must have if a liberal community is to survive—for "no regime can long survive unless qualities of mind and character that support its specific principles and purposes and counteract its unwise tendencies are deliberately cultivated and regularly exercised" (Berkowitz 1999, 11-12)-or as that which is conducive to "happiness or human flourishing" (Berkowitz 1999,

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1 "For two generations, scholarly inquiry has been dominated by the belief that the liberal polity does not rest on individual virtue" (Galston 1988, 1277).

10), or as some combination of these (see, in general, Galston 1991, Macedo 1990, and Sandel 1996).

The reaction that this recovery of virtue within the liberal tradition has sparked is noteworthy: Alasdair MacIntyre (1985) has flatly and famously declared that, with the exhaustion of Enlightenment rationalism, we live in a time "after virtue," and only the rejection of that supposed rationalism, together with the adoption of a Thomistic Aristotelianism, can return us to coherent moral categories (compare Bartlett 2001, 45–54). Others, also inspired by premodern moral thought, have pursued a less radical approach by attempting to mix tenets of liberalism with a more robust or substantive account of the human good than liberalism typically permits (e.g., Nussbaum 1988, 1992; consider, in general, Volpi 1999).

However impressive these differing approaches to the problem of virtue may be, all appear to be seriously defective from the point of view opened by Plato's inquiry into virtue: for, to begin with, Plato makes clear both the power and the inadequacy of beginning from virtue understood as either that which is conducive to the well-being of the community of which one is a part of that which is conducive to a strictly private wellbeing. However naturally virtue may first come to sight as the performance of a task assigned us by our regime for the sake of its benefit, for example, we are attracted to that task in part by the hope that the completion of it will be good (also) for ourselves. Moreover, the demands of political health are not always in harmony with those of individual health, as is indicated by the necessity that every regime honor heroic self-sacrifice, for example (consider also Meno 73a4-a5 and context).2 As far as I am aware, none of the contemporary theorists has succeeded in demonstrating the identity of the virtue needed by the liberal community and that required by "human flourishing."

At all events, whether one defines "virtue" as the set of characteristics required by political well-being or by individual health, virtue so conceived is choiceworthy on account of something other and better than virtue itself. Virtue thus becomes a merely mercenary good (compare Berkowitz 1999, 172). That is, if these descriptions capture *something* of what we mean by "virtue,"

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> I have used the text of Alfred Croiset in his edition of the works of Plato, prepared in collaboration with Louis Bodin (Plato [1923] 1992). Translations throughout are my own.

they also omit an aspect most vital to it, that of its nobility. And any account of virtue that ignores or obscures this, or that rushes past it by collapsing virtue into selfish concern, begins from a truncated version of it and indeed of the human beings who care for it (consider, in this regard, the terse dismissal of Kant's "entirely nonprudential account of virtue" in Berkowitz 1999, 131–33).

This essay offers a detailed exeges of Plato's Meno. It does so on the basis of the conviction that Plato is among the most important premodern sources able to contribute to the contentious revival of virtue among liberal theorists today. I suggest that if the analysis of virtue remains within the confines of strictly liberal presuppositions, the latest advocates of virtue will never attain the goal they most seek: the reconciliation of individual interest with communal well-being, the pursuit of happiness with the performance of duty. For Plato too recognizes these apparently irreconcilable concerns, but he attempts to bridge them by means of a third, what he calls "nobility" or "the noble" (to kalon), which may be provisionally understood as a good that is not simply reducible either to individual or to collective well-being. Though it can still speak powerfully to us, this conception of nobility is neglected by almost all contemporary discussions. What is more, Plato indicates that the concern for nobility brings with it an openness to and even a need for belief in an afterlife, one that is superintended by just or providential deities. That the contemporary debate pays very little attention indeed to virtue in its complex relation to religion or piety is another sign of its restricted scope (compare Budziszewski 1992). In brief, if the sought-for incorporation of virtue into liberal thought and practice fails to grapple with these profound human concerns, the language of virtue and its attendant moral sentiments will remain a matter more of scholarly debate than of lived practice.

If the possibility, at least, that Plato may shed light on this controversy is admissible, one must nonetheless choose from among the 35 dialogues that have come down to us as his. Even a cursory overview of them, however, makes readily apparent the most relevant to a discussion of virtue: The subject matter of the Meno, from its opening lines to its final words, is precisely virtue or human excellence (aretē). Indeed the Meno can even lay claim to being the Platonic dialogue on virtue, for although Socrates treats the several virtues at length elsewhere—justice in the Laws, Republic, and Gorgias; courage in the Laches and Protagoras; moderation in the *Charmides*; piety in the *Euthyphro*—only in the Meno does he raise and doggedly pursue the comprehensive question, "What is virtue?" The observations that follow are intended to be an introduction to the dialogue as well as an invitation to contemporary scholars to reconsider it.

# ON THE MENO

#### Introduction

If the centrality of the question "What is virtue?" is the most obvious characteristic of the *Meno*, its next most

striking feature is surely the resistance that Socrates meets with throughout in attempting to answer this question: for in the first and longest part of the dialogue (70a1-89e5), Socrates must exhort Meno on five occasions to define virtue or to investigate together with him what in the world virtue itself is (71d4-d8, 73c6-c8, 77a5-b1, 79e5-e6, 86c4-c6). And even after Socrates rescues Meno from the frustration he succumbs to when brought to see the inadequacy of each of his three definitions of virtue (71e1-72a5, 73c9-d1, 77b1-b4), Meno still prefers to investigate the lesser or subsequent difficulty of how virtue is acquired: He resists Socrates' guiding question to the very end (86c7-d2, 100b4-b6). If the root of his ultimate resistance to this question is his now-manifest confusion—as distinguished from his initial resistance or at any rate indifference, which stemmed from his conviction that it is "not difficult" to answer it and even "easy" to do so (71e1-e2)—we must wonder what it is that prevents Meno from taking the step that Socrates insists is necessary to clearing up this confusion (e.g., 79d6-e2). Moreover, in the brief but highly charged appearance of the democratic statesman Anytus that constitutes the dialogue's second part (89e6–95a1), Socrates encounters not merely resistance to his general line of inquiry but open hostility. Finally, in the last part of the dialogue (95a2-100c2), in which Meno returns as Socrates' interlocutor but at which Anytus is present as a silent witness (consider 99e2 and 100b8). Socrates' charge to Meno to persuade Anytus of the things that he himself has been persuaded of proves to be all but impossible: Newly equipped with certain "correct opinions" that as such tend to flee those who hold them (97e6–98a3), Meno is probably incapable of persuading Anytus of anything, let alone of making him "gentler" (100c1). And Socrates, for his part, knows full well that he will have occasion to converse with Anytus later on (99e3-e4). The resistance of Meno and that of Anytus combine to prevent Socrates from treating the question "problem of virtue" as he wishes and so to make of the Meno an apparently "aporetic" dialogue.

We can begin to discern the source of this resistance by noting that Plato chose as Socrates' principal interlocutors in the dialogue on virtue a future political criminal and a future accuser of Socrates: Menos, Socrates' pupil in virtue, will become a spectacular example of political vice a year or so after the dialogue takes place, (Xenophon Anabasis of Cyrus 2.6.21-2.6.29; Klein [1965] 1989, 36-38), just as Socrates' authority on virtue, Anytus (89e9-90b6), will become, a year or so after that, the most important of the three Athenian citizens who bring about Socrates' conviction on charges of impiety and corrupting the young and therewith his execution (Apology of Socrates 18b3 and context; Klein [1965] 1989, 223-25). If Plato's choice of interlocutors was not a frivolous one, we are meant to learn from it; and it leads us to suspect that this very political setting is somehow the appropriate one for investigating the question "What is virtue?" or that this apparently "epistemological" question is (also) a thoroughly political one. As for the subsequent question of the teachability of virtue, Socrates and Meno eventually arrive at not one but two answers: that virtue is knowledge or prudence and hence teachable and that virtue is not knowledge but a kind of correct opinion given by divine dispensation and hence not teachable. As we shall see, each answer responds to or makes explicit the two principles present in Meno's opinions about virtue—to the effect that virtue is one's own greatest good or happiness and that it is the carrying out of one's duty or task. The elusive unity of the class "virtue," which Meno and Socrates seek, will be uncontroversial only if one's proper tasks or duties are identical to the requirements of one's own greatest good. Plato does all he can, in part through the drama of the dialogue, to indicate how far apart these are.

### Meno's Three Attempts to Define Virtue

The dialogue begins abruptly with Meno's barrage of questions: "Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is something teachable? Or whether it isn't something teachable but is rather something that can be acquired by practice? Or whether it isn't something that can be acquired by practice or learning, but is present in human beings by nature or in some other way?" (70a1a4). The abruptness and relative complexity of Meno's query imply both an urgent desire to know the answer to it and some prior reflection on it. As for the latter, we discover eventually that Meno believes he shares Gorgias' opinions about virtue (71d1-d3) and that Gorgias himself, far from claiming to teach virtue, ridicules those others (the sophists) who do make that claim (95c1-c4). When the dialogue opens, then, Meno must at a minimum incline to the view that virtue cannot be taught, and this helps to explain the order of the alternatives he lists: first things first. Still, the eagerness of his question suggests that he has perhaps not settled the matter to his own satisfaction (consider also 95c7c8), as is confirmed by the fact that Socrates leads him to accept, for a time at least, the view that virtue can be taught (89c2-c4).

Because Socrates professes utter ignorance of "what in the world virtue itself is" and hence also of what sort of a thing it may be, a profession Meno greets with something close to incredulity (71b9-c2), it falls to Meno to offer the first definition of virtue: The virtue of a man is to be capable of carrying out the affairs of the city and, in doing so, to benefit friends, harm enemies, and take care that he himself not suffer any such harm, just as the virtue of a woman is to be able to manage the household well, both preserving its contents and being obedient to the husband. One could state in this way also the virtue of children, male and female, as well as of slaves and freemen, as Meno indicates. And contrary to the impression that Socrates' response leaves (72a6-b7 and c6-d1), Meno does offer, in addition to this enumeration of virtues, a definition meant to encompass them all: "There are also very many other virtues, so there's no perplexity in speaking about what virtue is. For virtue is related to each task for each of us in accord with each action and time of life."

Central to Meno's definition of virtue is the "task" ("work," "duty": ergon) assigned to each, the demands of the task in question determining the specific content or character of virtue in each case. The many and var-

ied virtues properly share a single "form" (72c7, 72d8, 72e5) or constitute a single class because each permits its possessor to contribute directly or indirectly to one and the same goal, the well-being of the city. For if the will of the husband and the needs of the household together determine the virtue of the wife, what else but the will and needs of the city itself could determine the "task" and therewith the virtue of the man, charged as he is with tending to its affairs? Socrates himself, in the course of criticizing this account of virtue, draws attention to its political character by comparing it to a "hive" (or "swarm") of bees. And if Meno had answered the question of what it is that unites the many and varied bees, as he says he could do (72c1-c5), he might have parried Socrates' criticism: As the various bees form a single class because they are the beings that live in and contribute to the well-being of the hive, so the various virtues form a single class because they are the dispositions of soul leading each of us to contribute to the well-being of our political community.

This altogether political definition of virtue, approved of for all practical purposes by Aristotle in his Politics (1260a27-a28), leaves unclear whether the virtues in question are good also for the virtuous themselves. That is, if the virtuous man must see to it that he not suffer such harm as he may inflict on his enemies, will he also benefit himself as he is to benefit his friends (71e3-e5)? Socrates alludes to this difficulty by speaking no longer of the hive but of the health and strength of the individual man and woman (72d4–73a3): If virtue is determined by our "task," does not the performance of that task promise to be or to lead to our own wellbeing too? Does not virtue constitute the health and strength (of soul) of the virtuous? Virtue—justice and moderation, for example (73a9,73b1-b2)—seems to be the necessary means to carrying out the "task" peculiar to us as men or women, elders or children, and therefore to be the necessary means to our becoming good—to our becoming good, that is, not only as husbands or wives, elders or children, but as "human beings" (73a6c5, noting especially 73b4,73bb, and 73c1-c3).

Meno demurs: The case of the virtue of man and woman, on the one hand, and that of their health, on the other, seem "somehow" dissimilar to him (73a4-a5). In his first definition of virtue, then, Meno emphasizes the capacity needed to serve well a whole greater than oneself, and he may even harbor some doubt as to whether such service is good for the one who serves as well. But when prompted to fall once again under the influence of Gorgias (compare 73c6–c8 with 71d4), Meno attempts to fulfill (more) directly the promise of virtue to be good for the virtuous themselves. Virtue, he contends, is the capacity to rule human beings, ruling being the greatest good for those who do so (as he later affirms: 78c6-c9). The sought-for unity of virtue is here purchased at the price of excluding from the category all but the virtue of the man, as Socrates easily demonstrates by speaking now of the one example that Meno had mentioned in his first definition but that Socrates had thus far omitted, that of the slave (compare 71e1-72a1 with 72d4-d6 and 73a2): The virtue of the slave surely cannot be to rule others! Meno could have saved this second or amended definition by

contending that the slave equipped with the capacity to rule would indeed be a poor slave but a virtuous human being nonetheless or for that very reason; he might have contended or conceded that a "virtuous" (=dutiful) slave is not a virtuous (=good) human being. But far from defending virtue understood as ruling, Meno is led by Socrates to abandon it immediately: Since only just rule is virtuous—because "justice, Socrates, is virtue" (73d9-d10)—the virtuous human being would rule only when justice permits or requires it. Virtue thus is or results in the attainment of the truly greatest good for oneself at the same time that it (in the form of justice if not also moderation: compare 73d9-d10 with 73a9-b2) may demand the sacrifice of that very good. In this way "virtue" comes to sight as both that which conduces to one's own good and that which may call for the sacrifice of one's own good, the latter more powerfully, perhaps, than the former. Ruling others is virtue (73c9), and justice is virtue (73d9-d10). Or, to put Meno's confusion another way, he contends that justice is both the whole of virtue and (merely) a part of virtue.

In his eagerness to advance their inquiry, Socrates proceeds to discuss the nature of definition so as to supply a model or models for Meno to follow in speaking about virtue (75a8-a9, 75b4, 75b11-c1, 77a5-b1). Socrates eventually raises two questions parallel to that pertaining to virtue: "What is shape?" and "What is color?" In taking up the first, Socrates pays close attention to what Meno says about shape or how he "names" or "calls" the various shapes (74d5–d6, 75d8, 75e11): We call the round a shape, not shape simply, just as we call the straight a shape, not shape simply; round and straight are in a sense opposites but nonetheless fall equally under the heading "shape." Why is this? Here Socrates is forced to state his own view: Shape is that which "alone among the beings happens always to accompany color" (75b9-b11). Socrates' definition sticks very close indeed to our ordinary experience of things, for we are somehow aware of both shape and color—the names for each are not meaningless sounds to us—even though we may be unable to state precisely what each is or to define the class character of each; and Socrates' definition serves to clarify the one by means of the other or to clarify the relation present in our ordinary experience of the two but of which we are not altogether aware. To understand the thing we call "virtue," then, we must make clear to ourselves the elements of it present in our ordinary experience, the interrelation of which may not be entirely evident to us.

In the third and last of his definitions, Meno attempts to resolve the tension present in his second, and in doing so he makes clearer still the conflicting principles that guide his conception of the class "virtue." Relying on the authority not of Gorgias but of an unnamed poet, Meno contends that virtue is the capacity of one who desires "the noble [beautiful] things" to provide them for himself (77b2-b5). As was evident also from the second definition, Meno himself strongly prefers the noble things to their ignoble counterparts, for he is willing to sacrifice what he understands to be his own good for the sake of what the noble (e.g., the just) course demands. But on what does that willingness rest? Socrates will

soon restate the definition in question, with Meno's hearty approval, as "the capacity to provide the good things for oneself" (78c1; also 78c4-c5). He earns the right to do so in part by establishing immediately that Meno understands the noble things to be superlatively good (77b6-b7): Although there may be goods that are not noble, all noble things—just rule, for exampleare indeed good. That is, we surely desire the noble things because, as noble, they are attractive in and of themselves. Yet we also believe them to be good, which means in the context "good for us," as Socrates makes clear. For by maintaining that there is no one who wants to be wretched and unhappy, he corrects Meno's impression that there are some who desire bad things even though they know or suppose them to be bad: We desire the noble things because we believe them to be good and hence conducive to our happiness. Moreover, since all equally want to be happy or to possess for themselves the (truly) good things, and since virtue does not belong to all equally, virtue must consist in the capacity to attain those very things and not in the mere wanting or wish for them (78b3-c2; note Socrates' at least provisional approval at 78c3-c4).

As Socrates and Meno interpret it, then, this third definition of virtue resolves the tension present in the second by making all but explicit the hope that guides Meno in his attachment to "the noble things:" He hopes to be profoundly benefited thereby. Such "sacrifice" as nobility or virtue demands, then, is, properly speaking, no sacrifice at all. Moreover, the priority of the good to the noble that this account of virtue implies suggests in turn that if a given action could be shown not to be good for one, then neither could it be noble; and precisely one who is most devoted to the noble things should, as a result, be willing and even eager to forgo it. It remains for Socrates to determine how much of this Meno understands or accepts.

Since virtue is now the capacity "to provide the good things for oneself," acting virtuously should amount to securing health and wealth for oneself, as well as honors in a city and offices—the only sorts of things that are good according to Meno (78c6-c7). But Meno cannot abide by this understanding of virtue. On the contrary, Socrates quickly and easily leads him to the view that justice and piety—the latter being mentioned here for the first time (compare 74a4–a6)—sometimes demand going without such good things. Virtue consists in sometimes providing oneself (or, now, another: 78e5) with gold and silver and sometimes not providing them, depending upon the demands of justice. But, to repeat, Meno also believes that the very sacrifice of things good for him will, as a noble act, somehow also be good for him. Meno is even more attracted to the noble sacrifice of the things that he holds to be good for him than he is to the direct attainment of them, but he is so ultimately on the ground that such "sacrifice" is advantageous, though he appears not to be fully aware of that ground as such. Socrates concludes this argument by insisting that for as long as the class "virtue" remains unclear, it is impossible to state what its parts are, justice included (consider 79a3-a5, 79b2, and 79c8-c9). In his present condition, Meno has no basis on which to suppose that even justice is a virtue (consider also 71b1-b3).

### Meno's Rebellion

When Socrates attempts for the fourth time to elicit from Meno a definition of virtue, this time recurring to the authority of Gorgias, Meno rebels (79e5–80d8). That is, after he playfully compares the effect of conversing with Socrates to that of being numbed by a stingray—and making clear in the process how politically dangerous Socrates' characteristic activity is (80b4–b6)—Meno states his famous "paradox": "By setting out what sort of a thing for yourself, from among those that you don't know, will you make your inquiry? Or even if you happen right upon it, how will you know that this is that thing which you didn't know?" (80d5–d8). Meno now seems doomed to remain at a loss concerning virtue; so frustrated is Meno by now that he even despairs of rational inquiry altogether.

Perhaps taking his cue from the previous day's conversation (76e8–e9), and certainly from their most recent inquiry (78d4, 78e1), Socrates now conducts an experiment by having recourse to an argument of a very different kind: "I have heard both men and women wise in divine matters—." And with this he hits home, for Meno interrupts him in midsentence: "Stating what account [logos]?" The wise logos in question proves to have two sources: It is stated both by those of the priests and priestesses who have been concerned with giving a logos of the matters in their purview and by Pindar and all the many other poets who are divine. If perhaps for different reasons, then, the teaching in question is sanctioned by both reason and divine inspiration. According to it, the human soul is immortal and never perishes, "dying" being a misnomer for what is in fact the continual regeneration of the soul. (We note that, in contrast to what we discerned in Socrates' discussion of shape and color, the world of experience as captured by our speech is now and in this crucial respect misleading; reality properly so-called lies beyond or behind the apparent one, the one given in and through ordinary speech.) And from this logos concerning the immortality of the soul, Socrates concludes that we must live out our lives as piously as possible because great rewards are available to those who do so: It is through the actions of Persephone that "glorious kings/And men swift in strength and greatest in wisdom" arise, men whose reputations remain unsullied for the rest of time. Socrates thus paints a vivid and alluring picture of the rewards—among them reputation and strength and rule—that await the politically ambitious Meno if only he will remain true to his (repeatedly demonstrated) inclination to forgo the direct pursuit of what he holds to be his own greatest good for the sake of or in the name of nobility, of justice in particular.

And yet, for all of Meno's interest in it, this part of Socrates' report does nothing to alleviate Meno's disheartened condition. What, then, is its purpose? We recall that, at the core of Meno's eagerness to sacrifice his own good lies his desire to obtain precisely the good things for himself, and we suggest that Socrates is here attempting to shore up that attachment to justice or nobility, already present in Meno, by strengthening the hope that guides it: If this world is not such that the noble (=self-sacrificing) are always rewarded for their

nobility, let alone rewarded with great power and reputation, it becomes necessary to posit a different world, a subsequent life or lives, in which the noble will receive their just deserts through divine intervention. Only in this way will those who are most attracted to nobility or devoted to justice remain so attracted and be as content as possible with their devotion. Because Meno performed poorly on the earlier test meant to determine the extent of his self-knowledge, Socrates now has recourse to the view of the world made necessary by Meno's confusion and, to that extent, sanctioned by reason itself.

If Socrates' report concerning the rewards of Persephone does not directly assuage Meno's distress, his account of the soul's immortality is intended to do so. According to that account, the immortal soul has seen all things, both those in Hades and those here, and it is not possible for it not to have learned all things at some time. It is nothing to be wondered at, then, if the soul can be made to recollect the things that it once knew, provided it recalls some one thing first (81d2). Since our souls have already learned what virtue is, then, we need only recollect here and now the knowledge that is present but dormant in us. Thus what is called "learning" is but recollection properly speaking. (In this important case too, the way human beings speak of things is deceptive.)

After this brief series of assertions, which Socrates merely "trusts" to be true (81e1-e2), he is ready to return to the question of what virtue is. Meno, however, is not. And yet he challenges only the equation of learning with recollection—that is, he is willing to let stand Socrates' report concerning the immortality of the soul and the rewards of Persephone. This willingness is an important demonstration of the connection between Meno's state of soul and the "providential" view of the world he readily confirms. Convinced both that political power is the greatest good for himself and that it is noble sometimes to sacrifice the attainment of it, precisely because doing so is superlatively good for him, Meno fails to see what it is that he truly wants. The selflessness he is attracted to for selfish reasons renders him open to and indeed eager for the services of Persephone.

Socrates' lengthy response to Meno's paradox includes his celebrated conversation with one of Meno's slaves, the avowed purpose of which is to demonstrate the proposition that all learning is but recollection of knowledge gained in a previous life or lives. In three successive stages, Socrates poses geometrical puzzles for the slave to solve, despite, or rather because of, the fact that the slave has never been taught geometry; the correct answers the slave comes up with must therefore have a source other than knowledge acquired in this life. But on the basis of these exchanges, we conclude that the process of "recollection" is a difficult one, for the slave performs poorly under Socrates' questioning. In fact, Socrates himself leads the slave to the correct answers eventually, answers arrived at by performing simple acts of calculation, of putting two and two together (82d4; Sharples 1985, 8-9; Vlastos 1965, 159–60; Weiss [2001, 94] rightly notes the partly comic character of these passages). Attractive as these passages may be to us, they do not prove that all learning

is recollection; still less that all can recollect equally: They establish only that the slave understands basic concepts of shape, size, and proportion (line, square, double, half) that would be known to anyone having learned a language (consider Socrates' all-important question at 82b4). The slave does not know and never "recollects" the name "diagonal," for example, because this is taught by sophists with whom he has had no contract in this or apparently any other life (85b4).

The arguments concerning recollection are defective in part because they beg the decisive question of the teachability of virtue; even if the soul has learned all things, Socrates nowhere proves that virtue is among the things that can be taught (Bruell 1999, 169-70). We must not forget that the entire digression with Meno's slave is meant chiefly to alleviate Meno's frustration or despair, and in this it is successful (compare 79e7-80d8 with 86c4–c7). That is, it is a rhetorical argument intended to persuade, one that Socrates himself admits he would be unwilling to fight very hard for (86b6-c2). But these exchanges do introduce an important puzzle concerning our knowledge of virtue. For even granting that the soul is immortal, that all nature is akin, and that every soul has-somehow-learned "all things" in a previous life or lives (81c5-d1), it turns out that we not only-somehow-forget the knowledge we have learned but also take on false opinions in its stead. Chief among these false opinions is our conviction that we know something—what virtue is, for example—when in fact we no longer do. And this means that, as there is an ignorance peculiar to our existence here and now, so there is a learning and hence a knowledge peculiar to our existence here and now that cannot itself be an example of recollection, namely, learning and hence coming to know that we do not know that something in fact (for previously we did know it).

The passage from our present ignorance to our knowledge of that ignorance is effected according to Socrates by "questioning" (86a7) of the kind to which he has just subjected both Meno and his slave. In both cases, Socrates elicits from his interlocutors opinions that are indeed present in them but of which they are not altogether aware; and as he now stresses, some of those opinions are true (86a7), although their truth is hidden in part because they coexist with false counterparts. While it may be quite possible not to know a specific human being and hence his characteristics, it now appears impossible not to have at least opinions, and indeed some true opinions, about virtue: With more justification than he knew, Meno reasonably greeted Socrates' profession of utter ignorance about virtue with disbelief (71a1-c2). What, then, is the source of these opinions in us, true as well as falseif we discount, as indeed we must, Socrates' official (theological-rhetorical) explanation? That the answer to this question involves considerations of politics appears from the remaining sections of the dialogue.

#### On the Political Character of Virtue

Despite Socrates' suggestion that they continue to pursue the question of what virtue is, Meno insists that they turn instead to the subsequent question of whether it is

teachable. Socrates yields, but without letting his own question drop entirely: The question of the teachability of virtue will be considered by asking what sort of thing virtue must be, if it is to be teachable (87b2-b6).3 The gist of the argument runs as follows: Virtue is good; there is nothing good that is not encompassed or governed by (a kind of) knowledge; virtue is therefore (a kind of) knowledge. But in what sense are all goods encompassed by knowledge according to Socrates? Such external or bodily goods as health, strength, beauty, and wealth sometimes benefit us and sometimes harm us; only when we make "correct use" of each do they benefit us. This is true even of the things of the soul: What we call moderation, justice, courage, docility, memory, magnificence, and so on, benefit us only when they are guided by knowledge, and Socrates here identifies prudence as the knowledge of how to use these so as to benefit ourselves—courage absent prudence is but harmful boldness (88b3-b6; compare Protagoras 350a6-b6 and context). The standard determining not only the goodness of the external goods, but also the goodness and hence the virtuous character of the various "virtues," is their contribution to one's own good: All that issues in one's own happiness (88c3) or is advantageous (89a2) is governed by prudence; and since virtue is here nothing but the advantageous for oneself, it may be equated with (the whole or a part of) prudence (89a3-a4). We have thus returned to an understanding of virtue very close to that seen in Socrates' examination of Meno's third definition.

Socrates concludes from this argument that those who are good would not be such by nature, presumably on the grounds that if virtue is a kind of knowledge or prudence, it is acquired through teaching. But the evidence Socrates adduces to support this conclusion is puzzling to say the least: If there were such good persons by nature, the city would have set people to watch over them as soon as they became apparent in order to keep them from being corrupted and to ensure that they would become "useful to the cities." There are not overseers of this kind; therefore the good are not by nature (89b1-b7; note Meno's somewhat puzzled response). This reference to the political utility of the virtuous or good recalls an anomaly in the argument summarized in the preceding paragraph but omitted there: Between his assertion that all good things are encompassed by knowledge (87d4-d8) and his proof or clarification of it (87e5 and following), Socrates had added that not only would virtue, being good, be advantageous (beneficial), but so too would we be advantageous (beneficial) insofar as we are virtuous (87d8–e2). The latter assertion, which is developed only now and anticipates what is to come (96e7–97a4, 98c5–c6, 98c8– c9), compels us to wonder for whom or for what the virtuous are as such advantageous: for although virtue has just been equated with prudence and hence the capacity to benefit oneself or to be happy, it is now that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> "Socrates on the face of it postpones the question of the nature of excellence itself, and gives in to Meno by discussing its teachability on the basis of an assumption about its nature; but this does in fact lead to consideration of a number of theories about the nature of excellence itself" (Sharples 1985, 1).

which enables one to be "useful to the cities." We have thus returned to a definition of virtue akin to Meno's first. What is more, as soon as Socrates has introduced (or reintroduced) the idea of virtue as political service, he retracts the premise that virtue is knowledge and hence teachable (89c5 and following).

This drastic change in the argument takes place just before the arrival of Meno's guest-friend, Anytus: As Anytus takes a seat among them, Socrates is in the midst of arguing that virtue is not teachable because teachable things will have both teachers and students of them, and despite his best efforts, he has so far failed to find a teacher of virtue. That the "virtue" now under discussion is very far removed from prudence becomes clear from Socrates' restatement to Anytus of what it is that Meno wishes to possess, a restatement that emphasizes service to others in ways and to a degree that Meno himself never did: "[Meno] desires that wisdom and virtue by means of which human beings nobly manage both households and cities and tend to their own parents and know how both to receive and to send off citizens and guest-friends in a manner worthy of a good man" (91a2-a6). Socrates then retreats from his contention that there are no teachers of virtue just long enough to test Anytus' reaction to the possibility that the proper teachers of virtue are the sophists, who after all claim to teach it and charge a fee for doing so (91b7-b8, 95c1-c4). The vehemence of Anytus' condemnation of the sophists is matched only by its baselessness, convinced as he is of their pernicious character through no experience of his own or that of his kin. Anytus maintains instead that every Athenian gentleman is a competent teacher of virtue, and he thus belies Socrates' claim at the beginning of the dialogue that all Athenians would "laugh" at the suggestion that they know what virtue is or, therefore, whether it can be taught (compare 71a1-b4 with 92e3-93a4 and 94e3-e7). With the dramatic entry of Anytus, just after Socrates has begun the argument meant to deny that (political) virtue is knowledge or prudence, Plato reminds us of how politically charged the inquiry into virtue is and how dangerous or offensive Socrates' apparently modest claims to ignorance are.4

If common decency, as one might call the virtue now at issue, can indeed be passed on from elder to youth (93a2-a3) and father to son (95e9-96a2), in one way or another (consider 95e9-96a2 again in the light of Protagoras 325b5-326e5), the kind of virtue that Socrates speaks of next—that of the greatest statesmanship, embodied by such luminaries as Themistocles. Aristides, Pericles, and Thucydides—clearly cannot be: Even Anytus must admit that these illustrious fathers failed to pass on to those they most cared for, their sons, the skill or wisdom for which each is celebrated (93a2–95a1, noting especially the transition from "the noble and good" at 93a2 to "those good at the political things" at 93a5-a6). And just as the claim of the sophists to teach virtue was dismissed merely on the basis of Anytus' uninformed prejudice against them,

so Socrates here denies the teachability of (political) virtue in *both* senses, the higher and the lower, solely on the grounds that the higher cannot be taught.

Evidently angered by Socrates (consider 94e3-95a1 in light of 99e2), Anytus withdraws from the conversation but not the group (91a2, 91a6, 92d4-d5). As a result, Socrates turns to Meno, but he too is unable to supply evidence that either the gentlemen ("the noble and good") or the sophists can teach virtue. Purportedly to establish not only that political men like Meno have contradictory opinions on the matter but that even a poet (Theognis) states contradictory things about it. Socrates adduces three quotations, the first dealing with learning from the great or powerful, the second with instilling intellectual understanding or comprehension (noēma), and the third with fostering such obedience as one gains from listening to a father's moderate words or tales. But Theognis speaks explicitly of teaching (or being taught) only in the first and third quotations (95d6, 96a1): In the case of great statesmanship or power, he contends that one can be taught noble (worthy: esthla) things by being with the powerful and being pleasing to them; and in the case of ordinary decency, he speaks of the effectiveness of obedience as distinguished from teaching. (As for the second and central case, the poet leaves it unclear whether teaching strictly speaking is possible.) If Theognis grants to the great what Socrates denies them, Theognis may nonetheless be free of selfcontradiction (see also Bruell 1999, 183).

Theognis' lines are important in part because they summarize the different understandings of "virtue" present in the Meno: political virtue understood as either common decency or great statesmanship, which Socrates insists is not teachable; and virtue proper, which is (a kind of) knowledge or prudence and is, as such, teachable. In the person of Anytus, moreover, Plato puts before our eyes a living embodiment of political virtue, certainly in its lesser form but also, as Anytus himself apparently believes (95a4), in its higher. As for the source of his opinions about virtue, no recourse to an immortal soul or to Persephone is needed to discover it, for he has come to hold the opinions he does as a result of the rearing and education given him in this life by his father Anthemion (90b1; consider also 95e9– 96a2), a self-made man noteworthy for his modesty as a citizen and his orderliness and good behavior as a man (90a1-b3). The correctness of that education and of the opinions thereby instilled in Anytus is confirmed for him in a most powerful way: by the hearty approval of the Athenian multitude, who "elect him to the greatest offices" (90b2-b3). Because he has received from earliest youth a most emphatic answer to the question, "What is virtue?" Anytus feels no need to raise it himself, let alone to countenance any suggestion that it is the sophists who teach it or-still less-that it cannot be taught at all: To affirm either would be to denigrate the paternal education he has received.

What is true of Anytus is true of us all to some degree. Each of us, that is, is reared in and educated by a specific family that is in turn shaped by a specific political community, and these place their mark on us, on our souls, as surely as Athens and Anthemion did on Anytus. Only by being brought to see the contradictory character of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> "... in all likelihood, Socrates alone among his fellow citizens would confess to his ignorance on that point [i.e., as to what virtue is]" (Klein [1965] 1989, 41).

some of our most important opinions can we begin truly to question their adequacy; only through the kind of "questioning" (86a7) that Socrates has attempted to carry out in the Meno can the true but partially obscured opinions that dwell within us be roused and transformed into knowledge, those opinions that are merely "correct" ("orthodoxy") being abandoned in the process (note how carefully Socrates distinguishes between "correct" and "true" opinion: compare 97b1, 97b5, 97c4, 97c7, 97c9, 97d2, 98a7, 98b2, 98c1-c3, 98c10, and 98d1 with 86a7, 97b9, 97c2, 97e6, 98b7, 98d1, 99a2, and 99a5; see also Bruell 1999, 184). Neither Anytus nor Meno proves to be a proper subject of such questioning, for the whole of Anytus' life depends upon the stability of the answers he has already received; and Meno, though younger and thus having less at stake, proves unable to see or to face up to the nature of his confusion regarding virtue.

The final subsection of the dialogue (96d5–100c2), like Socrates' lengthy reply to Meno's "paradox," clearly serves a rhetorical purpose: It is meant to equip Meno with opinions that may enable him to "persuade" Anytus in turn and so to make him "gentler" (100b8c2). And as with that earlier reply (86b6-b7), Socrates here notes the inadequacy of the argument even as he makes it (100b4-b6; compare 98b2-b5). Leaving intact the argument that the virtue under discussion is not knowledge and hence not teachable, Socrates adds only that, for those who would guide "our affairs" (97a3-a4) or be "advantageous to the cities" (98c9) or guide aright "political action" (99b2), correct opinion, as distinguished from knowledge, is enough. Statesmen know what they are talking about as little as do soothsayers and divine prophets (99c2-c3, 99d1; compare 92c6). But if the source of (true) virtue, being a kind of knowledge, is learning or instruction, what is the source of this "correct opinion" or of the specific virtue in which it issues? According to Socrates, such opinion is granted them through "divine allotment" (99e6, 100b2-b3). This answer fills the gap left by Meno's opening question, in which he had spoken of teaching (or learning) and practice, as well as nature together with some unnamed fourth possibility (70a1-a4). The more obvious candidate to fill this lacuna might well seem to be nomos ("law," "custom"), the opposite of "nature" (physis). But nomos is conspicuous in the Meno by its complete absence, Plato resorting to paraphrases of it occasionally (see 70b6, 76d8, 82a5). Or could it be that, if not the word, at any rate its power is very much present in the dialogue, in which we witness its capacity to shape our opinions about virtue and, not least, about there being a "divine allotment"? At all events, the most that can be said in favor of Socrates' new suggestion is that it recalls the intervention of Persephone in granting to those who deserve it great power and strength and (a certain) wisdom (81b8-c4; consider 93e3, 93e7, and 94b1, as well as 90a2 and 91a3): The great statesmen are marked by an understanding that transcends human knowledge and that is justly theirs.

Socrates all but ends the dialogue by noting that there may be a sort of politician who can make others such as he is and who would thus be to those here as

the wise Teiresias was to the mere shades of Hades (100a1-a7). This unexpected admission of the possibility of teaching politics would be unintelligible had not Socrates asserted, in the Gorgias (a dialogue to which the Meno is obviously and repeatedly linked), that he is perhaps alone among the Athenians in undertaking "the true political art" and is alone in carrying out "the political things" (521d6-d8): The true political art does what every political community tries but fails to do adequately, namely, to care for the health of our souls. Socrates, then, is the "politician" in question. Only he understands the needs of the soul and so its proper task; only he understands, as a result, its specific virtue. And virtue so understood, being rational, is teachable. We are reminded of how far Socrates is from the view of the world with which he had earlier enticed Meno, by the manner in which he now quotes Homer's description of Teiresias (100a2-a7): He alters the text (Odyssey 10.494–10.495) so as to suppress the fact that it was none other than Persephone who had bestowed on the great seer his powers. The understanding that Socrates possesses and (to the extent possible) teaches owes nothing to "Persephone."

### CONCLUSION

As Plato makes clear, Meno is attracted to a conception of virtue (be it justice or piety) that calls for the sacrifice of the very things he holds to be best for himself; and what is true of Meno in this respect remains fully intelligible to us, once we are brought to see it. In and through our devotion to nobility, we seem to attain the greatest possible good for ourselves even as we, or precisely because we, forget or subsume or sacrifice our concern to attain that good. It should go without saying that there is something profoundly puzzling about this attraction or devotion, but unless modern theorists of virtue take it into account, in the first place by recognizing its existence, they will be unable to do what their recourse to virtue is meant to permit them to do: to speak of and to the whole of our humanity.

To be sure, the recognition of our concern with and even longing for nobility is but the beginning of Socratic political philosophy: As Socrates tries but fails to bring Meno to see, only by exploring our complex attachment to and hopes concerning "the noble" can we begin to understand our deepest wish. Moreover, reflection on such concern for virtue permits or requires us also to consider the highest question connected with it, that of the nature and existence of gods or a god, as Socrates' extended experiment with Meno indicates (81a5 and following). Just as the contemporary debate has neglected the peculiarly noble character of virtue, so it has proved particularly blind to the importance of religion or piety in any comprehensive account of human excellence. It redounds to the credit of a contemporary theorist, who would otherwise wish to separate the question of virtue from all "controversial opinions about human nature and metaphysical first principles" (Berkowitz 1999, 9), that he cannot finally avoid acknowledging their connection: "In the

long run, a complete understanding of virtue does require an account of first principles and a defense of controversial opinions about human nature and the cosmos" (Berkowitz 1999, 13). Yet the same study suffers from a defect characteristic of most contemporary treatments of virtue,<sup>5</sup> for what takes the place of the admittedly necessary "metaphysical" reflection is a certain value relativism, adopted on the opening page of the study without argument and, as it were, in passing: "Not that the question of virtue has a single formulation or one right answer" (Berkowitz 1999, 3). It may well be that the "restrictive metaphysical assumptions" of both Kant and Hobbes must be rejected (Berkowitz 1999. 132), but the study in question does so on the basis of an equally restrictive, if largely unstated, metaphysical assumption concerning the unknowable character of the human good—and therewith an implicit rejection of such accounts of the human good as claim divine origin. The question that Kant and, especially, Hobbes knew they had to confront is simply dropped. If a "strategy of avoidance" of questions pertaining to "foundations" is indeed "appropriate to political debate" (Berkowitz 1999, 14), is it appropriate to—is it possible in—political philosophy? And it is to political philosophy that we must turn if we are to begin to understand the complexity of the problem of virtue.

Perhaps in no author more than in Plato, we liberals may come to understand the breadth and depth of our concern for "virtue," for a human excellence that presents itself as irreducible to any other good. Moreover, in gaining greater awareness of our hopes concerning such virtue or excellence, we become aware also of the necessity of reflecting on the question of the divine, a question the significance of which liberal political philosophy has done everything in its very great power to obscure.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For a related difficulty that may attend Michael Sandel's recent attempt to revive civic virtue, consider Pangle 1998.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Consider in this regard the programmatic statement of Montesquieu ([1748] 1951, 25.12): "It is not therefore by filling the soul with this great object [i.e., fear of one's own death], by bringing it closer to the moment when it should find religion of greater importance, that one succeeds in detaching the soul from religion; a more certain way to attack a religion is by favor, by the comforts of life, by the hope of fortune; not by what reminds one of it, but by what makes one forget it; not by what makes one indignant but by what casts one into indifference when other passions act on our souls and when those that religion inspires are silent. General rule: in the matter of changing religion, invitations are stronger than penalties."

# **Political Citizenship and Democratization: The Gender Paradox**

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This research challenges models of democratization that claim liberal principles affirming the equality of rights-bearing individuals equably enhance the political inclusion of groups marginalized by race, class, or gender. While such explanations may suffice for race and class, this study's quantitative cross-national analysis of women's contemporary officeholding patterns establishes that gender presents a counter case whereby women's political citizenship is enhanced, first, by government institutions that paradoxically affirm both individual equality and kinship group difference and, second, by state policies that paradoxically affirm both individual equality and women's group difference. These findings challenge assumptions about the relationship between political citizenship and democratization, demonstrate how women's political inclusion as voters and officeholders is strengthened not by either a "sameness" principle (asserting women's equality to men as individuals) or a "difference" principle (asserting women's group difference from men) but rather by the paradoxical combination of both, and provide new views for assessing multiculturalism prospects within democratic states.

olitical citizenship—the right to vote and hold office—is a cornerstone of democratic theory and practice (Joshua Cohen 1996, 95). Models of democratization focus on two key features critical for expanding political citizenship: governmental institutions and state polices. At the most basic level, the institutional shift from inherited monarchical structures of political rule to electoral ones expands the base of those eligible to participate in formal political power. From the standpoint of state policies, important work by Karen Orren (1991) and Rogers Smith (1997) argues that an ideological shift from the use of ascriptive group characteristics—such as race, class, and gender—to liberal principles of individual equality as the basis of state policies expands the political citizenship of subordinate groups.

However, these assumptions about the relationship of political citizenship and democratization break down when we examine gender in the American case. At the founding of the American state, for example, the structural substitution of an electoral democracy for an inherited monarchy, while increasing the political citizenship of *some* men, decreased the political citizenship of *all* women. *Some* women lost the right to be queens, but by 1807, all states explicitly excluded women from the franchise, giving *no* women the right to vote. Kerber 1980, 1998; Keyssar 2000, 54).<sup>2</sup> Similarly, in the nineteenth century, institutionalization of cultural commitments to liberal principles of individual equality, while expanding the voting rights of white and African-American men, failed to secure the same franchise for *any* women—whatever their class or race.<sup>3</sup> Women did not obtain a federal guarantee of the right to vote until 1920, with the addition of the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

More significant than this protracted period of time, however, is the way reformers achieved this goal. They retained liberal, individual equality claims that women should have the right to vote *in spite of* their group difference from men but also asserted ascriptive arguments that women should have the right to vote

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All forms of citizenship—social, civil, and political—are crucial for political inclusion; see Tilly et al. 1997. This study focuses on political citizenship because, although democracy comes in many forms, as Joshua Cohen (1996, 95) notes, it entails the "fundamental idea... that the authorization to exercise state power must arise from the collective decisions of the members of a society who are governed by that power... [m]ore precisely... as made within and expressed through social and political institutions designed to acknowledge their collective authority." For this reason, exclusion from political citizenship—that is, from participation in the institutional decision-making process—constitutes a serious violation of the very definition of democracy. For the way "exclusion" and "inclusion" have shaped American political history, see Shklar 1991.

<sup>2</sup> Ironically, the very country from which the United States rebelled—England—had, at the time of the founding of the American state, one of the most important and respected leaders that had been seen until that time, a woman, Queen Elizabeth I. With the founding of the American state, however, came a new ideology, republican motherhood, which assigned to women the political task of contributing to the public sphere by raising children to be good citizens rather than being voters or political office holders themselves; see Kerber, 1980. Though a number of states in the nineteenth century granted women voting rights until as late as 1890.

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In the nineteenth century, reformers' successful use of liberal principles asserting the inherent equality of rights-bearing individuals resulted, at the state level, in dropping property requirements for white men by the midnineteenth century and, at the national level, in adding the Fifteenth Amendment to the federal constitution in 1870, guaranteeing voting rights for African-American men. Reformers' same use of liberal principles to challenge ascriptive ideologies and institutional structures blocking women's entry into the electorate, however, failed to achieve the right to vote for women either at the state level in the early nineteenth century or at the federal level in the late nineteenth century. For a discussion of how illiberal ideologies and institutional structures excluded women from political citizenship in the United States, see Kerber 1980. For an exceptionally thorough and critical analysis of the expansion of suffrage in the United States, see Keyssar 2000.

precisely because of their group difference. State policies in the Progressive era, such as protective labor legislation for women and mothers' pensions, affirmed the value of women's maternal group difference, and reformers drew upon the premise of such policies to argue that women's maternal group difference from men would prove to be a benefit to society, were women to have the right to vote. Thus, suffrage advocates invented a new, cultural justification for political inclusion, a paradoxical combination of liberal principles affirming the value of women's individual equality and ascriptive principles affirming the value of women's maternal group difference.

From an historical institutionalist perspective, the American case reveals the paradoxical foundation of women's political citizenship. Monarchies based on kinship group difference are political structures that can provide women with greater access to political rule than electoral democracies based on individual equality, and ascriptive arguments about women's group difference, combined with liberal arguments about individual equality, are cultural norms that can foster state policies that expand women's political citizenship more than liberal ones alone. This raises the question: Do these examples point merely to idiosyncratic attributes of an "exceptional" American state or to new explanations about the relationship between democratization and political citizenship in general?4

To answer that question, this research tests the hypothesis that structural and cultural paradoxical combinations affirming both individual equality and the value of women's group difference, when connected to government institutions and state policies, are key features of a political system that enhance women's election to national office. The results dramatically revise models of democratization and citizenship, sameness-difference debates in feminist theory, and multiculturalism perspectives.

### **GENDER AND OFFICEHOLDING**

Most nations today extend voting rights to women, but women's election to national office, the other major component of full political citizenship, varies widely. Forty-two nations elected a woman as their head of state or government in the twentieth century. In the United States, however, no woman has even been a strong contender as the presidential nominee of a major political party, much less been elected to the office of the presidency. Similarly, in the 200-year period between 1776 and 1976, there were 1,715 men, compared to only 11 women who had served in the United States Senate; there were 9,591 men and only 97 women during that period who had served in the House of Rep-

resentatives; and 507 men had served in presidential cabinets, compared to only 5 women (Cantor, Bernay, and Stoess 1992, 6). What is more, when we turn to the percentage of women elected to national legislatures in the year 2000, we see that the United States lags far behind other major, industrial democracies: In the United States women constitute only 13.3% of the House of Representatives, in contrast to Sweden, where women constitute 42.7% of the lower house of the national legislature; The Netherlands, at 36.0%; Germany, at 30.9%; South Africa, at 30.0%; Switzerland, at 23.0%; Australia, at 22.4%; Spain, at 21.6%; and Canada, at 20.6%.

That so few women are elected to national office in the United States is surprising, given the stature of the United States as a world industrial and political power, its strong feminist organizations, and its historic commitment to democratic values asserting the equality of all individuals. Most scholars explain this anomaly as a result of the power of political structures for setting opportunity parameters that enhance or depress women's recruitment to national office. In particular, researchers, such as Pippa Norris, have found that parliamentary systems benefit women, as do electoral systems that allow for proportional representation and multiple parties (Bystydzienski 1992, 204; Carroll 1990, 9; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Norris 1997; Welch and Studlar 1990). Researchers have also found the percentage of women in political office to be related to demographic characteristics. Women's educational rates, participation in the labor force, and percentage in professional occupations and a nation's urbanization, wealth, and population size all have been found to correlate positively with women's electoral success as national officeholders (Matland 1998; Norris 1987, 1996; Oakes and Almquist 1993, 71–81; Putnam 1976; Rule 1981, 1987). In addition, a national commitment to democratic practices ensuring individual rights and equality also fosters women's officeholding opportunities.7 The more rights and procedural safeguards there are, the more likely that women will be elected to national legislatures (Kenworthy and Malami 1999, 239-54).

In the American case, however, we noted additional features that enhance women's political incorporation into the public sphere as voters. At the founding of the United States, government institutions based on kinship group difference, such as the English monarchy from which the Americans rebelled, had provided more access to political rule for women than the new, electoral ones, based on individual equality alone. Similarly, in the Progressive era, the value of women's group difference, as expressed in maternalist state policies, combined with arguments asserting women's individual equality, spearheaded the successful campaign for woman suffrage.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> The literature on American exceptionalism is vast, but see Lipset 1996.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Jury duty and military service are additional components of political citizenship, though outside the scope of this study. For an excellent discussion of women's jury duty in the American context, see Ritter

 $<sup>^6</sup>$  These figures are for the year 2000 or the closest election year prior to the year 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> For an excellent cross-national expansion of indices and discussion of gender in relation to a diverse set of nations, see Nelson and Chowdhury 1994.

The question is: Do these paradoxical combinations—government institutions of electoral rule based on individual equality combined with monarchies based on kinship group difference, on the one hand, and state policies based on individual equality combined with the value of women's maternalist group difference, on the other—establish a new model explaining women's cross-national officeholding patterns? If so, how does their explanatory power compare with attributes found by other scholars to be important? To answer these questions, this research examines the relative impact of political structure, political policies, demographic variables, and paradoxical combinations of structure and policies on contemporary national officeholding patterns for women in 190 nations.

#### **VARIABLES AND DATA**

# Unit of Analysis: The Nation-State

The unit of analysis is the nation-state. Every nation that could be identified was included in this project, including nations that are members of the United Nations and those included in world almanacs and reference books, for a total of 190 nations.

# **National Legislative Officeholding**

The dependent variable measuring women's political citizenship is the percentage of a nation's legislature that is composed of women in the year 2000 or the prior year closest to it. This measure is obtained from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Much scholarship directs attention to women's distinct leadership styles, issue concerns, or voting patterns as voters or officeholders. This dependent variable, however, focuses on women's political recruitment: how women get into positions of political power in the first place—that is, descriptive representation, or what Norris and Lovenduski (1995, 94) term demographic representation. Although some question the significance of descriptive representation, others aver its value. As Virginia Sapiro (1998) argues, in a democracy it does matter

whether women vote, an argument made similarly by Jane Mansbridge (1990, 1999, 2001).<sup>12</sup> Political scientist Barbara Burrell points to the symbolic, normative. and policy benefits that accrue to enhancing women's descriptive representation, arguing that women's election to positions in government provides a positive symbolic identification for all women; enhances the normative, democratic belief that politics is equally open to all, regardless of one's gender; and bolsters the passage of policies benefiting women, such as federal funding for child care programs, family and medical leave legislation, and abortion rights (Burrell 1994, 151–52). More recently, Nancy Burns, Kay Schlozman. and Sidney Verba found that women's descriptive representation has a positive effect on women's knowledge and interest in politics, important factors leading to the increased mobilization of women as voters and active political participants (Verba and Schlozman 2000).

### **Government Institutions**

We measure the impact on women's officeholding of two major types of political structures: government institutions based on individual equality and government institutions based on kinship group difference. The individual equality of voters is the basic premise of liberal. democratic electoral systems. In some political systems, such as the United States, the equality of each individual voter, "one person, one vote," is even deemed a constitutional right (Gray v. Sanders 1963, Mahan v. Howell 1973). Thus, this project uses electoral systems as a measure of government institutions based on individual equality. Electoral systems, however, can be constructed in a variety of ways, and scholars have found this to be a significant influence on women's officeholding patterns. Specifically, women are more likely to be elected to national legislatures in parliamentary rather than in presidential systems and in competitive electoral structures characterized by multimember districts and multiple parties (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Norris 1994, 1997; Norris and Lovenduski 1995). 13

<sup>13</sup> Others point to the instrumental values of presidential or parliamentarian systems for consolidating democratic processes; see Vanhanen 1992, 9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Data for the lower house in a bicameral legislative system are used.
<sup>9</sup> The literature is vast, but see Carroll 1985; Cook, Thomas, and Wilcox 1994; Duerst-Lahti and Johnson 1990; Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995; Norris 1986; Reingold 1996; Thomas 1994; and Thomas and Welch 1991.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The focus of this analysis is not whether women vote differently than men do or whether women have different leadership styles or agendas but, rather, how women acquire the political representation as voters and officeholders; see Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999.

as voters and officeholders; see Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999. 

In lieu of formal political rights or descriptive representation, some focus on the power of social movements, informal political associations, and organizations to achieve political goals. Political scientist Theda Skocpol (2000), for example, has shown powerfully how informal networks of disenfranchised women used their position as outsiders to craft maternalist policies successful for establishing innovative welfare policies, such as the passage in the Progressive era of mothers' pension legislation at the state level. Mary Katzenstein (1998) makes a compelling case for studying informal modes of political power.

<sup>12</sup> Also, scholars argue that processes of democratization are thwarted as long as women lack "access to social and political institutions and offices" (Bayes, Hawkesworth, and Kelly 2001). The presumption that all individuals in a group share a common characteristic, trait, or behavior invites the criticism of essentialism. As a vast. well-established literature argues, however, the category "woman" is a heterogeneous one inclusive of individuals for whom there is no one common denominator; see, for example, Spivak 1999. Others, such as Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000, 3), argue that even from a biological perspective, "male" and "female" are most appropriately envisioned as lying on a continuum of definition rather than forming two, bipolar, exclusive categories. Historically and politically, however, it is important to understand the representation of group difference, however flawed it may be. Hence, what is significant about the maternalist arguments about women's group difference is not the validity of the views, but the political innovation of socially constructing a subordinate group's difference to be a positive, rather than a negative or neutral, justification for their political inclusion.

13 Others, point to their political inclusion.

This research uses variables developed in previous research to measure these structural attributes and to assess their impact on women's legislative officeholding (Kenworthy and Malami 1999). Dummy variables are used, based on whether a nation has a parliamentary or presidential system; the "other" category is the omitted category. Multiparty electoral systems are coded 2 if voters choose among party lists in multimember districts that average five or more seats per district; 1 if party lists used by districts average fewer than five seats, or a combination of party list and candidate voting is used, or voters choose among individual candidates but in multimember districts; 0 if voters choose among individual candidates in single-member districts; and -1 if the electoral system contains no competition between any parties.

This project measures government institutions based on kinship group difference as a component of a nation's political structure by assessing whether governance includes a monarchical principle of rule. In past centuries, monarchical political rule based on an inherited kinship group difference, when open to women, was a significant point of direct access to political leadership. While ordinarily giving preference to men, most monarchical structures of the past nevertheless placed less emphasis upon gender as a qualification for officeholding than did electoral democracies, such as the United States. Those who "throw away" women monarchs on the grounds that their entry to political power on the basis of their elitist group difference renders them irrelevant to an investigation of women's electoral officeholding in electoral democracies miss a crucial structural lesson: Monarchies based on kinship group difference, when open to women, constitute a structural component of the state that can increase rather than decrease women's formal political power in the public sphere of governance, however symbolic that governance might be.

As Burns, Schlozman, and Verba (2001) note, examples of gender-integrated politics provide a crucial psychological mechanism for women's knowledge and interest in politics, which in turn affects their participation in politics. In this respect, monarchies open to women are government institutions that provide an example of political rule as not only a "man's game," but also a "woman's game" (Burns, Schlozman, and Verba 2001). Thus, although we can eschew the association of monarchies with castelike systems of feudal hierarchies, we also might do well to consider how contemporary monarchies open to women provide a "gender-integrated" example of political rule that could enhance women's acquisition of democratic political citizenship, including their election to national office. To test this hypothesis, this research measures whether a designated monarchical kinship group is a component of the state's political structure, where its power can range from all but absolute to that which is primarily symbolic. Monarchies constitute two dummy variables, one indicating a monarchy open to women as well as men and the other indicating a monarchy open only to men.

#### **State Policies**

This project accepts the definition of political culture as the basic political attitudes, belief systems, or ideological perspectives of a nation (Diamond 1999; Marx 2002). Although political culture is difficult to measure and often neglected, political scientist Larry Diamond contends that it is "a central factor in the consolidation of democracy" (Diamond 1992, 1999, 62–192; Inglehart 1997, 161–67). This project assesses a nation's cultural affirmation of individual equality and ascriptive group difference in general and women's maternal group difference in particular by analyzing state policies. The cultural affirmation of individual equality is measured by rating scales ranking nation's on the degree to which state policies guarantee democratic rights to individuals "in spite of" their ascriptive group differences by adhering to human rights policies, due process, and basic liberty guarantees, such as the right to a fair trial, freedom from torture or cruel forms of punishment, and freedom of the press, speech, association, and religion. The U.S. government regularly provides updates on the level of civil rights and political rights operating within nations, 14 as do human rights research organizations (Freedom House 1997). This project makes use of published rating scales, which rank nations from 1 to 7, where 1 is low commitment to individual rights and 7 is high (Freedom House 1997).

This project measures the cultural affirmation of group difference in general and women's maternal group difference in particular by assessing whether a nation constitutionalizes state policies providing protections, privileges, or protections to individuals "because of" their group difference. In so doing, this project draws upon the growing literature in public law claiming that constitutions define the central purposes and values of a polity as well as its institutional framework (Belz 1972, 640; Greenberg et al. 1993). As such, constitutions become a valuable source of information not only about the way nations structure their political institutions, but also about their political culture, that is, the basic ideological principles affirmed by a political system. 15 Constitutions are relatively more permanent than legislation and court decisions (Jackson and Tushnet 1999). Thus, the inclusions of provisions in constitutions, or the laws of the land that serve in lieu of a constitution, represent more enduring values of a political system than passage of legislation or court decisions alone. In the United Kingdom, for example, the laws that serve in lieu of a written constitution provide for a monarchy. That is not to say, of course,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Since the 1970s, Congress has linked the provision of foreign aid to human rights practices, which "implies that human rights can be measured, at least at the ordinal level, so that the human rights practices of other nations can be ranked from best to worst" (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 540). Human Rights Reports, released by the United States Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, are used to determine the level of democratic practice where there is missing information.
<sup>15</sup> For the power of language in the context of law, see Feldman 2000;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> For the power of language in the context of law, see Feldman 2000 for the importance of constitutional text, see Tribe and Dorf 1991.

that there is no cultural discussion or political debate about the British monarchy but, rather, to say that its "constitutional acceptance" at the national level reflects a significant feature of British political culture and values.

This project's documentation of the presence of a constitutional affirmation of benefits to individuals because of their group differences, not in spite of them, complements and supplements the massive cross-national analysis of constitutional texts launched by the University of Wuerzburg's International Constitutional Law (ICL) Project, begun in 1996. The ICL Project is in the process of classifying all national constitutions on the basis of a common typology so that it is possible to compare the presence or absence of specific, textual provisions across constitutions worldwide. The ICL categories include type of government, support for minority rights, affirmative action protections, welfare benefits, and secularism. This project draws upon and expands those categories to include constitutional provisions affirming support to individuals because of their group difference in general and women's maternal group difference in particular.

Welfare Group Difference. This project adopts the definition of women's maternal group difference to be women's disproportional association with "carework" compared to men (Orloff 1993, 303-28). As Alva Myrdal (1941, 339-41) noted, prior to the advent of state social security policies, people were protected from disabilities resulting from illness, old age, and other affirmities by the care-work provided in the context of the family as an institution. Women within the family typically are identified as the primary performers of care-work in their roles as wives and mothers. Thus, in terms of political culture, women's maternal group difference from men is defined in terms of care-work (Orloff 1993). However, as Mrydal (1941, 340) observes, in the development of a welfare state, the "protective tasks which earlier had been provided for within the family are ... transferred to more expert public bodies...[to] a whole series of institutions...[forming] an interlocking system of social assistance." Typically, it is women who perform more care-work in the public provision of social assistance as paid professionals who disproportionally choose service occupations, such as social workers, primary school, nurses, or unpaid social service volunteers. Hence, women's disproportionate engagement in care-work—whether performed within or outside the home—culturally defines care-work, or welfare provision, to be "women's work." 16

All nations regulate marriage and family relations as a primary site for the provision of welfare. Many nations go further by legislating state policies for the provision of welfare, that is, care-work, as performed within or outside the home. Some go even further and constitutionalize care-work by making welfare provision an affirmative duty of the state. This project adopts the latter as a measure of a political system's cultural affirmation of the value of care-work by coding whether a nation constitutionally mandates state benefits, protections, or privileges to individuals "because of" their need for care-work as administered either within or outside the home. 17 Thus, the variable, welfare group difference, includes the constitutionalization of care-work benefits to the ill, the elderly, the disabled, and designated family members, such as mothers, children, and fathers. Nations that do so are coded 1; nations that do not are coded 0.

Additional Group Differences. Cultural group difference is measured as constitutionalized state protections, benefits, or privileges provided to individuals because of their cultural, racial, religious, ethnic, or linguistic group differences. This draws upon the work of scholars who define cultural minority groups in terms of ascriptive rather than behavioral characteristics (Fottrell and Bowring 1999, 45-51). Nations that constitutionally affirm at least one cultural group difference are given a score of 1; nations that do not are coded 0. Working-class group difference is measured as constitutionalized state protections, benefits, or privileges provided to individuals because of their status as workers; nations that do so are coded 1, and nations that do not are coded 0. Foreign group difference is measured as constitutionalized state protections, benefits, or privileges provided to individuals because of their status as foreigners within the political system; nations that do so are coded 1, and nations that do not are coded 0.

### **Demographic Variables**

Scholars have found that demographic variables, such as women's entry into the paid labor force, are positively related to women's election to national office. This project examines the impact of demographic variables on women's officeholding patterns by including the percentage of women in the paid labor force, in professional occupations, and in secondary education as well as the population of the nation, its gross domestic product (GDP), and its percentage urbanization.

# Paradoxical Combinations: Individual Equality and Group Difference

From the standpoint of government institutions, attention is rarely focused on monarchical rule based on kinship group difference in relation to processes of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> According to the U.S. Department of Labor, in 2001, women constituted 93.1% of registered nurses, 82.5% of elementary school teachers, and 90% of nursing aides (www.dol.gov/wb/). For an excellent analysis of gender, welfare, and the state, see Hirschmann and Liebert (2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Omitted from this coding are nations that constitutionalize carework as a duty of motherhood, fatherhood, or family roles. Rather, what is coded is whether a nation publically affirms the value of care-work as an affirmative duty of the state by providing benefits, privileges, or protections to individuals *because of* their relation to care-work.

democratization, 18 much less the interaction effects combining monarchical structures and electoral political rule based on individual equality. This project, however, tests the hypothesis that political systems that paradoxically affirm the structural value of individual equality (electoral systems of political rule) and kinship group difference (monarchical systems of political rule) are ones that are more likely to have high percentages of women in their national legislatures. To measure the impact of these paradoxical structural combinations, two features of an electoral democracy—parliamentary system and electoral competition system—are each multiplied by the presence or absence of a monarchy open to women and by the presence or absence of a monarchy open only to men, producing four dummy interaction terms.

Similarly, from the standpoint of state policies, the unidimensional, linear assumption that traditionalism and liberalism are antithetical poles on a policy continuum underlies most assessments of how the "dominant norms and values" in a country influence women's recruitment to political office (Norris 1997, 217). Thus, measurements are directed toward establishing whether a nation scores high on liberal policies supporting women's equality or scores high on traditionalism, as measured, for example, by its degree of Catholicism (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Norris 1997, 217). Such a premise, however, fails to consider the additional possibility that rather than either liberal or traditional values, it is the combination of both that facilitates women's political citizenship. At the level of social movement activism, however, it was exactly such a combination in the early twentieth century that facilitated American women's acquisition of the right to vote, a major component of political citizenship. As historian Nancy Cott (1987, 29) notes, by the 1910s the efforts of male and female reformers to establish new government policies for the "regulation of housing, factory conditions, and community health and safety" facilitated suffragists' arguments that "modern conditions bridged the chasm between the realm of politics and woman's conventional realm of the home."19 However, even mainstream reformers, often portrayed as "social feminists" who "believed in woman's traditional role in society, that of mother and nurture" (Lunardini 1986, 150), nevertheless also conducted an equally vigorous development of individual rights arguments for woman suffrage (Kraditor 1965).<sup>20</sup>

Thus, this research hypothesizes that the strongest cultural influence on women's officeholding is the paradoxical combination of the value of individual equality and the value of women's group difference. Thus, this study assesses the independent effects of individual equality and group difference upon women's officeholding patterns and, more importantly, their interaction effects, that is, the paradoxical combination of both. Nations scoring above four on the seven-point democratic rights scale are scored as affirming individual equality. This dummy variable is then multiplied by the welfare, cultural, working class, and foreign group difference dummy variables to produce four dummy variables measuring the interaction effects of the affirmation of individual equality and the affirmation of welfare, cultural, working class, and foreign group difference, respectively.

#### RESEARCH FINDINGS

# Independent Effects Models: Institutions, Policies, and Demography

Let us first consider the independent effects of structural (government institutions), cultural (state policies), and demographic characteristics of nations variables explaining women's cross-national officeholding patterns, as reported in Table 1. From the standpoint of structural variables defined in terms of government institutions, most electoral variables based on a premise of individual equality are statistically significant. As expected, party competition does have a positive impact upon women's political recruitment; the positive regression coefficient indicates that more competitive electoral structures boost women's percentage in the national legislature by more than 3% (3.115). Surprisingly, however, when all nations in the world are included, presidential systems have a greater positive impact on women's election to national legislatures than do parliamentary systems, where the former increase women's election to office by 3% (3.066) and the latter are statistically insignificant.

Most surprisingly of all, perhaps, is that monarchies based on kinship group difference (when open to women) are government institutions that enhance women's election to national legislatures the most, increasing the percentage by nearly 7% (6.822), as indicated by the positive regression coefficient. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For an excellent discussion of the relevance of monarchical structures to processes of democratization, see Anderson 1991.

<sup>19</sup> Consequently, in the Progressive era reformers contended that women should have "the right to vote in order to ensure domestic welfare ... [which was] part of women's duties as wives, mothers, and community members" (Cott 1987, 29). Of course, group characterization of women included negative depictions intended to block their right to vote, similar to the way in which negative group characterizations of men marginalized by race and class were asserted to thwart the expansion of suffrage to include them. As a representative from Florida put it, "I am opposed to woman suffrage... [because] the place for the women is at home. That is where they belong.... The real mothers—I do not mean all of them, but the great majority of them—do not want it [woman suffrage]" (Congressional Record 1919, 89).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Carrie Chapman Catt, president of the National American Woman Suffrage Association (NAWSA), for example, in 27 speeches and articles dating from 1900 to 1920, cited "individual equality" arguments twice as often as "difference" arguments, 64 times compared to 32 times, respectively. As she stated, "Woman suffrage rests exactly upon the same basis as man suffrage. Women ask for it because it is the right of a citizen of a Republic to express a ballot's share in the making of the law the citizen is expected to obey" (Catt 1903, 5). These documents constitute the collection of Catt's papers housed at the Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Harvard University.

TABLE 1. Percentage of Women in National Legislature Explained by Government Institutions, State Policies, and Demographic Characteristics, 2000

·	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Government Institutions			
Individual equality			
Electoral sys.**	3.115 (0.324)		
Parliamentary sys.	1.225 (0.070)		
Presidential sys.**	3.066 (0.144)		
Group difference	(,		
Kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)***	6.822 (0.273)		
Kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)	-3.425 (-0.106)		
State policies			
Individual equality			
Democratic rights***		1.499 (0.389)	
Group difference		11 100 (01000)	
Welfare grp. diff.**		4.695 (0.221)	
Cultural grp. diff.		1.911 (0.109)	
Working-class grp. diff.		-0.861 (-0.044)	
Foreign group diff.		1.173 (0.062)	
Demography		11110 (0.002)	
Labor: women**			0.224 (0.251)
Education: women			-0.002 (-0.00)
Professions: women*			0.133 (0.194)
Population			0.003 (0.084)
Urbanization			0.003 (0.089)
GDP**			0.005 (0.293)
Life expectancy			-0.000 (-0.00
Constant	5.448***	-0.868	-3.603
$R^2$	0.225	0.212	0.324

<sup>a</sup>Constitutionalized state policies providing protections, benefits, privileges to individuals "because of" designated group difference.

presence of a male monarchy, however, has a negative impact on women's election to national office, decreasing the percentage by -3.425 at a statistical significance level that barely falls short of .100.

When we turn to state policies, we find only two statistically significant variables: democratic policies based on a premise of individual equality and constitutionalized care-work policies based on welfare group difference. Of the two, the latter is much stronger. Affirmation of democratic policies based on individual equality increases women's election to national legislatures by about 1.5% (1.499), but the nations that constitutionalize the provision of state care-work to those in need of welfare assistance elect more than 4.5% more women to their national legislatures (4.695). Equally interesting, however, is the failure of constitutionalized provisions targeted at cultural, working-class, or foreign groups to boost women's election to national office. None of these has a statistically significant influence on women's election to national office. Thus, we find that it is not just the integration of any group difference into the constitutional definition of state action that positively increases women's election to national legislatures but, rather, the integration of welfare group difference that enhances women's officeholding percentages in national legislatures.

When we turn to demographic variables, we find three that have a positive influence on women's national officeholding patterns: the percentage of the labor force that is women, the percentage of women in the professions, and the nation's gross domestic product. Unexpectedly, urbanization and population size have no statistically significant impact.

## Paradoxical Combinations: Individual **Equality and Group Difference**

The American political system is an example of a nation that structurally affirms the principle of individual equality in its electoral system but not group difference, particularly not kinship group difference as a basis for political rule, as in a monarchical system. Founders of the American state, for example, were proud to distance themselves from any association with what were viewed as necessarily tyrannical monarchies. Constitutionally, this aversion to inherited principles of rule based on kinship group difference finds expression in Article 1, Section 9, which states that "no title of nobility shall be granted by the United States; And no person holding any Office of Profit or Trust...shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any... Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, [or] Prince." Hence, American political structures are constitutionally cut off from any connection with monarchical

The same is not true, however, of many other political systems. In terms of political structure, as measured by government institutions, nearly a quarter of the world's nations (22.11%) feature some form of monarchical

TABLE 2. Government Institutions: Combinations of Group Difference and Individual Equality by Percentage of Women in National Legislatures, 2000

	Group Difference: Kinship Group Difference*		
Individual Equality	No Kinship Grp. Diff. (No Monarchy Open to Women)	Yes Kinship Grp. Diff. (Yes Monarchy Open to Women)	Total
Low electoral competition <sup>a</sup> High electoral competition Total	7.65 (107) <sup>b</sup> 11.39 (20) 9.41 (163)	12.75 (56) <b>28.06</b> (7) 15.71 (27)	8.24 (127) 14.45 (63) 10.30 (190)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>Low electoral competition is multimember districts averaging fewer than five seats; high electoral competition is five seats or more. <sup>b</sup>Number of cases in parenthesis.

rule, and of these monarchies, nearly 80% (78.57) paradoxically combine inherited rule based on kinship group difference with a democratic electoral system of rule based on the equality of individual voters. Scholars have found that competitive electoral systems enhance women's election to national office, but monarchies as a political structure that might influence women's political citizenship remain all but unexamined. If monarchies are insignificant, then we should find that a higher percentage of women is elected in competitive electoral systems, whether or not those systems also have a monarchy open to women. On the other hand, if monarchies do have a positive impact on women's election to national office, then we should find a higher percentage of women elected to national office in a political system that combines a competitive electoral system with a monarchy open to women. As Table 2 indicates, the latter proves correct. The mean percentage of women elected to national office for nations that have high electoral competition but no monarchy open to women is only 12.56, while the mean percentage for nations that have both soars to 28.06.21

In terms of state policies, the American political system is an example of a nation that affirms the value of individual equality but remains light years away from constitutionally providing benefits, privileges, or protections to individuals "because of" their group difference. Although the Progressive era has been noted as the golden age of an American maternalist state (Skocpol 1991), it is important to remember that reformers' success in establishing state policies for the provision of care-work was primarily focused on state legislatures, not the national Congress, and certainly not the federal constitution. In the early twentieth century, states passed mothers' pensions legislation to protect the welfare of women and children, and the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of statelevel protective labor legislation for women in 1908 in Muller v. Oregon. However, mothers' pensions legislation was never seriously considered by Congress, nor did sweeping protective labor legislation for women get on the Congressional agenda. What is more, the Child Labor Amendment that Congress did pass was struck Many other nations, however, do constitutionalize state provision of care-work. For example, Sweden constitutionally defines the "fundamental aims of public activity [the state]" to be "economic and cultural...[and that] it shall be incumbent upon the public administration to secure the right to...housing and education, and to promote social care and social security and a good living environment."<sup>25</sup> In the world at large, 78.4% of the nations constitutionally specify that it is an affirmative duty of the state to provide welfare benefits, that is, care-work, to individuals because of

p = 0.05.

down by the Court as unconstitutional.<sup>22</sup> Eventual passage of the Social Security Act in the New Deal Era did nationalize the provision of some welfare benefits,<sup>23</sup> but Congressional support of even minimum care-work remains highly controversial to this day, as evidenced by the 10 years it took to pass the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, which provides only for up to 12 weeks' *unpaid* leave to care for a child, ill family members, or one's own health. It is safe to say, therefore, that although the American state does affirm individual rights, it is a long way away from constitutionalizing state policies based on group difference, including women's care-work group difference, to be an affirmative duty of the state.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> See *Hammer v. Dagenhart* 1918. Congress responded by passing the Child Labor Tax Law in 1919, levying a prohibitive tax of 10% on products manufactured in whole or in part by children, but the Court struck this down in *Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company* 1922, declaring that Congress could not use its 'taxing power to accomplish an unconstitutional regulation." See Link and Catton 1980, 198, 323. <sup>23</sup> When welfare legislation was finally nationalized by the Social Security Act in the New Deal era, it nevertheless failed to address women's welfare needs adequately. See Mettler 1998.

What is more, many criticize Progressive-era maternalist policies for encoding in law restrictive roles and norms for women, which in effect limited, rather than expanded, women's full incorporation into the American state. See Stone 1994. From the standpoint of this project, however, although the FMLA uses gender-neutral terms in contrast to the maternalist-specific language of women's protective labor legislation and mothers' pensions in the early twentieth century, what is similar about Progressive-era maternalist policies and the FMLA is the use of public authority and resources to affirm the provision of care-work to others at the level of state and national legislatures but not the federal Constitution. For an insightful path dependence model analyzing the continuing impact of historical legacies on contemporary institutions and policies, see Pierson 2001.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The mean differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.

TABLE 3. State Policies: Combinations of Group Difference and Individual Equality by Percentage of Women in National Legislatures. 2000

	Group Difference: Constitutionalized Welfare Provision*		
Individual Equality	No Constitutionalized Welfare Provision	Yes Constitutionalized Welfare Provision	Total
Low democratic rights <sup>a</sup>	4.88 (19) <sup>b</sup>	7.94 (22)	6.76 (89)
High democratic rights	7.29 (70)	<b>14.92</b> (79)	13.41 (101)
Total	6.52 (41)	11.34 (149)	10.30 (190)

<sup>a</sup>Low individual equality is a score of less than 5 on a seven-point scale measuring democratic rights; high individual equality is a score of 5 or more.

<sup>b</sup>Number of cases in parentheses.

\*p=0.05. Constitutional provisions for state assistance to families, The ill, The elderly, or the disabled.

their group identity as fathers, mothers, parents, children, the ill, the elderly, or the disabled. Of these nations, over half (53.02%) also paradoxically combine the constitutionalization of care-work, women's group difference, with an affirmation of the value of democratic rights based on individual equality. Even more significant, however, is that it is these that have the highest percentage of women in their national legislatures. As indicated in Table 3, the mean percentage of women elected to national office in political systems that constitutionalize state welfare provisions but not democratic rights of individual equality is 7.94; the mean for nations that only affirm democratic rights of individual equality and do not constitutionalize state welfare provisions is only 7.29%; however, the mean for states that paradoxically affirm both rises to 14.92%.<sup>26</sup>

# The Full Model: Independent and Interaction Effects

It is when we turn to an assessment not only of the independent effects of government institutions and state policies, but also of their interaction effects, that we see the power of paradoxical combinations for enhancing women's election to national legislatures, as reported in Table 4. In this saturated full model containing both independent and interaction terms, the independent effects of all of the government institution variables and all of the state policy variables disappear; thus, there are no independent influences on women's election to national legislatures from type of electoral system or governmental system (parliament or presidency) or from whether a nation has a monarchy open to women. Similarly, there are no independent influences on women's election to national legislatures from any of the group difference variables, whether welfare, cultural, working, or foreign group difference.

When we turn to the interaction effects combining individual equality and group difference in the context of governmental institutions and state policies, however, we see a different picture. Nations that paradoxically combine governmental institutions based on electoral principles of rule (individual equality) and

monarchical principles of rule open to women (kinship group difference) are expected to have national legislatures composed of 4.037% more women, as indicated in Table 4. Monarchies have no positive impact on women's election to national office, however, when limited to men. For monarchies to foster women's political citizenship, therefore, women must be politically incorporated not only as the mothers of monarchs, but as monarchs themselves.

Nations that paradoxically combine state policies based on democratic principles (individual equality) and constitutionalized care-work (women's group difference) are expected to have national legislatures composed of 6.73% more women than nations that do not, as indicated in Table 4. Significantly, however, the same boost is not there for combinations of individual equality with constitutional benefits, protections, or privileges "because of" other group differences, such as cultural, worker, or foreign group differences. Thus, in the full model, the only group difference that has a positive impact on women's election to national office is the constitutionalization of women's maternalist group difference, care-work, to be a component of state action, and, then, only when paradoxically combined with affirmation of individual equality as measured by democratic practice.

Demographically, in the full model the percentage of the labor force composed of women and a nation's GDP remain positive and statistically significant. This finding supports the work of others who argue that, along with welfare provisions, the most powerful catalyst for women's economic and political emancipation is access to the paid labor force (Orloff 1993, 318–22).

Subsets. We see further confirmation of these results by applying the full model to subsets of nations used by researchers in other studies (Lijphart 1999; Vanhanen 1997), as reported in Table 5. The full model is applied to Subset I, which is composed of 172 nations and, thus, is large and similar to the 190 nations used in this research (Vanhanen 1997). On the other hand, Subset II is composed of only 36 nations, all of which are democracies (Lijphart 1999), thereby making for a subset very different in composition from the set of 190 nations used in this research. In addition, Subset II contains two added variables: Lijphart's (1999, 312)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> The mean differences are statistically significant at the .05 level.

ndanandant Variable	Dependent Variable (Percentage Women in National Legislature
ndependent Variable	(1 ercentage Worker in National Edgiciator)
Government institutions	
Individual equality	1.236 (0.126)
Electoral system	0.954 (0.052)
Parliamentary system	2.716 (0.123)
Presidential system	2.716 (0.123)
Group difference	0.110 / 0.004\
Kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)	-0.110 (-0.004)
Kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)	-3.581 (-0.110)
State policies	
Individual equality	0.000 ( .0.004)
Democratic rights	-0.333 (-0.084)
Group difference	1 745 (0.000)
Welfare grp. diff.	1.745 (0.080)
Cultural grp. diff.	-0.110 (-0.006)
Working-class grp. diff.	0.695 (0.038)
Foreign grp. diff.	1.539 (0.077)
Institutional combinations: indiv. eq. * grp. diff.	4.007 (0.470)**
Elect. sys. * kinship grp. diff, (monarchy, open to women)	4.037 (0.176)**
Elect. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)	0.680 (0.025)
Parl. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)	3.247 (0.124)
Parl. sys. * Kinship grp diff. (monarchy, men only)	-0.734 (-0.014)
Policy combinations: indiv. eq. * grp. diff.	0.700 (0.000)**
Dem. rights ∗ welfare grp. diff.	6.728 (0.369)**
Dem. rights * cultural grp. diff.	-0.319 (-0.016)
Dem. rights * working class grp. diff.	-3.732 (-0.203)
Dem. rights * foreign grp. diff.	-1.369 (-0.055)
Demography	0.400 (0.040)**
Labor: women	0.190 (0.213)**
Education: women	0.006 (0.066)
Professions: women	0.003 (0.050)
Population	0.001 (0.086)
Urbanization	0.000 (0.000)
GDP	0.004 (0.239)**
Life expectancy	-0.001 (-0.035)
constant	-3.990
$R^2$	0.552
'n	190 nations

executive-parties dimension and his federal-unitary dimension.

The patterns found in this study are validated by both the similar Subset I and the dissimilar Subset II. In both the dissimilar and the similar subsets, the paradoxical combinations of individual equality and group difference remain positive influences on women's election to national legislature, and in both subsets, the strongest impact on women's election to national office of any variable is the state policy combination of democratic rights and constitutionalized state welfare provision. In addition, both subsets show the positive impact of combining government institutions based on individual equality and group difference in the government institutions of the state: a competitive electoral system and a monarchy open to women in the case of Subset I and a parliamentary system and a monarchy open to women in the case of Subset II.

# The Double Paradox: Government Institutions and State Policies

We identified two axes of the state that are critical for women's political citizenship: political structure defining government institutions and cultural norms constitutionalized as state policies. We found that nations that paradoxically combine individual equality and group difference on either axis enhance the election of women to national office. Nations that combine individual equality and group difference on both axes, however, in effect, incorporate into the state a double paradox, as it were, and as such, do even better, as indicated in Figure 1. Considering only those nations that have high electoral competition and high democratic practice, we see in Figure 1 that those combining individual equality and group difference on both government institutions and the state policies axes have the highest mean

	Subset I,	Subset II,
	173 <sup>b</sup> Nations	36 Democracies
Independent Variable	(Vanhanen 1997)	(Lijphart 1999)
Government institutions: indiv. equality		
Electoral system	1.515 (0.157)*	5.131 (0.433)*
Parliamentary system	0.680 (0.038)	<u> </u>
Presidential system	2.670 (0.117)	9.154 (0.358)**
Group difference	, ,	<b>(/</b>
Kinship grp. diff, (monarchy, open to women)	-0.411 (-0.016)	-9.119 (-0.422)
Kinship grp. diff, (monarchy, men only)	-3.772 (-0.120)	<u> </u>
State policies: indiv. equality	(,	
Democratic rights	-0.116 (-0.030)	17.668 (2.396)**
Group difference		
Welfare grp. diff.	1.417 (0.063)	-46.915 (-1.909) <sup>4</sup>
Cultural grp. diff.	0.406 (0.023)	91.469 (4.291)
Working-class grp. diff.	0.434 (0.021)	-12.815 (-0.568)
Foreign grp. diff.	1.620 (0.083)	a
Institutional combs: indiv. eq. * grp. diff.	1.020 (0.000)	
Elect. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)	4.782 (0.212)**	3.264 (0.274)
Elect. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)	0.600 (0.023)	0.204 (0.274)
Parl. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, open to women)	3.295 (0.123)	14.249 (0.653)*
Parl. sys. * kinship grp. diff. (monarchy, men only)	-0.542 (-0.011)	14.245 (0.000)
Policy combinations: indiv eq. * grp. diff.	0.012 ( 0.011)	
Dem. rights * welfare grp. diff.	5.878 (0.324)**	56.156 (2.431)**
Dem. rights * cultural grp. diff.	0.008 (0.004)	-90.405 (-4.148)
Dem. rights * working-class grp. diff.	-4.068 (-0.222)*	7.656 (.351)
Dem. rights * foreign group diff.	-1.147 (-0.048)	7.321 (.286)**
Demography	-1.147 (-0.048)	7.321 (.200)
Labor: women	0.170 (0.193)**	1.241 (0.827)***
Education: women	0.110 (0.126)	-0.244 (-0.107)
Professions: women	-0.0002 (.000)	0.031 (0.028)
Population	0.008 (0.102)	-0.030 (-0.413) <sup>4</sup>
Urbanization	-0.003 (-0.008).	0.186 (0.366)**
GDP	<b>0.037 (0.228)**</b>	-0.204 (-0.722) <sup>2</sup>
Life expectancy	-0.001 (-0.005)	-0.204 (-0.722) 0.276 (0.973)***
Executive—parties dimension	-0.001 (-0.003) 	
Federal-unitary dimension		0.578 (0.056) <b>3.924 (0.368)</b> **
•		0.02 (0.000)
Constant	-4.582	<b>-158.445**</b>
$R^2$	0.563	0.947

	Yes, Kinship (	nt Institutions: Group Difference open to women)	
		^	•
•			
•			
State Policies:	24.05	28.06	State Policies:
No Constitutionalized Welfare Provision	9.25	16.18	Yes Constitutionalized Welfare Provision
		ı	

percentage of women elected to their national legislatures, 28.06%.

# CONCLUSION: GENDER AND POLITICAL CITIZENSHIP

### The Gender Paradox

This project extends the analysis of women's political citizenship in relation to two major dimensions of statebuilding: What the state "is" in terms of its government institutions and what the state "does" in terms of its constitutionalized policies. First, from the standpoint of what the state "is," this research establishes that not only modern, government institutions based on a principle of individual equality benefit women's election to national office, but also traditional ones, such as monarchical systems of rule based on kinship group difference. Far from a meaningless symbolic attribute of a state, therefore, traditional monarchies to this day retain significant power for defining nationality and for enhancing political stability, as is evident in contemporary discussions of what are considered the more forward-looking monarchies in the Middle East, such as Morocco and Jordan (Jehl 1999, A3).

However, for monarchies to benefit women's political citizenship, they must be combined with the affirmation of individual equality and women must be eligible to rule as sovereign. The latter condition sheds light on Japan, one of the world's leading economic powers, which has an extraordinarily low percentage of women elected to its national legislature, only 4.6%, despite having high scores affirming individual equality, a competitive electoral system, and a monarchy. However, although eight women ruled as empresses in Japan in centuries past, since 1889, Japan's monarchy has been open only to men. After Crown Princess Masako gave birth to a baby girl, however, Prime Minister Koizum and 83% of the Japanese people support amending the Japanese Constitution to allow a woman to succeed to the imperial throne (Hernandez 2001, A3), a policy this study found to enhance women's access to electoral office. In the words of Junko Kamikita, a homemaker, "It would be good to have a woman as the symbol of our state, just like Queen Elizabeth or Prime Minister Thatcher. If we have a female symbol of state, the Japanese people's notions [about women in politics] would change" (French 2001, A3)<sup>27</sup>.

Second, from the standpoint of what the state "does" this research supports previous scholarship establishing that state policies have an important impact on women and that welfare state policies, in particular, are "women-friendly." However, it goes beyond such findings by showing that it is not just the constitutionalization of women's group difference, care-work, in the form of state policies providing welfare to those in need, that boosts women's election to national office

but, rather, the paradoxical combination of constitutionalized welfare policies and democratic state policies affirming individual equality. The significance of the latter is hidden in many studies that focus on western European nations where the presence of democratic rights affirming individual equality is a virtual constant, making it appear that it is the variation in the provision of state welfare benefits alone that makes a state women-friendly. This research alters that view by showing that affirmation of principles of individual equality also are women-friendly, when paradoxically combined with the constitutionalized affirmation of the value of women's group difference, that is, care-work.

# Models of Democratization: Paradoxical Combinations

Our identification of the gender paradox as the basis of women's political citizenship dramatically revises models of democratization and citizenship. It has been usual to ignore monarchies as political structures relevant to democratization processes and to view ascriptive principles of group difference as antithetical, if not destructive, of liberal principles of individual equality for promoting the political inclusion of subordinate groups. Some understand political citizenship, therefore, as advancing only when the latter prevail over the former. As Rogers Smith (1997, 36–37) has argued, the Enlightenment idea of the equality of all rights-bearing individuals, when dominant, fosters an institutional commitment to greater political equality, which in turn generates public policies securing the political inclusivity of marginal groups. Liberal ideology, therefore, serves as the basis for evaluating "legal systems that automatically subordinate women, blacks, Native Americans, homosexuals, and non-Christians...[as] presumptively invalid"—a crucial mechanism for establishing alternative institutional structures and public policies for achieving greater political inclusivity." Thus, as Smith contends, in the context of the multiple traditions characterizing the American state, the dominant pattern for achieving the political inclusion of marginal groups is for the liberal tradition based on individual rights and equality to compete with and triumph over an Americanist tradition based on ascriptive principles stressing group difference.28

Karen Orren (1991, 40, 95), in her pathbreaking analysis of labor in the United States, *Belated Feudalism*, also associates liberalism with the "art of demolition," that is, as an instrument for destroying feudal principles of obedience based on group difference so

 $<sup>^{27}\</sup> The\ New\ York\ Times$  editorial page concurs, declaring that a Japanese empress "would send a positive message to all Japanese women" (Editorial 2001).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> Rogers Smith notes that woman suffrage is a counterexample to a model positing the power of liberal principles to overcome political exclusion based on ascriptive characteristics. He recognizes "that women's voting rights were won through a combination of liberal, republican, and ascriptive arguments, with the latter more prominent in the era of final success." However, Smith also acknowledges that "he treats these combinations as ineradicably problematic," in contrast to the analysis here suggesting "that in many societies, these apparently paradoxical combinations work quite harmoniously"(personal correspondence, 2002).

as to replace them with liberal principles based on the concept of "voluntary and intentional" individuals.<sup>29</sup> In her view, economic rights expand only when liberal precepts based on individual equality compete with and prevail over ascriptive ones based on master-servant group differences. Similarly, in her new and challenging framework for evaluating constitutional and political development, she argues that we must direct attention to the contest between "officers' rights" and "citizen rights." Officers' rights are a holdover from a feudal organization of political society honoring deference, as based on group difference hierarchies, in contrast to the location of rights in the citizenry at large. Democratic practices expand, not by combining the two, but only when the latter prevail over the former (Orren 2000).

Yet this study found that we must also view ascriptive and liberal principles in combination, not only in competition, with one another,<sup>30</sup> such that the shift from ascriptive principles based on group difference to liberal principles based on individual equality need not be an "all or nothing" process. The expansion of woman suffrage in the United States, for example, was enhanced when reformers paradoxically combined liberal arguments based on individual equality with ascriptive arguments based on the value of women's maternal group difference. Far from an historical curiosity or an example of American exceptionalism, however, we also found that this paradoxical combination enhanced the election of women to national office in contemporary, cross-national contexts. In particular, it was not just any group difference that enhanced women's election to national office but, rather, a group difference that was specifically identified with welfare, or care-work, that is, with maternalism or "women's work. When combined with the affirmation of individual equality, the constitutionalization of welfare provisions was found to be the most positive influence on women's election to national office.

Similarly, although it is usual to write off monarchical structures as politically irrelevant to processes of democratization (Anderson 1991), this study found that monarchies open to women paradoxically combined with competitive electoral and parliamentary systems have a greater positive influence on women's election to national legislatures than do such electoral structural features alone. This finding adds to our understanding of how the "mode of transition" in periods of regime change affects political citizenship (Munck and Leff 1999), particularly the impact on women's polit-

ical citizenship. Rather than a unilinear change from inherited monarchical regimes based on kinship group difference to liberal electoral ones based on individual equality, women's political citizenship is fostered by the paradoxical combination of both, thereby bolstering the contention of Orren and Skowronek (1994) that to decipher parameters of development is to identify mixed orders of change and sequence.

#### **Gender: From Nation to State**

Scholars have long emphasized two crucial components of democratic consolidation: national unity of the people and stability of political institutions (Huntington 1968; Rustow 1999), that is, the nation and the state, respectively. It has been noted how gender figures prominently in the construction of the nation, that is, the way in which a political community is "imagined" (Anderson 1983) or "invented" (McClintock 1991). As scholars argue, women's group difference from men can be used as the very emblem of national identity. The veiling of women in Muslim communities, for example, can be viewed, rather than as a return to tradition, instead as a cultural symbol specifically constructed in contemporary times to signify national independence from the West (Ahmed 1992; Badran 1994). Similarly, historian Nancy Cott (2000) cogently argues that public policies regulating marriage as the institutional site of family and sexual relations provided the United States with a mechanism for developing and maintaining a cohesive national identity.

This study found, however, that what is crucial for women's political citizenship is the incorporation of gender difference into the construction of the state. Gender difference is defined by women's disproportionate association with biological and social reproductive labor. Biological reproductive labor refers to the generation of people, including kinship groups, by means of pregnancy and birth. This is a type of reproductive labor engaged in only by women; hence, women's disproportional association with it. Social reproductive labor is the nurturing and care of people once they are born.<sup>31</sup> Not all women do more social reproductive work than all men, of course, but as a group, empirically, women do more, both within the family and in the paid labor force as social workers, nurses, elementary school teachers, and service volunteers; hence, women's disproportional association with nurturing and care.

Political scientist Jacqueline Stevens (1999) powerfully analyzes the way in which the state construct kinship rules, such as marriage regulations, to control membership in a political society. She thus focuses needed attention on the political relevance of biological reproductive labor in relation to the state. However,

Orren analyzes how liberal principles based on individual equality are institutionally located in legislatures that draft positive law and how feudal principles based on hierarchial group difference are institutionally maintained by a judicial system drawing upon common law precepts as its reference for decision-making.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> As Ira Katznelson (1999, 570) notes, there is a particular affinity between "illiberal impulses" stressing inherently unequal group differences and republicanism because republicanism is "characterized by a strong elective affinity for clear and deep principles of inclusion and thus of exclusion." Also, many fault liberalism for its incapacity for including subordinate groups. See Hirschmann 1989; Pateman, Hirschmann, and Powell 1992; Scalia 1998; and Sinopoli and Hirschmann 1991.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> Social reproductive labor is "the activities and attitudes, behaviors and emotions, responsibilities and relationships directly involved in the maintainance of life on a daily basis...how food, clothing and shelter are made available for immediate consumption, how the care and socialization of children is accomplished...[how the] care for elderly and infirm is organize" (Brenner and Laslett 1991).

she does not address the impact on women's political citizenship of reproductive labor as a constituent component of government institutions or constitutionalized state policies. Yet that is exactly what some political systems do. Political systems that institutionalize monarchies based on kinship group difference, for example, structurally make biological reproductive labor—women's group difference—a constituent component of the state's government. Other political systems constitutionalize care-work (welfare provision) to be an affirmative duty of the state, thereby making social reproductive labor—women's group differencea constituent component of state policy. This study found that it is this use of gender—women's group difference—to construct the government institutions and constitutional policies of the state that enhances women's political citizenship.32

Yet another major finding of this study is that it is not solely the incorporation of women's group difference—biological and social reproductive laborinto state construction, but the paradoxical combination of women's reproductive labor group difference and the affirmation of women's individual equality that increases women's political citizenship. Significantly, the principle of individual equality in liberal theory and practice corresponds to an opposite type of labor: productive labor. As John Locke formulated the labor theory of value, all human beings are born equal by "virtue of their "self-ownership," that is, their capacity for productive labor. When an individual mixes her or his productive labor with raw material, the resulting product is that person's property. One of the major purposes of the liberal state is to protect property as generated by productive laborers presumed to be equal. This study confirms the work of others who found that women's incorporation into the paid labor force as productive workers also has a positive influence on women's political citizenship. So, too, does the affirmation of individual equality in the form of electoral competition and equal state treatment of individuals in spite of their group differences.

However, this study clarifies that the crucial issue for women's political citizenship is the construction of the state on the basis of not one, but the two essential work tasks<sup>33</sup> of every society, productive and reproductive labor, corresponding, respectively, to women's dual, if not paradoxical, identities as productive laborers who are the "same" as men and as reproductive laborers who are "different" than men. Without the state's affirmation of the liberal principle that all individuals are born free and equal—the liberal premise of productive labor—women lose the right to challenge state policies that stereotype and limit women's opportunities on the basis of their reproductive group identity. Equally significant, however, without the integration of women's

reproductive group difference into the state's construction, as Seyla Benhabib (1987, 160; quoted in Nash 1998, 32) puts it, "[A]n entire domain of human activity, namely nurture, reproduction, love, and care...is excluded from moral and political considerations and confined to the realm of 'nature,'" thereby severing women, in terms of their group identity, from the state.

# Feminist Theory and Practice: Sameness and Difference

The paradoxical combination of individual equality and women's group difference identified in this research and its association with productive and reproductive labor, respectively, also addresses the all but intractable debate among feminists and others striving to improve women's position in American society.<sup>34</sup> The very definition of liberalism, which assumes the existence of "free and equal individuals," places women, according to Kate Nash (1998, 32–34) in a "catch-22" position. On the one hand, if women adapt to male norms by asserting their equality and sameness with men, they do so at the cost of negating the reproductive and nurturing roles disproportionately associated with women, thereby destroying their specificity as women. On the other hand, if women assert their difference from men, their very specificity as women categorizes them as deviant from the universalistic formulation of the liberal principle that all individuals are equal, in the sense of being the same. Thus, as Nash (1998, 1) notes, "Most contemporary feminist political theorists see liberalism as unequivocally incompatible with feminism...[because to use] the universal principles of liberalism to try to gain equality with men and liberty from subordination to men is doomed to failure. It will only contribute to the advancement of those women who mimic men and, since no women can do so beyond a certain point, ultimately it will fail them too." This conundrum has produced what legal scholar Robin West (1988, 1) identifies as a jurisprudence analysis polarized into a masculine "separation thesis" and a feminist "connection thesis."

This study finds, however, that sameness and difference need not be mutually exclusive approaches and, thus, need not form what Amy Gutmann (1985, 316-18) terms "the tyranny of dualism" or what Jean Cohen (1999, 252) defines as the ambiguity about whether "uniform equal rights and respect [are] owed to every citizen due to their individual status as legal persons or to their membership status as belonging to a particular political community." As this research establishes, it is not that liberal principles of individual equality "fail" women (Klausen and Maier 2001); indeed, we found that democratic rights affirming individual equality are crucial for advancing women's political incorporation as voters and officeholders. Rather, it is that individual equality is "not enough." As we discovered, women's political citizenship, rather than requiring an either/or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> This finding supports important work by Robert Lieberman (2002) analyzing how racial distinctions affect welfare state development and political incorporation and also extends Joan Tronto's focus on the political significance of care-work (1993c).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> For an excellent discussion of the primacy of labor in relation to processes of political development, see Orren 1995.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> For an early, powreful analysis of the sameness–difference debate, see West 1988.

choice between individual equality and women's group difference, advances on the paradoxical combination of both.35

### Multiculturalism

This study's identification of the gender paradox, exemplifying the paradoxical combination of individual equality and the value of group difference, has an important relationship to multiculturalism debates. what some term the "politics of difference" or "identity politics."36 Advocates of multicultural perspectives stress that claims based on rights should not be targeted at the individual alone as a unit of society but should also be established for groups (Bok 1995; Phillips 1999, 96). As Alan Wolfe and Jytte Klausen (2000) note, the multicultural substitution of the group for the individual can cast identity politics "as anti-liberal in tone and consequence." They caution, along with others, such as Susan Okin, the need for combining both individual and group norms. Identity politics, Okin argues, can successfully combine with liberal principles, if and when groups allow individual members to enter and exit at will, avoid essentialism by recognizing individual diversity within ascriptive groups, and accept common standards of citizenship embodied in rules of law by the society at large (Okin 1999; Wolfe and Klausen 2000). In other words, multiculturalism works when based on a paradoxical combination of the affirmation of individual equality and group difference. This research demonstrates that such combinations not only are possible, but are advantageous to the political inclusion of subordinate groups, thereby adding significant theoretical and empirical validation for the advocacy of multicultural policies within electoral, democratic nation-states.

### **APPENDIX: DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES**

(1) Women's share of parliamentary seats. Percentage of women elected to the main national legislative body (lower house if bicameral), as of 2000 or the nearest prior year to 2000, from the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

(2) Welfare group difference. Dummy variable: Presence or absence of at least one constitutional provision for special benefits, protections, or privileges to individuals because of welfare needs, such as mothers, fathers, children, the disabled, the ill, or the elderly. Examples of such provisions are that the state "shall make special efforts to ensure a secure standard of living, instruction and education for the young," "mothers shall receive support and protection before an after the birth of the child," and "to recognize and protect the family as a fundamental and vital social unit." Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia,

Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Maceonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritania, Mexico, Moldavia, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Samoa, San Marino and Principe, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leon, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Togo, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu. Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia. (3) Monarchical group difference (open to women).

Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma (Myanmar), Burundi.

Cambodia. Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Central

African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo.

Dummy variable: Presence or absence of constitutional provision for a monarchy open to women. Australia, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Denmark, Dominica, Grenads, Jamaica, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Monaco, The Netherland, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Solomon Islands, Spain, St. Kitts and Nevis, Sweden, Thailand, Tonga, Trinidad & Tobago, Tuvalu, United Kingdom.

(4) Monarchical group difference (male only). Dummy variable. Belgium, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia. Japan, Jordan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Malaysia, Morocco,

Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland.

(5) Cultural group difference. Example of clauses coded: "It is the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions enabling the Sami people to preserve and develop its language, culture and way of life." Dummy variable: Presence or absence of at least one constitutional guarantee for state benefits, protections, or privileges (including political representative quotas) because of cultural identity, race, language, or religion. Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, China, Colombia, Congo, Croatia, Cuba, Cypress, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Micronesia, Moldova, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, North Korea, Norway. Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian Federation, Seychelles, Sierra Leon, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

(6) Working-class group difference. Examples of clauses coded: "The maximum duration of work for one day shall be eight hours," "The maximum duration of nightwork shall

<sup>35</sup> This adds support to "relational" perspectives of legal scholars;

see Minow 1991 and Nedelsky 1989.

The literature is vast, but see Benhabib 1996; Bock and James 1992; Holmes and Murray 1999; Kymlicka 1997; Kymlicka and Norma 2000; Melzer, Weinberger, and Zinman 1998; Phillips 1999; Shapiro and Kymlicka 1997; Wolfe and Klausen 2000; and Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999.

be seven hours," "The use of labor of minors under 14 years of age is prohibited." Dummy variable. Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antiqua-Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Cypress, Denmark, Diibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gambia, Georgia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Oatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Rwanda, San Marino and Principe, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leon, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Switzerland, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Uzbekistan, Uruguay, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

(7) Foreign group difference. Dummy variable: Presence or absence of at least one constitutional protection because of foreign or alien status. Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Benin, Bulgaria, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iraq, Italy, Laos, Macedonia, Mali, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Mozambique, The Netherlands, North Korea, Oman, Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Somalia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, Yugoslavia. All group difference data were coded from the national constitution in effect for the year used to measure the percentage of women elected to the country's

national legislature.

(8) Individual equality. Degree of political rights and freedoms, scored on a scale of 1 (low) to 7 (high), 1991–97. From Kenworthy and Malami 1999 and Freedom House 1997.

- (9) Parliamentary system. Dummy variable, coded by author. From Banks 1991 or the national constitution.
- (10) Presidential system. Dummy variable, coded by author. From Banks 1991 or the national constitution.
- (11) Electoral system. Structure of the electoral system. Coded 2 if voters choose among party lists in multimember districts that average five or more seats per district; 1 if party lists are used by district size averages of fewer than five seats, or a combination of party list and candidate voting is used, or voters choose among individual candidates but in multimember districts; 0 if voters choose among individual candidates in single-member districts; -1 if no party system at all. Adapted from Kenworthy and Malami, 1999.
- (12) Women's education. Female share of enrollees in secondary education, 1980–90. From Kenworthy and Malami 1999 and United Nations, WISTAT.
- (13) Women's labor. Female share of the paid labor force, 1994. From Kenworthy and Malami 1999 and United Nations, WISTAT.

- (14) Women in professional occupations. Female share of employees in profession, technical, and related occupations, 1990. From Kenworthy and Malami 1999 and United Nations, WISTAT. *Population*. In millions, closest figure to 2000. From Dorling Kindersley 1994, 2000 and Banks 1991.
- (15) Urbanization. Percentage urban. From Dorling Kindersley 1994, 2000). Gross domestic product (GDP). World ranking on domestic product per capita. From Dorling Kindersley 1994, 2000.
- (16) Life expectancy. World ranking on life expectancy. From Dorling Kindersley 1994, 2000.

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# Lipstick and Logarithms: Gender, Institutional Context, and Representative Bureaucracy

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ccording to the theory of representative bureaucracy, passive representation among public employees will lead to active representation in bureaucratic outputs. Existing research demonstrates that the link between passive and active representation exists for race but not for sex. Past research on this topic has not, however, taken into account the contextual environment that affects whether sex will translate into gender and lead to active representation in the bureaucracy. In this paper, we create a framework that specifies the conditions that affect whether passive representation results in active representation for sex and then test this framework using the case of education. We find that passive representation of women in education leads to active representation and that the institutional context affects the extent to which this link between passive and active representation occurs.

he women's movement has long sought to increase the number of women in leadership positions within government organizations. An assumption behind this goal is that increased access to positions of power (passive representation) will result in policies that improve the lives other women outside the organization (active representation). Is this assumption valid? Little empirical research exists that explores whether increasing the number of women in an organization affects the policy outputs of the organization. What little research there is shows no link between passive and active representation for gender (Hindera 1993; Selden 1997).

In this article, we create a theoretical framework that identifies the conditions under which gender diversity has a substantive effect on organizational outputs and tests whether the passive representation of women in education affects the performance of female students. Future researchers interested in diversity in other bureaucracies, legislatures, or courts can use this framework to explore whether diversity matters in different organizations and across policy areas.

Our findings for whether passive representation of women leads to active representation in education has implications for public policies seeking to increase the

diversity of organizations such as affirmative action. If a link exists between passive and active representation for gender, then diversity, or the lack thereof, has distributive consequences that go beyond the equal opportunity of individual workers.

# REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY

The literature on representative bureaucracy provides a rich foundation for our research. The premise underlying this research is that a representative bureaucracy is a good to be provided and that a bureaucracy broadly reflective of the interests, opinions, needs, desires, and values of the general public has a legitimate claim to participate in the policy process (Selden 1997). The existing research distinguishes between passive and active representation. Passive representation refers to the bureaucracy's demographic representativeness of a larger population (Mosher 1982). Active representation, in contrast, is defined as bureaucrats' advocacy of their constituents' interests, making policy decisions that benefit a given group among the agency's clientele, often by eliminating discriminatory barriers (Hindera 1993; Mosher 1982). Our research is concerned with understanding when passive representation leads to active representation for women. We ask, in the language of Hanna Pitkin (1967), When are female bureaucrats merely "standing for" women and when might we expect them to "act for" women?

Most research on active representation focuses on race and shows that minority bureaucrats frequently implement policies or use their discretion to reduce the disparate treatment minority clients have received historically from various public bureaucracies (Hindera 1993; Meier et al. 1989; Meier and Stewart 1992; Selden 1997). In contrast, research examining representation and the sex of the bureaucrats is limited and somewhat mixed in its results. The meager research that exists finds that passive representation for women clearly affects individuals within organizations (Duerst-Lahti and Johnson 1990; Kelly, Hale, and Burgess 1991) but has not found evidence that passive representation

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results in active representation of women in bureaucratic outputs (Hindera 1993; Selden 1997). In sum, prior research, sparse as it is, indicates that passive representation can lead to active representation for race but not for sex.

### SEX, GENDER, AND IDENTIFICATION: FEMINIST THEORY

We are intrigued by these findings that race is a significantly more important factor than sex in affecting bureaucrats' actions and decisions. Surely sex is no less, if no more, central in shaping individuals' experiences in the world and, hence, in shaping political values. Why, then, would bureaucrats fail to translate passive representation into active representation on the basis of sex? Because representation is not a normal bureaucratic function, we need to know when female bureaucrats are likely to identify as women rather than as agency employees or a myriad of other roles. The central role of identity in representation logically leads us to work in feminist theory.

Feminist theory suggests that part of the answer to our question lies in the complicated relationship among politics, group identity, and sexual difference. As Simone de Beauvoir (1974, xxii) observed in 1949, "Women do not say 'We," for they lack a distinctive history, culture, or religion that both marks them off as a collective with internal similarities and differentiates them from others of their social class. In many ways, the history of second-wave feminism in the United States confirms de Beauvoir's point, for in the very process of articulating a feminist "We" through the practices of consciousness raising, feminists were confronted with the wide range of markers of difference that distinguish women from one another: race, class, sexuality—the list could go on and on. Could it be that, as some feminists have suggested, women compose a social collective definable only by recourse to a common biological sex (Daly 1978; O'Brien 1989)?

Defining women according to (supposed) biological similarities that remain constant over time runs afoul, however, of another foundational premise of secondwave feminist thought: the important distinction between sex and gender. Insofar as sex refers simply to the physiological reproductive capacities, gender describes the social and cultural interpretation of sex or, more precisely, the cultural magnification of sexual difference and commensurate suppression of similarities between women and men (Rubin 1975). The concept of gender helps feminists challenge limitations that are socially imposed upon women, limitations that are justified by reference to ascriptive characteristics said to follow from biological maleness or femaleness but that differ demonstrably across cultures, social classes, and historical eras. Put differently, gender evokes the social conventions that claim biological sex as their natural origin, marking the difference (for example) between biological femaleness and what counts as feminine in any given time or place. If sex is described as a binary variable (male or female), gender is more accurately thought of as designating a limitless range of possible interpretations of sex that coexist within a given society.<sup>1</sup>

### SEX, GENDER, AND INSTITUTIONS

Our examination of feminist theory convinces us that the classic social scientists' variable of "sex," crucial as it is to any inquiry measuring the social distinctions between women and men, is simply not nuanced enough to capture fully the complexity of gender. Gender, not sex, is what matters for the purposes of social research (Duerst-Lahti and Kelly 1995), for it is the considerably more complicated concept of gender that tracks the political-institutional meanings that make "sex" socially relevant. By extracting "sex" from gender to distinguish female from male, scholars dispense with precisely what makes gender important to social science research—social meaning—and endow sexual difference with a constant and invariant quality that much feminist thinking about social identification and political action shows to be problematic. Of course, this presents something of a problem for social scientists, who, for the time being anyway, may be hard pressed to reconfigure their data so as to encode a schema more complicated than the stark binary, male/female, allows us to imagine. But this is not reason enough to abandon the effort to rethink how we treat gender, or processes of identification more generally, in empirical work. Certainly researchers can make data tell a more complex story about gender even when they are limited by the binaries of their data; and we suggest that a large part of that project is entailed in the process of interpreting the data or, more precisely, interpreting data in light of the larger institutional features that shape the circumstances in which bureaucrats exercise discretion and act to affect policy outcomes, in other words, in the ways that female bureaucrats identify as women and translate passive into active representation.

In this respect, some of the conceptual contributions of the new institutionalism are useful; this literature can focus our concern with processes of identification by reference to the possibilities opened and foreclosed by institutions themselves and, thus, help us to hone

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Butler (1990) complicated this distinction between sex and gender. Exclusive attention to the ways in which men and women are formed through gender socialization left sex itself undertheorized and relatively unproblematized. Butler contends that many feminists continue to assume a more or less symmetrical relationship between sex and gender, even as they insist upon the differences between them. If gender is distinct from sex, she suggests, there is no reason to suppose that gender follows from sex, that is, there is no reason to assume that femininity will attach itself exclusively (or even primarily) to female bodies, or masculinity to male bodies. Calling into question the binary character of both sex and gender, Butler argues that sex is subject to the same historical and cultural forces as gender, with the consequence that sex is itself a gendered category. Gender is quite clearly historical, a property not of bodies but of practices that accrue meaning and gain purchase through a regulated series of repetitions that attain the virtual status of institution. Sex is not prior to gender—it is not the natural foundation from which social forces construct gender—but another product of the same practices that constitute gender, testifying to their institutional power.

in on the institutional contexts in which identification is crystallized, enacted, sustained, contested, and transformed.2 Institutions work as "ligatures" that fasten competing and cooperating sites of political analysis (the state, the economy, and civil society) together with relationships among political actors and largescale processes (Katznelson 1997, 103). Political agents, including bureaucrats, are always embedded in institutional milieus; they are both shaped and constrained by the contingencies of context and circumstance (Immergut 1998; Katznelson 1997); and public policy is also influenced by the complex, often competing, dynamics fostered by the interaction of institutions (Orren and Skowronek 1994). Even more significant for our purposes here, institutions shape social actors' cognition by conferring identity—that is, by selecting the factors that are to be considered relevant in making decisions.<sup>3</sup> As Douglas (1986, 59) states, "Sameness [read identity] is not a quality that can be recognized in things themselves; it is conferred upon elements within a coherent scheme" worked out by institutions for institutional purposes and political ends.

Social institutions are important sites where sexual difference comes to be defined as salient to social identity, for they are the locations where gendered practices develop and are repeated, adapted, and sometimes transformed. Institutional structure is particularly important in shaping the behavior of individuals who work in bureaucracies because bureaucracies are not generally designed to serve a representative function for a particular clientele group. Institutional structures help to determine the purpose and scope of bureaucrats' work and how much discretion they have in carrying out their tasks. Hierarchy, control of information, standard operating procedures, and roles all work to keep individual behavior in line with the goals of the bureaucracy (Simon 1997). We cannot understand bureaucratic behavior without taking into account the institutions in which the behavior takes place. The power of bureaucracies to constrain individual behavior works against active representation because individuals engaging in an advocacy role within the organization must overcome institutional constraints to identify with clients who share their demographic characteristics (Meier 1993a). Institutional structures in the organization can work to highlight identity with the organization (Romzek 1990) and, in so doing, deemphasize identity based on demographic characteristics. According to Ferguson (1984, 18), hierarchy and roles in bureaucratic settings cause bureaucrats to de-emphasize their multiple identities and to increase the importance of their identity as members of the organization. Not surprisingly, research has found that the best predictor of bureaucratic attitudes is the agency for which an individual works, not his/her demographic characteristics (Meier and Nigro 1976; Mosher 1982).

Although institutional structure plays a large role in constraining the behavior of individuals working within it, bureaucracies cannot completely determine and control individual practices. Even with the power of hierarchy, managers of bureaucracies cannot completely circumscribe their subordinates' activities due to information asymmetry and goal conflict (Brehm and Gates 1997; Moe 1984). In fact, institutional structures and the individuals who inhabit the institution have a symbiotic relationship. The preferences and attitudes of individual bureaucrats work to shape institutional structures such as standard operating procedures and norms (Barnard 1938; Brudney et al. 2000).

Institutions supply the social context and meaning that marks the distinction between gender and sex. Insofar as a considerable body of feminist research in the social sciences demonstrates that gender plays an important role in shaping individual experience and perspective (Chodorow 1978; Gilligan 1982; Keller 1985; Young 1990), it stands to reason that bureaucratic institutions, too, are both the subjects and the objects of gendered practices: Institutions are the products of gendered behavior as well as the environment in which that behavior takes place and is (or can be) transformed.

While feminist scholars contend that gender matters, then, it is important to add that institutions matter as well, for it is within institutions that sex accrues social meaning and, thus, through institutional practices that gender becomes politically salient. Put differently, institutional, and institutionalized, practices constitute gender, and constitute gender as both mutable and malleable, shaping the circumstances in which a subject's political consciousness might crystallize around the question of gender and she might act to promote causes and interests associated with women. In short, attending to institutional contexts can help us develop richer interpretations of data that are otherwise limited by binary coding according to sex. Doing so enables us to develop a more nuanced understanding of how and when gender matters, of how and under what conditions female bureaucrats are likely to translate passive into active representation.

The null finding that there is no link between passive and active representation with respect to gender is flawed because it does not explicitly incorporate the institutional and political context of the bureaucratic experience into empirical analysis. The important question facing us is not necessarily whether passive gender representation leads to active representation, but under what conditions this link occurs (Kelly and Newman 2001)? In what follows we create a template that can be used to identify cases when we should expect passive representation to lead to active representation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In more traditional public administration terms, identity is similar to what organizational theorists termed "role." The multiple and changing identities of an individual bureaucrat are similar to Simon's (1997, 158) contention that "an individual can assume a variety of roles when these are evoked by appropriate circumstances, each of which may interact only weakly with the others." See also Brudney et al. 2000.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For example, when an academic department is required to report the demographic distribution of its faculty according sex and race, distinctions of maleness or femaleness, and white or black, become salient. But when the same department is contracting with a caterer for its annual retirement banquet, other markers of difference—such as eating habits that distinguish vegetarians from carnivores—emerge as differences that matter.

### FACTORS THAT FACILITATE ACTIVE REPRESENTATION FOR GENDER

Because institutional and political contexts matter, we should not expect active representation to occur in the case of gender across all bureaucratic settings. Past empirical tests of representative bureaucracy for sex, however, have paid little attention to identifying the context in which bureaucrats' gender identity plays a prominent role in how they perform their work. We seek to fill this gap in the literature by creating a framework that will identify cases where active representation is likely to occur and use this framework to generate and test hypotheses concerning the impact of gender representation on the bureaucratic outputs of education bureaucracies.

Two necessary, but not sufficient, conditions exist for active bureaucratic representation to occur. First, bureaucrats must have discretion in how they carry out their jobs. In bureaucracies where most decisions are dictated by rules, bureaucrats have few opportunities to shape outputs to reward a particular group (Meier 1993a). Second, a necessary condition for representative bureaucracy concerns the type of policy the organization produces. Researchers argue that for representative bureaucracy to occur, the policy issue must be salient to the demographic characteristic in question (Meier 1993a; Selden 1997). Certain policy outputs are salient to demographic characteristics such as gender, while other issues may not be. This definition does little, however, to help us differentiate the issues that are women's issues from those that are not.5

Intuitively we all can identify issues that have been defined as "women's issues." Intuition does little, however, to help us systematically identify policy issues that foster representative bureaucracy. As a group, women may have a distinct viewpoint on many policy issues, but they do not always do so. The content of women's issues is fluid and changes over time. It is not a constant (compare Dolan 2000 and Meier and Nigro 1976).

The fluid nature of what counts as women's issues makes it difficult, therefore, to identify a priori the issues for which we expect to find representative bureaucracy for gender unless we more clearly specify the necessary conditions for an issue to become gendered. We argue that a policy area can become gendered (1) because the policy directly benefits women as a class, (2) because the gender of the bureaucrat changes the

client-bureaucrat relationship, or (3) because the issue has been defined as a women's issue through the political process.<sup>7</sup>

The most straightforward way to identify a women's issue is to determine whether the policy directly benefits women as a group as distinct from men. Policies such as equal pay and funding for women's health directly benefit women as a class. As such, they provide bureaucrats an opportunity to play a representative role by distributing benefits to women or by increasing overall benefits

The second way of identifying gender-salient issues is by exploring whether the gender of the bureaucrat influences the client-bureaucratic relationship. This is most important in street-level bureaucracies where the interaction between bureaucrat and client is crucial in determining policy outputs. When bureaucrats and clients share the same demographic characteristic, they often share the same life experiences (Thielemann and Stewart 1996). Some life experiences are shared by women and, for the most part, not shared by men. In the case of rape, for example, female victims may feel more comfortable working with female law enforcement bureaucrats, who may be more likely to respond productively and sympathetically.

In addition, women can have distinct perspectives on many policies that benefit not only women, but also children and men (social welfare policies for example). Research has found that gender matters to broader policy areas that do not benefit women exclusively, such as the use of force in foreign or domestic affairs, income redistribution, and consumer concerns (Hale and Kelly 1989). The political process of issue definition is such that an issue may be defined one way during one historical period but take on another meaning at another time in response to the work of social movements and interest group pressure (Rochefort and Cobb 1994). For example, in industrialized nations, certain kinds of policy concerns—pay equity, reproductive rights, domestic violence, child care, etc.—are perceived as women's issues, largely because these have been targeted by feminists as venues where the social construction of gender places women at a distinct disadvantage (in assigning to them primary responsibility for child care, for example) or subjects them to systematic discrimination. Such issues represent only a small portion of public policy matters that might, in different circumstances, come to be viewed as having a distinctive impact on women.8 We hypothesize that active representation will occur only in bureaucracies dealing with policy issues that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Researchers have begun to focus on the interaction between institutional structure and representative bureaucracy (see Kelly and Newman 2001). Thus far, work in this area has not systematically identified the conditions that are necessary and those that are sufficient for representative bureaucracy for gender to exist.

cient for representative bureaucracy for gender to exist.

The terms gender and women are not synonymous. The paucity of representation of women in organizations does not make gender unimportant. Organizations without female representation are gendered to privilege the masculine. Because, historically, women have not been represented in organizations, gender diversity should give organizations a more "female" orientation. Therefore we are interested in issues salient to women as opposed to men. We refer to these issues as "gendered."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Even though both men and women have gender, by "gendered" we mean made more relevant to women.

Of course behavior will vary among female bureaucrats. Not all women will take up the role of active representation even when an issue is gendered.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Selden's (1997) finding that passive representation does not lead to active representation for women is not surprising given the fact that the issue she studied, housing for farmers, is not a particularly gendered issue. The needs of farmers have not been on the feminist political agenda, nor do gender differences exist in public opinion concerning agricultural policy. Furthermore, the lack of high numbers of single female farmers make it unlikely that a street-level bureaucrat will feel that she can advocate for women by increasing aid to

directly benefit women as a class, gendered policy issues and issues where the bureaucrats' gender identification changes the client-bureaucrat relationship.

Other institutional and contextual factors such as the mission of a given bureaucracy should influence the transfer of passive into active representation. Some bureaucracies create advocacy roles for bureaucrats in keeping with organizational missions (Selden 1997) by socializing individual bureaucrats to adopt organizational goals (March and Olson 1994; Romzek 1990; Simon 1947). If the bureaucracy has a mission of assisting a particular group, passive representation should lead seamlessly to active representation. Although bureaucrats who do not share the demographic characteristics of their clientele should also act as advocates (Downs 1966), those who do share the demographic characteristic(s) should be easier to incorporate into the agency's goals as a consequence of their common demographic predispositions toward these goals. We hypothesize that although mission is not a necessary condition, passive representation in terms of gender might be expected to lead to active representation when the leaders of the bureaucracy or the bureaucracy's historical mission focus on assisting women. Active representation will increase as passive representation increases in agencies with an advocacy mission but will not be as strong in agencies lacking this advocacy mission.9

Similar to mission, hierarchy will affect whether female bureaucrats become advocates. Some scholars argue that hierarchy by its very nature precludes representative bureaucracy. They argue that hierarchical organizations depersonalize relationships, making members less likely to identify with a group outside of the organization (Ferguson 1984). According to this line of thinking, hierarchical organizations cannot be feminist organizations (Firestone 1970; Gelb 1986). Accordingly, we should expect bureaucratic organizations to maintain the status quo even as they increase passive representation. We hypothesize that more hierarchical and centralized organizations will be less likely to link passive and active representation.

Although hierarchy in and of itself may weaken the link between passive and active representation, the Weberian view of bureaucracy suggests that the existence of hierarchy per se is less important than the question of who occupies the top of any hierarchy. Hierarchy gives control to those bureaucrats at the top of the organizational structure (Weber 1946). By this reasoning, when women gain access to upper levels of an organization, they should create an internal environment more conducive to representative advocacy. Researchers have found that stratification affects representative bureaucracy for race (Meier, Stewart, and England 1989). We hypothesize that as the number of women in su-

pervisory positions increases, active representation will increase.

In addition, organizational theorists have argued that a numerical threshold is necessary for passive to be transformed into active representation (Meier 1993b; Thompson 1978). A critical mass may be needed for minorities to take an advocacy role (Kanter 1977). This leads to our next hypothesis: Organizations with a critical mass of women will be more likely to allow for active representation.

Professionalization also influences bureaucratic outputs. Professions compete with the bureaucracy in shaping individual bureaucrats' goals because professionals receive some of their rewards from a group outside of the bureaucracy. Incorporating professionals into bureaucracies incorporates their values into the bureaucracy (Eisner 1991; Hodges and Durant 1989; Meier 2000). If professionals who see advocacy for a particular group as their role dominate a bureaucracy, we should expect bureaucratic outputs to be distributed to benefit that group. Similar to mission, professionalization should affect all bureaucrats, not just female ones. However, because women may be more disposed toward engaging in active representation for women due to shared experience, we believe that greater professionalization will facilitate the translation of passive representation into active representation.<sup>10</sup>

This section has hypothesized that seven institutional/contextual factors affect the transformation of passive representation into active representation: discretion, the gendering of a given policy issue, mission/socialization, hierarchy, stratification, critical mass, and professionalization. Although active representation should not occur in any organization without discretion and a gendered policy issue, the influence of other factors will become more or less important depending on the specific organization studied.

### THE EMPIRICAL CASE

Our neoinstitutional theory of representative bureaucracy and gender links the processes of identification with the representation of clientele. This section describes our empirical test of the theory using schools and educational performance. Looking at education systems, we examine how female math teachers affect female students' math scores and subsequently influence student aspirations. Any movement from the more general theory to specific tests of the theory will inevitably narrow the range of variation; in some cases, variables will become constants (that is, when a single type of agency is investigated, mission becomes a constant) or their variation will be truncated.

### Theoretical Modifications

For bureaucratic representation to occur, the issue involved must be identified as a gendered one. Among the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> We believe that the historic lack of mission for advocating for women in the EEOC helps to explain the failure of passive representation to lead to active representation that Hindera (1993) finds in his analysis of EEOC activity in the 1980s. In future research we will explore this further.

Women may be more attracted to professions where advocacy is possible, such as social work or teaching.

most constant gender issues in education is that of math scores. Nationwide, a persistent gender gap exists, with girls scoring lower than boys on math tests (Strauss and Subotnik 1994). Performance on standardized math tests is in turn associated with continuing one's education, especially in fields that emphasize math or mathematical reasoning (Oakes 1990; Wilson and Boldizar 1990). Insofar as identifying an issue as gendered is a necessary environmental condition for representation, the matter of improving girls' math scores meets the standard of benefiting women as a class. By selecting the same type of agencies (schools) during the same time frame (1995–98), we have turned many of the other factors, including mission, into constants.

Within the organization, a second necessary condition for representative bureaucracy is that the bureaucrats in question have discretion to influence outcomes. This paper focuses on street-level bureaucrats: teachers, both female teachers in general and female math teachers in particular. The normal principal (in both senses of the term)-agent relationship provides greater advantages to the agent (i.e., the teacher) than in most other organizations. School systems vest a great deal of autonomy in these street-level personnel who come to the organization as trained professionals. Administrators only rarely visit individual classrooms and, thus, do not closely monitor the interactions between teacher and student. Administrative control is limited to issues such as textbooks used, whether lesson plans were filed, and access to instructional resources. While these are important factors, they have only modest effects on how a teacher conducts a class.

With this discretion female teachers could affect the math grades of female students in one of four ways.<sup>11</sup> First, female teachers aware of the math gap might spend additional time with and generate more positive reinforcement for girls when teaching math. Second, girls who do not have a female math teacher could still identify with one as a role model; this identification could result in a greater effort to succeed in math classes. Third, nonmath teachers might facilitate learning by encouraging students who run into difficulty. Although math teachers are in a better position to provide this encouragement, a student might identify more closely with another teacher with a different specialization. This might be specific and linked to math classes or general and linked to overall aspirations. Some of this influence could work through an informal advising process, or might require no personal contact at all. Fourth, female teachers may be more likely than male teachers to press schools to adopt policies that will encourage girls in fields where they have historically underperformed. Although there is evidence that both male and female teachers call on boys more often, allow boys to dominate classroom discussion, push boys for more information, and expect more from male students (Campbell 1991; Fennema and Leder 1990; Sadker and Sadker 1994), there is evidence that in math and science classrooms female teachers act as role models, enhance female students' performance, and warm the "chilly climate" (Angrist and Almquist 1975; Rothstein 1995; Stake and Granger 1978). Only one of these four methods of influence requires that an individual student come into contact with a specific math teacher in a classroom; the other three processes can work throughout the organization. This diffuseness of impact means that it must be studied at the organizational rather than the individual level. <sup>12</sup> Accordingly, schools serve as the units of analysis.

Within the organization, two of our institutional variables remain relevant—stratification and hierarchy; the other three are essentially constant across organizations—professionalization and socialization or operate at well above minimum levels—critical mass. Hierarchically, school systems are extremely flat organizations with discretion vested in street-level personnel. Despite the general flat structure, school districts vary, with some being more decentralized. Our measure of decentralization is the span of control at the street level, that is, the ratio of the number of teachers to the total number of administrators in the organization. As this variable increases, administrators supervise more teachers, with the logical result that the time available to supervise any one teacher will decline. The mean span is 14, with a standard deviation of five.

Despite the preference for flat organizational forms, school districts are highly stratified by sex and can be considered classic glass-ceiling organizations. Fully 75% of teachers in Texas schools are female, but only 27% of supervisors (principals, assistant principals, and assistant superintendents) and only 8.4% of superintendents are. These data provide us with a measure of stratification—the percentage of female administrators.

The concept of a critical mass plays a role when any group has limited access to the organization (see Kanter 1977; Meier 1993b). Both female teachers (75%) and female math teachers (68%) constitute a majority of their classification. These figures should be well above what constitutes a critical mass, thus rendering the concept inapplicable for teachers (but not for administrators, see below).

In general terms, both professionalization and socialization should be relatively similar across these organizations. Teachers have a common educational background, and they serve a general instructional role within the organization. Individual schools of education might make a teacher more aware of gender issues, and some schools might encourage the development of a representation role; however, data on these factors are not available. In general, the professionalization and socialization of individuals across these organizations should be more similar than different.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> There is a fifth possibility. Because schools operate in a segmented labor market, female math teachers might simply be better teachers (see Meier, Wrinkle, and Polinard 1999).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Analysis at the individual level might also miss influences that persist through time. If the impact of an individual teacher persists, then studies conducted in later years are unlikely to capture that influence.

### The Texas Case

Our specific case is 607 Texas high schools from 1995 to 1998. Because many of the data exist only at the district level, we were able to move our unit of analysis to the school level by restricting the analysis to single high school districts (we replicated this analysis with data at the district level and found similar results). Except for the eighth grade math test, all data were measured at the high school level. The Texas case provides an ideal setting for our study for two reasons. First, Texas has statewide standardized tests and an elaborate database that permits analysis by sex. Second, the Texas set of schools is extremely diverse in terms of race, ethnicity, resources, urban location, and other factors that affect education performance. The diversity of these schools suggests that findings from Texas should also apply to other educational systems as well as to organizations with similar characteristics (highly professionalized organizations with discretion vested in street-level bureaucrats). If Texas differs from other states, it is because educational performance has consistently been a salient issue for the past 15 years and because expenditures have increased more rapidly in Texas than in the nation as a whole.

### **Dependent Variables**

Texas requires standardized tests of all students in grades 3, 5, 6, 7, and 8 as well as an exit exam. Our first dependent variables are the percentage of female students who pass the math exams in grade 8 and the exit exam. The literature suggests that math scores diverge only in junior and senior high when girls face the choice between lipstick and logarithms (Fennema and Sherman 1977; Meece and Parsons 1982; Oakes 1990; Strauss and Subotnik 1994). In Texas, boys' and girls' math scores are essentially the same in grades 3 through 8, but boys' pass rates exceed girls' by 4.1 percentage points on the exit exam.

Performance on standardized tests is a hurdle along the way to educational achievement. Students who perform poorly on such exams may also perform poorly on others or might reduce their overall educational aspirations. To investigate these phenomena in the context of representative bureaucracy, four other dependent variables are examined—average SAT scores, average ACT scores, the percentage of students who score above 1110 on the SAT or its equivalent on the ACT, and the successful completion of advanced placement exams (for which college credit is given). Girls in Texas score higher than boys on the ACT (16.8 vs. 15.2) and are more likely to pass advanced placement classes (15.7% vs. 14.1%) but score well below boys on SAT exams (933 vs. 962) and are less likely to break the 1,110 standard (16.8% vs. 18.3%). The lower SAT scores are not a function of more girls taking the test; correlations between the number of test takers and the average scores approach 0 when more than 30% of students take the exam. The correlation in this data set where 46% of students take the SAT is only 0.08, and that disappears with a control for poverty.

### **Control Variables**

In addition to the key independent variables (female math teachers or female teachers, hierarchy and stratification), two sets of controls are used—one set for the task difficulty facing the organization and the other for organizational resources. Task difficulty reflects the truism that some students are easier to educate than others. The literature consistently finds that poverty and race are correlated with greater education problems (Jencks and Phillips 1998). Poverty and race are associated both with a lack of educational resources in the home and with other factors (e.g., single-family households) that affect student learning. The three specific measures are the percentage of black students, the percentage of Latino students, and the percentage of poor students (measured as students eligible for free school lunch programs). Each of these control variables should be negatively related to student performance.

The relationship between resources and student performance is controversial (Hanushek 1996; Hedges and Greenwald 1996). Recent research using well-crafted longitudinal data sets and well-designed experiments, however, generally shows that additional resources are associated with higher student performance (Evans, Murray, and Schwab 1997; Wenglinsky 1997). Two measures of resources are included—average teacher salary and average class size. Teacher salaries should be positively related to student performance, and class size should be negatively related to performance. <sup>13</sup>

Because our data are pooled (four years and 607 schools), we also include a set of control variables to deal with the time series aspect of the data set. Dummy variables for individual years were included in each equation. These dummy variables were always jointly significant, reflecting the overall positive trends in the student performance. To deal with the other source of problems related to pools, we assessed the cross sections of each equation for heteroscedasticity. Levels of heteroscedasticity were modest, and using robust standard errors had little impact on the findings presented here.

#### **FINDINGS**

The two regressions for girls' math scores are given in Table 1. The results are consistent with expectations. Female math teachers are positively associated with girls' math scores in grade 8 and on the exit exam. For grades 3, 5, and 6 the relationships are not statistically different from zero (results not shown). These findings are consistent with the literature that finds that sex differences in math performance do not arise until junior high. At lower grade levels where there are no sex differences, the sex of math teachers appears to be irrelevant. <sup>14</sup> In junior high and senior high, female

We also estimated these equations using median family income and percentage of the population living in poverty. Neither variable was statistically significant in the presence of the other control variables. Including these variables did not affect the other relationships found. The lack of relationship at the elementary levels makes sense also given the key independent variable—math teachers. Math teachers

Girls Passing the Math Test		Exit Exam		,	Grade 8	
Independent Variable	Slope	Error		Slope	Error	t
Female math teachers	0.055	0.013	4.09	0.053	0.013	4.08
Black student percentage	-0.288	0.027	10.78	-0.272	0.026	10.56
Latino student percentage	-0.115	0.018	6.47	-0.105	0.017	6.1
Low-income student percentage	-0.142	0.026	5.51	-0.205	0.025	8.1
Teachers' salaries (000)	0.768	0.137	5.62	0.747	0.131	5.6
Class size	-1.053	0.147	7.17	-0.971	0.142	6.8
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.35			.51		
F	145.20			281.62		
SE	12.69			12.27		
N of cases	2,414			2,427		

math teachers are associated with higher math scores for girls even when controlling for other factors.

On the math exit exam, a one percentage point increase in female math teachers is associated with a 0.055 percentage point increase in the girls' pass rate, all other things being equal. While this appears to be a relatively modest relationship, in fact, a one-standard deviation change in the percentage of female math teachers is associated with a change equivalent to 25% of the gap between boys' and girls' math scores. While the sex of math teachers is clearly not the most important factor in math education, reductions of this size would be substantively important and well worth pursuing. The control variables' relationships are all consistent with expectations.

Representation is a process that should be affected by institutional factors. In this case, both hierarchy and stratification vary. Female math teachers should be most likely to act in ways to benefit female students in organizations with low levels of hierarchy and high numbers of female administrators.

Table 2 examines the math exit exam and splits our districts according to the key institutional variables (we split the data rather than use interaction effects to avoid the massive collinearity generated by interac-

tion terms). Regressions are run for hierarchical and nonhierarchical organizations (span of control greater than 14) and for organizations with more and less female administrators (25% cut point).16 Our institutional hypothesis is that the impact of female math teachers should increase (that is, the regression coefficient should increase) in flat organizations and in organizations with more female administrators. The results are mixed. The teachers' slope increases for flat organizations, but the difference is not statistically significant. For female administrators the relationship is statistically significant, but the difference is in the wrong direction. These mixed findings may be explained by the nature of math instruction, which is highly specific and rife with discretion. Organizations may be likely to find it difficult to modify a process that is characterized by extremely high levels of information asymmetry and few opportunities for observation.

Although math exams are a relatively narrow slice of public school curricula, they have long-term implications for building human capital. Table 3 relates math exit exams to average SAT scores (the verbal and math total; individual tests are not available). Several findings are relevant. First, math exit scores are positively correlated with SAT scores; all things equal, a onepercentile increase in the pass rate is associated with a 0.95 point increase on the SAT (about 15.8 points for a one-standard deviation change). Second, math teachers affect SAT scores only indirectly via their impact on the math exam. Third, female teachers in general, however, are associated with a substantial increase in female SAT scores; a one-percentile increase in female teachers is associated with an increase of 2.0 points on the SAT (about 17 points for a one standard deviation change), all other things equal.

The results in Table 3 suggest a slight change in focus to female teachers in general and to indicators of

are a certified designation that applies only to secondary school teachers. Elementary school teachers are certified only as elementary school teachers unless they have a specialization such as special education or bilingual education. Math is not a designated elementary certification in Texas. In short, math teachers are unlikely to affect math scores when there are no "math" teachers.

math scores when there are no "math" teachers. <sup>15</sup> The 25% figure would hold if boys were not affected by having a woman math teacher. In fact, boys' scores are also improved by having a woman math teacher but not as much as girls' scores are. This means that the gap would not close this quickly. The illustration is provided as a way of judging the substantive size of the impact, not on closing the gap per se. The impact of female math teachers on boys' scores is an important issue substantively and theoretically. When boys' scores on any of the indicators are included in these models, the results are weaker but generally hold up. We present the models without boys' scores because our theory contends that representation will generate benefits for the represented clientele; it does not argue that the represented will benefit more than other clientele.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> We use 25% as a threshold effect for administrators based on Meier's (1993b) empirical estimates for race rather than Kanter's (1977) theoretical estimate of 15%. The use of 25% also divides the sample more evenly.

TABLE 2. Female Math Teachers and Girls' Math Scores: Dependent Variable = Percentage of Girls Passing the Math Exit Exam

	Hierarchy		Stratification, Female Managers	
Independent Variable	Low	High	Few	Many
Female math teachers	0.065	0.052	0.078	0.025
	(3.34)	(2.69)	(3.91)	(1.24)
Black student percentage	−0.249́	-0.316	-0.307	-0.258
	(7.90)	(6.81)	(6.20)	(7.94)
Latino student percentage	−`0.085́	-0.128	-0.123	-0.099
	(3.84)	(4.44)	(3.85)	(4.32)
Low-income student percentage	−0.184́	_0.11 <del>5</del>	-0.119	-0.178
_	(5.92)	(2.64)	(2.45)	(5.57)
Teachers' salaries (000)	0.621	`0.988	0.909	0.489
	(3.49)	(4.59)	(3.93)	(2.62)
Class size	−Ì1.13́5	-0.693	-1.069	-0.897
•	(5.90)	(2.74)	(4.18)	(4.48)
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.44	.28	.31	.40
F	114.50	45.26	50.04	.40 87.53
SE	10.88	14.57	13.45	11.78
N of cases	1,300	1,075	983	1,153

Note: Coefficients for annual dummy variables not included. All relationships significant at p < .05 except female math teachers. Stratification: more than 25% women managers.

TABLE 3. Specific Versus General Imp	pacts: Math Teachers and Other Teachers: Dependent
Variable = Girls' SAT Exam Scores	the same same reasonate Depondont
Indonondout Variable	<del></del>

Independent Variable	Slope	Error	t Score
Female math teachers	-0.007	0.106	-0.06
Female teachers	2.003	0.384	5.22*
Math exit exam scores	0.952	0.136	6.99*
Black student percentage	0.070	0.162	0.43
Latino student percentage	-0.045	0.112	0.40
Low-income student percentage	-1.239	0.163	7.62*
Teachers' salaries (000)	5.172	0.862	5.96*
Class size	1.104	1.010	1.09
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.50	•	·
F	150.09		
SE	62.77		
N of cases	1,657		
Note: Coefficients for annual dummy variables no			

college aspirations. Because the influence of female teachers is likely to be diffused through out the organization, the institutional factors in our theory—hierarchy and stratification—in this case, are also more likely to come into play. The next two tables examine SAT scores, ACT scores, high exam scores, and passing advanced placement exams and how the relationships between these variables and female teachers are structured by hierarchy and stratification. Again, our working hypothesis is that the influence of female teachers will be enhanced in decentralized organizations and organizations with women in positions of administrative authority.

Table 4 shows how hierarchy interacts with female teachers to affect female student performance. The second column of the table shows that female teachers are positively associated with outcomes for female students

on all four indicators. With regard to the interaction with structure, our hypothesis is that women teachers will have a greater impact in relatively flat organizations (those with a span of control over more than 14). In flatter organizations, a one-percentage point increase in female faculty is associated with a 3.36-point gain on the SAT, substantially more than the corresponding 0.85point gain for more hierarchical organizations. Similarly for ACT scores, the slope for female teachers is more than three times higher in flat organizations than in the others. At the high end of the scale, that is, scores above 1,110 on the SAT or its ACT equivalent, a onepercentile increase in female teachers correlates with a 0.37-percentage point increase in high-performing students in flat organizations; in other organizations, the relationship is essentially zero. Finally, the strongest comparison exists for advanced placement classes. A

	All S	chools	Hier	archy		Probability
Dependent Variable	Slope	t Score	Low Slope	High Slope	t Score <sup>a</sup>	
SAT scores	2.215	6.38	3.359	0.848	5.46	<0.001
ACT scores	0.061	2.25	0.091	0.025	1.98	.024
Above criterion						
(1,100 SAT equivalent)	0.144	3.22	0.373	-0.033	6.62	<0.001
Advanced placement	0.504	5.88	0.892	0.015 udents, percentage	10.23	<0.001

	All Schools		Women	Managers		
Dependent Variable	Slope	t Score	20%+	<20%	t Test	Probabil <u>ity</u>
SAT scores	2.215	6.38	2.745	1.801	1.91	.028
ACT scores	0.061	2.25	0.088	0.032	1.40	.081
Above criterion						
(1,110 SAT equivalent)	0.144	3.22	0.202	0.043	2.46	.006
Advanced placement	0.504	5.88	0.665	0.120	3.68	< 0.001

one-percentage point increase in female teachers is linked to 0.89 percentage point more female students taking and passing advanced placement exams in flat organizations; again, in other organizations the relationship is essentially zero. All four differences between the sets of slopes are statistically significant at the 0.05 level; in every case, active representative is greater in less hierarchical organizations.

In Table 5 the relationship between high levels of female administrators and the representation function of female teachers is probed. The hypothesis is that a larger number of female administrators should permit female teachers to be more active representatives for their female students. In every case, the slope coefficient for female teachers is larger in organizations with more than 25% female administrators than it is in the other organizations. In three of the four cases (the exception is ACT scores), the relationship is significant at the .05 level (one tail test). In the ACT case, the difference between the two coefficients barely misses statistical significance.

Overall our findings in Tables 4 and 5 show eight of the eight relationships to be consistent with the institutional hypotheses about representative bureaucracy (seven of eight if one counts only statistically significant differences). If there were no relationships between structure and representation, the probability that we could get eight of eight relationships in a predicted direction is less than .004 (for seven or more of eight the probability is .035).<sup>17</sup>

### CONCLUSION

According to our framework, public education meets the necessary conditions for the transfer of passive representation to active representation for women. Consistent with our theory, passive representation does lead to active representation for gender in public education. An increase in passive representation for female math teachers and for female teachers in general correlates with educational benefits for girls. The level of passive representation for women in the bureaucracy has consequences for the policy benefits the bureaucracy produces for women. In contrast to past research, our findings suggest that the link between passive and active representation can exist for gender, as well as race. These findings support the assertion that the benefits of diversity go beyond providing equal opportunity to individuals. Some have critiqued policies such as affirmative action as providing benefits solely to middle-class women (Gilliam 1995). Our findings suggest, however, that increasing the diversity of bureaucratic organizations for sex has implications for female clients of the bureaucracy, many of whom are not middle-class.

Our findings also support our contention that institutional context affects whether passive representation will lead to active representation. The findings show consistent support that stratification and hierarchy play an important role. In schools with more female administrators, female teachers were associated with higher ACT, SAT, and advanced placement rates for girls. For hierarchy, the representative process also worked better for girls in less hierarchical organizations. Clearly, stratification and hierarchy are important institutional variables that affect whether passive

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Calculated as a binomial probability distribution of eight successes in eight trials with a probability of .5.

representation will lead to active representation. For those seeking to increase active representation on the basis of gender, attention must be paid to not only increasing overall passive representation but also the structure of the organization and the representation at upper levels of the organization. Institutional barriers that create glass ceilings for women have policy consequences that go beyond the lack of opportunity for individual women.

This study is the first to find that passive bureaucratic representation translates into active representation for women, and thus it sheds some light on an old puzzle, namely, why previous research has uncovered a strong association between passive and active representation where race is concerned but no relationship at all where gender is the object of scrutiny. Race and gender are of interest to students of representative bureaucracy precisely insofar as they accrue political meaning within institutions. While scholars in the field have long been attentive to the ways in which race is institutionally defined, they have been less careful in their considerations of gender. 18 Scholars who rely exclusively on "sex"—that is, on data encoded according to the binary "male/female"—without accounting for the ways in which these designations acquire meaning within institutions (and public life more generally) miss precisely what it is that makes gender political. This is to say that they miss the very factors that are likely to move women working within bureaucracies to act to reduce institutionalized biases against women, individually and collectively. We attribute our unique positive results to our efforts to wed our neoinstitutional framework with the insights of feminist theory. This study is, however, only the first step in a reformulation of the theory of representative bureaucracy and women.

To explore fully whether passive representation leads to active representation for women in the bureaucracy, researchers must examine a variety of cases. We hope that the framework presented in this analysis will provide guidance in terms of the cases where we should look for gender representation. Thus far, little attention has been paid to identifying cases where, theoretically, gender representation should occur and where it should not. The case of education suggests that passive representation can lead to active representation for gender. Future research is needed, however, to verify whether this will occur across policy areas that meet our necessary conditions. Once we select cases where opportunities exist for representative bureaucracy, additional empirical tests can be conducted to determine whether the institutional variables we have identified matter.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> Without explicitly doing so, studies on race and representative bureaucracy have chosen institutions that are conducive to the translation of passive into active representation. Our theory that the institutional context is important applies to both race and sex.

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## Self-Interest, Social Security, and the Distinctive Participation Patterns of Senior Citizens

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ecades of participation research show that political activity increases with income, but the participation of senior citizens specifically with regard to Social Security poses an exception to this pattern. Social Security-oriented participation decreases as income rises, in part because lower-income seniors are more dependent on the program. The negative income-participation gradient is especially pronounced for letter writing about the program, but even Social Security-related voting and contributing are less common among higher-income seniors. This is an instance in which self-interest is highly influential: Those who are more dependent are more active. It is also an example of lower-class mobilization with regard to an economic issue, something quite unusual in the United States.

t is well established that political participation increases with income, even for activities in which income seems irrelevant, such as voting, or counterintuitive, such as protesting (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) suggest several reasons for this pattern. Income is a politically relevant and fungible resource that directly or indirectly facilitates activity; the affluent are more highly engaged with public affairs, as they typically have more at stake in a variety of policy areas; and higher-income individuals are more frequently recruited to political activity. In the United States, which lacks strong labor unions and socialist parties, lower-income citizens are less mobilized, especially on economic issues.

Political activity concerning Social Security may, however, be different. Social Security is not only an economic issue but also a government program. Rather than personalize or "morselize" their fate as in many other domains, citizens can attribute their well-being to government action (Lane 1962, 353; see Sears and Funk 1990). Moreover, political activity is seen as an appropriate vehicle for expressing dissatisfaction or concern about the policy and its operation. Because the program is self-contributory, no welfare stigma or moral bar discourages political activism on the issue, as is the case with other government programs benefiting lowincome individuals. More importantly, Social Security is unlike many issues in that the stakes are greater for lower-income recipients, who derive a larger portion of their income from the program. The usual incomeinterest gradient is reversed. Accordingly, participation based on Social Security may be greater among lower-income than among higher-income seniors, a reversal of the typically positive income-participation relationship.

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Poorer seniors may seem incapable of participating at high rates, given their low resources. However, several characteristics of seniors and their programs make their unusual activity concerning Social Security possible. Seniors' resources are offset in a variety of ways and less detrimental to their participation than low resources are to the participation of nonseniors. Also, the political parties mobilize low-income seniors at the same rate as higher-income seniors, and moderate-income elders at even higher rates, again different from the usual pattern, where mobilization increases with income.

A negative relationship between income and participatory activity concerning Social Security would be important in several regards. It would represent an exception to a long-standing regularity in behavioral research—that political participation is more common. among the affluent. It would be a rare example of selfinterest exerting a significant influence on individual behavior, since the most dependent are hypothesized to be the most active. Finally, this case would add another example to the small but growing literature on the effects of policy on the political behavior and attitudes of mass publics (e.g., Mettler 1998; Mettler and Welch 2001; Soss 1999). Social Security may democratize senior participation by raising the activity levels of lowerincome seniors relative to the affluent for the portion of seniors' participation that concerns Social Security.

### **INCOME AND PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA**

Decades of research amply illustrate the higher political participation rates of the affluent and offer several explanations for the traditionally positive relationship between income and political activity. Perhaps the most obvious is that income is a necessary resource for some activities, such as making campaign contributions. Even beyond that, political participation is a luxury good more readily available to higher-income citizens. The affluent are not preoccupied with securing the necessities of daily life and can purchase the labor of others such as gardeners and babysitters to free their time (e.g., Conway 1991, 25; Milbrath and Goel 1977, 98; Rosenstone 1982). They can "simply afford to do more—of everything—than citizens with little money," including political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 12).


Efforts to recruit citizens to political activity also tend to focus on the affluent. In Europe, socialist parties and labor unions mobilize the lower class, in some countries to levels of political activity rivaling those of the middle class (Powell 1986; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978). In the United States, in contrast, no laborbased political party emerged in the early twentieth century (Skocpol 1995, 26), and labor unions have been relatively weak. Contemporary mobilization techniques such as direct mail and door-to-door canvassing are directed predominantly toward highstatus individuals and neighborhoods (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Low-income Americans are rarely mobilized to political activity, except by religious institutions, which typically focus on moral rather than economic issues (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Finally, income affects participation by enhancing individuals' engagement with politics and sense of stake in the system. Higher-income people have a greater stake in many policy areas. Perhaps the best example is tax policy, where those with high incomes have more to win or lose. Affluent homeowners, for example, were more likely than other Californians to support Proposition 13, the 1978 property tax rollback initiative, because of the large tax savings the measure promised them (Sears and Citrin 1982). High-income individuals are also more likely to perceive their great stake; their political interest is stimulated by their high-level jobs, in which they learn how government affects their business and personal lives (Conway 1991). Additionally, they belong to voluntary organizations at high rates. These institutional affiliations provide civic skills, recruitment opportunities, and proximity to other active individuals who both share information about issues and enforce participatory norms (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

Thus, resource, engagement, and mobilization factors all contribute to the higher participation rates of the affluent. The positive relationship between income and political participation is so pervasive that it appears even in explanations of political activity among disadvantaged groups. Black and Latino political activists, for example, have higher incomes and are less likely to receive government assistance than the groups from which they are drawn (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, chap. 8). The resource mobilization theory of social movements argues that groups with higher levels of resources are more likely to overcome collective action problems and engage in political activity (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Next to education, income is the political resource most important in explaining both conventional and unconventional activity.

### SOCIAL SECURITY AND SENIOR PARTICIPATION

For most participatory activities, income operates in the same way for senior citizens: Affluent seniors are more politically active (Campbell 2000). However, in the context of Social Security, income plays a different role-it is an indicator not of "resources" but of "dependence on government transfers." As shown in Figure 1, poorer seniors derive a higher portion of their income from Social Security. Seniors in the lowest two quintiles get over 80% of their income from the program, compared to just 18% for the highest quintile. Because the stakes in this issue area are greater for lower-income seniors, they should exhibit more interest in Social Security than their more affluent counterparts, and they should be more likely to engage in Social Security-based participation. In this issue domain income measures dependence rather than participatory



capacity, and the usually positive relationships between income and political interest and participation are reversed.

Not all political activities would be equally affected. A negative income—participation relationship is most likely for letter writing about Social Security. Citizen-initiated, issue-specific, and independent of the electoral cycle, letter writing is the chief means by which seniors can voice their concerns about Social Security. This activity might include particularized casework requests to solve individual problems, more generalized statements of policy concern, or objections to deleterious reform proposals. In any of these instances, letter writing is the participatory vehicle by which specific issue concerns can be raised, and lower-income seniors should be more likely to write such letters.

There may be spillover effects on voting and contributing as well. For these acts, however, the income-participation relationship is unlikely to be monotonically negative, as is the case with Social Security-based contacting. Contacting is a "purer" act: Letters are usually about a specific topic, so survey respondents' assertions that they wrote about Social Security are probably accurate. In contrast, individuals vote and contribute for a variety of reasons, and so Social Security-based voting and contributing may be "contaminated" by other issues. Since the incomeparticipation relationship around these other issues is positive, the relationship between income and reported Social Security-based participation will not be monotonically negative. In addition, contributing requires disposable income, suggesting a curvilinear relationship for that activity, with moderate-income seniors who are concerned about Social Security being more likely to contribute with the program in mind than either low-income seniors who cannot afford to or high-income seniors who are not interested in doing so.

### **DATA AND METHODS**

Three data sets are necessary to test these hypotheses about seniors' interest in Social Security and their participation concerning the program and to describe their pattern of political party mobilization, as no single data set contains all of these dependent variables. Roper Survey 8108 (Roper Organization 1981) asked respondents how closely they follow news of various topics.<sup>1</sup> I use this data set to assess seniors' interest in Social Security compared to other domestic and international issues. The 1990 Citizen Participation Study (Verba et al. 1995) provides the Social Security-based participation items. Program recipients were asked whether they had ever contacted an elected official to complain about Social Security payments, taken into account a candidate's position on Social Security in deciding how to vote, or made a campaign contribution based at least in part on concern about Social Security payments. Finally, party mobilization is measured in the 1996 National Election Study, where respondents were asked whether someone from a political party contacted them during the election season.

The Citizen Participation Study items measuring Social Security-based participation require a closer look. Not only do the activities themselves differ in their "purity," as noted above, but also the survey items measuring Social Security-based participation vary in the locus of self-interest. With Social Security-based contacting, the self-interest is in the motivation to write a letter; a senior citizen depends on the program, experiences a problem with benefits or feels concern about a proposed policy change, and chooses to write a letter to an elected official to request assistance or to express the policy concern. The hypothesized relationship is between income and a particular kind of participation, and this participation is higher among lower-income seniors. Social Security-based voting and contributing are a bit different. The question wording for Social Security-based voting places the self-interest not in the motivation to vote, but in vote choice. The item measures (1) whether a respondent voted and (2) whether the respondent felt that Social Security figured into the vote choice. Social Security-based contributing is also a dependent variable with two parts: the act of contributing and the attribution of the motive to Social Security. Thus for voting and contributing in the context of Social Security, the relationship is not between income and a certain kind of participation, as with Social Security-based contacting, but between income and a propensity to attribute the primary motivation to Social Security. However, while these distinctions are important to note, affluent seniors should nonetheless be least likely to engage in these acts, whether the dependent variable is contacting with Social Security in mind or attributing a vote decision or political contribution to concern with the program. The relationship between income and each type of Social Security-based participation should be different from that between income and non-Social Security-based participation.

In each analysis, the dependent variable is modeled as a function of *income*, *education*, *gender*, *race*, *marital status*, *work status*, and *age* (where available). Income is represented curvilinearily by the inclusion of a squared term except where tests for multicollinearity indicated that income-squared was redundant with income. The models are estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) or, where the outcome is dichotomous, logistic regression. "Seniors" are respondents aged 65 and over, and "nonseniors" are ages 18 to 64.

### SENIORS' PARTICIPATORY CAPACITY

Before testing the hypotheses about the greater propensity of lower-income seniors to be interested in Social Security and to engage in Social Security-based participation, it is necessary to discuss whether seniors, particularly the less affluent, have sufficient means to participate. Resources such as education and income are among the strongest predictors of participatory activity (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995), yet senior citizens have the lowest formal education and household income of any age group. One-third of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This is the most recent Roper survey available assessing Social Security-specific interest. See Appendix A for the news items included.

seniors in the Citizen Participation Study lack a high school diploma, compared to only 9% of respondents aged 35 to 49. The average family income for seniors is just over \$24,000, compared to almost \$46,000 for those aged 35 to 49.

Despite their low resource levels, however, senior citizens in the United States participate at very high rates. In the 1996 National Election Study, seniors were 7% more likely to vote than 35 to 64 year olds, and 27% more likely to vote than persons under 35. Twelve percent of seniors made campaign contributions, compared to 9% of the middle age group and just 3% of the youngest group.

Seniors' active participation suggests that their modest resource levels are counterbalanced in several ways. With retirement, one trades one politically relevant resource, income, for another, free time. Seniors report over 12 hours of free time per day, compared to five hours for respondents aged 35 to 49.2 Also, seniors' incomes "go further" than those of nonseniors. Seniors do spend a greater share of their income on health care—12% of their before-tax income, compared to 5% among all households in 1997—but spend less than nonseniors, both in absolute terms and as a percentage of income, in categories such as entertainment, apparel, transportation, and, most notably, personal taxes and mortgage costs (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1999, 471). Seniors also hold less nonmortgage consumer debt (Duensing 1988). They benefit from a variety of financial breaks that are conferred on the basis of age rather than a means test: They are exempt from Social Security and Medicare taxes on earnings; they get an extra deduction on their federal income taxes; they pay taxes on a smaller share of their incomes; and they receive discounts at many retail stores, restaurants, hotels, and so on.<sup>3</sup> The mean senior family income is just 53% that of 35 to 49 year olds in the Citizen Participation Study, but adjusting for household size brings seniors' per capita income to 88% that of the younger group.

That seniors have low education levels may be even less relevant for participation than their low incomes since education relative to one's cohort is what matters for many participatory activities (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). But even seniors' low absolute levels of formal education are offset in several ways. To some extent, life experience may serve as a substitute for formal education (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Over a lifetime one may absorb participatory norms and values, learn to process political information, and become accustomed to voting through sheer habit (Plutzer 2002; Weisberg and Grofman 1981); a long life in the "school of hard knocks" may impart the same experience with bureaucratic relationships

Thus low resources do not represent the same bar to senior political activity as to nonsenior activity. Many seniors, even the less affluent, have sufficient resources to act on their great interest in Social Security, to which I now turn.

### **RESULTS**

### **Political Interest**

In Roper Survey 8108, respondents were asked whether they follow news of various domestic and international issues closely, follow it casually, or pay no attention. Eighty-one percent of seniors said that they follow news of Social Security closely, compared to 54% of nonseniors. Seniors followed news of Social Security more closely than any other topic. Indeed, the highest level of interest shown by any age group in any issue was seniors' interest in Social Security.<sup>6</sup>

To examine how the dependence gradient influences interest in Social Security, I modeled interest in

that helps educated people overcome the procedural hurdles necessary to register and vote (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, 35–36, 60). There may also be cohort differences in education content and quality. Earlier cohorts may have been more steeped in democratic, "American" values in school (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Perhaps greater education quality explains why seniors score as high as the more educated 35 to 49 year olds on the Citizen Participation Study vocabulary test. Lack of formal education may also be offset by voluntary group and church memberships. Seniors belong to these groups at the same rates as, or higher rates than, younger people and practice many politically relevant skills such as letter writing and speech making. 5


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> On a 10-item test, seniors got 6.3 definitions correct on average, compared to 6.6 for the younger group.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In the Citizen Participation Study, respondents were asked whether they had engaged in the following activities in the last six months as part of their job, organizational involvements, or church activities: written a letter, come to a meeting where they took part in making decisions, planned or chaired a meeting, or given a presentation or speech. The job skill questions were asked of those who were employed. The church skill questions were asked of those who were active members of their churches or who had served on their church board in the past five years. The organization skill questions were asked of respondents' "main" organization, and only skills exercised in nonpolitical organizations are analyzed here (see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Appendix B.9, for further explanations of the skills variables). Seniors are just as likely to belong to nonpolitical organizations as 35 to 49 year olds (74 to 72%) and practice the same number of skills there, 1.3 of a possible four. Seniors are even more likely to be members of a religious institution or to attend religious services two or more times per month—79%, vs. 67% of 35 to 49 year olds—and, again, practice as many skills, 1.6 on average. Only 10% of seniors work, and the survey did not ask about skills acquired on the job before retirement.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Senior interest in Social Security remains strong contemporarily. In the 1998 midterm election exit poll administered by the Voter News Service, seniors were most likely to cite Social Security as the issue that mattered most in deciding their vote for the House of Representatives (Toner 1999, A10). Thirty-one percent of seniors chose Social Security as the issue that mattered most, followed by "moral and ethical standards" (20%), education (14%), taxes (11%), the economy/jobs (10%), health care (8%), and the Clinton/Lewinsky matter (6%). The "most important problem" mentioned most frequently among seniors in the 2000 NES was Social Security; among nonseniors, it was education.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> In the Citizen Participation Study, free time is defined as time not spent working, doing housework, studying, or sleeping. The largest difference between seniors and nonseniors is time spent working. Retired senior men have even more free time, 14 hours per day.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The median senior couple with an income of \$25,000 would owe \$294 in federal taxes, or 1.15%, whereas the median nonsenior couple with an income of \$45,000 would owe \$5,164, or 11.5%. On an income of \$40,000, seniors would pay \$2,664, or 6.6%, in federal taxes, compared to \$4,414 or 11.0% for nonseniors (Moon and Mulvey 1996, 25).



domestic topics, international topics, and Social Security as a function of income and other covariates. I scored interest in Social Security as a dichotomous variable—one for those following news of the program closely, zero for those following it casually or not at all—and estimated the model with logistic regression. I constructed scales for interest in domestic and international issues by adding the number of issues each respondent followed closely (zero to five), which I recoded to zero to one and estimated with OLS.

Figure 2 shows the effect of income on issue interest among seniors with the other covariates held to their means. Interest in domestic and international issues increases with income, the traditional pattern.

In contrast, interest in Social Security falls at high income levels. Strictly, I predicted a monotonically negative income—interest relationship, while the results here are curvilinear. It could be that the income variable in the Roper data picks up some of the (positive) effects of education even when education is controlled for.

 $^7$  A factor analysis on the news items produces two scales, with the domestic issues (prices, income taxes, interest rates, air traffic controllers' strike, and the Conoco buyout) producing one scale with a Cronbach's  $\alpha$  of .58 and international issues (royal wedding, Arab-Israeli relations, Polish situation, English riots, Irish hunger strikes) producing another with a Cronbach's  $\alpha$  of .75.

Alternatively, it may be that self-interest is a weaker influence on attitudes than participation, for acting on an issue is more costly than voicing an opinion on a survey, and so typically only the self-interested act (Citrin and Green 1990). In any case, even with issue interest, Social Security has a different pattern vis-à-vis income than other domestic and international issues. These effects are even more pronounced in participation.

#### **Political Participation**

Table 1 shows the three types of Social Security-based participation modeled as a function of income, incomesquared, and other covariates. As hypothesized, income has a negative influence on contacting based on Social Security, the opposite of its usual sign (column 2). The relatively small number of cases prevents the coefficient for income from achieving statistical significance itself, but a log likelihood test shows that income and income-squared are jointly significant (p < .001). Figure 3a illustrates the probability by income that a senior citizen will write a letter complaining about Social Security, and it falls precipitously, in great contrast to the typically positive income-participation gradient.

As predicted, the results for Social Security-based voting and contributing are somewhat different. The likelihood of voting on the basis of Social Security first rises with income and then decreases at higher income levels (Figure 3b). If the Social Security voting item truly measured only Social Security-oriented voting and was not contaminated by other issues (people vote for many reasons even when they say they voted with regard to Social Security), the line would drop

The news interest items are ordinal variables. I could have estimated each with ordered logit, but I wanted to combine the domestic and international items, and doing so other than by this method would impose a metric on them. While scoring close interest as 1 and casual or no interest as 0 loses some information, the basic result—that interest in domestic and international issues rises with income while interest in Social Security falls at higher income levels—remains the same whether (1) the items are estimated as shown; (2) interest in the domestic and international items is scored 1, 2, 3 and combined into additive scales that violate the ordinal nature of the variables, or (3) the percentage of respondents who closely follow each item is averaged across domestic and international issues and Social Security by income level (a bivariate model).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> While the Citizen Participation Study had, 2,517 respondents, the Social Security-specific participation items were asked of Social Security households, including 235 senior respondents.

	Social Security-Based Participation				
Independent Variable	Contacting	Voting	Contributing		
Income	-0.014 <sup>a</sup>	0.017 <sup>a</sup>	0.095 <sup>a</sup>		
	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.068)		
Income-squared	`0.00002ª	$-0.00009^{a}$	-0.001 <sup>a</sup>		
	(0.0001)	(0.00008)	0.001		
Education	`0.391**	0.090	0.126		
	(0.144)	(0.097)	(0.166)		
Male	`1.310 <sup>*</sup>	`1.215 <sup>*</sup> *	_0.354 <sup>°</sup>		
	(0.610)	(0.379)	(0.614)		
Married	_`0.829 <sup>´</sup>	_`0.020 <sup>´</sup>	-0.073		
	(0.566)	(0.323)	(0.608)		
Black	-0.071	_`0.367 <sup>′</sup>	`0.988		
	(1.050)	(0.604)	(0.899)		
Working	1.243	—1.830 <sup>**</sup>	0.252		
	(1.408)	(0.678)	(1.223)		
Retired	1.233	—`1.330 <sup>*</sup> **	`0.933		
	(1.122)	(0.399)	(0.755)		
Age	0.023	_`0.043 <sup>#</sup>	0.005		
, igo	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.047)		
Constant	_6.838*	1.934	_`5.403 <sup>´</sup>		
	(3.341)	(1.999)	(3.745)		
N	235	232	234		
% predicted	94.1	70.4	94.3		
Cox & Snell R <sup>2</sup>	0.07	0.09	0.02		

Source: 1990 Citizen Participation Study (Verba et al. 1995).

Note: Figures in cells are logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are for respondents aged 65 and over. In OLS estimates of the same models, the tolerances for each predictor are greater than .10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem. p < .10; p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01; \*\*\* p < .001 (two-sided). a = 0.01 (two-sided). a = 0.01 (two-sided).

monotonically with income. Even so, Social Security is less common at high income levels, different from the usual participation pattern.

Social Security-based contributing also rises at first with income and then drops. Making contributions of any kind, even those based on a concern with Social Security, is unlikely at low income levels, where interest in the issue is great but activity limited by income constraints. Such activity becomes more likely at moderate income levels, where there is more disposable income but still substantial dependence on Social Security. As predicted, participation falls at high income levels (Figure 3c). Although voting and contributing do not fall monotonically with income as does contacting, both are less common among high-income than among low- and moderate-income seniors.

### Mobilization


Social Security may be of such importance to low-income seniors that they recognize their interest in the program without being prompted by other political actors. Perhaps the impact of government action is as "transparently obvious" to seniors as it is to government employees and farmers, who recognize the effects of government policies on their well-being and who participate at rates higher than predicted by their socioeconomic status (Lipset [1959] 1981, 196–97; see Lewis-Beck 1977 and Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

As it turns out, the unusual pattern of seniors' interest in Social Security is reinforced by a distinctive mobilization pattern: Low-income seniors are as likely as their higher-income counterparts to be mobilized by the political parties, and moderate-income seniors are even more likely.

Figure 4 shows the likelihoods that seniors and nonseniors at various income levels were contacted by a political party during the election season, after controls for other demographic characteristics. For nonseniors, the likelihood of being mobilized rises with income. This is the pattern found in past research: High-income individuals are more likely to be asked to participate than their low-income counterparts.

Once again, senior citizens are different. The likelihood of party mobilization during the campaign season rises with income to a point but then falls at high income levels. Parties may appear to be acting rationally, conserving limited resources by declining to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> This pattern is most pronounced for mobilization by the Democratic party. The likelihood that a senior respondent is mobilized by the Democratic party rises from .05 at low income levels to .13 at moderate incomes, falling to nearly zero among the most affluent. The pattern of mobilization by the Republican party is much flatter, and the curve, although much more shallow, opens upward: the likelihood of mobilization by the Republican party is .08 at low income levels, decreasing slightly, to .06, at moderate incomes, and increasing to .08 among the affluent. In neither case are affluent seniors mobilized at higher rates than poorer seniors.



mobilize high-income seniors, who already vote at high rates. Presumably mobilizing highly participatory affluent nonseniors would be a waste as well, yet that is precisely what the parties do, making the different pattern for seniors all the more notable. Thus lower- and moderate-income seniors are more likely to participate with regard to Social Security not only because of their great interest in the program, but also because they are mobilized to politics at high rates.


#### DISCUSSION

The role of Social Security helps explain the high rates of political participation by seniors. Among nonseniors, the extremely modest activity levels of the less affluent pull down the overall participation rate. In contrast, low-income seniors participate at higher rates than would be predicted by their resource levels because of their dependence on Social Security. On average, seniors receive almost half their income from Social Security (Moon and Mulvey 1996, 29). Like some other special societal groups—farmers and government employees—seniors have a large stake in government action. Social Security is especially important to poorer seniors—the 40% of seniors who receive four-fifths of their income from the program. Their dependence on Social Security boosts their participation and works against the usually positive income-participation gradient.

Social Security's role is both important and unusual. The Social Security-based participation of low-income seniors is a rare instance in which self-interest is highly influential. Researchers often have difficulty detecting self-interested behavior (Citrin and Green 1990). People fail to act in their self-interest because of informational or cognitive limitations (Simon 1983) or because they choose as social creatures to act altruistically (Sen 1977; Stoker 1992; Wildavsky 1987). With Social Security, though, the stakes are "visible," "tangible," "large," and "certain" (Citrin and Green 1990, 18), and there is no moral prohibition on the exercise of their self-interest. 11 Social Security is a non-means-tested entitlement program to which recipients or their spouses contributed during their years in the workforce. Although academics and policy experts may assert that the system is really a pay-as-you-go intergenerational transfer program and that the relationship between one's contributions and one's benefits is indirect, the program is popularly understood as an insurance program. As Franklin D. Roosevelt said, Social Security's self-contributory design gives recipients a "legal, moral, and political right" to their benefits (quoted in Schlesinger 1958, 309).

Social Security also is distinctive in American politics as a mobilizer of a low-income group. To the extent that economic self-interest influences behavior, it often simply augments the high participation rates of the most active segments of the citizenry. Those affluent homeowners who opposed Proposition 13 were "the most politicized and vocal" portion of the population to begin with (Sears and Citrin 1982, 220). It is low-income seniors, however, who are most active on the basis of Social Security, able to be so because of their sufficiently high participatory capacity, interested in doing so because of their great stake in the program,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> In addition, the self-interest that is influential here is the rarest and most rigorous type: "narrow" self-interest, the pursuit of "relatively short-run material benefits for the actor or his immediate family," to use David Sears's definition (found in Citrin and Green 1990, 4). Usually scholars are unable to detect the influence of self-interest even when it is more broadly defined.



and recruited to do so in part because Social Security creates a basis for mobilization.

Indeed, this bottom-up self-interest story is augmented by a top-down mobilization process. Senior citizens are one of the few groups in American society in which both the high- and the low-income members are mobilized with regard to economic issues, and not only by the political parties as shown here, but also in other venues. One of every two seniors belongs to the AARP, and as with voluntary group membership in general, AARP members are more educated, affluent, and white than nonmembers (Campbell 2000). However, poorer seniors, unlike many other lowincome groups, also have sources of mobilization, political information, and political discussion. Thousands of senior centers and nutrition programs across the country, many run by the Administration on Aging, attract lower-income seniors. Inevitably seniors hear political discussion and policy news. One study from the 1960s found that although seniors active in old-age social welfare clubs were demographically similar to nonmembers, club members were more likely to talk about health and medical care (25% versus 2%) and other problems of old age (16% to 5%), were more likely to believe that "older people ought to organize to demand their rights" (68% to 39%), and were more likely to believe that older people ought to be more active in politics (74% to 48%) (Rose 1965). Hence, low-income seniors both take a keen interest in government policy and learn in these group settings how to make their preferences heard in the political arena.

### CONCLUSION

According to Lipset ([1959] 1981, 190), one factor affecting turnout is the "relevance of government policies to the individual." Groups that see a visible effect of government policy on their well-being—including government employees, farmers, veterans, and, as shown

here, Social Security recipients—have a great stake in government activity and participate at higher rates than would otherwise be expected (Lipset [1959] 1981, 190–94; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

The Social Security case is also unusual and important because the program's participatory effects are most pronounced for low-income seniors. Ordinarily it is difficult to mobilize poorer individuals, but lower-income seniors' dependence on Social Security is so great and so obvious that seniors are able to act in a self-interested manner, protecting their Social Security benefits. Social Security thus provides an important instance of self-interest significantly influencing participatory behavior. It would not be an exaggeration to conclude that the program is largely responsible for the creation of the senior constituency and its electoral significance.

### **APPENDIX A: ROPER SURVEY 8108 QUESTION WORDINGS**

Issue-specific interest. Of course, everyone is more interested in some things being carried in the news than in others. To take some different kinds of examples—Is news about [each item in turn] something you have recently been following fairly closely, or just following casually, or not paying much attention to? Which prices are going up or down and how much?: the legislation to reduce income taxes; the legislation to deal with changes in Social Security; interest rates being charged by banks; attempts by Seagrams, Mobil, Texaco, DuPont, and others to buy Conoco; the marriage of Prince Charles and Lady Diana; the hunger strikes by Irish prisoners; the riots in England; relations between Israel and the Arab countries; the situation in Poland; the air traffic controllers' strike. (Coded 1 if followed closely, 0 if followed casually or not much).

Income. Now here is a list of income categories. Would you call off the letter of the category that best describes the combined annual income of all members of this household, including wages or salary, pensions, interest or dividends, and all other sources? Nine-category variable.

Race. Recorded by interviewer. Coded 1 if black, 0 otherwise.

Gender. Coded 1 if male, 0 if female.

Marital status. Are you married, single, widowed, separated, or divorced? Coded 1 if married, 0 otherwise.

Work status. Are you at present employed, either full-time or part-time? [If no]: Are you a housewife, unemployed, a student, retired, or what? Coded 1 if working, 0 otherwise.

Education. What was the last grade of regular school that you completed—not counting specialized schools like secretarial, art, or trade schools? Seven-category variable.

### APPENDIX B: CITIZEN PARTICIPATION STUDY QUESTION WORDINGS

Social Security voting. In the past five years, have you taken into account the position of a candidate in relation to Social Security Payments in deciding how to vote? Coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.

Social Security contacting. In the past five years, have you contacted a government official to complain about Social Security Payments? Coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.

Social Security contributing. In the past five years, have you given a campaign contribution based, at least in part, on your concern about Social Security Payments? Coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.

Income. Which of the income groups listed on this card includes the total 1989 income before taxes of all members of your family living in your home? Please include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. [If uncertain: What would be your best guess?] Sixteen-category variable.

Race. What is your race? [Which category describes your racial background?] Coded 1 if black, 0 otherwise.

Gender. Coded 1 if male, 0 if female.

Marital status. Are you currently married, living in a marriage-like relationship, widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married? Coded 1 if married, 0 otherwise.

Work status. Last week, were you working full-time for pay, working part-time for pay, going to school, keeping house, or something else? Coded 1 if working, 0 otherwise.

Education. What is the highest grade of regular school that you have completed and gotten credit for? If necessary say: By regular school we mean a school that can be counted toward an elementary or high school diploma or a college or university degree. Did you get a high school diploma or pass a high school equivalency test? Do you have any college degrees—that is, not including degrees from a business college, technical college, or vocational school? What is the highest degree that you have earned? Eight-category variable.

Age. Calculated from year born.

### APPENDIX C: 1996 NATIONAL ELECTION STUDY QUESTION WORDINGS

Party mobilization. As you know, the political parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidate. Did anyone from one of the political parties call you up or come around and talk to you about the campaign this year? (v961162; coded 1 if yes, 0 if no.)

Income. Please look at page 21 of the booklet and tell me the letter of the income group that includes the income of all members of your family living here in 1995 before taxes. This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income. Twenty-four-category variable.

Race. (v960067; coded 1 if black, 0 otherwise). Gender. (v960066; coded 1 if male, 0 if female).

Marital status. Are you married now and living with your (husband/wife)—or are you widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never married? (v960606; coded 1 if married, 0 otherwise).

Work status. We'd like to know if you are working now, temporarily laid off, or are you unemployed, retired, permanently disabled, a homemaker, a student, or what? (v960616; coded 1 if working, 0 otherwise.)

Education. What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed? Did you get a high school diploma or pass a high school equivalency test? What is the highest degree that you have earned? I used the summary of the above three questions (v960610). Seven-category variable.

Age. Calculated from year born (v960605).

# APPENDIX D: PREDICTING ISSUE INTEREST AMONG SENIORS AND PARTY MOBILIZATION OF SENIORS AND NONSENIORS

TABLE A1. Predicting Issue Interest among Seniors (Figure 2) Independent Social Domestic International Variable Security Issues Issues 0.135# Income 0.006\* 0.008\*\* (0.075)(0.002)(0.003)Income-squared -0.003\*(0.001)Education 0.176 0.034\* 0.045\*(0.151)(0.016)(0.019)Male 0.078 0.064 0.010 (0.440)(0.051)(0.061)Married -0.2610.031 0.034 (0.407)(0.046)(0.055)Black 0.314 -0.030-0.023(0.599)(0.069)(0.082)Working 0.158 0.046 0.074 (0.779)(0.086)(0.106)Retired -0.001-0.0080.048 (0.502)(0.059)(0.071)Constant -0.0890.254\*\*\* 0.078 (0.670)(0.073)(0.087)Ν 202 196 196 % predicted 78.2  $R^2$ 0.04 0.14 0.15 F-test p < .001p < .001

Source: Roper Survey 8108, August 1981 (Roper Organization 1981).

Note: For Social Security, figures in cells are logistic regression coefficients predicting whether respondents followed news of the program closely. For domestic and international issues, figures in cells are OLS coefficients predicting the number of issues respondents followed closely (0 to 5, rescaled to 0–1). Standard errors are in parentheses. Results are for respondents aged 65 and over; age within the senior group is not available in this data set. Cox and Snell  $R^2$  shown for logistic regression results. Income-squared was eliminated from the domestic and international equations because a check for multicollinearity revealed a high correlation with Income. The tolerances for the predictors in the models shown are greater than .10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem. \*\*p < .01; \*\*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001 (two-sided).

TABLE A2. Predicting Party Mobilization of Seniors and Nonseniors (Figure 4)

Independent		
Variable	Nonseniors (18–64)	Seniors (65+)
Income	0.002	0.025 <sup>a</sup> .
•	(0.003)	(0.018)
Income-squared		$-0.0002^{a}$
		(0.0002)
Education	0.190***	0.063
	(0.049)	(0.093)
Male	−0. <b>166</b> -	0.030
	(0.146)	(0.293)
Married	0.454**	0.096
ı	(0.162)	(0.305)
Black	-0.370	-0.149
	(0.271)	(0.501)
Working	-0.002	1.206*
	(0.203)	(0.611)
Retired	0.261	0.703
	(0.376)	(0.486)
Age	0.020**	0.004
	(0.007)	(0.019)
Constant	-2.967***	-2.072 (1.722)
	(0.380)	(1.562)
<sub>N</sub>	1,113	281
% predicted	73.9	63.3
Cox & Snell R2	0.05	0.04

Source: 1996 National Election Study (Rosenstone et al. 1998). Note: Figures in cells are logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Income-squared was eliminated from the nonsenior equation because a check for multicollinearity revealed a high correlation with Income. In OLS estimates of the models shown, the tolerances for the predictors are greater than .10, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem. \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01; \*\*\*p < .001 (two-sided). \*aLog-likelihood test shows that income and income-squared are jointly significant (p < .001).

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### Strategic Parliamentary Dissolution

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n important agenda power in parliamentary democracies is the discretion over the dissolution of parliament. We argue that variation in constitutional rules and the political environment will systematically affect the frequency of early elections. We hypothesize that dissolution will be more frequent under single-party governments, when the head of state plays an insignificant role, when neither parliament nor the cabinet can inhibit dissolution, when minority governments are in power, when the head of state can dissolve unilaterally, and later in the constitutional term. Using standard logistic and Cox-proportional hazard techniques, we test these expectations in a pooled time-series setting against observations of most OECD parliamentary democracies for the years 1960–1995. We find that parliamentary dissolutions are more frequent earlier in the constitutional term, under minority governments, when the head of state plays an insignificant role, and when the parliament or the cabinet is not involved.

n parliamentary democracies, the accountability of representatives to citizens is established and maintained primarily through legislative elections. Political scientists have paid great attention to such contests and to the popular preferences they signal. A central theme in this vast literature is whether or not (and how) governments are rewarded or punished for their performance—most commonly, their economic performance—while in office (e.g., Anderson 1995a, 1995b; Powell and Whitten 1993; Rose and Mackie 1983). What has been less widely studied, however, is how incumbent politicians use their constitutional dissolution powers precisely to choose the time and circumstances of the voters' reckoning.

Early elections are an option in almost every parliamentary system. Yet the conditions under which this option can be and is exercised vary significantly. Parliamentary dissolution sometimes occurs at the call of a single actor such as the prime minister, whereas in other cases it results from the interaction of several public officials including presidents and parliamentarians. Thus, the politicians whose careers and political fortunes are most directly at stake can frequently manipulate the timing of elections and the conditions under which they occur. Voters and opposition politicians are not blind to this. As a result, the electoral accountability of parliamentary governments is bound up in a series of strategic and anticipatory relationships.

We seek to explain early parliamentary dissolution. There are two potential explanations. Either dissolution occurs because of political need or it happens due

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to political opportunity. In the former case, dissolution could happen with particular frequency during times of crises or in unstable countries. In the latter case, early elections should be held when politicians find them opportune for partisan or personal reasons. We entertain the second possibility. We argue that opportunity is profoundly affected by institutional differences in the strategic environment in which dissolution decisions are made. While it is important to understand the motivations of the politicians empowered to make dissolution decisions, it is just as important to grasp how their opportunities and incentives vary across institutional settings. In exploring these institutional effects, we build on the veto players framework that has become influential in the study of comparative politics (e.g., Tsebelis 2002). Yet a precise understanding of the mechanisms of parliamentary dissolution requires a refinement of that conceptual apparatus.

### **DISSOLUTION POWERS: A SURVEY**

We take parliamentary government to mean the institutional arrangement in which the chief executive is accountable, through a confidence relationship, to the parliamentary majority and can be removed from office by the latter (Strøm 2000). In most such regimes, simple legislative majorities can dismiss the executive at will on a motion initiated either by the opposition (a successful no confidence motion) or by the prime minister (a failed confidence motion) (Huber 1996). Most parliamentary democracies also feature a potentially offsetting dissolution power that permits parliament to be retired and new elections to be held before the regular legislative term is up.<sup>1</sup>

This dissolution power is often viewed as a key feature of parliamentarism. Douglas Verney (1959), for example, counts it among the 11 defining characteristics of parliamentary democracy. To Juan Linz (1994), it is a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> We refer to parliamentary dissolutions and early elections synonymously. Thus, we assume that whenever parliament is dissolved, a general election is constitutionally required and indeed takes place. We thus ignore potential dissolutions followed by states of emergency, coups d'etat, and the like.

critical antidote to the problems of "temporal rigidity" that plague presidential democracies. Parliamentary government is commonly conceived as a system of "fused powers," in which the legislative and executive branches of government are forced to represent consistent policies. When vested in the head of government, the authority to dissolve parliament is a counterweight to the legislative majority's dismissal power. These two "doomsday devices," the dismissal power and the dissolution power, force the legislative and executive branches of government into interdependence (Lupia and Strøm 1995).

Contemporary parliamentary constitutions vary widely in their dissolution powers. There are some systems in which discretionary dissolution is constitutionally proscribed. In Switzerland, which we admittedly would not classify as a parliamentary democracy, parliament can be dissolved only upon constitutional amendment. And while the Norwegian constitution in practice is clearly parliamentary, it permits no early dissolution of the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament) for any reason. Yet such cases are rare. Most constitutions permit parliamentary dissolution and place the ultimate decision in the hands of the head of state, whether monarch or president. In some cases, France and Italy among them, the head of state is constitutionally free to dissolve parliament at his or her discretion. More commonly, however, the head of state can dissolve parliament only upon the request of the prime minister. Yet under some constitutions the prime minister may be able to dissolve unilaterally (as in New Zealand) or with the consent of the parliamentary majority (as in Belgium since 1995). Elsewhere, parliament may, by majority vote, decide to dissolve itself (Austria and, by implication, Sweden since 1975). Several regimes permit or mandate dissolution upon the passage of a constitutional amendment (e.g., Denmark and Belgium). Finally, constitutions sometimes constrain the circumstances or timing of parliamentary dissolution. Many constitutions (e.g., the German Basic Law) seek to reserve this mechanism for emergency situations. The French Constitution does not allow the president to dissolve within the first year of the parliamentary term. And the Italian Constitution permits no dissolution in the last six months of the president's term (the so-called "white semester").

Table 1 surveys the dissolution powers of 20 advanced industrial democracies. We can distinguish among 10 forms of dissolution power, which are not all mutually exclusive. Overall, the variety of dissolution provisions displayed in Table 1 is remarkable. Except for some states in the Westminster tradition, hardly any two parliamentary systems are alike. Some constitutions (e.g., Belgium and Denmark) feature a combination of several dissolution powers. But is this diversity of institutional mechanism purely a curiosity, or does it have systematic and predictable consequences for the ways in which these powers are employed? We argue that differences in dissolution powers indeed affect the incidence of early elections. Our next task is to review our understanding of the behavior that results in parliamentary dissolution, which will enable us to identify the institutional conditions that lead to its occurrence.

### EXPLAINING PARLIAMENTARY DISSOLUTION

Although the literature on parliamentary dissolution is by no means large, recent years have witnessed several interesting efforts to understand the phenomenon and its implications. For example, empirical analyses suggest that Japanese governments may be more likely than Indian ones to dissolve strategically (Chowdhury 1993; Ito 1990). But even more important have been a number of theoretical efforts to understand parliamentary dissolution more generally in "opportunistic" terms. Fundamentally, this body of scholarship has been based on Smith's (2000, 5) simple but powerful observation that leaders "call elections when they expect to win." In its most parsimonious form, this assumption has provided the motivation for models that depict parliamentary dissolution as a decision problem faced by a rational and unitary government interested in exploiting its power for electoral advantage. In his pioneering analysis, Balke (1990) thus models the government's decision to call early elections as an optimal stopping problem, assuming that governments maximize tenure in office in a zero-sum world. He finds, among other results, that parliamentary dissolution should be more common when governments enjoy high popularity and when the end of the parliament's regular term (the time at which the constitution mandates that elections be held) approaches.

While the decision whether or not to dissolve may be in the hands of the government incumbents, their behavior may well be conditioned by their interaction with other political actors, such as opposition parties or the voters themselves. To the extent that such actors can affect the benefit that incumbents derive from dissolution, they transform dissolution decisions into games of strategic interaction. Smith (1996) thus analyzes the decision to call early elections in majoritarian systems as a sequential equilibrium game between voters and party (government and opposition) leaders. He assumes that voters use their information about dissolution decisions to update their beliefs about the government's competence and that the opposition devotes resources to a campaign aimed at affecting these perceptions. Ultimately, guided by their perception of the government's competence relative to the opposition, the voters choose whether or not to reelect the government. Given these assumptions, Smith reports, among other analytical results, that early elections are called when the government is popular and when the current value of holding office is low compared to the expected value of future office—holding. The latter might, for example, be the case under a minority government (Smith 1996, 103-04).

Neither Balke nor Smith models governments consisting of a coalition of parties with diverging preferences, the situation that typifies most parliamentary democracies. Lupia and Strøm (1995), however,

Prime Minister Prim	TABLE 1. Diss	Dissolution Powers, by Country	s, by Country	j							
x x		Prime Minister with 'Partisan' Head of State	Prime Minister with 'non-Partisan' Head of State	me Minister Inilaterally				Head of State Unilaterally	Parliament Unilaterally	Cabinet with	Constitutional
× ×	Australia		×	1				C. marchanis	o marciany		
× < ×	Austria		•		×				>		
× ×	Belgium (~1995)				<	×			<		>
< ×	Belgium (1995–)					<>				>	<>
*	Canada		×			< .		•		<	<
*	Denmark		: ×					•			>
×	Finland (-1991)		•					>			<
*	Finland (1991-)	×						<			
*	France							>			
*	Germany	×						<			
*	Iceland							>			>
×	Ireland	×						<			<
<	Israel								>		
	Italy							×	<		
	Japan						×	<			
	Luxembourg					×	(				>
	Netherlands					:×					<
	New Zealand			×							>
	Norway										<
	Sweden (-1970)					×					
	Sweden (1971–74)			×		<b>.</b>					
	Sweden (1975-)						×				>
	Switzerland						ζ				<>
Source: Parliaments of the World: A Comparative Reference Company and Utherd Environments and Local Action (1900)	United Kingdom		×								<
	Source: Parliaments	of the World: A Con	nparative Reference C	Compendium (1986)	and World Fno.	Iclopadia of Parlis	mente and L	dicloturae (1008)			

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analyze the strategic timing of parliamentary elections in such coalition systems. Their game begins when an event (e.g., a credible poll) informs all parties about their expected fortunes if an election were to be held. Each coalition member can then offer a reallocation of power to any other party. If no party is willing to make an acceptable offer, either there is a vote of confidence in the existing coalition or parliament is dissolved. Lupia and Strøm find that dissolution is most likely when there exist parties that expect large net benefits from an election and at the same time derive little value from the seats they currently control or from coalitions they could enter. Their model also suggests that, all else equal, dissolution becomes more attractive as the end of parliament's constitutional interelection period (CIEP) approaches. Finally, Lupia and Strøm (1995, 655–56) find that dissolution depends on the balance between several types of costs: the opportunity costs of calling elections and the transaction costs of bargaining, campaigning, and electioneering. Diermeier and Stevenson (2000) provide a stochastic reformulation of this model, and in their empirical estimates they separate out the hazard rate due to parliamentary dissolution. Consistently with Lupia and Strøm, they find a substantial increase in the dissolution hazard as the end of the parliamentary term approaches, though empirically this increase is not monotonic.

While this emerging literature rigorously models the motivations behind dissolution decisions, it does not fully capture the effects of the institutional environment. Both Balke and Smith, for example, assume unitary governments that can dissolve parliament at will. This is a considerable simplification of parliamentary democracies, most of which have multiparty cabinets and constitutions that constrain the prime minister's ability to dissolve. Similarly, Lupia and Strøm model dissolution only as a last stage in coalition bargaining and assume that dissolution occurs only when a majority of the legislators prefer that outcome to the status quo. In the real world, however, there is often no coalition bargaining before parliament is dissolved,2 particularly if dissolution powers are vested in a single constitutional agent such as the president.3 For example, when President François Mitterrand dissolved the French National Assembly in 1981, he deliberately did so against the preferences of the center-right parliamentary majority.

Thus, the existing literature has not adequately captured the institutional rules under which parliamentary dissolution typically happens. Nor has it fully explored

the effects of bargaining between players representing different political parties. Finally, the existing literature remains theoretical and so far has not spawned any extensive empirical investigation. We move forward in all these respects, by considering more complex and plausible institutional environments, by explicitly modeling multiparty situations, and by subjecting our theoretical results to systematic empirical tests. We do so somewhat inductively, by constructing our models on the basis of the empirical survey of dissolution powers reported above.

### STRATEGIC DISSOLUTION: A MODEL

Building on Table 1, let us now consider the circumstances in which parliamentary dissolution powers will be exercised. Presumably, constitution-makers devise dissolution powers to allow politicians to extricate themselves from decisional gridlock, to allow disgraced leaders to retreat, or to permit a consultation with the voters on pressing and unforeseen issues that may arise. Hence, parliamentary dissolution powers are designed to avoid the "temporal rigidity" that Linz (1994) finds to be such a flaw in presidential systems. Yet, like all institutions, dissolution powers can be manipulated for other, and perhaps less lofty, purposes. We are concerned with the ability of politicians to use them for partisan purposes, though we do not deny the possibility of more public-spirited use. Thus, in this section we develop a baseline model of strategic parliamentary dissolution, which we later extend. We model the process that may lead to new elections as a game between three players: (1) the prime minister, whom we assume to be the leader of one of the governing parties, (2) a pivotal coalition partner, and (3) the head of state. We make no assumption here as to whether the head of state holds an elective or hereditary office or whether or not that person is a partisan. We do, however, return to these issues.

Our model assumes that all players are rational and that all the features of the game are common knowledge. We exclude from consideration all dissolutions that are caused by the government's own defeat or collapse. Moreover, we focus on those circumstances in which the options of renegotiating an existing coalition or forming a new one, rather than calling elections, can be disregarded. The game takes place during the parliament's term, after it has been elected and before its maximum constitutional term (the end of the CIEP) has been reached. The events we describe may be set in motion by a change in one of the relevant payoffs, for example, the expected benefit to one of the parties of holding an election at that time.

We assume that each player has a specific constitutional power and that their interaction occurs in a specified sequence. We agree with Tsebelis (1995, 2002)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The best interpretation of such cases, however, may be that the relevant party leaders bypass the bargaining stage because they correctly anticipate its costs (see above) relative to the expected benefits. In other words, if party leaders perceive a substantial probability of winning an outright majority, they may be unlikely to accept the transaction costs of coalition bargaining and the hassles of actually implementing such a deal. This is particularly likely to happen in majoritarian systems, such as the ones analyzed by Smith.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Nonetheless, the stipulation makes sense as an equilibrium institution, since we would not expect parliamentary majorities to sustain rules under which the legislature could routinely be dismissed against the preferences of its majority.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In Lupia and Strøm's (1995) terms, this could be because the transaction costs of coalition bargaining are too high relative to the benefits. Compared to Lupia and Strøm, we thus simplify our assumptions about the bargaining environment, while our model is more institutionally contextual.


that the number and preferences of veto players matter. Yet an adequate understanding of parliamentary dissolution requires a careful specification of the decision process and the powers of the individual players. It is useful and indeed necessary to distinguish between powerful players, whose actions may affect the payoffs of other players but whose consent is neither sufficient nor necessary for dissolution; veto players, whose consent is necessary but not sufficient for dissolution; decisive players, whose consent is sufficient but not necessary; and, finally, dictators, whose consent is both necessary and sufficient (Strøm 1995). Moreover, among veto players there may be important differences between those that can exercise agenda control, ex ante veto players, and those that can instead put their feet down ex post.

In our baseline model, the prime minister is a veto player with agenda control. He, and only he, has the power to propose dissolution, and unless he does so, no election will be held until constitutionally required. The coalition partner is a powerful player who has consultative power only. She can dissent from the prime minister's request. After the prime minister has requested dissolution, the coalition partner can choose either to oppose that request or to acquiesce. Finally, the head of state has ex post veto power. Once the prime minister has requested dissolution, and regardless of whether the coalition partner dissents, the head of state can either grant or refuse this request. This baseline model assumes that parliamentary dissolution can take place only when it is initially requested by the prime minister and then approved by the head of state. We later show the implications of varying these institutional assumptions. The extensive form of the game is illustrated in Figure 1. Note that while all three players have some capacity to influence the outcome of the game, they are not all veto players. While the head of state holds an ex post and the prime minister an ex ante veto, the

coalition partner is at best a powerful player, who cannot by herself prevent dissolution.

There are five possible outcomes, identified by Roman numerals in Figure 1. Either the prime minister proposes dissolution or he does not. In the latter case, no election is held and the game ends (outcome V). If, on the other hand, the prime minister does call for new elections, the coalition partner has the choice whether or not to oppose this request. If she acquiesces, the game proceeds to the upper subgame at the final decision node, whereas if the coalition partner instead opposes the prime minister's call, the game advances to the lower subgame. Finally, the head of state decides whether to heed or reject the prime minister's request. If the head of state dissolves, the game ends at outcome I (if the coalition partner has acquiesced) or at outcome III (if she has dissented). If, on the other hand. the head of state refuses to dissolve, the result is either outcome II (if the coalition partner has acquiesced) or outcome IV (if she has opposed dissolution).

Before we can solve this game, we describe the payoffs of the players. For each player, there is an expected net value of holding the election now, which we denote  $E_{\rm P}$  for the prime minister,  $E_{\rm C}$  for the coalition partner, and E<sub>H</sub> for the head of state. Think of this variable as the difference between the value of holding elections now and the value of continuing the existing parliament, either until its term expires or until some other opportunity for dissolution may arise. We make no assumption as to precisely why the players may or may not prefer a new election. For example, the prime minister may prefer to dissolve because he expects that an early election will allow him to remain prime minister for a longer time, because he believes that his party will get more votes now than at any feasible time in the future, because he anticipates that he may be able to form a more valuable coalition now than later, or for some combination of such reasons.



We do assume, however, that to the prime minister and the coalition partner the value of the existing parliament will decline over the course of the parliamentary term. This value derives from two factors: the values of the existing seats and bargaining power that the party enjoys and the value of future opportunities to time elections. With each passing day, the time left in the existing parliament diminishes, and so do the opportunities to call early elections. On the very last day of the parliamentary term, existing seats must be relinquished, and the opportunity to decide election timing disappears. Hence, all else equal, as the value of the existing parliament declines over the course of its term, the net value of holding new elections rises.

### Costs

Each player faces a specific cost associated with the exercise of his or her respective powers. The prime minister incurs a proposal cost, P, where P > 0, whenever he requests an early election. We can think of this as a shorthand for the (unmodeled) signaling game between the prime minister and the voters. As Smith (1996) argues, the prime minister has private information, unavailable to the voters, about the likely future performance of the government and the economy. He can use this information strategically to call elections when he anticipates downturns in the government's fortunes. Unfortunately for him, this very act functions as a signal to the voters that worse times lie ahead. Whenever the prime minister requests dissolution, he thus signals to the voters a lack of confidence in the government's future. The voters will use this information to downgrade their assessment of the government's performance and may respond by withdrawing support from the prime minister's party. We therefore assume that there is always some nonzero cost to such proposals.

The coalition partner pays a dissent cost, D, where D > 0, if she opposes the prime minister's request. Any such expression of dissent amounts to overt conflict within the governing coalition. Awkwardly, this conflict may have to be resolved at the same time that the parties are going into an electoral campaign. The cost of such behavior, again, derives from the voters. All else equal, we believe that voters will downgrade their assessment of governing parties whenever these parties openly squabble. Such squabbles, of course, are likely to be particularly costly when they occur just prior to a general election.

Finally, the head of state pays a veto cost, V, where V > 0, if he vetoes a prime ministerial request for early dissolution. Refusing such a request means picking a fight with the prime minister. Although among parliamentary democracies the head of state's constitutional powers vary, he is typically less powerful than the prime minister. We therefore assume that, all else equal, the head of state will prefer not to frustrate the prime minister. Note, however, that the head of state's veto cost is contingent on the behavior of the coalition partner. If the coalition partner has opposed dissolution and we are in the lower subgame in Figure 1, then the veto cost

TABLE 2	. Payoff Mat	rix in Dissolu	ition Game
		Coalition	
Outcome	Prime Ministe	er Partner	Head of State
Ī	E <sub>P</sub> – P	E <sub>C</sub>	E <sub>H</sub>
II .	-P	0	$-V_{U}$
111	$E_{P}-P$	E <sub>C</sub> – D –D	<i>Е</i> н
IV	-P	-D	$-V_{L}$
V	0	0	0
Note: E	not ovported	election henefit	for player i

Note:  $E_1$  = net expected election benefit for player i; P = proposal cost, where P > 0; D = dissent cost, where D > 0; and  $V_U$ ,  $V_L$  = veto cost, where  $V_U$ ,  $V_L$  > 0, and  $V_U$  >  $V_L$ .


is lower than in the upper subgame. In other words, it is less costly for the head of state to refuse a contested request for dissolution than an uncontested one. We denote the former (contested) veto cost  $V_L$  (denoting the lower subgame) and the latter (uncontested) veto cost  $V_U$  (denoting the upper subgame).

For simplicity, we assume that no player is indifferent between any of the potential outcomes. Given these assumptions, Table 2 illustrates the payoff to each player under each of the five possible outcomes. Again, all features of the game are assumed to be common knowledge.

We solve the game through backward induction. As the simple proof in the Appendix shows, three of the five outcomes (numbers II, III, and IV) never occur in equilibrium. The coalition partner will never oppose the prime minister's request if she knows that the head of state will dissolve regardless (outcome III). And the prime minister will not propose if he knows that the head of state will veto (outcome II or IV). In equilibrium, we should therefore never observe dissolution requests that are opposed by the prime minister's coalition partner or vetoes by the head of state. This result serves as a caution against interpretations to the effect that even strong heads of state are powerless to refuse dissolution or that parties that do not control the prime ministership cannot prevent the PM from dissolving. One cannot infer the impossibility of such events from their nonoccurrence. Rather, vetoes and intracabinet conflict over dissolution requests fail to occur because the prime minister, or the head of state, anticipates the costs they would impose. The empirical evidence suggests that such "out-of-equilibrium" behavior is, in fact, quite uncommon.<sup>5</sup> The paucity of contested dissolutions thus suggests that complete

Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Albert Reynolds was less fortunate. In 1993-94 he led a coalition of his own Fianna Fáil and the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Occasionally, presidents apparently do consider vetoing dissolution requests, as when German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in 1983 engineered the parliamentary defeat of his coalition on a confidence vote and subsequently requested that Federal President Karl Carstens dissolve. At the time, there was some question as to whether Carstens would indeed comply. Kohl's request was a fairly blatant manipulation of the German Basic Law, according to which the chancellor can request dissolution only when his government has lost its Bundestag majority. Clearly, his parliamentary defeat notwithstanding, Kohl continued to enjoy the confidence of a parliamentary majority. In the end, President Carstens nevertheless acceded to Kohl's request. Yet, over the nearly two decades that have since passed, no other Bundestag has been retired early.



information is a realistic assumption for most dissolution scenarios.

Parliamentary dissolution will thus occur if and only if either  $E_{\rm P}-P>0$  and  $E_{\rm H}>-V_{\rm L}$  (regardless of the coalition partner's incentive condition) or  $E_{\rm P}-P>0$  and  $E_{\rm C}>-D$  and  $-V_{\rm L}>E_{\rm H}>-V_{\rm U}$ . Under all other conditions, the prime minister will not propose and no dissolution will occur.

Given the conditions for dissolution summarized above, simple comparative statics can generate further inferences as to the likelihood of dissolution. For example, all else equal, an increase in the prime minister's, the head of state's, or the coalition partner's expected benefit from an early election could cause parliament to be dissolved when otherwise the status quo would have prevailed. And such increases could never have the opposite effect. Similarly, dissolution may be precipitated by a decrease in the prime minister's proposal costs, or by an increase in the coalition partner's dissent costs or the head of state's veto costs, but never by shifts in the opposite directions.

Irish Labour Party. The coalition collapsed in fall 1994, when Labour withdrew and announced that it would support a no-confidence motion against the rump Fianna Fáil government. Reportedly, Reynolds considered requesting a dissolution of the Dáil (the Irish House of Commons). However, President Mary Robinson then consulted the Chair of the Bar Council on her constitutional powers, which was interpreted as a signal that, if asked, she would veto dissolution (she later told a journalist that she would indeed have refused to dissolve). Thereupon, Reynolds simply capitulated and resigned as Taoisech and party leader. Instead Ireland had its first-ever change of governing parties without an election. Thus, although dissolution was contested in the Irish as well as the German case, neither president ended up casting a veto.

#### **SPECIAL MODELS**

The model that we have presented does not capture all the real-world institutional variation and complexities. As Table 1 shows, dissolution powers come in many varieties. In addition, they may be exercised in circumstances that do not fully meet the specifications of the model, for example, under single-party governments. Fortunately, a number of these conditions can be captured through simple modifications of our baseline model. In this section, we develop four "special" versions, each of which reflects a common empirical regularity that deviates from the specifications of the baseline model. As we shall see, each special model also generates somewhat different conditions under which parliamentary dissolution will be proposed and undertaken.

### **Special Model 1: No Coalition Partner**

One special circumstance is when the prime minister has no coalition partner, for example, because he leads a single-party majority government. Then, there will never be a member of the cabinet with a partisan incentive to oppose the request for dissolution. Since the possibility of a contested dissolution proposal is moot, the head of state always finds himself in the upper subgame, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for dissolution reduce to  $E_{\rm P}-P>0$  and  $E_{\rm H}>-V_{\rm U}$ . See Figure 2 for an illustration. In other words, the existence of a suitably motivated coalition partner can, in some circumstances, prevent early parliamentary elections but can never by itself cause dissolution when this would

not otherwise occur. Parliamentary dissolution thus occurs more easily when there is no coalition partner.

### Special Model 2: Proposal Power Vested in the Cabinet/Parliamentary Majority

The second special model is one in which the coalition partner's approval is necessary for dissolution. Thus, in this model the coalition partner is a veto player, as illustrated in the lower half of Figure 2. We can think of this case as equivalent to a constitution under which the decision to dissolve must be taken by the cabinet as a whole (or by a parliamentary majority).6 Austria, Israel, and Sweden feature this variety of dissolution power, though in none of these countries is this the only circumstance in which early elections can be called. Under special model 2, parliamentary dissolution will occur if and only if  $E_C > -D$  and  $E_P - P > 0$ and  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm U}$ , that is, when indeed the incentive conditions of all three players are satisfied. Thus, this is the only one of the special models in which the necessary and sufficient conditions for dissolution are unambiguously more restrictive than in the baseline model. Hence, if agenda control over dissolution rests with the parliamentary majority, rather than with the prime minister, early elections should be less common.

### Special Model 3: A Nonpartisan or Powerless Head of State

We noted above that in our baseline model the head of state is a generic player. In reality he or she may be either a monarch or a directly or indirectly elected president. As students of parliamentary democracies well know, many such polities, such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Belgium, The Netherlands, and several of the Scandinavian countries, have hereditary monarchs whose preferences (at least those that are publicly expressed) are not driven by electoral considerations. Even under republican constitutions, the president may, for all practical intents and purposes, be a nonpartisan figure, as in Iceland. Nonpartisan heads of state tend to take pains to appear personally disinterested in electoral outcomes.

The constitutional status of the head of state clearly has implications for our model. If the head of state is partisan, then the expected value he derives from early elections will vary with poll numbers and the electoral cycle in the same way as those of party leaders. If, on the other hand, the head of state is nonpartisan, then his net value from new elections should be zero. Our third special model is thus one in which the head of state either

is a figurehead or is always indifferent between existing and future parliaments. In this case, we can think of the head of state's incentive condition as satisfied, which means that he will always dissolve if asked. Hence, the coalition partner will not dissent, and dissolution will take place whenever the prime minister's incentive condition is satisfied (i.e., if and only if  $E_P - P > 0$ ). It is easy to see that this is a more inclusive set of conditions than those that cause dissolution in our baseline model. In other words, to the extent that the head of state's type affects whether or not early parliamentary elections are proposed and held, dissolution occurs more easily under nonpartisan heads of state than under partisan ones. The same logic applies a fortiori to constitutions in which the head of state does not even have any authority to veto dissolution proposals, as in Japan, New Zealand, and Sweden. Here, too, dissolution will occur whenever the proposer's incentive conditions are met.

### Special Model 4: The Head of State Can Dissolve Unilaterally

Finally, our empirical survey tells us that proposal power over parliamentary dissolution need not rest with the prime minister. In several countries, the head of state (empirically in such cases, this is always a president) can dissolve parliament unilaterally. This is true in France, Iceland, and Italy. Until 1991, it was the situation in Finland also. In the fourth and final special model, the head of state is thus constitutionally permitted to dissolve parliament on his own. Since agenda control then rests with the head of state himself, there are no veto costs, and the head of state is effectively a dictator rather than a veto player. The necessary and sufficient conditions for dissolution hence reduce to  $E_{\rm H} > 0$ . In other words, when the head of state can dismiss parliament unilaterally, dissolution depends strictly on whether his own incentive condition is satisfied.8

Note that, compared to the baseline model, this is not unequivocally a more or less restrictive set of conditions. Rather, it substitutes a simple incentive condition for the two conditions in the baseline model. In other words, if the president's incentive condition is satisfied, the prime minister's incentive condition does not bind. On the other hand, unless the head of state favors it, there is no set of preferences on the part of the prime minister and coalition partner that will generate parliamentary dissolution. In the baseline model, the president may dissolve even if his net electoral benefit is negative, as long as his veto costs outweigh this disutility. This will not occur in Special Model 4. On the other hand, in the latter model, the president may have an opportunity to dissolve in situations in which in the baseline model the prime minister would preempt such behavior.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> We treat these two conditions as equivalent. Under minority government, of course, the cabinet may not command the support of a parliamentary majority. In our empirical analysis, we estimate the effect of minority status independently, so that we can control for this divergence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Note also that under this form of dissolution power, the head of state typically either is nonpartisan or does not enjoy veto powers. Thus, several real-world countries combine special models 2 and 3. In our empirical model we estimate the effects of these two institutional variations independently, so that it is possible to account for their simultaneous or separate occurrence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The head of state is then either a decisive player (if there are other ways beyond his control in which parliament can be dissolved, e.g., through a constitutional amendment) or a dictator (if there are no such alternative roads to dissolution). In this analysis, we generally disregard the former possibility.

TABLE 3.	Outcome	es of Dissolution (	Game				
Prime	Coalition	Head of State's Payoffs					
Minister's Payoffs	Partner's Payoffs	$E_{\rm H} > 0$	$0 > E_{H} > - V_{L} > - V_{U}$	$0 > -V_L > E_H > -V_U$	$0>-V_L>-V_U>E_H$		
$E_p - P > 0$	$E_{C} > -D$	Dissolution	Dissolvijon (SVA: ŠÓ)	Discolution (SIV4: SO)	SQ (SM3: Dissolution)		
	$E_{C} < -D$	Dissolution (SAR SONE SO)	Dissoluijon (SM2 & SM2: SO)	SQ (SM1-& SM3: Dissolution)	SQ (SM3: Dissolution)		
$E_p - P < 0$	$E_{C} > -D$	SQ (SM4: Dissolution)	SQ	SQ	SQ		
	$E_{\mathbb{C}} < -D$	SQ (SM4: Dissolution)	SQ	SQ	SQ		

In Table 3, we summarize the results of the baseline model, as well as each of the special models. All the necessary and sufficient conditions for dissolution can thus be characterized by these 16 mutually exhaustive and exclusive payoff configurations. Note that in the baseline model, five configurations lead to early elections (outcome I), whereas in the remaining 11, no proposal to dissolve will be made (outcome V). In Table 3, we have also identified for each cell the special models in which the result would differ from that of the baseline model.

In the top left-hand cell in Table 3, all three players derive a net benefit from dissolution. Not surprisingly, dissolution occurs under each of our five institutional models. In the cells toward the lower right-hand side, dissolution is much less attractive to the players, and correspondingly there are six cells in which dissolution never happens in any model. The most interesting cells, however, are the shaded set of nine cells running from the top right-hand corner to the bottom left-hand one. These are the conditions under which the preferences of the different constitutional players diverge, and institutional features determine whether or not dissolution happens. In five of these cases, dissolution occurs in one or several special models but not in the baseline model. In four cases, the status quo prevails in one or more special models, whereas the baseline model predicts dissolution. In sum, these results show that (1) there is a broader set of preference configurations associated with the status quo than with dissolution, and (2) there is a large set of conditions under which specific institutional features, rather than preferences in and of themselves, determine the outcome. The first of these results reflects the fact that, overall, dissolution powers tend to constrain, rather than enable, individual constitutional players. The second result suggests that such institutions are both diverse and consequential.

### **HYPOTHESES**

These results lead straightforwardly to a number of testable hypotheses. As we have seen, the incidence of parliamentary dissolution is determined in part by the preferences of the players and in part by the institutions that may or may not empower them to dissolve. Unfortunately, the preferences of the players, and specifically their electoral expectations, are not directly observable, whereas the institutions are. Many of our hypotheses are therefore derived from the special models and the institutional variation that they reflect. The specific hypotheses that will guide our analysis are summarized below. All should be read as *ceteris paribus* expectations.

Hypotheses 1 through 4 concern institutional effects that follow directly from the special models.

Hypothesis 1. Except when the head of state has unilateral dissolution power, parliamentary dissolution will be more common under single-party than under coalition governments.

Hypothesis 2. Compared to that in the baseline model, dissolution will be less common when proposal power is vested in the cabinet or in the parliamentary majority.

Hypothesis 3. Compared to that in the baseline model, dissolution will be more common when the head of state is either powerless or nonpartisan.

Hypothesis 4. When the head of state has unilateral dissolution power, the incidence of dissolution will differ from that in the baseline model.

Hypothesis 1 follows from Special Model 1, with the caveat that we expect no effect of coalition status when the dissolution decision rests with the head of state alone. Hypothesis 2 follows straightforwardly from Special Model 2, and Hypothesis 3 similarly from Special Model 3. Hypothesis 4 is the only one that may require a bit of elaboration. Recall from Special Model 4 that when the head of state can dissolve unilaterally, we have countervailing expectations. On the one hand, the president can dissolve even in situations in which the prime minister would not have requested it. On the other hand, an agenda-setting prime minister might request dissolution in situations where the head of state would not have dissolved on his own initiative

but is unwilling to pay the veto cost. A priori, we have no reason to expect one condition to be more prevalent than the other. This is therefore the only hypothesis that does not specify the direction in which we expect the outcome to differ from the baseline model.

Our next four hypotheses focus on the net electoral benefits, and thus the preferences, of the relevant players. These hypotheses follow less directly from our models but are supported in part by other scholarship on dissolution. Recall that net electoral benefits are the expected benefits from an early election, minus the continuation value of the existing parliament. The latter may differ systematically depending on the type of government in office. Some governments are less capable of controlling the legislative agenda than others and, therefore, less likely to generate effective public policy. Such governments may also more easily be induced to dissolve parliament. The less effective and secure the government is under the existing distribution of parliamentary forces, the lower the value of continuing the existing parliament. Specifically, we expect minority governments to be more frequently persuaded or compelled to call early elections. As Balke (1990, 211-12) points out, "The fact that the government might be forced from power sometime in the future lowers the opportunity costs of losing the election. Thus, governments in parliamentary systems that allow the dissolution of Parliament by a vote of no confidence or systems where coalitions are relatively unstable will call early elections more often" (Smith [1996] makes a very similar argument).

There are actually two reasons to expect minority governments to call early elections more frequently than other administrations: their vulnerability and their electoral prospects. A minority government may easily find itself in a situation in which it has much to gain and little to lose from elections. It might, in such circumstances, dissolve in the hope of significantly improving its bargaining power, for example, by gaining a parliamentary majority, as British Prime Minister Harold Wilson did in October 1974. Both of these factors enhance the expected benefits from an election, relative to current benefits. Since under minority governments the continuation value of the current parliament is thus likely to be low, the net value of new elections should be correspondingly higher.

Hypothesis 5. Early dissolution will be more common under minority governments than under majority governments (Balke 1990; Lupia and Strøm 1995; Smith 1996).

An additional consideration is the partisan relationship between the head of state and the prime minister. Special Model 4 shows that when the former has unilateral dissolution powers (is a dictator in this respect), the incidence of dissolution may differ from that in the baseline model, though the expected direction of this difference is unclear. We might, however, in such circumstances, expect differences in partisanship to be a powerful motive for the head of state. He might be more inclined to dissolve if the prime minister represents a

different party, compared to when the prime minister is a copartisan. Thus, we expect the interaction of presidential dissolution power and partisan differences with the prime minister to promote dissolution, compared to the baseline model.

Hypothesis 6. When the head of state can dissolve unilaterally, early dissolution will be more common when the head of state is of a different party than the prime minister.

The expected net benefits from an early election also depend on how long these benefits can be enjoyed. This, in turn, is a function of the maximum length of the parliamentary term (the CIEP), as well as of the time remaining in the current term. All else equal, the longer the CIEP, the more likely it is that the net benefits from an early election will be positive. Hence, a long parliamentary term should be positively correlated with the incidence of early parliamentary dissolution. Finally, since the continuation value of parliament will decline over the course of the parliamentary term (see above), the expected net electoral benefits for all players should, all else equal, increase as the end of the constitutional term approaches.

HYPOTHESIS 7. The longer a parliament's constitutional term (CIEP), the more common dissolution will be (see Balke 1990, Lupia and Strøm 1995).

Hypothesis 8. The later in a parliament's constitutional term it is, the more common dissolution will be (see Balke 1990, Lupia and Strøm 1995).

#### **EMPIRICAL DESIGN**

We address these questions by examining all 192 elections in 18 parliamentary democracies from 1960 to 1995, inclusive. The sample includes most of the world's stable parliamentary regimes and a particularly high proportion of those in Western Europe. We have, however, excluded some states that have not been democratic throughout the 1960–95 period, such as Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Two additional countries, Switzerland and Norway, have been excluded because neither provides for the constitutional possibility of early elections. See Table 5 for a breakdown of the observations by country. Note that since our sample is relatively small, especially when we break it down into various institutional subcategories, it is difficult to attain conventional standards of statistical significance.

Our analysis occurs in two stages and uses two distinct data configurations. First, we employ standard logistic regression techniques to investigate the frequency of early elections across the countries mentioned above. For this analysis, our observations include all national legislative elections, and the dependent variable is whether or not they were called early. We code as "early" any election that occurs at least 90 days before the end of the constitutional term (CIEP). 9 We

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The 90-day cutoff divides the sample roughly in half. If a 180-day cutoff date is used instead, the substantive results are quite similar.

	Frequency of	Difference of
Single-party v. Multi-Party Governments (H1)	Early Elections	Means
Single-party (N=73)	04.004	
Multi-party ( $N=82$ )	61.6%	t = -1.3042
	51.2%	p >  t  = 0.1941
Cabinet/Parliamentary Proposal Power v. Baseline (H2)		
Cabinet/Parliamentary Proposal (N=71) Baseline Model (N=23)	50.7%	t = 0.4808
, ,	56.5%	p >  t  = 0.6318
Powerless/Non-Partisan Head of State v. Baseline (H3)		
Powerless/Non-Partisan HoS (N = 132)	56.1%	t = 0.0409
Baseline Model (N=23)	56.5%	p >  t  = 0.9675
Unilateral Head of State v. Baseline (H4)		
Unilateral Head of State ( $N=36$ )	55.6%	t = 0.0717
Baseline Model (N=23)	56.5%	p >  t  = 0.9431
Minority v. Majority Governments (H5)		[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
Minority $(N=48)$	70.8%	t = -2.4132
Majority ( $N = 143$ )	51.0%	p >  t  = 0.0168
Combining H1 and H5		p >  1  0.0100
Single-Party Minority (N=24)	66.7%	
Multi-Party Minority ( $\hat{N} = 15$ )	80.0%	
Single-Party Majority (N = 49)	59.2%	
Multi-Party Majority ( $\hat{N} = 67$ )	44.8%	
Partisan Conflict Between PM and HoS (H6)		
Conflict $(N=24)$	62.5%	t = -1.7910
Agreement (N=12)	41.7%	t = -1.7910 p >  t  = 0.0778
CIEPs (H7)	1117 /5	p> i =0.0770
3 Years (N=34)	26.5%	4 4000
4 Years (N=101)	26.5% 56.4%	t = -4.4296
5 Years (N=56)	73.2%	p >  t  = 0.0000

then turn to a duration model to investigate these relationships further. For this portion of the analysis, our units are monthly observations of parliaments, and the dependent variable is whether or not an election was called during that month. For cabinet data prior to 1990 we rely on Woldendorp, Keman, and Budge (1993), whereas subsequent cabinet data have been compiled from Keesing's Record of World Events. Our data on dissolution powers has been drawn primarily from the handbooks Parliaments of the World (Inter-Parliamentary Union 1986) and the World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures (Kurian 1998). with supplementary data from personal communication with country experts. For bicameral legislatures, our parliamentary data refer to the lower (popular) chamber.

#### DO DISSOLUTION RULES MATTER?

We begin our analysis by examining the effect of institutional rules on the frequency of early elections. Recall that we have four specific hypotheses relating to these issues. First, except in situations where the head of state has unilateral authority, dissolution will be more likely under single-party governments than coalition governments (H1). Second, compared to that in the baseline model, dissolution will be less common when proposal power is vested in the cabinet or the parliamentary

majority (H2). Third, compared to that in the baseline model, dissolution will be more common when the head of state is either powerless or nonpartisan (H3). And, finally, when the head of state has unilateral dissolution power the incidence of dissolution will be different from that in the baseline model (H4).

In the top half of Table 4, we report a set of simple bivariate relationships between the variables just outlined and the incidence of early elections. None of the observed differences are contrary to our expectations, though most are statistically insignificant. As expected, single-party governments call early elections more often (61.6%) than do multiparty governments (51.2%). For hypothesis 2, our results, though weak, are similarly consistent with expectations. For hypotheses 3 and 4, our first look suggests no effects at all.

We also have four hypotheses less directly derived from these models. First, dissolution will be more likely under minority governments than under majority governments (H5). Second, dissolution will be more common under presidential dissolution control when partisan conflict exists between the head of state and prime minister (H6). Third, dissolution will be more common in countries with longer constitutional terms (CIEPs) (H7). And, finally, dissolution will be more likely as the end of the CIEP approaches (H8).

The simple breakdowns for hypotheses 5 through 7 are presented in the bottom half of Table 4. As

		nal Term Expired and Early Elections (1960–95), by Country  Percentage of Constitutional Term Expired					
	No. of Elections		75–95%	50-75%	25-50%	<25%	
Ireland	11	0	5	3	1	2	
Denmark	14	1	3	7	. 2	1	
Japan	12	1	5	5	0	1	
United Kingdom	9	1	5	1	1	1	
Canada	11	2	4	2	1	2	
Belgium	12	3	2	5	1	1	
France	9	3	3	1	2	0	
italy	9	3	4	1	· 1	0	
Australia	14	6	3	4	1	0	
Austria	11	5	4	0	2	0	
The Netherlands	10	5	3	0	2	0	
Israel	9	5	3	1	0	0	
Finland	10	6	3	0	1	0	
Iceland	10	6	3	0	1	0	
Germany	10	ă	1	1	0	0	
Sweden	12	10	Ò	2	0	0	
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	7	6	1	ō	0	0	
Luxembourg	12	11	i	Ō	0	0	
New Zealand Total	192	82	53	33	16	8	

hypothesis 5 predicts, early elections are called more frequently under minority governments (70.8%) than under majority governments (51.0%). Yet the interaction between majority and coalition status is particularly interesting. Whereas among majority governments, single-party administrations are more likely than coalitions to dissolve early, the opposite is the case for minority governments, in which case coalition governments call early elections at the impressive rate of 80%. The reason for this reversal among minority governments, we suspect, lies in their vulnerability rather than in strategy. Multiparty minority governments are likely to be the weakest type of parliamentary government, and the high incidence of early elections may reflect their susceptibility to parliamentary defeat rather than strategic and voluntary dissolution on their part.

The results for hypothesis 6 are again in the expected direction. In other words, early elections appear to be more common when the head of state and prime minister represent different parties (62.5%) rather than when they are copartisans (41.7%). Finally, the expectations of hypothesis 7 are strongly supported, with early elections being called more frequently as the CIEP increases. In countries with a CIEP of three years, only 26.5% of all parliaments are dissolved early, whereas in countries with a CIEP of four or five years early elections are called 56.4% and 73.2% of the time, respectively.

Our final concern here is whether early elections become more common as the parliamentary term wears on. Table 5 lists our countries in declining order of the incidence of dissolution, specifically by the proportion of parliaments dissolved before the 95th percentile of their term. Using a proportional measure for simplicity of comparison, Table 5 also clearly shows that the incidence of parliamentary dissolution increases toward

the end of the parliamentary term. Of the 110 parliaments dissolved before the 95th percentile of their regular term, nearly half (53) were in fact dissolved after the three-quarter mark (the 75th percentile). That is, almost as many parliaments were dissolved during that 20% of their terms than during the preceding 75% combined. Let us look more closely at this rising rate of parliamentary dissolution. During the first quarter of their terms, no more than 8 of our 192 parliaments were terminated, which amounts to only 4.2%. Over the next quarter of the terms, 16 of the remaining 184 parliaments were dissolved, or 8.7%. The third quarter claims another 33 of 168 survivors, or 19.6%. Finally, 53 parliaments come to an end during the next 20% of the term, or 39.3% of the remnant of 135. Clearly, hypothesis 8 is supported: The later in the term it is, the more likely parliamentary dissolution becomes. In fact, the probability of dissolution roughly doubles with each passing quarter of the constitutional term.

We continue our empirical analysis by reporting a set of multivariate logit models of the frequency of early elections. For this portion of the analysis, the dependent variable equals 1 if an election was called early (before the last 90 days of the constitutional term) and 0 otherwise. The independent variables of model 1 include only those variables directly derived from our special models, along with the CIEP variable. Describically, Single-Party Interaction is an interaction between single-party governments and all dissolution rules except unilateral heads of state, taking on a value of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> The justification for including the CIEP variables in this initial specification is that their effects are constant across the players in our game. Without their inclusion, we believe that the institutional model will be underspecified and that we will not get an accurate picture of the institutional effects.

	Model 1		Model 2		
	Coefficient	z Value	Coefficient	z Value	
Dependent variable	Early election dummy <sup>a</sup>				
Single-party interaction	0.503	1.272	0.356	0.876	
Cabinet or parliament proposal power	-1.383	-2.534**	-1.283	-2.329**	
Powerless head of state	1.521	2.325**	1.414	2.112**	
Unilateral head of state	0.114	0.203	-0.855	-1.093	
Minority government			0.869	2.011**	
Partisan conflict			1.264	1.649	
CIEP4	2.552	4.088***	2.386	3.921***	
CIEP5	3.039	4.658***	2.968	4,676***	
Constant	-2.683		-2.635		
Number of observations	191		191		
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	.1257		.1493		
$\chi^2$	32.94 (p=.0000)		39.12 (p=.0000)		
log-likelihood	-114		-111.44		

1 when those conditions hold and 0 otherwise; Unilateral Head of State = 1 if dissolution power is controlled by a unilateral head of state and 0 otherwise; Powerless Head of State = 1 if the head of state has no role in dissolution and 0 otherwise; Cabinet or Parliamentary Proposal Power = 1 if dissolution proposal power is controlled by the cabinet or parliamentary majority and 0 otherwise; Ciep4 = 1 if the constitutional term is four years and 0 otherwise; and Ciep5 = 1 if the constitutional term is five years and 0 otherwise. The institutional baseline is effectively equal to our baseline model, whereas the excluded category for CIEP is a three-year term. Model 2 incorporates the two "noninstitutional" variables of our analysis, specifically, Partisan Conflict = 1 if there is a unilateral head of state whose prime minister represents a different party and 0 if the head of state and prime minister are from the same party, and Minority = 1 if the government lacks a parliamentary majority and 0 otherwise.

In Table 6, we report the estimates for these two models. The purely institutional model (model 1) clearly confirms that parliamentary dissolution is less common when controlled by the cabinet or parliamentary majority (hypothesis 2). Our expectation that dissolution will be more common with a nonpartisan or powerless head of state is also supported (hypothesis 3). As to the effect of a single-party government on dissolution (hypothesis 1), the observed effect is in the correct direction but insignificant. And the effect of having dissolution power unilaterally vested in the head of state (hypothesis 4) is effectively nonexistent. Recall that we had no clear directional expectation concerning this variable because of the potentially countervailing effects of such an institutional arrangement. The results, therefore, may suggest that these effects cancel each other out in the aggregate. Finally, our expectations concerning the effects of term length (hypothesis 8) are strongly confirmed by the two CIEP dummy variables. The longer the constitutional term, the higher the incidence of early dissolution.

When we add the noninstitutional variables to the equation in model 2. the results of model 1 are reaffirmed. Our estimates of the institutional effects remain unchanged. Among the added variables, minority government enhances the incidence of dissolution, just as we expected (hypothesis 5). The other purpose of model 2 is to try to sort out some of the conflicting effects of vesting dissolution power unilaterally in the head of state. As we expected, the incidence of dissolution goes up when there is partisan disagreement between the president and the prime minister (hypothesis 6). The results also show that, absent such partisan conflict, heads of state are less likely to dissolve than are prime ministers. Yet neither of these effects is statistically significant. In sum, then, no coefficient in either specification of our model has an unexpected sign, even though some of these effects fail to reach conventional levels of statistical significance.

These logistic regression models require us to treat dissolution as a binary variable. For a given parliament, either early dissolution happens or it does not. Yet this is of course a rather crude operationalization, and it is one that does not capture the full force of our argument. It is not just that certain conditions should facilitate dissolution. The likelihood of dissolution should also increase over the course of the constitutional term (hypothesis 7). To test this expectation more cleanly, we conclude our empirical analysis by introducing a simple Cox proportional hazard duration model. Here, our observations are monthly, and the dependent variable is whether or not an election is held during the specific month in question.

The independent variables are identical to those reported in Table 6, with two exceptions. To capture the temporal effects suggested in hypothesis 7, we have included a time count variable, *Time Left*, which corresponds to the number of days left in the constitutionally prescribed term (CIEP). Our expectation is there will be a negative relationship between this variable and the incidence of dissolution, which is to say that the more

TABLE 7. Duration Analysis of Ea	Arly Elections, Cox Proportional Ha  Model 1		Model 2		
	Hazard Ratio	z Value	Hazard Ratio	z Value	
Dependent variable .	Election term censored				
Single-party interaction	1.367	1.251	1.208	0.801	
Cabinet or parliament proposal power	0.490	-2.629**	0.528	-2.641*	
Powerless head of state	1.319	0.846	1.064	0.198	
Unilateral head of state	0.665	-1.219	0.434	-2.137 <sup>*</sup>	
Minority government			3.365	5.572*	
Partisan conflict			1.489	0.836	
Timeleft	0.997	-3.373***	0.998	-2.807 <sup>*</sup>	
CIEP4_5	4.296	2.690**	3.058	2.190*	
Number of observations	7,743		7,743		
$\chi^2$	22.14 (p = .0001)		46.69 (p = .0000)		
λ log-likelihood	-526.42		<b>–512.64</b>		

time is left in the constitutional term, the less likely it is that an election will be called. The introduction of this variable, however, creates severe collinearity problems if we also seek to include both CIEP dummy variables. We have therefore been forced to substitute a single dummy to capture all terms longer than three years. Thus,  $Ciep4\_5=1$  if the constitutional term is four or five years and 0 otherwise. Finally, because it is impossible to know whether parliaments in the last month of their constitutional term would have been dissolved voluntarily, we have censored all observations within their last month of the CIEP.

Our results, which are reported in Table 7, are broadly consistent with the logistic regression results in Table 6, though in some cases slightly weaker. Again, hypotheses 2, 6, and 7 are clearly supported. In addition, the temporal effect is as we expected: The less time left in the constitutional term, the greater the likelihood of dissolution (hypothesis 8). Moreover, dissolution is, once again, more common under a powerless or nonpartisan head of state, but in these models the effect shrinks to statistical insignificance. Much as in the logit model, the effects of a single-party government are in the expected direction but too weak to be statistically significant. It appears that the expected tendency for single-party governments to precipitate early elections holds for majority but not for minority governments, perhaps because, among the latter, parliamentary vulnerability trumps strategic behavior. Finally, we find the same countervailing but relatively weak effects of vesting dissolution power unilaterally in the president. In sum, we find no results in any of the four specifications of our model that run directly contrary to our expectations. But while some of our hypotheses are consistently supported, other results are not always strong or equal to conventional standards of statistical significance.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

Polities all over the world are contending with issues of institutional reform. These efforts are based on the explicit or implicit belief that institutions, and the ways in which they structure the policy agenda, matter. We concur. It is therefore surprising that one important institutional mechanism, the authority to dissolve parliament and call early elections, has received such scant attention among political reformers and scholars. Although the power of parliamentary dissolution is a key feature of most parliamentary democracies, it varies substantially from one such system to the next. And even though dissolution powers can be designed to give specific constitutional actors significant agenda powers, there has been very little systematic study of this institution.

Ideally, dissolution provisions can be used to counteract the "temporal rigidity" with which Linz (1994) is so concerned. Yet we have little reason to believe that the actual use of parliamentary dissolution powers is motivated by the need to solve serious political crises. The nations with the highest incidence of early elections, such as Ireland and Denmark (see Table 5), are characterized by vigorous electoral competition rather than systemic instability. Nor does parliamentary dissolution seem to correlate with cabinet instability. The three European countries with the highest rates of cabinet turnover, Italy, Finland, and Belgium (Müller and Strøm 2000, 585), have only middling frequencies of early dissolution. Thus, there is little evidence to suggest that parliamentary dissolution tends to occur in response to systemic crises or parliamentary deadlock. 11

On the contrary, it appears that the employment of this mechanism can be more plausibly understood as a strategy employed by self-interested or partisan prime ministers or presidents with particular constitutional powers. Such powers are of particular interest to the political observer when they can be used to confer a partisan advantage on those in whom they have been vested.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Consider the Italian Parliament elected on June 7, 1953. During its term, six successive cabinets were formed, including two that failed their initial vote of investiture. One prime minister, Adone Zoli, found himself dependent on neofascist support and asked to be relieved of his office. His request was refused. Yet no election was called by either President Einaudi (1948–55) or President Gronchi (1955–62) until the end of the regular parliamentary term in 1958.

Our interest in dissolution powers has focused precisely on identifying systematic institutional differences that may affect the frequency with which dissolution powers are exercised for partisan advantage. Building on several recent works in the neo-institutional tradition, we have used a set of simple game-theoretic models to formulate a set of specific hypotheses concerning the effects and strategic use of parliamentary dissolution powers.

Our models show that veto powers, such as may be vested in the head of state, matter. And as Tsebelis (2002) generally suggests, the more veto players, the less likely a change from the status quo (here, a parliamentary dissolution). But not all relevant players are in fact veto players. Some may instead be decisive players or simply (such as the coalition partner in the baseline model) powerful players (Strøm 1995). Decisive or powerful players may also contribute to dissolution, but not necessarily in the same way that a veto player would. To understand parliamentary dissolutions, it is necessary to model the powers of each player carefully.

Our empirical results confirm that institutional rules significantly affect the incidence of strategic parliamentary dissolution. We have found strong evidence that the likelihood of parliamentary dissolution increases substantially and apparently monotonically as the end of the constitutional term approaches. Indeed, the hazard rate of parliaments to dissolution seems to fit an exponential function remarkably well. In examining who dissolves parliament, our strongest results are (1) that dissolution powers are used more frequently by minority governments, (2) that the longer the parliamentary term, the more common is dissolution, and (3) that early elections are less frequent if the power to propose them rests with the cabinet as a whole or the parliamentary majority.

Our analysis supports many of the analytical results of Balke (1990) and Smith (1996). Incumbents do seem to use dissolution powers strategically and for partisan purposes. But we also demonstrate that institutions significantly affect and constrain the ability of incumbent politicians to engage in such timing decisions. The question in constitutional design, then, is what price to pay in partisan opportunism for the flexibility that dissolution powers afford.

#### **APPENDIX**

We here state more fully and precisely the conditions under which parliamentary dissolution occurs in each of our models. The results for the baseline model are presented first, then those of the various special models. We proceed by backward induction and employ the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution concept. Please refer to Figures 1 and 2 for an extensive-form representation of the games, to Table 2 for a presentation of the payoff matrix, and to Table 3 for a summary of the equilibrium conditions.

#### **Baseline Model**

Head of State. We first describe the behavior of the head of state at the last stage of the game. In the upper subgame (when the prime minister has proposed and the coalition partner acquiesced), the head of state will dissolve if and only if  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm U}$ . Otherwise, he will veto. In the lower subgame (when the prime minister has proposed and the coalition partner dissented), the head of state will dissolve whenever  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm L}$  and otherwise veto.

Coalition Partner. We next describe the behavior of the coalition partner at the penultimate stage of the game. Her choices depend on her own payoffs, as well as on her expectations concerning the subsequent behavior by the head of state. For the coalition partner to dissent, two conditions must be satisfied simultaneously: (1) her own incentive condition (she must prefer dissenting and getting the status quo to dissolution), and (2) upon her dissent, the head of state must proceed to veto dissolution. There are three possible configurations of the head of state's preferences: (1)  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm L} > -V_{\rm U}$ , (2)  $E_{\rm H} < -V_{\rm U} < -V_{\rm L}$ , and (3)  $-V_{\rm L} > E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm U}$ . Only the third of these configurations would satisfy the second condition above. The full set of configurations bearing on the coalition partner's decision, and the related equilibrium conditions in the subgame, are thus as follows.

- 1. If  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm L} > -V_{\rm U}$  and  $E_{\rm C} > -D$ , then acquiesce, dissolve
- 2. If  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm L} > -V_{\rm U}$  and  $E_{\rm C} < -D$ , then acquiesce, dissolve
- 3. If  $E_{\rm H} < -\dot{V}_{\rm U} < -V_{\rm L}$  and  $E_{\rm C} > -D$ , then acquiesce, veto (outcome II).
- 4. If  $E_{\rm H} < -V_{\rm U} < -V_{\rm L}$  and  $E_{\rm C} < -D$ , then acquiesce, veto (outcome II).
- 5. If  $-V_L > E_H > -V_U$  and  $E_C > -D$ , then acquiesce, dissolve (outcome I).
- 6. If  $-V_L > E_H > -V_U$  and  $E_C < -D$ , then dissent, veto (out-

Note that outcome III never occurs in equilibrium in this subgame, because  $E_C - D < E_C$ , by definition. Hence, the coalition partner will not dissent when she knows that the head of state will not veto.

Prime Minister. Finally, we describe the necessary and sufficient conditions for the prime minister to propose dissolution, as well as the equilibrium in each case. In describing these, we refer to the configurations of preferences of the head of state and the coalition partner by the numbers with which they have been identified above (1 through 6). For the prime minister to propose dissolution, his incentive condition must be satisfied, which means that  $E_P - P > 0$ . Moreover, the prime minister will not propose in any situation that would lead to outcome II or outcome IV, both of which would give him a payoff of -P, which by definition is <0. In other words, the prime minister will not make any proposal that he knows will be vetoed. Hence, the prime minister will not propose in configurations 3, 4, and 6 above. Thus,

- 1. If  $E_P P < 0$ , then not propose (outcome V).
- 2. If  $\vec{E_P} P > 0$  and (1), then propose, acquiesce, dissolve
- 3. If  $E_P P > 0$  and (2), then propose, acquiesce, dissolve (outcome I).
- 4. If  $E_P P > 0$  and (3), then not propose (outcome V). 5. If  $E_P P > 0$  and (4), then not propose (outcome V).
- 6. If  $E_P P > 0$  and (5), then propose, acquiesce, dissolve (outcome I).
- 7. If  $E_P P > 0$  and (6), then not propose (outcome V).

In summary, there are three payoff configurations that jointly constitute the necessary and sufficient conditions for dissolution (Outcome I), namely, those numbered 2, 3, and 6 above. Thus, dissolution occurs if and only if

$$E_{\rm P} - P > 0$$
,  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm L} > -V_{\rm U}$ , and  $E_{\rm C} > -D$ , or  $E_{\rm P} - P > 0$ ,  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm L} > -V_{\rm U}$ , and  $E_{\rm C} < -D$ , or  $E_{\rm P} - P > 0$ ,  $-V_{\rm L} > E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm U}$ , and  $E_{\rm C} > -D$ .

These conditions can in turn be summarized as follows: Dissolution will occur if and only if either (1)  $E_P - P > 0$  and  $E_H > -V_L$ , or (2)  $E_P - P > 0$ ,  $E_C > -D$ , and  $E_H > -V_U$ .

Under all other conditions, no proposal will be made (outcome V). Note that the prime minister prevents any realization of outcomes II and IV, whereas the coalition partner blocks outcome III.

#### **Special Model 1**

In this model, the head of state will dissolve whenever  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm U}$ . Otherwise, he will veto. The prime minister proposes dissolution whenever his own incentive condition is satisfied and he knows that the head of state will dissolve. Hence, dissolution will occur if and only if  $E_{\rm P} - P > 0$  and  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm U}$ .

#### **Special Model 2**

In this model, the head of state can dissolve only in what corresponds to the upper subgame of the baseline model, when the prime minister has proposed and the coalition partner acquiesced. As in the upper subgame of the baseline model, the head of state will dissolve whenever  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm U}$ . Otherwise, he will veto

Special model 2 transforms the coalition partner into a veto player. Yet her choices depend on her own payoffs, as well as on her expectations concerning the subsequent behavior by the head of state. For the coalition partner to dissent, two conditions must be satisfied: She must prefer the payoff from dissent to dissolution (which is to say that  $E_{\rm C}<-D$ ), and she must know that the head of state would not have vetoed regardless. There are two possible configurations of the head of state's preferences: (1)  $E_{\rm H}>-V_{\rm U}$ , and (2)  $E_{\rm H}<-V_{\rm U}$ . The full set of configurations bearing on the coalition partner's decision and the related equilibrium conditions in the subgame are thus as follows.

If  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm U}$  and  $E_{\rm C} > -D$ , then acquiesce, dissolve (outcome I)

If  $E_{\rm H} > -V_{\rm U}$  and  $E_{\rm C} < -D$ , then dissent (outcome III).

If  $E_{\rm H} < -V_{\rm U}$  and  $E_{\rm C} > -D$ , then acquiesce, veto (outcome II).

If  $E_{\rm H} < -V_{\rm U}$  and  $E_{\rm C} < -D$ , then acquiesce, veto (outcome II).

Finally, the prime minister will propose dissolution only if his incentive condition is satisfied, which means that  $E_P - P > 0$ . In addition, the prime minister will not propose if that would lead to outcome II (veto by the head of state) or outcome III (veto by the coalition partner), both of which would give him a payoff of -P (which by definition is <0). Hence, the prime minister proposes only under the first of the conditions above, and the necessary and sufficient conditions for dissolution are  $E_P - P > 0$ ,  $E_H > -V_U$ , and  $E_C > -D$ .

#### **Special Model 3**

In this model, the head of state will always dissolve if asked, either because his incentive condition is always satisfied or because he has no power to veto. The coalition partner will then never dissent, since such behavior is costly and could never induce the head of state to veto dissolution. Since the head of state will thus always dissolve and the coalition partner

never dissent, the prime minister proposes dissolution whenever his incentive condition is satisfied, that is, if and only if  $E_P - P > 0$ . This, then, is the necessary and sufficient condition for dissolution in special model 3.

#### Special Model 4

In special model 4, the head of state can dissolve unilaterally and is thus a dictator rather than a veto player. Since agenda control then rests with the head of state himself, there are no veto costs. The necessary and sufficient condition for dissolution hence reduces to  $E_{\rm H} > 0$ . In other words, when the head of state can dismiss parliament unilaterally, dissolution depends strictly on whether he prefers elections to the status quo.

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# Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation

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The extent to which political conflict over U.S. trade policy has led to clashes between broad-based class coalitions has varied significantly over time during the past two centuries. I argue that much of this variation can be explained by changes in economywide levels of interindustry factor mobility. Class distinctions between voters are more economically and politically salient when interindustry mobility is high; when mobility is low, industry distinctions become more critical and tend to split apart broader political coalitions. I report evidence indicating large changes in levels of labor and capital mobility over the last two centuries. These changes coincide with significant shifts in the character of American trade politics. Analysis of congressional voting on 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and 1994 provides evidence of large swings in coalition patterns.

istory has shown that international trade can generate intense class conflict, pitting capital against labor, or farmers against industry, and making the tariff the central policy issue in electoral competition between political parties. In the United States, at the turn of the twentieth century, the trade issue did ignite a fierce political contest between protrade farmers and protectionist urban interests, and the tariff became the focal point for the parties in virtually every election fought between 1888 and 1914. But this type of intense class warfare was not the norm in American trade politics prior to the Civil War, when battles over policy were dominated by regionally specific, industrybased groups (Pincus 1977), nor has it continued in more recent times, when policies have been shaped in large measure by the lobbying efforts of industry associations, labor unions, and political action committees, and the trade issue has all but vanished at election time (Destler 1992).

In what circumstances does international trade deepen class cleavages in politics? When do narrower, industry-based coalitions tend to flourish instead? The existing scholarly literature is largely silent on the question and strangely polarized. While Rogowski (1989) presents evidence that trade can create class divisions that are so fundamental that they can reshape entire political systems, much of the recent analysis of American trade politics follows Schattschneider (1935) in placing industry-based lobbies at center stage (Baldwin 1985; Grossman and Helpman 1995). This division mirrors a more fundamental divide between Marxist political economy, in which all politics is class politics, and pluralist-style approaches to American politics that focus on the activities of interest groups. Bridging the gap is vital for understanding the political-economic origins of not only trade policy, but a vast range of regulatory, industrial, and monetary policies that can

create class antagonisms and yet also affect the relative fortunes of different industries. What is at issue is the definition of the basic building blocks of political economy: the alignment of preferences that creates political coalitions.

I argue here that variation in coalition patterns can be explained in large measure by changes in economywide levels of interindustry factor mobility: that is, the ease with which owners of factors of production (land, labor, and capital) can move between industries. Class distinctions between voters are more economically and politically salient when interindustry mobility is high; when mobility is low, industry distinctions become more critical and tend to split apart broader political coalitions. I report evidence indicating large changes in levels of labor and capital mobility over the last two centuries. These changes coincide with significant shifts in the character of American trade politics. Analysis of congressional voting on 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and 1994 provides evidence of large swings in coalition patterns. The findings carry important implications for political-economic studies of economic policymaking in general, for the future direction of U.S. trade policy, for future economic growth, and for arguments in favor of adjustment assistance programs that would raise levels of interindustry factor mobility.

## TRADE THEORY, COALITIONS AND FACTOR MOBILITY

According to the Stolper–Samuelson (1941) theorem, trade increases real returns for owners of the factor of production with which the economy is relatively abundantly endowed, while real returns for owners of the scarce factor decline. This result depends critically on the assumption that factors of production, while immobile internationally, are perfectly mobile within the domestic economy. The logic is simple enough: Increased trade lowers the price of the imported good, leading to a reduction in its domestic production and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Factors are identified as broad categories of productive inputs and include at least labor and capital. Traditional studies focus on land, labor, and capital, though the case has been for subdividing these into narrower categories (Leamer 1984).

freeing up more of the factor it uses relatively intensively (the scarce factor) than is demanded elsewhere in the economy at existing prices. When factor prices adjust, returns to the scarce factor fall even further than the price of the imported good, while returns to the abundant factor rise even further than the price of the exported good. The interindustry mobility of the factors assures that trade affects owners of each factor in the same way no matter where they are employed in the economy. This is the insight that encouraged Rogowski (1989) to anticipate broad-based conflict among owners of land, labor, and capital in trade politics.<sup>2</sup>

Very different results are generated by alternative types of models (often referred to as "Ricardo-Viner" models) in which one or more factor of production is assumed to be immobile between industries (Jones 1971; Mussa 1974, 1982).<sup>3</sup> In these models, the returns to "specific" factors are tied closely to the fortunes of the industry in which they are employed. Factors specific to export industries receive a real increase in returns due to trade, while those employed in import-competing industries lose in real terms. 4 Factor specificity thus drives a wedge between members of the same class employed in different industries. The implication is that political coalitions form along industry lines, and this has guided much of the empirical analysis in the "endogenous policy" literature in economics that relates variation in import barriers across industries to the relative political strength of different industry-based groups (e.g., Anderson 1980; Lavergne 1983).

The Stolper–Samuelson and Ricardo–Viner models examine extreme, or polar, cases, in which productive factors are either perfectly mobile or specific. Factor mobility is better regarded as a continuous variable, affected by a range of economic, technological, and political conditions. Allowing that factors can have varying degrees of interindustry mobility, the simple prediction is that broad class-based political coalitions are more likely where factor mobility is high, while narrow industry-based coalitions are more likely where mobility is low. The trade issue—and, in fact, any policy

issue that affects relative commodity prices—will divide an economy into very different types of coalitions if there is substantial variation in levels of interindustry factor mobility (see Appendix A for a formal, general-equilibrium treatment).

### EVIDENCE OF TRENDS IN FACTOR MOBILITY IN THE U.S. ECONOMY

#### **Measuring Interindustry Factor Mobility**

Given the obvious importance of interindustry factor mobility in determining the income distribution effects of trade (and, hence, the politics of trade), it is vexing, as Grossman and Levinsohn (1989) have pointed out, that very few attempts have actually been made to assess levels of mobility empirically. The most direct evidence has been provided in work on industry wage differentials (e.g., Krueger and Summers 1988), the response of stock-market returns to import price shocks (Grossman and Levinsohn 1989), and prices in secondary markets for capital equipment (Ramey and Shapiro 1998). All these studies suggest significant factor specificity and sizable industry rents in U.S. manufacturing in recent years, but we do not have a historical standard of reference with which to compare these findings.

To compare levels of factor mobility in the U.S. economy in different periods, I have examined the variation between rates of return for factors employed in different industries. This is simply an application of the "law of one price." If factors are highly mobile (i.e., movable), return differentials should be arbitraged away by (actual or potential) factor movement. Smaller differentials in wages and profits across industries are thus indicators of higher levels of mobility. The magnitude of the differentials will reflect the costs of moving factors between industries, which are influenced by a range of economic and political variables, including the specificity of human and physical capital to particular firms and industries, any factor market regulations that affect firm entry and exit and hiring and firing, any policies that assist relocation and retraining, and the costs of transportation and communication. Different versions of this type of measure have been used previously in a wide range of studies of labor and capital mobility.8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Classes are defined here simply in terms of factor ownership: Each factor class comprises those individuals well endowed with a factor relative to the economy as a whole. This definition allows for the fact that individuals often own a mix of factors (Mayer 1984).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The original model was introduced independently by Jones (1971) and Samuelson (1971): The former christened it the "specific-factors" model, while the latter named it the "Ricardo-Viner" model.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Again, the logic is straightforward: A decrease in the domestic production of an imported good releases any mobile factors for employment elsewhere in the economy and thus renders factors specific to the import-competing industry less productive, driving down their real returns. Returns on the mobile factor rise relative to the price of the imported good but fall relative to the price of exports, so that the income effects of trade for owners of this factor depend on patterns of consumption.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The bifurcation is generally considered unproblematic in the economics literature: Specific-factors effects are regarded as important in the short term but not the long term (Caves et al. 1990, 146–49; Krugman and Obstfeld 1988, 81; Mussa 1974). It is simply assumed that, over time, all factors are perfectly mobile. But this ignores politics: Factor owners do not just choose between accepting their returns in one industry and moving to another, they can also lobby to influence policy (and hence returns).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Magee (1980) examined the "revealed preferences" of industry groups to make inferences about mobility in his much-cited study of testimony by labor unions and management groups before the House Ways and Means Committee on the Trade Act of 1974.

<sup>7</sup> In contrast, a great deal of the contrast a great deal of the contrast and the Trade Act of 1974.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> In contrast, a great deal of empirical work has been done on the interregional mobility of labor and capital in the American economy aimed explicitly at uncovering historical trends, with much of the attention focused on the geographic integration of the markets for labor and capital during the nineteenth century (e.g., Coelho and Shepherd 1976; Davis 1965; Lebergott 1964; Odell 1989; Rosenbloom 1990).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> On industry wage variance in recent years, see Dickens and Katz 1987, Gibbons and Katz 1992, Katz and Summers 1989, and Krueger and Summers 1987, 1988. Almost all the work on the geographic integration of U.S. labor and financial markets has focused upon regional differences in wages and interest rates, and rate-of return differentials have also been used to gauge the level of international capital mobility (e.g., Frankel 1991).



There are good reasons for exercising caution when examining wage and profit differentials, since they may partly reflect other features of factor markets besides mobility (these issues are discussed further below). It is the size of industry rents that is key for the political story here, however, and wage and profit differentials are the clearest measure we have of whether such rents actually exist.<sup>9</sup>

#### Interindustry Variation in Wages and Profits

Following Long (1960) I use data on wage payments reported in the decennial census to calculate annual wages for workers in major manufacturing industries (approximates of the modern two-digit Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] categories) for each census year beginning in 1820. I also calculated average daily wages of "common laborers" in each of these industries from the payroll records of firms compiled in the Weeks report of 1886. After the turn of the century, evidence

on annual wages of production workers in two-digit SIC industries is readily available from the Department of Commerce, <sup>12</sup> hourly earnings for production workers are calculated after 1947 by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), <sup>13</sup> and separate data on hourly wages for unskilled workers between 1920 and 1937 were compiled by the National Industrial Conference Board (Glasser 1940, 36).

Using each of the data series to calculate coefficients of variation across industries yields an interesting set of results. The data, shown in Figure 1, indicate two broad trends: a general decline in interindustry variation in wages over the course of the nineteenth century, consistent with a marked rise in interindustry labor mobility, and a general increase in wage variation beginning sometime between the 1910s and the 1930s, indicating a steep decline in interindustry mobility more recently. These different trends have been noted separately by analysts focusing on particular eras (e.g., Atack, Bateman, and Margo 2000; Bell and Freeman 1991), and the evidence of sizable differences in wages across industries in recent years is also consistent with much recent work by labor economists using more detailed survey data on individual workers (e.g., Dickens and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Hiscox (2002) provides a detailed discussion and treatment of these measurement issues and a more detailed analysis of all the available evidence on historical trends in U.S. factor mobility.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> I began with the 17 industries examined by Long (1960, 72–73) for the period 1860 to 1890, amending the list to extend the series for 15 of these industries for which data are available over the period 1820 to 1910. I then created a separate series for 20 industries, adding five categories that were excluded from Long's study but for which data exist over the full span of years. All lists, and original data, are available from the author.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> The Weeks report was published as U.S. Congress, House (1886). I calculated simple averages across firms in Massachusetts, New York,

and Pennsylvania only (since all data were entered manually for each firm).

firm).

12 See the U.S. Department of Commerce's, *Census of Manufactures* and *Annual Survey of Manufactures* (various years). Beginning in 1900, earnings data are reported for 15 two-digit SIC industries; from 1947, they are reported for 19 industries.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> See the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Employment and Earnings (various years).



Katz 1987; Krueger and Summers 1988). <sup>14</sup> As Figure 1 indicates, the size of these much-discussed "industry rents" trended downward markedly during earlier stages of industrialization and upward only more recently. <sup>15</sup>

There is very little direct evidence on firm profits in different industries prior to 1909, when federal taxes were first imposed on corporate incomes (Epstein and Gordon 1939, 122). Beginning in 1933, data from annual reports on corporation profits (as percentages of net worth and equity) are available from the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), categorized

according to their main activities into two-digit SIC industries. <sup>16</sup> For earlier years, following Bateman and Weiss (1981), I used census manuscripts to calculate profits (value-added minus wage costs) as a percentage of the capital invested for firms in each of the major manufacturing industries in each census year. After 1919, the Department of Commerce ceased reporting data on capital invested, but from 1947 reports total man-hours consumed per year for each industry, and these can be used as a proxy for total investments. <sup>17</sup>

Figure 2 charts coefficients of variation in profits across manufacturing industries using these different data series. The results generally match the pattern exhibited in the wages data. There was a general decline in interindustry variation in profits over most of the nineteenth century, indicating a sharp rise in capital mobility, but then a long-term increase in profit differentials beginning some time between the 1880s and the 1910s, indicating a significant decline in interindustry capital mobility since then. <sup>18</sup> The evidence suggesting high levels of capital specificity in recent years matches

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Only very basic controls can be applied in the aggregate data to account for heterogeneity in skill levels across industries. There is strong evidence, however, that interindustry differences in skill mixes are quite stable over time and controlling for a greater range of individual skill variables is not important for estimating the *relative* size of differentials over time. See Hiscox 2002 and Krueger and Summers 1987

<sup>15</sup> Note too that the latter trend fits with evidence of a long-term decline in quit rates among manufacturing workers since 1919 (Hiscox 2002; Ragan 1984) and with survey data on job tenure that show that the number of years spent on the same job by the average worker rose substantially between 1950 and 1990. Workers aged 55 to 64 were at their jobs an average of 16.0 years in 1991, compared with 9.5 years in 1951; those aged 45 to 54 had been at their jobs an average of 12.2 years in 1991, up from 7.9 years in 1951; and for those in the 35 to 44 age bracket the average tenure rose to 7.9 years in 1991 from 4.3 years in 1951. Data are from the Employee Benefits Research Institute; see The Economist, January 28, 1995. Economists have noted that these data clash violently with the widely held perception that the U.S. workforce has become increasingly mobile in response to globalization and technological change; see reports in The Economist, January 28, 1995, and in The New York Times, April 1993.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> The data are reported by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, in *Survey of American Listed Corporations: Corporation Profits* (various years), and the U.S. Department of Commerce, in *Statistical Abstract of the United States* (various years).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> This follows Alt et al. 1999. Note that the industry lists used for calculations of profit variation are identical to those used in the analysis of wages.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> There are no controls here for cross-industry differences in risk or demand shocks, but Hiscox (2002) reports matching results using measures of profits disaggregated to the four-digit SIC level to estimate equations and control for industry-specific risk and demand-side variables.

the findings of Grossman and Levinsohn (1989), based upon a study of stock-market returns in the 1970s and 1980s, and conclusions reached by Ramey and Shapiro (1998), based upon prices in secondary markets for capital equipment.<sup>19</sup>

#### Industrialization and Factor Mobility

The evidence indicates that there have been substantial changes over time in general levels of interindustry labor and capital mobility in the U.S. economy. The pattern that emerges—rising mobility during most of the nineteenth century, falling mobility in recent decadescan be explained by the technological transformations associated with industrialization. Historical accounts of American economic development have emphasized a range of technological changes that combined to make the economy more fluid during the early stages of industrialization in the nineteenth century (e.g., Sokoloff and Villaflor 1992). Major innovations in systems of water, rail, and road transportation drastically lowered the costs of factor movement and lessened the importance of geography to economy (Davis, Hughes, and McDougall 1961, 276-96). Labor migration and capital flows grew markedly (Perloff 1965). Agricultural producers were affected too, as distance from markets and resources became less important for the location of production. At the same time innovations in manufacturing technology had profound implications for interindustry mobility. New mills and factories replaced craft shops and home manufacture, and the old skills of the artisan class were rendered obsolete (Sokoloff and Villaflor 1992). Much of the new factory technology was readily adaptable to use in alternative industries (Landes 1969, 293-94) and created a vast demand for unskilled labor, making it far easier for industrial workers to shift between jobs in different industries (Sokoloff 1986).<sup>20</sup>

Around the turn of the century, however, technological changes in manufacturing began to reverse these trends. Most important was the growing complementarity between labor skills and the newest technology (Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987; Griliches 1969; Hamermesh 1993). The key change appears to have taken place in the 1910s and 1920s with the move from assembly-line to continuous-process technology—the latter requiring more skilled workers in the management and operation of highly-complex tasks (Cain and Paterson 1986; Goldin and Katz 1996). Growth in the demand for specialized human capital has been concomitant with continued technological improvements

since that time (Mincer 1984). Job tenure rose along with training in firm-specific skills (Carter and Savocca 1990; Sundstrom 1988). Meanwhile, barriers to exit and entry for manufacturing firms appear to have risen markedly along with the growing importance of specialized technologies (Ramey and Shapiro 1998) and as a function of the higher start-up costs and increased investments in physical capital associated with the general growth in the scale of production (Caves and Porter 1979).<sup>21</sup>

## COALITION PATTERNS IN U.S. TRADE POLITICS: CONGRESSIONAL VOTES, 1824–1994

#### **Expectations and Evidence**

In light of the evidence that levels of interindustry factor mobility have varied substantially in the American economy over time, the question remains as to whether these changes have produced the expected changes political coalitions. If the argument advanced above is correct, the formation of broad factor-owning class coalitions should have been most likely during periods when interindustry factor mobility was relatively high (between the 1880s and the 1920s), while narrow industry-based coalitions should have been most likely in periods when interindustry mobility was relatively low (earlier in the nineteenth and later in the twentieth centuries).<sup>22</sup>

These expectations do fit with some of the stylized historical facts of American trade politics. According to standard accounts, trade politics was a predominantly local, group-based affair at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The emerging political parties were split over the tariff issue along regional lines and trade legislation reflected the competing pressures placed on Congress by a vast array of locally organized groups (Pincus 1977; Stanwood 1903, 240-43; Taussig 1931, 25-36). In the years following the Civil War, however, trade became the partisan issue in American politics, as Republicans, drawing broad support mostly from business and labor, supported high protectionist tariffs over the vehement opposition of Democrats and their largely rural constituency (Stewart 1991, 218; Taussig 1931, chaps. 5-8; Verdier 1994, 108-15).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> Note too that increasing capital specificity in recent decades is evidenced by growing rates of investment in research and development by firms—a popular indicator of specificity since it captures the emphasis placed by firms on developing their own technologies (Acs and Isberg 1991). Spending by U.S. manufacturing companies on R&D rose from about 0.5% of sales in 1950 to over 3% in 1990 (see U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, various years).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Goldin (1990, 115) has argued that, by the turn of the century, the market for labor in the manufacturing sector was essentially a spot market, with most jobs easily handled by the average worker. See also Gordon, Edwards, and Reich (1982, 112–28).

<sup>21</sup> While the evidence that scale economies alone act as powerful barriers to entry in practice is not strong (Scherer 1980), there is more evidence that larger capital requirements mean that fewer individuals or groups can secure the funding needed for entry (Geroski and Jacquemin 1985). Strategic considerations also tend to inhibit exit when scale economies are large (Ghemawat and Nalebuff 1990).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> For simplicity, levels of mobility are treated as general to all factors here. One might prefer to differentiate measures of mobility for each factor, but the evidence indicates that technological forces have affected levels of mobility in a very similar fashion for all factors. From Figures 1 and 2 it does seem that levels of interindustry capital mobility may have peaked earlier than levels of labor mobility, and one might thus anticipate that industry-based schisms among owners of capital would predate similar divisions among workers late in the nineteenth century. For an extended formal treatment of the consequences of allowing different rates of change in capital and labor mobility, see Hiscox 1997.

Regional divisions began to yield to a growing class cleavage that separated landowners (especially in the South and West) from urban interests and helped to generate the Granger and Populist movements.<sup>23</sup> At the height of the conflict, the Republican tariff of 1890 was denounced as the "culminating atrocity of class legislation" in the Democratic party platform, and the two parties squared off on the trade issue at each election. Growing rifts over the trade issue within the parties became more apparent in the 1920s and 1930s, however, and by the 1960s there were deep divisions in both parties and in the peak associations representing labor, business, and rural classes (Destler 1992, 176-77; Turner and Schneier 1970, 71).<sup>24</sup> Meanwhile, lobbying by industry groups appeared to intensify (on both sides of the trade issue) and played a key role in shaping policy outcomes (Baldwin 1985; Destler 1992, 189-96; Lavergne 1983).25

#### **Congressional Voting**

We can better assess temporal changes in coalition patterns (and the relative utility of class and group-based models) by examining congressional votes on major pieces of trade legislation in different historical periods. The presumption here is that legislators' voting decisions reflect their response to pressures from societal coalitions. If the theory is correct, voting decisions should more clearly reflect legislators' responses to demands by broad factor classes when levels of interindustry factor mobility are relatively high and demands from protectionist and free-trade industries within their districts when mobility levels are relatively low.

A number of studies of congressional votes on trade policy have appeared in the literature to date. Most of these have been limited to examining a specific piece of legislation, usually in recent years (see Baldwin and Magee 2000). They include studies of votes on automobile domestic content legislation in 1982 (Coughlin 1985; McArthur and Marks 1988), the Trade Act of 1974 (Baldwin 1985), textile quota legislation in 1985 (Tosini and Tower 1987), the Export Facilitation Act of 1987 (Uri and Mixon 1992), and the omnibus trade legislation of 1987 (Marks 1993). The votes on the NAFTA have been given special attention in recent work (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Holian, Krebs, and Walsh 1997; Kahane 1996; Steagall and Jennings 1996;

Uslaner 1998). Conybeare (1991) looks at votes in earlier times, and Gilligan (1997) provides an excellent analysis that covers 12 bills in Congress between 1890 and 1988.

The findings from these studies shed some light on the coalitions issue, but only indirectly. In analyses of recent trade votes, measures of the importance of import-competing industries in districts have significant, positive effects on the likelihood that legislators vote in favor of protection. Dependence on export industries in electoral districts, on the other hand, tends to raise the likelihood that legislators vote for liberalizing bills. These relationships, which fit well with the industry-based approach to trade politics, appear much less clear in the studies of earlier votes: Conybeare (1991) finds evidence of industry effects, but Gilligan (1997) indicates that such effects are quite weak. Evidence on the importance of factoral or class variables is even less clear. Recent studies have indicated that votes against NAFTA in 1993 were positively associated with the degree to which legislators relied upon campaign contributions from labor political action committees (Baldwin and Magee 2000; Steagall and Jennings 1996). But it is difficult to draw clear inferences from this without knowing the extent of the bias in the industry composition of contributing labor groups-laborintensive import-competing industries tend to be more unionized and, thus, are likely to be the primary source of contributions.

To compare the relative utility of class and industry-group models, I take a simple approach here, relating voting patterns among members of the Senate and House over time to measures of the class and industry makeup of their constituencies. The dependent variable is the legislator's vote for protection (1 = for a protectionist bill or against a liberalizing bill, 0 = against a protectionist bill or for a liberalizing bill). Votes on 30 major pieces of trade legislation between 1824 and 1994 are examined (Appendix B provides a detailed list of these bills).

The explanatory variables are measures of the class or industry characteristics of each state in each year in which a vote was taken. For factor classes, I derived several measures from the available census data.<sup>27</sup> As a basic measure of the importance of farmers in each state, I have used the total value of agricultural production as a fraction of state income. As a measure of the importance of labor, I used total employment in manufacturing as a proportion of each state's population. Measuring the importance of capital poses somewhat greater problems, since the census data on capital

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> As one simple indicator of the trend, the proportion of states in which two senators split their votes on trade legislation rose from 0.09 in the final votes on the Tariff Act of 1824 to 0.22 in votes on the Tariff Act of 1842 and 0.32 for the Trade Act of 1875. Meanwhile the average party cohesion (Rice indexes) for votes on major trade bills in the House rose from 2.8% in 1824, to 44.1% in 1842, and to 66.1% in 1875. Later votes became even more polarized along partisan lines as Republicans and Democrats went head to head: average cohesion registered 98.7 (in 1890), 90.2 (1894), 98.0 (1897), 97.4 (1909), and 94.3 (1913). See Appendix B for the full list of tariff bills.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Average party cohesion indexes for House votes on major trade bills were only 43.9 (in 1955), 43.3 (1962), 36.3 (1974), 33.0 (1993), and 33.0 (1994). See Appendix B for the full list of tariff bills.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Destler and Odell (1987) document a marked rise in political activity among both groups opposed to and groups supporting product-specific trade protection in the 1970s and 1980s.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> All models are estimated using probit in STATA 7.0.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> The state data on factors are drawn from decennial censuses (prior to 1919) and the U.S. Department of Commerce's Census of Manufactures, Census of Agriculture, and Census of Mining (afterward) for years closest to the years in which each vote was taken. For years prior to 1840 the state data are extrapolated from the time series on later observations. State income data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1989), State Personal Income (various years), and Kuznets et al. (1960). State population data are from the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States.

invested in manufacturing industries ends in 1919. Using total manufacturing production in each state is one possible approach, but this does not permit distinctions between the amounts of capital and labor engaged in production. Instead I used profits earned by capital in manufacturing (measured as value-added minus wage payments) as a fraction of the state income, on the assumption that these profits vary from state to state largely as a function of the total magnitude of investments.<sup>28</sup> To measure the industry characteristics of each state I examined the size of the leading exporting and import-competing industries in each state using data on trade from the Department of Commerce and census data on production in manufacturing, mining, and agricultural sectors. For each state I calculated total production in the 10 leading exporting and importcompeting industries in each year as a proportion of the state income.<sup>29</sup>

The analysis includes dummy variables for each bill, to account for individual characteristics of particular bills (or years) when examining votes in favor of protection.<sup>30</sup> On the other hand, I have not included controls for the party affiliations and regional locations of members of Congress, even though previous work indicates that both types of variables have been good predictors of voting patterns on trade at different times. I exclude them here to provide the clearest imaginable test between the class and the industrygroup models. Party affiliations and regional locations are both strongly correlated with the measures of the class and industry characteristics of states at different levels in different periods. This in unsurprising: The competing parties have appealed to very different classbased constituencies over the years and to supporters in different geographical regions, and those regions themselves have often displayed marked differences in their economic composition in terms of both factor classes and trade-affected industries (see Kim 1998). In the antebellum years, for instance, the Jackson Democrats in Congress were elected mainly from Southern states

in which farming outweighed manufacturing interests and exporting industries were far larger than import-competing concerns. My main concern here is not to muddy the water when comparing the performance of the class and group-based models by inadvertently including class effects in the group-based model, or vice versa.

I have divided the main analysis into five parts, pooling the votes taken in five historical periods: 1824–60, 1875–1913, 1922–37, 1945–62, and 1970-94. The aim is simply to provide some clear comparisons over time. The estimations of each model have also been performed on a bill-by-bill basis and the conclusions are substantively identical to those reported below. The class and industry models are estimated separately, and their performance in different periods is then compared and evaluated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) *J* test. The class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) and their performance in different periods is then compared and evaluated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) are the class are estimated using Davidson are the class 
The "class model" includes the three indicators of the importance of different factor classes in each state: the value of agricultural production, employment in manufacturing, and profits earned by capital in manufacturing. According to the basic class-based approach, we should expect that the value of farm production is negatively related to votes for protection over the entire time span, since the U.S. economy has been relatively well endowed with land, compared to other nations, and owners of land should thus have favored freer trade (in accord with the Stolper-Samuelson model).34 Owners of labor, on the other hand, should have favored protection, since the economy has been relatively poorly endowed with labor compared with its trading partners, and thus employment in manufacturing in states should be positively related to votes for protection. And, finally, according to Rogowski (1989, 29), the United States is properly regarded as a capital-scarce economy for most of the period prior to 1914, transforming into a capital-abundant economy sometime before the First World War. We should thus expect a change in the policy preferences of owners of capital sometime between the second and the third periods examined here (or perhaps even earlier), with a shift away from support for protection. In terms of the estimated effects, that means that total profits earned by capital in each state

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> The measure is strongly correlated (at 0.92) with the total capital invested as a fraction of the state income for the period (1840–1919) for which data on the latter are available. I have performed the analysis using a range of alternative measures of the class variables, including the total value of land in agriculture and total land area (for farmers), aggregate wages in manufacturing (for labor), and total manufacturing production and production per worker (for capital). The key results, discussed in the next section, are substantively identical regardless of which combination of measures is employed.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> The 10 leading exporting and import-competing industries in each year in which a vote occurred were identified using figures for exports and imports drawn from the U.S. Department of Commerce's Commerce and Navigation of the United States. This approach follows that used by Gilligan (1997), though the set of votes/years differs in that my analysis includes the antebellum period as well as many bills after 1870 that have been excluded from previous studies. The full lists if the top 10 export and import-competing industries in each year are available from the author.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> I have also examined specifications of each model that include variables such as dummies for bills with provisions delegating authority to the president to negotiate tariff reductions with other nations and for bills that ratified trade treaties already negotiated. The key substantive results are identical to the ones reported below so the simplest specifications have been presented.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> The division of the post-1945 period just recognizes that U.S. trade patterns were quite volatile in the immediate postwar period, as the European and Japanese economies were rebuilding, and (not coincidentally) the two political parties switched sides on the trade issue in the 1960s.

in the 1960s.

32 Note that since some members of Congress vote on more than one bill in each of the pools considered, all observations are not independent and so the estimated standard errors are biased in a downward direction in that analysis. I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for making this point. Results for the bill-by-bill analysis are available from the author.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> The various class and industry variables are collinear in ways and degrees that differ over time, so including them all in one estimation would actually make it very difficult to interpret the size and significance of their competing effects on voting.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> See Rogowski (1989) for quantitative evidence on U.S. factor endowments, with deductions about class preferences on trade derived from the Stolper–Samuelson theorem. Rogowski's designations are applied here.

Probit Estimations for Senate Votes on Trade Bills—Class Model TABLE 1. Effect of Individual Variables Estimation Result on Probability of Vote for Protection<sup>b</sup> (Dependent Variable = Vote for Protection)<sup>a</sup> 1824-60 1875-1913 1922-37 1945-62 1970-94 1824-60 1875-1913 1922-37 1945-62 1970-94 -0.31 -0.62-0.640.82 2.84\*\* -1.26 -0.46-0.82\* <u>-1.57\*\*</u> Value of farm -0.84 (0.07)(0.10)(0.77)(0.06)(0.10)(0.09)(0.73)production (0.50)(0.38)(0.53)0.42 0.74 -0.322.11 0.53 0.69 9.32\*\* 16.02\*\* 9.38\*\* 3.00 Employment in (0.07)(0.27)(0.04)(0.03)(2.64)(3.40)(4.12)(0.04)(2.21)(3.27)manufacturing 0.64 -0.38 0.34 0.12 0.68 0.08 -6.04\*\* -8.69\*\*-2.89\*-2.02Profits in (0.30)(0.08)(1.59)(0.38)(0.04)(0.11)(2.01)(1.43)manufacturing (2.10)(2.03)372 532 367 280 382 241.43 -219.96 -121.49 log-likelihood -225.25 324.51 .1329 .0270 .1288 Pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> .1246 .1189

<sup>a</sup>Estimations include constant and dummy variables for individual bills (not shown). Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01. <sup>b</sup>Effects estimated for change in each variable from minimum (0) to maximum (1) values for equations including only that variable and bill dummies using *Clarify* (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

should be positively associated with votes for protection in the first period and most of the second period and negatively thereafter.

Table 1 reports two sets of results. On the left are the estimated coefficients and pseudo-R2 statistics from the probit estimations of the class model in each period, which can be compared (see Table 5 below) with the results from the alternative industry-group model. On the right, to give some idea of the magnitude of the different effects, are the first differences in the probability of voting for protection when each of the class variables changes from its theoretical minimum to its theoretical maximum value (from 0 to 1). Interpreting the estimated coefficients in the full model (on the left) is rather difficult here because employment and profits in manufacturing are so highly collinear across states (they are correlated at about 0.7 in each period). Both directly reflect the size of the manufacturing sector in each state and the separate effects of the different class variables are thus difficult to discern.35 An interesting part of the problem here is that when both employment and profits are included in the one model, the estimated coefficients will also measure the effects of variation in labor and capital intensities in manufacturing production (using more labor with the same amount of capital, and vice versa). As a partial corrective here I have simply calculated the first differences for each variable (on the right) when other class variables are excluded from the model. The separate effects are less important, in the end, than the overall performance of the class model in each period and how it compares with the industry-group model, so this is not a crucial issue.

The value of farm production is negatively associated with votes for protection, as anticipated, in all but the fourth period. The votes taken in the immediate post-1945 years may be anomalous in this regard due to the new rural reliance on farm support programs introduced in the 1930s. The estimated effects of farming on votes (shown on the right) are smallest in the first and last periods; the largest negative effects appear in the periods between 1875 and 1937. Manufacturing employment is positively associated with protectionist votes, as expected, although the results are again less clear between 1945 and 1962, the postwar boom period for all kinds of U.S. manufacturing exports. While the class model anticipates that owners of capital favored protection up until at least 1914, the coefficients for the profits variable in the first three periods are negative. Since employment and profits are highly collinear, however, this may simply indicate that highly capitalintensive producers were less supportive of protection than others. The effects of profits on votes, calculated with employment excluded from the estimation (on the right), are positive until 1937, and largest between 1875 and 1937, as are the effects of employment on votes.36

Table 2 presents the results of estimations for the same set of votes on trade legislation in the Senate, but now using indicators of the importance of exporting and import-competing industries in each state as the explanatory variables. In line with a simple industry-group model, we anticipate that the importance of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> For a discussion, see Gujarati 1995, 327–35. The problem is not just inefficiency, though the standard errors for the estimates more than double when all three variables are included in the model rather than one alone. It is also a question of effective sample size: There are hardly any observations, for instance, in which state employment in manufacturing is high while state profits in manufacturing are low (or vice versa).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>36</sup> I have tried variants of the basic class model for the recent periods that include measures of the skill level of the workforce in each state assuming, in line with Midford (1993) and Scheve and Slaughter (1998, 2000), that skilled workers, viewed as a separate class, oppose protection. Yet models that include measures of the proportion of the state's adult population with high school diplomas or higher levels of education perform no better than the basic specification in Table 1. In none of the estimations are the coefficients on these variables significant, and often they take the wrong (positive) sign. Since such data are unavailable for previous periods, I have reported only the simplest model here to provide straightforward comparisons over time.

Probit Estimations for Senate Votes on Trade Bills—Industry Group Model TABLE 2. Estimation Result Effect of Individual Variables (Dependent Variable = Vote for Protection)<sup>a</sup> on Probability of Vote for Protection<sup>b</sup> 1824-60 1875-1913 1922-37 1945-62 1970-94 1824-60 1875-1913 1922-37 1945-62 1970-94 Exporting industries -2.30\*\* -1.09\*\* -3.55\*\* -2.80\*\*-4.79\*\*-0.73-0.48-0.50-0.26-0.54(0.31)(0.25)(0.43)(0.07)(1.06)(1.41)(0.05)(0.04)(0.05)(0.10)Import-competing 1.27 1.27\* 1.70 3.45\* 1.24 0.65 0.52 0.47 0.46 0.73 industries (1.03)(0.56)(1.06)(0.92)(0.79)(0.04)(0.06)(0.09)(0.26)(0.06)372 532 367 280 382 log-likelihood -199.80-347.00-226.24 -129.36 -229.52 Pseudo-R2 .2249 .0578 .1041 .0768 .0750

<sup>a</sup>Estimations include constant and dummy variables for individual bills (not shown). Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01. <sup>b</sup>Effects estimated for change in each variable from minimum (0) to maximum (1) values for equations including only that variable and bill dummies using *Clarify* (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

	Estimation Result (Dependent Variable = Vote for Protection) $^a$					Effect of Individual Variables on Probability of Vote for Protection <sup>b</sup>				
Value of Co.		1875–1913		1945–62	1970–94	1824–60	1875–1913	1922–37	1945–62	1970–94
Value of farm production	-1.36** (0.26)	-0.53**	-0.03	2.69**	-1.72**	-0.40	-0.68	-0.52	0.28	-0.49
Employment in	6.47**	(0.11) 8.46**	(0.31) 15.57**	(0.43) 8.95**	(0.43) 4.04**	(0.03) 0.64	(0.03) 0.73	(0.04) 0.81	(0.12) 0.81	(0.04) 0.69
manufacturing Profits in	(1.07) -2.25*	(1.17)	(2.06)	(1.53)	(1.73)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)
manufacturing	(0.99)	-1.32 (1.00)	-2.46** (0.72)	-0.31 (0.87)	0.19 (0.68)	0.45 (0.10)	0.80 (0.02)	0.71 (0.05)	0.68 (0.12)	0.45 (0.11)
N	1,584	2,656	1,565	1,262	2,480					
log-likelihood Pseudo- <i>R</i> 2	-985.28 .1001	-1,658.12 .0992	-909.46 .1552	-754.86 .0504	-1,605.73 .0638					

<sup>a</sup>Estimations include constant and dummy variables for individual bills (not shown). Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01. bEffects estimated for change in each variable from minimum (0) to maximum (1) values for equations including only that variable and bill dummies using *Clarify* (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

exporting industries should be negatively related to votes for protection, since individuals employed or invested in those industries benefit from trade liberalization, while the importance of import-competing industries should be positively related to votes for protection.

As expected, in each period the estimated coefficients for the exporting industries variable are negative, and the coefficients for import-competing industries are positive. Again, we must exercise care here in interpreting the size and significance of the separate effects, since these two variables appear quite collinear across states in early periods. Again (on the right), I simply calculated the first difference effects on the probability of voting for protection for a change in each variable from its theoretical minimum to its theoretical maximum (0 to 1) when excluding the other industry variable from the estimation. Here the pattern in the size of effects over time is the reverse of that for the class variables: Both industry variables have larger effects on voting in the first and last period and smaller effects on votes in between.

Overall, the results of the analysis of the Senate votes are quite consistent with expectations based upon changes in factor mobility over time. Voting decisions more closely reflect Senator's consideration of the interests of broad factor classes when levels of mobility were higher (in the years between 1875 and 1937) than when mobility levels were lower (in the periods between 1824 and 1860 and from 1945 to the 1990s). The pattern works just the other way when we examine the responsiveness of Senate voting to demands from free-trade and protectionist industries within each state.

Tables 3 and 4 report the results of the analysis of House votes for each model. These must be treated with a little more caution since the measures of the importance of classes and industries are available only at the state level, rather than the district level, and so we are relying on an assumption that the class and industry composition of districts within states are similar.

The results are very similar to those obtained from the analysis of Senate votes. The estimated coefficients are comparable for each class and industry variable

TABLE 4. Probit Estimations for House Votes on Trade Bills—Industry Group Model										
	Estimation Result $(Dependent \ Variable = Vote \ for \ Protection)^a$					Effect of Individual Variables on Probability of Vote for Protection <sup>b</sup>				
	1824-60	 1875–1913	1922–37	1945–62	1970–94	1824–60	1875–1913	1922–37	1945–62	
Exporting industries	-1.86** (0.11)	-0.82** (0.10)	-3.21** (0.40)	-0.73* (0.30)	-2.16** (0.53)	-0.65 (0.03)	-0.37 (0.03)	-0.47 (0.04)	-0.22 (0.11)	0.58 (0.05)
Import-competing industries	1.62* (0.73)	1.27** (0.36)	0.63 (0.63)	1.34* <del>*</del> (0.48)	2.56** (0.29)	0.63 (0.02)	0.46 (0.02)	0.41 (0.14)	0.41 (0.15)	0.64 (0.03)
N	1,583	2,656	1,565	1,262	2,480	1				
log-likelihood Pseudo- <i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	_880.49 1954_	-1, 727.72 .0614	.1250	.0163	.0808			41	*- 05.	*** - 01

<sup>a</sup>Estimations include constant and dummy variables for individual bills (not shown). Standard errors in parentheses. \*p < .05; \*\*p < .01. Effects estimated for change in each variable from minimum (0) to maximum (1) values for equations including only that variable and bill dummies using Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000).

0.55 .93** 0.52) 0.53 0.71) Class	A. Senate Votes  2.06  -0.53 (0.71) 3.21** (0.49) Industry	1.23 1.90** (0.67) 2.41** (0.53) Neither	1.73 3.79** (1.44) 3.06** (0.68) Neither	0.36 3.17** (0.63) 0.49 (1.45) Class
.93** 0.52) 0.53 0.71)	-0.53 (0.71) 3.21** (0.49)	1.90** (0.67) 2.41** (0.53)	3.79** (1.44) 3.06** (0.68)	3.17** (0.63) 0.49 (1.45)
0.52) 0.53 0.71)	(0.71) 3.21** (0.49)	(0.67) 2.41** (0.53)	(1.44) 3.06** (0.68)	(0.63) 0.49 (1.45)
0.71)	(0.49)	(0.53)	(0.68)	(1.45)
<i>JI</i> ass	ii iddaa y			Ciass
	B. House Votes			
0.51	1.62	1.24	3.09	0.85
	0.30 (0.39)	1.54** (0.43)	1.34 (0.92)	2.92** (0.34)
-0.16 0.39)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.37)	1.26 (0.87) Class
	3.95** (0.29) (-0.16) (0.39)	0.29) (0.39) -0.16 3.18** (0.39) (0.26)	0.29) (0.39) (0.43) -0.16 3.18** 2.76** (0.39) (0.26) (0.30)	0.29) (0.39) (0.43) (0.92) -0.16 3.18** 2.76** 2.80**

Note: Specifications as listed in Tables 1-4.

 $a_{\alpha_l}$  and  $a_c$  are estimated coefficients for predicted values from industry and class models, respectively, in linear combination with the alternative model. Model test applies the 95% confidence interval. Standard errors in parentheses. \*\*p < .01.

in each period. The only clear difference is that the estimated effects of employment and profits on voting in the immediate postwar years, between 1945 and 1962, are positive rather than negative (Table 3), suggesting that members of the House from states heavily dependent on manufacturing did not switch positions on trade as quickly after the war as senators. Again, the estimated effects for the maximum possible change in each of the class variables are largest in the second and third periods, between 1875 and 1937. And again, the estimated effects of changes in each of the industry variables indicate a complementary result: They are largest in the earliest and latest periods and smaller in the periods in between.

A simple way to gain a better sense of the relative utility of the class and industry models involves a comparison of the pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> values in each period (see Table 5). For votes in both the Senate and the House the pattern is the same: The class model performs much better than the industry model in periods two through four, while performing far worse than the industry model in periods one and five.

Table 5 also reports the results of formal tests to discriminate between the two competing models. Davidson and MacKinnon's (1981) "J test" is used to assess H<sub>0</sub> (the class model is appropriate) against H<sub>1</sub> (the industry model is appropriate) by an indirect linear combination of the two models. The test is conducted by estimating a combination of the class model and the predicted values from the industry model, where  $\alpha_i$  is the weight on the industry model. If H<sub>0</sub> is true, then the true value of  $\alpha_i$  is zero. We can then test for  $\alpha_i = 0$ to judge whether H<sub>0</sub> can be rejected. The procedure is simply reversed to test for whether H<sub>1</sub> can be rejected. Clearly the industry model dominates the class model in periods one and five, in both the Senate and House; the class model dominates the industry model in period two in both chambers; while a clear winner (or loser) does not emerge in periods three and four. The votes in period four, between 1945 and 1962, seem especially difficult for the models: While the class model appears to explain more of the variation in both the Senate and the House votes, the effects of two of the three class variables (farming production and profits in manufacturing) actually go counter to the direction anticipated in standard class-based accounts.

It should be clear that these cross-time comparisons provide only an indirect test of the factor mobility hypothesis. We are tightly constrained by the availability of data. If we had data on levels of factor mobility by electoral district for a substantial period of history, so that we could allow for spatial differences in mobility levels as well as temporal ones, we could do much more with the analysis of roll call votes and test the theory more directly. But the data on general levels of mobility reported in Figures 1 and 2 represent the first systematic measurement of interindustry factor mobility over any span of time in the literature—an astounding fact given the centrality of mobility (and its converse, specificity) in theories of political economy. It is enough to provide us with a set of basic predictions about how the relative utility of the class and group-based models should fluctuate over time. That these predictions are confirmed by the analysis of congressional voting patterns strongly suggests that further analysis of factor mobility holds real promise for helping to bridge the large gulf that exists between competing theoretical models currently used in political economy.

#### CONCLUSIONS

While the possibility of relating variation in factor mobility to variation in coalitions has been discussed by a number of scholars in the past (see Alt et al. 1996; Magee 1980), no systematic empirical study of the relationship has been furnished to date. The evidence presented here suggests that mobility levels in the United States have varied markedly with different stages of industrialization over the last two centuries. These changes coincided with significant shifts in trade politics: Voting decisions in both the Senate and the House more clearly reflected class-based considerations when interindustry mobility was relatively high but were more in line with industry-based pressures when mobility was relatively low.

These results do not, of course, approximate the final word on the matter. Using legislative votes as the dependent variable here has the advantage that it is "where the action is" when it comes to the making of trade policy, but it is at least one step removed from the social cleavages and coalitions that are at issue. Alternative evidence should be considered. One possibility involves the use of data from public opinion surveys to measure the policy preferences of individuals. In recent work, Scheve and Slaughter (1998, 2001) have examined responses to a question about the desirability of new limits on imported goods included in

National Election Studies surveys in 1992 and 1996, relating them to the occupational characteristics of respondents.<sup>37</sup> They conclude that a basic class characteristic of respondents (their skill level) was a better predictor of their opinions on trade policy than the competitive position of the industry in which they were employed, a conclusion that runs counter to the results from the analysis of recent congressional trade votes reported above.<sup>38</sup> Pursuing this type of evidence further, and the apparent disjuncture between public attitudes and congressional politics, might be extremely fruitful, although reliable survey data are available only for very recent years.39

More work on the issue is clearly warranted. But the findings reported here do suggest a relatively simple solution to the persisting division in the scholarly literature between class and group-based models. Both types of approaches can be justified under different conditions. For the study of political economy more generally the findings have some wide-ranging implications. Depending upon the assumptions one makes about levels of interindustry mobility, general equilibrium models produce very different predictions about the distributional implications of any policy that affects relative commodity prices, and thus the demand for different factors of production, and any policy that affects the supply of those different factors. The distributional effects of a vast range of policies thus hinge upon levels of mobility: exchange-rate policy, controls on foreign investment (both outward and inward), all forms of industrial policy and industry regulation (subsidies, tax incentives, and labor and environmental laws), and immigration policy. The extent to which these policy issues generate class conflict, rather than industry-based rent-seeking, will hinge critically upon levels of factor mobility in the economy.

There are important implications, too, for the direction of U.S. trade policy. When levels of interindustry mobility decline, as in recent years, the evidence suggests that policymakers will have less incentive to stake out a coherent free trade (or protectionist) position on trade, aimed at capturing support from a broad class-based coalition, and instead they will be more inclined to adopt incoherent policy positions that balance competing demands from the most powerful industry

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> Gabel (1998) has employed data on public support for European Union membership from recent Eurobarometer surveys in a similar

fashion.

38 Interestingly, however, Scheve and Slaughter have also found that respondents in counties in which import-competing industries accounted for larger shares of employment tended to have more protectionist views. This seems like a reasonable confirmation of the strength of industry-based coalitions, although they argue that it reflects calculations the respondents are making about the effects of international trade on housing values in the counties.

Much also appears to depend on the wording of the particular survey question examined and the context in which it has been posed. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1972, 81-84) argue forcefully that public attitudes toward the trade issue are especially poorly informed and unstable, changing drastically in accord with small changes in the wording of questions. Context may also be critical. In 1992 and 1996, for instance, survey responses are likely to have hinged upon attitudes toward NAFTA that had some very particular characteristics (e.g., the potential effects on foreign direct investment).

groups on both sides—supporting multilateral trade negotiations with one hand, for instance, while generously applying nontariff barriers to imports in key sectors with the other. If mobility levels continue to decline, this raises the specter of a kind of Olsonian nightmare in which a growing share of the economy's resources are squandered on zero-sum distributive battles instead of being invested in productive activities (Bhagwati 1982; Olson 1982).

Class-based political battles are no picnic, of course. They can be a tumultuous and disruptive force, producing sharp fluctuations in policy as first one side, then another, gains control of government. But broadbased class coalitions are also more encompassing of society as a whole, as Olson (1982) famously noted, and thus more interested in policies that expand the size of the national "pie" rather than simply divide it. Establishing some kind of stable compromise between broad class coalitions along Swedish lines is an obvious solution, providing for efficiency-enhancing types of economic policies and methods of compensation. But maintaining such a broad-based compromise requires programs that discourage industry rent-seeking by supporting and promoting high levels of interindustry mobility among owners of labor and capital. In the end, a strong case may thus emerge for more extensive forms of adjustment assistance to workers and firms that would enable them to respond to changes in the international economy in more efficient, nonpolitical wavs.

#### APPENDIX A. A MODEL OF THE INCOME EFFECTS OF TRADE WITH VARIABLE FACTOR MOBILITY

The model developed here builds upon Jones's (1971) three-factor model. It is a modified version of the traditional,  $2 \times 2$  general-equilibrium model used in the trade literature. Consider an economy in which two commodities,  $X_1$  and  $X_2$ , are produced, and sector i uses only factors specific to it,  $L_i$  and  $K_i$ . Since only relative prices matter in this two-commodity model,  $X_1$  is chosen as the *numeraire* for the analysis. Equilibrium is described by full employment of each factor (Equations 1 to 4) and competitive profits (Equations 5 and 6):

$$a_{L11}X_1 = L_1, (1)$$

$$a_{K11}X_1 = K_1, (2)$$

$$a_{122}X_2 = L_2, (3)$$

$$a_{K22}X_2 = K_2,$$
 (4)

$$a_{L11}w_1 + a_{K11}r_1 = 1, (5)$$

$$a_{L22}w_2 + a_{K22}r_2 = p, (6)$$

where  $a_{Lij}$  and  $a_{Kij}$  are the quantities of  $L_i$  and  $K_i$  required per unit output of  $X_j$ ,  $w_j$  and  $r_j$  are returns to labor and capital in industry j in terms of the first commodity, and p is the relative price of the second commodity in terms of the first. Full employment requires that techniques of production are variable, and since competition ensures that unit costs are minimized, each  $a_{ij}$  depends upon the ratio of factor prices in industry  $j: a_{ij} = a_{ij}(w_1/r_j)$ .

Solving Equations 1 and 2 for  $X_1$ , and Equations 3 and 4 for  $X_2$  yields:

$$\frac{a_{L11}}{a_{K11}}K_1=L_1, (7)$$

$$\frac{a_{122}}{a_{K22}}K_2 = L_2. {8}$$

Equations 5 to 8 provide a set of four relationships in the four unknown factor prices. Commodity prices are exogenous, and for the moment, endowments of specific factors are treated as parameters. The structure of the model is best examined by describing the manner in which the equilibrium is disturbed by changes in commodity prices. After differentiating totally, we can solve for the percentage change in each of the factor returns (results are stated in percentage terms to indicate, not only directions, but relative magnitudes of changes).

$$\frac{dw_1}{w_1} = -\frac{\theta_{K11}}{\sigma_1} \left( \frac{dL_1}{L_1} - \frac{dK_1}{K_1} \right), \tag{9}$$

$$\frac{dr_1}{r_1} = \frac{\theta_{L11}}{\sigma_1} \left( \frac{dL_1}{L_1} - \frac{dK_1}{K_1} \right), \tag{10}$$

$$\frac{dw_2}{w_2} = \frac{dp}{p} - \frac{\theta_{K22}}{\sigma_2} \left( \frac{dL_2}{L_2} - \frac{dK_2}{K_2} \right), \tag{11}$$

$$\frac{dr_2}{r_2} = \frac{dp}{p} + \frac{\theta_{L22}}{\sigma_2} \left( \frac{dL_2}{L_2} - \frac{dK_2}{K_2} \right), \tag{12}$$

where  $\sigma_j$  is the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in industry j,  $\theta_{Lij}$  and  $\theta_{Kij}$  are the distributive shares of factor i in the value of output of industry j, and we have utilized the relation

$$\theta_{Lij}\left(\frac{da_{Lij}}{a_{Li}}\right) + \theta_{Kij}\left(\frac{da_{Kij}}{a_{Kij}}\right) = 0,$$

which is implied by the cost-minimizing choice of  $a_{ij}$  (Jones 1971, 6).

To analyze the effects of factor mobility we can consider each of the specific factors to be themselves outputs of productive processes whereby  $L_1$  can be converted into  $L_2$  and  $K_1$  into  $K_2$  at increasing opportunity costs. Total factor endowments, L and K, are fixed exogenously (where  $L = L_1 + L_2$  and  $K = K_1 + K_2$ ), but the ratios  $L_2/L_1$  and  $K_2/K_1$  respond positively to relative returns,  $w_2/w_1$  and  $r_2/r_1$ , respectively. Mobility is then defined interms of the elasticities of substitution,  $\phi_L$  and  $\phi_K$ , along the transformation loci connecting  $L_2$  and  $L_1$  and connecting  $K_2$  and  $K_1$ , respectively.

$$\phi_L = \frac{d(L_2/L_1)/(L_2/L_1)}{d(w_2/w_1)/(w_2/w_1)},$$
 and also,

$$\phi_K = \frac{d(K_2/K_1)/(K_2/K_1)}{d(r_2/r_1)/(r_2/r_1)},$$

where  $\phi_L$ ,  $\phi_K \geq 0$ .

These relationships can be used with Equations 9 to 12 to derive full solutions for the percentage change in factor returns as a function of the percentage change in commodity prices ("hats" indicate percentage changes):

$$\hat{w}_1 = \left[ \frac{-\theta_{K11}\sigma_2(\phi_K \tau_{K2} - \phi_L \tau_{L2}) - \theta_{K11}\phi_L \phi_K \Omega}{\Delta} \right] \hat{p}, \tag{13}$$

$$\hat{r}_1 = \left[ \frac{\theta_{L11}\sigma_2(\phi_K \tau_{K2} - \phi_L \tau_{L2}) + \theta_{L11}\phi_L \phi_K \Omega}{\Delta} \right] \hat{p}, \tag{14}$$

$$\hat{w}_{2} = \left[ \frac{-\theta_{K11}\sigma_{2}(\phi_{K}\tau_{K2} - \phi_{L}\tau_{I2}) + \phi_{K}(\sigma_{1}\tau_{K1} + \sigma_{2}\tau_{K2}) + \sigma_{1}\sigma_{2} - \theta_{K11}\phi_{L}\phi_{K}\Omega}{\Delta} \right] \hat{p},$$
(15)

$$\hat{r}_2 = \left[ \frac{\theta_{L11}\sigma_2(\phi_K\tau_{K2} - \phi_L\tau_{L2}) + \phi_L(\sigma_1\tau_{L1} + \sigma_2\tau_{L2}) + \sigma_1\sigma_2 + \theta_{L11}\phi_L\phi_K\Omega}{\Delta} \right] \hat{p}, \tag{16}$$

where  $\Delta = \phi_L(\theta_{K22}\sigma_1\tau_{L1} + \theta_{K11}\sigma_2\tau_{L2}) + \phi_K(\theta_{L22}\sigma_1\tau_{K1} + \theta_{L11}\sigma_2\tau_{K2}) + \sigma_1\sigma_2 + (\theta_{L11} - \theta_{L22})\phi_L\phi_K\Omega > 0$ ,

 $\Omega = \tau_{L1}\tau_{K2} - \tau_{I2}\tau_{K1},$ 

where  $\tau_{L_J}$  and  $\tau_{K_J}$  are the fractions of total labor and capital employed in industry j.  $\Omega$  describes factor intensities: It is positive (negative) when production of  $X_1$  is relatively labor (capital)-intensive.

Equations 13–16 show that the relationships between p and factor returns depend on the levels of labor and capital mobility. The Ricardo-Viner and Stolper-Samuelson results appear here as special cases. If we assume that capital is completely specific, as in the standard Ricardo-Viner derivation,  $\phi_K = 0$  and the solutions yield the standard results. Specifically, if p rises  $(\hat{p} > 0)$ , both wage rates also rise but at a slower rate:  $\hat{p} > \hat{w}_2 > \hat{w}_1 > 0$ . (Note that  $\hat{w}_2$  approximates  $\hat{w}_1$  as  $\phi_L$ rises.) Further, the return on capital in the second industry increases at a faster rate than p, while in the first industry it falls:  $\hat{r}_2 > \hat{p} > 0 > \hat{r}_1$ . If we assume that labor and capital are infinitely mobile, as in the Stolper-Samuelson approach,  $\phi_L = \phi_K = \infty$  and the model yields the familiar outcome: An increase in the relative price of the labor(capital)-intensive commodity produces a larger rise in wage rates (profits) and a decline in profits (wages). Specifically, if p rises,  $\hat{w}_2$  and  $\hat{w}_1$ are greater than  $\hat{p}$  (<0), and  $\hat{r}_2$  and  $\hat{r}_1$  are negative (> $\hat{p}$ ), if and only if  $\Omega < (>)0$ .

The key relationship that concerns us here describes how the mobility of a factor influences class solidarity, as indicated by the difference between the effects of a price change on returns to the factor in each industry. For any change in p, the absolute difference between  $\hat{w}_1$  and  $\hat{w}_2$  is inversely related to  $\phi_L$ ; that is,  $\partial(|\hat{w}_1 - \hat{w}_2|)/\partial\phi_L < 0$ . Likewise, the absolute difference between  $\hat{r}_1$  and  $\hat{r}_2$  is inversely related to  $\phi_K$ ; that is,  $\partial(|\hat{r}_1 - \hat{r}_2|)/\partial\phi_K < 0$ . The implication is that, for any change in relative prices induced by a shift in trade policy or trade flows, the income effects for workers (capitalists) in different industries will be more similar when labor (capital) mobility is higher, all else equal.

## APPENDIX B. CONGRESSIONAL VOTES ON TRADE LEGISLATION

The full list of trade bills included for the House and Senate and how they have been coded is given in Table A1. I selected major pieces of legislation that directly raised or lowered barriers to imports. Approximately two bills for each decade were selected, for a total of 30 altogether. I excluded product-specific legislation (e.g., the 1988 Textile and Apparel Act) on the grounds that voting decisions on such bills are less representative of preferences with regard to the trade issue in general and are also more prone to logrolling. I also

excluded bills that were unclear or controversial in nature and difficult to interpret as either protectionist or liberalizing. The 1870 and 1872 Tariff Acts and the 1883 "Mongrel Tariff," in which Republicans cut some duties in response to surplus revenues with the aim of defending protection generally, are prime examples (Taussig 1931, 178-89, 232-50). The omnibus trade legislation voted upon between 1986 and 1988, to which was attached a wide array of non-trade-related provisions, is another. I included the protectionist Trade Remedies Reform Act of 1984 rather than the omnibus Trade and Tariff Act of the same year, into which it was ultimately incorporated, since the latter contained a mixture of liberal and protectionist measures. Finally, I excluded some rare "hurrah" votes, on the 1979 Trade Agreements Act that implemented the Tokyo Round agreement, the 1988 Canada-Û.S. Free Trade Agreement, and the Senate vote on the 1974 Trade Act, on the grounds that there is almost no variation in the dependent variable.

Several other general pieces of trade legislation might have been included. The protectionist tariff bill of 1820 was excluded in favor of the more famous 1824 Tariff Act. Ratification votes on reciprocity treaties with Canada in 1854 and 1910, and the 1864 resolution to abrogate the former of these, were excluded since their impact was limited to a narrow range of imported raw materials. The 1877 Mills Resolution that the tariff should be used only for revenue purposes was excluded since 146 representatives did not cast a vote. The 1878 Wood bill to reduce duties on manufactures was more important, but it was defeated by a motion to strike out the enacting clause in the House. The ill-fated Morrison bills of 1886 were excluded in favor of the more successful, and almost identical, 1884 bill. I included only two of the numerous post-1945 votes on RTA extension bills, excluding the votes of 1948, 1949, 1951, 1953, 1954, and 1958. The 1948, 1949, and 1951 votes are somewhat ambiguous in their liberalizing character since they introduced the "peril-point" and Escape Clause provisions designed to ensure that trade treaties would do no harm to domestic industries and thus were supported by many protectionists (Pastor 1980, 96). The 1987 Gephardt Amendment to the omnibus trade bill of that year, requiring action against nations running large trade deficits with the United States, might have been included, although in political substance it approximates the 1984 Trade Remedies Reform bill that made the list. The 1993 vote to extend the president's authority to complete the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations was excluded to make way for the 1994 vote to implement the actual agreement.

TABLE A1. Selected Trade Bills						
Legislation	Coded					
Tariff Act 1824	Protectionist					
Tariff Act 1828	Protectionist					
Adams Compromise	Protectionist					
Tariff 1832	, 1010011111111111111111111111111111111					
Clay Compromise	Liberal					
Tariff 1833						
Tariff Act 1842	Protectionist					
Walker Tariff	Liberal					
Act 1846						
Tariff Act 1857	Protectionist (House)/ Liberal (Senate)					
Morrill Tariff Act 1861	Protectionist					
Tariff Act 1875	Protectionist					
Morrison Bill 1884	Protectionist (House only)					
Mills Bill 1888	Liberal (House)/					
	Protectionist (Senate)					
McKinley Tariff 1890	Protectionist					
Gorman Tariff 1894	Liberal					
Dingley Tariff 1897	Protectionist					
Payne-Aldrich Tariff 1909	Protectionist					
Underwood Tariff 1913	Liberal					
Fordney-McCumber Tariff 1922	Protectionist					
Smoot–Hawley Tariff 1930	Protectionist					
RTAA 1934	Liberal					
RTA Extension 1937	Liberal					
RTA Extension 1945	Liberal					
RTA Extension 1955	Liberal					
Trade Expansion	Liberal					
Act 1962						
Mills Bill 1970	Protectionist (House only)					
Trade Reform	Liberal (House only)					
Act 1974 McIntyre Amendment	Protectionist (Senate only)					
1974						
Trade Remedies Reform 1984	Protectionist (House only)					
Disapprove Fast-Track	Protectionist					
NAFTA 1993	Liberal					
GATT Uruguay	Liberal					
Round 1994						

Most of the coding decisions were straightforward. The "Adams Compromise" act of 1832 is coded protectionist, in accord with Taussig's (1931, 109-10) interpretation, since while it did cut revenue duties and remove the "minimums" system, it retained all of the protective duties of 1828 and was thus widely regarded as an endorsement of the "American system" of tariffs as permanent policy (Stanwood 1903, 383-86). The "Clay Compromise" of 1833, in contrast, provided for large (albeit gradual) cuts in protective duties. For the Tariff Act of 1857, I treated the House and Senate versions separately. In the House, the Campbell bill (known as the "manufacturers' bill") attempted to deal with the problem of surplus revenues by removing only duties on raw materials. In the Senate, the Democratic majority substituted Hunter's bill mandating cuts in protective duties. I also split the House and Senate bills of 1888: The Mills bill in the House proposed large tariff reductions, but the Senate revised it completely, formulating a protectionist bill that became the blueprint for the McKinley tariff of 1890.

For each bill the votes used in the analysis are those on final passage, since votes on amendments and procedural questions are more likely to be affected by idiosyncratic and strategic concerns. The source for all voting data was Rosenthal and Pool (2000).

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#### **BOOK REVIEWS**

#### **Political Theory**

Calhoun and Popular Rule: The Political Theory of the *Disquisition* and *Discourse*. By H. Lee Cheek, Jr. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001. 202p. \$29.95.

Christopher M. Duncan, University of Dayton

C. S. Lewis claimed that he was a democrat because he believed in the fall of man. He went on to suggest that it was not that some men did not deserve to be slaves, but that none deserved to be masters. While not exactly the sort of uplifting proclamation that many partisans of democracy would hope to rally their followers around, it does provide those among us who are persuaded that human beings are limited in their capacities to reject vice and sin with an avenue and persuasive rationale to join their ranks. It is with this sort of view in mind that H. Lee Cheek, Jr.'s provocative and cogently argued book on the political thought of John C. Calhoun ought to be read.

Broadly speaking, Cheek engages in two general projects in this book. The first is an attempt to get Calhoun right, i.e., to understand him as he understood himself. The second project involves answering the larger question of whether the correctly defined Calhoun was, himself, right. This work succeeds admirably both in its provision of a sustainable interpretation of Calhoun's political theory and in its argument that much of what he theorized remains pertinent and useful. To those who believe that the term "Southern Democrat" is oxymoronic when applied to a supporter of slavery, the latter assertion will no doubt seem quite problematic. Cheek manages to disarm his potential critics, however, through what some may see as a slightly disingenuous strategy of at once narrowing his focus and generalizing his questions. Hence, we are asked to read the Disquisition and the Discourse closely and in the context of the South Atlantic republican tradition, but diverted from asking what the relationship between those works and defense of the South's peculiar institution might have been.

Indeed, slavery is barely mentioned, and in a footnote we are told that it is simply "beyond the scope of this book" (n. 37, p. 92). Though others may balk at this, I think that Cheek is on target when he asserts that "defending slavery was not the touchstone of Calhoun's thought" (p. 22) and, furthermore, that it is instructive to note along with him that readers as different and far removed from Calhoun as Stokely Carmichael sought out the *Disquisition* for theoretical guidance. Still, the question of linkage does remain begged.

That having been said about what the author does not attempt, there is much to be said in favor of what he does. According to Cheek, Calhoun's larger goal was to "reconcile the need for popular rule with the ethical preconditions for its survival" (p. ix). After a perfunctory but lucid account of the existing scholarship, Cheek embarks on his constructive project in the second chapter. There we are treated to a persuasive argument that places Calhoun's thought in a direct and quasi-apostolic relationship to the Jefferson of the Kentucky Resolutions and the Madison of the Virginia Resolutions and the Report of 1800. The case is made there that "for Jefferson, Madison, and Calhoun, only the states could adequately represent the people" and that "no other assemblage, and certainly not the population en masse, could represent the needs and diversity of Americans" (p. 56). Rather than the simplistic amalgamation of Calhoun's defense of states rights with a defense of slavery that is often performed by his less thoughtful critics, Cheek portrays it as the foundation of a larger political commitment to diffused power, legislative dominance, and the overall restraint in political life that is ultimately necessary for the preservation of liberty itself. As such, Cheek can assert without flinching that "Calhoun may be called the last of the founders" (p. 79). Though perhaps something of an overstatement, those who would reject the lineage or its basis would do well to remember exactly to whom the first 10 amendments to the Constitution were meant to apply.

Where Calhoun's thought departs from his predecessors is in his significantly deeper appreciation of the obstacles and limits to human perfection contained in our very nature. What many would refer to as the burden of original sin, Calhoun calls the "law of animated existence" (p. 100). That appreciation prods Calhoun to reject both libertarian individualism and political centralization as threats in their own right to a sustainable and ordered liberty. While Cheek ignores the obvious irony, he is on firm ground when he frames Calhoun's position as one designed to thwart majority tyranny and the dangers of unrestrained and nondeliberative "momentary electoral majorities" in an effort unite "constitutional and popular rule" (p. 113). What many may find discomforting is that at least one strong logical extension of that position is the claim of Calhoun's that "to accommodate the greatest amount of liberty, individuals and states must be allowed to pursue those avenues they may deem best to promote... interests and happiness" (p. 118).

The substantive chapter on the Discourse that follows only deepens that level of discomfort for opponents of states rights by asserting straightaway that when the Discourse is read properly and in light of the Disquisition, the conclusion that "the Tenth Amendment was a guide for defining the theoretical core of the republic" (p. 151) becomes all but inescapable. Now while I believe that the author does overestimate the continuity between the Articles of Confederation and the Constitution that is both asserted and implied by such an argument, the larger vision of both his and Calhoun's retains its consistency and integrity. Simply put, that larger vision forces Calhoun's detractors to explain how liberty, popular rule, community, and constitutionalism can all flourish simultaneously without a sustained commitment to the principle of subsidiarity and the diffusion of power. Neither the author nor his subject believes that you can, and both cases are persuasive.

In sum, this is a rich and well-argued book. It not only forces its thoughtful readers into a serious reconsideration about the political thought and theory of John C. Calhoun, but, at its best, forces them to reconsider the nature, purpose, and future prospects of the American regime. If the author is correct when he claims that Calhoun attempted to "locate the restorative features of the tradition within the original purity of the document [the Constitution]" (p. 166), then we must ask those who oppose his arguments, yet share his larger goals, where they would have us look.

If You're an Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? By G. A. Cohen. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000. 233p. \$35.00 cloth, \$18.00 paper.

Gillian Brock, The University of Auckland

In this work, G. A. Cohen presents his Gifford Lectures. He explains why he no longer believes in the inevitability of equality, why he rejects liberals' faith in the sufficiency of political recipes, and why he now believes "that a change in social ethos, a change in the attitudes people sustain toward each other in the thick of daily life, is necessary for producing equality" (p. 3). Both just rules and just personal choices are required for distributive justice. Good structural design is not

enough: You cannot change the world without changing the soul, as it were. He discusses how closely this aligns him with Christian views he once utterly disparaged.

The 10 chapters of the book are (mostly) so arranged as to explain the background to why he held the key views he did and why they have changed where they have. Autobiographical detail liberally intermingles with philosophical analysis. The autobiographical portions inform the philosophical analysis in ways rarely attempted in typical works of political philosophy, and the result is astonishingly successful.

Cohen starts off outlining (rather than resolving) some paradoxes of conviction. He moves on to a wonderfully candid discussion of his Montreal communist Jewish childhood and the political, religious, and antireligious views he once held. He then turns to discuss how classical Marxism was in the grip of the "obstetric conception of political practice" (p. 43) and why this dangerous idea should be rejected. If you hold the obstetric conception, you are more inclined to believe that solutions will simply appear and you do not expect to have to encounter hard choices in a way that responsible politics must. Moreover, obstetricism "appears to justify a criminal inattention to what one is trying to achieve, to the problem of socialist design" (p. 77). Cohen argues that recipes are essential not only so that it is clear what those in power are to do with power, but also so that the masses might have some reason to give them that power. So, rather than holding the obstetric view "according to which the baby is what the baby is, not what the midwife designs it to be" (p. 77), we should, at the very least, switch (and possibly mangle) metaphors, so that if we do not like the hot kitchen we are in, we start writing "recipes for future kitchens"

After an examination of Marx's view that religion is the opiate of the people, Cohen explains why equality is no longer inevitable. Marx believed that since the working class constituted the majority, produced the wealth, yet were exploited and needy, they would have nothing to lose from revolting. Cohen argues that this view is no longer sustainable because there is now no group within society of which all these features are true: There is no group on which society depends for production, that is exploited, constitutes a majority, and is in dire need. Furthermore, he is skeptical about creating proletarian solidarity across countries.

Equality is not inevitable, but we have ample reason to demand it, so the move to normative political philosophy is a wise one for a Marxist to make. There follows his engagement with leading American political philosophers, especially the work of John Rawls. He presses several criticisms of Rawls. It is important to note that he disagrees with Rawls on just how much inequality can be justified by the difference principle, and he takes issue with Rawls's view that the difference principle applies to the basic structure of society (which typically is taken to consist in society's major coercive social institutions). Cohen argues that there is no defensible account of what the basic structure is, such that principles which apply to it do not also apply to choices made within it. Rawls believes that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of justice because its effects are so profound and pervasive. Cohen argues that if these are the relevant grounds for identifying the primary subject of justice, the major coercive social institutions cannot be our only focus, as the example of the family makes clear. The major reason for caring about the basic structure that Rawls offers is also a reason for caring about the informal structure and personal choice within society. Moreover, there is ample scope for personal justice or injustice within a just structure. Securing distributive justice by purely structural means is impossible. A society committed to the difference principle would still need "an ethos which informs choice within just rules" (p. 132).

Finally, Cohen turns to the issue of whether rich (professed) egalitarians can really answer the question "If you're an egalitarian, how come you're so rich?" in any defensible ways, given the widespread inequality in the world today. He examines a number of justifications an egalitarian might offer for not giving away much personal wealth: giving wouldn't remove inequality of power or reduce division between people, giving would merely be a drop in the ocean, giving is a duty of the state not individuals, giving could disadvantage one's children relative to one's peers, and giving would involve a sharp reduction in standard of living, which would induce a strong sense of deprivation. His aim in the final chapter is simply to assemble reasons, and although he believes some reasons are good ones (for instance, something like the last two listed), he doesn't weigh up just how plausible on balance we should find these.

In this excellent book, Cohen has combined fascinating autobiography with rigorous theoretical analysis, often drawing on the details of his past to explain the importance of key shifts in his theoretical views. The result is a work that is both immensely enjoyable to read and a sophisticated contribution to Marxist theory, egalitarianism, and debates about what political philosophy should entail for personal behavior. In particular, his discussion on this last issue constitutes pioneering work in an area not yet claiming many political philosophers' attention (professionally, at any rate).

The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict By Elizabeth Frazer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 279p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Barbara Arneil, University of British Columbia

This book begins where The Politics of Community (1993), Elizabeth Frazer's previous book (coauthored with Nicola Lacey) left off. Having laid the groundwork for the analytical problems within both liberal and communitarian thought and proposed a new type of feminist communitarianism in the first book, Frazer turns her penetrating analytical mind in this book to considering in greater depth the nature of both communitarianism and community. Ironically, having spent so much time analyzing the community, Frazer's recommendation at the end of this book is to dispense with the term in many contexts in favor of a series of interlinked concepts such as family, locality, association, and group.

Frazer begins by distinguishing three types of communitarian thought: vernacular, political, and philosophical. The first of these gets little attention in the remainder of the book and Frazer is explicitly concerned with the work of political communitarian thought in the works of Henry Tam and Amitai Etzioni as well as the political platforms of Tony Blair and Bill Clinton. The analysis of these two very distinct threads of thought within the communitarian tradition is both illuminating and thorough. The central problem for communitarian analysis from Frazer's point of view is the vague meaning of "community" that lies at the heart of both types of communitarianism but is left strangely underanalyzed in either body of thought.

Frazer devotes a preliminary chapter to analyzing the concept of "community" and then uses this analysis to anchor the subsequent chapters on family, locality, and the larger political society. She is informed by social theory as well as political literature in this quest and she does an admirable job of pinning down what exactly the community is from a number of theoretical vantage points. While community,

as it is characterized in both strains of communitarian thought, is fundamentally enmeshed in social relations, Frazer rightly concludes that it is its transcendent character that distinguishes the community from what might otherwise be called an association. And it is this capacity to transcend, coupled with the shared values and boundaries implied, that creates problems for democratic politics according to Frazer, for a number of reasons that she develops in succeeding chapters.

Before she turns to look at the family, locality, and political society more broadly, Frazer turns her attention to the connection between interpretivism and social constructionism in communitarian thought. She concludes that communities necessarily play a role in the grounding of interpretations, but cannot be a solution to adjudicating the resolution of differing interpretations. She argues that social constructionism is useful to the extent that it is clear about "the mechanisms and processes the communitarians hypothesize" (p. 131). Frazer again draws together a disparate number of sources to provide a rigorous account of what the exact social constructs in building a community are. Within communitarian social constructivist thought however, Frazer acknowledges a tension. Ultimately, if the community is a social construction, it may be altered. As such, social constructionism often leads to the questioning, indeed dismantling, of previous social constructs (p. 138). This strain between a transcendent, bounded, and organic community and the shifting, fluid nature of politics is an underlying theme of Frazer's analysis.

Frazer explores this theoretical tension by disaggregating the "community" into locality, family, and political society, in three separate chapters. In all three cases she argues that the use of "community" as a theoretical category has perverse effects. In essence, community as it is conceptualized in communitarian thought creates a politics of boundaries. The metaphor she has in mind is a series of nested boxes; the family, the place, and the nation-state are all bounded communities, each conceived to fit nicely into the next and building community at each stage. Frazer rightly points out that the nature of identity and democratic politics moves toward the disruption of such boundaries. "A preferable conception of democratic politics emphasizes the unsettlement of boundaries" (p. 7). And the "community" as it is currently understood cannot "capture the range of social relations and conflicts that make up these organizations, institutions and agglomerations" (p. 191). According to Frazer, the preferable metaphor would be that of a network, which would better encompass the tension between the unity and the conflict in her title. A question immediately arises as to the implications of losing the concept of community and the boundaries and membership that go with it. Without hard boundaries circumscribing a community and a clear notion of its membership, how does one ensure the standard bearers of democratic theory practice: accountability, representative institutions, and transparent authority?

Ultimately, not only has Frazer made an important contribution to communitarian theory (both political and philosophical variants) by forcing its proponents to take more seriously the concept of community and how it is to be reconciled with the principles of democracy, identity politics, and social constructivism, but she has contributed to all those other bodies of literature that have, hitherto, used an undertheorized notion of community: from communitarian feminism to criminal justice reform to support of expanded local governments. The analysis is rigorous and methodical, the organization clear, and the writing lucid. This book would be a useful contribution for anyone interested in liberalism or communitarianism, in both theory and practice.

Millenarianism and Messianism in Early Modern European Culture Vols. 1–4. Edited by Matt Goldish, Richard H. Popkin, James E. Force, Karl A. Kottman, and John Christian Laursen. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. 784p. \$253.00.

Adam B. Seligman, Boston University

All societies contain some image or vision of their own perfection—of life, both individual and collective, free of the burdens of history and death. In the history of civilizations, these visions have often served as a fulcrum of radical change and social transformation. Just as often, they have served as the ideological underpinnings of more abortive movements of social change. Moreover, in the lives of individuals and groups, they have often led to a renunciation of the world and its concerns in search of a more private wholeness, in a life of contemplation and retreat.

While some image of human perfection, free of suffering and death, has characterized all human societies, the notion of a perfect social order, posited over and against the chaos and mutability of human history, is more intimately related to what Max Weber defined as those universal problems of meaning addressed by theodicies: that is, the promise of salvational religions to overcome the inherent finiteness of human existence, the problems posed by the discrepancy between fate and merit, and the perfection of the transcendent order in contradistinction to the imperfection of reality. The positing of a harmonious social order characterized by the full satisfaction of human wants, peace, equality, and the absence of discretionary authority—which has been identified with different strands of utopian and messianic thought-is thus rooted in the selfsame dynamic that gave rise to salvational religions. There thus would seem to be some innate connection between millennial speculation as a mode of thought and social action and the vision of salvation held out by the different world-historical religions.

The Western tradition of millennial thought and action was rooted in both early Hellenistic images of the perfect city or a perfect past, as illustrated in Hesiod's Works and Days, and in the particular religious visions of both Judaism and early Christianity, with their stress on an otherworldly future, an Endzeit of absolute perfection still to be experienced. To these must be added the speculation of the early Church Fathers and Christian philosophers on the prelapsarian state of nature. The early Christian communities, of course, lived in an intense expectation of the Second Coming and the End of Days, which, until the third and fourth centuries, retained their "this-worldly" character. The linear temporality of Christianity in positing an end to historical time, posited also the ultimate reunion of historical and sacred dimensions of time through its eschatological notions. This perspective, bearing as it does on the millennial element of Christian belief, was, however, through its very nature, a centrifugal, antinomian force, working against the concrete needs of institution building as perceived by many of the early Church fathers, in both the ante-Nicene and post-Nicene periods. Indeed, this centrifugal tendency was manifest in the reigns of Constantine and Theodosius, when an apocalyptic separatism led many groups of Christians beyond the boundaries of a Church tainted by its compromise with secular authority. Its potentially disruptive force was fought by none as strongly as St. Augustine, who in his writings, especially in City of God and the Confessions, laid out a different temporal schema, which, while maintaining the linear structure of sacred time, removed its end from any possible embedment in the mundane sphere of secular historical processes. In its stead, he posited the "ends of time" beyond time proper and beyond

history, thus separating salvation from society and history from eschatology. In temporal terms, the separation of the civitas terrena and civitas Dei effected an ultimate disjunction of sacred and mundane times and "histories," by declaring events in the saeculum irrelevant to the schema of salvation.

The disembedment of sacred time, and so of the eschatological moment from mundane historical referents, dictated, however, the necessity of positing a new realm where people and especially Christians could orient their lives to the fount of the sacred. On the most general level, this was achieved through the ministrations of the Church. More concretely, the realization of salvation was achieved in the sacraments, which provided that arena in which the communicant could establish contact with the sacred dimension of existence. The sacraments thus became that arena where sacred and profane met and salvation was attained, in contrast to its previously imminent perceived realization at the end of historical time.

Such a "solution" to the eschatological orientations of Christian belief was, of course, incomplete, and many alternative visions appeared over the millennia of Christian history, from lay reform movements such as the Devotio Moderna, to Neoplatonic mysticism, to the folk traditions of the Land of Cockaigne and the rituals of carnival. The most salient expression of alternative visions was in the different millennial movements of the Middle Ages, which broke at the same time with the sacramental doctrines of the Catholic Church and with its institutional structures. By propounding a thisworldly millennialism, one seen to take place within mundane history, they effectively broke down the institutional constraints that had, within the Catholic Church, bounded millennialism to otherworldly interpretations and pursuits. Thus, in many medieval millennial movements, such as the Waldensians and later the Taborites, there developed, concurrently with a break with the sacramental doctrine of the Church, the positing of new boundaries of collective membership, that is, of the salvational collective, as well as new principles and structures of authority.

The early modern period—that covered by these four volumes-experienced an outburst of millennial expectations and millennial-inspired action across Europe. And while much has been written on the Protestant aspects of this millennial outburst, these collected volumes illustrate just how endemic millennial speculation was, not only among the different Protestant sects but also among Catholics and Jews as well. The themes of the volumes run from Jewish Messianism in the Early Modern World (Vol. 1), to Catholic Millenarianism from Savonarola to the Abbe Gregoire (Vol. 2), to The Millenarian Turn: Millenarian Contexts of Science, Politics and Everyday Anglo-American Life in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries (Vol. 3) to Continental Millenarians: Protestants, Catholics, Heretics (Vol. 4). All the chapters were presented as papers at a series of conferences organized by Richard Popkin. Popkin is perhaps best known in the scholarly world for his The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, which was first published in 1964 and attained the status of a classic. For the last twenty years or so, however, he has concentrated most of his efforts on the study of millennial groups and thinkers, contributing significantly to the vast scholarly literature devoted to this subject. The current volumes include chapters by some of the best-known scholars working in the history of millennial thought, dealing with personages and themes both known and more esoteric. The vast majority of the contributions are of historical focus and deal with either small groups of virtuosos or exceptional thinkers within the different religious communities. Much less attention is paid to sociological factors, to issues of group dynamics, and to the broader societal implications of millennial speculation in the periods under consideration. One has the sense that the conferences were very much of historians and scholars working in the field of the history of ideas and much less with the intersection of these ideas with broader social processes (such as the emigration to New England in the 1630s, for example).

There are exceptions to this characterization, most often in the first volume, dealing with Jewish millennial speculation. Fascinating in this volume is the focus not only on intra-Jewish debates, but on the relation of Jewish millennial speculation with Christian developments. Different groups of Sabbatian thinkers are discussed in different chapters, but so are the millennial traditions of certain "converso" groups. Quite a few of the chapters deal with individuals who, in one way or another, bridged the Jewish and Christian worlds—either Christians following Jewish messianic speculation or Jewish converts to Christianity engaged in calculating the Second Coming of Christ. Richard Popkin's own chapter on "Christian Interest and Concerns about Sabbatai Zevi" forms a lynchpin of those essays dealing with joint Christian-Jewish speculation on the immanence of the millennium.

The second volume, on Catholic millenarianism, is, perhaps not surprisingly, the shortest. It opens with a masterful essay by Bernard McGinn, one of the leading scholars of millennialism, giving an overview of Catholic millennial speculation—arguably the least studied of the millennial phenomenon (for reasons made clear in the beginning of this review). This is followed by another intriguing essay by Popkin on Savonarola's thought, which in fact connects Savonarola's millennial speculations to his critique of philosophy. In this volume, too, the Jewish-Christian nexus of millennial thought plays a strong role, not least in the case of the French revolutionary priest Abbé Gregoire, for whom the emancipation of the Jews was part of a millennial scenario.

The third volume deals with more generally familiar themes in millennial studies: the thought of Joseph Mede, Issac Newton, Robert Boyle, Joseph Priestly, and others, and the millennial rhetoric and tropes of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Britain. As in the other volumes, the emphasis is on relatively circumscribed case studies of historical figures, rather than on a political or sociological analysis of broad social movements.

The final volume returns from the Anglo-American context to millennial speculation on the Continent, with essays on Dutch millenarianism; studies of the Frenchmen Issac Le Peyrere, Pierre Jurieu, and Pierre Bayle; of German Pietism, Rosicrucianism, and of the fascinating link between Arian and millennial heresies. A major figure in the latter was Miguel Servetus, who—as readers of Popkin's early work know—was burned as a heretic in Calvin's Geneva and for whom Sebastian Castellio offered a spirited defense predicated on a skeptical consciousness, that the very nature of a Deus abscondidus makes it impossible to go so far as to burn someone as a heretic since we cannot, ultimately, be certain of our own knowledge.

The chapters are all written for cognoscenti; they are not introductory texts, nor do they provide sufficient context for those not already knowledgeable about the issues studied. However, for those students and scholars already committed to the study of millennial voices, these volumes will open new vistas. Perhaps their most important contribution, which is much inspired by Popkin's own work, is in the study of those individuals and groups who bridged religious communities and social universes. Indeed, with the focus in so many chapters on the shared cognitive universe of millennial speculation (across religious boundaries), an important new dimension is opened in our understanding of early modern mentalities, at least among a fascinating and interconnected group of global (or at least trans-Atlantic and inter-European) elites.

Environmentalism Unbound: Exploring New Pathways for Change By Robert Gottlieb. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2001. 408p. \$29.95.

David Schlosberg, Northern Arizona University

The key argument of Robert Gottlieb's Environmentalism Unbound is that an integrated focus on pollution prevention and environmental justice can lay the groundwork for fundamental environmental and social change (p. xiii). The aim is to develop a common vision and a more "embracing language" for environmentalism that is more broadly appealing than a mainstream focus on nature and species and more broadly applicable to a range of environmental and social issues. Such an expanded environmental discourse—integrating the workplace, the social, and the ecological-would make for an unbounded and more successful environmentalism. This is another wonderful offering by Gottlieb, right up there with his Forcing the Spring (1993). The recognition of diverse discourses of environmentalism and social justice is a challenge to movement strategies, and Gottlieb takes on the issue with a focus on both a broad vision and everyday practice.

The opening chapters, laying out the historical boundaries of the environmental movement and the possibilities of moving beyond those boundaries with reference to pollution prevention and environmental justice, provide a thorough and well-argued framework for the cases that follow. Gottlieb's examination of the development of the environmental justice movement goes beyond the standard fare. He delves into the internal politics and definitional conflicts in the movement, and focuses on issues such as land use, brownfields redevelopment, and transportation. And in attempting to forge a larger discursive community across different parts of the environmental movement, Gottlieb demonstrates how a mainstream concern with air quality, for example, can also be articulated from the point of view of environmental justice by focusing on diesel fumes, children's health, and the transit needs of poorer communities. Such expanded discourse, he argues, can lead to a more inclusive and challenging environmentalism.

'Clean production" is the place where pollution prevention and environmental justice can come together, and Gottlieb looks at three industries—dry cleaning, janitorial, and food production/distribution—with an eye toward his proposed common vision. One key question for Gottlieb is how to overcome the worker/community divide. In response, his case studies attempt to get at community support for a change in environmental practice, for example, Korean community development agencies' support for the transition to less toxic dry-cleaning processes. But while the stories and descriptions of the case studies are thorough in and of themselves, Gottlieb is not always successful in his aim of thoroughly tying together the discourses of pollution prevention and environmental justice. In the dry-cleaning example Gottlieb offers an excellent discussion of how industry and regulatory agencies are slow to come around to a viable, front-end alternative to the toxic emissions of the conventional dry-cleaning process and gives insight into the problematic regulatory process with regard to chemicals (a focus on the tail end rather than prevention and the bias toward industry-sponsored and -supported initiatives). While Gottlieb then demonstrates the possible role of community organizations in convincing cleaners to retool with nontoxic processes, the broader link to the discourse of environmental justice is weak. More discussion of the principles of environmental justice, including, for example, demands for the cessation of the production of toxins and the right of all workers to a safe and healthy work environment, would have helped strengthen the pollution prevention/ environmental justice link. In the case study of janitorial

work and workers, the discussion is, again, comprehensive, well researched, and thoroughly documented, but there is not much of a link made—or a "common vision" laid out—across the various issues and discourses brought up in the chapter. Gottlieb wants us to see how the disparate discourses existing around environmental issues, labor conditions, and community-based job creation can be brought into a broad and linked environmental social movement. While the vision is clear, the case studies seem to prove the difficulty more than the promise of such a move.

That is, until Gottlieb gets into two chapters on the politics of food production. The links among community needs, pollution prevention, and environmental justice are much more directly and clearly made here. Pesticide concerns are linked to nonpoint pollution, which is linked to farmworker health, which is linked to sustainable agriculture, and all relate to both health and elimination of hunger. The reaction to the USDA proposed rules on organics is a wonderful example of an issue where the potential for broad coalitions has been awakened. In response to Agriculture's attempt to certify the use of sewage sludge, genetic engineering, and food irradiation as "organic," organic farmers and consumers teamed up with environmental advocates and pesticide critics (among others) who had been arguing for sustainable food production. Again, the food chapters are wonderfully rich and well documented, with not just coverage of the last 30 years of the organic agriculture movement, but discussion of depressionera relief gardens, wartime victory gardens, community gardens, school gardens, market gardens, and farmers markets. In addition to this thorough approach, Gottlieb here demonstrates the potential discursive links among different audiences concerned with the current food production regime. One only has to be a regular visitor to a farmers market (a description of which opens the book) to understand the potential "embracing language" that sustainably produced food can have. Farmers markets link urban justice to sustainability through an alternative mode of food distribution and encompass a response to a variety of environmental, social, labor, and market issues (and are also attractive across the political spectrum).

But even here, the notion of a unified, yet unbound, environmentalism is incomplete. While links are made discursively, and food issues may bring together members of diverse discursive communities, no social coalition has been formed that encompasses all of the food issues Gottlieb addresses. There are numerous groups and efforts surrounding a critique of the current food regime, but as Gottlieb notes, the effect is still less than the sum of its parts (p. 271).

Gottlieb identifies the project of Environmentalism Unbound as an outline of the possibilities for reenvisioning institutions and systems, including challenges to structures of power that maintain current systems and discourses; his case studies offer "snapshots of these possibilities for reenvisioning" (p. 275). But in offering a visionary, yet pragmatic, discussion of the emerging discourse and obstacles faced, Gottlieb is still not convincing that disparate parts of a movementits various concerns and values—can be brought into a single discursive project, which was the hope at the start. Environmentalism's biggest challenge, he concludes, is in providing a singular "totalizing vision" (in Hilary Wainwright's terms). Maybe that focus on a single vision is itself the problem, however. An environmentalism unbound may be a collection of visions with multiple points of linkage, which comes together on particular issues yet eschews the singularity of one common vision. That type of environmentalism is in evidence in numerous recent protests regarding globalization, and certainly abounds in the farmers markets Gottlieb celebrates.

**De-Facing Power** By Clarissa Rile Hayward. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 224p. \$54.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

P. E. Digeser, University of California, Santa Barbara

Clarissa Rile Hayward's book begins with the provocative claim that focusing on the relationship between the powerful and the powerless is not the best way to study power. Traditional theories of power have concentrated on the question of what it means for A to have power over B. By seeking to discern who possesses it and how their possession diminishes the freedom of others, researchers have tended to put a face on power. In contrast, Hayward "de-faces" power by arguing that it need not entail a relationship between A's and B's but can be understood entirely in terms of how the field of action of both the powerful and the powerless is defined.

Drawing on the poststructural work of Michel Foucault, Hayward advocates seeing power as a set of social boundaries that can both constrain and enable action. These boundaries include laws, rules, norms, conventions, practices, and institutional arrangements. They create a space for action, define what constitutes knowledge, establish the urgency of problems, legitimize the forms of discipline, and generate a set of identities. Like Foucault, Hayward argues that we can never escape such power relations. However, unlike Foucault, Hayward emphasizes the fact that we are differently situated vis-à-vis these boundaries and that these differences have an ethical import. Some of us have the resources and the opportunities to reflect upon and seek to transform the norms that govern our conduct and some do not.

By drawing on the discourse theory of Jürgen Habermas, Hayward endorses the normative claim that those who are affected by a rule or practice should have a say in its creation. The capacity to shape and not escape the boundaries that define our fields of action is what Hayward calls political freedom. Those who lack the resources to rethink and reformulate the norms that govern their lives lack political freedom and suffer from domination. Domination, however, is not a matter of A's pushing around B's (although this certainly occurs) but entails the existence of asymmetries in political freedom. In emphasizing the ways in which power affects all parties, Hayward argues that there is no space for negative freedom if such freedom means acting outside social constraints. Hayward wants to deface (as in disfigure) the traditional portraits of power that emphasize a relationship between the powerful and the powerless and a realm of negative freedom that exists beyond power.

The beginning and end of the book engage in some quite refined theoretical work, while the middle chapters illustrate the research implications of defacing power by offering two case studies in education. Using the method of participant observation, Hayward seeks to explore (as opposed to explain) the ways in which power operates in two very different fourthgrade classrooms. One is in a very affluent suburb and the other is in a poor, inner-city district. By understanding power as "a network of boundaries that delimit, for all, the field of what is socially possible" (p. 3), Hayward uses these case studies to show how power constrains and enables teachers and students in both classrooms.

Hayward is well aware of the limitations and advantages of her chosen approach. She presents her conclusions in a very measured form as trying to elicit some hypotheses about how constraints shape teaching. Hayward's analysis, however, would be strengthened by talking more about the advantages and disadvantages of using classrooms (as opposed to other arenas) and fourth graders (as opposed to older or younger students) for studying power. Hayward is also aware that her own democratic/participatory response to asymmetric

power relations entails norms that are neither natural nor universally shared. She acknowledges that these norms would "discourage a range of possible ways of ordering social life, including those supported by many religious and other traditional views" (p. 176). But the range of those excluded by Hayward's democratic alternative extends beyond the believers in divine commands and natural hierarchies. It also excludes the shy and the inarticulate. A universal call to politicize all social norms will appear burdensome, if not oppressive, to those who prefer a quiet private life to the hubbub of the political or those who seek to explore and exploit, as opposed to question and legitimize, the norms they have inherited. Whether Hayward's argument is open to these criticisms depends on how one understands political freedom. On the one hand, Hayward may be claiming that political freedom exists when the opportunity exists to call into question the norms that govern one's life, even if one decides not to act on that opportunity. Acting on one's political freedom need not be a norm for everyone, although the opportunity to act should be open to all. On the other hand, Hayward may be making the stronger claim that freedom can be found only in critically thinking about and collectively acting on our capacities to establish social norms. The opportunity to exercise political freedom is not sufficient and so those who prefer not to participate in norm formation are not free. On this reading, the position is open to the risk that, by forcing reticent people to participate, they can be forced to be free.

Hayward's discussion of defacing power is most successful in attacking visions of negative freedom that require complete independence of all norms and conventions, or what Richard Flathman calls unsituated negative freedom. Rejecting unsituated negative freedom, however, does not entail accepting political freedom as the only or the most important form of freedom. As Hayward notes, Flathman's situated negative freedom acknowledges the necessity of social norms and conventions. However, the project of defacing power would seem to leave situated negative freedom intact, and calling into question conventions, norms, and institutions could be an exercise of this form of negative freedom. Nevertheless, these comments regarding Hayward's discussion of freedom do not diminish the compelling nature of her analysis of contemporary disputes over power or of her exploration of defacing power. Hayward provides an important contribution to the problem of how to study the power of norms and institutional structures.

Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market: Beyond Commercial Modelling By Russell Keat. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 224p. \$69.95.

Peter Lindsay, Georgia State University

With respect to markets, the twentieth century closed with a great deal more ebullience than it opened. Not that 1900 was a watershed in antimarket thinking—that was still to come. No, the contrast between *fins de siecle* is striking because whatever criticisms markets had to endure during the final century of the millennium seemed to have all but vanished by its close.

The problem of our ebullience is that it renders any difficulties we may have with markets increasingly awkward to express. How, for instance, might those in academic, scientific, and cultural enterprises respond to being left to the iron hand of market discipline? What counts as a good reason *not* to conform to the same pressures as felt in the "real world"? If consumers will not support a given activity with dollar votes, then what possible defense, short of elitist pleas, can haute culture muster? These are precisely the sorts of difficult

questions addressed in Russell Keat's Cultural Goods and the Limits of the Market. If anything, then, the book is timely. It is, fortunately, also quite good.

Keat's general claim is not that the market is bereft of appeal, but simply that there are "certain kinds of social activities and institutions which are appropriately governed by the market and others that are not" (p. 3). To illustrate the latter sort of activity/institution, Keat draws on Alisdair MacIntyre's conception of 'practices,' or (in MacIntyre's words) "socially established cooperative activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to...that form of activity" (p. 22). (Obvious examples are dance, chess, sports, and scientific research.) The claim here is that practices give expression to different sources of well-being than the market does. Hence societies that allow the market to, in Habermas' parlance, 'colonize' all social life (these practices, in particular) do so at their own peril.

Keat's account of the market's shortcomings is fairly familiar. First, he reminds us that at best the market only satisfies existing preferences (and often it does not even accomplish this), while doing little for "the kinds of critical or reflective processes upon which, ideally, individuals might wish to base their judgements of what is valuable to them" (p. 46). Second, he examines, and, in a chapter devoted to the issue, questions the extent to which consumption and well-being are positively correlated. Finally, he notes that many of the things we value (family, friends, commitments) have little bearing on the market.

Fortunately, where the market falls short, practices can, if preserved, provide relief. For instance, "people's ability to develop their own sense of what is valuable . . . will be enhanced by their access to cultural practices in which the tensions and conflicts between various conceptions of the good . . . are thematized and explored in both discursive and non-discursive forms" (p. 47). The key to this argument lies in the distinguishing feature of practices—namely, their rejection of "want-regarding" value in favor of "ideal-regarding" value. Practices have internally generated standards of excellence (such as the arc of a diver or the laboratory technique of a scientist) that are at least conceptually distinct from (although too often actually sullied by) the tastes of nonauthoritative consumers. As such, they offer intrinsic rewards ("internal goods") quite apart from whatever else (honor, pride, power, money) might come the way of the practitioner.

The problem, however, is that because such rewards are independent of a practice's ability to stay afloat financially, it can have only a contingent chance for success in a market-dominated society (i.e., in a society where rewards and financial return are indistinct). If forced to conform to market rules of survival, many practices would simply cease to exist. Moreover, because such a society would view success through a market framework, any pleas to spare the practice would likely fall on deaf ears. The task, as Keat sees it, is thus to promote spaces for practices, either as supplements to markets or through the infusion into markets of the "practice-like characteristic of productive activities" (Chapter 6).

The strength of Keat's argument is derived largely from his success at articulating the appeal of practices (for both producers and consumers). To the already converted, such articulation offers reassuring confirmation of what might be only intuitively understood. To the rest, it serves a more vital role of helping to broaden the support base for practices.

As we have seen, however, articulating appeal will not take either camp past the lament, "Yeah, sounds great, too bad the market won't support it." Hence, Keat needs also to show why practices are not just a desirable, but a just supplement

to the market, a task he saves for the final chapter. The argument there turns on the distinction between ends and means. The virtue of markets, according to their nonlibertarian "classical" defenders, lies in their ability to generate "the kinds of human goods that contribute to people's material well-being." But, he goes on, "Suppose one can show that...the market does not always succeed in contributing maximally to everyone's well-being?" (p. 150). As he has shown precisely that throughout much of the book, he is able to conclude that the limits to the market can be established by the very arguments that offer it its greatest support. Thus the "bottom line" gives way to well-being, as the argument for market discipline is trumped by an argument of a higher calling. That the market cannot support a productive enterprise turns out to have little bearing on the more vital question of whether a good society should support it.

The argument has great force, in large part because Keat presents it with clear and coherent language. There are, however, a few problems here that should not go unmentioned, problems owing to the fact that this is not so much a book as a collection of essays on a theme. As such, and because Keat has made little effort to adapt the essays into a single cohesive argument, much gets repeated. (Twice we read MacIntyre's verbatim definition of practices [pp. 22, 82], as we do his verbatim definition of institutions [pp. 24, 122–23].) In and of itself, repetition is not always such a bad thing, but where it adds little in the way of clarity, it serves only as a needless annoyance.

The more pronounced difficulty with the essays-on-atheme approach involves the layering-on of supportive but ultimately distracting arguments. Many of the chapters offer refinements of a number of other theorists, among them Mark Sagoff (Chapter 3), Michael Walzer (Chapter 4), and Robert Lane (Chapter 7). I say refinements because, with all his interlocutors, Keat is in general sympathy, looking only to offer fairly subtle critiques and distinctions. The trouble is that much of the force of his overall argument can too easily get lost in what sometimes amounts to little more than nitpicking.

Such problems are unfortunate, but they should not obscure the value of Keat's contribution. His plea for perspective on markets offers a much needed reminder of arguments that—to continue the earlier historical comparison—have not had great currency since the days of T. H. Green, L. T. Hobhouse, and R. H. Tawney. It is especially refreshing to see these arguments reintroduced in the social and intellectual context of a very different time.

Faith, Reason, and Political Life Today Edited by Peter Augustine Lawler and Dale McConkey. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 272p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.00 paper.

Lief H. Carter, Colorado College

These 14 essays range as far and wide as the sprawling title of this collection implies. The papers originated at a 1999 interdisciplinary conference at Berry College on politics, religion, and community. Most of the authors teach at Southern colleges. They come not only from political science and government departments but also from philosophy, English, sociology, religion, and theology departments. Twelve of the 14 are male. On first glance the collection might appear to be "traditional." Indeed, many of the essays, e.g., Daniel Mahoney's treatment of Solzhenitsyn on "Repentance and Self-Limitation in the Life of Nations," explicitly raise religious themes and questions.

However, as the editors freely admit in the introduction, these essays are diverse and comprehensive rather than thematically tight. They are not traditional. The postmodern condition, which frees us from the obligation to honor ruling disciplinary canons, allows these authors to write about whatever strikes their fancies. Michelle Brady writes of "Autonomy and Community in Aristotle," while James Pontuso writes about Trevanian's "Perfect Postmodern Tale," the 1979 novel *Shibumi*. Paul Cantor's essay (see below) includes this line: "Who know what happens when you tickle a Klingon?" (p. 30). This fancy-driven diversity makes the collection a surprisingly good read.

An excerpt, chosen almost at random, from the index suggests the scope of this book's diversity. In the middle of the "Gs" we find in order, with no omissions, these six entries: Gilligan's Island; Girard, Rene; God; Goethe; Goldberg, Whoopie; Gore, Al. (God gets by far the most page references here, but the index as a whole gives roughly as many references to Hegel and to Heidegger as it does to Christianity and to Augustine.) The editors' arrangement of the essays also belies any unifying theme. The book might have sequenced together essays by Gregory Johnson and Henry Edmondson III featuring Flannery O'Connor or placed together essays by Paul Cantor and Diana Schaub, both of which draw on political themes in Star Trek. But the first 10 of the 14 essays appear to be listed alphabetically by author. Johnson and Cantor belong in the first 10, while Edmondson and Schaub appear, out of alphabetical order, among the final four.

While no single subject matter unifies these essays, a plurality of them explicitly takes up the "end of history" theme. In doing so they raise nice questions about the shape of global governance mechanisms. Indeed, normative and religious questions, according to these authors, inevitably arise because popular democracy is clearly not itself a viable model for global governance. Joseph Knippenberg's essay on Leo Strauss and the end of history raises these questions most directly. A second, and perhaps counterintuitive, theme is that many of these authors embrace postmodernism. Editor Peter Lawler's "End of History 2000" touches on themes raised more fully in his recent book, Postmodernism Rightly Understood (1999). Both Lawler, who links Thomism and postmodernism, and Pontuso's working of Shibumi give Rorty his full and fair due. Ashley Woodiwiss writes of "A Postmodern Augustinian Recovery of Political Judgment." Marc Guerra analyzes "Christianity's Epicurean Temptation."

A few essays get overly dense. Tom Darby's "On Spiritual Crisis, Globalization, and Planetary Rule" tries to answer the question, "So who has the right to rule the planet?" (p. 60). His answer tries to link Alexandre Kojeve, Leo Strauss, Carl Schmitt, and Martin Heidegger, not to mention Bacon, Nietzsche, Aristotle, and Christ. In doing so he puts too many academic balls in the air to juggle successfully. Most of the time, however, the writing and editing are remarkably concise. They display little tendentiousness. Mining this book almost at random can extract many nuggets. For this reviewer, most of the nuggets consisted of discovering new minds: Kojeve and Trevanian, already mentioned, and Paul Seaton's discussion of the work of Pierre Manent. Just within the last year, I discovered Rene Girard and, thus, particularly appreciated Stephen Gardner's "Tocqueville, Girard, and the Mystique of Anti-Modernism." Readers who don't know Flannery O'Connor's short story "Revelation" may find Johnson's juxtaposition of this Southern "Christian" with Walker Percy's analysis of stoicism in Southern culture especially satisfying.

Beyond the specific nuggets, this collection yields at least three less tangible satisfactions. First, these essayists, like most of the rest of us most of the time, are not academic superstars. We do not have here the academic equivalent of a West End theatrical triumph. These essays instead give the satisfaction of seeing your hometown theater company tackle a series of major plays, doing the material inventively and doing themselves proud in the process. Second, whether or not these authors are relatively young, the collection does describe interesting new directions that liberated and pluralistic scholarship can take. Finally, for those of us of a certain age who find it harder to communicate political wisdom to students who are increasingly disengaged, cynical, and/or merely "local" rather than "cosmopolitan," it helps to learn some new teaching materials from the more playful and fanciful of these essays. I think I'll try Diana Schaub's "Captain Kirk and the Art of Rule" on some undergraduates this year.

Individual essays in the collection may resonate deeply with readers' own academic projects, but for most of us this is more a browsing book for professors than a collection to assign en masse to a graduate seminar. There are many good reads here. Indeed some of them may read better precisely because they help us sharpen our own positions in contrast to those of the authors.

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn: The Ascent from Ideology By Daniel J. Mahoney. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 200p. \$65.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Peter Augustine Lawler, Berry College

This very remarkable and most timely book differs from others on Solzhenitsyn by highlighting his "critique of ideology" and his "recovery of the 'natural world" (p. 3). Ideology, for Solzhenitsyn, is the name for the lie characteristic of the twentieth century: Human beings, through historical transformation, can end suffering and so make virtue or the distinction between good and evil superfluous. The state and God can wither away because we will no longer be political and spiritual beings. We know that ideology could not change human nature or what Daniel Mahoney calls "the ontological structure of the world," but it could magnify human evil to genuinely monstrous dimensions. Solzhenitsyn's contention that communist ideology was responsible for the murder of tens of millions has become much less controversial in recent years. The Black Book of Communism, Mahoney shows, provides abundant evidence for what Solzhenitsyn already knew.

Solzhenitsyn presents numerous examples of courageous, personal resistance to the lie of ideology as evidence that the natural world exists. The natural or real world of human beings is where conscience cannot be exterminated, where we cannot help but distinguish between good and evil. The truth is, Solzhenitsyn said, that human beings are born to die, and so they are not meant only to be happy. They cannot live well unless they have a clear and calm view of death, and they must be willing to risk their lives to live responsibly in light of the truth. The Marxist has never been able to explain why at history's end we will be simply happy if death itself does not wither away and we remain conscious of all that is implied in our individuality. For Solzhenitsyn, the idea of the end of history in all its forms is a self-deceptive lullaby that turns us away from the ineradicable necessity of personal responsibility. The recovery of the natural world through reflection on the "point of view" at the foundation of the dissident experience may well be the antidote to the progressivist or historical imagination.

Mahoney makes the jarring but brilliant and perfectly true observation that Solzhenitsyn is a postmodern foundationalist. He is a stern critic of the laziness and moral weakness or relativism of postmodernism as it is usually understood. But if postmodernism is really a reflection on the failure of the modern project to conquer human nature, then Solzhenitsyn is a proponent of postmodernism rightly understood. At the end of his famous Harvard Address, he contends that medieval thought was distorted because it was excessively spiritual;

it slighted the fact that human beings have bodies. Modern thought was distorted because it tried to understand human beings as simply bodies. It denied the fact that they have souls or a spiritual life. Postmodern thought—given the experience of medieval and modern excesses—can be based on a realistic assessment of the places of both the material and spiritual dimensions of human existence. Postmodern thought is the foundation of a world fit for human beings, not angles or pigs.

The idea that the dissident reflection might actually be the foundation for the reconstruction of social and political life based on a balanced view of the truth about human nature Mahoney rightly criticizes as somewhat utopian. But it is also the basis for Solzhenitsyn's most realistic proposals for political reform, including the reinvigoration of local selfgovernment as the starting point for civic consciousness and his promotion of a form of Russian national patriotism that is far from imperialism. The being who is neither mind nor body needs political pride tempered by religious repentance; human beings must both assert themselves and limit themselves to fulfill what is best about their natures. Solzhenitsyn opposes most vehemently the characteristically modern resistance to the idea of human limitations. The truth is that we are not self-made; we must acknowledge a natural and divine order which we have been given and to which we are somehow responsible. We must acknowledge that what we have been given, even death, is good for us. But Solzhenitsyn also provides examples of towering political excellence, of the fact that not all human pride is vanity. The best of these, Mahoney meticulously explains in his central chapter, is the unjustly neglected Russian statesman Pyotor Arkadievich Stolypin.

Solzhenitsyn, with his belief in natural conscience and the virtue of repentance, is undeniably a Christian. Mahoney notices that he was not always one. He converted to Russian Orthodoxy because he discovered through his natural powers and dissident experiences that Christian anthropologyits account of man—is true. But he is a curiously moderate or political sort of Christian. At one point, Mahoney claims that Solzhenitsyn "combines Pascalian 'existentialism' and classical realism" (p. 33), which means that he is partly Augustinian and partly Aristotelian. That claim is meant to correct the characteristic excesses of the best interpreters of Solzhenitsyn prior to Mahoney. Some of them say he is an Aristotelian (Delba Winthrop and James Pontuso) and others an Augustinian (Robert Kraynak and Edward Ericson). But Augustinians, for Solzhenitsyn, disparage excessively the goods of the natural world; they exaggerate human misery and impotence. The Aristotelians exaggerate the completeness and self-sufficiency of the political and philosophical lives; the political philosopher does not account for all the longings and inevitable shortcomings of the whole human person.

The natural world is good because it is both moral and truthful, but it is not good enough for us to be completely satisfied by the goods it offers us. Our reflection on the good that is a human being culminates in mystery, and so a genuinely thoughtful person engages in dissident resistance against theoretical and practical efforts to abolish that mystery or make us totally at home in the world. The Solzhenitsyn-inspired dissident Mahoney even rebels against Leo Strauss's tendency to reduce morality to merely a tool for philosophers. Even the philosopher is not exempt from the moral responsibility that living in the truth gives us all.

Another way Mahoney expresses Solzhenitsyn's moderation is by saying that there is a dialectic between magnanimity and humility in his thought. The idea of dialectic suggests that the Christian and Aristotelian components of

Solzhenitsyn's thought are not merely mixed. Not only do the points of view of magnanimity and humility each reflect only part of the truth about human nature, they also fit together into some kind of whole, the whole that is the natural world and natural conscience. That would make Solzhenitsyn's "postmodern, post-totalitarian foundationalism" (p. 46) at least something like Thomism. Mahoney never does call Solzhenitsyn a Thomist, but he does say that the "natural goods" Solzhenitsyn defends "clearly point beyond themselves and are compatible with the truth of faith" (p. 102). Mahoney's exceptionally penetrating, wonderfully judicious, and always accessible analysis is on the cutting edge of thought today.

The Free and Open Press: The Founding of American Democratic Press Liberty, 1640–1800 By Robert W. T. Martin. New York: New York University Press, 2001. 288p. \$40.00.

Mark A. Graber, University of Maryland

The Free and Open Press is an exceptionally satisfying first book. Robert W. T. Martin revitalizes a debate over the status of press rights in eighteenth-century America that had grown tiresome over the past 20 years. Challenging Leonard Levy, his critics, and the ongoing republic/liberalism divide in American political thought, Martin's work offers an interpretation of free speech thought that explains why early Americans sometimes fought for and sometimes fought against press rights. Though Martin claims too much for his thesis at times, all scholars of American political thought and constitutional development should read his book.

When Americans during the eighteenth century spoke of a free and open press, Martin claims, they mingled two distinct concepts: a free press and an open press. The free press was a vehicle for exposing government tyranny. The open press provided all people with an avenue to express their political and social beliefs. These two concepts were conflated in colonial America, Martin notes, because proponents of press rights thought a press open to all was the best means of preventing government tyranny. During the Revolution and last decade of the eighteenth century, prominent Americans separated the two rationales. Whig advocates of the Revolution and Democratic-Republicans claimed that an open press was a kept press, biased toward the status quo and royal power. Jeffersonians during the 1790s regarded an open press as unnecessary, given the existence of multiple papers in most areas. Much of the debate surrounding the Alien and Sedition Acts, Martin observes, stemmed from political reactions to an emerging partisan press. Federalists feared a press that might weaken confidence in republican institutions. Jeffersonians championed a republican press that kept a close watch for government tyranny. Jeffersonians won the battle and lost the war. The Alien and Sedition Acts expired to the relief of all. The partisan press thrived throughout the nineteenth century. The modern theories of democracy that gave birth to the partisan press, however, would not be revived until the twentieth century.

Martin deserves particular credit for uncovering the important debates over an open press that structured much free speech debate during the eighteenth century. He presents much evidence demonstrating that for most Americans before the Revolution, a free press was a press that was open to all persons. Printing was a public calling, much as medicine or keeping a tavern. "Printers are educated in the Belief," Benjamin Franklin declares in the pages of *The Free and Open Press*, "that when Men differ in Opinion, both sides ought equally to have the Advantage of being heard by the Publick" (p. 55). Other printers similarly claimed that ownership of a

press gave them no right to determine the ideological content of what they printed.

This vision of an impartial press was undermined during the late eighteenth century. Many Americans during the Revolution believed that the press had a special obligation to scrutinize government. A partisan press, they believed, prevented government officials and their supporters from dominating public debate. Numerous journalists claimed that their obligation to print only reasonable pieces required them to take sides in controversial debates. One Revolutionary printer noted that no good arguments existed against independence from Great Britain (p. 86).

Eighteenth-century Americans did not distinguish the free press from the open press in quite the way presented by The Free and Open Press. Martin sees the free press as a republican instrument for retaining community control of the government, and an open press as a liberal instrument enabling persons to exercise their right to political advocacy. Arguments might be made for the reverse conclusions. The free press was a liberal instrument allowing those who owned presses to determine the use of their property. An open press was a republican instrument ensuring public exposure to ideas on both sides of political struggles. The best synthesis is that both free press and open press notions contained liberal and republican elements, and Martin is sympathetic to this general point. His work consistently observes that press thought in general has both liberal and republican dimensions, that distinguishing the two is a parlor game scholars are best off abandoning.

The Free and Open Press is a remarkably good book by any standard. The prose is clear, the jargon limited. Martin has done a fabulous job of reading the primary sources and integrating the secondary sources. He recognizes that constitutional history exists outside of courts, that the liberty of the press is more often defined by what is published than by what judges say at any given time. Martin has a wonderful story to tell and does not ruin his tale by consistently stopping to tell us that he is right while other distinguished minds are wrong. The conclusion highlights how the controversy over the free and open press is repeated at present in debates over whether the marketplace of ideas can be trusted to produce truth. Although Martin is not interested in theories of constitutional interpretation, his findings have important implications for free speech law. The Free and Open Press suggests that at the time the First Amendment was framed, the liberty of the press was the right to publish one's sentiments in a press, not the right of the person who owned the press to exclude reasonable commentary. The discarded fairness rule, in this view, was the original constitutional understanding. One wonders what Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas might make of these findings.

The Ethics of Nationalism By Margaret Moore. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 272p. \$45.00.

Chandran Kukathas, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy

This fine study purports to offer "a normative theory of nationalism." Such a theory is needed, the author claims, because most of the literature on the ethics of secession proceeds on the mistaken assumption that the normative problem of state breakup is best addressed by applying established liberal arguments or values to the issue at hand. In fact, however, it makes little sense to derive a theory of secession in this way, rather than by considering directly the kinds of normative claims secessionists make. These are nationalist claims. We need, moreover, to recognize that well-

known accounts of nationalism, such as those offered by Ernest Gellner, for whom nationalism is a political principle that holds that the political and national unit should be congruent, are inadequate—either because they include too much, or because, as in the case of Gellner (Nations and Nationalism, 1983), they associate it with a particular set of demands or principles. Nationalism, according to Margaret Moore, should be understood as "a normative argument that confers moral value on national membership, and on the past and future existence of the nation, and identifies the nation with a particular homeland or part of the globe" (p. 5). Once we have understood this, we will be in a better position to understand the key policies and demands of nationalists, including their occasional (and only occasional) demands for national self-determination, and to understand the normative limits of nationalism. And we will then be in a better position to understand the nature, and defensibility, of national selfdetermination, and of secession in particular.

The argument developed in this carefully constructed work is, ultimately, a defense of the institutional recognition of national identities. Moore's contention is that nations are moral communities characterized by bonds of solidarity and mutual trust, and that the attachment people feel to such communities is good reason to recognize national identity. But this requires a shift away from seeing nations as grounded in culture (as suggested by liberal nationalists, such as Yael Tamir, Joseph Raz, and Will Kymlicka)—for national identity should not be confounded with a common culture. Nationalists are concerned with preserving political communities, through the protection of jurisdiction, but this does not mean that they seek to preserve their cultures. This requires not the congruence of nation and state, but states that enable nationalist aspirations to be fulfilled—in part at least because they enable communities of identity to flourish. What is required is a state in which the different communities that comprise it cooperate with, rather than seek to control, one another. Equally required is the development of national and international institutions to uphold rights of self-determination. But, crucially, these would have to be institutions that upheld not so much particular norms of justice by which selfdetermination would be permitted, as procedure by which the legitimacy of a national community could be settled. The right to self-determination depends not upon the national community having the right values but upon its having its own identity—and one it seeks to preserve.

This is an argument of considerable merit, offered in a work that is as philosophically subtle as it is historically and politically well informed. The author engages with many of the major modern contributors to the literature on nationalism and secession, from David Miller (On Nationality, 1995) to Allen Buchanan (Secession, 1991), and offers criticism which is acute, and sometimes insightful—though always careful and fair.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that there is nothing in the book with which to take issue. One particular conclusion the author tries to defend that gives rise to a number of concerns is the constitutional right to self-determination. While attempting to strike a balance between institutional arrangements that make secession too easy and others that make it too difficult, Moore argues that a "constitutional right to self-determination, including a right to secession, is necessary because we do not want to trap minorities in states that they do not identify with or regard as legitimate" (p. 218). While this expresses what is surely a laudable principle (and one with which I have considerable sympathy), there is also the issue of the implications of such a principle for some states. Moore's contention is that not only would a right of secession clause in a state's constitution help guarantee

minority aspirations, but it would also offer the state "the best mechanism that [it] could employ to ensure the territorial integrity of the state" (p. 219).

Yet if we consider the case of Kashmir, a very different implication of a right to secession presents itself. Kashmir. as India's only Muslim-majority state, is not only dominated by a vigorous and violent independence movement but is also claimed by Pakistan—which asserts precisely the principle of self-determination that Moore defends. The advantage for Pakistan of any attempt to establish the wishes of the Kashmiris is that Kashmir may not only leave India but also fall under Pakistan's sphere of influence. (There is even a remote possibility of Kashmir's irredentists succeeding in reuniting the province with Pakistan.) The disadvantage to India is not only the loss of territory, or even the encouragement this might give to secessionists in other regions, particularly in the Punjab, but the threat to civil peace within India. Indian Muslims would now be in an even smaller minority, and very possibly the targets of nationalist, anti-Muslim, resentment. At worst, this could mean a bloodbath. If so, the best solution might be one that made the claims of would-be secessionists more ambiguous or uncertain. Drawing clear lines demarcating rights in international law may make it more, rather than less, difficult to resolve complex matters by political accommodations.

To suggest this is not to argue that the principles Moore defends are wrong, only that a clarification of ethical principles may not imply that any particular institutional conclusions follow. Or that institutional reform is desirable. That said, however, it would only be fair to point out that such practical political issues are raised by Moore in a final chapter that is self-consciously "speculative." While there is much to dispute or argue about in these pages, this is a mark of the author's boldness, rather than an indicator of any sort of naïveté. Anyone coming for the first time to the issue of the morality of nationalism would do well to begin with this work. Scholars already working in the field will find it a valuable and challenging contribution to their discussions.

Conscience and Community: Revisiting Toleration and Religious Dissent in Early Modern England and America By Andrew R. Murphy. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. 337p. \$45.00.

Patrick Neal, University of Vermont

Political theorists interested in liberalism often fall into one of two quite different camps. There are those (call them the "analytic" school) who engage in arguments designed to justify or criticize various accounts of justice, legitimacy, and the like, and on the other hand, there are those (call them the "historical" school) who aim at providing a rich historical account of the processes through which such concepts developed in the modern age. Rawls and Dworkin as opposed to Pocock and Skinner, if you will. In my view, the most interesting and ultimately fruitful work in political theory is done by those who practice a mixture of the two approaches. Two prime examples would be Jeremy Waldron and Charles Taylor. Andrew Murphy's first book is a highly interesting and very promising exemplar of this mixed approach. I have no doubt but that "pure" historians will question the novelty of his account of arguments over toleration in the seventeenth century, or that "pure" analysts will question the relevance of that account to the more analytical positions with regard to the contemporary concerns he stakes out in the latter portion of the book. But I found it to be one of the great strengths of his book that he does try to look at contemporary issues with an eye toward the historical context out of which they

emerged. I found my own understanding of contemporary normative arguments about toleration, religious freedom, and liberal public reason enriched and deepened by a reading of Murphy's clear and lively account of the seventeenthcentury arguments.

Murphy's book is divided into two parts. The first, much longer, part is the historical account of arguments for and against religious toleration in three particular cases. They are Massachusetts Bay, Pennsylvania, and England from the Civil War through the Glorious Revolution. In the second, much briefer, part, Murphy calls into question a number of features of contemporary liberal theory, especially in the person of John Rawls, in light of the earlier historical account. He is highly critical of Rawls's account of public reason in political liberalism, seeing it as more of a betrayal than an extension of the tradition of freedom of conscience begun in the seventeenth century. He is also skeptical of the idea that contemporary demands for equal recognition through the language of identity politics can be derived from or made compatible with the structure of the traditional liberal account of freedom of conscience. Without necessarily criticizing the appeals for equal recognition, Murphy usefully and persuasively shows that such appeals cannot be rightly seen as mere extensions of the right to conscience and toleration developed through the crucible of seventeenth-century politics. Indeed, as he shows, there is a deep analytical tension between the more or less negative quality of freedom from governmental coercion claimed by the traditional appeal to the right of religious conscience and the somewhat more positive notion of freedom presupposed in numerous contemporary calls for equal recognition and the affirmation of difference as such. I took Murphy's argument to demonstrate once again the truth of Isaiah Berlin's view that however much we may wish to believe that all good things are co-possible without loss, the truth is that liberty is not equality, and that sometimes they must conflict with one another.

In the historical sections of the book, Murphy emphasizes the way in which the practice of toleration gradually emerged as a consequence of particular historical events and pragmatic political choices (with sometimes unintended consequences) in various contexts. His aim is to undermine the idea that the rise of toleration as a practice manifested the unfolding of an ideal of liberalism that has reached its teleological culmination in our present era. Murphy's account of the often ironic twists and turns of actual seventeenth-century controversies is designed to reveal the oversimplification of such a Whig interpretation of the history of liberalism. His account also brings out the intensely religious character of so much of the seventeenth-century debate over toleration on both sides of the issue, a fact that challenges the idea that the toleration debate was simply one between enlightened, secular liberals and regressive, conservative Christians. In the course of articulating his historical account, Murphy does a very good job of bringing out the considerable force of the antitolerationist arguments in these controversies. It is easy today to dismiss the antitolerationists in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and England as nothing more than irrational barriers in the way of progress, but Murphy persuades that concerns for basic order and about the politically destabilizing possibilities of religious dissent in the early modern age were no mere pretenses for the exercise of selfish state power. Thus, for example, he is able to acknowledge the courage and historical significance of Roger Williams and Anne Hutchinson without having to make John Cotton and the other Massachusetts Bay leaders appear merely as cardboard villains.

It is common in the literature of political theory now to see toleration dismissed as "mere" toleration, and to see the pragmatic idea of a modus vivendi political arrangement that secures peace among groups with different modes of life treated as the poor relation to a more elevated ideal of political consensus built upon either moral consensus (communitarianism) or at least an overlapping consensus of similar moralities/religions (Rawls's political liberalism). Murphy does not seek to debunk these higher ideals, but he does try to remind us that it is practically imprudent, not to say foolish, to denigrate toleration and modus vivendi politics for falling short of those ideals, not least because the very possibility of the ideals is built upon the practical foundation provided by them. I think Murphy is right to think that the emergence of toleration in the seventeenth century was not the nascent beginning of a necessary process whose glory is abundant today, but a contingent achievement of both good fortune and political skill, an inheritance that we are fortunate to have been bequeathed and which we would do well to take better care of.

Forms of Power By Gianfranco Poggi. Cambridge: Blackwell, 2001. 256p. \$66.95 cloth, \$28.95 paper.

Regina F. Titunik, University of Hawaii at Hilo

The main themes of this book are prefigured in Gianfranco Poggi's two significant earlier works on the rise and character of the modern state: The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction, 1978, and The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects, 1990, (especially in the first chapter of the latter). In connection with his discussion of state formation, Poggi put forward the view that political power is one particular form of social power and is distinguished from other types of social power by its control of the means of violence. In the current work, Poggi undertakes the considerable task of explicating power in its various forms. He abstracts the concept of power from the historical context of his previous works and, with characteristic lucidity, details the various forms of social power and their interrelations.

Poggi distinguishes three forms of social power—political, ideological/normative, and economic. This tripartite division of social power recalls Max Weber's distinction of "class, status and party" and other similar conceptualizations of a trinity of power forms reflecting the physical, psychical, and material needs of human beings. Indeed, Poggi readily adopts this familiar and useful tripartite formulation and rests his particular distinctions on the kinds of resources that are controlled by power holders, that is, wealth, status, and rulership.

In the broadest sense, power, for Poggi, signifies the human ability to "make a difference" to the world (p. 3). Human beings necessarily transform external nature in order to sustain their existence (and are in turn transformed by the results of their activities). Social power is recognizable when this ability to make a difference is used "in order to control the ability to make a difference that another individual possesses qua human" (p. 9). Poggi examines the political, ideological/normative, and economic expressions of social power successively and considers the interactions between the latter two forms and political power. He also adds a concluding chapter on military power, which, though an aspect of political power, has become sufficiently distinct from other aspects of the political system to warrant separate consideration.

Political power, which represents the constant "point of reference" (p. 29) of the work, involves the threat of violence and the arousal of fear. This form of social power most starkly manifests the phenomenon of power insofar as the deepest human vulnerabilities are evoked and exploited—though, as was indicated by Thomas Hobbes (and is emphasized by Poggi), violence is threatened and fear "awakened" precisely in order to control violence and assuage fear.

It is through the exercise of political power, Poggi intriguingly observes, that the tension between equality and inequality becomes especially pronounced. All forms of social power, he thinks, necessarily embody a tension between basic human equality, on the one hand, and the asymmetries produced by power relationships, on the other. Social power, as indicated, involves making use of another human being's power to "make a difference." The power holder does not aim to extirpate or crush the human powers of the subordinate, but rather seeks to direct those powers to serve his or her own ends. Paradoxically, however, by endeavoring to control the other's uniquely human power to make a difference, the equal humanity of the other is implicitly recognized. One of the primary acts through which political power is deployed—communication of command—particularly exposes this paradox because the act of command relies on the equal humanity of the underling. The subordinate party is expected to understand (p. 32) the command. The act of command—albeit backed by the "or else" of force (p. 30)presumes a basic commonality between the subordinate and superordinate parties, a commonality or equality that necessitates elaborate justifications of the inequalities sustained by political power. Economic power, by contrast, operates not by issuing commands; it directs action by using constraints in such a way that the individual, still pursuing his or her own designs, is compelled to follow one path rather than another and thus "advance the power holder's interests" (p. 123). In view of the evident difference between political and economic power, an argument has been made that there is really "no such thing as economic power proper" (p. 125). Consistent with his overriding idea that political power is only one form of social power, Poggi convincingly refutes this argument with the recurring view that access to and control of resources is decisive in identifying the exercise of power.

Since human beings "make a difference" and are artificers of their own conditions of existence, a profound insecurity about the ultimate foundations of existence necessarily arises. Wielders of ideological/normative power control the resources of ideas and meaning that assuage this human anxiety, but, not unlike in the case of political power, also arouse this insecurity in order to be in a position to continuously relieve it. Religious power is the prime manifestation of this kind of power that controls and dispenses longedfor meaning. Creative intellectuals also provide cognitive maps that make needed sense of the world. Both forms of ideological/normative power benefit political power when their apparent access to spiritual and ultimate forces is used to exalt the political realm and cover it with a kind of sublimity. Bearers of ideological/normative power, in turn, benefit from support and other resources provided by political powers. It is important to note, however, that while various forms of power enter into mutually beneficial relationships, no harmonious reconciliation of these forms of power, according to Poggi, takes place. Competition and struggle characterize their dynamic interrelations.

Max Weber and Thomas Hobbes represent the most notable intellectual influences on this study. (Hegel, it seems to me, is also a presence, though his relevant account of the contradictions inherent in the "master/slave" relationship, among other things, is not cited.) Like Hobbes, Poggi affirms the fundamental equality of human beings. This view of the basic equality of human beings as the proper starting point for understanding political power is also shared by Max Weber (though this aspect of Weber's thought is insufficiently appreciated by many commentators). Weber, and Poggi following him, hold that political power, however necessary, is "artificially established" (p. 49) and thus represents a deviation from the more real, equal condition of

human beings. Because the power relationship is an aberrant condition, it requires "justification" or, in Weber's terms, "legitimation." While Poggi's arguments for seeing equality as the basic human condition are compelling, the notion of political power as "imposition" is, arguably, too narrow. It may be that political power, in the form of leadership, is sought out by the potential subordinates in order to pursue collective projects more effectively. This idea is only briefly considered by Poggi (pp. 49–53) and is, in my view, not adequately stated or refuted. The fact that the powerful have different interests from the powerless and often do not serve the collective good (p. 52) does not disprove the idea that human beings may naturally seek to set up and follow leaders.

This is an ambitious work that deals in an illuminating and comprehensive way with a notoriously difficult concept. Given the scope and complexity of the project, it is perhaps unfair to raise objections about what might have been covered more extensively. Still, I will note one significant issue that lingers on the edges of the exposition, demanding fuller attention. There is a diachronic dimension intrinsic to forms of social power and their interrelations, which Poggi clearly indicates by identifying some recent trends—globalization, for example—that change the relations between and within forms of power. The historical changes in the forms of power account for the necessity of distinguishing military power for separate consideration. Over time, the warrior has become disassociated from the political leader, a process that Poggi characterizes as the "civilianization' of government" (p. 46). Since, at present, one organizational segment—the military controls the implements of violent force, this group develops separate interests and enters into competitive and conflictual relations with other parts of the political system (p. 183). In the tradition of pluralist liberalism, Poggi generally prizes the conflict between and within forms of power and is anxious that, in the future, some forms of social power may be eliminated or various forms of power will be consolidated into a single hierarchy (p. 204). What I miss is a fuller account of how the institutional embodiments of social power are differentiated over time and of the broad mechanisms that account for the prospect that this process may reverse itself and the power forms merge into a hierarchy. In effect, I miss the elucidation of historical patterns that Poggi so ably accomplished in his previous works. But this is only a minor observation about what is altogether an important and impressive work.

Value, Respect, and Attachment By Joseph Raz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 186p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.00 paper.

William Corlett, Bates College

Widely known for the challenges he poses for the excesses of "me-first" individualism loosely associated with contemporary Western liberalism, Joseph Raz has grown accustomed to plumbing its depths for signs of humanity and goodness. His new book approaches the twin problem of pursuing universal values while acknowledging particularistic cultures, through a window opened in *Engaging Reason* (1999), where he unpacks the complexity of a "value-reason nexus" to conclude that valuable options are often pursued for incommensurate reasons. In what sense, he now asks, can this "nexus" be said to be universal? At the heart of this project lies an attempt to extend his earlier analysis of value in two related directions: toward human attachments, where Raz must show that particular engagements with value need not fly in the face of universality, and toward an abstract approach to universal respect, which nevertheless remains part and parcel of our contingent attachments.

Raz offers a delightfully accessible opening chapter that embraces both sides of the tension between universal and particular approaches to value. The attachments one forges with others are universal in the sense that everyone can in principle rely upon them and particularistic in the sense that one's attachments are one's own. This double suggestionthat value is "neither and both" self-created and immutableis explored in greater depth in the second chapter, where Raz tightens the knot between contingent human attachments and value's universality. He writes in ways that are determined to show that "reconciliation is possible" (p. 74). After defining value in an "inflationary" sense as "any property which (necessarily) makes anything which possesses it good (or bad) at least to a degree" (p. 43), Raz turns his back on attempts to unearth value's universality by bringing "to light a general feature of all values" (p. 59) and looks instead at approaching the universality of value through a "rejection of those false values about which rage past or present moral struggles" (p. 59). Objectivity begins to require an avoidance of wrongdoing instead of a pursuit of an immutable truth. Raz put it like this: "Since values are objective, they cannot be independent of social conditions" (p. 62), which leads him to suggest that contingency sets "a limit to the intelligibility of value" (p. 76). But if there is an "element of pure contingency at the heart of values" (p. 76), then Raz will have to show how it makes sense to speak of value's universality without relying on an Archimedean point or even a loosely overlapping consensus.

This he prepares to do in the third chapter, which works both to reinforce the point that universal values depend upon social relations and to set the stage for establishing the sense of universality that can survive this kind of social dependence. Raz accomplishes the first task by contesting the popular claim that human life has "an unconditional and non-derivative value" (p. 115). Arguing instead that our lives bear conditional value—that is, that they "are good because something else is, when the relationship between them is a necessary relationship" (p. 77n)—he needs here to distinguish "the value of people from the value of their remaining alive" (p. 115n). Setting aside the (intrinsic) value of life itself, Raz makes what we do or could do with our lives a fundamental part of why we value them. And so the stage is set for discussing the value of people.

But not so fast. Although he is prepared to argue that "respect for people... is a central moral duty" (p. 125), Raz's approach to universality requires spending more time with the abstraction "respect" than with real people, at least at first. By connecting the second chapter's inflationary sense of value to reasons for one's duty to respect what is valuable—for example, each other-the fourth chapter moves well beyond the way Raz views respect in Morality of Freedom (1986). Raz opens by isolating Kant's categorical approach to respect from its familiar housing in a phenomenal-noumenal binary, but remains sufficiently Kantian to claim that moral law is the object of respect; he quotes Kant as saying "the object of respect is, therefore, nothing but the law.... All respect for a person is properly only respect for the law (of honesty, etc.) of which the person provides an example" (p. 135). On this basis, Raz moves to distinguish the theoretical construct of a value in itself—a person, for example—from the more popular notion of treating people as ends in themselves and never as means, a distinction that even Kant, he explains, sometimes conflated.

Raz next advances "three stages of correct response to value": first, "psychological acknowledgment" of what is valuable and, relatedly, "expression of recognition of value in language"; second, "preserve what is of value"; and third, "engage with value in appropriate ways" (pp. 161–62). The

first two ways of relating to what is valuable—respecting it—are required universally to avoid moral wrongdoing, whereas the latter—engaging with it—is optional and thereby subject to contingencies. Even though "ultimately, our lives are about engaging with value," respect "is the right reaction to what is of value even when you do not value it" (p. 164).

Raz can finally apply his value-reason model to human beings. One has a duty to the moral law to respect fellow human beings. But there is plenty of room left at the third stage of the model for attachments in the world of contingency. One is doing wrong, for example, by denigrating a person from a different culture or failing to preserve it, but continuing to identify with an inherited culture is entirely optional. In the end, we begin to realize that respecting other people is good for those who do so. In a nutshell, Raz argues that "foundational moral values are universally valid in abstract form but they manifest themselves in ways which are socially dependent, and become accessible to us in ways which are socially dependent" (p. 8).

Those concerned with Western liberalism—whether critic, vanguard, or apologist-ignore the careful work of Joseph Raz at their peril. Readers new to Raz may find this newest volume a useful point of access before studying his more technical arguments. Those familiar with his work will certainly want to study his new distinction between the avoidance of wrongdoing and more optional life choices. And yet because this provocative work makes the autonomous agent its unit of analysis—in a sort of me-first methodology—respect for and engagement with others add to the risk of sliding back into precisely the individualism Raz seeks to enrich. This backsliding may reinforce his liberal credentials with some readers, but it stands at odds with his promising critique of excessive individualism. If the liberal tradition is ever to set its sights on what Iris Young's (2000) Inclusion and Democracy continues to call domination, it will have at least to begin defending its habit of methodological individualism. This requires engaging with the work of those less comfortable with (nonrelational) autonomy as a starting point. Raz's newest work on respect would have benefited, I think, from a studied engagement with the work of some "unusual subjects"-for example, Marilyn Frye's loving perspective (The Politics of Reality, 1983) or Young's democracy. Perhaps the most significant obstacle to a politics of respectful inclusion is a studied reluctance, when selecting "one's" unit of analysis, reviewing the relevant literature, and constructing abstract categories, to foreground and not lightly pass over the fact that we are always already in this life together.

Making Babies, Making Families: What Matters Most in an Age of Reproductive Technologies, Surrogacy, Adoption, and Same-Sex and Unwed Parents By Mary Lyndon Shanley. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001. 206p. \$27.00.

Julie Novkov, University of Oregon

Mary Lyndon Shanley's Making Babies, Making Families bravely wades into the difficult ethical questions of accommodating new reproductive technologies and diverse family arrangements within the framework of existing and possible liberal legal principles. The book grapples with definitions of parenthood and parental rights in the contexts of adoption, unwed fatherhood, gamete transfer, surrogate motherhood, and multiple parenting within the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community. Shanley mines these situations in order to derive some workable ethical and legal guidelines for the state's exercise of its regulatory capacities with respect to families. In doing so, she reveals the tensions and possibilities inherent in the state's role in defining families at

a moment when many perceive traditional family structures as collapsing, for better or for worse.

For the reader interested in the policy-based bottom line, Shanley provides ample food for thought. Among other policies, she argues in favor of facilitating open and transracial adoptions, undermining the promotion of "as if" adoptive families (families that look and behave structurally as if the children were the biological offspring of their parents). In disputes between unwed biological fathers and other claimants to parenthood, she advocates focusing on the relational aspects of parenthood, in lieu of complete reliance on genetic ties. She argues strenuously against permitting the marketing of gametes, claiming that such a market represents an illegitimate extension of capitalist principles into an area ill-suited for their articulation, and that it has significant potential for racial and class-based exploitation. She objects to legal decisions enforcing contracts against surrogate mothers who decide after giving birth that they do not wish to relinquish their babies, although she would permit individuals to form such contracts. Finally, she recommends centering the child's standpoint and needs in untangling sticky question of custody and visitation arising in the context of "queer" families.

The point of her book, however, is as much how she reaches these conclusions as the conclusions themselves. She opens the book with the claim that "the traditional fabric of family law is unraveling," attributing this problem to rapid transformations in family relationships (p. 1). The argument of the book, however, seems to be more that the problem is located at the interface of law and family relationships. The problematic principles that she identifies repeatedly within contemporary family law are the extension of market forces into the family, the legal commitment to models of extreme individualistic liberties and rights within family disputes, and the near exclusion of considerations of children's needs and perspectives. She argues for supplementing or replacing these principles with factors derived from modern feminist theories of justice. These factors include meaningful equality for women (defined as a recognition of women's unequal status in the family, the workplace, and in civil society more generally), the significance of relationships and care as well as individual rights and liberties, and the centering of children in the disputes that swirl around them. Her work thus incorporates feminist critique and vision as grounding in order to derive concrete answers to tough policy questions.

The scope of the book and its elegant argumentation are striking. Any one of these topics could command a lengthy analysis, but by considering all together, Shanley is able to develop a more unified critique and set of positive principles than she could otherwise provide. Moreover, she does not present her prescriptions as ideal and perfectly just solutions, recognizing the pain inherent in these questions. She seems to see her task as that of taming the tangled network of relationships into recognizable legal statuses that will produce more just outcomes than those that modern family law is currently providing. She consciously places herself with the strand of feminist thinking that emphasizes experiential theory and the centering of relationships in place of celebrations of individual liberal autonomy. These commitments both make her work more grounded and underline her insistence that a onesize-fits-all appraoch to family law will not produce justice.

One might question, however, Shanley's background assumptions about why this crisis has emerged now. She clearly wants to reject the traditional patriarchal conception of the family as wage-earning male married to nurturing female living together with their mutually dependent biological children. She does not go far enough, however, in emphasizing the extent to which this model of family life did not represent reality for many families in the past and does not for

contemporary families. Multiple caretakers, ranging from grandmothers and other adult relations to associates within ethnic enclaves to slave laborers and paid workers to older siblings, have provided nurturance for young children. Families freely opened their homes to orphans and children whose parents could not take care of them. What is at least somewhat new is the extent to which the law has become the means through which family relationship are not only legitimized but also constituted. Historical research on the family suggests, for instance, that the legal formalization of adoption as the primary means of adding a nonbiological child to a biologically related family is a relatively recent phenomenon (see, e.g., Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth, 1985). This reading of the problem as a collision between historical practice and legal formulations also emphasizes the need for legal change but suggests that the problem itself is neither new nor primarily one of accommodating new reproductive technologies and family forms in the law.

One might also question some of Shanley's proposals. Most notably, will merely allowing children the right to know basic information about their biological roots really achieve a meaningful centering of children's needs and interests? In practice, such a reform could easily fall short of accomplishing any major reframings of children's positions with respect to the law, becoming merely another procedural requirement with little ultimate significance. Likewise, while Shanley is surely right to require the taking of children's needs into account, this approach cannot lead to results that are universally generalizable or painless for children and those who wish to parent them.

Nonetheless, Shanley's approach of centering children has the potential to change the way we think about family law and the regulation of relationships in positive and significant ways. The book is thus a major accomplishment in terms of both its potential for shaping policies and its significance as a work of applied feminist ethics.

Body/Politics: Studies in Reproduction, Production, and (Re)Construction By Thomas C. Shevory. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000. 249p. \$59.95.

Robert H. Blank, Brunel University

Body/Politics is a well-researched book that brings together a significant range of topics to explicate the connections between changes occurring with the biological body and within body politics. The theoretical structure of the book is Marxist/ feminist with heavy reliance on critical theory for Thomas Shevory's legal analysis in some of the chapters. According to the author, the central thesis of the book is that "the process of technological change will be creatively destructive, opening new avenues for equality, diversity, self-expression, resistance to hierarchy and control, while also offering new means for domination, exploitation, oppression, and dehumanization" (p. 3). He thus rejects the more extreme stances of the "technoprogressives" who see nothing but good and the "technophobes" who see nothing but bad coming from these developments. He argues quite convincingly that the historical processes we face through these technological changes are dialectical and thus subject to human political intervention. In other words, if we so choose, we do have the capacity to shape technologies, though it is far from clear that we now actually have the will to do so.

Shevory is largely successful in meeting his stated aim of showing how contradictions within the current system of production manifest themselves in particular technological and ideological contexts. He is, however, less successful in meeting a second aim of providing "a form of resistance to a resurgent right, bent on sacrificing public and natural spaces in favor of short-term and shortsighted economic benefits" (p. 11). His analysis of schizophrenic Right with the "cyber" right faction of Gingrich on one side and the "patriot" right wing on the other, as reflected in their responses to new interventions in reproduction and resulting expansions in the domain of property and commodification, is interesting, although one could likely come up with similar conclusions about the political Left, feminists, and others. As the author himself clearly demonstrates, the issues raised by these new forays into modifying the human biology represent fundamental transformations in the way we think about our bodies, our rights, our property, and politics, and if so, I would argue they are thus unlikely to impact only on one segment of the political spectrum.

In order to argue his case, Shevory presents relatively detailed, and in some areas highly technical, case studies on such topics as surrogacy contracts, frozen embryos, the environment, biotechnology, and cosmetic surgery and other changes in appearance. Through these case studies he largely succeeds in his goal of providing concrete evidence of how body technologies are socially constructed and how they, in turn, have the power to reconstruct ideological positions and political practices. Although there is little new substantively in most of these chapters, together they do clarify the author's arguments and at the same time make for interesting reading, especially for readers who might not have had previous exposure to the material they cover. The chapter on (re)constructions of appearance, especially, I found most insightful, and I agree with Shevory that the virtual absence of this topic in the mainstream bioethics or public policy lit-

Most of the case chapters provide detailed conceptual and legal analysis. The discussions of rights in the chapters on surrogacy contracts and frozen embryos demonstrate the futility we face when attempting to create an abstract set of rights claims and the insurmountable problems that result when we try to reconcile such concepts within the context of these new technological capabilities. Likewise, the discussion in Chapter 6 of the changing conceptions of property brought about by biotechnology shows how property rights are continuing to subsume ever larger shares of life, thus leading Shevory to conclude that it is possible that someday everything will simply become property.

Unfortunately, as with many books published today, this book suffers from a lack of a rigorous copyediting process. Among the many coherence-type problems I found was the tendency not to follow through on lists of points. On page 65, for instance, the author says he will argue that surrogacy does this for several reasons, then states "First" but no others. Similarly, on page 69, he states that Raymond has criticized surrogacy on "four grounds: First"—but no Second, and so on. While these might be minor points, cumulatively to a reader such gaps are difficult to follow and frustrating, and they do divert attention from the author's arguments.

Another point of concern, which might also be related to editing at a different level, is that some of the case study chapters do not seem to be shaped by the themes of the book. Chapter 5, especially, seems out of place here. The book has the appearance of an attempt to fit separately written pieces into the whole after the fact with mixed results. Although I believe the author has done a relatively good job in tracing his argument and themes across the chapters, in some places it appears forced, and there remains a considerable unevenness in the book.

These caveats aside, *Body/Politics*, like its title, is an intriguing book that should be of potential interest to readers in political theory, public policy, and American politics. The

analysis is sound and in places highly detailed. Whether the reader agrees or disagrees with Shevory's specific conclusions (and I tend to agree), the discussion represents a competent analysis of an area that strikes at the heart of what we are, both as individuals and as members of society. As such, this book is a valuable contribution to a debate that might now be simmering but that in the near future is likely to reach the boiling point.

Revaluing Ethics: Aristotle's Dialectical Pedagogy By Thomas W. Smith. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 325p. \$75.50 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

Jacob Howland, University of Tulsa

Like Socrates, Thomas Smith's Aristotle practices philosophy as a way of life. The *Nicomachean Ethics* is Aristotle's protreptic and therapeutic introduction to this way of life. It is not a didactic treatise but a teaching that aims at the improvement of its readers' souls. It therefore begins from reputable opinions (*endoxa*) and employs dialectical arguments—not the best arguments simply, but the best available for improving the lives of Aristotle's audience.

This approach to the *Ethics* has much to recommend it. It offers the most compelling explanation I have seen of the text's many contradictions. Smith shows that these contradictions (e.g., regarding whether virtue is one or many, whether honor or friendship is the greatest external good, or whether shame is a virtue) have a twofold root. First, dialectical pedagogy necessarily involves contradiction because it begins with inadequate opinions and moves toward more adequate modes of understanding. Second, endoxa are intrinsically contradictory because they always reflect an incomplete sense of human flourishing. Smith is especially attuned to this problem because he reads the Ethics with an eye to Aristotle's political thought. Our souls have already been formed by the regimes in which we have been raised. But because all actual regimes "are more or less defective and exhibit a partial sense of human excellence" (p. 17), Aristotle must confront what Smith calls the problem of "prior deformation."

What, then, are the guiding assumptions of Aristotle's audience? Smith approaches this question in Part I of his book. He argues that the *Ethics* is aimed at men who love not virtue but "noble action." For these men, nobility entails "a shining vitality that demands recognition by others" (p. 35). Their upbringing has led them to pursue what Smith calls "virtue-asvirility," and to valorize honorable actions and political power rather than moral virtue. This description of Aristotle's audience makes sense: What spirited young Greek could remain unmoved by the example of Achilles? And as Smith observes, it is Aristotle himself who, in the course of criticizing the devotion to honor and power (NE 1.5), first presents virtue as a candidate for happiness.

If Smith is correct, Aristotle is in his own way engaged in what Plato calls the "ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry" (Republic 607b). His audience consists of risk takers whose love of noble action leads them to compete for zero-sum goods like honor, power, and wealth. Aristotle's task in the Ethics is to lead his readers from virtue-as-virility toward "virtue-as-equity," and to introduce them to sharable goods like friendship and knowledge. This will not be easy, especially because the practice of philosophy may strike readers as useless or even dangerous within the context of zero-sum competition.

In Part II, Smith provides a detailed account of Aristotle's "revaluation" of the virtues in the *Ethics*. The distinction in Book 1 between moral and intellectual virtue, as well as more specific distinctions between individual moral virtues, are not

Aristotle's own. Here again, Aristotle follows the endoxa, which undervalue the importance of thought with respect to action. Smith's analysis of the treatment of specific moral virtues in Books 3 through 5 of the *Ethics* accordingly aims to disclose Aristotle's dialectical attempt to transform reputable opinion in preparation for his reconsideration, in Book 6, of the role of thought in virtuous action.

Smith emphasizes the implicit yet essential role of thought in the virtues Aristotle discusses. The magnificent man, for example, is celebrated as much for his ability to judge what is needed by his community as for his openhandedness. What passes for generosity is furthermore most often an excessive attachment to external goods. (Contra Smith, however, excessive or extravagant gift giving must still be regarded as a vice.) In place of generosity as ordinarily understood, Aristotle points toward the spiritual generosity of Socrates. Indeed, Smith suggests that Socrates stands at the mean of other virtues as well, including truthfulness. This seems right, and, if anything, Smith does not develop these insights far enough. He misses Aristotle's suggestion that Socratic thoughtfulness is the key to genuine courage: Compare 1116b4-5 ("Socrates thought courage was knowledge") with the implicit reference to Socrates at 1115a17-18 ("perhaps one should not fear poverty or sickness, or in general anything that does not spring from vice and is not due to oneself").

Smith takes pains to show how Aristotle's account of justice differs from that of modern liberal thinkers. Aristotle's emphasis on the problem of political (de)formation helps us to understand that the liberal ideal of neutrality with respect to individual interests is unattainable. In any case, reflection on the limitations of legal justice discloses the need for the more fundamental virtue of equity (epieikeia). Equity turns out to be more fundamental than justice because "decent laws are precisely the rules of thumb determined by those who possess virtue-as-equity" (p. 153). Like the virtues discussed earlier, equity demands the cultivation of thoughtfulness. By the end of Book 5, then, Aristotle has prepared the reader for a radical reconsideration of the relationship between thought and action.

Aristotle begins this reconsideration in his discussion of practical wisdom or phronesis (the subject of the rest of Part II of Smith's book) and concludes it in his exploration of pleasure, friendship, and philosophy (the subjects of Part III). Phronêsis, Smith argues, does not involve the implementation of an abstractly formulated life-plan. It is rather the essentially "reactive" capacity to "determine the best course of action in the situations that have been handed to us" (p. 170). Because phronêsis involves an awareness of one's own failings and limitations, it opens one up to the satisfactions of friendship or philia (p. 268). Smith brings these insights to bear on the problem posed by Book 10 of the relationship between the life of contemplation and the life of action. We go astray if we approach this problem as a choice between two abstractly formulated life-plans. Phronêsis does not deal in abstractions; it "is actualized precisely when we judge aright amid the complexities of the situation given to us" (p. 258). In any case, contemplation and action are intertwined. Thought informs all action, and life itself is a kind of thoughtful wakefulness that is most fully actualized in the company of friends (pp. 173, 204). For that matter, the Ethics itself is rooted in philia: It is a supremely generous encouragement to the difficult and often misunderstood work of trying to become more virtuous (p. 224).

I have been able in this short review to touch only on the high points of Smith's comprehensive, engaging, and intelligent study. Suffice it to say that *Revaluing Ethics* is an important book from which all serious students of Aristotle's ethics and politics will profit.

The Ship of State: Statecraft and Politics from Ancient Greece to Democratic America By Norma Thompson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. 256p. \$35.00.

Nature, Woman, and the Art of Politics Edited by Eduardo A. Velasquez. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000. 385p. \$80.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Catherine Zuckert, University of Notre Dame

These books have similar aims and are written from a similar perspective. There are, however, important differences in content, emphasis, and form. Norma Thompson explicitly seeks to show that the Western intellectual tradition is not misogynist. One reason that it is not, she urges, is that it is not univocal. Within the tradition one can find several very different views of the character and relation of men and women. Introducing the volume he edited, Eduardo Velasquez states, "This collection of essays does not purport to give an answer to the question of what are 'nature' and 'woman,' at least not in an immediate, definitive sense. Rather, the comprehensive aim here is to reopen questions as to the 'nature of nature,' the 'nature of woman' with consideration given to the consequences of pairing some understanding of 'nature' with that of 'woman'" (p. xi). A collection of essays necessarily contains a variety of voices.

Thompson's Ship of State is an extended, elegantly written essay that displays great erudition. She covers the entire history of Western political thought—and more than the traditionally recognized theorists—from Homer to Gertrude Stein. She divides her consideration of the understanding of the relation and the significance of the relation between men and women or the masculine and feminine into three periods or "parts" concerning 1) the polis, 2) the state, and 3) democratic America. In her first two chapters, she argues that classical Greek authors saw the need for male and female traits to complement and balance each other in individuals as well as in communities. Homer in the Odyssey depicts such a balance within Odysseus and Penelope as well as in their marriage, Thucydides indicates the importance of the feminine by its absence, Aristotle argues that different individuals should serve the polity by performing different functions, and Plato balances male and female in the contrast between the "male drama" of the Republic and the explicitly feminine characteristics of Socratic philosophy.

Whereas the ancients advocated the need for a balance, Thompson argues, modern political thinkers emphasize the tension between the masculine and the feminine along with other extreme polarities. Machiavelli's works are full of antitheses-between princes and republics, foxes and lions, the great and the people: "What prevents these dichotomies from ensuing in hierarchies? Only subtlety in presentation" (p. 76). Rhetoric thus becomes extremely important to modern political theorists, who seek to find a balanced structure for the increasingly central control exercised over individuals by the state. Thompson defends herself in passing from critics who would accuse her of taking an essentialist view of the masculine and the feminine by pointing out that in her account of modernity, Edmund Burke "stands in as the paradigmatic 'feminine' writer, and Wollstonecraft as the sometimes 'masculine' one" (p. 76). In valorizing complexity and tradition as opposed to the simplicity of principle and the clarity of reason, Burke appears womanish. When Wollstonecraft urges women to become more virtuous, she keeps some of the original meaning and, therefore, the root in the masculine "vir." The tensions emerge full-blown in Mary Shelly's Frankenstein: "On one level of Frankenstein, Mary Shelley issues a feminist critique analogous to Burke's in the Reflections" (p. 105). By creating his monster in the laboratory, Victor Frankstein makes the female unnecessary.

On the other hand, what the monster comes to desire above all is feminine companionship. The balance is obviously awry and things go badly.

Rousseau and Tocqueville both try to right the balance by recognizing the equality of the sexes as parts of the human race, yet trying to reintroduce complementary traits and roles. They do not succeed, Thompson argues, because, in the end, they, their theories, and their writings cannot escape the leveling effects of democracy. Thompson defends Tocqueville from critics who point out that on the basis of his analysis, women never will achieve political or economic equality; he does so by reminding us that Tocqueville argues not for the equality but for the superiority of women: Women virtuously sacrifice themselves and their pleasures, rather than calculating their own interests like the men. Nevertheless, Thompson thinks the distinction Tocqueville attempts to draw between the roles and characters of the two sexes fails. It fails, first. because it is based merely on one passing phase of American history; it fails more fundamentally because he does not have the literary form or talent to resist democratic leveling. He writes a survey. The author who succeeds in establishing an identity for herself that differs from that which her male associates would impose upon her is Gertrude Stein. In praising Stein as the democratic Socrates, Thompson demonstrates that she or her analysis is not essentialist. However, what Thompson means by male and female, or what the forces and functions she thinks need to be distinguished and balanced in a polity are becomes unclear. Is she, in the end, talking about the relation between male and female in the tradition, or the superiority of literary to argumentative forms of writing? She praises literary works because they resist the democratic tendency to level everything and everyone to a common denominator and so to cover over, if not entirely to lose the complexity of, politics. This reader finds it difficult to believe, however, that political problems cannot merely be dramatized or even analyzed but actually solved through fictional works.

The essays in the Velasquez volume each focus on one author, or, in some cases, a few authors. The volume does not have a unifying thesis, although the essays all address a common problem or theme. Some of the authors, for example in the case of Jane Austen, explicitly disagree with each other. (Germaine Paulo Walsh argues that Austen has an Aristotelian view of character, whereas Inger Brodey contends that Austen is closer to Adam Smith.) In this space, I can only mention some of the pieces I found most striking. In the opening essay, Ronna Burger points out that the search for knowledge on the part of the woman apparently condemned in Genesis is what is praised in Socrates. Burger does not, however, consider the potential difference, if not outright contradiction, therefore, in the roots of the Western intellectual tradition. Likewise, Evanthia Speliotis points out that the apparent ground for the superiority of male to female in the household in the first book of Aristotle's Politics, greater physical strength, is the reason for the natural inferiority of the slave. Both of the natural relations in the household, Speliotis argues, are shown to be subpolitical and hence subrational. True political relations among equals involve ruling and being ruled in turn. But does Aristotle ever indicate that women can become citizens? Speliotis does not say. Matthew Crawford raises questions about the adequacy of Plutarch's defense of married love in the face of ancient philosophical pederasty. Melissa Matthes and Arlene Saxonhouse both suggest that the distinctions traditionally drawn between male and female roles and characteristics can be traced to force as much as, if not more than, to nature. Lee Ward disproves claims that John Locke supported a traditional notion of the natural and hence social and political inferiority of women

on the basis of an extraordinarily careful reading of a number of Locke's texts. Deborah Winkle brings out the ambiguous complexities in Rousseau's treatment of the natural, historical, and desirable relation between sexes in much more detail than Thompson. The collection ends with essays by Nicholas Capaldi on liberal political culture (Hegel to Mill), Denise Schaeffer on Nietzsche, Lesley Wheeler on Emily Dickinson, and Marc Conner on Toni Morrison—topics or authors Thompson ignored.

Whether one agrees or disagrees, the arguments presented in both volumes are wide-ranging and thought provoking. Both should be required reading for anyone exploring the basis and implications of sex and gender for human social relations and political order.

Liberalism Beyond Justice: Citizens, Society, and the Boundaries of Political Theory By John Tomasi. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 163p. \$55.00 cloth, \$15.95 paper.

Stephen L. Newman, York University

In a book published almost a decade ago, Ronald Beiner complained that contemporary liberalism suffers for its neglect of the Big Questions traditionally addressed by political philosophy. Preoccupied with narrowly conceived and highly formal questions of (procedural) justice, liberalism had no advice to give about how one should live. (See Ronald Beiner, What's the Matter with Liberalism, 1992.) John Tomasi's provocative new book takes this complaint seriously and attempts to remedy the defect in contemporary liberalism by moving it "beyond justice" to address the normative concerns of persons earnestly striving to lead good and worthwhile lives.

Tomasi considers modern liberal theory deficient insofar as most contemporary liberal theorists are willing to address social concerns only "in terms of justice and the legitimacy of state coercive action (or in terms of a narrow band of deliberative dispositions—e.g., the much ballyhooed 'sense of justice'—immediately attendant to those concepts)" (p. xv). Hence, an adequate theoretical defence of liberalism is taken to be identical to the project of justifying the authority of the liberal state" (p. xvi). But this narrow theoretical focus ignores the effects that liberal political institutions and practices inevitably have on the ethical outlooks of liberal citizens. Since there is much more to the moral lives of individuals than politics, and because the fit between a diverse citizenry's nonpublic moral views and the principles of political association is important to maintaining the stability of liberal regimes, liberals need to think seriously about why people such as we are would want to live in a society where the goal of contemporary liberalism—democratic justice has been legitimately achieved.

Liberals may be forgiven if they thought that the answer was obvious: Liberal justice offers a neutral political framework within which individuals who cannot agree on the meaning of life are able to live together peaceably, all of them free to pursue their own notions of how best to live (so long as they do not seek to impose their preferred ways of life on one another by force). Tomasi associates this position with "ethical liberalism," which treats the individual as the ultimate arbiter of what gives value to his or her own life. Ethical liberalism is said to rest on a particular conception of human moral personality, one that makes value formation a consequence of the individual's autonomous choices. Importantly, however, the ethical liberal point of view does not go unchallenged in modern society. Tomasi points out that the Romantic tradition is every bit as deeply rooted in Western culture; however, because Romantics do not affirm the normative ideal of individual autonomy, which seems to them a morally pernicious notion, they are hardly likely to accept justificatory political arguments that invoke an autonomy-affirming philosophy of life. Far from providing a neutral political framework, liberal institutions and practices will appear to them as morally subversive agents of change.

Respect for ethical diversity, which Tomasi places at the heart of the liberal principle of legitimacy, requires that all citizens be able to affirm liberal principles of political association for reasons that are fully convincing to them in light of their own more or less comprehensive moral views. In short, consistent liberals cannot require nonliberals to affirm a comprehensive liberal doctrine (such as ethical liberalism) as the price of admission to the liberal state. Tomasi understands Rawls's "political liberalism" as a response to the liberal legitimation crisis. By politicizing justice, i.e., by appealing only to people's shared political beliefs concerning the principles of justice. Rawls avoids having to make any substantive claims about the true moral nature of human beings. Instead, he anchors normative support for liberal justice in an overlapping consensus of moral viewpoints, each of which gives support to liberal political principles for good and sufficient reasons of its own. The only condition political liberalism imposes on citizens is that they "share the moral idea that humans are the kinds of beings who are owed reasons, in terms they themselves can accept, that justify coercive actions undertaken by the state with respect to them" (p. 9). While this limits the applicability of political liberalism to some finite number of social environments where reason-giving is the norm, it does not require any agreement concerning the best good for human beings.

In this sense Rawls succeeds at constructing a neutral scheme of justification; however, Tomasi insists that liberal political institutions and practices are not and cannot be neutral in their effects. This is because the language of liberal public discourse and the requirements of public reason have a tendency to infiltrate what he calls the "ethical background culture" of political liberalism, subtly pushing nonpublic moral beliefs in a liberal direction. He chides Rawls and other political liberals for treating this systemic ethical bias as inconsequential and insists that if political liberalism is to be truly accommodating of ethical diversity (and thus fully legitimate on its own terms), some way must be found of limiting the potentially homogenizing effects of liberal institutions and practices on the nonpublic sphere. It is here that Tomasi's argument is most original, and most controversial. He claims that political liberals have an obligation to be mindful of people's nonpublic moral commitments, which although not any part of public reason are, nonetheless, essential to their making a home in the world and thus immediately connected with their support of liberal institutions and practices.

Significant policy implications flow from this claim. Tomasi advocates that whenever possible public policies should be designed in ways that reduce the unintended effects of liberal justice on some citizens (without, of course, violating the rights of others). For example, liberal educators must be concerned "that they do not send a distorted or misleading message about nonpublic value as they go about preparing students for public life" (p. 93). This may require accommodating parental demands that public school students be educated about (though not in) particular religious traditions and made aware of how it is possible to reconcile political autonomy with their nonpublic moral commitments. More broadly, Tomasi thinks that liberalism needs to cultivate a deeper conception of citizenship, one that emulates the classical model by seeking to integrate the good citizen and the good person. "For any self-aware political liberal, any theory of good citizen conduct must include considerations about the way public values impinge on nonpublic spheres, and how those values can be put to personal uses there.... In a free society, the virtues of good citizens must be the virtues of (diverse) good souls" (p. 71).

Political liberals may not feel comfortable following Tomasi down this path. It is one thing to argue that genuine neutrality requires the liberal state to make reasonable accommodations for the protection of people's nonpublic moral beliefs; it is something else altogether to insist that liberals have an affirmative obligation to foster the nonpublic values that inform a morally diverse people's answers to the Big Questions of life. Political liberals will also find unsettling Tomasi's insistence that the need to accommodate ethical diversity places significant limits on the scope of redistributive social justice. In his view, redistributive measures turn out to have costs paid in terms of "the vanishing social space in which reasonable people might otherwise have perceived and responded to challenges of human social existence on their own, eudaimonistically directed terms" (p. 123). In other words, state intervention to address inequalities that may result from "the normal operation of free institutions" (p. 124) risks interference with the exercise of responsibilities toward others embedded in particular moral traditions. Fairness to these traditions and the ethical diversity they represent, Tomasi argues, reduces the opportunities for "social construction" undertaken in the name of justice. Perhaps. But there is a fine line in his argument between respecting the moral practices of social groups and providing incentives for potentially dissident members to stay where they are. Political liberals may well prefer to err on the side of potential dissidents by supplying them, as a matter of right, with the material resources that would ensure their independence.

**The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt** Edited by Dana Villa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 320p. \$55.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

Jeffrey C. Isaac, Indiana University, Bloomington

This is an excellent collection of essays about the political thought of Hannah Arendt. Its editor, Dana Villa, has assembled a first-rate group of scholars, many of whom are already well known for their contributions to Arendt studies. The volume is distinguished by the high quality of its contributions and by the effort of so many of its contributors to go beyond standard lines of exegesis to raise interesting questions and to press the boundaries of Arendt commentary. Arendt's work has received a great deal of attention from political theorists in recent years. The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt makes clear the richness of her thinking, the range of her concerns, and the ability of her writings to inspire creative commentary and constructive political theory.

The book consists of an Introduction and six thematic sections. In his fine Introduction, Dana Villa offers an overview of Arendt's career and concerns, emphasizing the rootedness of her theorizing in distinctively twentieth-century problems centering around totalitarianism. Villa underscores Arendt's modernism and her continuing relevance to contemporary concerns, themes that recur throughout the volume.

In Part One, "Totalitarianism and Nationalism," Margaret Canovan explores the distinctiveness of Arendt's unconventional account of the totalitarian phenomenon, emphasizing its diabolical and relentless tendency to sweep away human agency; and Ronald Beiner considers Arendt's discussions of different forms of nationalism, pointing out that while Arendt well understood the capacity of nationalism to frustrate human rights and political freedom, she failed to think constructively about political solutions to these problems. In Part Two, "Political Evil and the Holocaust," Seyla Benhabib ana-

lyzes the complexities of Arendt's treatment of Eichmann, and Mary Dietz offers an ingenious account of Arendt's theorizing as a particular kind of response to the traumatic horrors of the Holocaust, focusing on the absence of the Holocaust theme from Arendt's most constructive work of political theory, The Human Condition. While Benhabib emphasizes the lessons Arendt sought to learn from Nazism and the Eichmann trial, Dietz suggests that Arendt's political theory sought a "recreative escape" through the construction of a "powerful imagistic symbol" of heroic action removed from contemporary concerns. Similar themes are broached in Part Three, "Freedom and Political Action," with George Kateb discussing the strengths and weaknesses of Arendt's "heroic" conception of political action, and Jerome Kohn emphasizing the forward-looking character of Arendtian freedom. In Part IV, "Arendt and the Ancients," these themes are pursued from yet another angle, with J. Peter Euben, Jacques Taminaux, and Hauke Brunkhorst interpreting, in different ways, Arendt's reappropriation of ancient Greek and Roman theory and practice.

Part Five, "Revolution and Constitution," is perhaps the most interesting section of all. In it Jeremy Waldron offers a judicious and powerful account of the centrality of institutions to Arendtian politics, and Albrecht Wellmer presents a Habermasian rendering of Arendt's On Revolution, emphasizing the importance to modern politics of moral universalism and technological dynamism-both shortshrifted by Arendt-but also emphasizing the centrality of the political agency and civic responsibility that Arendt gives pride of place. Wellmer and Waldron both insist that Arendtian politics is best understood as a supplement rather than an alternative to liberal democratic institutions. Finally, in Part Six, "Judgment, Philosophy, and Thinking," essays by Maurizio Passerin D'Entreves, Frederick M. Dolan, and Richard J. Bernstein consider Arendt's writings on the various modes of thinking, underscoring in different ways Arendt's emphasis on the importance of intellectual independence and reflexivity in politics. Bernstein's essay, in particular, wrestles with some deep ambiguities in Arendt's corpus, locating a tension between worldliness and solitude in her understanding of "thinking," and linking this to her difficulty in coming to terms with the lessons of the career of her mentor, Martin Heidegger.

Arendt's corpus has exercised an extraordinary hold on the minds of political theorists since her death in 1975. It is hard to generalize about the voluminous Arendt literature, but it is possible to identify distinct lines of argument. If early readings of Arendt often tended to embrace her classicism as a counterweight to the positivistic tendencies of behavioral political science, for the past decade or more, as political theory has come into its own as a field, Arendt has been read against some of the dominant idioms of contemporary political theory itself. This has led to the flourishing of civic republican, Habermasian, Foucauldian, Derridaean, and other readings of Arendt. These readings have allowed scholars to construct fruitful dialogues between Arendt and a range of approaches, in the process fleshing out Arendt and these approaches themselves. The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt builds on this work. But it is also part of a broader recent tendency to move beyond it, following her own admonition to "think without bannisters" and outside of the box. Many of its commentaries are more than commentaries and more than efforts to extend conventional paradigms. They are efforts to probe Arendt in order to pursue difficult and relevant contemporary questions about the political meaning of evil, the nature of political agency, and the possibilities of democratic renewal. To this extent these essays are truly a fine "companion" to Arendt, for they help us not simply to

understand her but to do what she rightly thought we need to do—to think for ourselves about what we are doing.

The Platonic Political Art: A Study of Critical Reason and Democracy By John R. Wallach. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2001. 468p. \$65.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

Aristide Tessitore, Furman University

Not only is the practice of a genuinely Platonic political art compatible with a commitment to democracy, but, according to John Wallach's ambitious book, it furnishes a needed critical resource that can help tap the unfulfilled potential of democracy at the present time. Wallach's unconventional thesis emerges from his critical historicism, a method that attempts to carve a mean between the relatively ahistorical readings of Popper, Strauss, Arendt, Derrida, and Rorty (among others) and the radically historicist readings more typical of classicists and ancient historians (pp. 21-23). Whereas the latter tend to subordinate Plato to the historical and political forces of his time, the widely disparate interpretations of the former cohort view him as either "authoritarian" or radically "self-mocking." In either case, Plato is portrayed as an antagonist to the freedom and equality of democratic life. To release the Platonic political art from the grip of these influential but debilitating interpretations, Wallach seeks to navigate between the ahistorical elevation of theory (logos) and the historicist subordination of theory to practice (ergon), focusing instead on the dissonance of the logos/ergon relation itself.

Wallach explains that Plato's political art was forged in response to a welter of problems concerning power, ethics, and critical discourse in democratic Athens, all of which came to a head in "the honorable yet problematic life, and memory of Socrates," something he dubs "Plato's Socratic Problem" (p. 43). Socrates' failure to reconcile the exercise of virtue with the requirements of political life (depicted especially in the contrasting perspectives of Apology and Crito) became the central feature of Plato's Socratic problem, one that led to a new and distinctively philosophic conceptualization of the political art as an attempt "to understand and promote the potential for harmony between a critical ethics and the power of politics, between the ergon of democracy and the logos of justice" (p. 234).

The longest part of the book is devoted to an elucidation of Plato's political art. Plato begins with critical explorations of Athenian conventions in the aporetic dialogues (culminating in Protagoras and Gorgias), gives comprehensive and positive expression to his art in the Republic, and later applies it to practical themes of political leadership and constitutional law in the Statesman and Laws, respectively. Wallach incorporates generally accepted writing chronologies for the dialogues, but dependence upon theories of Plato's "intellectual development" has been displaced by the centrality of Plato's Socratic problem. The heart of this section-indeed, of the book as a whole—is a 116-page analysis of the Republic. Wallach contends that the Republic is misread when it is taken as a blueprint for political reform or dismissed as merely utopian; the genuinely Platonic connection between logos and ergon resides in the "inevitably problematic effort both to identify genuine justice discursively and philosophically and to exemplify it practically and politically" (p. 311). Moreover, Plato's pursuit of justice is marked by "the persuasion of education" rather than by the coercive or authoritarian imposition of violence. With these arguments in mind, Wallach takes on antidemocratic interpretations of the Republic. He maintains that the dialogue as a whole is not primarily directed against democracy but evidences a more radical project, one that rejects "the necessary connection between any existing political order... and the definition of justice" (p. 279, emphasis added). Rather than provide an ideal resolution for the problem of justice, Plato articulates an enduring problem, one that emerges from his attempt to grapple with the immediate historical conundrums dramatized in his "Socratic problem." It is this dynamic and open-ended interpretation of the Platonic political art that enables Wallach, in the final part of his book, to suggest ways in which that art might benefit contemporary debates about the relationship between critical reason and democracy.

Readers of Wallach's book will encounter an earnest Plato, one ardently devoted to the constructive project defined by his Socratic problem. But it is a Plato without humor and a Socrates stripped of the characteristic irony that both engaged and alienated his contemporaries. Indeed, the only time that irony becomes thematic is on the concluding page, where Wallach rightly notes "the remarkable irony" of his argument: A political art distinguished by its critical stance toward ancient democracy can become a democratic asset in the current postliberal age. Wallach intentionally plays down Socratic or Platonic irony, apparently fearing a movement of interpretative regress that threatens constructive philosophic claims (p. 90). He turns instead to the seemingly more solid ground of history but, in so doing, (ironically) runs the risk of distorting a truth about the historical Socrates that may be inseparable from his critical legacy. With respect to Plato, the possiblity of infinite regress is constrained by the artistry of the dialogue form he helped perfect.

This points to a second lacuna in Wallach's study, the almost complete absence of sensitivity to literary genre. In fact, Wallach wishes to bypass both the vagaries of literary interpretation and the apolitical appropriations of analytical philosophy. His halfway house, however, leans to the analytic side in its neglect of irony and literary drama, something he justifies with the claim that "philosophical arguments...count for more than their embodiment by characters" (p. 90). Dramatic elements are not entirely neglected but are valued as evidence for the historical problems that Plato attempts to resolve (p. 91), an approach that raises a more general question about the adequacy of the critical historicist method itself. Whereas it is readily apparent that our understanding of Plato is enriched by knowledge of history, it is by no means obvious when a particular argument should be considered historically dependent or historically transcending. Wallach invokes the latter perspective in the crucial case, arguing (correctly in my view) that the critical political theory of the Republic was not developed primarily in opposition to Athenian democracy, but with reference to injustices that suffuse "every existing political order" (p. 234). The reader is left to wonder how one ought to distinguish historical contingencies that constrain Plato's formulations from aspects of Plato's art that transcend the particular practical circumstances within which they were originally conceived. This judgment seems no less susceptible to the kind of regress that Wallach decries with respect to interpretations that engage the ironic and/or literary dimensions of Plato's art. Wallach also appears to allow partisan passions to intrude upon his project in a most unPlatonic way. Key points in his interpretation of the Republic (neither blueprint nor utopia; not a critique simply of democratic Athens but of all existing regimes) have been anticipated by Strauss and Bloom, whom he cites only to dismiss, derisively caricaturing their work as antipolitical or conservatively aristocratic.

Notwithstanding these difficulties, Wallach's book is clearly written, encompasses an impressive breadth of historical and

philosophic material, and strenuously engages a mountain of recent and not so recent scholarly debate about Plato. It also contains several subtle and insightful ways of framing particular issues within the *Republic* and relating them to Plato's other dialogues. Those who find Plato's literary genius or use of irony to be inseparable from his political

art will find this book unsatisfying. However, in the measure that Wallach succeeds in problematizing a widespread tendency to read Plato through the analytic or radically historicizing lenses developed especially during the last century, his book deserves serious consideration and makes an important contribution.

## **American Politics**

Black and Multiracial Politics in America Edited by Yvette M. Alex-Assensoh and Lawrence J. Hanks. New York: New York University Press, 2000. 404p. \$55.00 cloth, \$21.00 paper.

Michael K. Brown, University of California, Santa Cruz

The waves of immigrants arriving in the United States over the last 20 years, largely from Latin America and Asia, have settled in a few states—mainly California, New York, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey—and in big cities in those states. Like the migration of African Americans to northern cities in the twentieth century and the suburbanization of whites, this demographic transformation is remaking urban politics. Black and Multiracial Politics in America, a collection of original essays, addresses the implications of this change for "the practice and process of black and multiracial politics in American society" (p. xiii). The authors seek to forge a new link between the study of black and the study of multiracial politics.

This anthology is dedicated to the proposition that the black—white paradigm "no longer appropriately characterizes American racial politics." Not all of the essays speak to this question, but those that do raise two important issues. One question concerns the meaning of race in American politics, whether recent demographic changes fundamentally alter the color line. The second question is whether the relationship between the new immigrants and African Americans will turn on conflict or cooperation.

Some of the essays in this book suggest that racial divisions between whites and nonwhites remain salient to American politics despite immigration. Pie-te Lien and Margaret Conway demonstrate that blacks, Latinos, and Asian Americans are all far more likely to support affirmative action, albeit for very different reasons, than whites, who disproportionately oppose such policies. And Pie-te Lien shows that race is still consequential to voting. She writes, "All the nonwhite groups—Asians and Latinos especially—had much lower registration and voting rates than Whites" (p. 207). It is well known that voting rates for Latinos and Asian Americans are much lower than those for other groups because far fewer are eligible to register. Almost half of Asian Americans and two-fifths of Latinos are not citizens and therefore are disqualified. This is changing, particularly in California in the wake of the antiimmigrant ballot initiatives of the 1990s. Even so, racial differences in voting remain after accounting for differences in education, income, marital status, and union membership of eligible voters.

Since race matters for the new immigrants as well as African Americans, the interesting question is whether the divide between whites and nonwhites will lead to multiracial political coalitions or whether competition for resources, access, and political power results in new patterns of ethnic conflict, especially between blacks and the new immigrant groups. If the studies in this book are any guide, the answer

depends as much on how blacks respond to the new immigrants as on the reaction of whites. One factor influencing African Americans' response is the continuing significance of black racial consciousness, particularly a strong nationalist outlook. In one of the most interesting essays in the book, Errol Henderson argues that Black Nationalism waxes or wanes depending on macro political phenomena, specifically war, a repressive political climate, and whether the country is preoccupied with foreign or domestic affairs. Wars sharpen the discrepancy between black sacrifice abroad and oppression at home, inducing African-American militancy and white intransigence. In these circumstances, black leaders championing integration lose out to nationalists.

Henderson's valuable effort to chart the oscillations of Black Nationalism is not wholly convincing, mainly because World War II and the Korean war do not really fit the pattern. There are also secular changes that matter. In their fascinating study of the Million Man March, Joseph McCormick II and Sekou Franklin find that racial consciousness remains the most salient feature of African American political identity today even among putative integrationists. They are far more race conscious than the integrationsts of the pre-1965 era and "far more concerned," McCormick and Franklin write, "with reforming the economic, political, and social order and removing racial impediments to their progress than with mere racial integration per se" (p. 331). McCormick and Franklin think that either black consciousness could lead to efforts to form new political coalitions or it could intensify nationalism and impede the development of nascent multiracial coalitions. Whether it leads to coalitions or to separation depends in part on the ethnic and political consciousness of other groups. Unfortunately, we learn very little in this book about the political identity and consciousness of most Latinos or Asian Americans. This is one of the major weaknesses of the collection.

Several essays address the difficulties of building multiracial coalitions. Raphael Sonenshein argued some time ago that biracial political coalitions depended in part on an alliance between groups who were mutually excluded from political power and influence but who shared political goals and ideology. Blacks, Puerto Ricans, and Afro-Caribbeans all tread the same side of the color line and could be expected to endorse similar policies. For two reasons, however, multiracial coalitions are difficult to build and sustain. One of the paradoxes of contemporary black politics is that African Americans now have political power in many cities but remain a marginal group, victimized by white racism. José E. Cruz found that resentment and racial ambivalence governed the relationship between blacks and Puerto Ricans in Hartford, Connecticut, and frustrated efforts at cooperation. Black elites were reluctant simply to give up power to a new group, who, not surprisingly, insisted on appointing members of their own group to agencies and elected offices.

The other reality shaping the development of multiracial political coalitions is the transnational identity of many of the new immigrants. Whatever ostensible political objectives they might share with blacks, Reuel Rogers argues that

Afro-Caribbean political identity is shaped by a "sojourner mentality [that] fuels the 'myth of return." (p. 39) Maintaining their ties to families and friends in their home countries enables Afro-Caribbeans to think that exit may be preferable to voice. Rogers is right to point out that both pluralists who preach assimilation and those who think that the new immigrants will become just another minority group wrongly ignore the power of a transnational political identity.

This collection of essays could not be timelier. Although some of the studies are peripheral to the major themes and thus less interesting, scholars pondering the implications of recent immigration for ethnic and racial politics would do well to look at this collection of essays.

American Labor Unions in the Electoral Arena By Herbert B. Asher, Eric S. Heberlig, Randall B. Ripley, and Karen Snyder. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 207p. \$69.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Glenn Perusek, Albion College

For more than a generation, as the authors rightly point out, the impact of organized labor on electoral politics has been neglected in scholarly literature. Indeed, only a tiny minority of social scientists explicitly focuses on organized labor in the United States. Although the impact of the social movements of the 1960s appeared to heighten awareness of the importance of class, race, and gender, class and its organized expression, the union movement, has received less attention, while studies of race and gender have flourished.

Thus, a systematic study of the impact of organized labor upon electoral politics, historically grounded yet centered upon contemporary outcomes and prospects, is to be welcomed. This work, the product of a decade-long study of organized labor in electoral politics, relies on American National Election Studies for national data. But in research funded by the Center for Labor Research at Ohio State University, the authors conducted four original surveys of elections in Ohio (1990–96), sampling union members and the general population. In addition to being a succint statement from a behavioralist perspective of the trajectory of American labor in politics since the 1950s, this work's distinctive contribution is the careful analysis of these surveys.

The study is set against the backdrop of a long process of erosion of the power of organized labor in the United States, as well as the political and organizational turn taken by the AFL-CIO in 1995 to arrest this decline. The authors have a strong sense of the transformation of the socioeconomic circumstances of organized labor. In the 1930s to 1950s period, the typical union member lived in an urban/industrial center, near the factory, in a neighborhood with many co-workers. In this environment, the union hall was an integral institution in the community, "the site of frequent meetings, wedding receptions, weekend dances, and summertime potlucks. Factory, family, union, and neighbors were intertwined" (p. 35). But the postwar period, of course, brought suburbanization and membership dispersal, as well as transformations of the American economy that resulted in membership decline, with a membership that was more white collar, self-identified as "middle class," and less committed to traditional strategies for achieving organizational goals.

While union density declined throughout the postwar period, the official labor movement adopted a status quo political orientation. Traditional union political strategy minimized expenditures on education and mobilization, particularly of members whose beliefs differed from the organization. Tar-

geting key races for political action committee (PAC) contributions, and then lobbying those elected to office, was easier than the painstaking process of working with the rank and file to solidify them behind the Democratic Party or a comprehensive issue agenda. Even though this system achieved few political victories for labor in the post-Taft Hartley era, it was able to protect organized labor from greater political defeats so long as the Democratic Party enjoyed majorities in Congress. As narrowly efficient as this strategy was, it bred organizational complacency. When Democratic control of Congress ended, labor was forced to reevaluate the traditional strategy. The Sweeney administration of the AFL-CIO has emphasized aggressive organizational campaigns, political mobilization of existing members, and an increasingly sophisticated use of electronic media to improve organized labor's image to the general public.

With the election of the John Sweeney as president of the AFL-CIO, organized labor sought renewal through a renewed focus on organization of new members, although it engaged in increasingly sophisticated electoral activity as part of a comprehensive strategy. Sweeney openly spoke of the danger that organized labor would be consigned to permanent irrelevance in the United States if unable to organize new members. The authors disagree with Sweeney's advocacy that organized labor renew itself by becoming a social movement representing universal interests, suggesting, definitionally, that social movements operate outside "normal institutional channels" and employ "illegitimate, disruptive tactics" (p. 3). Their judicious formulation treats organized labor as a "peak association" primarily concerned with advancing the interests of their own members, but capable of speaking for the interests of nonmembers as part of broader coalitions.

The book, however, is not centered upon organized labor as an interest organization advocating a policy orientation in the legislative arena. Instead, it is organized labor's work in elections, and the related activities of membership education and mobilization, that form the primary concerns of the volume. After examining the historical, demographic, and sociological transformations that have diminished union power in the postwar period, the authors explore members' attitudes toward unions (Chapter 3), traditional political strategy (Chapter 4), political strategy in the Sweeney era (Chapter 5), union political activists (Chapter 6), and election day outcomes (Chapter 7).

This research confirms the standard wisdom of behavioral studies that "party identification is the ultimate variable" (p. 41); in the case of organized labor, party identification and ideology are the strongest predictors of support for unionendorsed candidates. In other words, membership in a union alone washes out as a factor in vote choice, once controlled for party identification. Does this make labor irrelevant in American elections? Hardly. The authors convincingly argue that deeper, long-run education and mobilization do make organized labor a factor. Election campaign mobilization is less important than long-run education: "Committed members are more likely to look to the union for cues and to follow those cues" (p. 151). This seems to confirm the Sweeney administration's view that organizing new members, educating members and the general public on the positive social and economic benefits of unionization, and political strategy work hand in hand in the difficult task of revitalizing American unionism. It also points in the direction of studies on the formation of liberal ideology and Democratic Party identification, studies that in all likelihood will need to rely on different methodologies than those employed in this able expression of behavioralist research.

Superintending Democracy: The Courts and the Political Process Edited by Christopher P. Banks and John C. Green. Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 2001. 396p. \$39.95.

The Votes That Counted: How the Court Decided the 2000 Presidential Election By Howard Gillman. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001. 301p. \$27.50.

Robert W. Langran, Villanova University

Superintending Democracy is a very fine collection of articles about the role of the judicial branch and our electoral system. It is an especially timely book in view of the Supreme Court's ruling in Bush v. Gore. However, the book does not focus on that one decision. Rather, the articles run the gamut and cover all the times the courts and electoral politics intertwine.

In the opening article, not only do editors Banks and Green discuss the theme of the book and how the remaining 11 articles fit that theme but they set forth a model to examine just how much of a role the courts do play. They look at the degree of intervention and whether the subject matter involves political resources or political actors. Then the next five articles use the political resources area.

The article by Banks has a myriad of cases that discuss the Supreme Court's response to political corruption, i.e., bribery, conflict of interest, campaign finance (with much emphasis on Buckley v. Valeo, the integrity of the ballot and franchise, political participation, and partisan parties. The author gives the Court praise. The John Bonifaz, Gregory Luke, and Brenda Wright article gives arguments why Buckley should be revisited in light of the massive campaign spending in federal elections, whereas the Joel Gora article likes Buckley's linkage of campaign spending with free speech. Each will be persuasive for its adherents. The Trevor Potter article looks at the Supreme Court's decision on disclosure in campaign finance reform, arguing that the Court will be more inclined to uphold disclosure laws for larger organizations than for individuals. The Barbara Perry article tackles the racial gerrymandering problem and how the Court has tried to steer a moderate path here.

The six articles concerning political actors starts with coeditor Green's look at the Supreme Court and political parties, beginning with a classic anecdote from one of his students about parties. Green fears that the Court may become too involved with intraparty disputes, a highly political matter. The David Ryden article looks at political reform and concludes that the Court has done poorly here with regard to minor and new parties, with the Timmons case a classic example. The David O'Brien article examines the Court's role in political patronage, stressing that it has not ended it despite allegations to the contrary. The Katy Harriger article focuses on the Whitewater and Iran-Contra controversies, arguing that independent counsels in both cases encountered problems in this investigation due to legal limitations. The Steven Tauber article shows how great the influence of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund was, is, and will be with regard to minority voting rights law. Finally, coeditor Banks closes with a look at Bush v. Gore, concluding that the Court did overstep its bounds here in its attempt to superintend democracy.

As for the Gillman book, it is a meticulous study of the 2000 presidential election and the role played by various people and institutions once Election Day was history. It differs from other books on the subject in that it gives an in-depth look at all the events that led to the Supreme Court's Bush v. Gore decision, so much so that the book is not only a fascinating read but also an excellent resource tool. After setting out the plan of the book, Gillman proceeds to show why Democratic voters in Palm Beach County had lawsuits filed in their behalf (his description of the "butterfly ballot" is illuminating)

and why Volusia County filed a lawsuit against the Florida secretary of state (later joined by Palm Beach County). Contrary to what many people believe, the Bush campaign filed the first lawsuit (for an emergency injunction to try to halt manual recounts), which was denied by a U.S. District Court judge and the Court of Appeals. The Florida Supreme Court would also not halt them, but after a lower Florida judge allowed the secretary of state to ignore late recount results, the Florida Supreme Court unanimously held that she must accept them and extended the deadline (although it later refused to compel Miami-Dade County to restart its recount, and it upheld a lower Florida judge's ruling that he had no authority to order a new election in Palm Beach County).

This is where the Bush campaign decided to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, and three days after hearing the argumants, it unanimously vacated the decision and asked the Florida court to clarify whether its decision was based exclusively on Florida statutes, which subsequently they said it was. The U.S. Court of Appeals then ruled 8-4 that the manual recounts were valid. As all this was occurring, separate cases were heard by lower Florida judges about the way absentee ballots were handled in two counties by Republicans, but were allowed, and the decisions were later upheld by the Florida Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the separate case of Gore v. Harris saw a 4-3 Florida Supreme Court order an immediate commencement of a statewide recount of so-called undervotes, the Court of Appeals deny Bush's appeal, but the U.S. Supreme Court 5-4 issue an emergency injunction to halt it. That same day, a U.S. District Court judge held that the Florida Constitution was not violated by the acceptance of absentee ballots after Election Day, said decision later upheld by a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals.

That brings Gillman to a full discussion of the oral arguments before the U.S. Supreme Court in *Bush* v. *Gore*, followed the next night (December 12) by the Court's 5–4 decision holding that the manual recount violated the equal protection clause due to the standard for reviewing ballots, which allowed for too much variation. Thus ended the election, because Gore conceded the next day.

The book would be valuable enough if it ended here, as it has so much detailed information. However, Gillman now proceeds to give his analysis, and he comes to the conclusion that the Court's decision was wrong: It was a usurpation of judicial power, and even though it ended a period of uncertainty about next president, it was classic partisan decision making. Acceptance or rejection of that conclusion should not be the determining factor of the book's importance, which lies in its thorough examination of all the legal maneuverings surrounding this historic election. Both the Banks-Green and the Gillman books are worthy contributions to the literature on the role played by courts in electoral processes.

Continuity and Change in House Elections Edited by David W. Brady, John F. Cogan, and Morris P. Fiorina. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 297p. \$55.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Patricia Conley, Northwestern University

For years, congressional elections were ignored or treated as fairly straightforward and predictable. The Democrats controlled the House. Incumbents nearly always won. Voters chose the candidate who would deliver the local goods. The magnitude of the Republican victory in the 1994 midterms set politicians, journalists, and scholars on a search to find an explanation that would place the election in the proper context. Was 1994 an outlier or the beginning of a new era? This volume places the 1990s in the context of the past 40 years of

House elections and provides a solid foundation for gauging whether 1994 was the culmination of long-term trends or a dramatic break with the past.

The book is an outgrowth of a conference sponsored by the Hoover Institute after the elections of 1994 and 1996, aimed at explaining how the Republicans could have captured the House of Representatives and retained their majority, despite Clinton's sizable reelection victory. First, what best explains the Republican takeover in 1994? A nationalized congressional campaign? Redistricting? A large number of Democratic retirements? Some chapters look at structural changes that provided opportunities for Republican gains over time; other chapters focus on more immediate causes of victory. Second, what are the factors that affected a member's reelection chances in the 1990s? Roll call voting or district service? The book suggests that candidate ideology and policy behavior played an important role in the congressional elections of the 1990s. In most chapters, the 1994 election is not viewed in isolation, but in the context of time-series data going back 20 to 40 years.

The early chapters outline long-term trends and structural changes that led to the Republican majority in the House. Gary Jacobson suggests that "the question is not so much why the Republicans finally won the House in 1994 but why it took them so long to do so" (p. 11). During the past 40 years, the incumbency advantage has declined and the number of contested House races has increased. In recent years, there has been a greater congruence between presidential and House voting. Jacobson argues that these factors, along with an increase in the quality of Republican challengers and voluntary retirements among Democrats, combined to give the Republicans their majority in 1994. Charles Bullock documents the increase in white voter support for Republican candidates in the South, where the Republican Party has gained the greatest number of seats. David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran analyze the effects of majority-minority redistricting.

Later chapters focus on the nationalization of the 1994 election. Congressional elections are typically viewed as lowsalience, local events. But in 1994, the Republican House leadership offered their "Contract with America" as a platform for all Republican candidates and ran against the politics of President Bill Clinton. The public was more aware of which party controlled the House in 1994 than in any election year since the mid-1970s when this type of data was first collected. John Hibbing and Eric Tiritilli show that in 1994, disapproval of Congress actually mattered-attribution of blame to the Democratic Party hurt Democratic incumbents. David Brady, Robert D'Onofrio, and Morris Fiorina discuss nationalization by examining how well House elections are predicted by the previous presidential vote. They provide an interesting account of the ups and downs of the local and national components of the House vote since 1954, and show that the national component of the vote was indeed on an upswing in

Several authors take issue with the notion that congressional elections are not oriented around policy. The steady increase in the ideological polarization of political parties in the House has made it easier for parties to be viewed as collectives and held responsible at the polls. Both Robort Erikson and Gerald Wright and also David Brady, Brandice Canes-Wrone, and John Cogan argue for the importance of policy by providing evidence that members who stray too far from their districts' ideological position are punished at the polls. Brady and his coauthors speculate that members may stray from their districts on roll call votes in exchange for appointments and perks offered by presidents and party leaders. David Leal and Frederick Hess examine the role of issues by interviewing the campaign staff of challengers in

several states in 1994. They find that Democratic challengers were less eager to campaign on the issues, even when their party was generally viewed as more competent on a particular issue. They argue that Republican emphasis on the issues, particularly crime, could help explain the magnitude of their victory in 1994.

The book provides persuasive evidence that the elections of the mid-1990s were not merely an anomaly. Congressional elections have changed. After reading this book, it would be hard to argue that congressional elections are purely local affairs. The public appears to treat members of Congress as men and women of style, pork, and substance. As for political predictions, the book suggests that the factors that led to the Republican takeover do not offer the Democrats hope of a dramatic return to power in the near future. In addition, Stephen Ansolabehere and Jim Snyder show that good committee assignments and membership in the majority party lead to much greater success in fund-raising, particularly political action committee donations. Thus, the Republican majority is potentially reinforced by incumbency advantages in raising money.

Although the major explanations for Republican victory are compelling, it is difficult to glean the relative weight of explanatory variables because each chapter focuses on a separate subset of explanations. One chapter documents changes in the South; another concentrates on the effects of congressional disapproval. Further, several authors impute policy motivations to voters when evaluating congressional candidates, yet only one chapter uses individual-level survey data to discuss the reasons and motivations of voters; other chapters use aggregate, district-level data. Senate races would be a helpful and interesting contrast. More attention could be paid to whether theories of divided government would be modified by what we have learned about recent congressional elections.

Yet despite these concerns, this edited volume is a major contribution to the literature on congressional elections. The chapters present solid empirical work and fit well together. In addition to providing a thoughtful analysis of the election of 1994, the editors have put together a volume that will give the reader an overview of the major trends, empirical measures, and theoretical questions that motivate this field of research.

The Politics of Breast Cancer By Maureen Hogan Casamayou. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 191p. \$60.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Carol S. Weissert, Michigan State University

This book aims to explain why funding levels for breast cancer research suddenly achieved extensive media coverage, as well as both attention and action from Congress and the White House, in the period between 1990 and 1993. Maureen Hogan Casamayou's answer: the effective mobilization of legions of angry women and their allies by entrepreneurial leaders in a new breast cancer coalition. She tells the story of how these women came together, charted strategy, and succeeded in expanding federal funding.

In fact, the book covers more than this rather narrow time frame and provides an engaging and informative description of the history of funding for cancer research, the political activities surrounding that history, and the role of women legislators in bringing the issue of research parity to the policy agenda—all happening before 1990. In fact, as Casamayou notes, women's grassroots groups have been active against cancer for many years. For example, in 1937 a coalition of women's groups drummed up support for federal cancer legislation. Congressional hearings on breast cancer were first

held in 1976. Breast cancer has long garnered research funding, which in 1987 was larger than research related to any other type of cancer.

The actors (or actresses) in Casamayou's story are engaging and smart. Too many women die from the disease, but their contributions are many. Indeed, the contribution of this book is primarily in the story it tells of three breast cancer issues that played out prior to the announced time frame of the book: surgery options for breast cancer victims, mammography screenings, and funding for research on breast cancer.

Casamayou clearly and concisely documents the frustration of women in the 1970s when they sought alternatives to radical surgical treatment of breast cancer. When one medical writer sought to get a diagnostic biopsy prior to surgical removal of her breast, 19 surgeons turned her down. In the following years, a modified radical mastectomy and other surgical offerings became widespread. The efforts to increase access to mammography also took place in the 1970s. and mammography screenings greatly increased in the 1980s. Grassroots lobbying played an important part in the passage in the late 1980s of federal legislation requiring Medicare coverage of routine mammography screening. The original requirement was part of the 1988 Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act that was later repealed. It was revived as part of the fiscal 1991 budget-reconciliation bill, even though it had been in neither the House nor the Senate bills.

In the late 1980s, women legislators in the Congressional Caucus on Women's Issues were raising questions about breast cancer research and other issues, such as the poor representation of women in clinical trials in National Institutes of Health-funded research. Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa, whose sister had died from the disease, was a strong supporter of increased funding for breast cancer research, and he was the initiator of the "ingenious device" by which Department of Defense money could be directly allocated for this purpose. As Casamayou notes, "It is indeed ironic that one of the most prestigious and traditional male-oriented government departments, the DOD, is disbursing funds for breast cancer research" (p. 161).

While this background is useful and provides extremely vivid examples of how legislative and individual entrepreneurs can affect policy in major ways, Casamayou's primary concern is the nationally and regionally organized efforts to affect policy in the early 1990s. She focuses on the National Breast Cancer Coalition (NBCC), which was formed in 1991 with the express purpose of political advocacy. The coalition built on the work of earlier advocates by organizing massive petition drives and marches, encouraging congressional hearings, and using the media to help tell the breast cancer "story." The NBCC was active in political campaigns; in the late 1990s it organized a voting registration drive and sponsored a national poll illustrating the importance of breast cancer to the American voter.

Casamayou describes the activities of the new NBCC, highlighting their mobilization and publicity efforts. While she asserts that the early 1990s are a distinctive and remarkable period in the history of grassroots mobilization, her own story highlights how this mobilization actually built on and expanded earlier efforts. The NBCC did provide an organizational framework for political advocacy—performed in earlier years by more loosely coupled groups and organizations focused primarily on funding issues. But the similarities far exceed the differences.

Casamayou makes the point that the success of the breast cancer-prevention advocates (pre-1990 and later) is because of their "collective entrepreneurship." But she does not cite the literature on collective entrepreneurship and indeed

never fully specifies how she is defining the term. Further, her "evidence" is pretty weak. She makes the (interesting) point that entrepreneurs in the area have had personal experience with breast cancer, but her documentation is flawed by a lack of clarification of how she is "counting." In one table, she counts the number of entrepreneurs in grassroots and national organizations but does not explain how entrepreneurs are defined and what it means that the Kentucky organization has two leaders (entrepreneurs) who had breast cancer. Similarly, the table does not explain why seven state organizations were selected. A second table supporting the idea that collective entrepreneurship took place has only a few of the states from the earlier table and little explanation for how the "shared experience" explaining their involvement was defined.

Another quibble is with the organization of the book, which early on mentions groups by initials and individuals by name. none of whom are identified. There is also some confusion caused by the author's skipping around in chronology—with some earlier events explained later in the book rather than in more obvious introductory sections. In addition, the espoused focus of the book on the 1990-93 period seems forced and inappropriate. Some of the most interesting events described in the book occurred before or after that period. She notes that the NBCC "fairly claimed much of the credit for the enormous increases in breast cancer research in the 1990s" (p. x), but the NBCC was not even formed until mid-1991. And the book does not provide a table showing the growth of funding for breast cancer—a mystifying omission given that explaining the growth in breast cancer funding is a major aim of this book.

Finally, the author doesn't adequately make the case that it is the national political advocacy group that is the true success story here. She undercuts her own case by showing how individual, congressional, and grassroots efforts started almost two decades before 1990, efforts which were very successful and paved the way for the NBCC—a latecomer to the policy world. Nevertheless, the book provides a very useful telling of a very interesting story of grassroots and congressional advocacy. It outlines the strategies, motivations, and personal stories behind this effort. The analysis of collective action on the part of the NBCC was a secondary and more disappointing aspect of the book.

Civil Rights and Public Accommodations: The Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung Cases By Richard C. Cortner. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. 240p. \$29.95.

Joseph Stewart, Jr., University of New Mexico

Mention Richard Cortner's name and political scientists think of "stories" of court cases well and thoroughly told. Cortner's latest effort is another superb contribution to this line of work. In this work he focuses on the two cases in which the constitutionality of Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA) was tested—the *Heart of Atlanta Motel* case and the "Ollie's Barbeque" case.

Title II was the most hotly debated part of the CRA, but, probably because of the relative ease of implementing its provisions compared to subsequent civil rights policy in voting rights, school desegregation, equal employment opportunity, or open housing, it has been neglected in recent scholarship. This inattention is doubly ironic given the fact that one of the most infamous of the Supreme Court's cases, *Plessy v. Ferguson* (1896), was a public accommodations case.

Cortner begins by setting background for and the context of the passage of the CRA. The constitutional and strategic issues are immediately obvious. Where does Congress get the power to legislate against racial discrimination in public accommodations? How can privately owned business enterprises be *public* accommodations? Does the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause apply? Should Article I's Commerce Clause be dispositive? Would the Supreme Court be willing to overrule the *Civil Rights Cases* (1883), which struck down the previous Congressional attempt to outlaw racial discrimination in public accommodations—the Civil Rights Act of 1875?

Having set the stage, Cortner details the progress of each of the cases. The contrast is also immediately obvious. The Heart of Atlanta Motel is clearly and admittedly covered by Title II and houses a restaurant that had desegregated. Thus, the government (read: Solicitor General Archibald Cox) can take the offensive. (Recent attendees of the APSA convention might find it interesting to know that the motel stood on the current site of the Atlanta Hilton & Towers.)

Simultaneously, in the same city, Lester Maddox defended (literally, with pickax handles) his Pickrick restaurant against desegregation (and parlayed the accompanying fame into the Governorship and Lt. Governorship of Georgia, in that order). The FBI had thoroughly investigated this case, and the government was well prepared to defend this case at the Supreme Court. Because, however, Maddox declined to appeal his initial court loss, the first restaurant case came from an out-of-the-way barbeque joint in "Bombingham," Alabama—Ollie's Barbeque—which had not been the target of any enforcement action. Ollie McClung, Sr., according to Cortner, found the inspiration for his opposition to the CRA not in racism, but in religion. To the government's discomfort, the case was more tenuously connected to interstate commerce, the grounds upon which Congress had at least implicitly based the legislation. Interestingly, in both cases, both opponents of the CRA vowed to obey the Supreme Court's decision.

Cortner is at his best as he details the legal arguments in each of the cases and judicial deliberations of the cases combined. "Details" is not an idly chosen verb. Cortner's research into presidential files, oral histories, Department of Justice Civil Rights Division files (of the Heart of Atlanta case but not the McClung case, the files of which are lost), and files of participating attorneys is obvious. Cortner recalls both old (New York v. Miln, 1837) and more contemporaneous (Bell v. Maryland, 1964) public accommodations cases. His insights on the arguments and the rationales for those arguments of the Heart of Atlanta and McClung attorneys and the Justices is superb—the result of careful, time-consuming, and meticulous scholarly work. We know more about the politics of litigation and of Supreme Court politics because of this work.

So what? Cortner again does a superb job of explicating the importance of these cases for Commerce Clause and civil rights law. One might be tempted to say that these cases ended an era. After all, the Court has issued only one significant decision applying the public accomodations section since 1964 (Daniel v. Paul, 1969 [upholding the application of the public accommodations provisions to a privately owned recreation area outside of Little Rock, AR]). Cortner, however, demonstrates the continuing relevance of this litigation by comparing it to the "mini-revival of the doctrine of dual federalism" (p. 195) and the Court's willingness to impose limits on the use of the commerce power as a basis for legislation, signaled by the Court's rediscovery of the Tenth Amendment and its creative readings of the Eleventh Amendment. The account is current through the spring 2000 decision in U.S. v. Morrison (the Violence Against Women Act case).

Cortner's latest book is valuable on several dimensions. Even those scholars and teachers who have taught these cases for years will learn something from Cortner's account. Quite

simply, no one before has gone to the effort to amass so much information in one place about these important and interesting cases and the people involved. Scholars and teachers will already know the basics of judicial process and the nature of litigation that are presented herein, but their students, who do not, will learn what they need to know in the context of real cases, vividly depicted by Cortner. Thus, this volume would be a superb supplement in judicial process, constitutional law, civil rights, or American government courses. It should be read by anyone interested in these topics or teaching these courses.

Taking Aim: Target Populations and the Wars on AIDS and Drugs By Mark C. Donovan. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 148p. \$50.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Steven A. Peterson, Penn State, Harrisburg

One recent approach to the study of public policy has been policy design. And one component of this is the concept of target populations. Perhaps the strongest case for the importance of target populations as a focus for research has been advanced in the work of Anne Schneider and Helen Ingram. They have argued that target populations help to shape the construction of public policies. If target populations are politically weak and have negative constructions (for instance, drug users and drug dealers), then policies will tend to be harsh and punitive—penalties rather than benefits. In part, this serves political purposes, since one would get "political points" for being harsh with those who have little power and are perceived as "bad" people. In the process, bad policy may result, since the construction of target populations and policies aimed at them may have little to do with actually solving complex social problems.

Mark Donovan's book, Taking Aim: Target Populations and the Wars on AIDS and Drugs, begins where Schneider and Ingram leave off. His analysis of target populations adds an extra dimension—the nature of the problem being addressed. As a result, this book becomes a modest but useful step forward in the literature on target populations and policy design.

First, a brief description of the book. The first chapter simply explores the concept of target populations, building on the work of Schneider and Ingram. Donovan defines target population thus (p. 4): "Target populations are groups of people delimited by some shared characteristics who are identified through legislative language as the recipient of a benefit, a burden, or special treatment under federal law."

Donovan notes the importance of the political ambition of elected officials in dealing with target populations. He also emphasizes the key role of social problems. In the end, policy is a function of the interaction of target populations and social problems, with political ambition of elected officials and the structure of political institutions also coming into play.

Chapter 2 elaborates upon the political context, noting the importance of institutions, especially committees and committee hearings and floor debate, on the politics of target populations. Hearings and other venues provide opportunities for political leaders to "explain themselves" regarding policy choice—including how target populations are to be treated and why.

Chapters 3 and 4 are case studies of target populations: first, drug policy, and second, AIDS policy. Many in the target populations of drug users and AIDS victims are negatively constructed—and without much power. Thus, not surprisingly, political discourse can be harsh against such groups, with penalties assessed against them. Examples include the

clever use of politicizing the target population of AIDS victims by Jesse Helms and how he put opponents into a bad political position by his framing of the targeted people with AIDS (PWAs). However, Donovan notes that within each target population we find subpopulations, such as veterans who become drug users. Political leaders make fine-grained calculations and may treat different subgroups within a target population differently for political purposes (e.g., veterans who are drug users end up treated differently than other subpopulations of drug users).

The end result, as the rest of the book shows, is that sometimes segments of negatively constructed target populations are treated positively by Congress, receiving benefits rather than punishment. The Ryan White Act, for instance, provides benefits for some components of the AIDS population, based on the positive construction of innocent victims, such as hemophiliacs. This discussion is a modest advance over the original conceptualization of target populations by Schneider and Ingram.

A key case study is needle exchange. This is a program that has some rational linkage with reducing the spread of AIDS among intravenous drug users. But the "war on drugs" makes it, politically, extremely difficult for policymakers to accept this program as a policy choice. The construction of target populations is one important element in this political decision.

All in all, this is a useful volume that advances discourse on target populations. A number of commentators have observed that the policy design literature often has an abstract, ungrounded flavor to it. One aspect of policy design, though, does appear to provide an opportunity for solid empirical research, and that is the focus on target populations. What Schneider and Ingram did at a conceptual level, Donovan does at a more grounded level: He demonstrates the importance of the concept for explaining federal policy. Especially noteworthy is his use of content analysis to examine committee hearings and floor debate in order to see what themes emerged and how these were linked to target populations and policy problems, as members of Congress grappled with how to create policy on drug use and AIDS.

This book will be useful to readers who are interested in the formation of public policy, who are interested in the nature of policy design—especially as policy design is linked to target populations, and who study the nature of the linkage of social problems with policy solutions. In the final analysis, this book makes a nice, albeit limited, contribution to the literature.

## Married to the Mouse: Walt Disney World and Orlando By Richard E. Foglesong. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001. 251p. \$27.95.

Susan E. Clarke, University of Colorado at Boulder

This account of the development of Walt Disney World in Florida is an engaging contribution to the growing literature on tourism and urban politics. The many pleasures of reading this book include learning that Disney World was initially slated for St. Louis, that Henry Kissinger declared that Epcot would enhance world peace more than this shuttle diplomacy, that Disney prepared a proposal for a HUD planning grant for Disney World, and that even Walt Disney thought that Disneyland Anaheim was tacky. Foglesong meticulously details more than three decades of negotiations among the Walt Disney corporate conglomerate, the city of Orlando, and Orange and Osceola counties in Florida over the location and development of Walt Disney World and its spinoff theme parks. Not surprisingly, the Mouse wins most of the battles.

To Disney, "both capitalism and democracy were problematic," in Foglesong's felicitous diagnosis. Each resulted in more fragmentation than the Disney corporation considered tolerable; to resolve this dilemma in Florida, the Disney corporation constructed a land development model with highly centralized administration and control, embedded in fused private and public powers. Disney negotiated not only for tax breaks and infrastructure development subsidies in Florida but also for institutional arrangements that granted Disney developments autonomy from local and state political control. These institutional privileges and "immunities," rather than tax incentives per se, are at the heart of the Orlando deal. It promised growth in exchange for privatization of governmental authority and deregulation of conventional land use and zoning controls. The Orlando area boomed with the location of Disney World: It remains one of the fastest-growing urban areas in the United States, job growth is explosive, and an enormous tourism infrastructure of hotels, entertainment attractions, and commercial development continues to unfold. The price of this growth, however, is equally staggering: Tourism brought low-wage jobs, overloaded local services and transportation facilities, and created substantial affordable housing shortages.

For Orlando and the surrounding counties, the Disney deal proved remarkably lopsided. Tax breaks reduced the local tax revenues that might have contributed to meeting the costs of explosive growth. The establishment of Reedy Creek Improvement District as a special-purpose district governed by Disney allowed the Mouse to control development as well as crowd out other local governments in bidding for bond financing for the Disney World infrastructure. Disney's informal influence operated through lavish perks for local and state officials, well-funded lobbying, a clientelistic pattern of contracts with planning organizations, engineering and construction companies, and legal firms throughout the region, and a readiness to enter into lawsuits with anyone appearing to stand in the way of the corporate mission. And in an early and prescient move, Walt Disney himself insisted that the Disney World project spill over government boundaries to ensure interjurisdictional competition for Disney favors.

Early on, the Orange County Commission (p. 73), labor unions (p. 86), and public planners (p. 91) contested the Disney initiatives. Indeed, when opponents mobilized to voice their concerns, Disney often made strategic concessions to preserve its favorable image and public support. These occasions were infrequent, however, the concessions were modest and public officials rarely pursued their advantage in negotiations over an obviously immobile investment. Most local elected officials sought growth, local political structures were underdeveloped, the media remained syncophantic, and local taxpayer and downtown business organizations found it difficult to mobilize challenges to Disney's legal and fiscal powers.

But as Foglesong astutely notes, "legal powers exist in a political context" (p. 114); changes in the political context eventually undermined the seemingly hegemonic Disney control. In 1985, the state began to implement growth management legislation requiring "concurrency" in private development and public facility provision; this meant that Disney would have to negotiate with local communities if it continued its aggressive development plans. Disney's corporate decision to move beyond hotel and entertainment development and to launch Celebration, a planned residential community development, outside its own Reedy Creek special district, triggered a growing chorus of discontent from Celebration residents and taxpayers in surrounding communities. And over the years, the Disney presence itself set in play changes in local economic and political conditions that encouraged

resistance from citizen groups and the occasional civil servant, such as Osceola's Property Appraiser, willing to stand up to the Mouse. Even though political factors and conflict became more important over time, there is little evidence of an alternative vision or strategy for the area. Foglesong sets out some options in his conclusion—building on the emerging high-tech sector rather than offering further incentives for tourism, constructing a human capital agenda, establishing a living wage policy, and supporting revitalization of downtown Orlando—but there is little reason to anticipate that the necessary leadership or constituencies for these agendas will emerge. This inability to anticipate the conditions under which these agendas might become important hints at some of the weaknesses of the study.

Foglesong's narrative underscores the importance of documenting the postwar urban development experience while many of the key players are still available. This is ultimately a descriptive rather than an analytical or theoretical account of these processes. While this is a significant accomplishment, the many claims to loftier theoretical goals mar the effort, not because they are inappropriate but because they are not used to frame and interpret the analysis. The study is sprinkled with references to regimes, regime transition, growth machines, path dependency, and human capital agendas; but this is primarily a story about a clever and complex land development deal in Florida rather than an analysis using these concepts to understand better the political processes involved. Few readers will see this as a case study assessing "the significance of Walt Disney World for city-building and urban governance" (p. xi), much less be persuaded of Disney's intellectual interest in urban planning ideas. Nor are private decision making, privatization, and deregulation unique to Orlando and as remarkable as Foglesong's emphasis suggests, although the scale at which these occurred is noteworthy. Similarly, Foglesong declares that a regime perspective, with its emphasis on political factors, provides "a better understanding of the dynamics of the Disney–local relationship" (p. 189) but falls short of linking the details to the theory.

Instead, Foglesong uses the metaphor of love and marriage to frame his work. Each chapter is titled accordingly, ranging from "Seduction" to "Conflict" to "Therapy." This comes across as precious rather than insightful; using this framework stymies any attempt at theory-building. This is most apparent in the final chapter ("Therapy"), one of the strongest in the book. Foglesong's observations about the Disney World experience are intriguing but disconnected; references to regimes and other concepts appear as afterthoughts in a book structured around a rhetorical device rather than a theoretical argument. In the absence of an analytic logic, alternative explanations, or counterfactuals, the reader is left to sort out the meanings and implications of being Married to the Mouse.

## Tabloid Justice: Criminal Justice in an Age of Media Frenzy By Richard L. Fox and Robert W. Van Sickel. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 225p. \$55.00 cloth, \$22.00 paper.

William C. Green, Morehead State University

We live in a tabloid era defined by *The National Enquirer* and *The Star*. How has it affected popular confidence in the criminal justice system? Richard L. Fox and Robert W. Van Sickel's study examines the mass media's tabloid news coverage of high-profile criminal cases that involve violence and race, gender, and social class issues. This news coverage, they argue, sacrifices the media's educational function, misinforms the public about the operation of the criminal justice system, and contributes to the public's lack of faith in criminal justice.

The authors argue that the 1990s are a unique period in tabloid news coverage of criminal trials and investigations. Chapter 1 introduces seven cases—William Kennedy Smith, Rodney King, Erick and Lyle Menendez, O. J. Simpson, Louise Woodward, JonBenet Ramsey, and William Jefferson Clinton—that serve as vehicles to explore the mass media's use of criminal cases as entertainment. Chapter 2 details how the mass media became tabloidized with the blurring of the mainstream media and tabloid press and the emergence of television news magazines. Then it explores how the tabloidized media increased the amount and immediacy of its coverage of criminal cases. Chapter 3 examines the rise of the new media of cable television news, talk programs, and the Internet, which, the authors argue, has increased the tabloid coverage of political and legal news. Chapter 4 presents the findings of the authors' 1999 national poll conducted to assess the criminal justice effects of tabloid media coverage. Their poll results reveal a high level of familiarity with the seven tabloid cases and low levels of confidence in the criminal justice system and in police, judges, and juries. Chapter 5 turns to the national poll's examination of the racial, gender, and class impacts of tabloid media coverage and finds that the seven cases diminished confidence in the criminal justice system's treatment of blacks and women and of all defendants regardless of their economic status. The findings also reveal that blacks and women viewed these cases as lessening their confidence in the criminal justice system, but there were no differences on the basis of wealth.

In sum, the authors find that commercial interests now drive the mass media's focus on criminal trials; that the mainstream media are increasingly employing tabloid techniques in reporting criminal cases; that cable television, talk radio, and the Internet are critical elements in fostering a tabloid justice environment; that faith in the criminal justice system has decreased as public awareness of high-profile criminal cases increases; and that tabloid coverage reinforces racial, gender, and economic cleavages (pp. 187–90).

Tabloid Justice suffers from two faults. First, there is only a tenuous connection between the social constructionism theory the authors discuss at the outset (pp. 5-7) and their analysis of the data on tabloid news coverage. Largely absent is any sustained attention to larger historical, political, economic, and cultural changes driving the transformation of television news. Over the past 30 years, they claim that there are three "distinct" periods (1968-74, 1975-89, and 1990-) in which television news coverage has changed, but they fail to define their "social and political importance" criteria for these periods and they fail to include all the cases from Table 2.5 (p. 69) in their analysis of the 1975-89 period. If they had included Patty Hearst, John Hinckley, Bernard Goetz, and Jim Bakker, all identified in Table 2.5, they would not have been able to conclude that the media focused on "more individual and personal types of crimes" and less on crimes of broad social and political importance (p. 68). When they turn to the 1990s, they assert that it is a distinctive decade in which media coverage increased largely due to an increasingly frenzied climate of tabloid journalism fostered by their seven tabloid cases, but they do not provide any criteria for the choice of their seven cases (p. 30), nor do they explain findings contrary to their argument. In their discussion of Table 2.10, they tell us that 60 Minutes and 20/20's coverage of tabloid cases did not increase, but they do not explain what the table tells us: The coverage by these two television newsmagazine programs decreased by 2%.

Second, the authors create a straw man, the media as civic educator, and then bewail the fact that news coverage does not live up to their expectations. The news to which they want the media to give continuing coverage is information about

events that do not often touch our personal lives directly: diplomatic visits, tree-spiking environmentalists, and campaign finance reform. Yet the authors cannot demonstrate that their straw man's tabloid coverage of criminal trials and investigations has lessened popular faith in the criminal justice system or its police, judges, or juries. In fact, they admit that they cannot confirm their second and most critical of three hypotheses: "Public exposure to tabloid cases has diminished confidence in the criminal justice system" (p. 127). All they can establish is a "relationship between an individual's general confidence in the system and how the system worked in each of the cases" (pp. 134-35), and not the direction of this relationship. Even this conclusion is thrown into doubt by the failure of the first question of their national poll to focus solely on the media: "When you learn of the verdict in a criminal case, whether it is in the news or through talking with friends and family, how confident are you that the criminal justice system made a correct decision?" (p. 202). These observations also apply to their analysis of race, gender, and economic status. The authors are unable to tie levels of confidence based on these demographic groups to a tabloid style news coverage of criminal cases. In sum, Tabloid Justice may have established a case based on reasonable suspicion. but not on probable cause.

By Popular Demand: Revitalizing Representative Democracy Through Deliberative Elections By John Gastil. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000. 275p. \$48.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Christopher Wlezien, University of Oxford

A growing chorus of academics, journalists, and politicos alike bemoans the state of American democracy. The symptoms are well known. Public trust in government has declined over time, the stock of social capital has shrunk, and turnout remains low. Some observers even argue that politicians now are less responsive to public opinion on various issues. Perhaps understandably, there is increasing pressure for reform of the electoral process, including campaign finance, the conduct of campaigns, media coverage of campaigns, and election rules themselves. In *By Popular Demand*, John Gastil joins the call for reform, but in an original and provocative way.

The book begins on familiar territory: the tenuous state of representative democracy in the United States. Gastil states: "There are two fundamental problems in American politics. The first is that most Americans do not believe that elected officials represent their interests. The second is that they are correct" (p. 1). That is, there is a democratic deficit in the United States and a serious one at that. The problem to Gastil is that elections fail to ensure the accountability of elected officials. This failure of elections ultimately reflects "underdeveloped public judgments, superficial voter evaluations of candidates, and the shallow pool of contestants for elected office" (p. 33).

Gastil marshals a lot of the empirical literature that implies or might imply that public opinion is largely uninformed and incoherent and that most voters are largely incapable of making decisions based on policy preferences. He highlights incumbent reelection rates to argue that sitting politicians have effectively stifled competition among candidates, which leaves voters with little choice on Election Day. The confluence of these factors, according to Gastil, has produced the misrepresentation, nonvoting, and distrust that we currently observe in the United States. Civic neglect has taken root.

Gastil considers various radical and conventional reforms of the process that have been proposed over the years and finds them wanting. They will not meaningfully change a thing, he argues, because the real problem is with the public's voice itself. It simply is not clear to politicians what the public actually wants, partly because most of us have little information and partly because we speak in a cacophony of voices. Measured public opinion thus is of little guidance to elected officials. As Gastil writes: "Officeholders cannot represent the public's policy judgments to the decision-making body until the public presents those concerns to them" (p. 111). He argues further that revealing this public voice requires active deliberation among citizens: They must be brought together to discuss issues face-to-face.

Deliberative forums have been used in the United States for some time now and Gastil nicely traces the history, from early efforts to promote civic education to more recent attempts to conduct deliberative polls. He finds much to recommend these forums but concludes that a full-fledged deliberative democracy is not feasible. This is understandable. It nevertheless is possible, he argues, to use deliberative methods to reveal a meaningful public voice on various political issues. Specifically, he proposes using "citizen panels." Here a representative sample of the public would be brought together to deliberate on the issues of the day, aided by the testimony of various partisan and expert witnesses. This would serve to reveal a public voice on political issues. Then, to actually reflect these preferences more broadly, and in a politically meaningful way, summary information about the conclusions of the panels would be made available to the voting public, say, in the League of Women Voters' guides. Gastil goes even further in some formulations and recommends putting the information on ballots themselves. By doing so, voters would have ready access to the considered opinions of typical people on the important issues of the day. They would be armed and dangerous, at least for incumbent politicians. This could serve to fundamentally revitalize representative democracy in the United States, according to Gastil.

What Gastil is proposing clearly is provocative and warrants consideration. Let me put aside practical issues, such as picking issues for citizen panels to consider, putting together and running the panels, and summarizing the results of the deliberations, let alone getting this information on ballots. These are for others to sort out. My concerns are more basic: the existence of a real problem in modern American democracy, whether more information about issues and candidates is the solution, and what deliberative elections might actually accomplish.

In contrast with Gastil's characterization, a good amount of research shows that representative democracy in the United States actually works quite well. We have learned that the American public has meaningful preferences for policy, at least in certain areas, and acquires reasonably accurate information about candidates' positions (and policy itself) in these areas. We also have learned that voters use this information when evaluating politicians and, perhaps most importantly, that elected officials represent public preferences in policy. Some research even suggests that politicians quite literally respond to changing preferences over time. Gastil does not reflect this literature, at least not much of it. As a result, his portrait of American political life is not quite right. It is not that things are perfect. It's just that the sky is not falling.

This is not to gainsay the value of providing additional information to voters. After all, with more, presumably representative, information, there is reason to suppose that people's opinions will change. Of course, this is most likely where people have little information to begin with. With more information, opinions about extending "most favored nation" status to China, for example, are likely to change. So are opinions about approaches to regulating water pollution. This is not surprising. Neither is it surprising that most people know

little about these issues to begin with. They are not salient to many voters. But why then would they vote on the basis of these issues? What difference would the added value of deliberation actually make on Election Day? This is of fundamental importance, as Gastil himself claims—the electoral incentive being the most reliable motivation for politicians. He does consider the electoral connection in a very general way toward the end of the book, and is surprisingly tentative in his expectations. One ultimately cannot help wondering what deliberative elections can accomplish, even in the best of circumstances.

Perhaps there is reason to experiment, which Gastil encourages us to do in his concluding chapter. Perhaps we will learn that deliberative elections can have a beneficial effect on the quality of voters' judgments, the responsiveness of politicians, and public trust in government itself. I am not optimistic, however. All Gastil really offers us here is hope. The book is interesting, to be sure. It also is well written. It just does not add anything to what we already know. Then again, that is not what Gastil sets out to do, and he has given us something to think about.

Justice & Nature: Kantian Philosophy, Environmental Policy, and the Law By John Martin Gillroy. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000. 443p. \$70.00 cloth, \$34.95 paper.

Kerry H. Whiteside, Franklin & Marshall College

That environmental problems such as groundwater contamination, global warming, and loss of biodiversity pose mounting political challenges is now widely admitted. The meager progress in reversing these trends calls into question the adequacy of policy instruments conventionally used to address them. Gillroy maintains that the environmental policy failure stems from its grounding in economic reasoning. An alternative paradigm of Kantian inspiration is his proposed remedy.

The market paradigm that informs cost-benefit analysis and current environmental legislation makes efficiency the primary measure of sound policy. Through a "thin theory of autonomy," that paradigm valorizes a society in which individuals exercise freedom in the form of choices that aim to give them opportunities to achieve, in relation to their initial endowment of goods, the highest index of satisfied preferences. In contrast, Gillroy proposes a thick theory of autonomy that discriminates morally among preferences. It recognizes that endowments are unequal and that individuals have a moral claim on the material and cultural resources that are necessary for them to become capable of truly free choice. It takes account of the human ability to revise preferences in light of a fuller understanding of personal potential and community well-being. And it understands that the functional integration of living and nonliving components into evolving natural systems generates noninstrumental value worthy of human respect. Securing at least a minimal "baseline" of conditions that support the autonomy of both humans and nature should become the standard of a just polity (p. 280).

In building this alternative paradigm, Gillroy contributes to scholarly debates in an unusually wide range of disciplines. Philosophers will discover a nuanced reconstruction of Kant's moral and political philosophy. Gillroy credits Kant with greater moral flexibility and more attention to communitarian concerns than is commonly acknowledged. Policy analysts should be drawn to Gillroy's contention that the strategic situation driving many cases of environmental risk-taking is not a prisoner's dilemma, but an assurance game: a situation in which citizens would prefer to cooperate to protect collective goods, provided that the state acts to prevent others

from taking advantage of them. Environmental ethicists will be struck by Gillroy's view that Kant would recognize a duty "to respect and preserve nature's functional integrity as an evolutionary and homeostatic end-in-itself" (p. 189).

That is a highly controversial claim. In The New Ecological Order (1995), Luc Ferry maintains that Kant's emphasis on freedom as the source of a being's inherent worth excludes intrinsic value from nature's causally determined order. Yet, demonstrates Gillroy, Kant did call for harmonizing humanity and nature, and he saw something inherently wrong in "destroying all order in nature" (pp. 184-189). Critics may still challenge the idea that functional integrity constitutes intrinsic value. Surely functionally integrating the parts of my computer does not give those parts inherent worth. For Kant, our moral duties toward other people are grounded not in our functional interdependence with them, but in each person's existence as a rational self, who can guide his or her own behavior in a principled way. Simply instrumentalizing people is wrong because it overrides the very capacity that commands respect. Ecosystems, even if they are "self-regulating" in a sense, do not regulate their actions by principle. So it remains unclear why instrumentalizing them is intrinsically any more wrong than dismantling my computer for spare parts. Perhaps the wrongness stems from the disruption of life or perhaps there is something about the nonhuman origin of certain homeostatic processes that makes them especially valuable. But Gillroy develops neither argument. It remains open to question whether the Kantian language of inherent worth is adequate to the task of describing an ethic of respect for things that we must continue, at some rate, to chop down, to domesticate, to eat.

This book illustrates the promise and the pitfalls of *a priori* moral theorizing in environmental affairs. Promisingly, it does a fine job of grounding the intuition that the significance of some goods, including natural ones, is distorted unless we devise political processes protecting them from commensuration, aggregration, and trade-offs. From a strictly pragmatic perspective, polluting an aquifer and providing bottled water to local inhabitants can seem morally equivalent to preventing groundwater contamination in the first place. Those who reject such equivalency will be attracted to Gillroy's "Ecosystem Design Approach."

A pitfall of a priori theorizing, however, is a tendency to envision policy as the direct implementation of moral imperatives, without pausing to ask whether the prescribed approaches are ratified by political experience. Gillroy tends to favor regulatory regimes that rely on centralized, state-sponsored, scientifically informed decision-making processes (e.g., pp. 311, 342, 378). Meanwhile, he is content to leave unspecified the level of aggregation-individual life form, species, ecosystem, biosphere—at which safeguarding "nature's" intrinsic value becomes imperative. As a result, the potential scope of bureaucratic discretion in Gillroy's world of anticipatory regulation is breathtaking. He would require that "all risk-producing activity causing collective damage to environmental security be justified as supporting moralbaseline needs before it can continue" (p. 145). Since virtually all human activity disrupts some manifestation of "nature, just about any imaginable economic enterprise might be subject to ex ante regulation. Students of bureaucratic behavior might wish that Gillroy had considered evidence that dysfunctions such as regulatory capture, corruption, and stultifying inertia can compromise the effectiveness of such centralizing approaches.

But more analysis is not really what would most increase the appeal of this book. It already contains so much material that its Table of Contents is longer than the present review. If its audience were more precisely targeted, this volume could be more approachable. Gillroy hopes for readers as comfortable contemplating Kant's Realm of Ends as perusing Supreme Court opinions on environmental impact statements or digesting academic debates over the concept of Kaldor efficiency. Those with more specific interests will find their patience tested at times. Quite justifiably, most will read this book selectively. Parts of *Justice and Nature* will then rightly find their way into many graduate-level seminars on environmental policy and environmental ethics.

The Limits of Policy Change: Incrementalism, Worldview, and the Rule of Law By Michael T. Hayes. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 204p. \$60.00 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Robert F. Durant, University of Baltimore

"There remains," writes Michael T. Hayes in his provocative new book, "a pressing need to educate the publicspecialists and nonspecialists alike—on what politics can accomplish, and at what speed" (p. 189). To this end, Hayes challenges what Thomas Sowell (A Conflict of Visions, 1987) calls the tenets of "articulated rationality" (i.e., rationalcomprehensive ideals) in the policy process. He vigorously asserts that the benefits of incrementalism (viz., its focus on "partisan mutual adjustment," its understanding of "the importance of checks on the arbitrary abuse of power," and "its ability to draw on the dispersion of knowledge throughout the political system" [p. 8]) exceed its costs (e.g., delay and incoherent policy outcomes). Moreover, on balance, "partisan mutual adjustment produces better [emphasis added] policy outcomes than any attempt at rational-comprehensive analysis" (p. 8).

Grounded in the "anti-rationalist" tradition (e.g., Hayek, Law, Legislation, and Liberty, 1948), Hayes begins by reviewing the reasons why rationalists (i.e., those predisposed toward "large-scale policy experiments," "logical coherence" of thought, and "perfect solutions to problems" [p. 29]) presumably err. Among other things, they underestimate human fallibility, hold naive faith in reason alone to address public problems (as opposed to the "systemic rationality" afforded by tradition, custom, and political bargaining and compromise), and overestimate what government can accomplish. These errors, in turn, produce failed results, disillusion citizens, and accrete presidential and bureaucratic power at the expense of Congress.

Hayes, however, is no apologist for incrementalism. In lamenting the biased pluralism it produces, he argues, first, for federal policies (e.g., tax subsidies and campaign finance reform) to "mobil[ize] interests that currently are unorganized and thus unrepresented in the policy process" (p. 162). Thus, rather than wanting to *lessen* conflict among interest groups (a common reform prescription), Hayes wants to *heighten* it by expanding the types of contestants participating. Second, to combat interest group pluralism and constrain bureaucratic discretion, Hayes joins Lowi (*The End of Liberalism*, 1979) in promoting policymaking premised on the "rule of law" (i.e., making laws that apply equally to everyone and do not discriminate against or privilege particular groups).

After stressing how evaluations of incrementalism are colored by personal views of human nature and what is achievable through politics, Hayes is at his analytical best in Chapters 3 through 9. Using case analyses of the Clean Air Act (CAA) of 1970, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWOA) of 1996, and the Clinton health care initiative in 1993–94, he offers a series of typologies for sorting out the dynamics of the policy process. Included are typologies of philosophical worldviews (Chapter 3), policy

processes (Chapter 4), public policies (Chapter 5), policy environments (Chapter 7), and policy outcomes (Chapter 9).

Especially useful is how Hayes puts contemporary policy controversies into the context of enduring philosophical debates (among adaptive conservatives, utopian visionaries, nostalgic conservatives, and meliorative liberals). Valuable also is his identification of key contextual factors (and their interaction) that animate those debates. He identifies, for example, how different policy demand patterns (conflictual versus consensual) lead to different reactions by Congress (e.g., nondecisions, delegative policies, and allocative policies). Highlighted throughout is how interest group inequalities contribute to these disparate congressional reactions.

Likewise, Hayes offers insights (some counterintuitive) that beg testing, elaborating, and refining in future research. For example, in classifying policies by how consensual or conflictual their objectives are and how well- or ill-understood their proposed solutions might be, his analysis both refines and challenges conventional thinking about mass public arousal (e.g., Charles O. Jones, *Cleaning the Air*, 1975). Absent a convergence of consensual objectives and expectations, for example, Hayes argues that mass public arousal leads to dramaturgical incrementalism (i.e., symbolic policies—e.g., nuclear freeze legislation in the 1980s—that may or may not address the problem), rather than nonincremental policy change.

Despite these strengths, however, Hayes ultimately fails to make a persuasive case either that the benefits of incrementalism exceed its costs or that it produces better policy outcomes than rationalist strategies. They certainly may, but he offers neither an explicit empirical standard for testing these theses (i.e., "better" in what sense and measured in what way?) nor systematic comparisons of these disparate types of policy approaches in practice (e.g., comparing environmental policies produced at different times or places using rationalist versus antirationalist processes). Rationalists, moreover, will dismiss his litany of their "shortcomings" as a caricature rather than a serious treatment of their aims, assumptions, or approach to policymaking. Skeptics, too, will note that large-scale and initially nonincremental programs like Social Security, Medicare, and the Marshall Plan did work; did not produce citizen disillusionment; were devised with political acumen rather than "naïveté"; and were not premised on assumptions of human infallibility.

Nor is Hayes's case for the superiority of incrementalism helped by leaving key concepts undefined (e.g., what constitutes adequate "deliberation," "incremental versus non-incremental change," and "public arousal" versus "public anxiety"). This conceptual ambiguity places judgments about "better policy" squarely within the eye of the beholder. For example, his own "rule of law" proposal will strike some as utopian, naive, and misguided. Nor is his argument helped by conceptualizing rational-comprehensive and incremental decision strategies as mutually exclusive in practice. The former can be a potent "input" into the latter, qualitatively altering policy discourse, options, and outcomes.

Readers more sympathetic to nonincremental policy needs, processes, and possibilities also are unlikely to believe that Hayes has adequately presented or effectively countered their arguments (and counterarguments to incrementalism) as robustly as he could. For example, he curtly dismisses in a paragraph (p. 96) the theses that periodic bursts of nonincremental policy change do occur (e.g., Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones, Agendas and Instability, 1993). Even more broadly, one wishes that Hayes had explicitly related his arguments to contemporary reconceptualizations of interest group, policy process, and bureaucratic dynamics and motives.

Recent scholarship, for example, challenges "capture" theories of agencies and images of unresponsive bureaucrats (B. Dan Wood and Richard Waterman, Bureaucratic Dynamics, 1985), notes the rising success of postmaterialist over materialist values in the policy process (Jeffrey Berry, The New Liberalism, 2000), and heralds the power of ideas (Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith, Policy Change and Learning, 1993). Yet Hayes's arguments rest largely on tenets of interest group liberalism that these reconceptualizations modify or challenge.

These shortcomings and oversights, however, do not lessen the importance of addressing the problems of incrementalism that Hayes summarizes. Nor do they make his contributions less important for policy specialists and nonspecialists to engage seriously. If they do, the educational aims of *The Limits of Change* will be realized.

Who Speaks for the Poor?: National Interest Groups and Social Policy By R. Allen Hays. 277p. New York: Routledge, 2001. \$75.00.

Declarations of Dependency: The Civic Republican Tradition in U.S. Poverty Policy By Alan F. Zundel. 178p. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. \$50.50 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Douglas R. Imig, University of Memphis

The new monographs by R. Allen Hays and Allen F. Zundel are welcome additions to our effort to understand the processes by which Americans make social welfare policy. Hays's work looks at the set of interest groups that testified before Congress on poverty policy during the 28-year period from 1970 to 1997, a period characterized by both incremental change and major upheaval in poverty policymaking. Zundel's work examines the rhetorical frames that have driven major social welfare reform efforts over the past century and a half.

In Who Speaks for the Poor? Hays provides a close examination of those who gave testimony before Congress during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s on three critical sets of issues: housing, food stamps, and cash assistance. Hays answers his title question by showing that a "chorus of voices" participate in drafting major legislation affecting the poor (p. 4). But of the dozens of groups that testified before Congress, almost none are made up of low-income people. Instead, the interests of the poor are represented by proxies, including intergovernmental lobbies, public and private sector service providers, and public interest and good government groups. After reviewing who testified on these dimensions of social welfare policy, the final sections of the work are devoted to a call for more direct participation by the poor in politics and for more community organizing around social justice.

Hay's project provides much-needed insights into the configuration of organizations that testified on key pieces of legislation during a critical era in the history of American social welfare policy. Over these 28 years, we saw both expansions in social welfare spending (e.g., through Nixon's block grant programs) and profound retrenchments (most notably, the abolition of entitlements to assistance through the 1996 Personal Responsibility Act). Hays's analysis sheds light on the ways that major shifts in the direction of policymaking influence the actions of individual groups (p. 16), as well as the influence of policy shifts on the composition of policy communities (p. 35). The work is largely silent when it comes to identifying which voices were most significant in engineering the fundamental shift itself in the overall direction of American social welfare policy during this period, or the mechanisms through which that shift occurred.

Ultimately, Hays attributes major policy shifts to "forces outside the arena of interest group struggle" (p. 139), and proposes a number of potentially critical factors. These include the weakening of labor unions and a shift to post-Fordist modes of production (p. 59), the growth of well-funded conservative think tanks in the 1970s and 1980s (p. 61), and shifts in party control of Congress and the White House (e.g., p. 80). It would be helpful if the work offered a theoretical construct for understanding the ways in which these factors influence the policy space available to alternative visions of effective social welfare policy. We are left to wonder if these contextual factors work in consistent ways across time in shaping the debates surrounding policymaking.

Additionally, the work is largely silent on other voices contributing to social welfare policy, other venues for action, and other types of political engagement. Presenting testimony and lobbying Congress are only a few of the strategic choices available to advocates. The volume mentions the wave of antihomelessness protests that were launched during the early 1980s, but the author doubts that protest would have had much effect in the late 1990s, given the Republican majority in Congress (p. 232). Yet much of the mobilization in the early 1980s came in direct response to the polarizing rhetoric of a strong Republican president. Similarly, the current surge in anti-globalization protests has emerged in direct response to a strong pro-business and anti-labor political climate. If Hays ultimately intends the volume to be a call for more direct participation in politics (p. 9), it would have been useful to analyze the effectiveness of a broader range of mobilization efforts with differential transaction costs.

In Declarations of Dependency, Zundel argues that U.S. poverty policymaking bears the imprint of a "civic republicanism," in which small farm owners are held up as models of civic virtue because they are tied to the communities in which they live, are motivated by foresight, and-through thrift and hard work—are able to achieve economic independence (p. 122). The author argues that both the public and policymakers continue to attribute these civic virtues to small landowners, despite the shrinking place for small-scale agriculture in the U.S. economy (p. 121). Zundel traces the influence of this civic republican tradition through the Homestead Acts, through homeownership programs for the poor, and to more recent proposals to expand the productive assets of lowincome people through microcredit associations, tax-exempt capital development accounts, and employee stock purchase plans. Zundel's work makes a compelling case that the image of the homesteader continues to permeate antipoverty policy, and that the durability of this image appears to be independent of the actual legacy of the homesteading acts.

Most of the best land offered to homesteaders, for example, was taken very early in the nation's history (p. 39), and the majority of the remainder was not suitable for farming. Further, there were a great many instances of fraud, with businesses filing false claims and then stripping the lands of their timber or mineral resources before abandoning them. Congress also used the acts to deed an additional 100 million acres to those already granted to the railroads (p. 40).

In spite of the uneven policy implications of the Homestead Acts, Zundel demonstrates that the frame surfaces again and again: for example, in land reform schemes (e.g., the 1937 Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act) and in proposals to promote homeownership by the poor (e.g., the 1919 "Own Your Own Home" campaign designed by the Department of Labor and the National Association of Real Estate Boards).

As with the Hays monograph, Zundel's work hints at the overarching importance of social and political factors in explaining the rise and fall of these individual reform movements. He notes that policy proposals depend on open "windows of opportunity," which can result from contentious politics (p. 49), patterns of partisan control of political institutions (e.g., the "stunning Republican takeover of both houses of Congress" [p. 97]), levels of issue salience and media attention (p. 112), and the presence or absence of powerful allies (pp. 112–13), as well as shifting employment patterns (p. 40).

But, again, these factors are mentioned largely in passing, and the work does not offer a coherent theoretical framework for understanding the ways in which these contextual factors influence patterns of policymaking, the reception that various policy proposals will receive, or the conditions under which challengers—employing this or some other frame—will gain policy concessions.

Without such a framework, the monograph is unable to explain why certain policy entrepreneurs have been comparatively successful at employing this frame in particular historical eras. If Zundel is right that the frame itself is enduring, then a significant part of the story concerns the conditions under which policy proposals in this tradition have captured the public imagination and leveraged political concessions, and the conditions under which they have not. What should we make, for example, of the short history of Reconstruction efforts to make public lands available for homesteading by freed slaves in the south (p. 39)? Certainly this effort fell directly within the civic republican tradition, and gained strong backing from Radical Reconstructionists in Congress. The reasons behind the weak implementation and ultimate reversal of this set of policy proposals might provide analytical heft to Zundel's argument by suggesting the boundaries of the power of the civic republican frame.

The analysis would also benefit from a consideration of the terms under which other dimensions of "deservedness" have come to dominate discussions of poverty and of effective social welfare policy. The narrative is largely silent, for example, on social welfare policies built upon attributions of civic virtue associated with military service (Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers, 1992), or participation in public or civic work (Harry C. Boyte and Nancy N. Kari, Building America, 1996; Daphne Spain, How Women Saved the City, 2001).

Ultimately, these two works are useful additions to the literature in the field, and are interesting companions to each other. They offer different perspectives on critical inputs to the same policy processes—during overlapping time frames—and provide two distinct vantages on the relationship between effective and vigorous citizenship and social welfare policymaking. Finally, taken together, these works make a striking case for the need for more integrated efforts to build a theoretical understanding of the mechanisms that link dimensions of social and political context to the routines and processes of incremental public policymaking.

Adversarial Legalism: The American Way of Law By Robert A. Kagan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 339p. \$49.95.

Ronald Kahn, Oberlin College

Robert Kagan has three main objectives in writing this book: to demonstrate that the American systems of criminal and civil law, social welfare, and environmental regulation are dominated by "adversarial legalism," to critique and explain why it has taken hold in the United States, and to make proposals for reform in light of findings in the United States and the advanced capitalist nations of Europe, the Commonwealth, and Japan.

Drawing upon his own research and other previously published single nation and cross-national studies, Kagan suc-

ceeds in demonstrating that the United States, compared to these other nations, is dominated by adversarial legalism in its criminal and civil justice systems and its implementation of social welfare and environmental policy. Kagan argues that adversarial legalism is the term that best describes American legal systems and policy implementation because they are dominated by costly, stressful, and inefficient litigation fostered by politicized lawyers who rely on detailed prescriptive legal rules and formal processes of contestation. These result in plaintiffs in civil suits making outrageous demands for damages, prosecutors proposing long prison terms resulting in plea bargaining, and corporations and public interest groups using the courts to secure their interests from government and those with fewer resources failing to pursue their interests.

A superb critique is offered of the process of adversarial legalism in the United States. Kagan views adversarial legalism as a functional, more negative, equivalent to large central legal and regulatory bureaucracies of trained experts and judges found in these other democratic, capitalist nations. The major drawbacks of the process of adversarial legalism in the United States include legal malleability, uncertainty, and unpredictability and time-consuming delays that impose economic and social costs on people who can least afford them and benefit those with resources to enter the legal and regulatory process. He demonstrates forcefully that adversarial legalism impedes and increases the costs of bringing and settling civil and criminal disputes, securing economic development, and providing benefits to welfare recipients and improving the environment. He also argues that the process of adversarial legalism fosters adversarialness between business and labor, between government and citizens, and among corporations and levels of government. Adversarial legalism encourages unclear legislation, so groups and citizens must go to courts to secure benefits and protect their interests, and fosters legislatures to expand the right to sue government, corporations, and professionals such as doctors. This has a chilling affect on the establishment of less costly, user-friendly, informal bureaucratic and court processes.

Kagan reviews the elements of American political structure and culture that further adversarial legalism. Kagan argues that adversarial legalism is fostered by the following structural aspects of the American political system, compared to these other nations': far more fragmented, decentralized, nonhierarchical, and political courts and bureaucracies, with different outcomes likely at the national, state, and local levels of government; and strong interest groups, weak parties, and a weak state, rather than the strong central state, bureaucracy, and neocorporatist cooperation among interests such as labor and business found in other capitalist democracies.

Kagan argues that American political culture spawns a legal culture that views law, courts, and regulation, as malleable, fallible, and the product of continuing political battles rather than the application of universal standards through rational decision making. Lawyers' engagement in adversarial legalism and the rejection of compromise and cooperation among parties in a dispute is caused by a fundamental tension between a political culture that expects government to protect citizens from serious harm, injustice, and environmental dangers ("total justice") and a second set of values that emphasize a mistrust of concentrated power in government that requires limits on government authority. As a result, lawyers convince the public that adversarial legalism is the process needed to fight injustice and arbitrary government.

Kagan is less successful in arguing that the United States would be better off without adversarial legalism and with a system of civil and criminal justice and social welfare and environmental regulation that is found in Europe, the Commonwealth nations, and Japan. Part of the reason for this

is that Kagan moves back and forth between process and outcome-based standards of evaluation when making comparisons. In his analysis of criminal and civil court systems, Kagan defines injustice, in process terms, as the condition when parties feel compelled to abandon legally justifiable positions to avoid the costs and uncertainties of adjudication. When Kagan discusses the implementation of social welfare laws, he introduces an outcomes standard of evaluation. Kagan writes, "It [adversarial legalism] has not proved capable of producing significant effects on levels of, or gaps in, benefits and services" (p. 175).

Unfortunately, the small-n cross-national case studies Kagan relies upon to make the argument against adversarial legalism and for a European nation-like legal system do not provide systematic evidence of whether, and under what conditions, the poor, government, and corporations are the winners and losers overall. Nor can such studies explain whether inequities are the result of the negative aspects of the adversarial legalism as a process, differences in political structure, or different political cultures. The studies that Kagan draws upon simply do not provide systematic evidence of distribution differences among institutions and citizens in the United States and compared to these other nations. The linkages among process, structure, and political culture are not clear enough to make such determinations.

Nor is evidence presented of process and outcome injustices in the criminal justice, tort, and regulatory systems of the nations of Europe, the Commonwealth, and Japan, to which the United States is compared. Therefore we cannot assess the process and outcome injustices in these nations with less adversarial legalism when we make comparisons with the United States. For example, we need to assess the impact on legal certainty, stability, and justice in England that is caused by the power of the House of Commons to change civil liberties, civil rights, and criminal procedures overnight and the impact of European Union courts and bureaucracies on the English legal system and regulation process when comparing the United States and Britain. These problems raise questions whether the American criminal justice and tort law system and social welfare and environmental regulation systems come up as short as Kagan suggests when they are compared to other advanced capitalist nations' systems.

Finally, Kagan has not demonstrated that adversarial legalism is the primary cause of injustice whether measured in process or outcomes terms. With regard to social welfare, Kagan admits, "Adversarial legalism is not the cause of the grudging and incomplete character of the American social welfare system. It can more properly be viewed as a consequence—the response of politically liberal lawyers and judges to a political system that has not provided a nationally uniform, broad-based regime of social and health insurance, public housing, and generous employee benefits" (p. 175). However, Kagan argues that the response by the political system to social welfare policies is due to a political culture that spawns an individualistic, not a collectivist, vision of individual needs and agency. If this is so, then reducing the effects of adversarial legalism in individual decision-making processes, while the political and (resulting) legal culture remain unchanged, may produce little substantive change. It may, perhaps, ensure more justice as that is defined in process terms, but less outcome justice.

Moreover, we would have to discount expected declines in legal advocacy and resources for groups involved in such advocacy with the introduction of central legal bureaucracies and other efforts to reduce adversarial legalism in the United States. However, Michael McCann provides clear evidence that fear of lawsuits and legal advocacy, the core elements and structural consequences of adversarial legal-

ism, resulted in increased allocations by government with regard to equal pay for women in Washington state (Michael McCann, *Rights at Work: Law and the Politics of Pay Equity*, 1994). Would this economic redistribution have occurred if adversarial legalism were abandoned and we placed our trust in a political system dominated by what Theodore Lowi has called "interest group liberalism?"

If we do not know whether process and outcome injustices are primarily caused by the political structure or culture, then we cannot know whether changes in political structures and processes will produce declines in either type of injustice. Therefore, it is hard to determine whether the reforms that Kagan advocates, such as establishing better-trained, centralized legal bureaucracies at the state level and introducing a loser-pays system into tort law, would reduce or increase injustice. Perhaps more research on the linkages among political culture, political structures, and legal and policy implementation systems in the United States and other advanced capitalist nations would provide a firmer foundation on which to make a determination whether replacing adversarial legalism with legal structures and processes from other advanced capitalist democracies is the best course to follow.

**Dreams of a More Perfect Union** By Rogan Kersh. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 358p. \$39.95.

Robert W. T. Martin, Hamilton College

Rogan Kersh's ambitious and well-researched book traces the history of the concept of American national "union" from the middle of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth century, when the concept lost the peculiar force it had had and fell out of use (more or less replaced by such concepts as "nation," "country," and, especially, "America"). The analysis demonstrates how the concept of national union has been used in exclusive as well as inclusive ways. The subject is an important one, especially to an America united by terrorist threats. And it is a topic made more conspicuous in the last decade by our ongoing discourse over multiculturalism. So the concept of national union is perhaps less obscure and more relevant than Kersh suggests (p. 3). Connections to the recent work of Rogers Smith (Civic Ideals, 1997) are also apparent. Still, the term itself has been out of favor for about a century now, so Kersh's study is a welcome effort to get us thinking about a relatively novel topic.

In breaking new ground here, Kersh's excellent and wideranging book speaks to a number of audiences. Scholars of American political development will learn much from the book, and those who study multiculturalism will find intriguing the twists and turns taken by the concept of national union. Dreams of a More Perfect Union will interest conceptual historians with its well-researched example of conceptual growth and decline. All of these audiences, and lay readers of American history, will benefit from this book. Many may find themselves wanting even more, their appetites whetted, but that is to be expected. Tracing such a broad and important topic over a century and a half is a monumental task that naturally raises more questions than any one book—no matter how well crafted—can hope to answer.

Kersh examines the rise and eventual decline of the concept of national union, mapping its impressive staying power, even to the verge of—and immediately after—the Civil War. Readers follow the concept's emergence in the middle of the eighteenth century, and its brief fading in the face of Tory praise of transcontinental union in the 1760s. We then see how the concept grew in importance, despite the vast cultural (not to mention practical) distances between regions during the early nineteenth century. In many ways, the concept itself

was the glue that bound the country together. Yet national union all but disappeared in the 1890s. Radical Republicans and African Americans abandoned the term after their egalitarian vision of a moral union was widely rejected by white America. And then the word was co-opted by an emerging labor movement.

To trace this underappreciated history, Kersh uses a powerful mix of methodologies and levels of analysis. First, there is the qualitative investigation of exemplary central figures, such as Madison, Webster, Douglass, and Lincoln. This analysis is then augmented by a broader reading of less elite writings in newspapers and other popular sources. This is all pretty standard; but Kersh adds to the mix a more systematic study of the proportional use of the concept in a sample of representative newspapers. The outcome of this methodical analysis is a number of graphs charting the ebb and flow of national union's political and rhetorical salience. As a result, Dreams of a More Perfect Union is more historical in temper than many conceptual histories, which tend to focus almost exclusively on important philosophical contributions and advances. If the work is less dramatic than a study of bold innovations, it is more historically precise, detailing even periods of relative conceptual stasis.

A number of important findings emerge. For example, Kersh occupies a well-supported middle ground between those who see early American thinkers as mere borrowers of the European tradition and those who view American thought as wholly unique. The indefatigable liberal/republican debate is shown to miss a great deal about the American visions of national union. Another contribution should be mentioned as well: Conceptual historians are here given a rich new example of conceptual demise from which to learn. They might, however, wish he had drawn more substantial connections to existing approaches to conceptual history (pp. 282–83).

Kersh's empirical sample and content analysis is methodologically innovative and quite valuable. His sampling technique involved studying representative newspapers' issues for the fifth day of January, April, July, and October (every other year, 1750–1900) and calculating the proportional use of the concept of national union per newspaper page. A number of adjustments were required to fill out the samples (pp. 20, 305), so the result is only "an informal sense of union across time and place" (p. 20). But that is enough to demonstrate the power and longevity of union as the conceptual tool for understanding American federalism. For instance, although profound transformations after the Civil War remade America, it was still conceived of—in both North and South—not as a nation, as many scholars suggest, but as a union.

These and other significant findings supported by Kersh's methodology are generally augmented by his careful use of even the most recent research that touches on any aspect of this broad study. One notable exception to this attention to the scholarly literature involves the concept of the public sphere. Kersh analyzes at length James Madison's notion of affective union and demonstrates its powerful influence throughout the nineteenth century. Yet Madison's vision of the union was not built solely on affect, but even more so on public reason engendered by political discourse. Saul Cornell's (1999) The Other Founders documents some Anti-Federalists'—and later Madison's—understanding of the role a vibrant public sphere could play in unifying the country. Similarly, although Lance Banning's (1995) Sacred Fire is cited to support Kersh's unionist reading of Madison, Banning's stress on Madison's liberal republicanism and vision of the public sphere is ignored. Ultimately, the role of an animated public sphere as a unifying force in the polity seems underinvestigated.

Dreams of a More Perfect Union closes with brief reflections on the prospects for American national unity and an assessment of whether religion or a sense of patriotism might be the source for our future civic bonds. In his surefooted way, Kersh then turns to Walt Whitman as the preeminent American theorist of unity in diversity. The questions raised are all the more pressing in light of the recent flag-waving that reassured a terrorized Union; and if this ambitious and informative study cannot answer all of them, it does provide the basis for approaching these crucial challenges in a sophisticated, well-informed, and intelligent way.

Hitching a Ride: Omnibus Legislating in the U.S. Congress By Glen S. Krutz. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001. 183p. \$60.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

C. Lawrence Evans, The College of William and Mary

In recent decades, roughly 25 percent of major bills considered by the U.S. Congress have been omnibus measures—large, often unwieldy, legislative vehicles that touch on multiple policy areas. The 1981 reconciliation bill, which included much of President Reagan's economic agenda, is perhaps the best-known example. But many important policy proposals, from crime control to welfare reform, have passed as part of omnibus legislation.

Critics argue that these megabills undermine deliberation and that the practice should be curtailed. For one, members of Congress are seldom able to secure separate votes on the component parts of an omnibus measure because of chamber rules, leadership pressure, and ignorance about what these massive bills actually contain. The omnibus strategy also reduces the policy discretion of the executive branch. A president can either veto the entire package, including must-pass items that the administration supports, or sign into law a grab bag of unrelated items, perhaps including major legislation opposed by the administration.

There is, however, another side to the omnibus story. On Capitol Hill, the passage of legislation is complicated by overlapping committee jurisdictions, budgetary constraints, a crushing legislative workload, rampant obstructionism, and, according to some, our national tendency toward divided government. By streamlining the legislative process, the omnibus strategy provides congressional leaders with a valuable tool for overcoming gridlock and competing for power with the president. According to this view, omnibus legislating is an important institutional adaptation to the practical difficulties of lawmaking in the contemporary Congress.

What factors explain the rise of omnibus bills in Washington? How do the consequences of omnibus legislating vary, depending on the scope of the measure, the context of consideration, and the issue areas under focus? What strategic calculations determine when and how congressional leaders will construct an omnibus measure, as well as the response of other legislators and the president? Are bills in certain issue areas particularly likely to be considered via the omnibus? On balance, does the strategy strengthen or weaken the legislative process? Scholars seeking answers to these and related questions should begin with Glen Krutz's excellent book on the topic.

This book is an important addition to the literature for a number of reasons. First, the author stakes out important new territory for systematic analysis. Prior to this study, no one had developed a workable definition of what constitutes an omnibus bill, and generalizations about the practice have been based mostly on anecdotes, such as the 1981 reconciliation measure. Krutz's definition—rooted in the scope and length of a bill—makes good intuitive sense, and it can be

operationalized, generating valuable insights about Congress. The 1981 reconciliation bill, for instance, was not a turning point in the emergence of the omnibus practice. Instead, the percentage of omnibus measures (among major bills) grew gradually during the 1950s and 1960s, began to increase sharply during the mid-1970s, and then leveled off during the 1990s. It is interesting to note that the rise in Senate individualism and obstructionism that occurred during the 1970s corresponds nicely with Krutz's time series, helping to explain why congressional leaders increasingly resorted to the omnibus strategy.

A second strength of the book is the author's attempt to relate omnibus usage to leading theories of legislative behavior. Krutz distinguishes between two broad categories of theory. Purposive explanations, which he also labels "political" and "micro-level," emphasize the strategic calculations of individual members. Included here are the distributive and partisan theories of Congress. Organizational explanations, in contrast, are characterized as "macro-level," and place a greater emphasis on institutional adaptation and chamber efficiency. Krutz posits that both categories of explanation are necessary to understand omnibus legislating. He develops a hybrid conceptualization that yields a number of hypotheses about the factors associated with omnibus usage. For the most part, these hypotheses are supported by data, providing further evidence that no single theory can explain the central elements of Congress.

Third, the author compiles extensive new data about omnibus legislating. For instance, he marshals evidence about more than three thousand bills that received serious consideration by Congress from 1949 through 1994, and conducts a multivariate analysis of the factors influencing whether or not these items were considered via omnibus packages. Purposive factors help explain these data. Partisan theories, for example, generally imply greater minority party obstructionism when the majority party is relatively small and divided and the minority party is relatively large and unified. Overcoming such obstructionism is a key motivation behind the omnibus strategy. As expected, Krutz finds that individual bills are more likely to be added to omnibus measures when these conditions are met. However, organizational explanations, such as issue fragmentation and the size of the budget deficit, also have a statistically and substantively significant relationship with omnibus usage. In other chapters, the author conducts multivariate analyses of the incidence of omnibus bills by Congress, the impact of omnibus usage on legislative productivity, and the consequences of the strategy for congressional or presidential dominance over legislation.

Fourth, and most important, *Hitching a Ride* provides scholars with highly useful guidance for further research. The logical structure of Krutz's conceptual framework should be further developed. He argues that the construction of omnibus bills derives from two sets of strategic interactions: between congressional leaders and rank-and-file members and between Congress and the president. But the precise nature of these interactions—from actor goals and informational endowments to procedural constraints and the bargaining sequence—are not really spelled out in this book. The economics literature about commodity bundling and recent theoretical work by political scientists on legislative bargaining should inform scholarly efforts to build on the conceptual groundwork in this study.

Moreover, the rules that structure the consideration of omnibus measures vary somewhat from bill to bill and over time, and these differences receive only passing attention in this book. Reconciliation measures, for instance, provide the most consequential forum for omnibus legislating, and they are qualitatively different from the other megabills that Krutz

considers. (Reconciliation occurs via expedited procedures, and no filibusters are allowed.) We need more empirical research about the impact of structural arrangements on the construction of legislation, including omnibus packages. In this very impressive book, Glen Krutz provides us with a model for how such research should be conducted.

The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics By Geoffrey Layman. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 435p. \$49.50 cloth, \$22.50 paper.

Ted G. Jelen, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Analysts of religion and American politics have been awaiting this book for some time. In *The Great Divide*, Geoffrey Layman brings together two strands of research in American political behavior in an elegant, systematic fashion: the study of party system change (often described as the literature on "party realignment") and the analysis of religion in politics in the United States (long something of an esoteric speciality within political science). While Layman is not first to address the connection between the pew and the precinct, his impressive effort is at this point the authoritative source on religion and contemporary party politics.

The volume can be described rather simply. Using a variety of secondary data sources, Layman shows that the Republican and Democratic parties have become more internally homogeneous, and more distinctive, with respect to a variety of issues relating to traditional morality: abortion, women's roles, pornography, gay rights, and others. These changes have been taking place since the late 1960s and are manifested in the attitudes and behavior of political elites and mass publics. While the changes do not rise to the level of a "critical realignment," the manifestation of a "culture war" between traditionalists and progressives is a classic illustration of gradual party system change through "issue evolution."

This volume has at least two outstanding strengths. First, Layman provides a rather comprehensive description of recent changes in the party system, which incorporates analyses of both mass and elite political behavior. He convincingly demonstrates that the attitudes of political elites (delegates to national nominating conventions and members of Congress) and mass publics vary together, and he makes a plausible case for the direction of causality. Layman argues that changes in the basis of party cleavages are generally initiated by strategic candidates and leaders who stand to benefit from new alignments. Voters, in Layman's account, generally react to the changing cues provided by political leaders. Layman's description of recent changes in party cleavages is thoroughly grounded in the literature on party realignment, which makes the work quite relevant and accessible to political scientists.

A second strength of this book follows from the first. For several reasons, this is a book by a political scientist for political scientists, which means that Layman's analyses are quite accessible to readers who are not specialists in the religionpolitics subfield. As such, Layman has provided an important service to scholars who may be quite willing to acknowledge the importance of religion to contemporary party politics (a connection which by now seems virtually self-evident), but who, quite understandably, do not wish to devote the balance of their careers to the operationalization of religious variables. Scholars who specialize in the study of religion and politics will find relatively little new here but will surely admire the clarity and breadth of Layman's vision. Analysts of party politics in the United States who wish to take into account the role of religion will find their task made much easier by Layman's contribution.

To illustrate, at the conceptual level, Layman provides an excellent, self-contained description of the difference between the "ethno-religious" account of religious politics (in which membership in a particular religious tradition is paramount) and the more recent "culture wars" literature (in which a progressive-traditionalist cleavage cuts across denominational lines). In a clear, yet nuanced, analysis, Layman shows that the culture wars cleavage is becoming the dominant religious division in contemporary American politics, but that vestiges of the older, community-based alignment persist among African Americans, some white Roman Catholics, and Jews. Methodologically, Layman provides a plausible ordinal measure of religious orthodoxy that is based on denominational affiliation and church attendance. This measure is carefully validated with attitudinal measures from more recent surveys, and it permits Layman (as well as other scholars) to perform time-series analyses using surveys that contain fewer religious variables. The work contains extensive methodological and statistical appendices, which provide sophisticated analyses for those interested in the details of Layman's empirical research without detracting from the readability of a very well written volume.

While The Great Divide contains no glaring weaknesses. it seems appropriate to point out a couple of limitations to Layman's impressive effort. First and most importantly, this is a book about party politics, and readers are advised to generalize his analyses to other aspects of American religious politics with appropriate caution. For example, Layman's relatively simple index of doctrinal orthodoxy is quite useful in explaining variations in the attitudes and electoral behavior of voters and political elites, but it may be less helpful in other settings. If one is interested in explaining attitudes toward objects of the Christian Right (such as support the Christian Coalition or Pat Robertson), or in accounting for variations in the pro-life movement, the empirical picture might be somewhat more complicated. Other works (such as Clyde Wilcox's earlier book, God's Warriors, 1992) have shown that the interest group politics of doctrinally conservative Protestants are often fragmented by arcane (at least to those outside the evangelical tradition) doctrinal disputes or interdenominational rivalries (a phenomenon termed "religious particularism" by sociologists of religion). Layman shows that political parties in the United States do aggregate interests (or, more accurately, values), and this characteristic of American parties simplifies the task of the researcher enormously.

Second, Layman's work contains relatively little in the way of explanation of the independent variable: religious beliefs and values. Why the cleavages subsumed under the "culture wars" rubric are manifested in the party system (in contrast to social movements or religious revivals) is an important question that awaits further analysis. His explanation—that these religiously-based values cleavages were exploited by strategic political elites—is quite promising, but ultimately incomplete. Why did political entrepreneurs find such fertile ground in the politics of morality, and how did this set of issues displace others on the political agenda? Layman offers some anecdotal evidence (most specifically, in the activist base of the McGovern campaign in 1972), but a more complete explanation of the social changes that made possible the political change described in the book remains to be completed.

All this is simply to suggest that the work to relate religious memberships, attitudes, and behavior will continue. Layman has provided an excellent account of recent changes in the American party system, which will be indispensable as religion continues to command the attention of political scientists.

Elements of Reason Edited by Arthur Lupia, Matthew D. McCubbins, and Samuel L. Popkin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 344p. \$64.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Scott de Marchi, Duke University

Rarely is one invited to see the ingredients that go into the sausage, and if one plans only to eat sausage, this is an ideal situation. But the only way to *make* sausage is to take a close look at these ingredients, blemishes and all. Despite modeling shortcomings and disagreements that are evident among the authors, *Elements of Reason* is a remarkable book, both for its instructional value and the insight it offers into one of the most important problems in the social sciences.

Models of human decision making underlie almost all research problems, and currently, the debate is framed as a dichotomous choice between rational choice models on the one hand and bounded rationality models on the other. To the extent that Arthur Lupia, Matthew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin expose this dichotomy as false, and provide an infrastructure for building better models, this book is a muchneeded contribution. It seems to me that studying this book, blemishes and all, is far more worthwhile than engaging in the silly debate about whether humans satisfy the axioms of rational choice theory. Given how many instructors assign Donald Green and Ian Shapiro's Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory (1996), there is a real need for a book that seriously discusses the potential for better models; Elements of Reason is by far the best such offering to date.

As noted, the first benefit provided by this book is instructional. Many of the chapters summarize and extend important research traditions within political psychology. Norman Frolich and Joe Oppenheimer discuss the role of ethics in decision making; Shanto Iyengar and Nicholas Valentino examine political advertising and source credibility; Wendy Rahn relates public mood to decision making; Milton Lodge and Charles Taber extend the on-line tally model to account for affect; Popkin and Michael Dimock investigate how different levels of information condition reasoning about international policy; and Mark Turner presents findings on conceptual blending. These chapters would benefit any advanced undergraduate or graduate class that examines decision making.

The other benefit of the book is to provide building blocks for new models of decision making. In the tradition of Herbert Simon, the editors seek nothing less than models that explain human choice. Given this goal, the best way to evaluate the success of various research agendas is to compare the predictive power of their models. In particular, proposed models should be compared to rational choice theory, which in many respects is the baseline model for the social sciences because of its claims of generality. This positive goal is in contrast to past research that simply aims to discredit rational choice, and the contributors of this book deserve praise for making this argument forcefully.

It is worth repeating that rational choice has been widely accepted in large part due to analytic simplicity. Any model of human decision making must provide two working parts. First, one needs an instantiation for the problems that humans confront. In rational choice, this instantiation is most often an extensive form game with explicit utility functions. Second, one needs a solution concept and an algorithm that "solves" a given problem; rational choice theory typically utilizes Nash equilibrium as the solution concept and backwards induction as the algorithm.

An enormous amount of research has focused upon whether humans can actually frame problems correctly (i.e., can we satisfy information requirements?) or apply the appropriate solution concept (i.e., can we satisfy computational

requirements?). It is abundantly clear that humans fail at both aspects of decision making as defined by rational choice. Further, a fair reading of the cognitive psychology and artificial intelligence literatures suggests that rational choice is not even a good approximation of how humans solve problems.

The problem is that it takes something to beat something, and that is what Green and Shapiro, and other critics of rational choice theory, have failed to recognize. The important point made by the editors of this volume, and more forcefully by Arthur Denzau and Douglas North in their chapter, is that the counterclaim to the above, that is, that humans are in many ways limited or less good than homo economicus, is also wrongheaded. Denzau and North point out that humans typically make choices in difficult environments with limited information; in fact, our performance in even relatively simple games, such as go or poker, defies scientific understanding. Computers have had some success in chess, but games of slightly more complexity stymie the best computer opponents.

This is important because computers are the best embodiment of rational choice theory I can think of—they instantiate games in extensive forms and solve them using variations on backwards induction (e.g., alpha-beta pruning). We thus find ourselves in a world where very powerful rational choice entities (i.e., computers) cannot drive to work, cannot play poker, and cannot really match human behavior in most simple activities, much less something as complex as running a political campaign or passing legislation in Congress. Denzau and North, along with the editors of this volume, argue that we need to stop mocking the afflicted and instead build better models. Additional guidance on this point is presented in a chapter by Philip Tetlock, where he argues that humans are cognitive managers, rather than misers, who cope with trade-offs and taboos in a sophisticated way.

There is, however, discord on this central issue across different chapters of Elements of Reason. In an astonishing chapter, Paul Sniderman critiques his own research program on heuristic use, and proposes that much of the heavy lifting humans require to make choices is instead accomplished by institutions. In many ways, Sniderman's argument follows that of Simon, who claimed that the algorithms underlying choice are not sophisticated, and that complex environments condition choices such that humans only appear sophisticated. Thus, humans cannot on their own steam use heuristics to simplify choices. Rather, political parties and other institutions simplify choices, creating the illusion of citizen competence. The mistake here is that we have existence proofs that Simon and Sniderman's account is incomplete. Humans perform extremely well at impossibly difficult problems, absent any guidance from the environment or institutions. Further, moving the spotlight to institutions is a shell game. Institutions are created and maintained by elites, who are simply a different set of actors making decisions in ways we do not

James Kuklinski and Paul Quirk follow Sniderman's lead in criticizing the political-heuristics and collective-opinion research. They correctly argue that much of the work in political heuristics falls into the category of "just-so stories"—we lack models that describe how heuristics are learned, modified, or stored in memory, and so instead, political psychology resorts to semiplausible reconstructions that fail not only on the grounds of cognitive plausibility but also on utility. Given their pessimism, it is surprising that the answer Kuklinski and Quirk propose is derived from findings in evolutionary psychology. This substitutes one set of just-so stories for another. Instead of clever heuristics, we have untestable stories

of how hunter-gatherer society conditions current political choices.

I have highlighted one area of debate with the pages of *Elements of Reason*, though there are others of equal import. This volume is engaging for the simple virtue that debate of this kind furthers research in a way that is seldom witnessed in the sanitized accounts presented in journals. *Elements of Reason* makes a considered argument for building better models of choice, and makes an enormous contribution by providing a shared framework for evaluating these models. Further, the contributors to this volume present work that points to several promising directions for future research. Disagreements strengthen the book by providing researchers with insight into questions that are still contentious.

Elements of Reason raises more questions than it answers, and all the authors, to varying degrees, fail to provide models that implement their ideas. Without precise models, rational choice theory will continue as the default model of decision making. An unanswered question in astronomy or metaphysics is that if the universe is expanding, what is it expanding into? Elements of Reason poses a similar question for social science: If rational choice theory is contracting, what has been left behind? We need answers to this question, and Elements of Reason makes important strides in providing them.

Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections By Stephen K. Medvic. Columbus: Ohio State University, 2001. 224p. \$50.00 cloth.

Darrell M. West, Brown University

Political consultants have become an omnipresent part of the election landscape. Almost no prominent campaign emerges without a group of paid advisors who raise money, poll, design ads, and craft messages for the candidate. Yet despite the extensive visibility of campaign consultants, few empirical studies exist that attempt to measure the impact of this important player in American elections.

In his new book, *Political Consultants in U.S. Congressional Elections*, political scientist Stephen Medvic seeks to fill this gap in the literature. He focuses on two questions: what consultants do and how successful they are. Using case studies and empirical data, he looks at voting, fund-raising, and media advising. Unlike some others who have studied this phenomenon, he suggest that consultants are not as harmful to our political process as some observers have argued.

His major approach is what Medvic calls a theory of "deliberate priming." In this perspective, the author says that candidates emphasize specific themes to alter voter standards of candidate evaluation (p. 51). It is a process that is deliberate and self-conscious on the part of consultants. Through polls, focus groups, and ads, campaigners seek to alter the content of political races in ways advantageous to themselves. Appeals are made not to all voters, but to a subset of the electorate that is available to the candidate.

The book draws on a meticulously compiled general election data set. Taking advantage of federal laws requiring disclosure of campaign expenditures in federal races, the author develops a data set that includes the names of all consultants paid in two or more specific congressional elections (a criteria developed to weed out part-time consultants). Among other things, the data set included variables measuring the type of consulting service provided, the candidate's party, sex, incumbency status, previous elective office, the district presidential vote, the perceived vulnerability of the seat, the votes cast per candidate, the total votes cast in the race, wins

and losses, expenditures, and contributions (broken down by source).

Using these data, Medvic is able to develop a comprehensive look at congressional races in 1990 and 1992. Not surprising, winners were more likely to hire consultants than losers and to employ larger numbers of consultants per race. Media specialists and pollsters were the most likely consultants to be hired, followed by generalists, fund-raisers, and direct mail specialists. Interestingly, Democrats were more likely to hire consultants than Republicans. However, winning challengers were more likely than losing challengers to rely on consultants. There was no gender gap in reliance on campaign advisers.

The last part of the book seeks to measure the successfulness of consultants on election fortunes. To undertake this analysis, the author separates incumbents from challengers due to the well-recognized advantages incumbents bring to the electoral process in many areas. Using ordinary least-squares regression, Medvic models the incumbent's percentage of the vote by various campaign factors including whether or not each party's candidate employed a consultant.

The results reported in Chapter Five demonstrate that having a consultant significantly helps them run competitive campaigns. According to the analysis, challenges could reduce their opponent's vote by 2.7 percentage points merely by hiring a consultant. Since these results are independent of campaign expenditures, it suggests that consultants have an independent effect on election campaigns. In open seat elections, Medvic finds even more dramatic examples of consultant influence. Using multivariate models, he shows that Republicans in the early 1990s were able to raise their vote by 16 percentage points through employment of consultants.

Medvic deserves credit for undertaking a thorough, careful, and detailed study of the use and impact of campaign consultants. Although many observers make normative judgments about these hired guns, few inform their opinions with data analysis. In what surely was a laborious data collection effort, Medvic gets high marks for attempting to reach systematic generalizations about a subject that rarely goes beyond anecdotes.

The major thing I would have liked to see is some explication of the results beyond the 1990–92 period studied. In 1994, for example, House Republicans stormed the gates and took control of the House and Senate. What role, if any, did consultants play in this reversal of electoral fortune? It would have been interesting for Medvic to extend his analysis to this and later time periods to see if the patterns he found stood up or were idiosyncratic to periods of Democratic control of the House. If the latter were true, for example, it would point to contextual factors that are important for congressional elections.

In addition, I would have liked to see more development of the normative argument found in the closing chapter. In that chapter, Medvic suggests that consultants are not nearly as harmful to American democracy as frequently alleged. It would have been interesting for the author to speculate more generally about his results and explain why consultants should not be feared. Some, for example, blame consultants for the negative and misleading tone of election campaigns and the rising costs of gaining office. In what ways do his results speak to those fears and how do they refute them?

I would suggest that scholars interested in campaign effects take a close look at this book. The author tackles a difficult question and reaches some conclusions that are unconventional. His thesis deserves serious attention by campaign observers.

The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality By Tali Mendelberg. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 320p. \$52.50 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Vincent L. Hutchings, University of Michigan

Tali Mendelberg's *The Race Card* offers a methodologically rich and convincing account of the impact of subtle race cues in contemporary American politics. Although her thesis is a controversial one, Mendelberg develops a careful and cogent argument that racial attitudes can have a substantial effect on candidate evaluations—provided that candidates craft a racial appeal that appears to be about something other than race. She argues that the success of implicit antiblack appeals, ones juxtaposing visual references to race with ostensibly nonracial verbal messages on issues such as crime or welfare, are due to four "A" factors: ambivalence about racial stereotypes, accessibility and priming, awareness of one's reliance on racial attitudes, and the ambiguity of the racial cue.

According to Mendelberg, white Americans' ambivalence on racial matters springs from their simultaneous commitment to the norm of racial equality and their persistent acceptance of negative antiblack stereotypes. Thus, racial appeals are likely to be most persuasive when they evoke a racial reaction without appearing to violate this norm. Mendelberg relies on the extensive social psychological literature on accessibility and priming to show that it is through this mechanism that racial messages influence voters. That is, although many whites have internalized negative racial stereotypes, these attitudes are not necessarily brought to bear on political judgments absent some racial cue provided by political elites. Awareness of the racial intent behind political cues is important for Mendelberg because it can prevent the activation of antiblack attitudes. As she points out, a growing body of evidence suggests that attitudes can be primed without the conscious awareness of the individual. Indeed, socially undesirable attitudes on issues such as race may be especially susceptible to priming when the individual is not aware that he or she has been affected.

Finally, Mendelberg argues that political cues with an ambiguous racial message are likely to be more effective than explicit appeals (i.e., appeals where words such as "black" or "race" are used). This is because, when confronted with ambiguity, voters tend to rely on their own attitudes in order to make sense of the political world. If, as Mendelberg suspects, this applies to race-based appeals, then candidates will be most successful when their messages imply racial meaning without conveying it openly.

Perhaps the most notorious use of implicit racial appeals in contemporary politics is the Republicans' use of the "Willie Horton ad" during the 1988 presidential campaign, and much of Mendelberg's book is devoted to this issue. Anyone familiar with the 1988 campaign will recall that Horton, a black man serving time in Massachusetts on first-degree murder, assaulted a white couple, stabbing the man and raping the woman, during a weekend pass. Republicans used this tragic episode to argue that the Democratic presidential nominee, Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, was soft on crime. Many also believe they used it to send a not-too-subtle message about the Democrats' stand on race.

Although not the first to provide an in-depth account of the Horton ad and its subterranean linkages to the Bush campaign, Mendelberg does provide a theoretically grounded assessment of when the Horton message should have been most successful. Utilizing a detailed content analysis of the period, she points out that although Horton's race and that of his victims were routinely provided in the press, the news media—and presumably the white public—did not interpret

this appeal as racial for most of the campaign season. It was not until late October when the Reverend Jesse Jackson, and later Democratic vice-presidential candidate Lloyd Bentsen, accused the Republicans of crafting a racist appeal that the news media skeptically aired this interpretation.

According to Mendelberg's theory of racial priming, the Horton ad should have been most successful in activating racial attitudes vis-à-vis candidate evaluations before Jackson accused the Republicans of racism, thereby transforming an implicit racial message into an explicit one. In order to test this theory, Mendelberg examines survey data during each of the three media phases of the Horton campaign: when the message received little attention; when attention became far more prominent, but remained "implicit;" and when the strategy was accused by Jackson of being racist, and hence became "explicit." Consistent with her theory, she finds that whites' attitudes on the Racial Resentment scale are most strongly associated with Candidate evaluations during the first two phases, but not in the third. In fact, the effects are substantively and statistically insignificant in the final phase of the campaign. Mendelberg concludes in this chapter that in order to counter the Republican strategy of race priming, the Democrats would do well to follow the example set by Jesse Jackson.

Mendelberg is well aware that the results from these analyses are not definitive. Clearly, the impact of racial attitudes on candidate evaluations did decline just as the Horton campaign shifted from an "implicit" stage to a more "explicit" one. Still, analysis of survey data does not allow her to rule out the possibility that some other, unmeasured factor accounts for this decline. In order to confront this possibility, Mendelberg designed a series of clever experiments set in either Michigan or New Jersey. Essentially, she randomly assigned her subjects to conditions either where they viewed news accounts of one candidate making an explicit appeal to racial attitudes (e.g., "Hayes says that people, especially African Americans, take advantage of welfare at the expense of hard-working taxpayers") or where they viewed the same candidate making merely an implicit appeal (i.e., visual references only).

The author deserves considerable credit for the ingenuity and care that went into her experimental designs. In addition to designing her entirely fictitious news accounts, Mendelberg also selected her subjects randomly from the phone book and then exposed them to the stimuli in their homes. Virtually no one in this subfield has gone to greater lengths to ensure that a study occurred under the most realistic conditions possible. In spite of all this effort, however, the results from these experiments do not resolve all of the unanswered questions from her survey analyses.

Mendelberg's experiments generally show that explicit appeals are far less successful at priming racial attitudes than are implicit appeals. Moreover, consistent with her theory, these effects seem to be driven by concern with norm violations and awareness of the racial content of the political message. One peculiar result from these experiments, however, is that racially liberal subjects who are not concerned when they are informed that their views violate the norm are far *more* likely to support the racially conservative candidate. This result does not fundamentally undermine the author's argument, but it does suggest that we need to know more about how and why norm violations moderate racial priming.

My greatest concerns with the author's experiments have less to do with what they show than with what they do not reveal. In my view, Mendelberg never directly tests the strengths and weaknesses of her core advice to Democrats: that the appropriate response to implicit racial messages is to unmask them. By showing that explicit messages are less effective—

although, significantly, not ineffective—she has shown that many whites will reject such crude appeals. However, I suspect that many readers will find that a candidate engaging in an explicit racial appeal is not the same as another candidate who labels an implicit appeal as racist. Indeed, as Mendelberg herself argues, the power of implicit appeals lies in part in their very ambiguity. This ambiguity makes it difficult to successfully label an implicit appeal as racist, particularly as the sponsoring candidate is likely to contest this charge. Also, I wondered whether Jackson's apparently persuasive effort to undermine the Horton ad was actually due to Jackson's accusation or Bentsen's. This raises the question of what types of Democrats (e.g., black or white, liberal or moderate, male or female, etc.) can successfully raise the charge of racism without the fear that it might backfire? Also, how successful will this strategy be in the South? In fairness, Mendelberg cannot be criticized for failing to address all of these questions, but they seem like an appropriate starting place for those who will wish to build on her work. Until these questions have been answered, I think the jury is still out as to whether unmasking implicit racial appeals is necessarily a winning strategy

With these important caveats aside, Mendelberg's book should be regarded as a major contribution to the field of race and politics. The theory is well grounded in the literatures of political science and social psychology, the supportive evidence is carefully analyzed and methodologically diverse, and the conclusions drawn are generally persuasive. Although Mendelberg's thesis will undoubtedly be regarded as controversial in some circles, her book goes a long way in providing compelling evidence that race, and racial attitudes, still matter in contemporary American politics.

Learning by Voting: Sequential Choices in Presidential Primaries and Other Elections By Rebecca B. Morton and Kenneth C. Williams. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 184p. \$55.00.

Lonna Rae Atkeson, University of New Mexico

While most elections in the United States are simultaneous (with all voters casting their ballots on the same day), there are elections, such as the presidential primary system, in which voters cast their ballots over an extended period of time. Sequential voting poses an interesting puzzle for scholars of voting behavior, particularly given the information flow of elections, but also the strategic considerations of what is effectively an iterated process over time. Presidential primaries are essentially a sequence or series of state party races that begin in early February and last until June of a presidential election year. Although not precisely the same as the presidential primary process, mail-in balloting or early voting, whereby some voters, especially stronger partisans, choose to cast their ballots prior to election day, offers another example of sequential voting in the United States.

As Rebecca Morton and Kenneth Williams argue, the advantage and unique feature of sequential voting is that voters later in the process have more information about the candidates, including horse race information, delegate totals, candidate trait, ideology, and policy information because of the preceding electoral events. This advantage may give later voters the opportunity to make more informed and perhaps even better decisions than they would have otherwise. On the other hand, sequential voting has potential negative consequences. Specifically, states or voters that go early in the process may have an undue influence on the electoral outcome, influencing that process in ways that undermine its representativeness and fairness. If this is so, then simultaneous elections are better because they equalize voter influence and maximize the

chance that the better-known candidates will win. Morton and Williams are interested in tackling the normative questions of this debate, assessing through the use of formal methods and experimental design the strengths and weaknesses of each voting system.

Morton and Williams do a decent job of describing the history of the presidential primary system and document the increase by states in front-loading, the move from a later primary date to an earlier date in order to have a greater influence on the outcome. As a result of front-loading, they argue, primaries are now virtually simultaneous elections. They also do a nice job of describing the history of "early voting," also known as absentee or mail-in voting, and attempt to build a case that makes it equivalent to the process of sequential elections found in the presidential nominating system. In Chapter 4 they do a thoughtful and interesting review of previous formal models of simultaneous and sequential voting.

Chapter 5 is where the real meat of their argument and analysis begins. As good formal modelers, they begin by outlining their assumptions and the implications of those assumptions on voter behavior. Their model assumes three types of candidates and voters: liberal, moderate, and conservative (though subjects know candidates as only x, y, or z). Information is constant in their analysis, but it is limited. Voters know about only one candidate and on the basis of that information must consider appropriate strategic choices. In the sequential model, voters in later contests have an additional piece of information: They know the outcomes of the earlier contests. In one case (designated high information), these later voters know how liberal, moderate, and conservative voters voted, and in the other case (designated low information), voters only know the aggregated outcomes of earlier voting.

To test their model, the researchers created a computerized election environment for subjects, providing them information about the candidate types, the payoffs, including information about how voter types rank the candidates, and the number of voters in each voter type. Subjects are also placed in risk-averse or risk-seeking groups based on payoffs. In the sequential experiment, "later"-voting subjects receive the additional information in the two cases described. The authors then test nine hypotheses about voter behavior within this constrained information environment, and the results are not always successful.

First, their best models test hypotheses related to simultaneous voting and are most applicable to a three-candidate, low-information general election race. These models, then, are especially useful in understanding local elections where there are often multiple candidates and little information. Their iterative model, though interesting and insightful, may not apply well to our understanding of presidential nominating campaigns. The reason is that this model and its payoff structure do not take into consideration that the presidential nomination campaign is only the first step in the selection process and that strategic considerations about the general election campaign may have an influence on voter behavior during the nomination campaign. In addition, their experiment misses the fundamental intraparty nature of a nomination campaign, how it is uniquely different from a general election campaign during which candidates can send clear cues about rational voting behavior. The electorate in a nomination campaign is not as ideologically diverse as it is in a general election campaign. Voters in a nominating campaign may have several good choices, and the different payoffs among candidates may often be very small or in some cases nonexistent, unlike a general election campaign in which the ideological and policy payoffs are clear.

Second, in their sequential game, the authors do not consider the fact that the presidential nominating game changes significantly over time as candidates withdraw from the race. These withdrawals are not reflected in the payoff structure. What happens in a nomination game is that eventually the race becomes largely a two-person, instead of a three-person or more, race. Thus, the winnowing aspect of the presidential nominating game is, at best, only partially represented by aggregate information about earlier voting decisions.

Third, the authors really try to stretch their theoretical framework by arguing that early or absentee voting is similar to a sequential race. In fact, it currently is not, and theoretically it is unlikely to evolve into a sequential process. Early voting results are not revealed to the electorate and cannot be used as a basis of information for election day voters. This factor diminishes the applicability of the iterative game to this process.

Despite these criticisms, this book serves as an important first step in considering the normative implications of sequential and simultaneous elections on voter behavior. It would be of most interest to election scholars, but also has some use for those teaching graduate method classes. In particular, I found Appendix A a good, though brief, introduction to formal modeling and experimental design. I also found the design of the experiment, its payoffs, and inherent assumptions very interesting and would like to see more use of experimental designs by political science researchers.

Disjointed Pluralism: Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress By Eric Schickler. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 356p. \$65.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

David C. King, Harvard University

For those of us who watch Congress and steep ourselves in its history, there are a handful of theories purporting to explain how and why Congress changes. Political parties behave like cartels gathering power at another's expense. Election-minded members shape Congress to ease the passage of pork-barrel bills and to trade votes. Congress often seems designed to encourage legislators to become policy experts, and their expertise is protected by deference to committees that fairly closely represent the interests of the whole House or Senate. For at least the last 15 years, and in the name of New Institutionalism, full-throated fans of various theories have been arguing over which one is "right."

In Disjointed Pluralism, Eric Schickler looks at the history of Congressional rules, committee structures, and Congressional leadership through the various lenses of theory. He emerges with an argument that none of the prevailing theories is really right all the time and none of the theories is really wrong either. That criticism is not new or by itself very helpful, but Schickler does everyone better in inducing a theory about how various interests engage in a continual interplay over congressional power.

The "pluralism" in Schickler's title is a bevy of "collective interests" that might spur innovations in Congressional design. These include political parties, chamber-centered interests, individual power bases, policy interests, and reelection interests. No one cause of Congressional change is predominant, and "disjointed pluralism portrays institutions as multilayered historical composites that militate against any overarching order in legislative politics" (p. 17). Furthermore, "congressional development is disjointed in that members incrementally add new institutional mechanisms without dismantling preexisting institutions and without rationalizing the structure as a whole" (pp. 17–18).

Schickler makes four claims about how Congressional institutions change, and each is successfully defended in case studies and through careful empirical work. First, several collective interests (or theories that have typically been offered) are in play each time there are important changes in Congressional institutions. Second, advocates of change in Congress appeal to multiple interests by, for example, fashioning temporary coalitions among believers in strong parties and members pursuing reelection. Third, new institutions typically layer on top of preexisting ones, so that exploring Congressional rules and procedures is not unlike an archeological dig, appearing "more haphazard than the product of some overarching plan" (p. 15). Finally, the whole system is dynamic in that changes promoting one collective interest (say, the desires of policy experts) provoke contradictory reforms from other collective interests.

Just as there is no overarching plan in the design of Congress, Schickler's theory itself seems disjointed and at times patched together from a plurality of interesting explanations, path dependency among them. I suspect that the book will not be remembered for its theory, unless the notion of path dependency can be more explicitly developed in subsequent articles. And I risk making an especially nitpicky comment here: The book would have been better labeled simply by what comes after the colon—Institutional Innovation and the Development of the U.S. Congress.

Why?

Schickler's theory reads more like an *ad hoc* explanation, but as a nuanced, rigorously researched and theoretically *informed* description of Congressional reforms, *Disjointed Pluralism* is a tour de force. Schickler covers reforms in four periods, 1890–1910, 1919–32, 1937–52, and 1970–89. The result is the best and most comprehensive work on Congressional reform since Joseph Cooper and David Brady were writing sweeping histories 20 years ago.

Schickler's research is exhaustive but never exhausting to read, and he blends case studies with logit analyses in ways that should be a lesson to us all. *Disjointed Pluralism* is now, and for some time will be, the definitive analysis of the history of congressional reforms since the 1890s. There are some jarring surprises, which Schickler argues convincingly. Notably, Schickler shows that in the late 1800s and early 1900s, an era of strong parties, partisan interests did not singularly drive Congressional reforms. Multiple interests, as in all other eras, were very much in play.

If Congressional reforms emerge from a mixture of collective motives, reelection interests play a minor role. Schickler categorizes 42 reforms, beginning with the adoption of Speaker Reed's rules in 1890, yet "there is surprisingly little evidence that members' shared reelection interest has driven development in the four periods examined" (p. 255). That conclusion may jar students of Mayhew's 1974 book (Congress: The Electoral Connection), but Schickler is a Mayhew devotee (and his former Ph.D. student at Yale). Indeed, throughout the four periods, Congressional changes seem driven by policy interests, the creation of individual power bases, a tug-of-war with the executive branch, and the flux of power between the parties. And as Schickler shows, when one constellation of interests makes a change, there is an almost-inevitable path-dependent reaction from the forces that lost in the previous reforms.

Disjointed Pluralism is, wisely, not teleological, but in arguing that new institutional structures are evermore layered on top of the old, Schickler misses an opportunity to explain when and why older edifices are explicitly exploded. Schickler is right that "the effectiveness of institutional change has repeatedly been compromised by the need to accommo-

date a preexisting authority structure that privileged other interests" (p. 252). But the word repeatedly in that sentence should not be read as "inevitably."

The development of legislative institutions does tend toward complexity and layering, but on occasion whole lines of precedents and whole sections of the rules are jettisoned entirely. This is most likely to happen early in a legislature's history, as we are seeing today with the Russian Duma, the Ukrainian Rada, and so on. Perhaps this dynamic would have been more evident in Congress had Schickler's analysis begun with the late 1700s instead of the 1800s.

That is too much to ask, I know, because Eric Schickler's attention to detail and careful analysis of the last 100 years is a wonderful achievement in itself. Thanks to *Disjointed Pluralism*, full-throated fans of various single-cause theories will have a lot to talk about.

The War Against the New Deal: World War II and American Democracy By Brian Waddell. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2001. 236p. \$39.00.

Donald R. Brand, College of the Holy Cross

This book argues that the transition from the New Deal to a mobilized wartime economy during World War II restored corporate hegemony in collaboration with a state apparatus dominated by military elites. The purported losers in this transition were New Deal reformers committed to a planned economy and an extensive social welfare state, and groups like labor and small business whose interests were represented by reform elites. Organized chronologically, Waddell's account traces the development of the military-industrial complex from the War Industries Board in World War I to what Waddell asserts is a neocorporatist pattern of governance that had become established by the late 1940s and early 1950s. For the intervening years, he devotes attention to the trade association movement of the 1920s, the National Recovery Administration in the early 1930s, the New Deal turn to Keynesian economics, Harry Truman and the Marshall Plan, and the National Security Act of 1947; but the book focuses on the three periods associated with mobilization for World War II. These three periods are prewar mobilization from September, 1939 to December, 1941; the institutionalization of wartime mobilization from early 1942 through early 1943; and the battles over postwar reconversion that began in 1943 and continued into the immediate postwar era.

Waddell has synthesized some of the existing secondary literature and supplemented it with material from published government sources to provide a coherent interpretation of the relationship of the New Deal to wartime mobilization; but his book will not, and should not, persuade anyone skeptical of his initial premises. He utilizes evidence selectively, cites literature that supports his thesis while ignoring literature that opposes it, and does not independently verify or evaluate assertions found in congressional committee reports.

One example of his selectivity is that there is surprisingly little attention to labor and labor unions in the war years. Instead, Waddell focuses on the plight of small businesses and their disadvantages vis-à-vis oligopolistic firms in securing lucrative government contracts. Labor unions only appear when they are playing second fiddle to big business in war production agencies or being asked to accept wage restraints white business profits mushroom. Doris Kearns Goodwin's (1994) No Ordinary Time presents a very different picture of the wartime years. She argues that "even as he reached out to business during the war years, Roosevelt insisted on preserving the social gains of the previous decade." Specifically,

his "partnership with business was not forged at the expense of American labor" (p. 608). Supporting her argument, she notes that labor unions added six million new members in the war years and that they emerged from the war with unprecedented organizational strength; and that many in labor made significant wage gains, notably automobile workers, who doubled their incomes because of labor shortages. Waddell should have addressed her thesis; he should have provided an alternative explanation for some of the facts and data that she provides to support her claims. Instead, he ignores her; he does not even include her book in his bibliography. Similarly, he ignores the claim made by Jordan Schwarz in *The New Dealers* (1995) that the New Deal disbanded the War Resource Board to preserve civilian control over defense preparations and to preserve New Deal principles under new circumstances.

One of the strengths of The War Against the New Deal is Waddell's recognition that the struggle between New Deal reformers and big business was genuine and fundamental. The New Deal was not simply rationalizing capitalism, and its efforts to enhance the regulatory capacity of the American state posed a serious threat to the interests and prerogatives of business elites. While Waddell appropriately recognizes that opposition to some of the regulatory agenda of the New Deal could unite big business, it is a mistake to portray big business as a homogeneous class with unified interests. Waddell acknowledges that business leaders must overcome collective action dilemmas if they are to pursue shared interests effectively, and he acknowledges ideological differences between corporate liberals and laissez-faire conservatives; but he underestimates other conflicting business interests. For instance, he does not explore the important sectoral differences that fragment business unity. He pays particular attention to steel, aluminum, and copper because these raw materials were rationed during war mobilization and the industries associated with them tend to be highly oligopolistic, but he ignores what happened in less regulated, less oligopolistic sectors of the economy like textiles. He does not adequately distinguish the interests of firms producing defense materials sold to government as the sole consumer from the interests of firms producing materials that could be sold to consumers. He needs to supplement his general analysis of government—business relations with industry case studies to provide a richer, more empirical account of the war years.

Waddell concludes that the "military-corporate alliance triumphed" and the state was stronger "at the cost of compromising and diminishing America's democratic character." (p. 3). He concludes his account of the evolution of civilianmilitary relations with Truman and the enactment of the National Security Act of 1947, but his sweeping conclusion would seem to require some explanation for Truman's firing of Douglas MacArthur in 1951. This was a major political episode in the Truman presidency, and it seems to testify to the preeminence of civilian over military control in the immediate postwar era. The claim that the militaryindustrial complex had "diminished America's democratic character" would also entail some demonstration that America's defense policy and defense spending in the postwar years did not reflect the preferences of democratic majorities responding to the growing, real threat of the Soviet Union. Waddell provides no evidence to refute this claim, just as he provides no evidence to refute alternative interpretations of the fate of reform aspirations in the wartime years. He makes no converts because he preaches only to the converted.

## Comparative Politics

Unemployment in the New Europe Edited by Nancy Bermeo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 368p. \$70.00 cloth, \$28.00 paper.

Per Kongshøj Madsen, University of Copenhagen

The publication under review is the outcome of a Princeton University conference entitled "Unemployment's Effects" held in 1997. The themes of the chapters extend widely. Some authors focus on broad discussions of the possibilities for the "European model" to survive in a global economic setting, while others look at specific relations, for example, between unemployment and trade union strength, in just one European country. Some chapters have clear theoretical objectives, while others have a focus on empirical detail and statistical analysis. On the other hand, the majority of the chapters are related by a general positive view on the sustainability of the European model, even in the seemingly hostile environment of the global economy. Although the European welfare states and labor markets are often accused of being inflexible and hampered by "institutional sclerosis," they may also foster the development of a soft and kind capitalism—or organized managed economy-as Nancy Bermeo puts it in her introduction to the book.

A useful survey of the development of European labor markets over the last two decades is found in the contribution by David Cameron, who correctly points to the large discrepancies among the European countries when it comes to employment and unemployment performance. The following two chapters by Peter Hall and Martin Rhodes both argue the case for the organized market economy as a viable alternative to neoliberal capitalism. Hall provides a well-balanced discussion of the pros and cons of the two models, while Rhodes focuses on the effects of globalization on the European welfare states. Their positive attitude toward the "European project" is evident, but both authors argue their case in a balanced and well-documented fashion.

The next two chapters are written in the tradition of comparative quantitative macroanalysis. Bruce Western and Kieran Healy present results from an analysis of the wage slowdown in 18 OECD countries from 1965 to 1993, while Lyde Scruggs and Peter Lange examine the relation between unemployment and union density. The main message conveyed in both chapters is that "institutions matter." The process of wage determination is strongly influenced by the institutional setup. The same goes for the relation between unemployment and union density. Thus, countries where trade unions control the unemployment insurance system gain members during times of crisis. The opposite is true for countries with state-controlled benefit systems.

Then follow three case studies, of Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands, by Allan Stoleroff, Javier G. Polavieja and Andrew Richards, and Steven B. Wolinetz, respectively. Though they all in one way or the other serve to substantiate the main argument of the book, they are also the least interesting to the general reader, mainly due to their great detail and lack of updated material.

The last part of the book is focused on a theme, political behavior, which is somewhat remote from the rest of the chapters. First, Christopher J. Anderson presents the results of a comparative study of political behavior of the unemployed in 12 member states of the European Union. Data are from 1994. He does find some differences between the employed and the unemployed part of the population, but neglects the fact that individual unemployment is not a stable situation. To the contrary, many persons move to and from unemployment during the year as a normal element of the functioning of the labor market. By example in the Danish case, about onequarter of the employees experience at least one spell of unemployment every year. Furthermore, those affected by unemployment differ from the average employee in a number of respects, especially by having a high probability of being low skilled. Thus, one must expect that the political behavior of a person who is reported as unemployed at a given point in time is the result of the interplay between a large number of variables, including the duration of the current unemployment spell, educational background, income level, and so on. Or to put it differently: It is hard to tell from the analysis presented here whether we are dealing with the political behavior of the unemployed or the unskilled ormore probably—the result of the interplay between a number of socioeconomic variables. This criticism is less relevant in the case of the following chapter by José Maria Maravall and Martha Fraile, who use four background variables to explain the voting behavior of the Spanish voters in the election in April 1995. Not surprisingly, they find that variables other than unemployment, including income, are of importance to voting behavior.

In the final chapter, the editor Nancy Bermeo sums up the main argument of the volume. There is no clear winner of the "battle of the systems." Contrary to the conventional wisdom, at least in some quarters, both coordinated and uncoordinated policy models are able to deliver the good in the form of lower unemployment. And furthermore, coordinated policy models and competitive corporatism have the merit of being more favorable to social inclusion and lower inequality. They are just a nicer place for common folks, which is of course a positive conclusion for the majority of the population that can be characterized as such.

It is rare to find a collection of conference proceedings that does not show some weakness when it comes to actuality and coherence. One striking feature, when looking back over the chapters of the present publication, is the limited discussion of the European Employment Strategy, which since 1998 has been an important element in the reform process of the European Union. Considerations of the expected enlargement of the European Union with up to 10 Central and Eastern European countries are also absent in the volume. These observations are not a criticism of the editor as suchbecause the two subjects mentioned were practically missing in the academic debates just a few years ago. But they still show the risk of a considerable time lag between publications about the "new Europe"—and what is actually going on in the new Europe.

These critical remarks should not, however, scare the reader away from the book. For those not familiar with this line of research, the publication provides a valuable and balanced introduction to important alternatives to the liberal free-market orthodoxy. Also, for those academics, students, and others who are already familiar with—and maybe sympathetic to—the alternatives to the neoliberal paradigm, this collection of papers gives a helpful survey of the views of some of the prominent scholars active in the study of the ongoing transformation of Europe.

**The Retreat of Social Democracy** By John Callaghan. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000. 255p. \$69.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Against the Third Way By Alex Callinicos. Oxford: Polity Press, 2001. 160p. \$56.95 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Social Democracy in Neoliberal Times: The Left and Economic Policy since 1980 Edited by Andrew Glyn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 374p. \$70.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Fred Block, University of California, Davis

Since the 1980s, global financial integration and the rise of neoliberalism have significantly changed the terrain on which European social democratic parties operate. However, fierce debate persists over the evaluation of these changes. Some observers—from widely differing political standpoints—insist that social democracy and the free movement of capital across national boundaries are fundamentally incompatible. It follows that the only options for social democratic parties are either to embrace neoliberalism and dismantle much of the welfare state or organize concerted action to reshape the global financial architecture. An opposing group of analysts are equally adamant that while the terrain has certainly become more difficult, it is still possible for Social Democrats to preserve much of the welfare state and even launch new policy initiatives.

All three of the books under review argue for some variant of this second position with differing combinations of normative and empirical arguments. While the arguments are often implicit, most of the authors appear to be skeptical of neoliberal claims that markets can truly be self-regulating. It follows that if actual global financial arrangements fall far short of neoliberal dreams, then there is still considerable room for governments to play an active role in shaping how markets work. It is within this space that Social Democrats are able to pursue policies designed to protect citizens from the market.

The three books share a further agenda in common; they all see Tony Blair's Third Way path for the British Labour Party to be misguided. Alex Callinicos's book is a straightforward polemic that elaborates Perry Anderson's insight that "the Third Way is the best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today" (p. 109). Callinicos considers that Third Way rhetoric is simply an effort to conceal Blair's actual agenda of dismantling what remains of the welfare state and providing unconditional support for U.S. initiatives in order to impose its vision of market liberalism on the rest of the world.

John Callaghan's book presents a more scholarly account of European social democracy over the past 40 years. But surprisingly, Callaghan's reference to "Refreat" in his book's title refers only to the United Kingdom. His conclusion argues forcefully that European social democracy is not in decline, either in terms of electoral support or the ability to achieve its policy objectives. While Callaghan recognizes that all of these parties have become more cautious in the current global environment, he insists that outside of the U.K., they are continuing to defend social democratic values. The book's real agenda is to show that Tony Blair is out of step with the rest of European social democracy. Callaghan argues that Blair and New Labour have gone too far in embracing Thatcherite ideas, even at a time when their European colleagues are effectively defending the welfare state and developing proposals to bring footloose global capital under greater control. Callaghan's book is particularly useful in detailing the leftward turn within social democracy in the major European countries in the 1960s and 1970s and in recounting the defeats suffered in the 1980s. However, the book would be considerably stronger had he focused more attention on explaining the root causes of the policy divergences between New Labour in England and Social Democrats in Germany and France.

The third book is an unusually strong collection of essays that provide in-depth analyses of the recent experiences of a range of different social democratic governments. The quality is uniformly high and the essays develop detailed and sophisticated analyses. Most of the essays analyze the recent history of particular countries—with specific essays covering the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, Austria, Greece, Spain, Poland, and the special cases of Australia and New Zealand. Andrew Glyn's introduction and the last three essays are broadly comparative and move toward a broader assessment of the issues.

The essay on New Labour by Glyn and Stewart Wood shares Callincos's and Callaghan's distaste for Tony Blair's Third Way, but in only 22 pages, it offers a more subtle and detailed analysis. The authors acknowledge, for example, that some of New Labour's policies, such as the Working Families Tax Credit, the introduction of a minimum wage in April 1999, and possibly, the efforts to move young people into employment, have actually benefited the poorest households in the U.K. But they go on to explain why these initiatives are unlikely to make a significant difference in England's high rates of economic inequality and chronically high regional unemployment. They also persuasively argue that New Labour's consistent effort to keep the trade unions at arm's length "has left the government without any means to encourage the kind of coordination of wage bargaining which appears to have played a significant part in a number of recent 'employment miracles,' the Netherlands and Ireland, for example" (p. 209).

But while Glyn and Wood are in considerable agreement with the other authors in their assessment of New Labour, the cumulative thrust of the essays in Glyn's volume suggests a somewhat more pessimistic assessment of social democracy on the European Continent than that provided by Callaghan. Specifically, the chapters on Spain, Greece, and France emphasize both the failure of recent social democratic governments to bring unemployment rates down and their gradual accommodation to orthodox monetary policies. To be sure, each of these essays also stresses the unique challenges faced by these parties, particularly those that were not building on established social democratic traditions. In Austria and Sweden—in contrast—the assessments are somewhat more positive, and a comparative essay by John Stephens and Evelyne Huber does provide strong evidence that cutbacks in social spending in social democratic welfare states have thus far been quite limited.

In short, most of these essays downplay the role of global political economic factors in explaining the timidity or failure of particular social democratic governments. But there are occasional acknowledgments that capital mobility and exchange rate policies do significantly constrain government policy options. These arguments are developed most fully in one of the comparative essays written by Torben Iversen. Drawing heavily on the Swedish case, he argues that the government's conversion to a fixed exchange-rate policy, in combination with the collapse of centralized wage bargaining, significantly constrains its choices. Specifically, he cites Peter Swenson's use of the "trilemma" concept to argue that under current circumstances, social democratic governments cannot simultaneously pursue full employment, income equality, and budgetary restraint. And he goes on to argue that accommodation to either unemployment or increased income inequality threatens to undermine the coherence of social democratic electoral appeals.

Ultimately, the three books are persuasive in making the case that it is domestic politics and not global financial integration that has led Blair and New Labour to take minimal action to reverse levels of economic inequality that are far higher than those on the Continent. At the same time, they fail to provide a direct and persuasive challenge to those who argue that global financial integration is pushing all economies toward higher levels of economic inequality and greater acceptance of unemployment. The closest thing to such an argument is provided by Adam Przeworski in an essay in the Glyn volume that argues that "[m]ost of the effects attributed to globalization are due to something else, many to technological changes" (p. 330). But Przeworski also acknowledges that there is still too little solid research to make such a statement with any degree of confidence. The issue of whether social democracy can survive another 20 years of global neoliberalism remains unresolved.

But the Callinicos book provides a perspective that the other books lack; he devotes considerable attention to the United States role in advancing global neoliberalism. In contrast to those who imagine that economic integration is creating some kind of unified global capitalist class, Callinicos sees U.S. actions through the lens of Great Power politics, and he also sees U.S. hegemony as increasingly fragile. One source of weakness is the U.S. economy's dependence on a stock market bubble that Callinicos correctly predicted could not be sustained. Another potential weakness is the possibility that secondary powers can create effective alliances that will significantly limit U.S. international room to maneuver.

Implicitly, Callinicos raises the big question—whether the neoliberal era that began with Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan might actually be coming to a close. If the mantra of deregulation, privatization, and elimination of barriers to the free movement of goods and capital is losing its persuasiveness, then the whole question of whether social democracy can survive in this new environment could be moot. But even though neoliberalism appears increasingly to be on the defensive as an ideology and a policy framework, the global financial architecture continues to permit the enormous private flows of capital that discourage most governments from experimenting with any type of unorthodox economic policies. Moreover, since it is highly unlikely that the current Republican administration would agree to any significant changes in the current international financial regime, any progress toward a negotiated alternative to neoliberalism is years away. To be sure, reports of neoliberalism's death might well be exaggerated; the doctrine has proven to be remarkably resilient over the last quarter century.

Even so, Przeworski's essay has some interesting insights about how a new policy regime to replace neoliberalism might emerge. Earlier changes in policy regimes—such as the program that the Swedish Social Democrats campaigned on in 1932 or the innovations that Reagan and Thatcher pursued at the end of the 1970s—share several elements in common. First, the policy changes occurred during a period of economic crisis when voters believed that established policies had failed. Second, voters are persuaded that the political party favoring the new policy direction is responsible and has their best interest at heart. Third, the new government is blessed with a certain amount of luck in the period of implementing new policies. Przeworski recognizes that these dramatic breaks in policy regimes are rare, but the rewards to those parties with the courage to pursue this kind of risky path are substantial.

Przeworski implies that the "success" of a new policy regime in one country can lead to imitation in other countries and then a shift in the global financial regime that supports the new approach. It is significant that his approach places more causal weight on new policy ideas than on material conditions or political coalitions. Persuasive new ideas are the critical lever of historical change.

But Przeworski's emphasis on the centrality of ideas suggests a final observation about neoliberalism. A policy regime that is perpetuated by powerful institutions, but which is lacking in intellectual legitimacy, provides a fragile foundation for maintaining global economic and political order. The danger is that when crises occur, there will not be sufficient consensus among nations to negotiate effective responses. For this reason, even aside from the challenge of international terrorism, there is reason to fear that the early years of the twenty-first century might prove more turbulent and unpredictable than any time since the end of World War II.

The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through the Lens of Latin America Edited by Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 372p. \$59.50 cloth, \$15.95 paper.

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Standing the assumptions and causal propositions of established theories on their head, with an eye to refining them or pointing us to other theories, is a fruitful path to quickening the intellectual pulse, to reinvigorating a field of study, and to contributing to knowledge. The Other Mirror makes an eloquent and persuasive case for midrange theorizing as a tool for revitalizing area studies in general and Latin American studies in particular. If area studies are to recover from their marginality in the general disciplines, area specialists must once again engage the theory-building enterprise central to the disciplines that house them. By concentrating on midrange analysis, area studies have real contributions to make to general theory.

In the introduction, Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves argue that general theory offers area specialists a sure guide for framing questions guaranteed to advance knowledge of key but poorly understood problems. It also orders reality on the basis of assumptions and causal relationships. Through the lenses of a wide range of classic theorists, the volume focuses on one of the most enduring problems in Latin American studies: the problem of social order. Because order is defined as "the assumed understanding that institutionalized rules will be both imposed and obeyed in a standard and universal way" (p. 13), the editors make a case for focusing research on institutional development, specifically the persistence of political instability and weakness.

However, area specialists are not just idea "takers" and providers of data for general theorists. Grand theory can learn a lot from them. Their work may expose weaknesses in causal relationships and draw attention to problematic assumptions. Much of grand theory stands on the foundations of what has been learned from a few classic European cases and the United States. How well do concepts derived from that historically and culturally specific context extend to regions that have had a different historic experience? At what point does concept stretching or the teleology implicit in many general theoretic models based on those few cases call into question their utility for explaining outcomes in the developing world? The relevant question is, what factors explain the range of outcomes on a given problem across the developed and developing world?—not, what key elements in the development of Europe and the United States are missing in Latin America?

The editors organized the volume into three sections. Part One tackles the classic problem of economic development.

Jeremy Adelman applies Douglas North's work on property rights to explain the well-known gap between policy intent and result. North's approach leads Adelman to fruitful research questions. How does the structure of property rights vary at different moments of the reform process, and how does this affect the rationality of the subjects of reform? Aldelman then uses his case to expose an important limitation of North's approach. It lacks a political sensibility. Creating those rights—the predicament of developing countries—is a complex political process that requires study. Paul Gootenberg's rich intellectual history of Latin Americanists influenced by Alexander Gerschenkron revives the debate over the relationship between the timing of industrialization and the tasks, opportunities, and obstacles to economic development that developing countries face. Steven Topik follows up with a fine-grained examination of the contemporary implications of Karl Polanyi's work for the problem of political order. Polanyi argued that conflict between organized society and spreading, market-driven commodification moves history. Today, market failure and the concentration of wealth drive demands for state regulation. Failure to address the issue could result in some latter-day version of fascism. Veronica Montecinos and John Markoff conclude the section with a revealing exploration of how the rise of neoclassical economists to positions of political prominence in Latin America adds institutional power to the force of their

Part Two grapples with another perennial "riddle" of Latin America: the lack of political stability after nearly two hundred years of independence from Spain. This section turns the spotlight on state formation. López-Alves uses key concepts from Charles Tilly's work on the effects of war on state building to explain different types of state formation and their institutional weaknesses in Latin America. It is an imaginative exercise in how to use theory creatively in order to think about one's cases, rather than simply applying case material as confirming or disconfirming evidence for a general theory. Alan Knight gives a tour de force performance on how to use a range of seemingly contradictory definitions of the state and the sources of state autonomy to tease out criteria for categorizing states. He shows—with excellent dry humor upon occasion—how the Mexican state has come back almost full circle to the weak agent state of the late nineteenth century. Jorge Domínguez's review of Samuel Huntington's work makes a case for more intensive study of political parties in Latin America, on the premise that they are a key institution for conflict mediation in modern democracies. J. Samuel Valenzuela uses his detailed knowledge of Chilean politics to show the limitations of Barrington Moore's classic work on the social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Valenzuela argues that the Chilean case confirms the need for research that emphasizes the autonomy of political factors from socioeconomic ones to explain democratization.

Part Three turns to culture, understood as systems of meaning. Centeno's analysis of the concept of discipline, a key component of the cultural transition to modernity that, it is often claimed, Latin America lacks, is a delight. He explores the utility of Michel Foucault's theorizing on the subject, adroitly applying evidence to demonstrate how the ambiguous specification of key variables introduces causal confusion and to highlight that Foucault's work is littered with Eurocentric assumptions that do not transfer to the Latin American institutional context. Therefore, the real research task is to explain that different institutional development path. Robert M. Levine turns the spotlight on Michel de Certeau's studies on language as an expression of resistance in everyday life by subordinate social groups. Levine suggests that the current emphasis on subaltern and resistance studies is a form of

escapism that directs research away from a more significant reality: the structures being resisted. In the concluding chapter, Claudio Lomnitz launches a thorough critique of Benedict Anderson's theory of nationalism. He proposes an alternative approach focused on bonds of hierarchical dependence, rather than on horizontal feelings of a fraternal community.

Individual chapters have their difficulties, such as inconsistent analysis, dubious use of a single case for dismissing an entire theory, occasional lapses in how the theory applies to a case, or vice versa. These and other issues, however, in no measure detract from the tremendous achievement of the book. It reaffirms that the imaginative application of evidence to theory is a creative act leading to knowledge. One might have preferred a more consistent treatment of the relationship between theory and case material across the chapters. But perhaps the variety of approaches is a greater strength. It offers concrete examples by skilled scholars of the many uses of theory. The volume rekindles fundamental debates across a wide range of problems in theory building in several academic disciplines, and it makes a convincing case for the rich variety of ways in which area studies can contribute to the enterprise.

Commissioned Ridings: Designing Canada's Electoral Districts By John C. Courtney. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001. 337p. \$75.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

Herman Bakvis, Dalhousie University

The approach to the design and revision of electoral districts in Canada is quite different from that found in the United States, despite the two countries' sharing of the same basic first-past-the-post electoral system. As John Courtney notes in his careful study of the topic, in Canada the emphasis in defining electoral districts, or constituencies or ridings, has been underpinned by concepts such as "community of interest" and "effective representation," which encompass a wide range of political and social considerations—many local in nature—and which permit substantial deviation from the principle of one person, one vote. At the federal level, the allowable deviation in the size of constituencies can be plus or minus 25% within any given province, with the possibility of even greater variances under special circumstances. At the level of provincial electoral systems, the variances can be even larger, in part due to the fact that in certain provinces the ratio of urban to rural seats is specified in law. At the same time, the actual process of designing and reconfiguring the boundaries of constituencies, in the hands of independent, arm's-length commissions for the past 40 years, has been remarkably free of direct partisan influence. In fact, given the rather tattered state of current Canadian parliamentary democracy, characterized by one-party dominance in the federal parliament and a precipitous decline in voter turnout over the past three elections, the institution of arms-length boundary commissions stands out as something that works well and enjoys broad

Since the Election Boundaries Readjustment Act of 1964, the presence of 10 arm's-length federal bodies, one for each province, as well as comparable bodies at the provincial level, stands in marked contrast to the preceding era when constituency boundary adjustments were exclusively the domain of politicians and horse trading within the regional subcommittees of parliament was the predominant means of setting boundaries. Given that in Canada changes of any kind in institutional arrangements are relatively rare, the acceptance by members of parliament (MPs) and the government of the day of a new independent body that effectively removed them from the process is quite striking.

In Commissioned Ridings, Courtney, utilizing John Kingdon's agenda-setting model, notes the confluence of three streams in the 1950s and early 1960s: the problem of huge discrepancies in constituency size becoming more evident in light of increasing urbanization; the identification of a proposed solution in the form of independent commissions, a model that was already in place in at least one province and in effect in Australia since the turn of the twentieth century; and a unique set of circumstances—a series of minority governments in the federal parliament in the 1960s, the arrival of new, young urban Liberal Party MPs, and the leaders of the three main parties being committed to change—that allowed political support for the idea to take hold. Unlike the American case, none of these critical developments were driven by court challenges. Indeed, the only significant Canadian Supreme Court decision bearing on malapportionment—Carter 1991—came long after the 1964 act. Furthermore, Carter essentially affirmed the plus-minus 25% permissible variance in the federal legislation and legitimized the concepts of community of interest and effective representation. It is interesting to note, as Courtney points out, that since Carter, the commissions have actually moved in the direction of voter equality.

The main factor facilitating the adoption of independent commissions, claims Courtney, is federalism, particularly in respect to demonstration effects when one or more jurisdictions act as a laboratory to demonstrate the impact of new policies. In this case, it was the province of Manitoba that first adopted the independent commission model in 1955, drawing directly on the Australian experience. Other provinces, most notably Quebec in the 1960s, and the federal government, took serious note of the Manitoba experiment and subsequently adopted it.

In Canada there is a small but growing community of political scientists interested in the subject of electoral apportionment. This book effectively confirms Courtney as the foremost authority within this community. Painstakingly researched, well written, comprehensive, and above all balanced, Courtney's in-depth treatment would make it difficult for anyone to contemplate tackling another book-length study to complement or displace it. All aspects of the topic are covered, including the history of apportioning seats among the provinces, the unusual circumstances surrounding Manitoba's adoption of independent commissions (following an experiment with the single transferable vote in a multimember district for the city of Winnipeg), and the ramifications of the 1991 *Carter* decision.

While few people will take serious issue with Courtney's analysis or major conclusions, some might nonetheless argue that he perhaps underestimates the partisan elements that still remain. While politicians are no longer directly involved in deciding boundaries, in various ways they still shape the membership of the commissions. At the federal level, each commission is chaired by a judge selected by the chief justice for the province. The vast majority of judicial appointments in Canada are effectively partisan appointments made by the party in power without any legislative oversight or review. Thus, in the eyes of some there is still at least the taint of partisan bias. And while, as Courtney points out, academics have increasingly come to populate the membership of commissions, some of those academics will readily admit that there was likely a partisan element in their selection. (The selection of two of the three commission members is made by the speaker of the House of Commons, who is generally from the governing party.) Furthermore, the emphasis in some of the federal commissions on voter equality and the elimination of the privilege accorded rural seats can become an implicit form of gerrymandering favoring the governing

Liberal Party, given that the strength of the Liberals tends to be in urban areas.

If there is one area where the book disappoints, it could lie in the failure to engage the debate in Canada over proportional representation (PR), a topic that in recent years has preoccupied several political scientists and a rather more limited number of politicians. Pure PR, where the country as a whole becomes a single constituency, would make the issue of boundaries and constituency size irrelevant. However, most of the PR schemes proposed for Canada tend to involve some variant of the German or New Zealand model, where multiple constituencies are still a prominent feature. Such issues as district magnitude, boundaries, and the role of and need for commissions under these variants of PR in the Canadian context could have been usefully addressed by the author.

Courtney could validly respond that such discussion would stray too far from the main subject of the book. Furthermore, one suspects that the author believes the likelihood of PR's being adopted in Canada is rather remote, and he may well be correct. Nonetheless, the past year has seen the election of at least one provincial government, in British Columbia, that has made a commitment to examine the possibility of altering the first-past-the-post system in that province. If Courtney's thesis concerning the pivotal role of Manitoba in pioneering the role of the modern boundary commission is correct, it is conceivable that British Columbia could play a similar role with respect to PR. At a minimum, some discussion of PR in relation to boundary commissions would have made for a more interesting, and provocative, book. All this notwithstanding, the book represents a significant contribution to the literature on electoral district design and redistribution and an excellent starting point for further comparative research on the topic.

South Africa's Brittle Peace: The Problem of Post-Settlement Violence By Pierre du Toit. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 222p. \$65.00.

Then I Was Black: South African Political Identities in Transition By Courtney Jung. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000. 320p. \$35.00.

Allison Drew, University of York

These two books deal with the legacy of apartheid for South Africa's democracy, approaching the problems posed by this legacy from differing perspectives about the role of the state. Pierre du Toit, in a thoughtful and well-researched book, addresses the problem of violence in post-apartheid South Africa. Peace in a society with a history of violence needs to be nurtured, he contends, and the state must play a central role.

Du Toit traces the roots of post-apartheid violence to an evolving security dilemma. The British defeat of Afrikaners in the Anglo-Boer war of 1899–1902 was crucial to the development of this dilemma, he argues. A single statistic highlights the war's trauma for Afrikaners: In the concentration camps set up by the British for Afrikaner civilians, 7 out of every 20 Afrikaner children died from disease. This episode scarred subsequent generations, leading to the Afrikaner security dilemma. Apartheid was their response. In turn, apartheid created a security dilemma for Africans, whose identity was shaped by both material and nonmaterial deprivation. Ultimately, du Toit argues, apartheid broke down through its own contradictions, but not before spawning a culture of violence.

A mystique about armed struggle developed within the liberation movement. "Throughout the literature," du Toit writes, "the conviction is expressed (but not explained) that

the armed struggle served to inspire, motivate and spur the anti-apartheid movers more than any other form of resistance" (p. 83; italics in original). Crime came to be rationalized in terms of political struggle. Although issues about violence were at the heart of negotiations—notably debates about the suspension of armed struggle and the government's clandestine aid to the Inkatha Freedom Party—the paradox of transition was that violence and peacemaking went hand in hand. As negotiations unfolded, the "difference between conditions of war and peace became more vague, not less so, and the distinction between combatant and non-combatant more ambiguous and between enemy and ally more uncertain" (p. 78).

The democratic transition has brought a new security dilemma. Political violence decreased sharply after the 1994 democratic elections, while criminal violence has risen. As one indicator, South Africa's murder rate is 65 people per 100,000; in Canada, Sweden, and the United States it is less than 10 per 100,000. Family and community structures have lost cohesion; the police are seen as ineffective and corrupt; the inspirational motivation of the liberation struggle has dissipated. Criminal gangs have filled the social void. The culture of violence and the prevalence of arms are symptomatic of the state's inability to exercise a monopoly on the use of force and hence, du Toit believes, of the state's weakness: "A strong autonomous state able to deliver public goods both competently and equitably, and therefore to provide citizenship of equal value is a necessary yet still insufficient condition for democratic viability and for the containment of corruption" (p. 21; italics in original). Security is the basic issue around which the social contract between state and citizen is built; resolving this security dilemma is crucial to the maintenance of a stable democracy.

This resolution will entail strengthening state institutions to control violence, addressing unemployment, promoting foreign investment, and containing the international illegal trade in military equipment, which has been flooding the South African market. Just as importantly, argues du Toit, is the need to create national myths and symbols that are both neutral and inspiring. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) played some role in this process, du Toit states, even though in his view politicians had the last word on the commission. Nonetheless, he concedes, both acceptance of responsibility for collective guilt and forgiveness are necessary, if not sufficient, conditions for reconciliation, and in this respect the TRC was successful. "There are now fewer lies, deceptions and half-truths in circulation," he writes. "For this the TRC deserves credit" (p. 163). The African Renaissance might also serve as an inspirational myth, he suggests, depending on its content. South Africa must develop a way to allow youth dignity while enabling them to earn honor.

Courtney Jung, by contrast, is critical of such an emphasis on the state for the maintenance of democracy. The call to "bring the state back in," she argues, has seen the pendulum swing too far toward state-centric approaches to democratic stability. Jung is concerned with the implication of politicized ethnicity for democratic stability. Political identity, as she defines it, is the product of elite manipulation "refracted through the memories and networks of those who are mobilized" (p. 17) and activated during struggles for resources and power.

Jung argues that ethnic identities are politicized or depoliticized through the interaction of five variables: "conditioning factors," that is, material conditions, organizational networks, and available ideology, which affect political identities more than the "proximate factors" of political institutions and mobilizing discourse. This implies, she maintains, that "an exclusive focus on the design of constitutional and electoral

systems is probably misplaced" (p. 236). Instead, negotiations about conditioning factors will be more likely to promote fluid political identities. This will minimize the persistence of rigid sectional divisions and allow the development of crosscutting cleavages necessary for a pluralist civil society. Hers is a plea for the compatibility of multiculturalism and democracy: "Difference is the norm" (p. 263).

Jung examines three cases of politicized ethnicity: those of Afrikaner, Zulu, and Coloured identities. Afrikaner nationalism was used by political elites at various points in the twentieth century to build political alliances and promote a state-led development that facilitated the rise of an Afrikaner capitalist class. But from the 1960s, state discourse referred increasingly to white rather than Afrikaner identity. By the 1990s, Jung points out, political mobilization on the basis of Afrikaner ethnicity represented a very minor and far-right tendency.

The discussion of Zulu ethnicity and its political uses is the strongest and most interesting. If Mangosuthu Buthelezi used ethnicity, combined with intimidation, to build the Inkatha Freedom Party during the apartheid era, his approach has changed in response to post-apartheid conditions. During the 1980s, the United Democratic Front (UDF), aligned with the exiled African National Congress (ANC), played down sectional and class identities in favor of a broad anti-apartheid front. That approach has been replaced by the ANC's celebration of Zulu identity and its desire to include it within a broader African national identity. The ANC has gained the allegiance of the Zulu king, and although Inkatha has relied on chiefs for its rural base, the ANC is now undermining that relationship through the use of the government purse. Buthelezi, in turn, is seeking to broaden Inkatha's traditional Zulu support.

Jung's discussion of Coloured politics in the 1980s focuses on the UDF and the Labour Party, which participated in the racially exclusive Tricameral Parliament. But those two organizations did not represent the entire Coloured political spectrum in the 1980s; the Western Cape UDF was also involved in and influenced by heated debates with leftists outside the ANC and its allies. Seemingly taking informants' views at face value, Jung takes a rosy view of the ANC's current politics vis-à-vis Coloureds. It is debatable whether the ANC has dealt adequately with the alienation of those formerly classified as Coloured, who still feel themselves trapped between whites and an African majority. Surely, any test of the ANC's ethnic neutrality would be found in its policies: whether development assistance is allocated on the basis of ethnicity or geographic locality or on the basis of income and class, for example. Jung's discussion of organizational policies could be stronger at points. The characterizations of the Pan Africanist Congress, the Unity Movement, and the Black Consciousness Movement are at times questionable and would benefit from a more nuanced approach (pp. 269, 283).

The possibility of using electoral rules to represent and control ethnic groups was, of course, rejected during the negotiations process. The new constitution enshrines universal franchise and democratic rights. That ethnic identity should be fluid in post-apartheid South Africa comes as no surprise. The previous regime used repressive social engineering to divide South Africans into four main sectional groups and then to subdivide Africans further on the basis of supposed tribal identities. In democratic South Africa, people are free to identify themselves, culturally and politically, in terms that they choose, which may or may not include ethnic identities. The post-apartheid state, concerned with promoting both national and African unity, has employed the motifs of the Rainbow Nation and the African Renaissance to symbolize its national vision. Jung highlights the importance of eth-

nic fluidity in post-apartheid South Africa, while pointing to the significance of class and of rural-urban divisions. Gender identity, of growing political salience in post-apartheid South Africa, merits further research. South Africa remains an extremely class-divided society; the poorest are disproportionately black, rural, and female.

That ethnically based electoral engineering was a nonstarter does not, as Jung's argument implies, negate the need for a state role in other domains. South Africa must undoubtedly walk a fine line—avoiding the one-party state that may grow from a dominant party system, while addressing the pressing social needs faced by the country's majority. In a continent plagued by collapsed states and social anarchy, there is scope and need for South Africa to play a critical role in the continent's development. But this regional role does not negate the state's responsibility to its own population, as du Toit emphasizes. The most important checks on a state's arbitrary abuse of political power are the people and popular organizations and a willingness to hold political leadership accountable. To take one example, the publication of the TRC's report, in spite of partisan attempts to censor it and its critical evaluation of human rights violations across the political spectrum, indicates the commission's political autonomy from partisan influence. The TRC's report underlined, for the future, that post-apartheid governments will be held accountable for their own actions. Whatever the debates about the role of the state, it is the state's accountability to its people that is the greatest guarantor of democracy.

Support for Economic and Political Change in the China Countryside: An Empirical Study of Cadres and Villagers in Four Counties, 1990 and 1996 By Samuel J. Eldersveld and Mingming Shen. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 146p. \$70.00.

Alan P. L. Liu, University of California at Santa Barbara

Being one of a handful of opinion surveys conducted in China, this book should be of interest not only to China specialists but also to students of public opinion, political culture, and survey research. In 1990 and 1996, a joint team of American (University of Michigan) and Chinese (National Beijing University) scholars conducted surveys of the opinions of Chinese peasants and rural cadres in four Chinese counties in north and south China (in the provinces of Hebei, Hunan, Anhui, and the special municipality of Tianjin) concerning economic and political reforms in the post-Mao years. This book represents a partial analysis of the surveys.

Samuel Eldersveld and Mingming Shen conclude that "much democratization has, and is, taking place" (p. 134) in contemporary China. Although political liberalization at the mass level in China might be "only a small reality" (p. 134), it "is touching the lives of Chinese masses each day, socializing them to greater support for democracy" (p. 134). The evidence for such claims came entirely from Chinese respondents' answers to questions on their support for economic and political reforms, their beliefs on political participation, and their tolerance of political competitions and conflicts.

In economics, Eldersveld, Shen, and their colleagues asked peasants and cadres to evaluate the degree of success of the reforms and the benefits that they had received from them. They found that a large majority of cadres and masses in the four counties had accepted economic reforms, had benefited from them, and were ideologically disposed to less governmental control. They asked similar questions about political reforms, especially on direct election of county People's Congresses (China's nominal legislatures), election to village committees, separation between party and state, and

the extent of cadre corruption. A sharp difference appeared in the masses' responses to economic and political questions. A high rate of peasants, up to 50% of the respondents in both 1990 and 1996, refused to answer political questions. However, of those who responded, a clear majority supported the political reforms. Two major findings from the surveys are, first, the cadres' influence on attitudes of the masses (in a positive direction) and, second, a positive correlation between political activism and the extent of poverty in an area.

Interesting as these results are, the study by Eldersveld and Shen has a number of problems. First of all, the authors did not explain the criteria for selecting these four particular counties, out of 1,936 counties in China. But they noted considerable variances in people's attitudes in different localities. The lack of clarification in the standard for choosing the four counties makes one doubt their generalizations about democratization in China.

Second, the two authors had done a very limited background research into the history and social conditions of modern China. They neglected entirely the surveys and analyses of the countryside by Chinese scholars, relying instead on a few secondary English works. They mistook Chinese peasants' recovery of their precommunist way of farming for what they termed "amazing conversion" (p. 19; emphasis mine) to the so-called new system. They seemed to be unaware of the fact that post-Mao reforms in the countryside affected the political power structure very little. The rural power figures, such as (in descending order of authority) party branch secretary, secretary of the youth league, head of the local militia, and director of the women's association, remained intact and, in many villages, were still the same persons from Mao's era. These village elites controlled local elections. Chinese writers on local politics have presented a very different picture (for example, He Xuefeng, "System of Village Organization: Distances and Causes Between Ideal and Reality," Shehuixue 6 [1998]: 59-64; and Cao Yongxin, "Analysis of Some Problems in Rural Order and Village Political Development," Shehuixue 4 [1999]: 102-6). Eldersveld and Shen's descriptions of local politics as being competitive are thus extremely misleading (see pages 4 and 40). There were other errors of the same nature, such as portraying Mao as having played a significant role in promoting democracy within and outside of the Communist Party (see pages 11, 78, 93, and 131).

The third problem is that Eldersveld and Shen's discussion of political participation in rural China is out of context. According to the letters of the national government, village self-rule encompasses four democracies—election, decision making, management, and supervision. This book deals only with election. Academic and press reports from China tell us that villages that have lived up to the formal standard of self-rule are more exceptions than the rule. Furthermore, information from China indicates that an increasing number of peasants are resorting to the so-called collective shangfang gaozhuang (visiting higher authorities and lodging complaints against local leaders) to air their discontent. Even riots have occurred in rising numbers. That peasants are resorting to extrasystem ways of expressing their views testifies to the ineffectiveness of the formal system of political participation.

Last but not least, Eldersveld and Shen's study lacks a theoretical foundation. They have said nothing about the mechanism that might connect village self-rule to democratization at the national level. They write without elaboration that "if political change is to be implemented, including democratization, what happens at the local level is critical" (p. 116). If they had carefully studied Taiwan's transition from local election to national democratization, they might have had a reference country to help their analysis of Mainland China.

Unfortunately, their one reference to Taiwan (p. 68) exposes the two scholars' lack of the most basic knowledge of Taiwan's experience in democratization.

**Multinational Democracies** Edited by Alain G. Gagnon and James Tully. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 428p. \$70.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

Garth Stevenson, Brock University

As the distinguished Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor notes in his foreword to this book, liberal democratic political systems are becoming more diverse in terms of the cultural identities of their citizens, yet their legitimacy, unlike that of autocratic states or empires, depends on maintaining a certain level of unity and homogeneity. Without it, neither democratic participation, nor a regime of equal rights, nor even satisfactory economic performance appears to be possible. The effort to create a semblance of coherence and common purpose while recognizing and accepting unavoidable diversity, a theme that has dominated Canadian political discourse and practice for a century and a half, has become a preoccupation for much of the world. Yet there are more questions than answers. Consociationalism, a fashionable concept a generation ago, no longer has many supporters among social scientists. Federalism, originally invented in the United States for quite a different purpose, can accommodate conflicting nationalisms only if a precise geographical boundary can be drawn between them—and not always then.

This multiauthored, and multinational, book provides a number of insights into this problem. The concept around which the volume is organized, as suggested by its commendably brief title, is that of multinational democracy: defined as a democratic state containing more than one sociological nation. The four examples considered in the book are Canada, Belgium, Spain, and the United Kingdom, although the authors give the United Kingdom less attention than the other three. All are affluent, predominantly white, and reasonably stable North Atlantic democracies (although Spain's experience with democracy is relatively brief), a fact that suggests the implicit criteria for their inclusion in the volume.

"Multinational" should perhaps not be taken too literally: Belgium comprises only two national communities, although Brussels, where the two are mingled, constitutes a third component of Belgium's territorial federalism. In Canada, although it has recently become politically correct to refer to the aboriginal tribes as "First Nations," Quebec is the only minority nation with a fully developed civil society and a serious capability to form its own state, and the only one that controls a provincial government within the federal state. Spain and the United Kingdom, which are often, although erroneously, viewed as prototypical, and until recently highly centralized, "nation-states," are both more deserving of the multinational label.

The 19 authors of the book, about evenly divided between Canadians and non-Canadians, include both political philosophers and comparativists. (There are no women among the contributors, a rather conspicuous lack of inclusiveness in a book largely devoted to identity politics.) The book contains a lengthy general introduction by coeditor James Tully, followed by 16 chapters grouped into three parts. In the brief and anonymous introductions that lead off each of the three parts, we are told that the first part deals with interrelations between justice and stability in theory and practice, the second part with the tensions between normative claims about recognition and forms of accommodation, and the third part with the normative and institutional dimensions of modes of reconciliation and conflict management (pp. 35, 133, 275). In

practice, as these introductions may suggest, there is no clear delineation of purpose between the three parts, and the rationale for dividing the book into sections is not immediately obvious.

In his general introduction, Tully suggests that comparativists have usually approached the study of culturally divided societies with an emphasis on the search for accommodation and stability, while political philosophers have emphasized the themes of justice and recognition. As a political philosopher, Tully emphasizes the traditional preoccupations of his field, justice and recognition, but cautions that "the constitutive question is no longer the one that has defined these struggles since Kant and Hegel: what is the just and stable form of recognition that will end the struggle?" (p. 5). Instead, the quest for recognition should be viewed as an ongoing dialogue with no final resolution. The emphasis thus shifts from the "solution" that will "finally" resolve the question to the procedural rules that govern the dialogue, and to the freedom to adjust the relationships between national communities to reflect changing needs and aspirations. Almost half of Tully's introduction is devoted to an analysis of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Reference re the secession of Ouebec (1998) 2 S.C.R. 217, a decision that appears to be based on this assumption.

Several chapters refer, either explicitly or otherwise, to the familiar but somewhat misleading distinction between "civic" and "ethnic" nationalism. In Chapter 2, comparing the politics of bilingualism in Brussels, Montreal, and Barcelona, Dominique Arel suggests that the distinction is largely meaningless. No state can really be neutral or indifferent to questions of language or culture, and a civic nation-state is merely one whose minorities—usually immigrants who have voluntarily chosen to reside within the state—accept the inevitability of assimilation to the dominant language and culture. On the other hand, ethnic nationalism is not necessarily illiberal and may tolerate minority cultures in practice while being dedicated to the protection of one culture in theory. He obviously has Canadian and Québecois nationalism in mind when he writes: "Like in a game of shifting mirrors, the civic nation to some becomes the ethnic nation in the eyes of the other" (p. 76). In Chapter 12, entitled "Nationality in Divided Societies" but largely focusing on the case of Scotland, David Miller reaches much the same conclusion (p. 306). He also makes the important point that people may have a dual identity: Scottish/British or Québecois/Canadian.

In Chapter 8, Shane O'Neill draws somewhat different conclusions from his examination of Northern Ireland, where religion more than language tends to differentiate the two national communities within the state, and where the identities appear to be mutually exclusive. Although admitting that the Good Friday Agreement falls short of his ideal, since it continues to privilege the Unionist (British) majority, O'Neill believes that a truly neutral and inclusive political culture is possible in a divided society, provided that both sides agree to regard the question of which constitutes the numerical majority as irrelevant. (The present assumption that a majority should be allowed to decide whether Northern Ireland is affiliated with the Irish state or with the British state is inappropriate, in his opinion.) Even this qualified optimism seems to be at odds with the conclusions of Arel's chapter, not to mention the pessimistic but convincing comparative analysis of Canada and Belgium by Dimitrios Karmis and Alain G. Gagnon in Chapter 5.

In conclusion, this book is a welcome sign that the dialogue between Canadian and Québecois nationalists is maturing and becoming less parochial and more thoughtful—on both sides. It should be read not only by Canadians of both persuasions but by anyone interested in the politics of nationalism.

Politicians and Poachers: The Political Economy of Wildlife Policy in Africa By Clark C. Gibson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 262p. \$70.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

Goran Hyden, University of Florida

This interesting and insightful book on the political economy of wildlife policy in Africa is an important contribution to the literature not only on African politics but also on the role that institutions play in shaping behavior and decisions. Although wildlife may not occupy the same centrality in African economies as oil and precious metals do, it is a crucial natural resource that earns countries, especially in eastern and southern Africa, significant revenue. Few political scientists have paid attention to this sector. No one has really approached it from a political economy perspective. Yet the struggle over access to natural resources in Africa is very much a political matter. Gibson's well-crafted and thorough study fills this gap. Its main contribution to the discipline at large is its focus on the distributive nature of institutions. The latter do not just produce collective or public goods. They also serve individual interests differentially. By concentrating on the strategic interaction of individuals within institutions, Gibson, following in the tradition of Douglass North and Robert Bates, identifies the intended and unintended consequences of policy decisions made with regard to the use and conservation of wildlife in Africa.

The empirical focus of this study is Zambia's wildlife sector after independence. It traces the politics of wildlife beginning with the decision in the early years of independence by then-President Kaunda to continue, in spite of popular resistance, pursuing the conservationist approach adopted by the preceding colonial administration. The bulk of the analysis, however, centers on subsequent years when the principal issue was how to reduce poaching and ensure that ordinary citizens might be able to share the revenue from hunting and tourism. Much space is rightly devoted to the "community-based" approach to wildlife conservation that evolved in the 1980s following the reported success of the CAMPFIRE project (Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources) in neighboring Zimbabwe. The experiences of wildlife policy there as well as in Kenya provide useful, though not fully analyzed, comparisons with the empirically rich account of what took place in Zambia.

Anyone familiar with the issues of environmental conservation in Africa will feel at home in Gibson's account and analysis. I find three themes particularly well covered. The first is the "parks vs. people" topic, that is, the issue of how to combine wildlife conservation with cattle grazing and other such activities that may compete for the use of increasingly scarce land. The second is the tension between the conservationist lobby-largely international in composition-and nationally elected representatives wishing to respond to the opinions of their local constituents that wild game is either a nuisance or a resource to which they should have unrestrained access. The third is the difficulty of finding an institutional formula that caters to the complex and contentious nature of wildlife conservation in Africa. The author has consulted a very wide range of primary and secondary sources on the subject, and although his coverage of Kenya and Zimbabwe is less satisfactory, he demonstrates his command of the subject

My praise of the book notwithstanding, the author falls short of a critical reader's expectation with regard to at least two issues. The first is the extent to which his own case study is typical of policymaking in Africa. Gibson does not address this issue. For example, he rather uncritically uses his finding that the Zambian legislature threw out a government policy

initiative in this sector as proof that parliaments in Africa are more powerful than the mainstream literature assumes. The fact that this single rejection occurred in the context of what may have amounted to thousands of discretionary policy initiatives by the president and his government ministers is completely overlooked. One would have expected a more careful use of the evidence than such a generalizing statement.

The second relates to his conception of private interest. Gibson is obviously right in suggesting that much strategizing in public institutions is private. In African countries, patronage rather than policy reigns. Public policy, therefore, is falling short of expectations less because of inadequate executive capacity than due to a lack of commitment to the notion of a "civic" public realm. Gibson's own explanation of this phenomenon, however, tends to suffer from an overly simplified notion of what "private" or utilitarian interest really means in the African context. He operates with a crude distinction between a utilitarian and "moral" notion of political economy, which makes him overlook the fact that the African political economy really falls in between the two. It is neither wholly utilitarian, nor fully communitarian (or moral). Choice and behavior are socially embedded but not institutionalized in a formal or more permanent sense. The political process in Zambia and elsewhere in Africa really responds to and moves forward because of the investments people make in strategic relations with other key actors, whether they are superiors, allies, or supporters. "Causes" or issues do not drive these relations; they are only instrumental in fomenting such relations. Institutions that matter, therefore, are not formal but informal. They are inevitably ephemeral. The challenge that political leaders face in such contexts is how to stabilize these transient relationships. Sometimes this can be convincingly achieved by accepting defeat, especially if it is, as in the case of the president's defeat over the wildlife policy, on an issue where a majority of potential allies and supporters are on the other side. The issue, after all, is only a means, not an end, to success. By sticking to an overly bare notion of what selfinterest means in the African context, Gibson only touches on, but fails to explore, this key aspect of how relations rather than policy drive the political process in oft-unexpected directions.

No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945–1991 By Jeff Goodwin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 428p. \$60.00 cloth, \$23.00 paper.

Eric Selbin, Southwestern University

"Do we need yet another comparative study of revolutions?" (p. 5; emphasis in original), Jeff Goodwin asks in this eagerly (and long) anticipated and important new book, which is destined to influence scholars in several disciplines and fields. The answer, as this volume makes abundantly clear, is "yes," and few will be disappointed with this well-written, accessible, and compelling volume, the most nuanced and sophisticated argument yet for the state-centered (but, pace Goodwin, not structuralist; see p. 53) approach, and worthy heir to Theda Skocpol's (1979) still paradigmatic States and Social Revolutions. But therein lies the rub: Rather than the first book of the (putative) emergent fourth generation of scholars of revolution(s), this is likely the last of the third generation. Goodwin concedes he has "largely moved beyond" (p. xvi) the perspective he articulates here, and he, along with John Foran, is one of the most likely suspects to produce the next paradigmatic statement on revolutions. This, then, would seem the third generation's crowning glory; given the long gestation period and the prolific Goodwin's many and impressive contributions to matters revolutionary, this is almost more a legend than a book.

With the state firmly ensconced at the center (pp. 24–31) and implement—"the absolutely critical importance of political context" (p. 17)—in hand, Goodwin takes, primarily via secondary sources (p. xvi), a wide-ranging, erudite swing through a dozen-plus countries and many more movements. Adopting a broader ("political revolution") as opposed to more narrow ("social revolution") definition of revolution (p. 9), he sets out to sample revolutions and revolutionary movements that occurred only during the Cold War and only in "so-called peripheral or dependent societies of one type or another" (pp. 5-6); of greater note, he considers not just the successes but the failures as well (pp. 6-8). All of this is in pursuit of why revolutions and revolutionary movements emerge in some places and not others and succeed some of the time but not all of the time. The premise is that "general (if not universal) causal mechanisms" can be identified, catalogued, and compared (p. 8).

While the book is broken up into four parts (nine chapters), most people will read it as comprising two halves, one more theoretical, the other more substantive; a pithy annotated bibliography will quickly become a staple for graduate students in several disciplines. The more theoretically inclined will be particularly taken with chapters that consider the strengths and limitations of the state-centered perspective (Chapter 2), the introduction of "persistent insurgencies" as a nuanced third category to better theorize those processes caught between success and failure (Chapter 7), and a concluding chapter wherein Goodwin proffers "generalizations and prognostications."

The theoretical chapters are rich and provocative. Goodwin's artful discussion of the state-centric perspective, misleadingly labeled an "appetizer" (p. 31), is a powerful and clear paean to the statist tradition—long on strengths and short (and a bit dismissive; see, e.g., p. 55) on limitations. Goodwin presents a persuasive case for four distinct types of state-centered analysis: "the state-autonomy, state-capacity, political opportunity, and 'state constructionist' approaches" (pp. 37-40). In search of a "powerfully parsimonious" as opposed to "exhaustive" explanation (p. 58), Goodwin deftly demonstrates such a perspective as being suited to solving the puzzles that bedevil students of revolution to an extent that will convince most. Despite a caveat (to his credit, such are repeated early and often throughout the book) in the introduction that "states are not the only thing that matters" (p. 30; emphasis in original), this chapter and the rest of the book make clear Goodwin's commitment to the state as the key/critical (f) actor in the revolutionary process across its various stages; to borrow a line, the state isn't the only thing, it's everything—at least until "the sort of synthetic perspective on revolutions and collective action that we clearly need" (p. 63) comes along.

The other "half" of the book provides several brief nicely drawn case studies: chapters on Southeast Asia and what proved to be the only domino, Vietnam, set in a comparative perspective; chapters on Central America and the "anomalous" case of Honduras; and a chapter on Eastern Europe and its "refolutions." With regard to these more substantive chapters, I will defer to area studies specialists who will no doubt (and rightly) note problems; on the basis of the area with which I am most familiar, his accounts are perceptive and satisfactory. Some of these complaints may be more than mere quibbles or differences in emphases or interpretation; in any case, they will miss the point of the exercise. Despite some discomfort with such, presumably the social science project is to subject puzzling moments/processes of social disorder to the (calming) order of "scientific" analysis, and this is an attempt

to do a genuinely comparative project without resorting to either mindless number crunching or suspect rational choice analyses; neither have produced satisfactory answers with regard to resistance, rebellion, and revolution. Despite the reliance on secondary sources, the cases are treated seriously and rigorously. The absence of two of the most significant of the Cold War revolutions, China and Cuba (except for the latter's effective cameo in Chapter 2), seems odd.

The parsimony sought, Goodwin concludes, is ultimately not attained in the face of "the sheer implausibility of a general theory of revolutions or peripheral revolutions" (p. 290). The fault for this, it would seem, lies with an array of actors and factors that have relatively little to do with the state. But, he contends, few will be able to better the solutions to the puzzles that confront us, since across the myriad cases he finds that "revolutionary movements developed and sometimes thrived in opposition to" (p. 290) authoritarian albeit weak/ened states, even when they held elections, and succeeded most often when those states were particularly alienated from "civil society" and hierarchically structured. As presaged by his early invocation of Marx's dictum to the effect that people make their own history but not under the conditions of their own choosing (p. 25), and reflecting an impressive panoply of cases and a genuine effort to be sensitive to the conditions extant, Goodwin's bottom line is that "[c]ertain types of states and regimes unintentionally helped to construct revolutionary movements or, more precisely, the type of political contexts in which revolutionaries were able to thrive" (p. 292; another caveat echoes Marx: sometimes revolutionary movements "create, and [do] not simply exploit" opportunities).

For at least some, Goodwin's most controversial conclusion will be that revolutions will be less likely in the decades to come (p. 300). In short, globalization, the collapse of the Soviet model, and the emergence of formal democracies have dramatically reduced the space for and likelihood of revolutions. While as careful here as he is throughout, a quick refutation might simply be that globalization has created new economic problems and new sources of support, the collapse of the Cold War may create more rather than less space for revolutionaries (i.e., less excuses for intervention), and the institutionalization (often fragile) of democracy is proving to be a far cry from the consolidation of democracy, the democratization of people's everyday lives.

Goodwin has offered the most sensitive state- or institution-centered instrument yet for the study of revolutionary processes. And yet people remain at least distant and at times absent, and it is largely they and their actions whom and that we seek to explain. While recognizing that the inherent complexity of people may be problematic (even inelegant) in the salutary search for the most parsimonious explanation, ideology and culture provide entrees. People join revolutionary processes for many reasons, some of which, as Goodwin suggests, have to do with the state; but not all. Revolutionary struggles are about far more than struggles for or against state power, reflecting people's efforts to fundamentally transform the material and ideological conditions of their everyday lives (and those of others) now and for all time. However charily chosen, revolution is part of the tool kit for many people in many parts of the world, and it is the conscious efforts—not to deny the obvious profusion of concomitant unintended consequences—by at least an active minority of the participants to profoundly transform themselves and their entire society that defines the processes most of us construe as revolutions. That this happens largely within the constructs we have called states (more or less) since the seventeenth century may be in part a historical accident.

Revolution remains on the historical agenda both because "[r]evolutionary movements are not simply or exclusively a response to economic exploitation or inequality, but also and more directly a response to political oppression and violence, typically brutal and indiscriminate" (p. 3) and because there are people enmeshed in the struggle for profound change. While Trotsky posited revolution as the option only "when there is no other way out" (p. 26), a close colleague posed the question, "what is to be done." The puzzle posed by this marvelous book is, in part, why we should continue to center the state when, as Goodwin ably (and amply) demonstrates repeatedly, there are so many other factors that merit our consideration; there is another way to read Marx's dictum and its recognition that people make their own history. Ultimately, if we wish to understand and explicate why revolutions happen here and not there, now and not then, among these people and not those, we will have to investigate the lives of those people—their ideologies, their cultures, their communities, their symbols, and their commitments.

Here, I fear that I have committed the book reviewer's worst sin, taking the author to task for not writing the book the reviewer would have written if only s/he had been talented or clever enough to do so in the first place; mea cupla. This delightful and engaging book, crammed chock-full of thought-provoking and challenging ideas, is one of the finest books on revolution written to date and merits the wide consideration and regard it will receive.

Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage Edited by Peter A. Hall and David Soskice. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 560p. \$72.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

David Coates, Wake Forest University

The volume and quality of the scholarship generated of late on the question of the "varieties of capitalism" has been truly outstanding. We now know far more than we ever did about the internal workings of particular national economies, and about the determinants of what Angus Maddison once termed the "proximate" causes of their competitive strengths and weaknesses. That knowledge has come in part from the work of a talented set of comparative political scientists and industrial sociologists, many of whom participate in this collection. It has also come from the work of a set of economists and economic historians with sufficient professional courage and intellectual integrity to operate at (or even beyond) the edge of their notoriously narrow and institutionally blind discipline. But because that knowledge has come from so many sources, and because so much of it has entered the public domain in the form of discrete case studies or collections of relatively disconnected essays, what the subfield now needs, more than anything else, is the consolidation of a set of organizing frameworks and governing concepts designed to go beyond proximate causes to a fuller understanding of the dynamics of competitive advantage. This is why Peter Hall and David Soskice's much-heralded collection of essays, Varieties of Capitalism, is so important a milestone in the development of the subdiscipline of comparative political economy. At long last it gives us what Pepper D. Culpepper calls here an "analytical tool kit" (p. 303): a collection of essays built around the powerful conceptual devices of "comparative institutional advantage" and "institutional complementarities"—concepts deployed to explain "how the institutions structuring the political economy confer comparative advantages on a nation, especially in the sphere of innovation" (p. v)

Building on the already powerful conceptual distinction between "liberal market economies" and "coordinated market

economies" developed by David Soskice and others in the 1990s, the opening essay of this collection seems destined to be widely cited. In it, Hall and Soskice develop a firmcentered political economy based on a relational view of the firm: one in which firms develop their core competencies and dynamic capabilities by coordinating effectively in five spheres (those of industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate governance, interfirm relations, and intrafirm relations with their own employees). Such coordination happens one way in liberal market economies, in another way in coordinated market economies, in each case giving firms comparative institutional advantage to the degree that they exploit the institutional complementarities of the national system in which they find themselves embedded. The case study chapters that follow then demonstrate and reinforce the Hall and Soskice argument "that the institutional structure of a particular economy provides firms with advantages for engaging in specific types of activities there" (p. 37). In a collection of consistently high-quality pieces, there are particularly valuable comparative chapters on industrial relations, training systems, and corporate governance.

The very power of the argument developed here by Hall and Soskice, and the widely respected work already published elsewhere by many of the contributors to this volume, are likely to establish this book, and its governing concepts, as the dominant ones for the next generation of graduate students in the field. Yet insightful as the approach developed here is, there may be dangers lurking in such a dominance, for the notion of comparative institutional advantage as the key to competitiveness carries implications that are not widely signaled in this collection, even though the whole approach is introduced in an attractively tentative and open-ended manner. Two in particular stand out. One is that analysis should stop—that our explanation is complete—once the dynamics of institutional advantage are mapped, and the logics released by institutional interaction are charted. The other-queried in the volume only by Kathleen Thelen (p. 73) and Pepper Culpepper (p. 275)—is that particular bundles of institutional linkage, once established, largely predetermine the policy options available to economic actors (not least, labor movements) caught up within them.

The explanation of varieties of capitalism developed in the Hall and Soskice chapter does not go the extra inch to explore and explain why, when, and how particular sets of institutions come into existence. Nor does it go the extra mile to examine how those institutions relate to the wider set of class experiences and interests that seem (to some of us, at least) to be endemic to capitalism in all its national manifestations. Instead it gives us what can easily be read as a new kind of institutional determinism. Hall and Soskice establish the dynamism of coordinated market economies (and by implication, the long-term viability of welfare systems in their continental European form) by also conceding the viability of liberal market capitalism (and its incompatibility with labor rights and welfare provision of a commensurate kind). That runs the risk of inadvertently giving retrospective legitimation to the antilabor, antiwelfare arguments of Reagan and Thatcher, and of offering only the bleakest prospects for welfare provision in economies that have the misfortune already to be set onto a liberal-market path. I am sure that this political closure was entirely unintended by the editors, but it seems an ever-present danger of the analytical framework they have developed so well. And if it is, it follows that if we are properly to research the forces shaping institutional advantage, and if we are adequately to map the politics of changing those institutions, we now need to go beyond the conceptual universe and level of explanation developed in this fine collection.

There is no doubt that *Varieties of Capitalism* will prove to be a landmark text. It is a very important collection, of value to all students in the field. The issue before us is whether to treat its publication as an ending, or simply as a beginning. Let us hope, two decades from now, that the latter is its status.

Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism: A Century of Income Security Politics By Alexander Hicks. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 256p. \$45.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Norman Furniss, Indiana University

Alexander Hicks has written one of the most important works in the past thirty years on the development of income security policies in democratic capitalist states. (Hicks equates income security policies with "welfare states"—a point I will revisit later.) If this were not sufficient, the book also is the most significant comparative public policy study I have read. Based on years of reflection, scholarship and teaching, it covers, not merely cites, a wide range of literatures. It is extremely sensitive to particular historical experiences. It is theoretically informed. Most impressively, it is methodologically sophisticated and imaginative. And the book is concise and well—written. In short, it is a model of what exciting comparative research can be.

A brief review cannot capture the subtlety of the analysis, but broadly Hicks advances a "class centered, if state mediated, theory of the welfare state" (p. 15), in which "sustained working class steering integrates the journey" (p. 12). The argument proceeds historically, beginning with social security program consolidation after World War I. This is the most impressive chapter in the book. Hicks uses "Qualitative Comparative Analysis," a form of Boolean logical comparison developed by Charles Ragin (with contributions from Hicks himself [The Comparative Method, 1987]), to distinguish three distinct routes to early welfare state formation.

Next, Hicks examines the consolidations through the 1950s, showing "social democracy's predominance in the 1930s and 1940s social reform" (p. 109), and the significance of the strength of the labor movement throughout the 1950s. Once again, this account is methodologically imaginative and is grounded in an enviable command of the historical evidence. Finally, the chapters raise and develop a number of intriguing issues, ranging from the impact of Catholic social thought and Christian Democratic Parties to an assessment of Gosta Esping-Andersen's "worlds of welfare capitalism" (The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, 1990).

Hicks then turns neocorporatism as a "bridge" to the present pattern of social policies and politics, emphasizing the direct continued relevance of social democratic government to the "preservation of neocorporatist institutions and the welfare state regime" (p. 221). His concern shifts from funded program adoption (which states by now have or have not instituted—interestingly, there are few examples of states engaging in "late" adoption of, say, family allowances) to "welfare effort," defined as the level of public spending. The range of policies considered is expanded to include public health care effort. The final empirical chapter considers two reasons for the welfare state "crisis," demographic change and globalization, finding that in each case there is somewhat less than meets the eye. The discussion of globalization is particularly trenchant. Hicks concludes by raising the issue of "possible futures of the welfare state" (p. 230), with specific reference to social movement theory. Although he has a number of insightful things to say about the theory, it must be noted that this focus seems too narrow to tease out the full dynamics involved in discussions of possible futures.

Some expansion of Hicks's theoretical perspective and "dependent variable" (public spending) would be useful for this discussion. First, the "welfare state" need not be seen conceptually as the same institution as the social security state. This is especially the case if we add a consideration of policies like health care (Chapter 7) or include education. For example, over the past twenty years France (mainly through the policies of Socialist governments) has experienced a remarkable increase in access to all levels of the educational system, including higher education. (Of course, many European countries have seen this "massification" as well, but the French case is particularly striking.) All this bears directly on our understanding of what we might mean by the "welfare state" and its putative retrenchment. Second, and related, it could be valuable to examine the content, not merely the level, of welfare provision. Hicks's admonitions about the dangers of "overinterpretation" of the Beveridge Plan to the contrary, an explanation of why Britain moved from welfare pioneer to laggard (p. 125) seems incomplete without including the content of the Plan. The institutionalization of the flat rate benefit/flat rate contribution scheme constrained further reforms, and its presence mobilized political forces (including the Labour Party for its defense), locking them into the status quo for years. Present reforms and debates that advance quasi-private, or "tax expenditure," supplements or alternatives to publicly funded income security policies bring the need to include content into sharper focus. On policies such as health care, a concern only with publicly funded provisions is clearly insufficient.

Third, returning to "working class steering," it is unclear how much longer this concept will be fruitful in light both of the decline in party identification and of the debates within left parties themselves about what their visions should be. This debate is occurring within Christian Democratic Parties, with the idea of Catholic social action in at least temporary retreat. Finally, on the term "state," the book makes no mention of the European Union to which a majority of the countries under review belong. This is not a particular difficulty when our interest is primarily one of accounting for historical developments. But when we turn to the present and possible futures, the EU will have to be considered.

In sum, this is a deeply thoughtful book that not only clarifies and expands our understanding of the development of income security programs but also helps structure further research programs.

Brazilian Party Politics and the Coup of 1964 By Ollie Andrew Johnson III. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2001. 176p. \$55.00 cloth.

Deborah L. Norden, Whittier College

In 1964, Brazil embarked on one of Latin America's longest experiments in modern military authoritarianism. Ollie Johnson's *Brazilian Party Politics* seeks to understand one of the important antecedents to the coup by looking at the political party system during the 1945–64 period. While the book does not succeed in demonstrating a strong causal connection between party politics and the coup, it does provide a very interesting new perspective on party politics and realignment, looking beyond the more immediate electoral indicators of the Brazilian party system.

According to Johnson, Brazilian party politics during the pre-coup period "is fundamentally the story of the rise of leftist and nationalist party forces committed to changing the political and socioeconomic system and the reaction of more

conservative party forces against such change" (p. 14). The book effectively demonstrates this shift to the left in Brazilian politics by looking beyond merely electoral results to a consideration of intraparty factions and transparty alliances. By doing this, Johnson manages to build a much clearer picture of trends in Brazilian politics than the often amorphous, or "cloudy" (p. 35), image that emerges from considering only electoral support for the political parties.

As described, the three principal parties of the period, the PSD (Social Democratic Party, a centrist party), the PTB (Brazilian Labor Party, a party of the left), and the UDN (National Democratic Union, a conservative party), composed only the surface of organized political representation in Brazil. According to Johnson, by the early 1960s, each of these parties had developed progressive factions with similar agendas (p. 53). In the PTB, this faction succeeded in shifting the party to the left, while reactions against these factions encouraged the other two parties to shift further to the right. At the same time, two important "transparty" alliances formed, the FPN (National Parliamentary Front) and the ADP (Democratic Parliamentary Action), on the left and right, respectively (p. 89). Johnson writes that, "[w]hile the ADP was composed largely of UDN and PSD members, the FPN drew primarily from the PTB" (p. 101); however, both alliances included substantial numbers of individuals from all three major political parties, as well as from several of the smaller parties (pp. 144-51). Furthermore, Brazilians could opt to vote for these alliances instead of for political parties (p. 23). This is undoubtedly one of the most interesting revelations in the book. From Johnson's discussion, it would appear that these factions and alliances became more programmatic and ideological than the political parties during this period, and consequently perhaps more capable of representing ideas and interests than the major political parties.

In part because of this development, Johnson's effort to describe the changes as the realignment of the party system seems somewhat misplaced. The author defines realignment as "a systematic shift in strength among political parties" (p. 2), or "an important and sustained shifting of political power within the party system" (p. 12). However, the balance of power among the parties appears to have evolved much less—and much less consistently—during this period than the balance between parties, on the one hand, and subparty and cross-party units, on the other hand. To be sure, Johnson does demonstrate a trend in legislative elections toward a shrinking center (PDS) and growing left (PTB) (p. 42). Yet, neither presidential nor regional elections consistently follow the same pattern. Furthermore, leadership—at least at the presidential level-still appeared to be exercised by personalistic leaders with individual followings, rather than strong party ties. Thus, while politics in Brazil did appear to shift overall toward the left during this period, the political parties themselves do not seem to have been strong or cohesive enough to constitute the central players in this "realignment."

Despite the author's intriguing depiction of the different aspects of realignment in Brazil, he does not adequately demonstrate that this realignment led to the 1964 coup. While the coup itself, and the broader question of military intervention, is discussed very little in this book, the information given indicates that the overall political shift toward the left only indirectly motivated the coup. Instead, President João Goulart's leftist program and his efforts to embrace the "Basic Reforms"—a broad, reformist program including goals such as "democratizing the polity" and "reducing inequality" (p. 101)—gave the final impetus for the coup. Since Goulart had initially only been elected vice president, and the elected president (Jânio Quadros) represented a more

conservative party, Goulart's presidency cannot be interpreted as an indicator of leftist realignment. Rather, Goulart fell into the presidency accidentally. The growth of the more progressive FPN and leftist factions in the parties may have given teeth to Goulart's reformist goals, but it does not in itself appear to have motivated the coup.

Johnson's use of counterfactuals further highlights the importance of Goulart's leadership and policies for the coup. Using this approach, Johnson proposes that the outcome (the coup) might have been different had Goulart reacted differently at two points. The first of these was in 1961, when Goulart assumed the presidency. Goulart, from the PTB, had been elected vice president in the 1960 elections. Quadros, a personalistic leader now representing the conservative UDN, won the presidency with over 48% of the vote (p. 49). However, after seven months, Quadros resigned precipitously, and the government entered a severe political crisis, given the opposition to a possible presidency by more leftist Goulart. The military ultimately allowed Goulart to assume the presidency, but only after the rules had been changed in order to weaken the office. The second point was in 1964, when Goulart left the country in the face of the military insurrection. Johnson argues that at both these points, Goulart should have reacted more strongly, mobilizing supporters and standing fast in the face of these constitutional challenges. Although taking such actions admittedly would probably have led to bloodshed, Johnson proposes that Goulart might have managed to prevent the coup by stronger actions (p. 128).

The problem with this argument is twofold. First, as indicated, is that Johnson does not offer sufficient evidence that a change in Goulart's choices would have altered the outcome. The book simply does not provide enough information about the military, military decision making, and coup processes to make this claim, whether or not it is accurate. Secondly, as indicated, if Goulart's actions at either of these two moments could have prevented the coup, then his policies and choices would appear to have had more influence on military intervention than the broader political realignment.

In sum, this book offers an intricate, nuanced, and fascinating analysis of trends in Brazilian political representation during the 1945–64 period. In the process, Johnson makes an important contribution to the literature on party politics. However, efforts to link the study of party politics to the 1964 coup fall somewhat short. The author simply has not provided sufficient information about the coup to be able to explain it, nor does the information that is given support party realignment as a major cause. The book also lacks detail on the history and broader socioeconomic context, which makes it difficult for the reader to understand the links between the political shifts discussed and Brazil's broader social challenges. It is, finally, an excellent book on party politics, but a less successful contribution to the study of Brazil's 1964 coup.

# The Politics of Elite Transformation: The Consolidation of Greek Democracy in Theoretical Perspective By Neovi M. Karakatsanis. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. 224p. \$59.95.

Kevin Featherstone, London School of Economics

This is an ambitious and innovative study of the processes of democratization evident in Greece after 1974. It has two major distinctions. Firstly, it is based on an extensive range of personal interviews with some of the protagonists involved, as well as on archival searches. Secondly, the empirical analysis is placed within relevant theoretical frames, and these are used to draw out relevant comparisons with other European states. The book serves, therefore, as both a general introduction

to the turbulent history of the period and a useful source for comparative analysis of democratization processes. The book is highly accessible and readable. With these qualities, it is likely to become the definitive account of the transition to democracy in Greece. Many scholars and students will benefit from it.

In contrast to the repeated images of rancorous leadership squabbles, politics based on naked self-interest, and opponents accorded the utmost suspicion, Neovi Karakatsanis argues that it was the willingness to compromise among domestic political elites that "won" back democracy for Greece. The argument is qualified, however. Firstly, despite a shared opposition to the junta, the politicians could not bring themselves to negotiate a full settlement. Instead, agreements came in installments. Goodwill was restrained by timorous footsteps on the basis of careful calculation. Secondly, the gradual progress toward democratization was kept on track by the personal monopoly of power by Constantine Karamanlis. So, the cultural history of leader dependence was once again crucial.

The stress on theory in the title is potentially misleading. While the analysis is framed in the context of two competing theoretical approaches to democratic consolidation—elite settlement (following bargaining that overcomes traditional differences) and elite convergence (a two-phase process of elite collaboration)—the bulk of the analysis is empirical.

Not unusually, the book concludes on Greek exceptionalism: Reality requires a revision of the elite convergence model developed in other national contexts. Some of the justification for exceptionalism seems overstated. The elite convergence model need not be as restrictive as Karakatsanis assumes; the electoral logic on which it rests can be interpreted more broadly. Moreover, it is asserted both that the origins of elite consensus preceded the junta and that it was the result of the experience of the transition (p. 16). The main theoretical contribution is to argue that the convergence model must be disaggregated to capture "an often bewildering variety of elite motivations and dynamic processes" (p. 175). These include the logic of party building and a normative commitment to the establishment of an inclusive, stable democracy, based on drawing the appropriate lessons from modern Greek history. By contrast, no elite settlement or pact was negotiated; "politics remained a win-lose, zero-sum competitive game" (p. 176). For its part, the military first acted in compliance with democracy and then, differentially, imbued the values of civilian control. The theoretical frames are useful in allowing cross-national comparisons to be drawn. The author draws a limited number of parallels with countries elsewhere in southern Europe.

The author expertly dissects the interests and motivations behind the embrace of the new regime by each of the major political parties. The Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), created by Andreas Papandreou in 1974, was reconciled to moderation not only by electoral calculation—there is much stress here on its cynical opportunism—but also by a range of other considerations, such as foreign policy interests and the constraints of government. Much is made of the difference between PASOK's initial radicalism and its gradual acceptance of the basic constitutional order. The party's early radicalism is seen as helping to integrate the disaffected antiestablishment voters, carrying them with the party along the road to moderation and helping the new system to mature.

The analysis is heavily rooted in a synthesis of the views expressed to Karakatsanis in the extensive range of (anonymous) interviews that were obtained. This produces an eclecticism of interpretation, but there is value in this. While the arguments are not highly original, they are more firmly

anchored in empirical evidence than is sometimes found elsewhere.

The net result of the process of democratization, the author argues, is that Greece has a stable and consolidated "yet low quality democracy" (p. 173). The "quality" is impaired by the abuses of state patronage and a skewed, fragmented social welfare system. The terminology might be awkward, but the focus on these agendas is apt. Both are the prime foci of much of the current political debate in Greece (and beyond). And both are symptoms of the processes of "modernization-cum-Europeanization" underlying so much of contemporary Greek politics. But that should be the subject of another book.

Has Liberalism Failed Women?: Assuring Equal Representation in Europe and the United States Edited by Jytte Klausen and Charles S. Maier. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 243p.

Noelle H. Norton, University of San Diego

Over the past decade, while the United States effectively decided that liberalism could not accommodate quotas or affirmative action plans designed to alleviate gender and racial inequality, Europe decided that liberalism could accommodate a form of positive discrimination. As the U.S. Supreme Court systematically rolled back affirmative action plans and the state of California led the initiative to curtail government and educational affirmative action, countries like France, Germany, and Norway were implementing a variety of parity policies at both the constitutional and political levels. The parity movement that gained strength in Europe in the 1990s called for equal representation of both men and women in elected assemblies. Methods for achieving parity ranged from reserving parliamentary seats for female legislators by means of constitutional change to legal gender quotas in party lists and party rules. The editors of this volume point out that the Europeans have implemented these electoral reforms with "little public outcry" and "no manifestations of mass protests."

The essays the editors include address the challenges that parity presents democracies on the basis of liberal theories of representation, the institutional context in which parity has been implemented in Europe, and the concerns opponents of parity raise both in Europe and the United States. On the whole, the contributors present a broad and balanced analysis of the theoretical justification for parity and the concerns expressed by those who have experienced its implementation. Jytte Klausen and Charles Maier include essays by several prominent academics from Europe and the United States, political activists tied to the parity movement, and elected officials and jurists who currently face legal challenges to parity.

Although the editors note in their introduction that they present these essays for the purpose of discussion and not advocacy, it becomes clear after reading each one that they have serious reservations about political innovations that strengthen gender rights at the procedural level before more substantive rights are secured. Despite the placement of the argument by Jane Mansbridge (Chapter 2) at the front of the book, that "representation is best performed by descriptive representatives" (p. 19) and that the case for 50% female representation "is strong on historically contingent, non-essentialist grounds" (p. 33), a set of potential pitfalls and unintended consequences to parity legislation and parity party rules are also introduced as a primary theme early in the book.

In fact, the editors weave three kinds of concerns throughout alternating chapters in the book. First, several essays warn that the parity movement might stimulate a political backlash, similar to the affirmative action backlash in the United States, which will undo feminists gains in Europe. Others claim that the parity movement has focused on limited goals of electoral politics and sacrificed more substantive or controversial gender justice goals. Finally, some contributors caution that parity will not promote a feminist agenda because women from both the Right and the Left have been supportive of the movement.

These "cautionary tales" told by several contributors only enhance the dialogue the editors provoke with the book. They have carefully placed essays supportive of parity among the essays that are more cautious of or opposed to parity. In fact, the arrangement of the chapters places the reader in the center of the intellectual debate over the compatibility of parity with classical liberal democracies, making this book a pleasure to read. Readers from the United States will find themselves excited by this bold European experiment at the same time they recognize the cautionary arguments against these proposals.

The book divides the parity dialogue into four basic sections: "Theoretical Perspectives"; "Parity as an Electoral Issue"; "The Policy Process"; and "Cautionary Tales." In the first section, the editors introduce the theoretical discussion they will lead the reader into over the next 14 chapters. Essays by two academics showing contrasting perspectives are juxtaposed in Chapters 2 and 3: one by Jane Mansbridge from the United States supporting the compatibility of parity with liberalism and the other by Clause Offe from Germany opposing procedural mechanisms for overcoming gender injustice. The section concludes with a descriptively rich essay by Francoise Gaspard, the French scholar who coauthored the book that started the parity movement, stating that parity will only deepen democracy.

Gaspard's essay offers a nice transition into the second and third sections where the diverse European experience with parity as electoral politics and governmental policy is explored. Notable essays in these sections include one by Isabelle Giraud and Jane Jenson (Chapter 5), who contend that parity was promoted in France only because it was noncontroversial and left aside more important social and economic change for women. Another essay by Anna Coote (Chapter 7), a former consultant to the Labour government's minister for women in Great Britain, similarly claims that the Labour Party used parity only to win the election and left feminism "in the wilderness: wanted on the voyage, but not on arrival" (p. 111). On the other hand, several other essays in this section tentatively support parity in principle and practice. For example, in a well-researched case study of the British Labour Party's adoption of all-women shortlists in 1997, Pippa Norris (Chapter 6) shows that positive discrimination policies can transform legislative bodies when more women are included. Similarly, Christiane Lemke (Chapter 8) and Hege Skjeie (Chapter 10) write that parity dramatically increased the number of women legislators in Germany and in Scandinavian countries, respectively. Perhaps the essay by Agnes Hubert (Chapter 11), describing the European Union's effort to advance gender equality, best represents the cautionary tone of the book. Although Hubert praised the EU for supporting parity democracy, she warns that parity must be about greater gender equality and not simply about a greater number of women in political office.

In the final section of the book, the editors fully reveal their preferences by including essays that emphasize the pitfalls surrounding parity implementation in Europe and skepticism about parity adoption in the United States. Both Rogers Smith (Chapter 12) and Jytte Klausen (Chapter 14) contend that parity serves as a "quick fix" to political equality. Smith argues against expanding the political representation of women if it means giving up efforts to secure greater social change, while Klausen shows in a study of the conservative gender gap that a consequence of parity might be the depoliticization or neutralization of gender.

As noted, Has Liberalism Failed Women? puts the reader into what the authors would call a transatlantic intellectual dialogue about the merits of parity inside liberal democracies. Although the debate is lively, the essays diverse, and the contributors all prominent in their fields, the book is not flawless. The editors might have provided a more comprehensive introduction to these essays. At times, the redefinition of parity and parity policy alternatives inside each essay became redundant. Finally, a few of the contributions were not as fully developed or clearly linked to the larger themes of the book. However, none of these minor flaws detract from the overall value of this thoughtful and provocative book. Students of legislative politics and liberal political theory will find it as valuable as will those who are already immersed in the debate about the most appropriate methods for instituting gender justice.

Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin By Michael McFaul. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 384p. \$35.00.

The Russian Parliament: Institutional Evolution in a Transitional Regime, 1989–1999 By Thomas F. Remington. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001. 288p. \$40.00.

M. Steven Fish, University of California, Berkeley

Each of these books is, in its own way, a tour de force; each provides the best book-length account and analysis available to date on its subject. Michael McFaul's book offers a major contribution to thinking on regime change in general, as well as a fine account and analysis of Russia's transition from Sovietism. Thomas Remington's book, which investigates the nascence and internal operation of the Russian legislature, powerfully advances our understanding of the Russian parliament and the formation of political institutions more generally. Both books are scholarly and sophisticated, but each is also elegantly written, well organized, and accessible to the nonspecialist. Both authors were present at the creation of the new Russian political order, and each book is deeply informed by extensive interviews and first-hand observation.

Remington uses the argot of game theory, while McFaul prefers the language of what has become known as the transitions literature. Yet each book emphasizes the importance of unintended consequences and critical junctures, and each argues that the institutions that have evolved in Russia since the late 1980s are best understood as the products of political struggle, rather than of a preestablished correlation of social forces, structural factors, or cultural predispositions. Each book asks not why Russian democracy has failed to flower fully, but rather how Russia has skirted the trap of dictatorship and managed to create some lasting institutions that regulate political competition and provide for some degree of civil peace and political openness.

Remington's book argues against the common view that casts the Soviet parliament of 1989–91, the Russian parliament of 1990–93, and the post-1993 Russian parliament as radically disparate and largely disconnected institutions. Remington sees the development of parliamentary structure as incremental, and he unearths key sources of institutional continuity. He shows how bicameralism and partisanship, in particular, emerged and gained recognition over the lives of

all three parliaments, and he sees the post-1993 parliament as deeply influenced by its institutional predecessors. He discovers processes of learning and adaptation within and across parliaments over time, with legislators growing increasingly adept at bargaining, rule making, and rule following. He makes a powerful case for regarding parliamentarism in Russia as a work in progress.

Remington also takes on the conventional view of the Russian parliament as an anemic and inconsequential institution. He is fully cognizant of the formal limitations on the legislature's power. But he sees parliament as having expanded its prerogatives since 1993, and he holds that it has at least managed to make the president take his own constitution seriously. He argues that the growth of parliamentary capacity has enabled legislators and parties to check and tame executive power. Remington makes a strong case, detailing a record of legislative accomplishment and uncovering areas in which the parliament and the president are in continual discussion and negotiation. Still, on this score, this reviewer is not entirely convinced. Surely Remington is right to argue that parliament has turned out to be more than the decorative and toothless body that many observers expected it to be-and that the president perhaps wanted it to be—at the time of the constitution's passage in late 1993. But the president's decree powers and control over the government, judiciary, and state media, the absence of meaningful parliamentary oversight powers, and the enormous disparities in resources that prevail between the sprawling executive branch and a parliament that employs a staff with but a single personal assistant for each deputy make it difficult for the legislature to check the president in most areas of policymaking and implementation. This is not to deny that parliament may be, as Remington argues, a consequential and articulate political actor. I do, however, question whether the parliament really can, on an ongoing basis, tame executive power and force the president to abide by

Whereas Remington focuses on a particular institution within the broader context of regime change, McFaul seeks to explain the character of regime change itself. McFaul's dependent variable is the emergence/nonemergence of stable rules for open political competition. His cases are the Gorbachev period (1985–91), the Russian First Republic (1992–93), and the Russian Second Republic (1993–present). He argues that the first two cases represented failures at building lasting institutions for regulating political competition, while the third case, at least in relative terms, has been a success. His main explanatory variables are perceptions of the balance of power among political antagonists and the scope of the contested agenda for change.

McFaul holds that a relatively equal balance of power between rival political forces that leads to political stalemate, particularly when the balance of forces is unclear to the protagonists themselves, is more likely to produce breakdown than is a circumstance in which one side has triumphed unequivocally and managed to impose its own rules unilaterally. Here McFaul challenges Dankwart Rustow's notion regarding the potential virtue of evenly balanced, protracted conflict for producing the compromises—and eventually the rules and agencies—that institutionalize competition and keep it peaceful. According to McFaul, the balance of forces between the main political protagonists was relatively equal and entirely unclear during the Gorbachev and early post-Gorbachev periods. After the unequivocal triumph of Yeltsin over his communist and nationalist opponents in the armed conflict of 1993 and the adoption of a new constitution that resolved the battle between the president and the parliament in the president's favor, however, the balance of forces

tilted decisively toward the presidency and specifically toward Yeltsin and his political program. The clarification of power relations created the basis for the emergence of a system in which even opponents of the government and of the new regime had an interest in playing within the established rules. The adoption of the new constitution, the passage of time, and the practice of elections under clearly specified rules helped pull even avowed opponents of the post-Soviet regime into the electoral game and ultimately advanced both stability and democratization.

McFaul makes clear that he is aware of the potential tensions between the advantages of greater clarity and disparity in the balance of power, on the one hand, and democratization, on the other, and he grapples with this tension throughout his account of Russian politics after 1993. Still, in this reviewer's opinion, McFaul might underestimate the perniciousness for democratization—if not necessarily for short-run political stability—of the lopsided balance between Yeltsin and his opponents that emerged from the ashes of the 1993 conflict. Yeltsin's victory and his ability subsequently to win approval in a referendum for a draft constitution that expressed his own preferences in nearly unadulterated form did establish some institutional clarity. Outside of Chechnya, moreover, Russian political competition has become less bloody and chaotic since 1993. But during the past half decade, little worthy of the name "democratization" has occurred in Russia. The very institutions—especially the weakly constrained executive—that helped bring some order to the system initially are also impeding democratization and may even become sources of political instability and state failure.

Another of McFaul's major arguments is that the wider the scope of the agenda for change, the less likely a new democratic regime will emerge. Multiple, simultaneous transformations are harder to manage, and more likely to derail democratization, than are transitions where challenges can be managed sequentially and discretely. The breadth of contested terrain, according to McFaul, was exceptionally expansive in Russia during the Gorbachev period and the first two years of the post-Soviet era. The shape of the state itself and the battle between capitalism and socialism in the economic sphere were under dispute. But settlement of problems of state autonomy and independence during the early post-Gorbachev years, as well as the elimination of the option of a return to a command economy following Yeltsin's victory in the armed clash of 1993, narrowed the terrain of contest and enabled politicians to concentrate on—and productively fight over—political institutions. This reduction in the scope of the agenda for change helped stabilize politics. This argument is not counterintuitive, but nor is it easy to demonstrate in practice, and McFaul does an excellent job of laying out precisely how this dynamic worked.

This reviewer does not fully embrace the arguments made in either book, but they are vigorously and skillfully made. Each book is a model of rigorous, theoretically informed qualitative analysis. Both authors define their terms with precision, map out and explicate their causal arguments clearly, and present prodigious amounts of empirical evidence.

Together with Eugene Huskey's Presidential Power in Russia (1999), The Russian Parliament and Russia's Unfinished Revolution represent the most ambitious and successful book-length efforts to date to grapple with institutional genesis and transformation in post-Soviet Russia. The books focus on a single country, but their arguments are not case-specific. These works richly merit, and are already gaining, a broad audience among theoretically minded comparativists.

Black Atlantic Politics: Dilemmas of Political Empowerment in Boston and Liverpool By William E. Nelson Jr. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. 344p. \$74.50 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

Toni-Michelle C. Travis, George Mason University

Studies of local politics have often narrowly focused on elites, the role of competing interest groups, or the influence of the business community in making key decisions. Nelson's comparative study raises the level of discourse by drawing our attention to the often overlooked role of blacks in municipal politics. In comparing Boston and Liverpool the study expands our understanding of the similarities between racial politics in the United States and in Great Britain.

Organized in a readable manner, the book provides two opening chapters to frame the comparison. The chapters on Boston and Liverpool are designed as case studies, with a concluding chapter that allows one to focus on one city at a time.

Building on the literature of two fields, cultural politics and local government, Nelson presents a systematic study of the problems of blacks seeking empowerment on both sides of the Atlantic. In previous works on local government, blacks were merely incidental, while the focus here makes blacks central to the study.

As suggested by Paul Gilroy in The Black Atlantic (1993), the ocean provides a link between Britain and the North American colonies because of cultural commonalities and the experience of the slave trade. This examination of contemporary Liverpool and Boston reveals two communities trying to attain political empowerment. Two cities separated by an ocean exist where racial domination places the black community in a subordinate position as the recipients of policy outcomes, not partners in shaping policy, as the objects of institutional discrimination, and often as the victims of police harassment. The comparative analysis is framed in terms of the structure and budgetary constraints of local government, the relationship of the local government to the central government, the responsiveness of governing institutions to the black community, the resource level of the black community, and the ability of the black community to mobilize its resources to influence the public agenda. The beauty of the comparison is that it shows that race is a major force in determining policy in what appear to be two dissimilar

Comparative studies, although often complicated, elucidate key similarities. In examining two port cities Nelson finds racial hierarchies in which whites have been intransigent in response to black demands for representation and inclusion in governing circles. By focusing on political linkage between the black community and the local government, Nelson clarifies the subtleties of ongoing problems of racism and internal conflict within the black communities of Boston and Liverpool.

This comparison, however, notes one important difference between the two cultures with regard to race. The role of the state in the British system is different because there is no de jure history of discrimination and segregation. Consequently, there is no official acknowledgment of the overt prejudice that is practiced. With the general denial that race is an issue and not state policy, opposition to racism as well as hope of achieving any political power at the local level becomes difficult.

This is a pioneering study that will lead other scholars to examine the continuing problem of black empowerment in democratic cultures. Nelson's work shows that the problem is far from solved. Race continues to matter in local politics on both sides of the Atlantic. Nelson presents a solid,

well-documented study. However, it would have been enhanced by his paying greater attention to the West Indian dimensions of protest politics in Boston, where activists more often than not are of West Indian descent.

With regard to Liverpool, while it remains difficult to achieve unity and to build coalitions, an overlooked dimension is the impact of the immigrant policy on racial politics. If immigration increases, then the black population will grow and place increasing demands on the system.

This seminal work invites future studies analyzing the connection between politics and policy outcomes on both sides of the Atlantic where race is a prime factor. Future studies of local government will certainly need to examine structure, political linkages, and policy outcomes, but with race as a key actor, not a bit player. Immigration will continue to impact the local policy as residents of commonwealth countries continue to move to Great Britain. Boston, too, is experiencing population shifts, with more people of color from the Caribbean and Latin America becoming Boston residents as whites flee to homogeneous suburban enclaves. The story is not over. It will be a long struggle for empowerment unless more common ground is found for coalitions in both communities. Black Atlantic Politics will prove to be the guide for assessing future political empowerment in the Atlantic context.

Debating Governance: Authority, Steering, and Democracy Edited by Jon Pierre. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 251p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Christopher Ansell, University of California, Berkeley

If you remain befuddled, perplexed, or even a bit hazy about why scholars have shifted in the last decade from talking about "government" to talking about "governance," this is the volume for you. Debating Governance, edited by Jon Pierre, brings together a diverse group of scholars to analyze the meaning and value of this concept within their respective subfields. The title of the volume may, however, be ambiguous. These scholars are not debating the meaning and value of the term governance among themselves. The contributors to the volume generally agree that governance is a useful and valuable concept. Despite differences in emphasis, perspective, and language, the authors generally agree about why we must shift from talking about "government" to talking about "governance." The debate, if there is one, is with those who would deny or ignore fundamental changes in the way in which we govern ourselves over the last several

So what is this concept governance? There is no doubt that the term means different things to different people, and many of the authors in the volume show a healthy self-consciousness about what the term implies. The essay by Rod Rhodes, for example, identifies seven distinctive meanings of the term (pp. 58-60). However, I believe that these seven distinctive meanings are usefully reduced to two broader connotations. In the field of corporate governance, in new public management, and in the "good governance" movement associated with the World Bank, the term tends to signify the pursuit of fiscally responsible, efficient, and accountable organizations. Best business practices are advocated as a means to effective governance. In contrast, the other four meanings identified by Rhodes—governance as international interdependence, sociocybernetic system, new political economy, and networks—all refer to the ways in which activities of governing are now distributed over a much wider group of actors than they were in the past, none of whom can unilaterally control outcomes. Hence, governance

implies a process of coordinating and conciliating multiple actors

The authors of this volume all lean toward the second of these two connotations. As a number of the authors explicitly point out, governance suggests the shift from a "state-centric" model of governing (hence, "government") to a model in which authority and power are much more widely distributed. This distribution of authority and power places (or reflects) constraints on the ability of the state to govern unilaterally. Governance, with its emphasis on process, implies that governing now requires new institutional forms and a more intensive engagement between state and society. In his introduction to the volume, Pierre announces a central theme of the volume: "As the state's traditional power bases seem to be losing much of their former strength, there has been a search for alternative strategies through which the state can articulate and pursue the collective interest without necessarily relying on coercive instruments" (p. 2).

Skeptics may note that the state-centric model was never an adequate model to describe governing. They might wonder whether governance is much different from conventional pluralist accounts of governing. Such a critique might surprise the authors of the volume, because their "debate" is really directed toward those who remain wedded to the state-centric model. However, I think that their response might be the same to skeptics from both state-centric and pluralist camps. Governance seeks to acknowledge and call attention to the relative shift away from the state-centric model of governing toward a more pluralist model. The end result does not fit into either the state-centric category or the opposing category of society-centered pluralism. While constrained, the state remains too active and interventionist in the governance model to be described in conventional pluralist terms. As Pierre points out in the introduction, the contributors to the volume agree that governance reflects the transformation rather than the decline of the state. How, otherwise, can we understand the volume's many references to the state's role in "steering"? Although Paul Hirst's essay does champion a shift to societycentered governance, the state retains a critical, if reduced, presence in the governance models described by most of the other authors. Pierre describes governance as follows: "Governance has a dual meaning; on the one hand it refers to the empirical manifestations of state adaptation to its external environment as it emerges in the late twentieth century. On the other hand, governance also denotes a conceptual or theoretical representation of co-ordination of social systems and, for the most part, the role of the state in that process" (p. 3).

The great strength of this volume is the way it situates the concept of governance in many subdisciplines. Paul Hirst explores the tension between governance and democracy and advocates associative democracy as a framework for reconciling the tension. B. Guy Peters suggests that a comparative politics perspective on governance should ask, "Are certain types of political systems apparently better at steering and control than are others?" (p. 36). Rod Rhodes revises his well-known network model of public administration from the perspective of an "anti-foundational" epistemology. Gerry Stoker places governance in the context of the literature on urban growth coalitions and public-private partnerships. Andrew Gamble describes governance in terms of the evolving role of the state in the economy. Jan Kooiman's model of "social-political governance" emphasizes that public-private interactions have shifted from "one-way traffic" to "two-way traffic" (p. 142). James Rosenau elaborates his model of global "governance without government" by conceptualizing the nature of global change (p. 172). From a new political economy perspective, Anthony Payne describes projects of supranational regionalism as modes of governance. Alberta Sbragia analyzes the European Union as a form of governance that relies heavily on regulation, information control, and fiscal poverty.

Thus, the contributions to this volume cover an enormous range of perspectives. They are also well written and informative. Combined with the effective introduction and conclusion by Jon Pierre, they comprise a useful text for introducing the concept of governance to advanced undergraduates or graduate students.

Grassroots Expectations of Democracy and Economy: Argentina in Comparative Perspective By Nancy R. Powers. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001. 294p. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Steven Levitsky, Harvard University

As the recent political meltdowns in Venezuela and Argentina made clear, a vast gap persists between elite behavior and mass attitudes in much of Latin America. Scholarly understanding of this gap—and its political implications would benefit from more fine-grained, yet theoretically informed, studies of nonelites. Nancy Powers's Grassroots Expectations of Democracy and Economy is one such study. Drawing on in-depth interviews with 41 residents of two lower-income neighborhoods in Argentina's federal capital, Powers examines how poor people understand their own interests. She argues that people experience poverty in vastly different ways, and this variation has important implications for political behavior. Thus, to understand how poor people view the relationship between their own material conditions and government policy, one must examine "the conditions themselves and how people live with them" (p. 33). This kind of inductive analysis has important and well-known limitations, particularly for studies—such as this one—based on a small sample size. Yet given how little we continue to know about the relationship between mass attitudes and macrolevel politics in Latin America, such a "bottom up" approach should be welcomed. To the extent that fine-grained inductive research generates insights that 1) are unlikely to emerge out of larger-n studies and 2) challenge or refine dominant theoretical assumptions, it can be extremely fruitful. This is the case with important sections of the book.

Grassroots Expectations offers a wealth of insights into the conditions under which poor people respond—or do not respond—politically to material deprivation. Chapter 3 uses the case of low-income housing to show how variation in living conditions shapes poor people's political interests, as well as their capacity to act collectively. Thus, shantytowns are more likely to foster perceptions of shared housing interests and collective demand-making than are arrangements like "residence hotels" or abandoned buildings. More generally, Powers finds that the extreme heterogeneity of housing hinders collective mobilization, as the residents of hotels, abandoned buildings, and shantytowns "do not acknowledge a set of common shelter problems not do they seek similar solutions" (p. 85).

The book's core insights are found in Chapter 5. The chapter opens with typology of three possible orientations toward politics: 1) a microfocus, or a focus on private solutions to one's material problems, without attention to macropolitical issues; 2) macrofocus, or engagement with macrolevel political issues, but without making a link between these issues and personal material needs; and 3) micro-macro linkage, or an understanding of one's personal material problems (and their potential solutions) in terms of macrolevel politics. Powers is most interested in this third category, and the bulk of the chapter explores the conditions that give rise to a micromacro linkage. For the poor, the first response to pressing

material need is usually to "cope" individually, via a combination of informal sector employment, state welfare programs, private charities, and local partisan patrons. These coping mechanisms are described with a richness that is unusual in contemporary political science. Powers finds a strong relationship between perceived capacity to cope and attitudes toward the government. Those who view themselves as unable to cope are more likely to link their personal material needs to government policy than are those who perceive themselves as coping adequately. Although it is worth considering the possibility that the causal relationship is reversed (people who are ideologically disposed toward privatist thinking may be likely to say they can cope on their own), Powers's argument generates some interesting insights. It sheds light, for example, on the political salience of high inflation. Because hyperinflation so dramatically affects the poor's capacity to cope, it generates more intense macrolevel demands than do such economic problems as housing scarcity, low salaries, and even unemployment. This helps to explain why many poor and unemployed Argentines voted for Carlos Menem in 1995: Because hyperinflation made the micro-macro linkage salient for many voters, the electoral benefits of resolving it were greater than the costs associated with not resolving many other problems affecting the poor.

Though largely persuasive, the chapter understates the role of partisan clientelistic networks. Clientelistic networks—most of them Peronist—are pervasive in most low-income zones in Argentina, and they undoubtedly shape the way the poor interpret and engage in politics. The book understates the role of clientelism because it draws its sample from the federal capital, which is not representative of the country as a whole. Because it is wealthier, better educated, and more open to mass media influence than the rest of the country, the capital is characterized by substantially less clientelism. Had Powers drawn her sample from Greater Buenos Aires or the northern interior, her results might have been quite different.

Chapters 6 and 7 provide fewer original insights, and its major findings do not depart substantially from those of many large-n surveys. Chapter 6 presents respondents' views of the Menem government and various political alternatives. Readers may find the chapter too anecdotal, and its various references to parties and politicians that soon disappeared may quickly date it. The chapter concludes with the assertion that poor Argentines are stuck in a "static" Peronist identity that inhibits them from effectively pursuing their interests (p. 178). This characterization smacks of the false consciousness arguments that progressive scholars have made about Argentine workers since the 1940s and is inconsistent with the book's effort to take grassroots views seriously. Chapter 7 examines popular sector attitudes toward democracy. Although Powers found that the bulk of her respondents supported liberal democracy, many were "effective liberal democrats" (rather than absolute liberal democrats), in that they were willing to accept some illiberal actions (including closing the congress) for the sake of effective government. Powers concludes that support for democracy in Argentina is "context driven," rather than rooted in a "recognition of democracy's inherent values" (pp. 208–9).

In the excellent conclusion to Grassroots Expectations,

In the excellent conclusion to *Grassroots Expectations*, Powers links her findings to broader comparative theory. The chapter offers a critique of studies that characterize governments, such as those of Menem and Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori, as "neopopulist," arguing that such analyses pay insufficient attention to why poor people support them. According to Powers, both Menem and Fujimori substantially enhanced the individual security of poor citizens, and that enhanced security, rather than neopopulist appeals,

best explains their lower-class support. Powers also evaluates her findings in light of dominant theories of voting, arguing that although micro-macro linkage (or "pocketbook voting") is generally treated by scholars as unsophisticated political behavior, it may be quite rational in developing countries, where public policy often has tremendous impact on poor peoples' lives. Indeed, an ability to turn microlevel needs into macrolevel demands may be critical to effective citizenshipand to closing the elite-mass gap—in Latin America. Powers might have pointed out that contemporary patterns of economic liberalization, state retrenchment, mass party decline, and the decentralization and NGOization of social policy have further eroded the conditions facilitating such micromacro linkages. If her argument is correct, then these developments may have important negative implications for the quality of citizenship in Latin America.

Political Transition in Cambodia 1991–1999. Power, Elitism and Democracy By David W. Roberts. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 259p. \$40.00.

Patrick Vander Weyden, IPSoM/Catholic University of Brussels-ISPO/Catholic University of Leuven

In this book David W. Roberts provides an interesting descriptive account of recent Cambodian politics. The guiding principle of his study is the evaluation and implementation of the Paris Peace Agreement (PPA), which was signed in 1993. The main thesis in the book is that the content of the PPA mainly served the interests of international actors such as the United States and China, without taking into account the Cambodian political reality. In Roberts's view, the PPA developed from the Western ideal of liberal democracy, with multiparty elections as its central component and with total disregard for the Cambodian political context.

According to Roberts, the causes of the Cambodian conflict were still present after the signing of the PPA. In fact, "the significance of the conflict had not changed. It remained a vital struggle for political survival in an extremely hostile environment where the consequences of absolute defeat and marginalisation could be dire, and far more exaggerated than in western systems upon which the chosen model of polling was based" (p. 32). Cambodian political and social life is dominated by a system of patronage and clientilism, which is strongly hierarchically structured. Holding a political position in this system means having access to sources of personal wealth and the possibility of serving associated dependent groups of people. In addition, the Cambodian political elite is characterized by a lack of democratic values. Concepts such as cooperation and constructive opposition are of little substance to them. Furthermore, the lack of a democratic mechanism to solve conflicts, the dramatically poor economic situation, and the overall presence of arms make the ideal of the PPA and its implementation in the field even more unrealistic.

Roberts explores the lack of a democratic culture of the Cambodian political elite in view of the behavior of the different Cambodian actors in the period between 1991 and 1999. It becomes clear through the reading not only that the autocratic nature of the political elite was characteristic of Cambodia's governing People's Party (CPP), but also that other parties, such as the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP), are practicing undemocratic values. This is evident in the way the political parties behaved during the 1993 and 1998 elections and in the way the period in between was governed by a coalition government of the CPP and Front Uni Nacionale (FUNCINPEC). After the 1993 elections, with FUNCINPEC the winner and CPP coming in second, the CPP refused to

accept the election results. Only after the coalition government was installed was a nonviolent political climate restored. The forming of this coalition government is yet another illustration of the nondemocratic climate of the country because in Cambodia in 1993 having a coalition government simply meant that for each political department two ministers were appointed, one FUNCINPEC minister and one CPP minister. More or less the same thing happened after the 1998 elections. The CPP won the elections, FUNCINPEC came in second, and the Sam Rainsy Party third. Again, immediately after the elections, political parties did not want to accept the results, with a violent and aggressive atmosphere as a consequence. Finally, a nonelected senate was formed, which saved FUNCINPEC the affront of losing most of its power.

In the same critical fashion Roberts analyses the functioning of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), which was responsible for the implementation of the PPA and the conduction of the 1993 elections. According to Roberts the UNTAC did not succeed in creating a politically neutral environment, which was a precondition for "free and fair" elections, as stipulated in the PPA. The late deployment of the UNTAC, the inefficiency and ineffectivity of the deployment, the unsatisfactory disarmament, and the failure to separate the state administration from the governing party, CPP, are especially strongly criticized by Roberts. Roberts advances—in an impressively well-documented way—the uncommon proposition that the Khmer Rouge left the 1993 election process because the UNTAC was not able to create a politically neutral environment, which made it impossible, in the perception of the political leaders of the Khmer Rouge, to make their comeback in Cambodian politics by participating in the elections.

Although it is obvious that Roberts's detailed descriptions are the result of an accurate and critical analysis of primary written documents and in-depth interviews, he judges the transition process too harshly. Undoubtedly, there are still strong autocratic and nondemocratic values present within the Cambodian political elite. Certainly, the threat and the use of violence in a political context are still present. It is also true that the United Nations' implementation of the PPA was not very successful. Roberts seems to reject the idea of holding elections in an environment characterized by non-democratic values such as clientilism, patronalism, noncooperative experience, and violence and, last but less developed in the book, in an environment of poverty. Roberts leaves one crucial question unanswered: What would the alternative be?

Furthermore, Roberts's definition of democracy is rather stern and rigid. Consider, for example, the way he depicts the democratic attitudes of the Cambodians: "Many Khmers were thus not consciously voting for a transformation of political ideology and for democratic change. Many voted because doing so allowed them to make choices about who would best improve their socio-economic lot" (p. 205). It is unclear why voting for a party for this reason should be undemocratic. Elections are essentially about enabling the voter to establish his or her own priorities and to choose freely between parties. The high levels of turnout in both the 1993 and the 1998 elections clearly show that the Cambodian people want to express their vote and that they want to choose between parties, whatever reasons they might have.

Of course, it is too early to call Cambodia a democratic country, as evidenced most clearly by Roberts's extensive description of the autocratic behavior of the country's political elite. But it is worth taking into account that the transition from a nondemocratic to a democratic system takes time and that international support and pressure can achieve the desired effect of democratic values in the long run.

Palestinian Women: Patriarchy and Resistance in the West Bank By Cheryl A. Rubenberg. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 318p. 359.95.

Sara Roy, Harvard University

Several years ago, not long before the signing of the Oslo agreement, I was in a refugee camp in the Gaza Strip. As I was walking through the camp with a male friend, a woman whom I did not know approached me. She gently took my arm as if we were intimate friends, pulled me close, and said, "I have nothing left to feed my children but black milk." She then turned and walked away, leaving as imperceptibly as she had approached. My male friend immediately dismissed her as crazy. Yet I have never forgotten this woman or our momentary but wrenching encounter. It was not only the poignancy of her words that struck me, but their poetry. Her message to me was one of ultimate despair: I can no longer nourish my children. What good am I?

I again was reminded of this encounter after reading Cheryl Rubenberg's fine and beautifully crafted study of Palestinian village and camp women in the West Bank. The author, who is an associate professor of political science at Florida International University, is well known for her work on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In this work, Rubenberg has opened a door into a critical segment of Palestinian society few have entered and has given voice to women who are rarely heard within their own societies, let alone beyond them. Over 60% of Palestinian women in the West Bank live in villages and refugee camps. Yet many, perhaps most, studies of Palestinian women have focused on the far smaller segment of urban, upper- and middle-class women who are educated and politically active and whose lives bear little resemblance to those of the women in Rubenberg's study. Indeed, despite certain differences between rural and camp women, Rubenberg clearly shows that these two female populations share more in common with each other than either does with urban

Rubenberg's central argument is that the core of gender inequality in Palestinian society resides in patriarchal control and the repression of female sexuality. She argues that tradition and culture-more than religion-perpetuate women's oppression in village and camp societies. The primary site of patriarchal relations—male domination and female dependency—is the family, and these relations are replicated and diffused through all other institutions of society. Women's oppression is deepened further by Israel's repressive occupation, which has undermined the economic and political base of Palestinian society. The study focuses on the ways in which "gender roles and relations have been constructed by determinate social institutions and how they have been formed, deformed, transformed, and reproduced from the perspective of the women who live within this institutional framework" (p. 9).

This case study examines a distinct group of women who find themselves at a particular and extremely difficult moment in history, a moment shaped by many factors: the failure of the first Palestinian uprising and the Oslo peace process to achieve political and economic sovereignty; the emergence of, and subsequent opposition to, a corrupt and authoritarian Palestinian regime; the rapid and widespread impoverishment of the Palestinian people in both the West Bank and Gaza; and the failure of the women's movement to achieve needed changes in patriarchal roles and relations. It is important to note that the women's movement virtually abandoned grassroots women during the years of the peace process, when many nongovernmental organizations, including those run by women, became professionalized, responding to the needs of donors rather than to those of their own constituents. Indeed,

given the profound problems and pressures facing rural and camp women and their limited access to resources of any kind, the abandonment of these women by their urban and elite counterparts is nothing short of shameful.

The strength and importance of this book lie in Rubenberg's extensive and painstaking field research, which produced literally hundreds of hours of interviews conducted with 175 respondents. Hers is not a theoretical study but an empirical one. Although theory is minimized, it is not negated—its relevance and importance are made clear. What emerges then is a powerful, moving, and, at times, disturbing portrayal of Palestine's poorest and most oppressed women. Yet these women are not monolithic or homogeneous. They reveal remarkable diversity on a variety of issues and trenchant insight, in many instances, into their own condition and its sociological underpinnings as well as strategies for negotiating and resisting their social, economic, and political reality.

It is clear from this and many other studies of Palestinian society that needed change must ultimately come from within as well as from without. The common social patterns that are described and form the basis of this book not only reveal what is limiting and injurious to Palestinian women (and men) but also what is empowering and possible. As such, Cheryl Rubenberg's book is a welcome and much needed contribution to the discourse on Palestinian women and to understanding the larger conflict in which they and their families find themselves embroiled.

Mao's War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China By Judith Shapiro. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 287p. \$59.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

David Bachman, University of Washington

Judith Shapiro has written the first overview of environmental history of the People's Republic of China under Mao Zedong (1949–76). It is a grim history indeed. Instead of employing a more common temporal approach, Shapiro identifies four major themes leading to environmental degradation, and uses compelling case studies to illustrate those themes. The four themes are political repression and suppression of dissenting opinion; utopian urgency; dogmatic uniformity; and war preparation and forcible relocation of the population to remote areas.

The first theme of repression and its effects on the environment is exemplified by case studies concerning Beijing University President Ma Yinchu's suggestion that birth control be considered, starting in 1957, and civil engineer Huang Wanli's argument that the Sanxia Dam across the Yellow River, constructed in the 1950s, would not work. Both were persecuted for what proved to be their prophetic remarks. Shapiro argues that their cases were emblematic of state-intellectual interactions, especially after 1957, that made it almost impossible for scientific knowledge to be treated as a relevant criterion in assessing state policies.

The second theme of utopian urgency is told via the Great Leap Forward generally, several of its component campaigns, and the mass campaign to produce steel at the local level, in particular. This last campaign led to tremendous waste and extensive deforestation. The Leap also created the worst famine in the twentieth century, if not in human history.

The theme of dogmatic uniformity is told through the campaign to study (copy) the Dazhai Production Brigade—to terrace fields, to reclaim land, to transform nature so that more grain could be planted and grown. She details how this movement was put into practice through attempts to partially

fill in Dianchi Lake in Yunnan Province, near the City of Kunming. The lake's ecology was devastated by these efforts, and almost no additional grain output was obtained from the labor of hundreds of thousands.

Finally, the theme of war preparation and forcible relocation of the population discusses how, because of fear of attack by first the United States and later the Soviet Union, China moved many defense-related factories to the interior of the country in remote locations, causing widespread environmental damage. Here she highlights the Panzhihua steel mill in Sichuan Province. In the forcible relocation part of the chapter, she examines the policy of sending urban youths to live in the countryside. The attempt to grow rubber in Yunnan Province and how this destroyed tropical forests, with attendant damage or elimination of rare species of flora and fauna, are her particular entrée into connections between relocation and environmental degradation.

In her conclusion, Shapiro makes some brief comparative comments about environmental degradation in the economic history of the United States and the Soviet Union, and tries to open up the possibility of greater Chinese stewardship of China's environment. She notes, however, that China's economic reforms and dynamic economic growth over the last 20 years have severely compounded the damage inflicted during the Mao period.

The case studies are informative and well done, but while the environmental perspective sheds some new light on the nature of Mao's rule, China specialists will not find much that is terribly surprising here. Comparative public policy or environmental specialists might learn more about China and its environmental problems, but in the end, it should not come as a surprise to any thinking reader that a revolutionary regime is not likely to give much credence to rational scientific calculations, that the revolutionary regime will be impatient for success, and that it will go all out to transform all environments (social, natural, political, etc). The magnitude of China's environmental damage under Mao is a measure of how thoroughgoing the Chinese revolution attempted to be.

One could find a number of points on which to challenge or question Shapiro's interpretations. One might ask, even if China had begun birth control with Ma Yinchu's suggestions (and assuming it was voluntary), would it have made much difference to the rate of population increase? Shapiro suggests it would have, but there is no demographic model presented to buttress her argument. She states that all steel produced in 1958 was useless because it was smelted by the masses (p. 75). But in fact, more than half of all the steel produced in 1958 came from large, relatively modern mills and was used throughout China. She implies that war preparation was excessive and unnecessary, but this, as with much of the interpretation in the rest of the book, is only true in retrospect, and not during 1969, when numerous instances of conflict among Chinese and Soviet troops occurred.

This last point hints at one of my two biggest problems with the book. The normative framework she uses (sustainable development) did not exist to any significant extent for most of the period of Mao's rule. While China's treatment of its environment was particularly disastrous, it was not as if an "ideology" of environmental protection was well established in government decision making anywhere. Her work is also highly idealist in the philosophical sense, as the Ma Yinchu and Huang Wanli cases suggest. If only rational democratic discussion had taken place, disasters could have been avoided. One voice crying out in the wilderness could have made a difference. But as mentioned, she provides no evidence to show how birth control would have influenced population growth rates. In retrospect Huang was right, but many other scientists felt differently, even before extensive

political pressure was exerted on them. Would he have prevailed with free debate?

Although the dictatorial nature of the Chinese revolutionary state certainly caused many environmental catastrophes, Shapiro almost totally ignores more philosophically materialist concerns. Nowhere does she mention, for example, that about 70% of China's energy resources come from coal, or that as with any developing country, especially one deeply affected by the international balance of power, concerns about the environment will receive short shrift, while rapid economic growth will be a top priority. We are left to wonder, how much more worse off is the Chinese environment because of Mao than it would have been if China had followed an "East Asian Model" at an earlier stage? Is the Chinese situation noticeably worse than India's, with its democratic system but slower growth?

The historian of China, Mark Elvin, entitled one essay on China's environment "Three Thousand Years of Unsustainable Development" (East Asian History 6 [1993]) There has been a very long term pattern of Chinese environmental misuse and destruction (undoubtedly true elsewhere). Is it realistic to think that with the advent of mass consumption in China and faster growth rates than during the Mao period, sustainable development is likely to be attempted in China anytime soon?

Politics after Neoliberalism: Reregulation in Mexico By Richard Snyder. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 268p. \$60.00 cloth.

María Lorena Cook, Cornell University

Richard Snyder's well-crafted study substantiates what most political scientists suspected all along: that neoliberal reforms lead to new institutions of market governance, rather than to unregulated markets. Snyder sheds light on this understudied topic by examining the reregulation of the coffee sector by four state governments after the Mexican government dismantled the Instituto Mexicano del Café (INMECAFE), the state-owned enterprise that dominated the coffee industry during the 1970s and 1980s. By the late 1980s, when deregulation began, INMECAFE was providing production supports, price controls, and government-managed marketing channels for nearly 200 thousand small coffee producers. Most of these producers were located among the poorest states in southern Mexico.

State governments stepped into the policy arena vacated by federal authorities. Governors developed new regulatory projects for the coffee sector that were aimed at building political support coalitions in their states. Some governors attempted to do so via neocorporatist projects, ensuring that producer organizations that were political allies (and linked to the ruling PRI, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional) would benefit. Other governors launched crony capitalist projects that favored private elites. Snyder argues that in developing countries, the key to understanding this new institution building is that ambitious politicians, rather than insulated technocrats, drive reregulation.

Politicians' career ambitions and their ideological orientation ("policy repertoire"), shaped in turn by regime institutions and societal forces, determined the nature of reregulation projects they pursued. Institutional outcomes, however, depended on the way societal actors responded to these projects. Given the proper strategies and right set of conditions, grassroots producer organizations could alter the original projects in their favor. In the end, institutional outcomes were explained by the "strategic interactions between politicians and societal groups as they negotiate[d] the terms

of reregulation" (p. 14). How small producers managed or failed to negotiate favorable terms is at the core of the author's inquiry.

Snyder shows how in each of four states, strategic interactions among local elites, grassroots producers' associations, state governors, and federal officials led to markedly different institutional outcomes. He divides these reregulatory results into two categories: "participatory" (the states of Oaxaca and Chiapas) and "exclusionary" (Guerrero and Puebla) policy frameworks. Exclusionary policy frameworks generated monopoly rents for private elites, whereas participatory policy frameworks involved the creation of inclusive institutions that helped small producers compete in export markets.

In Oaxaca, strong producer organizations pursued an "engaged productivist" strategy and were able to negotiate with a "statist" governor to create a participatory policy framework. Participatory institutions also emerged eventually in Chiapas, where the 1994 Zapatista uprising ended a stalemate between the governor and peasant coffee organizations by enabling an alliance between grassroots producers and federal officials that neutralized the local coffee oligarchy. In Guerrero, strong grassroots producer organizations became embroiled in electoral conflicts, rather than in pushing producer interests. This led to an exclusionary policy framework fashioned by a "neoliberal" state governor. Finally, an exclusionary outcome obtained in Puebla, where a weak producers' movement faced a strong state governor and powerful oligarchy.

Snyder has produced an ambitious book, one that depicts the complex political interactions taking place in four regions of Mexico, while laying out an agenda for the study of "politics after neoliberalism." His subnational comparison of reregulation efforts within a single sector effectively supports his argument about the central role of politicians in the creation of new economic institutions. His research also provides a framework for analyzing cases in other sectors or countries where new rules for market governance are being shaped.

I found the author's discussion of producer strategies more problematic. Snyder claims that Oaxacan producer organizations pursued an "engaged productivist" strategy rather than a "partisan" strategy, thus enabling the creation of participatory frameworks. In Guerrero, by contrast, producer organizations pursued a partisan strategy, emphasizing political party opposition over productivist goals, which contributed to a reregulation project that failed to include or benefit small producers. Since Snyder is concerned with the conditions that enable the creation of participatory institutions, he appears to ascribe greater value to the former, "nonpartisan" strategy. Yet whether or not producer organizations were able to negotiate with state governors depended, among other things, on whether they signed on to newspaper ads in support of PRI presidential candidate Carlos Salinas prior to the 1988 elections. Organizations that chose to do so were rewarded with funds under PRONASOL (Programa Nacional de Solidaridad), a federal agency that funded antipoverty and development projects during the Salinas administration. Those organizations that did not sign the ads and that continued to support the left opposition PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática) were punished.

What Snyder implies was a more effective choice of strategy, therefore, was really a willingness to forfeit broader political aims for narrower group interests. The Salinas administration lured many popular organizations away from the political opposition with funds and other forms of support, arguably delaying political democracy even longer. Whether an engaged productivist strategy would have yielded similar results in another political context, one in which competitive electoral politics rather than political authoritarianism dominated, remains unanswered given the time frame of Snyder's

study, which ends in 1996, four years before the defeat of the PRI in the presidential elections.

As Snyder puts it, "one of the costs of choosing to be a democrat first, and a producer second, may be forfeiting the opportunity to build economic institutions that could help improve welfare and competitiveness" (p. 203). But Snyder devotes less attention to the costs of choosing to be a producer first, and a democrat second, in an authoritarian or semidemocratic regime undergoing political as well as economic transition.

This is an important book that deserves to be read by students of comparative political economy and Latin American and Mexican politics. Snyder has shown that politics remains central to understanding institution building in the wake of neoliberal reforms. The pessimistic lesson is that in the case of political decentralization, grassroots groups may become even more disadvantaged as the importance of national allies fades and they "struggl[e] alone against the exploitative designs of insurgent oligarchs" (p. 192). But his study also provides some cause for optimism. As long as politics matters, grassroots groups may shape their own future, even if they may not shape it under circumstances of their own choosing.

The Politics of the Spirit: The Political Implications of Pentecostalized Religion in Costa Rica and Guatemala By Timothy J. Steigenga. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001. 220p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Virginia Garrard-Burnett, University of Texas, Austin

The Politics of the Spirit is Timothy Steigenga's long-awaited quantitative study of religious affiliation and political behavior in Central America. What he has done in this spare and conscientious study is to take to task the "conventional wisdom" about Protestantism in Central America. This is a formidable endeavor, given the flood of scholarly literature that has been produced by anthropologists, historians, and sociologists about Protestantism, and especially Pentecostalism, in Latin America over the past two decades. Because Pentecostalism seemed to emerge in Central America during the region's political crisis of the late twentieth century, much of this literature carried with it a highly deterministic subtext, defined by Max Weber and by models of political behavior borrowed from the United States and European experiences.

În general, much of the existing work on political behavior and religious affiliation in Latin America and in Central America in particular has been idiosyncratic, anecdotal, intuitive (if often based on sound intuition), and contradictory. In this study, Steigenga takes the central but fuzzy precepts laid out by this earlier work and tests them in two cases, Guatemala and Costa Rica. His findings, based on surveys, interviews, and statistical analysis are so surprising and so persuasive that they force us to reconsider whether our conventions on this topic contained any wisdom at all.

There are two overarching hypotheses that drive this study. The first is that in Central America, Protestants (whom Steigenga differentiates throughout as Mainstream Protestants, Pentecostals, and Sects—a potentially problematic term that he uses to refer to such groups as Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Adventists) make up a political monolith, whose theological conservatism and religious affiliation translates into political quiescence at best and blind obedience to oppressive governments at worst. This hypothesis lies at the heart of Steigenga's study of Guatemala, where repressive government, 36 years of civil war, and a virulent counterinsurgency led briefly by the Pentecostal general,

Efrain Ríos Montt, would seem to offer a transparent example of the confluence of evangelical religious affiliation and political conservatism. Costa Rica, by contrast, which has a smaller Protestant population but a long-standing democratic tradition, would have seemed to offer a test case of whether Central American Protestants are more likely to be political and progressive in a more open society. The second operative hypothesis for this study is the Weberian equation of Protestantism and capitalism, recently updated by Amy Sherman, who argues in her 1997 work on Guatemala (*The Soul of Development: Biblical Christianity and Economic Transformation in Guatemala*) that Protestants can be shown to have adopted new patterns of thinking, which are demonstrably conducive to socioeconomic advancement that also enhances the development of democracy.

In his careful analysis, Steigenga unpacks these hypotheses element by element. His overall conclusion is that evangelicals, taken as a group (something he wisely advises us not to do), do indeed have a strong tendency to respect political authority, but that respect is present regardless of a given government's political context. In a series of surveys, which examine religious conservatism, political conservatism, and political affiliation, Steigenga is not able to identify any single pattern to support the notion that religious affiliation is the determinant of conservative political behavior in Central America, in either Guatemala or Costa Rica. What he does find, however, is that certain types of religious behavior (as opposed to affiliation) can drive political behavior.

In addition, he finds no evidence of the prosperity-enhancing behaviors described by Sherman (except among Guatemalan Neopentecostals, for whom material prosperity is theologically mandated). What Steigenga finds instead is what he describes as a "change in perception of economic status" [emphasis mine] (p. 42). While Protestants are not distinguishable from Catholics by any quantifiable economic measure, Protestants nonetheless typically perceive a causal relationship between religious affiliation and economic advancement, thus giving some credence to Anthony Gill ("The Economics of Evangelization," in Paul Sigmund, ed., Religious Freedom and Evangelization in Latin America, 1999) and others who advocate the rational economic model for religious change in Latin America.

For this reviewer, however, the real treasures in this little jewel box of a book are the secondary findings. Because Steigenga conducted his research among Catholics as well as Protestants, some unexpected congruencies emerge. Perhaps the most important of these is that in Guatemala, 50% of Mainstream (non-Pentecostal) Protestants and many Catholics perceive that they have experienced glossolalia (speaking in tongues), the defining experience of Pentecostalism, or some other miraculous manifestation of the Holy Spirit. The most common of these was miraculous healing, an event that no less that 71% of Guatemala Catholics report having experienced (pp. 45, 82). This revelation leads Steigenga to the conclusion that religion of all kinds is becoming "Pentecostalized" in Guatemala, as it is to a lesser extent in Costa Rica (p. 46).

This Pentecostalization of religion has serious implications for the development of civil society, the author suggests, because while he finds no consistent template for voting, political affiliation, or political participation across the lines of religious affiliation, he does identify clearly definable patterns across the spectrum of religious behavior, specifically in the area of charismatic behavior. The surprising evidence here suggests that charismatic religious experience, regardless of whether it is in a Pentecostal, Mainstream Protestant, or Catholic context, is a significant predicator of political variables in both Guatemala and Costa Rica. In Steigenga's

words, "the experience of speaking in tongues appears to be associated with higher levels of political quiescence" (p. 93). The reason for this is not entirely clear, although he indicates that it may have to do with the inward focus of charismatic behavior, which is likely to negatively impact voluntarism or involvement in political or other nonreligious social movements. But in these matters, denominational lines blur, for, as Steigenga notes, "charismatic Protestants may have more in common politically with charismatic Catholics than they do with other Protestants" (p. 93).

Another unexpected finding in this study is the apparent relationship between Protestant biblical literalism and the empowerment of women. Although gender was tangential to the larger concerns of this book, Steigenga surveyed respondents on their views of women's participation in the domestic and public spheres as a variable in his surveys on theological conservatism. While the work of Elizabeth Brusco (The Reformation of Machismo: Evangelical Conversion and Gender in Colombia, 1995) and others has suggested a causal relationship between women's membership in evangelical churches and the "reformation of machismo," the conventional wisdom heretofore was that Latin evangelical women nonetheless model themselves after the subservient "virtuous woman," the ideal type for many North American fundamentalists. In this study, Steigenga discovered an entirely different set of attitudes, based not only on behavior, but upon theology: Both doctrinally conservative Protestant and Catholics were likely to see gender equity, not subservience, as an ideal type. In the too-short chapter he devotes to gender, the author concludes that "measures of doctrinal orthodoxy are excellent predictors of positive attitudes toward gender equity across religious groups and across genders" (p. 132).

Clearly, Steigenga's work leads us to the juncture of important future studies. Its provocative and meticulous conclusions, laid out cleanly without rhetorical flourishes or overreaching analysis, suggests exciting new venues for research in ecumenical political behavior, gender analysis, and religious behavior in civil society. There may be scholars in the field who will disagree with his conclusions but who will also find it impossible to ignore them.

The Politics of Freeing Markets in Latin America: Chile, Argentina, and Mexico By Judith A. Teichman. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 288p. \$55.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Peter Kingstone, University of Connecticut

The politics of neoliberal reform in Latin America has produced a number of impressions that are more or less widely held, but not necessarily entirely accurate. For example, many critics of the neoliberal reform process see it as a creature of Washington and Wall Street-views of economic development imposed on vulnerable, debt-ridden Latin American governments. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank play crucial roles as carriers of the "Washington Consensus" and enforcers of its policy prescriptions. In this view, insulated technocrats—often with U.S. economics degrees—implement these essentially unpopular programs without consultation, oversight, or any societal participation. "Delegative democracy" and populations battered by a decade or more of debt and inflation help explain the extent to which these unelected and unaccountable technocrats have been able to promote this agenda. A narrow electoral coalition, anchored by wealth holders and conservative ideologues, has maintained the political space for these insulated technocrats to continue, despite deep opposition from societal groups such as labor.

In her new book, Judith Teichman does not dispute these characterizations. Rather, she notes that there are several aspects of neoliberal reform that are not fully addressed. First, as several scholars, such as Eduardo Silva for example, have shown, the image of technocrats working in isolation is not an accurate portrayal. Although technocrats did not consult widely, privileged members of the coalition, such as domestic business groups, played an important role in shaping economic policy. Second, this common "coalition" approach does not fully answer questions about why the pace and sequence of reforms vary among Latin American reformers. Examining the reform process in terms of coalitions makes it hard to recognize the role of specific individuals, their ideological or programmatic beliefs, and their links to specific groups in society. The failure to examine these individual technocrats and the alliances they form makes it hard to understand why some reforms advance quickly and substantially in one country, but lag in another. In other words, the coalition approach sheds little light on the political calculations in specific policy areas (pp. 15-16).

As an alternative to the coalition approach, Teichman instead imports the concept of a "policy network" from the literature on the developed world to the Latin American context. The differences in the Latin American context, however, mean that Teichman must adapt the concept in order to make it operable in the less democratic Latin American environment. Perhaps most importantly, policy networks in Latin America are not pluralistic and do not offer a wide array of societal groups any opportunities to influence policy. Policy networks in Latin America depend substantially on personal trust and loyalty instead of common interests, combine both personalistic and highly discretionary power with institutional sources of power, and form among individuals with formal positions and those without any formal office (p. 14). As a result, these networks persist even when specific individuals leave office. Policy networks in Latin America differ as well because they incorporate international actors, most importantly members of the World Bank. Finally, policy networks in Latin America appear to be important mobilizers of policy reform, in contrast to the United States or Britain where they are perceived as obstacles to change (p. 15).

Teichman uses this modified concept to great effect in examining the politics of market reform in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. The book does an admirable job of tracing the rising influence of key technocrats in the three countries. In each case, she successfully tracks the connections that form among these technocrats (often drawn from academia), representatives of international agencies (particularly the World Bank), and leading figures in the business community. The approach allows her to illustrate how ideas about reform developed in dialogue between the bank and the technocrats. Teichman's analysis shows how the flexibility and intimacy of World Bank officials in dealing with national policymakers fostered cooperation and learning, and facilitated the building of strategic alliances between bank and national officials and between national officials and domestic industrialists. In fact, the more distant and doctrinaire IMF officials wielded less influence than the more pragmatic World Bank. Thus, her analysis provides a nuanced alternative to the widely held view of neoliberal reform as an imposition from abroad. It also shows that the relationship between policy reformers and domestic industrialists was also more nuanced than often believed. Technocrats were neither agents of powerful economic interests nor entirely independent of business and thus able and willing to impose reforms on unsympathetic but impotent industrialists. Instead, industrialists and technocrats were involved in a genuine exchange: Industrialists

defended specific interests with some success in modifying policies; technocrats actively worked to teach, inform, and persuade industrialists, often successfully, of the merits of particular policy choices.

Teichman's modified policy network concept is a valuable and promising instrument for examining the nuances of policy deliberation and implementation in Latin America. In fact, the policy networks approach could have been pushed further. The author provides a good accounting of the general reform program in the three countries, but she does not examine any particular policy area in greater depth. The policy network concept seems particularly well suited for exploring the character of specific policies at a more detailed level and for helping account for variations in policy design from case to case. All three cases pursued trade liberalization, for example, but the design of the reform varies among the three, and it would have been helpful to see the policy network concept applied at that level of detail.

The book offers an additional benefit beyond the introduction and application of the modified policy network concept. It is an excellent book for teaching purposes, with a good balance between background, historical review, and analytical discussion. Overall, this is a valuable contribution to the study of economic reform in Latin America.

**The Tories and Europe** By John Turner. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001. 282p. \$29.95.

Samuel H. Beer, Harvard University

In this thoroughly researched, well-organized, and clearly written work, John Turner raises important questions of comparative politics. The book is packed with facts and informed by ideas. You may well disagree with his conclusions, as I do. But you must give him credit for the seriousness of his concerns and his willingness to present the evidence, even though it can sometimes be used to support a different interpretation. "Over the past forty years," he writes, when stating his central conclusion, "Europe has transformed the nature of British politics and Tory politics in particular" (p. 1). Contrary to a view common among political scientists that foreign policy normally has far less influence on electoral behavior than on domestic policy, he finds that Britain's relation to European integration has "gradually...moved to the heart of the domestic political agenda" (p. 1), radically altering the balance of power between the two main parties. As the Euroskeptical champions of national independence, the Conservatives have become "increasingly beleaguered over the issue," thereby making it possible for Labour "to use Europe as a way of revitalizing the party's programme and image" (p. 2). He clearly would like to see terminal decline for the Conservatives and continued success for a social democratic Britain in a similarly collectivist Europe.

Turner is certainly right when he claims that the question of Europe has so severely divided the Conservatives as to prevent them from governing effectively and winning elections. The causal connection between the European issue and these weaknesses, however, is not what he takes it to be. From Margaret Thatcher's anti-European tirade at Bruges in 1988, the issue did with increasing bitterness divide the party leadership and the parliamentary party. This made it ever more difficult to govern the country, as John Major found, for example, in his prolonged effort in 1992–93 to win parliamentary approval of the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union. It was not, however, the voter's disagreement with the party's Euroskepticism that led to its steep, continuing decline in the polls and to defeat in the general elections of 1997 and 2001. Actually, this decisive shift in the balance of

power, as Turner himself reports, dates from the economic crisis brought on by the Conservative government's move toward monetary union by adoption of the exchange rate mechanism. This humiliating failure deprived the Conservatives of their long-standing reputation as the party best able to manage the economy, opening up the huge gap behind Labour in the polls that has persisted to the present day.

While this failure strengthened Conservative Euroskepticism, that did the party no great harm among the voters. On the contrary, as Turner grants, they had long been of that mind. A survey done just before the 2001 election showed a preference for the Conservative position on Europe over Labour's of 44% to 28% (Robert Worcester and Roger Mortimer, Explaining Labour's Second Landslide, 2001, p. 29). The same survey, however, also reported the low salience of the issue. As an important reason for their choice, voters ranked Europe far below the familiar issues of a modern welfare state, health, education, pensions, the economy, unemployment and transport, with regard to all of which, and in that order, respondents greatly preferred Labour. The conventional wisdom is right. Domestic policy trumps foreign policy as an influence on electoral behavior.

The contests in which Europe has figured as an important influence have been the elections to the party leadership. This fierce quarrel within the Conservative elite had a decisive influence on public policy toward Europe, but contrary to Turner's view, it was peripheral to the transformation of British politics that took place during the Thatcher-Blair era. With a focus on domestic affairs, the essence of the change was the neoliberal break instigated by Margaret Thatcher from the post-war collectivist consensus. The significance of this break for Britain and the Conservatives appears if one looks back to the 1960s when the government of Harold Macmillan enthusiastically embraced and expanded the welfare state and managed economy introduced by Labour. In effect, Macmillan was reaffirming what he had said some years before, that "Toryism has always been a form of paternal Socialism" (The Star, London, June 25, 1936). R. A. Butler had also called on this brand of Toryism when he led the Conservatives into the convergence with Labour's achievement, which made the party once more electable and which has been denominated "Butskellism." Turner seems totally unaware of this Tory tradition, whose power and history bring out the radical contrast of the boldly ideological innovations of Thatcher, who contemptuously dismissed its adherents as "the wets."

Conducting his own purge by eliminating socialism in all but the name from New Labour's program, Tony Blair reinvigorated his party by accepting all the basic Thatcherite reforms, denationalization, fiscal prudence, and reduction of trade union privileges, and in some respects, such as his workfare reforms, going beyond what she had attempted. To this display of convergence to the Right rather than the Left, which may be called "Blatcherism," he added certain more generous provisions of social policy, justifying his claim to champion a Third Way. Toward Europe he did take a more positive approach, accepting, for example, the Maastricht Social Charter. Few of its provisions, however, were enacted into British law, and with regard to monetary union, the practical effect of his five criteria in delaying acceptance is much the same as John Major's "wait and see" position.

As for the future, a long view of the past must qualify any inference that the two landslide defeats spell terminal decline for the Conservatives. That party is the phoenix of British politics, having from its origins as the Tories of the seventeenth century suffered repeated defeat on behalf of such causes as divine right, aristocratic privilege, and protectionism, only pragmatically to recover as the party of government. Today it is excluded from power by the Europhobic obsession of its dominant faction. If Europe advances into a prosperous and secure future, uniting not only its elites but also its peoples, the Tories once again will be obliged to adapt. On the other hand, now that the pressure for cooperation exerted by the Cold War has slackened and the new fear of Islamic terrorism is tightening control of national borders, the old rivalries among these nation-states may revive. If so, Europe, stabilized in its restricted but still remarkable achievement as a customs union, will fulfill the Thatcherite prescription, obliging the more visionary Conservative Europhiles to make a corresponding adjustment.

### **International Relations**

Identities, Border, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory Edited by Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, and Yosef Lapid. Minneapolis: University of Minnestota Press, 2001. 328p. \$57.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Bridges and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations Edited by Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 431p. \$50.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Nicholas Onuf, Florida International University

The editors of *Bridges and Boundaries* asked contributors—nine political scientists and eight historians, all of them North American—to reflect on their respective disciplines and the way they go about "the study of international events" (p. 1). We should notice a positivist disposition here. While contributors "share an interest... in the state, politics and war" (p. 2), events are the stuff of international relations. That the state, politics, and war are complex institutional phenomena perhaps not reducible to events points to conceptual issues that this volume fails generally to address. Instead, contributors discuss the many problems attending generalized explanation

and empirical fit—theory and science—as if their shared interests imply a common stock of core concepts.

Given that most of the contributors are political realists, this assumption is no doubt well taken. Whether the concepts in question suit the needs of good theory, good science, or good history of international relations is another matter, and never considered. According to the editors, what does matter are differences in the conceptualization of events: "Whereas historians focus on 'human conduct,' political scientists analyze 'behavior'" (p. 23). Yet human behavior is often and perhaps always intentional, while unintended consequences are often events not behavioral in any sense. What the editors, as political scientists, have to say on this subject is confusing, and their contributors offer little help.

Part I consists of essays by Jack Levy, Stephen Pelz, Ned Lebow, and Andrew Bennett and Alexander George, on disciplinary practices and methodological issues. Most of this material is familiar enough, not least because it carries on a discussion initiated in *International Security 22* (Summer 1997). Part II provides a series of topical contexts by which to evaluate good practices in the two disciplines. First, Gerhard Weinberg's and Randall Schweller's relatively brief essays on the origins of World War II are juxtaposed for Carole Fink's

rather tentative adjudication. If this debate seems somewhat contrived, the next one, featuring substantial essays by Edward Ingram and William Thompson on British hegemony in the nineteenth century, is far more engaging.

With impressive command of relevant materials, the imperial historian and long-cycle theorist state their cases vigorously, while deftly exposing the other's weaknesses. Richard Rosecrance's postscript adds some perspective to the debate. By comparison, the three essays on the Cold War are rather disappointing. John Gaddis is all over the place. If his piece gives the distinct impression of being tossed off, Deborah Larson's rather pedantic discussion of sources in Cold War scholarship seems like a school exercise. Given so little to work with, William Wohlforth has little to contribute in his postscript. Finally, John Lynn's absorbing discussion of innovation and diffusion in the technology and organization of military affairs over several centuries stands by itself—rather oddly, since the rest of Part II uses debate as a format.

The two essays making up Part III, Conclusions, give the book a strong finish. Political scientist Robert Jervis picks up on three running themes. Positivist political scientists value parsimony and theory building more than historians do, while historians are more sensitive to moral concerns. Lacking theory, parsimony is out of the question; everything matters. If theory building means raising the level of abstraction in order to leave out what matters less, historians fear leaving out the wrong things. Acts of omission have ethical implications. Jervis suspects that political scientists tend to avoid the affective dimension of human affairs. Yet there is more to it than this. Issues of agency, intentionality, and normativity seem to make them uncomfortable.

Historian Paul Schroeder has a short reply to Jervis and his colleagues: "Yes, but" (p. 403). Schroeder argues that "history as actually practiced and presented by good professional historians is full of parsimonious explanation, if not theory" (p. 405). If no theory, then we must ask how the good historian knows what to leave out and how to organize what remains; narrative conventions hardly suffice. Indeed, the standards of good history remain as inscrutable as ever.

Schroeder does have quite a bit to say about moral judgment. He concludes that because historians tend to treat human actions as conduct, and political scientists treat it as behavior, historians are less disposed to ignore moral considerations. Yet this is too simple. Good historians often enough translate actions into events, not conduct. When they do so, they deploy an abstracting device that promotes neither parsimony nor moral self-awareness. Positivists know what to do with events. No contributor to this volume clarifies sufficiently the concept of *conduct*, and with it the relation of intention, judgment, and action, for any of us to put this concept to good

Metaphorical flourishes betray the conceptual limitations of *Bridges and Boundaries*. We might just as well position its contributors in a swampy zone at the distant margins of two disciplines. Neither ranchers and farmers (Lebow) nor martians and venusians (Thompson), they are back-country folk trucking and feuding with each other from time immemorial. Ancient tracks crisscrossing their landscape defy all boundaries; bridges and fords are everywhere but go nowhere. When offered a way out to the glittering city of social theory, with its Parisian fashions and multicultural sensibilities, these are the people who stay behind.

In these terms, *Identities, Borders and Orders* could not be more different. Its 15 contributors include political scientists, sociologists, and a geographer; several are European. They are participants in a "conceptually innovative" research project "operating against a background of North Americanstyle International Relations" (p. vii). The contributors

variously draw on postpositivist social theory and normative theory—they are metaphorical migrants who have come to the city and love its ways. In their essays, we find no disciplinary nostalgia or defensiveness, and thus no calls for bridge—building. Their project follows an earlier volume, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds., 1996), this time adding an explicit conceptual map for getting around the city.

Lapid sketches the map in his Introduction to the new volume. It identifies three sites for conceptual development—identities, borders, and orders—but always in relation to one another. Never fixed destinations, these linked points of reference constitute the "IBO triad" as inextricably related processes. Just as "the road to a processual-relational understanding of international relations will inevitably take us through the IB intersection" (p. 11), it will also take us through the IO and BO intersections. Of course, no single trip need go through all three intersections and, we might guess, each trip changes the map's details for the next adventurer.

Lapid's Introduction is too brief to provide an adequate conceptual orientation for city visitors. For the most part, contributors talk about identity (as a process) as if its relation to agency (as a condition) needs no additional clarification. The same may be said of order (as a process) in relation to structure (as a condition). Against this tendency are conceptually important discussions of the process of bordering in relation to identity and order. Nevertheless, the conceptual attention to borders has the perverse effect of turning the triad into a teeterboard whose fulcrum is bordering. At one end of the board are the essays of the book's Part I assessing an ever-shifting international order. At the other end are the essays in Part II for which issues of identity are paramount. These loads are unbalanced; the second part is less substantial than the first, perhaps because the latter draws upon the centuries' longer discussion of order (as a condition) in political and international theory.

The first three essays in Part I, by Mathias Albert and Lothar Brock, Richard Mansbach and Franke Wilmer, and Ronnie Lipschutz, intersect at many points in tracing the rise of "Westphalian" modernity. Their shared concern with normative properties of the modern world stands in marked contrast to the epic stories in *Bridges and Boundaries*. Didier Bigo's interesting discussion of the vanishing border between internal and external security emphasizes agents and their practices. Chris Brown examines liberal versions of cosmopolitan and communitarian polarities in what he might have called republican theory. As a geographer, David Newman helpfully reviews the way geographers think about borders.

David Jacobson leads off Part II with an essay on formal norms and global culture. Antje Wiener assesses the place of democratic practices in the "new medievalism"—a trope of Hedley Bull's certain to bemuse any good historian (cf. Brown, p. 233). Both Rey Koslowski and Martin Heisler consider migration and identity, respectively emphasizing dual nationality and citizenship. Neil Harvey could dispense with a formulaic use of Jacques Derrida in reviewing the Zapatista uprising.

Mathias Albert and Kratochwil structure their conclusion to the volume with a suggestive discussion of conceptual fuzziness. If processes are to be understood as changing sets of relations, as they assert, then fuzziness can be avoided if we turn our conceptual attention from objects to "activities" (p. 280; their emphasis). Despite this sensible claim, they invoke Niklas Luhmann's theory of society to uncover "a whole world of codes and evolutionary-communicative dynamics of world society, which work behind the intentions of the actors" (p. 288). Not only does the phrase "work behind" offer a

regrettable example of fuzzy conceptualization; Albert and Kratochwil seem to separate intentions and activities so radically that agency disappears from their conceptual world. If this is their intention, it is a gratuitous exercise in bordering, and one that works against the editors' stated intentions for this ambitious book.

Democracy, Liberalism, and War: Rethinking the Democratic Peace Debate Edited by Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 250p. \$52.00.

David Dessler, College of William and Mary

The essays in this ambitious volume take as their foil the democratic peace hypothesis: the claim that liberal democracies, while still going to war against nonliberal states, rarely wage war on one another. "This volume challenges the received international wisdom about democracy, liberalism, and war," write the editors in the Introduction. "The democratic peace, with its transhistorical causal law based on fixed definitions of democracy and war and a nation-state ontology of the international, is far too simplistic a frame from which to analyze the various historical and contemporary configurations of democracy, liberalism, and war" (p. 2).

The point of the book is not to refute the democratic peace hypothesis but to broaden the debate it has engendered. Several contributors examine the ways in which liberal democracy might be more of a problem than a solution in today's world. David Blaney argues that while liberal polities create a space for pluralism of a certain kind, they are also exclusionary in endorsing only those identities consistent with liberal norms. This "liberal fundamentalism," Blaney asserts, may explain why liberal states are warlike in their relations with nonliberal states. Himadeep Muppidi focuses on the relationship between democracy and state identity, suggesting in an analysis of India's relations with Pakistan and Sri Lanka that democracy did nothing to prevent conflict and war in these cases (and, in the case of Sri Lanka, may have actually helped give rise to war). Timothy Kubik claims that the military in modern liberal states is an independent actor that can influence and even work its way around the domestic normative constraints that are supposed to ensure the democratic peace. And Mark Rupert considers the ways in which democratic rule can be deformed by concentrations of private power grounded in relations between economic classes.

Other authors highlight the benefits of historicizing the concepts of "democracy" and "war" and moving beyond a narrow state-centric understanding of the relationship between them. Michael Mann maintains that in cases of colonial conflict (rather than interstate war), Western liberal regimes waged war against indigenous populations that were usually more democratic than they were. Tarak Barkawi assesses U.S. foreign policy in the Third World during the Cold War and notes that the wars the United States fought there do not fit into the analytic categories the democratic peace hypothesis provides. An adequate understanding of the relationship between democracy and war during the Cold War can be gained, Barkawi argues, only by shifting away from a purely statecentric theoretical framework. Bruce Cumings examines the origins of democracy in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan and concludes that we cannot understand these histories without examining transnational systems and hierachies of power that theorists of the democratic peace have ignored. And Martin Shaw sketches a historical and sociological approach to the problem of war and democracy that challenges the division of the world into distinct domestic and international spheres, suggesting that national states and societies cannot be treated as given structures in the global political order.

The volume largely succeeds in bringing the conventional debate about the democratic peace into question. The essays maintain a high scholarly standard, and they hang together much better than the contributions to most edited volumes do. They also strike a good balance between theory development and the introduction of new empirical material to the literature on democracy and war. This book will be indispensable reading for anyone interested in the full implications of the democratic peace debate.

The main weakness of the volume may be the tendency of some contributors to suggest they are challenging not only the conventional debate over the democratic peace but also conventional forms of social inquiry as well. In the book's concluding chapter, Raymond Duvall and Jutta Weldes argue that the essays in this volume reject "the logic of explanation employed by analysts of the democratic peace," which they characterize as "reductionist and causal" (p. 200). The alternative developed in this volume, Duvall and Weldes maintain, amounts to "the radical alternative of seeing [the democratic peace] as a historically contingent, systematic condition" (p. 200). But none of the substantive arguments in the book requires or entails a break with ordinary social science. The authors neither advance a new epistemology nor suggest new methods of social analysis. The novelty of their essays consists in the new theoretical and empirical ground they break, not in a new logic of explanation. What does democracy look like in India, and how does it shape India's relations with its neighbors? What role did democracy play in the colonial experiences of Western powers? How did U.S. policy in Asia during and after the Cold War shape the democracies that emerged in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan? The contributors to this volume argue convincingly that the answers to these and similar causal questions are crucial to an adequate understanding of the international relations of democracy, liberalism, and war. They do not show that we need new techniques of social inquiry to historicize and contextualize our understanding of democracy and war.

In conclusion, it is worth emphasizing that, as noted, the aim of this volume is not to show that the democratic peace hypothesis ("democratic states rarely fight one another") is false. Indeed, several contributors state flatly that they recognize the truth in this claim. Their concern is not to question the validity of the democratic peace hypothesis but its significance. If there is a main overall message of the volume, it is this: The democratic peace hypothesis obscures more than it reveals about the complex interrelations among democracy, liberalism, and war. It is not the hypothesis per se, but the monopoly it has enjoyed in academic and policy debate, that needs to be confronted. If we want to understand more fully how democracy, liberalism, and war are connected, the contributors to this volume are saying, we need research that is more theoretically ambitious and historically sensitive than most work on the topic has been to date.

**Rethinking Europe's Future** By David P. Calleo. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 381p. \$24.95.

From the Nation State to Europe?: Essays in Honor of Jack Hayward Edited by Anand Menon and Vincent Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 261p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Francesco Duina, Bates College

Rethinking Europe's Future and From the Nation State to Europe? belong to two different genres of European studies. From the Nation State to Europe? is a collection of academic essays about the transformation of the nation-state in the European Union's context and its implications for social

scientific theoretical concepts. Rethinking Europe's Future is by contrast aimed at politicians and policymakers. Its major objective is to discourage policies designed to push Europe and NATO to expand eastward, perhaps to embrace Russia, and instead to encourage Western Europe to assert itself as a major independent, even if not fully united, force in the world. Despite this disciplinary difference, however, the two books complement each other well. The former is about the present state of affairs in Europe; the latter concerns the future and, for that purpose, a good deal of the past. Both involve excellent scholarship and thoughtful arguments, though organizationally they share some weaknesses. They should prove interesting to any student of European affairs.

The essays in From the Nation State to Europe are dedicated to Jack Hayward, a prominent scholar of Europe from the University of Oxford. In line with Hayward's interests and recent trends in European studies, the authors skirt the "rather sterile debates" between intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists over the drivers of integration (p. 99). They focus instead on three topics: the impact of integration on the nation-state, the appropriateness of using theories of national politics to study the European Union (EU), and the implications of the observed changes for existing theories of national politics. In addressing these topics, the authors do not intend to be comprehensive. Rather, they aim to be selective and incisive.

The transformation of the nation-state is investigated from a number of interesting perspectives. Monetary union, Elie Cohen points out, has introduced great structural and cultural changes in the political landscape of France. With monetary policy no longer controlled by a central bank that is dependent on national politics, the strategies and discourse of French politicians have altered dramatically. Yves Mény expands on Cohen's point to note that in a great number of areas besides monetary policy, we can observe a transfer of power from nation-states to Brussels. The transfer has especially affected the legal sphere. Yet the transfer has few precedents in history: It has not been accompanied by a Europeanization of administrative structures (in the sense of centralization at the European level). Nation-states in Europe lack legal authority but retain administrative clout. The implications of this situation for the organization and strategies of interest groups are discussed (p. 40). The next two chapters return to France. Both Pierre Grémion and Stanley Hoffman explore the tensions between the traditional interventionist role of the French state and the European project. "Not only," Grémion argues, "did the removal of trade barriers inhibit the state's proactive role, but the philosophy that underlay this new Europe was derived from the German social market economy, which was unknown in and alien to France" (p. 49). Predictably, such tensions have affected national political parties, both in France and elsewhere. Hence, the section concludes with an examination by Hugh Berrington and Rod Hague of British political parties and their relationship to educational and class groupings.

If the preceding chapters implicitly recognize the growing political stature of the EU, the chapters in the next section investigate whether the EU may in fact be examined with the conceptual tools traditionally deployed in the study of nation-states. "Does the EU," the authors ask, "defy attempts at comparison with national politics?" (p. 5). The evidence seems to suggest that it does. In the case of policymaking, Jeremy Richardson argues, the EU has no parallels with the nation-state. Political parties play a minor role in Brussels, and the Council of Ministers "is more a site for disputation and resolution of radically different policy programmes and ideologies than an institution trying to introduce and implement a more or less recognizable *programme* of public policy"

(p. 98). The mass media are largely absent from the scene, and interest groups do not attempt to manipulate media officials to their own ends. David Hine arrives at a similar conclusion when investigating whether treaty revisions in the EU's history may be said to resemble constitutional reform in nationstates. It is interesting to note that the comparison is executed along three dimensions: substance, context or justification, and operating procedures. Only with regard to substance (i.e., whether similar issues of governance are at stake) do parallels exist. Otherwise, differences abound. Edward Page further emphasizes the differences between the EU and nation-states when he demonstrates that the legal and bureaucratic structures of the EU are fairly fragmented and reliant on outside groups and various internal institutions to produce laws. They are altogether different from the typically hierarchical national structures. Even in the realm of monetary policy, the EU escapes direct comparison. Economic models used to explain the benefits of independent central banks seem not to apply to the EU, as James Forder points out.

As Menon notes, the third section of the book examines whether "any substantive effect that the EU may have had on its member states has potential implications for the way in which we study national politics" (p. 6). Do concepts, such as sovereignty, national identity, governance, and class struggle still apply to European nation-states? The authors lack consensus on this topic. Bruno Jobert argues that states have lost their cohesiveness as political agents. They have become "interacting states," permanently in transaction with one another and various supranational centers of power, and behaving in line with internalized norms and expectations that exist at the international level (p. 192). Colin Crouch seems more ambivalent. He points to the transformation of nationalist managerial and capitalist classes into transnational groups, but he notes that labor remains still rooted in national politics. Peter Hall argues outright that states retain their uniqueness and features. Integration imposes similar pressures on nation-states; however, he notes, "nations are endowed with distinctive sets of institutions, embodying strengths as well as weaknesses, which make it feasible for them to pursue multiple adjustment strategies in the face of common problems" (p. 235).

A concluding chapter is missing, but this is partly explained by the passing away of Vincent Wright—its intended author. This minor flaw highlights a problem with the book common to edited volumes. At times one has to struggle to see the relevance of a given chapter for the themes at hand. Some chapters are a bit unclear, and one—Stanley Hoffman's—is incisive and promising but a bit too brief. The volume nonetheless offers a stimulating set of essays in light of interesting questions about the current state of European affairs.

If curious about the future, however, the reader would do well to turn to David P. Calleo's Rethinking Europe's Future, which offers an unusual evaluation of what the future might hold for Europe. Calleo's main message is one of caution. Western European nations, he thinks, have historically been in conflict with one another. The Cold War merely dampened such tensions by forcing European states to collaborate. The collapse of the Soviet Union has the potential to revive old tensions. The potential is real, he suggests: Five decades of dependence on American power have discouraged Europeans from taking any serious steps toward political and military unification. Current plans to expand eastward, perhaps all the way to Russia under the umbrella of NATO, would only complicate matters. Calleo argues that Europe's core is far from being solid. Moreover, Russia is in any case unlikely to join the European project in any meaningful way, while too much of a cultural, political, and economic gap separates most of the

Eastern European countries from those in Western Europe. Western Europe must establish itself as a strong, independent player in the world. This means, among other things, severing ties with the United States. "A new transatlantic relationship," Calleo notes, "will have to be found, one in which Europe will depend more on its own indigenous forces, institutions, and balances" (p. 5).

Calleo's prognosis, or perhaps prescription, for the future rests on a deep examination of the past, carried out in the first two thirds of the book. The first third offers an interesting and unusual, even if at times somewhat eclectic, review of the conflicting geopolitical and intellectual currents that shaped Europe in the twentieth century up to the Cold War. Disillusioned with American involvement in Europe after World War I, France has turned to Germany for partnership. Britain has instead had a persistent faith in the United States. World War II only served to solidify the British belief in an Atlantic partnership, while a "disillusioned [France] began exploring collaborating with Germany around a common European project" (p. 23). Underlying such differences between France and Britain are larger philosophical and theoretical threads, dating back to medieval visions of a united Europe and continuing through the Reformation, English liberalism, mercantilism, Herder, Napoleon, von Hayek, Keynes, and even communitarian nationalism. These threads generate what Calleo considers three fundamental tensions in Western European history: those between sovereign nation-states and international coexistence, those between capitalism and its self-destructive forces, and those between capitalism and

The second third of the book examines how the Cold War at once dampened these tensions and precluded the full development of a united Europe. "A divided and occupied Germany," writes Calleo at one point, "greatly eased and encouraged Franco-German contention" (p. 102). Nonetheless, it also compromised Europe's growth: "Being able to leave security to NATO under American leadership also allowed Europeans to avoid the dangerous issue of military primacy among themselves" (p. 102). When the Soviet Union unexpectedly collapsed, Europe resembled an insecure child charged with unprecedented responsibilities.

Many readers are likely to disagree with Calleo's recommendations for a strong, contained European Union. In the eyes of many politicians and academics, expansion seems desirable. Yet, most readers will surely acknowledge the merits of the book: a recommendable effort to link past and future, an unusual attention to intellectual and geopolitical currents, and a somewhat unfashionable (and therefore audacious) interpretation of the limits of enlargement. They will also identify some, primarily organizational, weaknesses. The last chapter, on Europe in the World Order, does not properly summarize the main themes of the book. It appears an addendum, rather than a concluding chapter. The links between chapters are moreover often unclear, as Calleo jumps from time period to time period, and somewhat unexpectedly alternates chapters on intellectual history and geopolitical history. It is the reader who must ultimately work to synthesize all the threads present in the book. The effort, as is the case with From the Nation State to Europe?, is worth making.

Through a Glass Darkly: Looking at Conflict Prevention, Management, and Termination By Stephen J. Cimbala. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. 224p. \$65.00.

Joseph B. Underhill-Cady, Augsburg College

One test of a book is how well it weathers major developments in world events, and, as with the end of the Cold War, the beginning of the new war on terrorism presents recent publications in international or military affairs with the danger of untimely relegation to the trash bin of history. After September 11, as we scramble to adjust and make sense of the "hunt for Osama," Stephen Cimbala's work, however, remains a useful compendium of lessons from several recent wars, crises, and ongoing military challenges. Although the book is not as suddenly relevant as Samuel Huntington's (1998) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order or Chalmers Johnson's (2001) Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire, the wisdom distilled within it is sound enough to apply equally well to the pre- and post-September 11 worlds. It is largely rooted in frameworks developed for studying the Cold War and superpower arms races, but Cimbala's examination of the new realities of military strategy and technology still has much to say about the war being waged in Afghanistan and the campaigns that are likely to follow.

Despite its poetic title, Through a Glass Darkly is a fairly prosaic treatment of six cases of U.S. military crisis or warfare, from the Cuban Missile Crisis up through the NATO campaign in Kosovo and challenges of information warfare, with concluding remarks on lessons learned for U.S. conflict management practices. Its primary audience is security studies scholars and graduate students, and those otherwise not needing to be told what "C4ISR" (Command, Control, Communication, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconaissance) stands for. That said, several of the cases (particularly the Cuban Missile Crisis and Gulf War) cover some well-trod ground, and Cimbala's treatment of them would be useful to students who are new to those cases. The author is sufficiently modest in his claims about the cases, forgoing any attempt at broad, scientific generalizations. To his credit, he is aware of the limitations of the study and does not promise more than he delivers. Behavioralists and those favoring large-n studies (or even structured, focused case studies) will have to look elsewhere. For very different reasons, postmodernists, feminists, and those interested in the discourse of war may get some mileage out of the book's occasional use of sexual metaphors or the use of terms like "peace wars" (see pp. xi, 141, 170).

The central theme of Cimbala's reflections is the recognition and emphasis on the human and subjective elements of warfare-what Clausewitz called the "friction" of war. He explores the impact of changes in technology and increased sophistication of military hardware, while recognizing the imperfections that remain in the humans behind the machines. For someone so thoroughly versed in the technology and "bombs and rockets," this focus is both unexpected and admirable. He offers some persuasive arguments about the challenges of and need for seeing the world through others' eyes, and the dangers of an excessive optimism about the wonders of technology and of human ability to control that technology. This theme is illustrated through an extensive and in-depth investigation of his three past cases—the Cuban Missile Crisis, the tensions of 1983-84, and the Gulf Warand three current or future challenges-nuclear weapons and information warfare, nuclear proliferation, and military operations other than war (this last topic being of particular interest of late). The data used in analyzing them consists of a thorough reading of recent literature on the topic, some interviews, and a scattering of primary documents, but not an extensive new set of data; these are accompanied by some very useful tables that summarize and categorize such things as the survivable nuclear forces during the Cuban Missile Crisis (p. 11), targeting objectives during Desert Storm (p. 63), and a typology of different weapons and conflict types in the post-Cold War era (pp. 184-85).

The framework developed for looking at these cases, however, does not add much to our understanding of them. He groups the cases together into three categories—the conflict management, prevention, and termination of the book's subtitle—with one past case and one present or future case of each. The definitions offered for each of these three kinds of cases are useful enough, but they do not apply very elegantly to the cases picked, and the pairs of cases are poorly matched. For instance, the conceptual linkage between Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) deployments in Europe and nuclear proliferation is weak at best (vertical and horizontal proliferation being very different animals); and it is unclear what lessons for peacekeeping missions might be derived from studying the success of bombing in the Gulf War. As he notes in the introduction (p. xi), one reason he picked these cases was just his interest in them, and that appears to have been the overriding factor.

As an example of work in security studies, Through a Glass Darkly frames the problems of conflict prevention or management as strictly military matters, and takes as unproblematic the goals pursued by the United States. The lack of attention to the range of underlying cultural, economic, or political sources of these conflicts, or to the ways in which U.S. foreign policy may be contributing to instability and provoking attacks, renders the treatment somewhat akin to trying to prevent house fires by installing more smoke detectors and fire extinguishers (laudable moves), while ignoring the potential problem with taunting or selling gasoline to the deranged pyromaniac next door. These studies take for granted the foreign policy goals of the United States and focus simply on how to achieve those goals, without examining the ways in which those goals might be problematic or counterproductive themselves. But security is too vague and slippery a term to leave unexamined, particularly when the U.S. military is in a position of such military dominance in the world.

But despite the fact that the book brackets this larger international political context and that there is not much that is startlingly new in the book, there is a healthy dose of venerable and well-supported pieces of wisdom regarding military affairs that bears repeating. With the bold cries for eradicating evil from the face of the earth and the increasingly technological nature of the "war on terrorism," reminders of the problems of hubris, ethnocentrism, and the general foibles and limitations of the human animal are both very timely and very welcome.

Learning to Manage Global Environmental Risks, vols. 1 & 2
By The Social Learning Group. Edited by William C.
Clark, Nancy Dickson, Jill Jäger, and Josee van Eijndhoven.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. Vol. 1: \$75.00 cloth,
\$30.00 paper. Vol. 2: \$60.00 cloth, \$27.00 paper.

Elizabeth R. DeSombre, Wellesley College

I have a colleague who collects maps of Africa that demonstrate a specific phenomenon: the developed world's unlearning of African geography. Across the centuries, the maps seem to show that mapmakers know less about the geography of the African continent—particularly the internal parts—than previously was the case. Rivers change direction; mountain ranges disappear. This unlearning, my colleague argues, comes from notions about the acceptability of sources of information previously used. These maps show the social nature of "learning," the idea that while in many cases there may be actual answers (after all, African geography exists), what information you look for, and from whom, determines how you will view the information you get, and ultimately what you will do with it.

Like geography, there may be a "right" answer to some of the world's atmospheric problems, but how these issues are defined, by whom, and when and where, has important impacts on how they are viewed and addressed. The ambitious project underlying these two volumes (with 37 contributing authors and countless research assistants and reviewers) attempts to examine the way countries of the world have evaluated, and responded to, environmental risks. "The Social Learning Group," as the authors collectively call themselves, do so by examining the responses of nine countries, the European Union, and international environmental organizations to three problems of atmospheric pollution: transboundary acid rain, stratospheric ozone depletion, and global climate change. The first volume, A Comparative History of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and Acid Rain, focuses primarily on country (and institution) case studies. The second volume, A Functional Analysis of Social Responses to Climate Change, Ozone Depletion, and Acid Rain, examines materials from across the countries and issues by what the authors call "risk management functions." The time frame within which they examine these issues, actors, and functions is chosen to be the 35 years between the International Geophysical Year in 1957 and the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992. Their aim is nothing less than a "long-term, large-scale, multinational perspective on global environmental management" (p. 3). In many ways they succeed.

There are multiple ways the authors could have organized the information presented here, and one of the most important aspects of this project may be what is not reported. So much work, for so many years, went into gathering systematic data for this study that the archives, stored at Harvard University, are likely to be invaluable to future generations of dissertation writers. Impelled perhaps by publishing necessity or the attention spans of potential readers, the authors and editors have had to seriously simplify the presentation of materials, and have taken only two passes of what could have been many through the information (by country and by function). By doing so they have demonstrated precisely what their volumes overall argue: How information is presented influences what you can do with it.

The first volume is organized by the responses of the countries examined—Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, the USSR, Hungary, Japan, Mexico, Canada, and the United States (along with the European Union and general international environmental institutions)—to the three environmental risks explored. This structure has both advantages and disadvantages. The country-by-country presentation becomes quickly repetitive. Precisely because of the learning that takes place across borders, the same information is presented as relevant to the decision processes of multiple countries, and it, along with the relevant acronyms and time lines, is discussed as if from scratch in each chapter. At the same time, the country-specific focus makes it easy to lose sight of the international or cross-border influences that are likely having an impact, since the information is presented from the perspective of the actors within a given country. Moreover, the chapters are structured to cover similar ground in a similar order, with the emphasis on the term similar; those hoping to skim through the chapters to find the information of most interest to them will have to look in slightly different locations in different chapters, and will find that some chapters cover some factors (the role of political structure, for instance) that others do not.

Nevertheless, some important ground is covered in these presentations. One of the most interesting approaches (demonstrating again both slight differences in implementation across chapters and vast quantities of work underlying seemingly simple presentations) involves graphs of the

attention given to environmental issues by national media. political decision makers, and scientific researchers. These can be used to explore the attention given within countries to an issue over time, and the relationship between scientific concern and popular attention. This approach is also used across countries (in Chapter 14, which draws conclusions from the preceding country chapters) to show what is often an eventual confluence of attention to a given issue, with climate change showing the greatest degree of simultaneity of awareness among the countries studied. This cross-cutting analysis also demonstrates that no one country of the group was the temporal or behavioral leader on all three issues examined. The comparisons also suggest that while countries may be addressing the same issue conceptually—acid rain, for example—on the international level, they do so by focusing on specifically local aspects of it in their domestic politics lake acidification in Scandinavia and eastern North America, forest dieback in Germany, the Netherlands, and Hungary. Act globally, frame locally.

Occasionally frustrating in the country presentations is what is hinted at in the data but not covered in the analysis or sufficiently discussed in all cases to independently evaluate. The role of the Netherlands as a small country with an open economy is suggested as being important for its approaches, but there is no systematic way to examine either of those variables. Accidents and governmental structures are mentioned in various chapters as playing a role in what countries do, but again, not explored across cases. One of the most interesting stories that repeatedly crops up is the difficulty encountered by antinuclear environmental organizations when faced with decisions about responding to certain environmental problems (acid rain or climate change) for which nuclear power could be a logical solution. This, as well, does not fit nicely into the set of variables examined in the country analysis. What gets lost most in the analysis tends to be the politics: who gains or loses most from different approaches to addressing the issue, who decides what decisions are made.

The second volume explores different functional aspects of responding to risks; it cuts across cases and countries to look at risk assessment, monitoring, option assessment, goal and strategy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. In most of these chapters, the primary findings are presented through stories—of how the "solution" of banning chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) use in aerosol spray cans was implemented first in the United States and then elsewhere, of how an initial focus on sulfur dioxide as the cause of acid rain eventually broadened to include other substances. Important general lessons are drawn as well. Risk assessments focus much more on emissions and concentrations of pollutants than on other aspects, though most chapters aspired to focus on end-toend assessments. These, as with some other functions, tend to be "sticky"; examining the role of carbon dioxide initially in climate risk assessments influences the likelihood that carbon dioxide will be the only gas considered when evaluating the risks associated with climate change (note that most models discuss the risks associated with a doubling of atmospheric carbon). Risk assessments also tend to progress from simple to more complex over time.

Monitoring often originates for purposes, largely scientific, prior to its being demanded for political processes. Information gathered from this process can have a huge impact on political decisions—witness Germany's conversion to being a supporter of acid rain controls after discovering its own forest dieback, and the international community's willingness to act on ozone depletion after the discovery of the Antarctic ozone "hole." More monitoring is done on the scientific aspects of the environmental problem than on impacts of it. Option assessment, the process of exploring the possible activities that

can be taken as a response to the environmental problem, focuses much more on reducing emissions than on adaptation activities or environmental modification. Formulation of goals and strategies across issues move within the time frame of the issue from capacity building to pollution reduction, and come to focus more on economic-based solutions (such as taxes or tradable emissions permits) in real time, such that issues addressed later are more likely to feature these types of solutions as goals. Implementation follows from the goals set in moving from building capacity to reducing emissions, and also shows an increasing emphasis on the use and strengthening of international institutions. Finally, the authors suggest that evaluation—of the process of addressing the environmental risk—is rarely done except as part of one of the other functions.

The social character of much of the learning is implicit but important. While it is true that rivers either flow one direction or the other and that carbon dioxide either does or does not have an impact on the global climate cycle, the actual "source" of the Nile depends upon how you define what the source of a river is. Likewise, our understanding of the role of global climate change may be about a doubling of carbon dioxide, about sea level rise, or about increased mean global temperature. These characterizations have everything to do with what we decide to look at, and what we define as part of the problem or part of the solution. With these volumes, our understanding of the geography of global atmospheric problems expands considerably.

Carrots, Sticks, and Ethnic Conflict: Rethinking Development Assistance Edited by Milton J. Esman and Ronald J. Herring. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 272p. \$49.50.

Stephen Ryan, University of Ulster

This excellent collection of essays takes the reader into a complex area: the relationship between economic development and ethnic conflict. It is such a tricky topic because there is consensus about neither what ethnicity is nor the contributions that economic factors make to the origins, dynamics, and resolution of ethnic strife. In fact the essays presented here steer clear of origins and resolution and focus instead on the less controversial area of how development policy impacts on the dynamics of ethnic conflicts. There is a great need for contributions in this area, because, as the introductory chapter by Herring and Esman notes, the international community is becoming more involved in humanitarian assistance and postviolence reconstruction initiatives in a number of protracted intercommunal conflicts. These include Bosnia, Kosovo, Israel and Palestine, Northern Ireland, and Lebanon. At the same time the increased awareness of ethnic conflict in the past decade has resulted in reassessments of what development means in a multicultural setting.

The volume is arranged into nine chapters. The contributors are all United States-based academics or analysts for aid agencies, and one is struck by the depth of knowledge that each brings to his/her respective area. At the core of the work are two chapters on the role of donor agencies (the World Bank and USAID) and five chapters that look at individual states. Perhaps the biggest strength of the volume are these detailed case studies of Kenya, Russia, and Ecuador and the two well-matched pieces on Sri Lanka. It is here that we learn how the grand theories of development economists and the political maneuvers of governments affect vulnerable people living in the real world.

The chapters on the donor organizations, by Gibson and McHugh, reach broadly similar conclusions. These are that

both the World Bank and USAID have attempted to pay more attention to the ethnic dimensions, but more could be done. In both organizations there is a tension between the ethnically aware fieldworkers and the policy makers back at headquarters. The result, at USAID, is a "curious failure to address ethnicity directly" (p. 69) and uncertainty about how to move forward in this area, while at the World Bank opinion is divided "between proponents of economic theory and those asserting the importance of qualitative social or cultural variables" (p. 43). However, disagreements are not just found in these organizations. Both writers point out that conflicts will also arise within ethnic groups in target areas about how to respond to development projects. This is a theme also taken up in Brysk's chapter on Ecuador. Here she identifies three responses to the liberalization strategies of the IMF: passive participation, political resistance, and the development of alternative economic strategies. This alerts us to the importance of intraethnic conflict and warns us not to engage in the reification of the ethnic group.

Most of the country-specific chapters show very well how development assistance can reinforce destructive ethnic interaction. Herring's analysis of the Sri Lankan conflict concentrates on the economic factors that contributed to the onset of the civil war in 1983. The chapter by Shenfield, on Russia, is perhaps the most dispiriting. He claims that the failure of development assistance to improve the dire economic circumstances of many Russians has resulted in a rise in support for extreme nationalist arguments that claim that Russia is being deliberately undermined by international aid agencies and a Jewish conspiracy. In addition, the rise of criminal gangs linked to groups in the Caucuses has resulted in a growing dislike and suspicion of minorities such as the Chechens. The final case study examines the adverse impact of IMF austerity programs on the Indian populations in Ecuador. A constant theme in these three chapters is the insecurity that can be produced by development programs.

The chapters by Cohen and Uphoff have slightly different emphases. Uphoff investigates the peacebuilding potential of development assistance through an analysis of the Gal Oya irrigation project in South East Sri Lanka. Cohen's chapter on Kenya, published posthumously, claims that those involved in aid-funded interventions have paid far closer attention to the ethnic dimension of their work than those who theorize about them at universities. He then backs up this claim by identifying projects in Kenya where those involved in the delivery of assistance consciously dealt with ethnic issues. One conclusion is that academics should spend less time trying to help aid workers understand the link between aid and ethnicity, for they already have a good grasp of this. Instead they should redirect their attention to the production of comparative case studies involving contributions from indigenous academics or expatriate field-workers that will produce more evidence enabling the development of guidelines to reduce negative

The concluding chapter by Esman, on the policy dimension of foreign aid, sets out some realistic guidelines for reducing the negative impact of aid. These include a greater sensitivity to the importance of context and a realization that one approach cannot fit all; a shift in the development assistance culture toward distributional and human rights themes; a priority on social peace rather than distributive justice; and ethnic conditionality on aid, with greater use of ethnic impact statements.

Interesting concepts such as "development diplomacy" (Ed Azar) and "ethnodevelopment" (Rudolpho Stavenhagen) are not addressed or tested in this volume, and this reviewer would have liked more on both the "peace through development" idea and the peacebuilding potential of foreign aid

discussed in the chapter by Uphoff. The role of NGOs, which are hardly mentioned in the case studies, might have been developed further. It is also a shame that although the editors seem to agree with Cohen's plea for detailed comparative studies leading to more effective policy guidelines, they were not able to meet his call for a stronger input from indigenous academics. There are chapters from representatives of the aid givers but not the aid receivers. However, these comments cannot take way from the quality of the work presented here. The book illuminates the ethnic dimensions of development assistance and shows how ignorance, indifference, and commercial and state interest can turn international projects into catalysts for ethnic conflict. Fortunately, it also offers some sound advice on how this can be avoided.

**Power and Conflict in the Age of Transparency** Edited by Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 371p. \$49.95.

Edward Comor, American University

According to editors Bernard I. Finel and Kristin M. Lord, "the puzzle for analysts of international affairs" in relation to transparency is not only how it has weakened states, "but also how it has strengthened them" (p. 2). Transparency, for them, is "a condition in which information about governmental preferences, intentions, and capabilities is made available either to the public or other outsiders" (p. 3). This apparently increasing openness is the outcome of, among other things, emerging communication and information technologies, the widespread adoption of democratic institutions, and the global reach of mass media organizations. Although transparency is "transforming international politics" (p. ix), it has been underassessed and, as such, Finel and Lord aim to examine "the phenomenon" in a "comprehensive way and assess its impact on world security and diplomacy" (p. 6).

The 11 chapters presented between the editors' "Introduction" and "Conclusion" (several of which have been published in some form elsewhere) generally follow these analytical parameters. Most begin with an empirical generalization. Authors then attempt to explain it through some kind of systematic analysis related to transparency. But the absence of a rigorous assessment of the concept itself—as conveyed, for example, in repeated references to transparency's ascendancy as a result of post—Cold War "trends"—and the positivist approach used by most of the contributors ultimately lead to frustrating roadblocks and limited results.

Setting the tone is a broad analysis by Ann Florini (Chapter 1). She portrays transparency in terms of the decline of states and sees global civil society as an increasingly central arbiter of information. In tune with the forward march of democratization and globalization (both apparently as inevitable as death and taxes), "the world is embracing new standards of conduct, enforced not by surveillance and coercion but by willful disclosure: regulation by revelation" (p. 17). Beyond the inherent (but here unrecognized) theoretical and empirical problems involved in treating state-civil society relations in terms of what amounts to an either/or framework, the chapter constitutes a largely descriptive presentation. Both the book's "Introduction" and this opening chapter leave the reader asking questions that emerge again in the pages that follow: Is transparency itself a concept (or phenomenon) worthy of this much attention and, if it is, what are the complex dynamics and processes shaping its trajectory and implications?

Following Florini, Robert Jervis's 1985 piece "From Balance to Concert" is revived. Kenneth A. Schultz follows with a chapter on the impact of transparency on international

crisis bargaining (Chapter 3). In Chapter 4, Jeffery Ritter assesses the diplomatic capabilities of democracies in light of transparency. These three focus on nation-state relations with little or no sociological nuance. A similarly limited analysis is found in Ronald Mitchell's "Sources of Transparency" (Chapter 7). It reiterates and expands upon trends promoting transparency and takes a particular interest in its implications for regime rules and effectiveness.

Such chapters are remarkable in that their theoretical and empirical limitations underline the fact that transparency, if it is to be taken as seriously as "global civil society," "global governance," and other such emerging concepts, cries out for analyses that venture significantly beyond the confines of neorealist assumptions and positivist models. Dealing with transparency in these terms is tantamount to assessing the cultural implications of international trade using a neoclassical economics perspective alone.

Some relief is provided in Douglas A. Van Belle's provocative chapter "Press Freedom and Peace" (Chapter 5). Van Belle assesses why press freedom is more strongly correlated with the absence of war than the latter is with the presence of democracy. Structural conditions, such as the commercial free press's penchant for entertainment and relatively sociological constructs like "legitimacy," are featured in the discussion. While helpful, these remain undertheorized and, as such (and as Van Belle himself puts it), his chapter "tends to generate more questions than answers" (p. 131).

Still more questions emerge in the chapter that follows by Finel and Lord (Chapter 7). Through case studies, they raise doubts in response to some of the more optimistic evaluations in the book. "It is possible," they write, "that both very high transparency, because it accurately signals intentions, and very low transparency, because it prevents the 'noise' of domestic politics from overwhelming diplomatic signals, allow states to diffuse crises. If accurate, only moderate transparency would exacerbate crises, because it would allow enough information to confuse the opponent, but not enough to clarify peaceful intentions" (p. 167). Again, the narrowness of the analytical worldview used to assess transparency delimits what can be revealed. The result is more ambiguity than precise elaboration. To their credit, Finel and Lord understand that in relation to particular issues "an unfortunate methodological gap between the most plausible explanations... and our ability to examine convincingly the causal processes" is present (p. 168). Indeed, the gap in question is more fundamentally an epistemological one, and recognizing this compels the reader to ask the editors why a more ambitious effort was not made to assess transparency's implications on interstate relations through supplemental critical and interpretative approaches.

Chapter 9, "Transparency and the News Media," by Steven Livingston, delineates three types of transparency domestic, imposed, and systemic—and through these he argues convincingly that media effect transparency in different ways in different contexts. Chapter 8, by John C. Barker and Ray A. Williamson, provides a detailed overview of commercial satellite developments and, importantly, raises the issue of information's credibility (also addressed by Schultz, Ritter, and the editors). Clifford Bob's contribution (Chapter 10) provides still more nuance in asking, in effect, how information is related to what is known. Here, more than in any other chapter, structural factors are carefully assessed. Complementing Livingston's contribution, Bob demonstrates that information is produced and distributed in the context of historically produced (and power-laden) structures that, almost invisibly, influence what information is made available and to whom. Perhaps in response to some of the book's other authors, Bob concludes with the following observation: "While for simplicity's sake, analysts may seek to understand the role of transparency in the dyadic relationship between two state opponents, a more comprehensive and accurate understanding is likely to be gained by expanding the conceptual and empirical scope. . . . Doing so also makes clear that transparency and the broader concepts of visibility and fit are not static, but dynamic and contested concepts in every conflict" (p. 308).

The final chapter in the collection is by James N. Rosenau. It is the most thought provoking and, perhaps not coincidentally, one of the least focused on transparency itself. Using his now-familiar concept "fragmegration," Rosenau treats transparency as more than just another variable and raises questions involving the affects (rather than straightforward effects) of information flows in shaping what different people think at different times and in different places.

In their "Conclusion," Finel and Lord write that "transparency is a complicated matter that rarely either harms or improves international security in any single, unequivocal way" (p. 339). Indeed, very few claims are made as a result of the preceding chapters. Two exceptions, however, are revealing. One is the effects of communications technologies and mass media on the timescales used to make decisions. As a result of instantaneous transnational information flows, "policies are likely to be examined in less depth and probably by a smaller group of participants. The participants may also filter incoming information to support previously held beliefs and rely heavily on cognitive shortcuts, the improper use of analogies, and unexamined assumptions, which can lead to misperception and faulty judgments" (p. 348). Another is the importance of "skills" in the task of comprehending and utilizing "information wisely" (p. 351).

When this book reaches such conclusions in light of its analytical limitations, the difficulty (if not impossibility) of assessing transparency's implications without a far more theoretical, sociological, and, indeed, epistemologically diverse inquiry becomes all too clear. Questions concerning forces and processes rather than relatively ahistorical trends, the complex implications of structures, standards of "legitimacy" and 'credibility," the cultural (and even psychic) implications of rapidly changing time frames, and others raised in relative isolation need to be interconnected and fleshed out, and a more challenging research agenda suggested. Subjects directly relevant to the editors' mandate, but conspicuously absent here, include transparency's implications in relation to what communication theorists call "hegemonic framing," the potentials of what some critical scholars refer to as "the Panoptic gaze," and broader questions concerning power as more than just a reflection of state and/or civil society resources.

One has little doubt that many will find this collection to be helpful and interesting—it certainly has its moments. But those who recognize transparency to be a concept requiring some comprehension of the historical and sociological processes through which information shapes knowledge will be disappointed. Bold steps are needed in response to the big questions raised in this book. Sadly, only a few of its contributors begin the task of formulating a truly comprehensive response.

**Governing the Internet: The Emergence of an International Regime** By Marcus Franda. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 2001. 255p. \$49.95.

Bernard I. Finel, Georgetown University

For many people, the Internet is simply a mass of information that arrives on their desktop through the miracle of e-mail or web browsers. The existence of reasonably efficient and intuitive interfaces, however, serves to mask the incredible complexity inherent in the establishment, growth, and maintenance of a global tangle of computer networks administered by a variety of universities, private corporations, governments, and individuals.

In this impressive new book, Marcus Franda seeks to shed light on the emergence of a governance structure for the Internet by examining the process in light of Oran Young's multistage framework for understanding the development of international regimes (p. 20). He looks at governance in terms of the management of the technical side of the Internet, but in separate chapters he also examines the development of frameworks for e-commerce, intellectual property, international law, and international security. There are a number of importance conceptual puzzles in this topic. First, the subject has implications for theories of international cooperation. Scholars have largely focused on the sources of state cooperation, although some recent work has focused on the rise of transnational activist networks (Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders, 1998). There is a lack of theorizing about cooperation across level of analysis among states, individuals, and organizations—perhaps because of the daunting conceptual problems of theorizing about the collective behavior of such dissimilar actors. Second, the question of Internet governance is intriguing because it crosses various usually distinct policy issues areas, namely, technology, politics, security, law, business, and economics. There is extensive conceptual work about how cooperation evolves in each of these areas, but relatively less about how actors can develop cooperative frameworks that bridge these different sets of issues. Finally, the growth of the Internet raises important issues about the devolution of state power onto nongovernmental organizations—a trend noted but rarely fully explained in the globalization literature. Although the backbone of the Internet was created by the U.S. government, by the 1990s it had become U.S. government policy to surrender most of its regulatory authority to various nongovernmental organizations and committees. This commitment to devolution remained strong even after the massive commercial and political potential of the Internet became evident—indeed, it was in part the rapid growth of the Internet that prompted the U.S. government to shed its responsibilities. How do we explain this dynamic? This is especially interesting given that, in many countries around the world, governments try to control the Internet—not only authoritarian states such as China, but Western democracies such as France. What are the causes of these variances?

Franda's work is suggestive about some of these issues but. unfortunately, fails to address many of them explicitly. The book is largely descriptive. Franda tells a very complicated story as coherently as possible. This is an impressive accomplishment for a topic that requires an appendix with a full four and a half pages of acronyms, from the ABA (American Bar Association) to XML (Extensible Markup Language) (pp. 217-21). Still, there are places in which Franda seems to be writing in shorthand. For instance, his comments about the "DNS wars" of the 1990s are probably meaningful only to readers with detailed knowledge of the case (pp. 57-9). The problem with the narrative is not the lack of the detail; rather it is the overabundance of details. Franda describes literally dozens of initiatives in which proposals were put forward only to be defeated by affected stakeholders leading to compromises and new initiatives. Consider, for instance. his discussion about unsuccessful efforts of the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) to develop a new governance structure for the Internet (pp. 50-51). Franda is trying to paint a picture of a dynamic process in which agenda formation is a distinct and prior step to negotiation, but with the exception of some comments at the beginning and end

of chapters he rarely makes those conceptual points clearly, nor does he explain their significance to the development of regime theory. Indeed, in some cases, Franda acknowledges that his framework is largely irrelevant: "When one goes beyond the technical and commercial components of these early years of the Internet's evolution, however, one encounters a number of elements that are not yet fully within the scope of even rudimentary international regime arrangements" (p. 145). These areas include important issues such as the relation of cyberspace to international law, privacy issues, and regulations on content (pp. 145–46).

Significantly, Franda's conceptual framework is ill equipped to illuminate the most interesting aspects of the case. Though he relies heavily on Young's argument that regimes develop by stages—agenda formation, negotiation, and operationalization—Franda's work does not constitute a rigorous test of the framework, although the development of a governance structure for the Internet does seem to follow the stages described by Young. The lack of discussion of evaluative criteria and alternative explanations precludes this book from the claim of theory testing. Young's framework is, more than anything else, a loose organization device. Franda does not seem particularly interested in regime theory in any case, and the discussion of it seems tacked on. This book is largely descriptive, even if what is described is a uniquely interesting case.

Despite the lack of conceptual innovation, this book will be of interest to social scientists, especially those interested in technology policy. Franda's description of the way in which individuals and organizations maneuvered provides wonderful examples of the dynamics of agenda formation. His presentation is particularly interesting because of the role of several individuals who served as policy entrepreneurs and were empowered by their command over some of the technical details of how the Internet functions. It is quite amazing to realize that as recently as 1998, important policy decisions could be affected by essentially free agents, unaffiliated with any particularly powerful stakeholder. The picture one gets is less of the rise of an epistemic community but, rather, the way in which control over information can empower individual actors on complex technological issues or, theoretically, on any issue where there is a quasi-monopoly on information.

Franda's book provides fewer insights into Young's second and third stages. His discussion of various negotiations is cursory, limited to discussions of initial positions and ultimate agreements. Many of the negotiations Franda discusses required consensus to be successful, but Franda rarely provides us with enough details to see how consensus evolved. His discussion of the operationalization phase is similarly limited, although here Franda is at the mercy of publication deadlines and the fact that many issues were still unresolved at the time the book went to press (and remain unresolved today). Given how quickly Internet governance has evolved over the past several years, Franda could do little more than report on recent developments. His lack of discussion of whether the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), for instance, has been able to function as expected is understandable.

Franda also fails to discuss what seems to be one of the major puzzles of the case, namely, why the U.S. government sought to devolve control over the Internet to nongovernmental actors. Franda hints that the high costs of governance were part of the reason, but for the most part he simply states that U.S. policy was to support the development of an independent governance structure. Given the government's initial and continued investment, this seems curious. Furthermore, the willingness of the U.S. government to support essentially a preferential commercial regime—particularly with regard

to the issue of sales taxes-for Internet commerce is puzzling. Franda does not explain the sources of U.S. government preferences or how they are different from the preferences of other governments—this is an issue if we hope to draw larger conclusions from the case. Franda notes, "An indication of the unique U.S. legislative environment on international taxation of the Internet was the October 1999 vote in the House of Representatives (423-1) in support for a resolution calling for the Clinton administration to seek a permanent moratorium on international e-commerce tariffs at WTO meetings" (p. 95). Was this resolution the result of well-placed policy entrepreneurs such as Al Gore? What was the role of various stakeholders in affecting government policy, including people such as Microsoft founder Bill Gates? How important were emerging norms of openness and transparency in supporting a hands-off posture? These are all crucial issues given the U.S. government's unique position vis-à-vis the Internet, but these concerns are largely outside of Franda's

With the "dot com meltdown" it is tempting to dismiss the importance of the Internet. However, its role in allowing information flows and, ultimately, its contribution to global commerce will undoubtedly make the Internet a continuing area of interest in the future. Marcus Franda's examination of the rise of an Internet governance regime is an interesting contribution to what is ultimately likely to be a voluminous literature. He should be commended for tackling an important issue, and for his clear exposition of an incredibly complex process. Unfortunately, Franda's focus on details at the expense of conceptual innovation or in-depth analysis limits the importance of this volume for most social scientists. For scholars working on issues related to the public policy of information technology, this book is a useful resource, albeit one that is rapidly aging. For the rest of the scholarly community, the definitive book on the conceptual issues related to Internet governance remains to be written.

The Environment, International Relations, and U.S. Foreign Policy Edited by Paul G. Harris. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 276p. \$65.00.

Adil Najam, Boston University

The basic premise of Paul Harris's edited volume is that "understanding U.S. international environmental policy is central to the entire project of global environmental protection" because the United States is the "world's largest polluter [as well as] the world's wealthiest country" (p. 4). To argue that the United States is disproportionately important to international environmental policy (or to international policy on most other issues) is an important, but relatively uncontroversial, case to make; and it is made rather well throughout the chapters in this book.

This volume is the result of an extended project on environmental change and foreign policy and follows at the heels of a companion volume that looked specifically at U.S. foreign policy on climate change. Unlike its predecessor, this volume is not focused on a particular issue and is more interested in drawing general lessons about U.S. environmental foreign policy. Its chapters can be divided into two distinct streams. One set of chapters—including those by Braden Allenby, Jon Barnett, Douglas Blum, and Harris—deal with the still contentious but vibrant area of environment and security. A second stream, based on case studies, highlight the roles played by various stakeholders in the U.S. environmental foreign policy process. This set includes chapters by Srini Sitaraman, John Barkdull, Robert Falkner, Morten Boas, Elizabeth DeSombre and Kristen Fletcher.

Between the two, the book provides a rich array of ideas and case evidence that will add to our understanding of U.S. foreign policy on the environment. Among the two, however, there is less than perfect coherence, in that the case studies do not seem to place the discussion on environmental security at the same level of centrality to the actual practice of U.S. foreign policy as the chapters in the first stream would suggest. For example, Barnett's suggestion that "the concept of environmental security is now integral to the environmental diplomacy of the United States" (p. 68) seems not to be borne out by the various case studies of U.S. environmental diplomacy presented elsewhere in the book. The case made in the various chapters (particularly those by Allenby, Barnett, and Harris) for changing the way we look at the issue of environment and security is certainly appealing at a normative level, but may not be terribly useful at the pragmatic level. Indeed, other chapters in the book (especially Sitaraman and Falkner on the ozone regime, Barkdull on the role of the executive branch on ocean issues, and DeSombre on environmental sanctions) seem to suggest that meaningful advancement in terms of environmental foreign policy can be made without necessarily "securitizing" the issue.

The case chapters on how domestic and international concerns are intertwined in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy provide a rich and textured discussion of the various actors involved in the process. These chapters—in particular, the discussions on the pivotal role that the executive branch plays in international environmental policy and on the role of environmental sanctions—make significant new contributions to our understanding of what the "sausage factory" looks like from the inside. The major contribution of the book is that it depicts the much-commented-upon "messiness" of U.S. foreign policy, particularly as it relates to the environment, rather vividly. As the editor points out in his introduction: "Perhaps the foremost among the conclusions of this volume is this: the highly pluralistic nature of U.S. foreign policymaking results in an inevitably large number of players, ranging from individuals to businesses to nongovernmental organizations. The number of local, state (i.e., U.S. 'states'), regional, national and international stakeholders involved in these issues is vast" (p. 35). But, Harris continues, "the number of actors is not the end of it; the U.S. Constitution created a contentious, multibranch government that does not resolve issues quickly, smoothly or easily. This convoluted democratic system is compounded by the number and complexity of the problems themselves. Thus foreign policy that emanates from Washington is almost inevitably unsatisfactory to all those involved" (p. 35).

It should be noted, however, that recognizing the complexity of the U.S. foreign policy process must not be confused with assuming that it is necessarily more complex than foreign policy processes elsewhere. While the U.S. environmental foreign policy process exhibits interesting peculiarities, U.S. peculiarities need not be any more peculiar than those of other states. Indeed, this volume does not seek to make that case. However, the point needs to be made simply because such a misunderstanding can be too easily construed from the book.

Which Lessons Matter?: American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979–1987 By Christopher R. Hemmer. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2000. 217p. \$17.95 cloth, \$55.50 paper.

William B. Quandt, University of Virginia

At least since Ernest May's influential (1973) 'Lessons' of the Past, students of American foreign policy have been conscious of the powerful hold that some analogies seem to

have on the minds of decision makers. All of us can think of "Munich" and "Vietnam" as shorthand for a whole series of judgments that we rely on to work through the maze of foreign policy calculus. In the aftermath of the World Trade Center attack in September 2001, we heard reference to "Pearl Harbor." And we can now anticipate that "9-11" will take its place as a marker for a set of lessons concerning the struggle against terrorism.

As Christopher Hemmer reminds us in this useful book, analogies are relied upon by decision makers for understandable reasons. They need reference points from the past as they confront an uncertain future. But analytically, there is a problem: How much explanatory weight can one give to the role of analogies? And, as Hemmer asks, "which ones matter?" After all, there is an infinite repertoire of so-called lessons from the past. And we know, at least anecdotally, that those who make policy are likely to dress up the untidy process of decision making by evoking important-sounding "lessons of history," even when these are little more than post facto rationalizations for actions taken.

Hemmer's approach to answering these questions is twofold. First, he provides a framework for thinking about the role of analogical reasoning in the policy process. Second, he develops two case studies in depth, Carter's response to the hostage crisis in Iran and Reagan's handling of a similar crisis a few years later, the "Iran-Contra" affair.

Hemmer sees analogical reasoning as a complement, not an alternative, to realist notions of strategic reasoning. As he correctly points out, a rational strategist will have no trouble identifying why the United States should react to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iraq, for example, but will still not know precisely which of several plausible strategies is best suited to the specific situation: "[W]hile most policy makers often know what interests they want to promote, they often do not know what specific policy will further those interests, so they turn to historical analogies for crucial information concerning what policy will best advance their interests" (p. 15). That judgment requires some degree of reasoning involving "lessons" of history. My own research on the Gulf crisis of 1990-91 suggests that the "Korean analogy"-be careful of expanding goals in the midst of a war—and "Lebanon"—be careful of the fragmentation of the country-were both consciously discussed by President Bush and his closest advisers. One cannot understand the American decision to stop short of overthrowing Saddam's regime without understanding the role of these lessons.

An important contribution of Hemmer is that he does not treat decision makers as passive victims of the analogies they carry in their heads. Instead, he sees them as actively analyzing the relevance of different lessons from the past. They tend to look first at recent history; they weigh the relative international and domestic consequences of a crisis as they look for appropriate guidelines; and they look for causal similarities. By attributing to analogies a role in structuring the definition of interests, Hemmer places himself in the constructivist camp within the international relations brotherhood.

Turning to the case studies, Hemmer finds that Carter and his colleagues consciously considered a wide range of historical precedents as they struggled to find a way to end the hostage crisis. Several examples of successful negotiations competed with more muscular examples of rescue attempts. Over the months of the crisis, the debate moved from one to another, and then back to negotiations. The result was not elegant, although the hostages were eventually released, but Hemmer's case does show the extent to which policy was informed by a conscious use of analogical reasoning.

The Reagan case is different, at least in Hemmer's telling. Although there was some attempt after the embarrassing

revelations of the arms for hostages dealings to dress up the policy as comparable to Nixon's opening to China, the record shows that Reagan was primarily driven by another preoccupation—not being crippled by the hostage crisis as Carter had been. His "use of history" largely focused on the domestic consequences for Carter of struggling with the hostage issue. He was determined not to let Carter's fate befall him, and so he sought a quick resolution to the crisis by offering arms in exchange for the release of the hostages. A bit more thought by the president and has inner circle might have led them to realize that they were inadvertently providing an incentive for more hostage taking, but that lesson was apparently not seen at the time.

I find the theoretical and empirical contributions of Hemmer's book to be quite impressive. He writes clearly, has done his homework on the cases, and makes a modest contribution toward constructivist thinking in foreign policy analysis. I have used the book in an advanced course on foreign policy, and students find it accessible and generally convincing. The book ends with some suggestions for further research, and it will be interesting to see where Hemmer goes next. Based on his debut, his future work will be worth waiting for.

Differential Europe: The European Union Impact on National Policymaking By Adrienne Héritier, Dieter Kerwer, Christoph Knill, Dirk Lehmkuhl, Michael Teutsch, and Anne-Cécile Douillet. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 368p. \$75.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

James A. Dunn, Jr., Rutgers University, Camden

National-level policy outcomes produced by European Union—level directives and regulations are much more diverse across member states than one might expect. This is especially true for those undramatic but complex policy areas that lack the salience of high-level negotiations and treaty signings. Adrienne Héritier and her five coauthors investigate the phenomenon of differential national responses to European policymaking in two transportation policy subareas across five states. They focus on the deregulation of road haulage (trucking) and the reform of publicly owned railways in the UK, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy. This allows them to show just how widely national policy outcomes can vary and still be generally in line with European Union (EU) requirements.

The authors point out that EU policies in road haulage and railroads aim at "market making" on the European level, that is, the reduction or abolition of previous national state interventions in order to allow market forces to deal with a problem. This represents an attempt to roll back the frontiers of the (interventionist) state. In principle, all stakeholders stand to benefit from the efficiency gains that can be achieved. In practice, of course, there are numerous conflicts over the distribution of costs and benefits.

The most crucial aspect of establishing a single European transport market in road haulage was the introduction of "cabotage," the authorization of nonresident trucking firms to operate in foreign domestic markets. Thus, a Dutch trucking firm can now haul goods not just between Amsterdam and Paris but also between Lyon and Marseille, under the same regulatory conditions as a French firm. Even so, national policy responses have been markedly different. Cabotage and EU-level policies produced more deregulatory reform in the Netherlands, but resulted in significant new social reregulatory efforts in France, and increased economic interventionism in Italy.

In railway reform, the deregulatory thrust of EU-level policy directives was very cautious. It only required more

financial transparency for state subsidies and separate accounting systems for investments in rail infrastructure, as well as for subsidies for train operations. This was just the beginning of a process aimed at reducing the deeply imbedded territorial monopolies of the continent's nationalized railroads. The end of the process in the far future might see a private German rail company operate its trains from Frankfurt into Paris on the same financial basis as French trains. Here, too, actual policy outcomes have differed widely. The UK's dismemberment and privatization of British Railways into a for-profit company that owned the tracks and a separate group of private companies that operated the trains went far beyond EU requirements. Carried out under Prime Minister John Major, it was driven by a Thatcher-era ideology of free market capitalism, and directives from Brussels played no role in motivating it or shaping its provisions.

By contrast, French politicians and interest groups denounced "liberal" interference by Brussels and stoutly resisted modest efforts to begin the "reform" of the Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Français (SNCF). They cited the ideology of "public service," which provided for rail service to remote regions, helped balance traffic via rail, road, and air, and justified the tradition of generous wages and pensions paid to the unionized cheminots as helping to raise the standards for the rest of the working class. Ironically, the unions were always ready to strike and deprive the public of its rail service until they got what they needed from the government. French rail policy makers and SNCF officials complied minimally with EU directives by creating a new state-owned company, Réseau Ferré de France, giving it legal responsibility for the rail infrastructure and financial responsibility for the multibillion dollar debt of the SNCF. But little has changed operationally. And as far as German trains pulling into Paris is concerned, the word still seems to be: "They shall not pass!"

One of the great strengths of this book is the systematic and focused approach to its subject. Such discipline is unusual in a book with six coauthors and five country chapters. Héritier and her colleagues review the major theoretical approaches to European integration and policymaking. They develop a common analytic framework of explanatory variables and apply it to each country chapter. They draw sound and well-supported comparative and theoretical conclusions on the basis of their framework and the evidence developed in the country chapters. The combination of their methodical approach, a somewhat ponderous writing style, and a high level of assumed background knowledge will make this book most useful to advanced graduate students and specialists in European integration and European transport policy.

Finally, one can say that the tight, disciplined focus of the authors is in a sense also a weakness, or at least a source of some frustration for readers familiar with the European transport policy scene. One sometimes gets the sense of missing important parts of the forest in order to examine a few selected trees very, very closely. For example, in their discussion of French rail policy in the 1970s and 1980s, the authors do not even mention le train à grande vitesse (TGV)—the word does not even appear in the chapter. Yet it was the much-vaunted success of high-speed rail as both a transportation mode and an export product (TGV technology was sold to nations as diverse as Taiwan and the United States) that enabled the SNCF to weather the domestic financial and political storms of the 1990s. And it was the barely concealed rivalry between the French public/private industrial complex backing TGV technology and the German groups pushing the InterCity Express (ICE) steel-wheel-on-steel-rail fast trains, as well as the Transrapid magnetic levitation technology, that fueled insider gossip and speculation at transport meetings in Brussels, Bonn, and Paris in those years.

Of course, no single book could cover every important aspect of transportation politics and policymaking at the European and national levels. Within its self-imposed limits, this study admirably achieves its goal of demonstrating that diversity remains alive and well in European nations' transport policies, despite the hopes (and fears) that many have concerning EU-level policymaking.

The Armies of East Asia: China, Taiwan, Japan and the Koreas By Dennis Van Vranken Hickey. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 280p. \$55.00.

Mary P. Callahan, University of Washington

This book is a detailed study of recent changes in security threats and defense forces in China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, and North Korea. The author argues that East Asia is in the midst of an arms race "of unprecedented scale" (p. 231). The major threats ("flashpoints") in the region are the tensions between North and South Korea, the conflict between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China over the future of Taiwan, and the competing claims to oil and other natural resources in the South China Sea. The range and character of these threats have not changed appreciatively in recent years, but what has changed are capabilities of militaries to project power, threaten neighbors, and destabilize the region.

Culling his data from an impressive range of primary and secondary English-language sources and from a handful of interviews, Hickey shows how the five countries rethought and reequipped their defense establishments in the 1980s and the 1990s, largely according to the way they perceived shifts in the balance of military, economic and political power in the region. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as a nearly unrivaled hegemon, each East Asian country under review bought new weapons systems, courted new allies and redefined old alliances, and increased high-technology warfare capabilities. While Hickey notes that it "would be a gross exaggeration to claim that the smell of war is in the air," he nonetheless argues persuasively that the region is "more insecure as it enters the new millennium" (p. 239).

The book's title is misleading, as Hickey's findings are less about the armies of East Asia than the regional arms race(s) and sources of instability. Because his concern throughout is that U.S. policymakers recognize both the subtle and the major shifts in defense postures in the region, this book should be considered a fundamental text for Pentagon planners as they rethink strategy toward Asia in the coming years. As such, Hickey provides a largely atheoretical narrative of what he calls "the military buildup in East Asia" (p. 1). The absence of explicit theoretical claims in the book, however, does not limit its value to scholars interested in comparative or theoretical analysis. In a sense, Hickey has done the grunt work, providing one of the very few integrated studies of defense establishments in Asia. While his framework focuses on external phenomena (such as the collapse of the Soviet Union) as the causes of changes in Asian military strategies and force structures, he also hints at the way domestic political conditions make some reforms possible and entirely rule out others. For example, in his chapter on Japan, Hickey notes that the gradual loosening of restrictions on using the military in anything but a purely defensive manner could come only with greater chronological distance from World War II. However, like many others who study the defense policies and military strategies of other nations with an eye toward generating recommendations for the United States, Hickey treats these policies largely as unified, unproblematic national reactions to international and regional forces, rather than as the outcomes of often hard-fought political struggles at home. In fact, for much of this book, the militaries of these countries come across purely as tools of the state, rather than as the highly political institutions that they are. Armies are made up of multiple sets of interests that often conflict with those of other national political agents and that cause splits even within the defense forces. Hickey alludes to what surely must have been divisive political struggles in his discussions of factions within the South Korean military and the People's Liberation Army but provides little analysis of how and why these factions rose and fell and how they stabilized or destabilized national and regional security.

The book's focus really is not the armies of East Asia but, rather, how the United States can take charge of security in the region. He never questions his assumption that the United States will be a-if not the only-major determinant in how these arms races play out. Among his policy prescriptions are calls for the United States to convene arms reduction conferences to prevent "what appears to be an unintended drift toward war" (p. 235) and to take charge of building a "genuine multilateral security forum for East Asia" (p. 235), one that is more binding than currently exists and that looks much more like a NATO arrangement. Hickey gives little sense that these initiatives could backfire on the United States or be politically unacceptable to national leaders in the region, thus contributing to longer-term volatility rather than stability (think the U.S. failure in its SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] initiative).

Aside from the inevitable difficulty of any attempt at predicting outcomes of highly political processes, the major weakness in the book is the absence of any serious attempt at systematic comparative analysis. Only seven pages of the conclusion engage in explicit comparison across the cases, despite the enormously significant similarities and divergences that emerge from the country chapters. This absence is not unexpected given Hickey's target audience, which appears to be the U.S. defense policy community. Nonetheless, the case chapters are filled with potential comparative insights that suggest fruitful avenues of inquiry for future researchers. Some examples are as follows: All of these militaries are downsizing their numbers of personnel to some degree or another. How are they doing this? And what impact does force reduction have on the social, political, and economic landscape of countries still weathering the economic crisis? Where are these men (and they all appear to be men in these cases) going to find employment? How will the next generation of young men be educated in citizenship if conscription is eliminated, for example, in South Korea? And how do these sociological changes in the domestic realm affect the stability of the East Asia region? Another commonality is that all of these militaries have emphasized much greater transnational linkages among their officer corps. How has this trafficking in officers influenced defense policy? Have more frequent intraregional contacts contributed to greater understanding and communication and, hence, made the region more stable? Or have military leaders come back from junkets abroad more committed than ever to building up stronger militaries to compete with those of the nations visited?

Environment, Scarcity, and Violence By Thomas F. Homer-Dixon. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999 253p. \$45.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Marian A. L. Miller, University of Akron

In Environment, Scarcity, and Violence, Thomas Homer-Dixon continues his examination of environmental scarcity. This exploration of the links between environmental scarcity and violent conflict captures much of the related complexity. He finds that scarcities of renewable resources, such as cropland, freshwater, and forests, can contribute to civil violence. As scarcities worsen, the incidence of this kind of violence is likely to increase. Although he acknowledges that environmental scarcity "by itself is neither a necessary nor sufficient cause" (p. 7) of violence, he argues that analysts should not underestimate its importance: Some conflicts cannot be clearly understood without an examination of the role of environmental scarcity. In this work, he offers "analysts and policymakers a tool kit of concepts and generalizations that they can use to analyze, explain, and sometimes predict connections between environmental scarcity and violence around the world" (p. 73).

He reviews the debate among analysts with neo-Malthusian, economic optimist, and distributionist stances. They offer differing explanations for economic scarcity: Neo-Malthusians emphasize physical causes, such as population size and growth; economic optimists focus on market failures and inappropriate policies and institutions; and distributionists stress social structures and political behavior. He suggests that the principal contribution of the book will be to synthesize these three perspectives.

Homer-Dixon focuses on renewable resources "that are both rivalrous and excludable" (p. 48). He sees them as being subject to three types of scarcity: supply-induced, demandinduced, and structural scarcities. These scarcities interact and reinforce one another, resulting in resource capture and ecological marginalization. Structural scarcity is often "sustained and reinforced by international economic relations that trap developing countries into dependence on a few raw material exports" (p. 15). Environmental scarcity may result in a number of negative social effects, such as reduced agricultural productivity, constrained economic productivity, migration, social segmentation, and disrupted institutions. The challenge, then, is for societies to use social and technical ingenuity so that they can adapt to these scarcities without undue hardship.

Homer-Dixon is indeed successful at drawing together many of the strands from the neo-Malthusian, economic optimist, and distributionist perspectives. In this multilayered work, he explores many relevant variables and synthesizes work from a number of research projects. It is a thoughtful and coherent treatment of a complex subject. Yet, there is one important variable that seems to be just barely visible in this analysis—the international system and the powerful actors that shape the system. It is important to consider these systemic issues, not only because of possible causal factors but also because of the extent to which systemic factors can constrain how individual countries adapt to resource scarcities.

Homer-Dixon focuses on the national and subnational levels, targeting how society is affected and how it responds. For example, in examining structural scarcity, he looks at the distribution of power and wealth within a society, but he does not address the distributional impact and structural scarcity resulting from the distribution of power and wealth within the international system itself. For him, its impact is limited to that of a reinforcing factor (p. 15).

He notes that the causes of environmental scarcity include "the size of the resource-consuming population, and the technologies and practices this population uses in its consumption behavior" (p. 14). Very often, factors outside of a society play a large role in determining how much cropland or water is available to support the local population. Almost all of the cases examined in this book are developing countries. Clearly, these are not the only societies experiencing environmental scarcity. But developed states can

generally exercise a broader array of options. In some cases, developed states avoid—or adapt to—resource scarcity not only because of social or technical ingenuity, but also because they have the economic and political power to use the resources of the developing countries. Consequently, when we look at a country's resource-consuming population, we have to consider the extent to which that population exists outside of the country's borders. This is a consideration not just for resource-surplus countries, but also for countries with significant resource deficits. Foreign ownership or control of land and the mandates of powerful global actors may contribute significantly to supply-induced and demand-induced scarcity. In some countries poor people go hungry, while arable land is used to provide food for livestock in distant lands, and while International Monetary Fund strictures limit government policy options.

In his examination of second-stage intervention, Homer-Dixon discusses how a society can use its indigenous resources more sensibly and provide alternative resources to people who have limited resource access. But global factors and external actors can also limit the extent to which developing countries can close the ingenuity gap. With the harmonization of intellectual property rights under the aegis of the World Trade Organization, technical and scientific information can become private property and therefore excludable knowledge. In the process, what is being privatized includes folk knowledge and genetic information. As powerful actors continue to appropriate knowledge and resources, the ingenuity gap might be more appropriately termed the wealth gap. Attempts to patent even the centuries-old knowledge of local communities can limit community options for adapting to scarcity.

Homer-Dixon is correct in stressing that "researchers need multivariate and complex theories and hypotheses" (p. 175) to explain multivariate and highly interactive ecological-political systems. But his discussion of environmental scarcity pays scant attention to an important set of variables—the international system and its powerful state and nonstate actors. Clearly, these actors do not provide the ultimate explanation for environmental scarcity, but they are more than reinforcing factors. Consequently, a focused examination of their role in this process should be a part of this "tool kit of concepts and generalizations" (p. 73) that is being offered to analysts and policymakers.

This criticism should not obscure the contributions made by Homer-Dixon's exploration of the links between environmental scarcity and conflict. It provides important insights into the social effects of environmental scarcity. His work in this area has led him to take a position that is congruent with the precautionary principle being encouraged in global environmental forums. He emphasizes that policymakers should focus on avoiding environmental scarcity, since they may not always be able to adapt to it. He cautions that it is unwise to assume that there will be an infinite fount of ingenuity adequate to address future scarcities.

U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis By David Patrick Houghton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 270p. \$64.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Marc Lynch, Williams College

David Patrick Houghton's U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis explores the power of historical analogies in foreign policy decision making, offering along the way an engaging, thought-provoking account of decision making during the Iranian hostage crisis. Posing the question "How do decision makers reason when confronted by a problem which

seems almost entirely novel in character and therefore without precedent?" (p. 19), Houghton follows Khong's Analogies at War in arguing for the centrality of analogical reasoning. The seizure of the American embassy by Iranian student radicals presented a genuinely perplexing problem for decision makers on all sides, and Houghton captures their uncertainty well. Since decision makers can rely on different historical analogies, and even the same historical analogy can offer competing lessons or be subject to divergent interpretations, Houghton focuses attention upon the interpretive interplay of analogies. As the crisis unfolded, decision makers deliberated, directly and indirectly, over the most relevant and useful analogy. These analogies, according to Houghton, are not merely justifications for strategies chosen for other reasons but directly affect individual policy preferences by shaping beliefs about the nature of the problem. Houghton convincingly establishes the prevalence and power of historical analogies in shaping the response of policymakers to unfamiliar situations. His efforts to construct generalizable theoretical propositions about their relative causal weight are somewhat less successful but are consistently thought-provoking.

The strength of the book lies in the detailed reconstruction of American decision making surrounding the initial response to the embassy seizure, the weighing of competing options, and the approval of the rescue attempt. Drawing on interviews with members of the Carter administration, Houghton demonstrates the prevalence of historical analogies in discussions at all levels. American deliberations routinely appealed to a rich set of possible analogies—the Pueblo hostage crisis of 1968, the Mayaguez rescue of 1975, the Israeli Entebbe operation of 1976, and others. In the course of debating their relevance and their putative lessons, individuals often became attached to "their" analogy. While Houghton eschews judging "how reliable analogies are as a guide to the future, or whether the analogies could have been better used" (p. 39), the narrative suggests that the reliance on particular analogies clouded the judgment of the key policymakers, leading them to overstate the similarities of the situations and to underestimate crucial differences. Houghton's method of searching out and reporting every instance he can find of the use of analogies reveals little of the relative incidence of analogical reasoning as opposed to other forms of reasoning, however. The core concept of analogical reasoning remains elusive, as a wide variety of appeals to historical lessons or theory is counted as analogical reasoning. This makes it difficult to prove or to falsify assertions about relative importance, particularly when the outcome of the "war of analogies" is consistent with the strategies that would follow from other modes of reasoning (pp. 103, 105). It also makes it difficult to establish the causal significance of analogies. Houghton recognizes that the presence of analogies in the deliberations does not alone establish their causal weight. He tries valiantly to demonstrate that the analogies were not simply rhetorical gambits (pp. 157-65) and briefly considers a range of competing hypotheses (pp. 166-201), but the indeterminacy of the analogical theory makes it difficult to render definitive conclusions. Houghton's enthusiasm for analogies sometimes seems to lead him to misread his own evidence. For example, when the author presents the 1948-49 Angus Ward hostage situation as a possible analogy, Gary Sick responds, "We all learned about this well after the event...nobody was saying 'Aha! This is like such and such a case'" (p. 99). Nevertheless, Houghton spends several pages speculating about its possible relevance: Perhaps it is relevant, but this example raises questions about the falsifiability of the argument.

Houghton's treatment of the Iranian side, which draws on an archive of interviews with Iranians provided by a British documentary production rather than on personal interviews, is suggestive of the limitations as well as the strengths of the analogical research program. Chapter three makes abundantly clear that the 1953 historical experience, in which the CIA backed the Shah's coup against the nationalist Mohammed Mossadegh, decisively shaped the expectations and strategies of many Iranians in 1979. Exploring the ramifications of this analogy for Iranians allows a deeper understanding of Iranian behavior but risks deflecting analytical attention from internal power struggles in which the embassy seizure strengthened the hand of Iranian radicals against more moderate factions that sought compromise with the United States and a more liberal state at home. The decisive weight of an event that few of the student radicals experienced personally also raises questions about Houghton's conclusion that "American and Iranian decision makers...overwhelmingly drew upon the experiences and analogies known to them personally, reflecting the greater cognitive availability of these events" (p. 144). The dominance of the 1953 analogy suggests that cultural frames of reference, historical nationalist narratives, or prevailing discursive tropes might be more relevant than individual experience or cognitive differences. The limitations of the emphasis on individuals can also be seen in the American case, which focuses narrowly on individual decision makers and rarely considers how debates and historical analogies in the wider public sphere might have shaped their beliefs.

Houghton's presentation of the Iranian case repeatedly attempts to demonstrate that Iranian reliance on the 1953 analogy led them to misread American intentions: "Why did the student radicals ignore evidence—mostly rhetorical but apparently sincere—that the Carter administration was different [from past administrations]?" (p. 70). Houghton's evidence contradicts his framing of the puzzle, however. He wonders why Iranians failed to appreciate Carter's human rights discourse but then demonstrates that this human rights policy never applied to Iran (pp. 70–71). Houghton posits that the 1953 analogy led the Iranians to expect a coup that Carter would have never considered but then admits that Brzezinski, hardly a marginal player, did advocate a coup (pp. 69-70). He suggests that the paranoia of the student radicals about an American-backed coup derived from their misapplication of the 1953 analogy but then reports that "an Iranian team had been recruited by the CIA to assist the military operation in Tehran... who believed they were recruited for an anti-Khomeini operation which would serve as a prelude to a coup d'etat" (p. 122), as well as a secret meeting between Bazargan and Brzezinski (pp. 61-62). In this case, the search for analogical reasoning distracts attention from a quartercentury of active American support for the Shah that gave Iranians good reason to expect American counterrevolutionary action. This prioritizing of analogical reasoning can also be seen in the dismissal of the importance of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in shaping American strategies toward Iran (p. 110). Despite these problems, Houghton has written an interesting and thought-provoking book on an important subject that raises a number of compelling questions for future research.

The National Co-ordination of EU Policy: The Domestic Level Edited by Hussein Kassim, B. Guy Peters, and Vincent Wright. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 269p. \$72.00.

Maria Green Cowles, American University

In recent years, scholars of the European Union (EU) have looked increasingly at the impact—administrative, institutional, legal, societal—of European integration on the mem-

ber states. Some of this earlier literature on "Europeanization" viewed the Brussels-member state relationship in a rather static, one-way, top-down dimension. For this reason, the editors of *The National Co-ordination of EU Policy* take pains to eschew Europeanization as an organizing concept. But perhaps the editors doth protest too much. *The National Co-ordination of EU Policy*, in fact, fits nicely in the current literature on Europeanization, which views the Brussels-member state relationship in more dynamic terms. Indeed, the book provides a welcome and valuable addition by examining the *domestic coordination processes* through which "governments arrive at the position that they defend in EU decision making" (p. 235).

The book's editors—Hussein Kassim, B. Guy Peters, and the late Vincent Wright-argue in the introduction that the European Union places growing pressures on member states to coordinate their domestic responses to EU policymaking. The widening competence of the union, the increased salience of EU policy, and specific requirements, such as the council presidency and intergovernmental conferences (IGCs) pose increasing demands on member states to "get Europe right" (p. 3). At the same time, policy coordination at the domestic level is problematic in the face of an EU characterized by institutional fragmentation, sectorization, and weak connections across policy areas, among other factors. The editors argue that one might expect some form of homogenization or marked convergence among countries in terms of their national policy coordination. Yet despite the growing salience and complexity of the European Union, the book finds continuing divergence in the member states as national patterns of policy coordination persist.

How are government decisions on EU policies made at the domestic level in various EU member states? How is the coordination carried out among political leaders, competing national ministries, parliaments, regional units, and, in some cases, civil society? Who takes the lead in this coordination process? To what extent is this coordination perceived as necessary? These questions, implicit throughout the book, are examined in the empirical chapters.

This edited volume is particularly commendable in that the contributors' chapters focus not only on the "Big Three" (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom), but also include seven other EU member states (Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Austria, and Denmark). Moreover, many of the primary and secondary references come from non-Anglo-Saxon or Germanic sources. Thus, with the exception of the Italian chapter, readers are treated to detailed, in-depth analyses of national policy coordination processes in 10 EU countries.

Despite the richness of the individual chapters, *The National Co-ordination of EU Policy* is not as rigorous in terms of overall cohesiveness as it could be. The case studies, for example, do not address key concepts—European pressures, EU complexities, convergence/divergence—in a systematic way. And while recognizing that key players and ministries differ from country to country, the chapters fall short of addressing the various policy actors—prime ministers, parliaments, ministry officials, and so on—in an organized fashion. The same can be said about the case studies' examination of various types of policy responses, whether they be from Pillars I, II, or III of the European Union, or whether they involve everyday ("low politics") or historic ("high politics" or IGC) decisions.

The task of identifying the core concepts, key actors, and policy types across the book is left to the concluding chapter. Here, Hussein Kassim does an admirable job in summing up and, in some cases, expanding upon the arguments of the individual chapters. He identifies four general findings of the

book. The first is an assertion that the EU exerts tremendous pressure on member states to coordinate their national processes in response to EU policymaking. Exactly what these EU pressures are and how they differ from country to country is never fully fleshed out in the empirical chapters, however. The second finding is that national policy coordination has, in fact, changed in the face of these pressures. Again, evidence for this argument deserves more careful discussion. While this is clearly true in some case studies (notably France), it was not so apparent in others (Germany). The third findingthat there are "important similarities" in the manner in which member states coordinate their national responses—and the fourth finding—that institutional divergence persists—are thoughtfully elaborated. Here, the book's identification not only of the similarities and differences that exist but also why they exist is a particularly valuable contribution to the

It is interesting to note that this book assumes the reader has a strong grasp of both domestic and European/ international-level processes and policies. Thus, comparativists with little knowledge of the EU will find the discussion of administrative and institutional features across 10 countries fascinating, but may stumble when a contributor refers to Agenda 2000, the Delors White Paper, and the "communautaire vocabulary" with no further explanation. Likewise, international relations scholars familiar with developments in the EU may find it difficult to follow the detailed discussions of subcommittees within various ministries or the casual references to political spats among national officials. That the book is pitched to this level of expertise among its readership is not a criticism per se. Rather, The National Coordination of EU Policy sheds light on the growing challenge to scholarship of the EU today.

In the concluding paragraphs, Kassim points out this challenge in an all-too-brief but important discussion of the book's theoretical implications. Scholarship on the EU, historically dominated by international relations scholars, has often assumed a certain "symmetry between the member states" in terms of their form, structure, and interest (p. 259). Moreover, both classical and liberal intergovernmentalist theorists with their "over-organized concept of the state" have failed to adequately account for the formation of national policy positions. As this book makes clear, how member states organize and coordinate their national policy responses is critical to understanding the policy responses themselves. Citing Simon Bulmer's seminal 1983 article, Kassim reminds us that understanding how the EU functions requires not only an understanding of Brussels politics, but also a "knowledge of domestic systems...and an appreciation of the distinctiveness of national policies" (p. 259).

Redrawing the Global Economy: Elements of Integration and Fragmentation By Alice Landau. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 277p. \$70.00.

Karl Kaltenthaler, Rhodes College

Alice Landau explores the nexus between globalization and regionalization in the global economy in *Redrawing the Global Economy*. This means that she examines the ways in which national economies are being melded globally, while at the same time, those very same economies are creating regional economic blocs.

Landau's central argument is that both globalization and regionalization are leading to a growing gap in wealth between developed and developing countries and within countries as well. Not only are globalization and regionalization helping only the richer countries, or those with means in both sets of countries, but the processes are also leading to a great deal of discontent among many of those not involved in steering them. Thus, Landau paints a relatively dark picture of what globalization and regionalization mean for North-South relations and economic development prospects for low-income countries.

Landau's treatment of globalization and regionalization covers a great deal of theoretical and empirical territory. The first portion of the book assesses the various theoretical arguments that have been forwarded as to the causes and consequences of the globalization process. She divides the scholars who have written on this topic into "optimists" and "pessimists." The optimists are those who see globalization producing absolute economic gains for all involved. For the optimists, to stay out of the globalization process is to miss out on the opportunity to increase one's society's prosperity. The pessimists, on the other hand, bemoan the economic consequences of globalization, particularly how the process widens the income gap between rich and poor and how it ties economies together in a way that can precipitate global, rather than simply national, economic crises.

After surveying the literature, Landau sets out to explore the empirical picture of globalization and regionalization. Her intent is to describe these processes around the world. In doing so, she focuses on what globalization has done to state power, the patterns of global trade, the creation of new international organizations to manage the process, foreign direct investment, the power and operations of transnational corporations, and international financial markets.

In the chapter on what globalization has done to state power, Landau concludes that the picture is not completely clear. She asserts that states are not withering away across the world, but then again, some states have always been very weak. It is clear to her, however, that because there are so many political actors in the global economy, there is increasing confusion over policy authority in some parts of the world.

The chapter that explores how globalization has affected global trade argues that trade flows are increasingly stratified, both across countries and across sectors. Trade is increasing among the rich countries of world, while there has been less increase in trade between low-income countries and the rest of the world. Also, within countries, some dynamic sectors have become more integrated into the global economy, while others have not, leading them to fall behind economically.

Landau's chapter on international organizations is meant to assess whether the World Trade Organization (WTO) has fostered the inclusion of countries from across the globe into the global economy. She asserts that the WTO has had only mixed success. It has helped bring the richer countries further into the global economy, but it has failed to do much to help the developing economies. Thus, the WTO has only added to the globalization gap between rich and low-income countries

The chapter on foreign direct investment (FDI) mirrors the chapter on global trade patterns. FDI is concentrated in the wealthiest portion of the world; low-income countries have not been major contributors or recipients of FDI. As globalization has made it easier for FDI to flow around the world, it has only increased that pattern.

The chapter on the operations of multinationals in the global economy paints a picture that is very similar to that shown in the chapters on trade and FDI; globalization is producing a bifurcated world. Transnational corporations are much more active within the developed world than they are in the developing world. Thus, the economic and political links

that transnational corporations create are much stronger and deeper between the higher-income countries.

The final empirical chapter, which deals with international capital markets, makes the argument that there are very different patterns of capital flows within the developed and developing world. The increasing flows of capital around the world have been concentrated in the developed world. The low-income countries have made strides in accessing capital, but they are still minor recipients compared to high-income countries.

Landau's examination of regionalization, which is much briefer than that devoted to globalization, centers on patterns of regionalization and then on an assessment of whether regionalization is fostering or impeding globalization. She asserts in the two chapters on regionalization that this process is indeed on the rise, but it is not acting as an impediment to globalization. She concludes the book by essentially summarizing her findings and argument.

Redrawing the Global Economy is a solid, comprehensive treatment of the issue of globalization. The book is a wealth of information and a very good start for one exploring the process of globalization and its economic consequences. It is almost encyclopedic in its breadth of coverage of the topic of globalization.

The book does suffer from its comprehensiveness, however, because it tries to cover so much territory in terms of the aspects of the global economy, it gives a rather superficial treatment of the subject matter in some places. This is a book that is best used as an introduction to the globalization topic; it is not very well suited for those who are looking for a deep treatment of specific aspects of the globalization process.

I would recommend this book as a text for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in courses in international political economy. The book is also useful to scholars who are not very familiar with the globalization process.

American Exceptionalism and US Foreign Policy: Public Diplomacy at the End of the Cold War By Siobhan McEvoy-Levy. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 256p. \$75.00.

Francis A. Beer, University of Colorado, Boulder

Public diplomacy, or foreign policy rhetoric, is an increasingly important dimension of international relations. As modern media extend their global reach, they bring national foreign policy actions out of the diplomatic closet into full public view. Public relations experts market foreign policy as they do other products and services. Foreign policy marketing uses rhetoric strategically to legitimize national actions, mobilize support from allies, and counter the propaganda efforts of opponents. McEvoy-Levy's work contributes to the growing literature of such modern international communication.

The author describes the way that rhetoric interacts with American exceptionalism. The genealogy of exceptionalism is embedded in American history, having its origins in the religious beliefs of the first European settlers. It traces its way forward through the rhetoric of President George Washington's warning about entangling alliances, the Monroe Doctrine and its various corollaries, and the doctrine of manifest destiny. It finally arrives at the beginning of the twenty-first century with America in its hegemonic moment as sole remaining superpower. In this vision, America is the city on the hill, defending good against evil, leading the world into the new day of peace and prosperity, globalization and democracy, toward the end of history and the new world order. This messianic rhetoric provides a powerful lever to consolidate

domestic support, appeal to shared values abroad, and escape unilaterally from the realist constraints of the international system.

The work's structure is logical and straightforward. It begins with a discussion of rhetoric and public diplomacy in international relations and foreign policy. It distinguishes between transitional and routine rhetoric, and discusses how rhetoric fits into standard models of foreign policymaking. Rhetoric infuses bureaucratic politics, incrementalism, organizational process, and agenda setting: Rhetoric gives voice to group and individual psychological dynamics. The next chapter discusses the history of the idea of American exceptionalism and the country's conception of its missionary role. In this context, rhetoric "reflects and constitutes the collective memory" (p. 43), communicates the collective national vision, and serves as an essential tool of international political mobilization.

There follows a detailed discussion of the rhetoric of several crises during the post–Cold War period. After the fall of the Berlin wall, American public diplomacy supported a policy that sought to move beyond containment, simultaneously expanding NATO and cooperative relations with the states of the former Soviet bloc, including Russia itself. In this process, the historical precedent of the U.S. Civil War served as a useful metaphor to support the "strategic rhetoric of reconstruction" (p. 70). This reconstruction had as its object both the larger international system and the states of the former Soviet Union.

During the Gulf War, the rhetoric of international community building again combined with references to past history. Metaphors from World War II were prominent, and Saddam Hussein morphed easily into Hitler. Vietnam became a powerful antimetaphor, a historical marker of American weakness, defeat, and decline that needed to be overcome. In this context, the rhetorical messages of the war became no-more-quagmires and America-is-back.

The immediate political tasks of the post-Cold War period and the military imperatives surrounding violence continued for the Clinton administration in the Balkans. At the same time, Clintonian rhetoric placed a new emphasis on international economic affairs. The metaphor of World War I had strong appeal, especially as it recalled the catalytic role of the Balkans in starting the unintended chain reaction. Further, the chaos that followed the harsh economic provisions of the Treaty of Versailles, unrestrained mercantilist competition, and hyperinflation had all contributed to the collapse of the interwar period. Clinton's rhetoric of reconstruction thus expanded to embrace further post-Soviet normalization and to support such initiatives as the creation of the National Economic Council and the National Service program, the North American Free Trade Association, the expansion of the World Trade Organization, and critical international economic rescue operations.

The rhetoric of American exceptionalism has framed American policy throughout the post–Cold War period. The "city on a hill," the "redeemer nation," "renewal through self-flagellation," and the "manifest destiny" of building international community and world order have been recurrent themes in American public diplomacy. Political leaders have used these themes strategically as they sought to build "sympathetic public ecologies," to recreate the American nation, and to advance an international program of "soft hegemony" (pp. 146–64). Although the author does not venture into this territory, these themes also sketch a doctrinal outline of what might be called American civil religion at the heart of American culture.

McEvoy-Levy does a good job of describing the significance of political rhetoric and identifying major rhetorical themes during the post–Cold War period. She shows the importance of metaphors of prior international events, particularly American wars, in framing current affairs. Her work also recapitulates elements of an earlier debate between realism and idealism. She describes clearly how American idealist impulses are formulated rhetorically and used for important political purposes within the context of an environment that can also be described in realist terms.

In the world politics of the twenty-first century, the programs of soft and hard power coalesce and reinforce each other. The political rhetoric of public diplomacy is part of a postrealist struggle for interpretation and meaning. The current War on Terrorism, for hearts and minds, on the air and on the ground, is the latest chapter, yet to be written, of this ongoing project.

**Arms and Ethnic Conflict** By John Sislin and Frederic S. Pearson. Lanham, MP: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001. 224p. \$65 cloth, \$25.95 paper.

Jeffrey T. Checkel, Universitetet i Oslo

John Sislin and Frederic Pearson have written a fine book that addresses a complex and understudied issue: the role of arms in ethnic conflict. While it is abundantly clear that arms and ethnic conflict are closely intertwined, we have little systematic knowledge on the nature of the relation. What kinds of weapons—tanks versus small arms, say—play the greatest role? Whatever the weapon, how does its influence vary at different stages in the process of ethnic conflict? As unpleasant as the thought might be, are there conditions under which armaments play a positive role in such conflicts—for example, by promoting a situation of stalemate or bringing about outside humanitarian intervention? The signal contribution of this compact volume is to shed much-needed light on these and many other questions.

This is not a book for those who prefer simple answers. Instead, the authors carefully sift through rich data sets to offer contingent, bounded arguments on the role(s) played by arms. Put differently, this is not an argument where a single independent variable goes forth and slays all others; rather, the emphasis is on how constellations of factors—arms one among them—interact under certain conditions to lead to the escalation or de-escalation of ethnic conflict. This kind of nuanced analysis allows the authors to tease out a number of important policy implications in an excellent concluding chapter.

The structure of the book reflects these ambitions. The authors begin by highlighting our lack of rigorous knowledge on the arms/ethnic-conflict nexus (Chapter 1) and then proceed to survey and assess the armaments and armsflow data upon which they rely (Chapter 2). The latter is a model of methodological caution, carefully assessing the drawbacks of various data sources—be they United Nations' registries, official government reports, or journalistic accounts

It is the next three chapters, however, that comprise the book's core. Addressing the role of arms in the onset, progression, and resolution of ethnic conflicts, each chapter is built upon a solid combination of narrative stories and broader, large-n analysis. Not only does this make for a smoother read in a stylistic sense; it also—and more importantly—increases confidence in the validity of the volume's findings. The authors thus often use a particular narrative to uncover a possible relation—say, that infusions of heavy arms lead to greater volatility in the escalatory/de-escalatory patterns of ethnic conflict—that is then tested against the larger set of cases

All this said, there are limitations to the analysis, with theoretical concerns most primary. Simply put, the book offers little that is new theoretically. Perhaps this is inevitable in a volume that so self-consciously and carefully emphasizes methodological and data issues. And to be fair, the authors themselves say up front that "[g]enerally we proceed from existing conflict theory, deriving logical expectations and then testing them to the extent possible" (Preface, p. xiv). The book therefore pulls existing theory off the shelf, as it were, and tests it. Fair enough.

Problems arise, however, when the authors uncritically accept the core assumptions on which those theories are built. Integrating a methodologically individualist view of actors with fixed properties and a rational choice theory of action, much of this work reduces ethnic conflict to the strategic machinations of opportunistic agents who carefully calculate costs and benefits. What is wrong with this? Absolutely nothing! Empirically, we have abundant evidence that such dynamics drive a good deal of ethnic conflict, with individuals opportunistically invoking ethnicity in the pursuit of political

At the same time, it strains credulity to believe that ethnic agents really do know the content of their utility functions and actually have sufficient information available to engage in intelligent cost/benefit calculations—assumptions made throughout the book under review (pp. 5, 46, 88, 121, for example). If most of us have trouble doing any of this on a daily basis, why should we assume that individuals in violent and possibly life-threatening situations will do any better? This discussion matters because the authors claim to be offering policy-relevant theory and analysis (Preface, Chapter 6). Yet if these assumptions do not always hold (p. 140, n. 5, for example), how credible and reliable are the policy prescriptions?

Given these facts, the book would have been that much stronger if alternative perspectives and assumptions on ethnic conflict were introduced and tested. Here, the starting point would be that such conflict is an inherently social phenomenon. What role, then, do social norms play in creating the in- and out-groups essential for the activization of ethnic identity markers? More important given the volume's analytic goals, how does an influx of armaments disrupt, change, or destabilize this group socialization process? What is going on when, in certain cases, ethnic actors do not seek arms despite incentives and opportunities to do so?

To ask and answer such questions suggests the utility of social constructivist perspectives for exploring the arms/ethnic-conflict relation. The point of introducing and testing such arguments would be to help the authors delimit their claims. Are there certain conditions under which it does make sense to view ethnic conflict—and the role of armaments in it—as being driven by utility-maximizing, strategic agents? Equally important, are there other conditions when it does not make sense? If such a research design were pursued, the beneficial end result would not be an argument of the "either/or" type—either rational choice or social constructivism—but of the "both/and" sort. In turn, this would help Sislin and Pearson advance a more robust and complete set of policy prescriptions.

My criticisms here need to be kept in context. Arms and Ethnic Conflict is a very good book that is judicious in its use of data, cautious in its claims, and of relevance to policymakers as well as scholars. One can only hope that the volume inspires scholars of a sociological and social constructivist orientation to build upon it, developing a more complete set of hypotheses that can be fit together in integrative ways in order for us to understand more fully the role of armaments in ethnic conflict.

The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity By Darryl C. Thomas. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001. 324p. \$57.95.

Howard P. Lehman, University of Utah

Since the end of the Cold War, development studies have fallen to the wayside as attention has shifted to the democratization process in Eastern Europe, the increased integration of the European Union, and the effects of economic globalization in the advanced industrialized countries. The developing world was seen as an afterthought or, in some cases, as arenas of misunderstandable ethnic or religious conflict, structural poverty, disease, and other hardships. However, in the context of September 11, more attention now is on the developing world, perhaps not so much on economic development, but more on containing various terrorist organizations. Yet development studies still exist, and this area of study maintains an historical connection to several decades worth of academic research. Scholars persistently ask such questions as why the South is poor and politically weak compared to countries in the North. Answers generally are located in the dependency literature of unequal economic relations leading to unequal power relations. Darryl C. Thomas, in The Theory and Practice of Third World Solidarity, asks this question but provides a somewhat different response. The economic and political inequality in the world is not necessarily due to economic ideology but to the color of skin (p. xi). The solidarity of the Third World that Thomas sees in the past is one based on race, and racial solidarity should be the means by which the poor and powerless of the Third World transform unequal power relations. Thomas refers to this relationship as global apartheid, defining it as a structure of the world system that combines political economy and racial antagonism (p. 26). He states that global apartheid refers to the continuation of white-minority dominance of political, social, legal, cultural, and economic decision-making apparatuses within the world system (p. 111) and that this form of racial capitalism has become a permanent feature in the world system.

The major focus of the book thus is a chronological review of the evolution of racial solidarity of the Third World and the nonalignment movement. An early chapter presents the case that the Third World historically has sought to respond to global apartheid. Thomas asks, to what extent has the Third World been successful in transforming the structures of global apartheid since the end of the World War II? To what extent has the pan-pigmentationalist dimension of Third World solidarity brought about changes in the global racial order? (p. 27). To answer these questions, he draws on an historical review of the nonalignment movement during the Afro-Asian coalition of the 1950s, the more extensive solidarity during the 1960s, the Cold War, and briefly the current phase of globalization. He argues that the nonaligned movement was successful in forging a dynamic alliance among its members to challenge the North-South divide (p. 80). He claims that the newly emerging nations from Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean rejected alliances and military pacts with the Great Powers. These neophytes sought to promote peace because they believed that only through international peace could their aspirations and needs be fulfilled (p. 76).

During the Cold War, Third World solidarity became fragmented as global apartheid continued its hold over the world system. Thomas points to the divisive effects of high oil prices, the growth of newly industrializing countries, and the division between some Third World countries seeking economic integration and those following economic self-reliance. By the late 1980s, he argues, the old orthodoxy of development being guided by the state was being replaced by a new orthodoxy. Increasingly, developing countries are now focusing on building a market economy, creating a hospitable environment for private capital, closing the state out of the economic arena, and opening their political system to democracy (p. 176). Since the end of the Cold War and the rise of globalization, the forces of globalization are increasing the gap between the North and the South as Third World states are losing control over their domestic economic and financial policies (p. 235). Third World solidarity is increasingly on the defensive, Thomas claims, as global capitalism is not being challenged. He argues that with the retreat of the Soviet bloc, the former USSR has turned its back on anti-imperialism (p. 241). Thomas concludes his study by claiming that it may take the unfolding battle throughout the developing world for racial dignity and political and economic democracy to shake the foundation of the emerging regime of global apartheid and develop a new base of solidarity that focuses on the political, economic, racial, and military dimensions of global inequality (p. 274).

This important book focuses not just on the political and economic inequalities between the North and the South, but also on the racial dimension of these inequalities. The majority of people in the North are white and the majority of the people in the South are nonwhite. Yet the book does not present a cohesive theoretical argument concerning the link between race and capitalism. For one thing, the author relies more on a descriptive account of this relationship and less on a theoretical analysis of race and class. Second, the nonalignment movement was a crucial feature of the independence movement of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet it never developed into a powerful counterforce against the superpowers. In many ways, the nonalignment movement was a misnomer since so many of its members did indeed side with one superpower or the other in military alliances. Third, the effects of the newly industrializing countries on the nonalignment movement need to be further analyzed. Were these countries an aberration within the global apartheid or were they a model of how Third World countries could establish themselves within global capitalism? Fourth, Third World solidarity seems to be presented in this study as a monolithic concept.

Yet international solidarity based on race has never materialized. Instead, we have seen a rise of regional institutions in the developing world that attempt to protect the interests of member states. NAFTA, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the East African Community, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are examples of regional solidarity. Finally, the book offers very little in terms of solidarity in the post-Cold War era. In some ways, the argument falters in the discussion of racial solidarity during this period. There is an absence of significant analysis of how the recent waves of democratization, human rights, and peace making efforts fit into the argument of global apartheid. Can Third World solidarity form around these emerging democracies? In what way has globalization affected Third World solidarity? This book raises many important questions, answers some, and leaves others unaddressed.

Perfect Deterrence By Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 441p. \$74.95 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

Michael D. McGinnis, Indiana University

For too long, nuclear deterrence theory has been treated as a casualty of the end of the Cold War. During the preceding period of superpower rivalry, debates over the credibility of nuclear deterrence attracted the attention of sophisticated game theorists in diverse disciplines. But with the end of the Cold War, this research tradition virtually ground to a halt. In this important new book, two long-term contributors to this body of research revisit these issues and effectively recast these models as representations of policy dilemmas of long-standing and continuing relevance. For instance, their models of U.S. strategic doctrines of massive retaliation and flexible response prove relevant to any situation in which the parties perceive two levels of conflict to be significantly different, even if neither level involves the use of nuclear weapons.

The book begins with a brief overview of two variants of classical deterrence theory. Whereas the first, structural version embraces the high levels of survivable deterrent forces needed to sustain Mutual Assured Destruction, writers in the second decision-theoretic strand treat superpower crises as Chicken games in which neither player could rationally initiate a full nuclear exchange. Standard models of both variants suffer, Zagare and Kilgour argue, from significant shortcomings, either in terms of logical consistency or empirical verisimilitude. In their view, effective deterrents must be both capable of causing harm to the target and credible in the sense of being cost-effective to carry out, should the occasion for doing actually arise.

The authors carefully work through a series of interrelated models, each focused on one particular form of deterrence. One sequence of models deals with asymmetric (or unilateral) deterrence, in which only one state is presumed to be interested in challenging the status quo. Another series deals with situations of mutual deterrence, in which both states attempt to deter the other from initiating a challenge. In all cases, simple models of complete information are used to illustrate the range of possible behaviors expected to occur under different equilibrium conditions, followed by more complex, and more realistic, models of incomplete information in which one or both players remain unsure of the credibility of the other state's deterrent threat. Part II focuses on direct deterrence, in which one state seeks to convince a second state not to initiate a change in the status quo. Part III deals with situations of extended deterrence, in which the first state extends its protection to a third state, an effort which necessarily compounds the problem of credibility. (Some models are also interpreted in terms of power transition theory.) Each chapter concludes with a "coda" recapitulating the major points covered in that chapter, and the book concludes with an overview of the argument as a whole.

Zagare and Kilgour are to be commended for their sustained effort to draw out the implications of a few variations on basic models. They present complex results clearly. Multiple equilibrium conditions are organized into categories illustrated by easily interpretable figures and distinguished by distinct labels (although by the end of the book, these labels do tend to run together). By relegating formal proofs to 70 pages of appendices, the authors maintain a clear focus in the text on the most important results. Notation is clear and

consistent, making it easy to directly compare equilibrium conditions for different models. Throughout the book, each set of findings is illustrated with appropriate examples, drawn from a wide array of historical eras.

The word *perfect* in the book's title refers to the condition that all equilibria must be subgame perfect, meaning that no threat can be based on actions that would be irrational to carry out, even at decision nodes that the players will not reach if both play their equilibrium strategies. This refinement has become the standard formal representation of the requirement that rational deterrents cannot be backed up with noncredible threats. As the authors demonstrate, however, many possible behaviors can be consistent with this criterion, in different sets of circumstances.

One of the most intriguing specific findings concerns the conditions under which a no-first use policy might have been, in some parameter configurations, sustainable as equilibrium (p. 238). In general, Zagare and Kilgour demonstrate that deterrence provides, at best, a fragile foundation for peace. In nearly all of the parameter configurations they investigate, any possible equilibrium supporting the status quo is associated with another closely related equilibrium in which some challenges do occur that may end in war (p. 293).

Rarely does any one formal modeler agree with all of the assumptions imposed by another modeler. In this case, I was concerned to see that in their simplest model of "generalized mutual deterrence" (pp. 70-81), two players select C or D simultaneously, after which a C player may choose to retaliate for a play of D. I understand the authors' reasons for setting it up this way, but it still strikes me as an uneasy hybrid between single-play and repeated game representations. For this and later, more complex models, the authors might have investigated the implications of requiring their equilibria to satisfy refinements beyond subgame perfection. Also, in some of the later models, a first-strike advantage might have been introduced in order to distinguish different paths to all-out war. Still, the authors justify each of their simplifications, and they hedge their conclusions accordingly. Overall, they have selected well, in the sense that their simplifications facilitate clear presentations and interpretations of their most impor-

By focusing on their own models, the authors leave open many avenues for later elaborations upon similar themes. For example, each crisis is treated here as a separate event, even though the authors presume that a state's level of credibility may vary according to the location or the salience of that particular crisis. Thus, later researchers might incorporate these specific models of individual crises into a broader, macrolevel model of rivalry. No one should expect that nuclear deterrence theory will ever regain its earlier position of prominence, but Zagare and Kilgour remind us that now, more than a decade after the end of the Cold War, important subtleties remain hidden within the logic of deterrence.

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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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


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


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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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Volume 26 Number 4 . December 2002

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
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### **Notes from the Editor**

Because I spend so much time reviewing potential APSR articles, it pains me to admit what is undeniably true: that a great deal of the important intellectual work in our discipline comes packaged not as journal articles, but as books. Many disciplines help their members stay abreast of new books in their field by maintaining "official" single-purpose book review journals. In political science, this function has long been performed by the APSR, which despite its name is primarily an outlet for research, not for reviews. That long-standing arrangement is about to change, for book reviews will bid farewell to the APSR after the current issue. Hereafter, the book review section, which has occupied approximately one-third of our pages, will migrate to the APSA's new journal, Perspectives on Politics, where it will reappear in volume 1, number 1, in March 2003. Gone from the APSR but not forgotten will be the invaluable contributions made by book review co-editors Susan Bickford and Gregory McAvoy, the long line of APSR book review editors who preceded them, and, of course, the thousands of scholars who over the years have taken on the thankless (and often cursed at) task of writing book reviews for the APSR. The APSR, sans book reviews, will continue to be published on a quarterly basis, but beginning in 2003, our new cover dates will be February, May, August, and November.

Beginning in 2003, PS, the APSA's "other" periodical, will also shift to a new schedule, appearing in January, April, July, and October. Included in its January issue will be a copy of my first annual editorial report, which was presented to the APSA Executive Council at the annual meeting in Boston. Editorial reports are usually pretty dull. Mine may be, too (though naturally I don't think so), but in light of the attention, much of it critical, that the APSR has attracted in recent years, I think you will find this particular report to be of special interest. I hereby call it to your attention and express the hope that after reading it you will pass along any thoughts you may wish to share; please direct these to apsr@gwu.edu.

#### IN THIS ISSUE

The orange cover of this issue completes our annual cycle of the color palette. Next year and for the foreseeable future, the same red, green, blue, orange progression will be repeated. Still changing from issue to issue will be the cover graphic, which we will continue to key to the theme of the first article in the issue.

To find a cover graphic that is somehow linked to the first article in an issue and is also interesting to look at, I rely on the scholarly expertise and aesthetic sense of Rob Hauck, the APSA's deputy executive director and a highly accomplished artist as well. To present the theme of Robert Lieberman's "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change," this issue's graphic features gears (standing for change),

turning wheels (representing ideas), and the meshing of the gears (representing structure)—a set of identifiable, concrete objects that cohere conceptually, signifying the broad thrust of Lieberman's essay. In recent years, debates have raged about the relative roles of "ideas" and "institutions" in explaining political change. Lieberman acknowledges both the strengths and the weaknesses of each approach, and sets for himself the daunting task of melding the two into a viable new synthesis. Then, rather than leaving the stage after making the case for a synthetic approach, he uses it as a framework for analyzing shifts in civil rights laws and policy in the United States. This application not only concretizes Lieberman's abstract argument, but also does much to illuminate U.S. "race policy" during the 1960s.

The next article in this issue also operates on a high conceptual plane, considering substantive and epistemological issues of broad disciplinary and interdisciplinary interest. In the search for useful ways to understand the political influences of "culture," political scientists have borrowed heavily from disciplines as diverse as literature and economics. Rarely, though, have they returned to first principles and devoted the necessary effort to fleshing out their understanding of culture. In "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science," Lisa Wedeen suggests that this inattention may be the primary reason why the study of culture in political science has become so divided. Wedeen offers a more fully theorized understanding of culture that holds out promise for solidifying research in this booming area of political analysis.

The next two articles could hardly be more different in approach, but share the very same substantive focus. Their common focus is one of the Big Issues of democratic governance: representation, and more specifically the representation of minorities. Overshadowed by the debate between "descriptive" versus "substantive" representation and purposefully disregarded by advocates of the former lurks the question of what characteristics of representatives are most likely to advance the interests of disadvantaged groups. Suzanne Dovi tackles this question head-on in "Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Or, Will Just Any Woman, Black, or Latino Do?" Dovi argues that well-intentioned and seemingly sound reasons for not articulating desirable criteria for descriptive choices are ultimately outweighed by the need for such criteria. She goes on to endorse a criterion that she claims will foster mutual understanding between descriptive representatives and their constituents. Are you convinced by Dovi's argument? No matter how you answer this question, Dovi's analysis should significantly sharpen your understanding of the issues swirling around the concept of descriptive representation.

This emphasis on the representation of minorities is sustained in Eyal Baharad and Shmuel Nitzan's "Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Notes from the Editor December 2002

Preference Intensity." The issue with which Baharad and Nitzan are concerned arises from the fact that in a simple pairwise voting system, the majority's preference will always prevail, no matter what the minority prefers or how intensely it prefers it. Might voting rules be devised that would ameliorate majority decisiveness and yet be unbiased (anonymous and neutral)? By bringing the tools of formal modeling to bear on this question, Baharad and Nitzan provide a closely reasoned answer to that question—an answer that has some fascinating implications for the way elections are conducted.

In the three remaining articles in this issue, the focus shifts from abstract conceptual and "large-M" methodological issues in political analysis (as in the contributions by Lieberman and Wedeen) and enduring Big Issues of democratic politics (as in the Dovi and Baharad-Nitzan articles) to some nitty-gritty aspects of the political process in the United States. The idea guiding Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Matthew Stephenson's "Precedent as a Response to the Complexity of Legal Communication," is that our understanding of the courts would be greatly enhanced by a better sense of how judges at different levels of the judicial system communicate with and learn from one another. Taking this as their cue, Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson build a model that clarifies when, why, and how precedent shapes judicial decisions. Although exercises of this type are sometimes seen as so stylized as to be empirically sterile, Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson's model enables them to reconcile some seemingly contradictory observations that have long puzzled observers of the courts and to speak to an array of important and divisive issues concerning judicial decisionmaking.

Speaking of "important and decisive": The series of decisions handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court in the early 1960s in cases involving legislative apportionment surely fit that description. In the wake of those decisions, a wave of research concluded that the imposition of the "one person-one vote" standard had brought about little or no change in the distribution of spending across legislative districts. That conclusion was disturbing, for it implied that an apportionment standard that emphasized equality in representation left policy outcomes largely unchanged from a time when some constituencies were grossly overrepresented and others had little voice in legislative decisions. In "Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and the Distribution of Public Expenditures in the American States," Stephen Ansolabehere, Alan Gerber, and James Snyder use a comprehensive dataset on state expenditures before and after redistricting to revisit the connection between representation and expenditures. Their results provide a foundation for a new interpretation of the utility of equal apportionment criteria and serve as a prime example of how rigorous political science research can speak to important and enduring policy issues.

As I compose these notes, debate rages about whether the United States ought to initiate military action in Iraq. Often noted has been the irony that

whereas many leaders of the American military leaders are taking a cautious approach to such action, much pressure to initiate action is being placed on the president by advisors who themselves have not served in the military (the so-called "chicken hawks"). Precisely this irony, as it has played out over the course of American history, is the subject of Chriustopher Gelpi and Peter D. Feaver's "Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force." Is it possible that decisionmakers with a military background have actually served as a force for the peaceful resolution of international conflicts involving the U.S.? Thus stated, the question is too simple, for it ignores the distinction between decisions to initiate militarized disputes in the first place and decisions about the level of force the U.S. uses in the disputes it initiates. Gelpi and Feaver use this distinction to structure their analysis of U.S. involvement in more than a hundred international disputes over the course of two centuries. The result is a fascinating set of conclusions about an often-overlooked set of influences on foreign policy decisionmaking.

#### **INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS**

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### Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change

ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN Columbia University

Institutional approaches to explaining political phenomena suffer from three common limitations: reductionism, reliance on exogenous factors, and excessive emphasis on order and structure. Ideational approaches to political explanation, while often more sensitive to change and agency, largely exhibit the same shortcomings. In particular, both perspectives share an emphasis on discerning and explaining patterns of ordered regularity in politics, making it hard to explain important episodes of political change. Relaxing this emphasis on order and viewing politics as situated in multiple and not necessarily equilibrated order suggests a way of synthesizing institutional and ideational approaches and developing more convincing accounts of political change. In this view, change arises out of "friction" among mismatched institutional and ideational patterns. An account of American civil rights policy in the 1960s and 1970s, which is not amenable to either straightforward institutional or ideational explanation, demonstrates the advantages of the approach.

s the time neared midnight on 10 June 1964, Everett Dirksen took the floor of the United States Senate to conclude three months of debate on the Civil Rights Act. "It is said that on the night he died," Dirksen said, "Victor Hugo wrote in his diary substantially this sentiment: 'Stronger than all the armies is an idea whose time has come.' The time has come," he went on, "for equality of opportunity in sharing in government, in education, and in employment. It will not be stayed or denied. It is here" (Congressional Record 1964, 13319; Whalen and Whalen 1985, 185, 198). Surely equality of opportunity for all races was an idea of its time in the United States in 1964, well past due according to many. But what made that particular night the moment when this idea arrived, to be entered finally into the nation's lawbooks by vote of a venerable legislative body that had long resisted it? Many things beyond the force of the idea itself conspired to make this idea arrive at that place at that time: a broad and vigorous social movement espousing it, political parties increasingly divided by it and consumed with it, and political institutions that were able to help its advocates build and sustain a coalition around it. How did these things contribute to the triumph of the liberal ideal of equal rights? As John Kingdon (1984, 1) asks, "What makes an idea's time come?"

Long dormant in the systematic study of politics, ideas have staged a remarkable comeback in the social sciences in the last 15 years or so. Indeed, the challenge of "bringing ideas back in" to political science and political explanation is one of the central issues now facing the discipline. There are a number of reasons

that we have arrived at this pass. First, developments in world politics brought ideas onto center stage. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of communism, and the convergence of the world's economic and political institutions on a new neoliberal paradigm, among other broad shifts, signaled a profound ideological transformation in much of the world. Never mind that the social sciences utterly failed to predict these phenomena; without reference to the ideological nature of these transformations, the new world of the twenty-first century seems unfathomable and the pathways by which it arrived incomprehensible (see Anderson n.d.).

Second, prevailing institutional approaches in political science are limited in their capacity to account for the substantive course of politics. Given the raw material—assumptions about actors' beliefs, preferences, knowledge, understandings, and expectations institutional theories can effectively derive predictions about which outcome from among a range of contemplated outcomes is likely to occur. But precisely because material approaches tend to take these things as given, they are at something of a loss to explain the appearance at any given moment of any particular menu of substantive choices. In the case of the Civil Rights Act, for example, institutional theories can explain why, given the emergence of civil rights as a salient issue, Congress acted as it did. They can even explain why the American political system at midcentury was particularly susceptible to the appeals of the civil rights movement. But they cannot account for the substantive content of civil rights demands, or of the beliefs and understandings that led actors to connect these demands with a particular set of policy solutions. Ideas, many analysts argue, can fill this explanatory gap. After all, they constitute much of the substantive raw material upon which institutional theory feedsthe goals and desires that people bring to the political world and, hence, the ways they define and express their interests; the meanings, interpretations, and judgments they attach to events and conditions; and their beliefs about cause-and-effect relationships in the political world and, hence, their expectations about how others will respond to their own behavior. To the extent that these and other things that go on in people's heads are not simply a function of something else in

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The Hugo quotation is actually a paraphrase of a passage from his historical essay, *Histoire d'un crime: Déposition d'un témoin*, his vicious account of Louis Napoleon's coup d'état of 1851. The passage reads, "On résiste à l'invasion des armées; on ne résiste pas à l'invasion des idées" ["The invasion of armies can be resisted; the invasion of ideas cannot be resisted"] (Hugo 1987, 456).

the political world, institutional and interest-based approaches will tell only a part of the causal story of many significant political phenomena (Berman 1998, 16–19).

With these limitations in mind, scholars studying the role of ideas in politics have offered a bracing challenge to material perspectives on a number of grounds. Ideational approaches challenge the reductionism of much institutional theory, which often assumes away any complexity in the substance of politics, as in spatial models of voting or legislative behavior that collapse political disputes typically to a single dimension (Black 1958; Downs 1957; Krehbiel 1988; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Ideas in politics, by contrast, are often complex and multidimensional. Ideational accounts of politics also challenge the tendency of institutional theories to take the interests and aims of political actors as given, whether they are determined by individual rationality, group affiliation, or cultural patterns. Rather, actors' understanding of their own interests is apt to evolve as the ideological setting of politics changes. More generally, ideational theories seem to challenge the institutional emphasis on structure, aggregate organizational or behavioral regularities, as the principal guiding force behind political behavior. A focus on ideas suggests, rather, the possibility that human agency can defy the constraints of political and social structures and create new political possibilities (Smith 1992).

These challenges zero in on the central shortcomings of institutional theories of politics. Although each brand of institutionalism has its own blind spots, in their broadest outlines they share these characteristicsreductionism, the exogeneity of certain fundamental elements of political life, and a privileging of structure over agency. Above all, institutional theories share an emphasis on finding order and stability, comprehensiveness and coherence, patterns and models that elucidate more or less general propositions about a class of political phenomena. Because of their emphasis on eliciting ordered patterns and regularities from observations about politics, institutional theories in general run into trouble in accounting for political change; How, after all, can we explain change in outcomes by reference to stable causes? Any search for the sources of change in this sort of explanatory scenario inevitably leads to a problem of infinite regress: To explain a change in some familiar state of affairs, we must assume an antecedent change in one or more causal factors that were previously part of a stable system. But after making this move we are left with the same problem: What caused this antecedent change, if not some change farther back in the causal chain? At some point in this sequence, the source of change must come from outside the system.

It is one of my contentions that these same dilemmas—problems of reductionism, exogeneity, and structure envy—ironically bedevil much ideational political analysis, contrary to common presumptions and the self-professed aims of many ideational theorists who define their enterprise as a counterweight to these particular sins of institutional analysis. Above all ideational and institutional accounts share the focus on ordered regularity that makes problems of change particularly intractable for both camps. It is certainly

true that ideational accounts are often more sensitive to change than institutional ones; ideas, after all, are a medium by which people can imagine a state of affairs other than the status quo and such imaginings might plausibly spur them to act to try and make changes. But ideas alone do not create the incentives or opportunities for action, and not all holders of alternative political ideas act on them. Moreover, ideational accounts of political change typically chronicle shifts from one ideational equilibrium to another.

There is no particular shame in these faults; they are the necessary elements of theory building and generalization that distinguish social science from the description of singular slices of human experience. Nevertheless, this set of analytical moves, common to both theoretical schools, comes at some cost. In particular, what Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek (1994) have called the "iconography of order," the quest to find coherent synchronous patterns—equilibria—in political life, often leaves political scientists scratching their heads when asked to account for political change.<sup>2</sup>

I suggest further that by substantially relaxing the common focus on order that both sets of approaches share, we can make progress in accommodating the two perspectives. That is, an analytic perspective that considers both institutions and ideas as integral, endogenous explanatory elements, without privileging one or the other, can go some distance in avoiding these traps. In particular, analysis that takes both ideas and institutions seriously will almost of necessity shed light on points of friction, irregularities, and discontinuities that drive political change. These discontinuities between separately constituted patterns of institutions and ideas can lead to a reformulation of the incentives and opportunities facing political actors and produce largescale political change that neither institutions nor ideas, considered independently, can explain. There are, to be sure, analytical costs to this approach, particularly the parsimony and clear foundations that often characterize institutional models of politics. But there are corresponding analytical gains, particularly the ability to account for major political change, that make these costs worth paying. After elaborating this critique of both institutional and ideational theories I sketch the outlines of a synthesis and illustrate its possibilities with an example taken from the development of civil rights policy in the United States.

# IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS: COMMON CHALLENGES

A variety of institutional perspectives has come to occupy, it is fair to say, the ascendant position in the theoretical pantheon of political science. There is, of course,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> By "order" I refer not to the orderliness of societies and government—what Samuel Huntington (1968, 1) defined as qualities of "consensus, community, legitimacy, organization, effectiveness, [and] stability"—but rather to the recognition of patterned regularity in social and political life. Some major works of social science have focused precisely on finding order among great moments of societal disorder, such as revolutions, as in the work of Barrington Moore (1966) and Theda Skocpol (1979).

a variety of "new institutionalisms" in political science (and the social sciences more generally), rooted in a variety of methodological and disciplinary approaches, from neoclassical microeconomics and the theory of games to macrohistorical sociology to the sociology of organizations and culture (Campbell and Pedersen 2001a; Hall and Taylor 1996; Immergut 1998; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Thelen and Steinmo 1992). Although these perspectives differ in significant ways, they share a common set of concerns and assumptions, particularly an interest in the way in which some set of regularities in political life (rules and procedures, organizational structures, norms, cultural scripts) shapes the expression and aggregation of political preferences, allocates power and regulates its exercise, and therefore affects political outcomes (Immergut 1998).

Another characteristic these perspectives share is a tendency to relegate ideas, however they are conceived, to the sidelines in explanatory accounts of political processes (see, e.g., Berman 1998, 14–24, and Hall 1997). One extreme version of this view holds that ideas are epiphenomenal, simply consequences of material (or structural or institutional) arrangements. This view is most clearly associated with certain versions of Marxism, but it also appears in non-Marxist variants. In such cases, expressions of ideas in a political setting might be taken not as genuine articulations of beliefs or understanding but as strategic manipulation or position taking aimed at advancing an interest or pursuing a goal that is deemed to be fundamental (see, e.g., Mayhew 1974).

Even in cases where the analysis is not quite so doggedly materialist, ideas are seen as exogenous to the more fundamental explanatory framework. Ideas often make an appearance in institutional analyses, where they serve the purpose of patching over lacunae in the basic explanation. This move has become somewhat common in rational-choice institutionalism, where ideas operate as focal points that help solve game-theoretic models with multiple equilibria (Bates, de Figueiredo, and Weingast 1998; Garrett and Weingast 1993). Ideas are unquestionably important to such analyses, but not ideas as ideas—that is, their content, valence, and intensity are less important than the role they play in a causal tableau. Ideas work in such instances merely as devices to untangle the knotty problems of institutional models; something else entering from the wings would do just as well. More generally, as Mark Blyth (1997, 231) has observed, "Ideas in such treatments are ultimately secondary to the mode of analysis in which they are employed. Their definition, operationalization, and explanatory power are simply derivative of the wider theory in which they are embedded." Although they might be important to particular explanations, ideas when adduced in this way do not fundamentally alter the institutionalist enterprise.

Such moves also ignore commonplace readings of history, in which ideas often appear as the prime movers of history. Prominent accounts of the American (Bailyn 1967; Wood 1969) and French (Sewell 1985) Revolutions, for example, have put ideas at the cen-

ter of causal accounts of tumultuous political change. Nor do they fully capture political developments that involve basic conflicts and transformations among political ideas and values. Such developments span the spectrum of substantive concerns in political science: the rise of Keynesianism and its eclipse by neoliberalism (Campbell and Pedersen 2001b; Hall 1989, 1993), the triumph of color-blind liberal integrationism in the United States over a history of race-conscious oppression (King 2000; Smith 1997), and the emergence of international norms of multilateralism and human rights out of Cold War realism (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Sikkink 1993). If institutionalism wants to remain relevant in political science, it must prove itself able to account convincingly for these changes that manifest themselves not simply in new policies but in fundamentally new ideological bases for politics.

The challenge for institutional approaches, therefore, is to find a way to treat ideas as analytically consequential in accounts of political action, policy development, and institutional change, and to do so without falling into the characteristic traps that I have outlined—particularly the ad hockery with which institutional accounts usually appropriate ideas as explanatory factors. But this must also be done in a way that retains the essential strengths of institutionalism in all its varieties: its accounts of strategic behavior by purposive agents under structural constraints, of the aggregation of interests, of the distribution and exercise of power, and of the social construction of political rationality—and its ability to combine and recombine these elements and mobilize them into convincing causal explanations of a wide range of political phenomena, from the presidential veto (Cameron 2000) and the political control of the bureaucracy (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1987) to social revolutions (Skocpol 1979), industrial policies (Dobbin 1994), lawmaking under separated powers (Krehbiel 1998), and welfare states (Pierson 1994; Skocpol 1992). Our synthesis should recognize, in other words, that ideas are not simply tools in the hands of power-seeking strategic agents (although they can be and often are) (Campbell 1998).

While institutional approaches labor under these difficulties in trying to assimilate ideas, ideational explanations share many of the same blinders. Again, these difficulties take more and less extreme forms. At the far extreme are accounts that posit a single, overwhelming, and, above all, stable set of ideas as the driving force in politics (see, e.g., Geertz 1964 and Hartz 1955). In such accounts it is the substance of ideas that matters above all in shaping political outcomes, whether they are coherent, logical, internally consistent, and thus influential; the causal mechanisms that drive this influence inhere in the ideas themselves. While such an approach is admittedly rare in the rationalist world of the social sciences, functional explanations of politics often ascribe this role to political ideas; modernization theory, which ascribes great importance to the logical, functional connections among the components of political systems, is a prominent example (Almond and Coleman 1960; Inglehart 1997).

More common are studies that emphasize political ideas as central causal factors but give short shrift to the political settings in which ideas become influential and to the causal mechanisms that influence the selection among ideas in concrete political choices (Berman 2001). In his magisterial survey of the multiple political traditions that have challenged liberalism for ascendancy in American politics, for example, Rogers Smith (1997) places his bets squarely on ideational factors, the interplay of three clusters of ideas about national membership and civic identity, as the central factor in shaping American citizenship laws and American political development more generally. Smith (1993, 1997) brilliantly parses the ideological currents that found expression in American citizenship and immigration policy and effectively challenges the view of American culture as thoroughly suffused with egalitarian liberalism that has held sway from Tocqueville through Louis Hartz and beyond (see also King 1973). These ideological traditions do not stand alone in Smith's work; like a mirror image of institutional accounts that rely on ideas as catalytic but not constitutive, his account presents evidence about the institutional settings in which ideas are enacted as policy—courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and the like. But these settings are exogenous to his theoretical framework; they appear conveniently as stage-setters for his interpretive enterprise but they do not fundamentally change the theoretical approach, limiting somewhat his theory's capacity to explain the particular sequence of outcomes he charts (Orren 1996a, 1996b; Smith 1996, 1999). As Smith (1999, 25) himself notes,

Conducive conditions are...not enough to explain outcomes. To grasp how and why early American political actors combined liberal, republican, racist, and sexist ideas and institutions, we must go beyond a Hartzian focus on their initial material and intellectual circumstances and attend to their central political tasks. Those tasks were not, first and foremost, the carrying on of any particular tradition, although many early Americans identified with historical figures who defended personal liberties and championed republican governments. American leaders were most immediately concerned with using available traditions first to mobilize support for the Revolution, then to build a successful new nation, and finally to maintain and extend it in various ways.

More precisely, these broad political projects posed particular political challenges to these actors, who had to negotiate a distinctive and shifting institutional universe to implement them. They had to pass laws, defend those laws against legal challenges, and administer them according to particular institutional rules and logics that were not necessarily connected to (or in synch with) the ideas these policies embody. These patterns surely affected the sequence and substance of the outcomes Smith charts by placing power in certain hands at certain moments, privileging certain interests over others, and creating moments of opportunity for politicians to act, whether out of strategic or ideological or some combination of motives (Kingdon 1984; Mayhew 2000). These features of the political landscape are not absent from his account, but they do not carry independent explanatory weight and he does not assimilate their effects systematically into his framework.

Just as ideas are not merely strategic tools, political ideas are not free-floating bits of knowledge and conjecture, detached from considerations of structure and power, that rise and fall according to the functional logic of the marketplace (to borrow Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s metaphor) or of natural selection (Abrams v. United States 1919, 630–31; Mill, On Liberty, chap. 2). Part of understanding political development and institutional change is understanding which ideas win (or, in fact, which ideas are in the arena to begin with), why, and with what consequences for whom. The important point is not only where ideas come from or how they cohere or collide but also how they come to be prominent, important, and powerful, even determinative in shaping political behavior and defining political rationality. As Sheri Berman (2001, 233) writes, "Political scientists must be able to explain . . . why some of the innumerable ideas in circulation achieve prominence in the political realm at particular moments and others not. Since no intellectual vacuum ever exists, what is really at issue here is ideational change, how individuals, groups, or societies exchange old ideas for new ones." These exchange processes, it is clear, occur at the intersection of ideas and institutions, and any fully convincing theory of political or institutional change must incorporate both as constituent elements with reasonably equal weights.

### ORDER, DISORDER, AND POLITICAL CHANGE

The most important limitation on the capacity of both institutional and ideational approaches to come to grips with processes of change is their common emphasis on ordered, patterned regularity. It is this emphasis, after all, that distinguishes social science from other modes of inquiry into human experience—the search for general patterns of behavior and interaction.<sup>3</sup> This emphasis on order leads, as Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek (1994, 1996, 1999) argue, to a view of political development that consists of periods of stability and coherence, of "politics as usual," punctuated by moments of extraordinary, even transformative change, after which things settle back down into a reformulated pattern of ordinariness (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993 and Carmines and Stimson 1989). Each brand of institutionalism lends itself to this view: Rational choice, with its emphasis on equilibrium and its methodology of comparative statics; historical institutionalism, with its focus on periodization and regimes;

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> This minimalist definition of social science is intended to be a thoroughly catholic one. I do not mean to endorse a vision of social science that depends on the discovery of Hempelian covering laws that govern human behavior across time and space, nor do I mean to exclude interpretive modes of inquiry such as Geertz's (1973) notion of "thick description," which, although it does not endorse generalization across cultural milieus, nevertheless hews to an idea of understanding human societies by discerning regular patterns of interaction and signification among their members (Merton 1949; Zuckerman 1997).

and sociological institutionalism, with its account of taken-for-granted cultural meanings and scripts that underlie action. Although ideational theories are often more attuned to change, they too tend to emphasize order and regularity. Ideas do not appear willy-nilly in ideational accounts; rather, they appear in settled, ordered configurations that serve to organize some reasonably broad aspect of political life over some span of time, whether as all-encompassing ideologies or as what Berman (1998, 21–22) calls "programmatic beliefs" (see also Eckstein 1988).

Both institutional and ideational approaches thus exhibit something of a bias toward finding and explaining stability in political arrangements. Each set of approaches has developed sophisticated tools for making causal inferences about the effects of stable, recurring patterns on political outcomes. This bias, however, poses a problem when we are confronted with significant political change. From a perspective that emphasizes stability and relegates things that do not fit the pattern to the background, the sources of important change almost necessarily appear to be exogenous, the result of some sort of shock of unknown origin that may or may not be assimilable by the prevailing order. What we are after is an explanation not of ordinary predictable variation in outcomes but of extraordinary change, where relationships among explanatory factors themselves change.

To put the matter in more analytical terms, consider a simple model of some political phenomenon:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \varepsilon. \tag{1}$$

Although the explanatory factors,  $X_1$  and  $X_2$ , vary, the model describes a stable pattern of relationships between these factors and the outcome, Y; when  $X_1$  or  $X_2$  varies by a certain amount, Y changes by a predictable amount, as described by the parameters,  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$ . Anything we do not observe or cannot measure or consider unnecessary to explain the outcome is bundled in the error term,  $\varepsilon$ . This model describes a stable pattern, and we can test its explanatory power by observing variation on the independent variables and comparing the model's predictions with actual states of the world under a variety of conditions. But consider that, for some reason, the pattern changes, requiring a new model to describe the same phenomenon:

$$Y = \beta_3 + \beta_4 X_1 + \beta_5 X_2 + \varepsilon. \tag{2}$$

This model describes a new set of stable regularities, in which the variables are the same but the relationships among them are different—we have new parameters,  $\beta_4$  and  $\beta_5$ , in place of the original ones. Now we have useful models of two situations, before and after some transformative change that has altered not just the conditions that produce some outcome (what I describe above as ordinary variation) but the very causal process at work in producing the outcome (extraordinary change).<sup>4</sup> We might even have a description of whatever happened at the moment of transformation from

(1) to (2). What we do not have is an account of how and why the world changed; there is nothing in the stable patterns of variation in model (1) that can provide a causal story about the emergence of model (2). Any explanation we might be able to mount for this change would have to be exogenous to model (1), based on something that was simply relegated to the error term, since model (1)'s parameters ( $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2$ ) are constant.<sup>5</sup>

What all of this abstract symbolism is meant to suggest is that the only source of explanatory power to account for significant political change—change that goes beyond the bounds of ordinary variation—is the error term, the detritus of the normal model of political affairs. These are the things that, as noted above, are considered irrelevant or unnecessary to a model of political order or else too wispy or ethereal to be the focus of systematic explanation. This is true, in general, of both institutional and ideational models that focus on ordered patterns in the political world. To explain the move from one set of institutions to another, we need reference to something exogenous to an institutional model of the initial state of affairs; likewise for a shift from one ideational pattern to another. The question is how to develop models of politics that can account for such substantial episodes without recourse to such ad hoc exogenous factors—in other words, how, if possible, to endogenize multiple ordered patterns, whether based on institutions or ideas, in a single type of explanatory framework that can help explain how apparently stable institutional and ideological patterns can change quite dramatically. There are limits, of course. Not everything that happens in the political world is predictable and consequential things happen that are quite simply beyond the reach of any reasonable model—singular events such as assassinations, for example. Thus we cannot hope to endogenize everything. Nevertheless, there does not seem to be any a priori reason why both ideas and institutions, neither of which has such singular character, cannot both be incorporated into reasonable, tractable models of politics.

One way out of this bind is to relax the emphasis on order and regularity in modeling politics. The alternative need not be chaos. Rather, we can consider that any political moment or episode or outcome is situated within a *variety* of ordered institutional and ideological patterns, each with its own origins and history and each with its own logic and pace (Orren and Skowronek 1994, 1996). These patterns, it is often metaphorically said, "take on lives of their own"; that is, they come to structure and delimit political interests, understandings, and behavior independently of other factors that might also be important. It is common in

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> For simplicity's sake, I have not considered the possibility that some new variable,  $X_3$ , may have entered the mix in the transition from

<sup>(1)</sup> to (2). This eventuality, however, would not change the fundamental point and would in fact deepen the conundrum that I am illustrating.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> I offer this stylized example not to suggest, as some have (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994), that the statistical reasoning represented therein is any kind of gold standard for social scientific inference but rather to demonstrate the distinction I am making between explaining stability and explaining change and to point to the need for more configurative models of politics that embrace a multiplicity of causal elements (Katznelson 1997).

both institutional and ideational analysis to conceive of political order in holistic terms. A political "order," in this mode, is a regular, predictable, and interconnected pattern of institutional and ideological arrangements that structures political life in a given place at a given time—"a durable mode of organizing and exercising political power...with distinct institutions, policies, and discourses," as David Plotke (1996, 1) defines it (see also Skowronek 1993). Such an order might have multiple institutional and ideological components, which shape and constrain political action by providing incentives, opportunities, and grounds for legitimation to political actors. An important presumption behind this approach is that a political "order" is internally coherent. This definition implies that the effects of the component parts are cumulative and mutually reinforcing, that they generally point most actors in the same (or at least complementary) directions most of the time. (This is not to say there is no conflict, only that conflicts are fundamentally stable and predictable and tend to be contained and resolved within the normal political processes that constitute the order in question according to generally agreed upon or conventionally understood rules and expectations.) As an analytical strategy for explaining political outcomes, this approach presumes that other factors are not consequential enough to create sufficiently strong incentives for actors to deviate from what appear to be the "normal" workings of

There is no reason to presume, however, that the ideological and institutional currents that prevail at any given time or place are necessarily connected with each other in any coherent or functional way. This is true for a number of reasons. First, political arrangements are rarely, if ever, the products of a coherent, total vision of politics that informs institutions and ideas and knits them together into a unified whole (and even in times and places that approach this extreme—revolutionary France, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany—politics remains subject to multiple, discordant forces). Rather, they are inevitably the products of compromise, partial and circumscribed, incoherent and jury-rigged, rarely if ever sweeping away the detritus of a previous order to construct a new one. New policies, institutional arrangements, or ideological paradigms thus do not replace the old but are layered atop prior patterns, creating what Jeffrey Tulis (1987, 17-18) has called a "layered text." Second, such arrangements are often the products of some past event, so that while institutions, policies, or sets of ideas might have arisen in response to particular historical circumstances, they often outlast the conditions that led to their creation and may persist despite being dysfunctional (North 1990). Consequently the ideological and institutional orders that prevail at any given time or place are unlikely to be connected with each other in any coherent or functional way. There may be instances in which ideological and institutional patterns "fit" together and cumulate into something that looks like an equilibrium (on the notion of "fit" see Skocpol 1992). At other times, however, they will collide and chafe, creating an ungainly configuration of political circumstances that has no clear resolution, presenting actors with contradictory and multidirectional imperatives and opportunities.

These considerations immediately shift attention away from any particular regularity and onto the tension or complementarity among patterns that might more plausibly drive the dynamics of political development. If we picture politics as occurring in multiple concurrent orders, it is in the friction between orders that we may more readily find the seeds of change within the politics of any given moment. Samuel Huntington (1981) identifies just such friction, between political ideals and the performance of political institutions, as the motive force behind American political development; when the gap between ideals and institutions grows large enough, he argues, periods of "creedal passion" occur in which institutional practices are reformed to align more closely with the ideals. Huntington's approach suggests the importance of the lack of fit among multiple ideological and institutional orders as an important motor of political change (although it is unclear what the causal mechanism is). But his view of these orders, particularly of ideas, is a relatively static one, in which a constant set of political ideas-the American Creed-serves as a fixed point to which political institutions and practices are tethered so that, like a pendulum, they return with a certain mechanical regularity and periodicity toward a central location. Political ideas and institutions are not fixed, however. Certain ideological constructions, at the level of Huntington's Creed (or culture, or ideology, or tradition)—the ideals of liberty and equality, for example—have a very long life span and can define enduring boundaries that a nation's politics will rarely, if ever, cross (Greenstone 1993). But ideas at this level do not offer a concrete guide to understanding the more precise pathways a country's political development might take. Many particular programmatic beliefs might be consistent with these broad boundary conditions, and these ideas might change more quickly. Moreover, the interpretation and framing even of deeply rooted ideas might change over time, so that concepts such as "liberty" or "equality" might be invoked to support very different practices in different contexts by people who all the while believe themselves to be upholding a timeless and unchanging political tradition. Similarly, some institutional features of politics are relatively stable over long stretches of time, while others are less fixed and more variable. If we unmoor both sets of factors from overly general assumptions about their fixity and stability, new patterns of order and change may well emerge into view.

As an example of this analytical dilemma, consider pluralism and consensus historiography, which dominated American social science in the aftermath of World War II. This approach, exemplified by such scholars as Louis Hartz (1955), Richard Hofstadter (1948), and David Truman (1971), offered a view of American politics in which ideology, institutions, and behavior were fundamentally aligned with one another. Liberal individualism, skepticism toward the state, the separation of powers, and a commitment to a set of "rules of the game" all went together to create

a unified and ordered whole, in which ideas, institutions, and interests reinforced one another to produce a frictionless politics of incremental adjustment and group accommodation, devoid of intense, polarizing, and destabilizing institutional or ideological confrontations (Bell 1960). But this school of thought lacked the capacity to explain the convulsive changes in American politics in the 1960s, such as the civil rights revolution, which mounted a profound challenge to the pluralist picture of order, consensus, and functionality—the type of untidy change that Truman (1971, xliv, 524) called (with more than a little horror) "the whirlwind." Even writers in this school who recognized the civil rights challenge, such as Gunnar Myrdal (1944), could not conceive of racism and segregation as anything other than mistakes, deviations, somehow external to the American political tradition (Smith 1993, 1997). But an alternative perspective understands the civil rights transformations of the 1950s and 1960s not as alien to the American political tradition but as outgrowths of many of the very ideological and institutional structures that are constitutive of it: an ideology of equal rights; political mobilization and organization; pressure on policymakers through the courts, electoral politics, and other institutional venues, and so forth (Klinkner and Smith 1999; McAdam 1982). In this view, the civil rights revolution arose from a clash among elements of the American political system rather than an unexplainable exogenous shock.

The central hypothesis that emerges from this discussion is that where friction among multiple political orders is more prevalent, the likelihood of significant, extraordinary political change (as opposed to normal variation) will increase. Note that this formulation is not necessarily about friction between ideas and institutions, although it may take this form, but about friction among ordered political patterns however constituted, whether institutional or ideational. Institutions can clash with each other, as can ideas. The essential point is to decompose the notion of a single, encompassing political "order" into its component parts, whatever form they happen to take, to judge the extent to which they overlap or conflict, and, finally, to assess whether the disjunction among them plausibly generates important political change. It is an important advantage of this approach that it can consider both institutions and ideas as building blocks of an explanation for political change, but it need not do so if the important motors of change in a given case fall on one side or other of the ideas-institutions divide.

The challenge of identifying and measuring friction among orders is a serious one. As the pluralism example demonstrates, different analysts can find order and disorder in the same material. Most important to the enterprise is simply the careful historical reconstruction of the relevant elements of the political setting of the moment under consideration—a policy debate, an era in political history, whatever the unit of analysis might be. This is not as biased and ad hoc an approach as it sounds at first blush. First, most episodes of important political change have already been the subject of voluminous historical analysis; even if analysts disagree

about the central causes of change, the key contextual factors and political patterns that are likely to generate friction in the political environment will be well known and this is unlikely to be a source of bias in the analysis (see Lustick 1996). Second, the characteristics of the major sources of political order are also well known, through the extensive literatures on ideas and institutions and their effects that I have already discussed. It is important to note that the approach I outline here is not a substitute for work that theorizes about order or discerns and explains ordered patterns in the political world, whether institutional or ideational. In fact, this synthesis can only build on the advances that have been made in the last generation by both institutional and ideational theorists and depends on the continuation and expansion of these research programs (see Fiorina 1996).

Thus finding the multiple political orders that combine and potentially clash to produce change is no great mystery. In general, there will be a finite number of components that will constitute the field of inquiry, what we might call the dimensions of disorder (or order, as the case might be). These can be described in three clusters, each of which is a familiar presence in political analysis. The first cluster comprises governing institutions, whether the conventional institutions of states (legislatures, executives, courts, bureaucracies), international organizations, or other governance arrangements. The second cluster comprises the organizational environment, such as political parties and party systems, the organization of interests, nongovernmental organizations, and the like. The third cluster comprises the ideological and cultural repertoires that organize and legitimate political discourse.

Each of these sets of factors generates incentives and opportunities and defines repertoires of legitimate moves for political actors. Measuring friction, then, is a matter of deriving, from the historical record, accounts of these incentives, opportunities, and repertoires that arise from multiple sources of political order and impinge simultaneously on the same set of actors. What is important is the "directionality" of these incentives. Where they point mostly or predominantly in one direction, at least for most actors most of the time, the result will likely be political stability. Friction, on the other hand, occurs when they point in substantially different directions, especially where they subject the same sets of actors to conflicting pressures that pose acute dilemmas and make conventional moves untenable. In such circumstances, significant political change is more likely to result.

The structure of the multiple-orders argument draws significantly on parallels with Paul Pierson's (1993, 2000a) work on policy feedback and path dependence. Pierson has called attention to processes by which political decisions made at particular moments can become self-reinforcing, making change difficult and costly even when the policies or institutions become dysfunctional (North 1990). The causal process in Pierson's framework involves the "locking-in" of policies or other political arrangements through processes of learning, the coordination and organization of political

activity, and the adaptation of expectations. Political actors, whose interests and understandings of the political world are increasingly likely to be aligned with these arrangements, act to protect them. This approach, with its emphasis on order and regularity, is thus particularly successful at explaining the status quo bias of many political arrangements, as in Pierson's (1994) own analysis of the surprising resilience of welfare policies in the face of strong political and ideological pressures for retrenchment (Wood 2001).

Although the path-dependence framework is especially well suited to explaining continuity, its focus on the unfolding of political processes over time draws attention to the particular mechanisms by which political processes reinforce themselves and consequently provide an important opening to the study of political change (Pierson 2000b; Thelen 1999; Wood 2001). In particular, its causal approach—its attention to the incentives, opportunities, and repertoires that prevailing structures construct for political actors—provides a useful guide to the causal mechanisms that underlie the multiple-orders approach. The causal sequence, in which actors adapt to existing political arrangements and behave in response to them, is parallel, but with the recognition that at any given moment, politics is situated on multiple "paths," each of which contributes to the array of the choices available to actors. When these paths are consonant with one another, when they point actors in complementary directions, the result may be stability and incrementalism; when they are not, rather than self-reinforcing patterns of "lock-in," the result will more likely be instability and uncertainty among actors about how to formulate and pursue their political aims.

Thus the causal mechanism linking structural friction and political change is the reformulation of the incentives and opportunities for individual political action that friction produces—the discontinuities between the expectations generated by the "orders" considered individually and new opportunities presented by the "system" (conceived as a complex of individual "orders"). When stable patterns of politics clash, purposive political actors will often find themselves at an impasse, unable to proceed according to the "normal" patterns and processes that had hitherto governed their behavior. Political ideas and interests that had formerly prevailed might no longer find outlets in the same institutional settings, or institutions might no longer be able to resolve (or even paper over) clashes of ideas as before. Political actors in such circumstances will often be induced to find new ways to define and advance their aims, whether by finding a new institutional forum that is more receptive to their ideas or by adapting ideas to take advantage of new institutional opportunities. The result of these moves is not that old orders are jettisoned but that elements of them are recombined and reconfigured into a new set of political patterns that is recognizably new and yet retains some continuity with the old ones (much as Tocqueville [1955] described the aftermath of the French Revolution).

One key to this explanatory strategy is the openness and unpredictability of these moments when the

normal order of politics is unsettled rather than change per se. Such friction, it is important to note, need not actually produce substantial change. The Clinton administration's health policy effort of 1993-94, for example, was a moment when a variety of institutional and ideological currents—electoral politics, interest-group configurations, policy legacies, and ideas flowing from the health policy community, among other thingscombined to make the status quo seem untenable and to make dramatic policy innovation seem possible, if not probable (Hacker 1997; Peterson 1998; Skocpol 1996). That Clinton's effort failed does not diminish the importance of understanding politics in terms of overlapping orders; rather, it underscores the importance of identifying such moments of prospective choice and opportunity when new directions seem genuinely available and tracing the choices actors make under these circumstances.

This perspective presents politics as a process that may have stable elements but contains within itself the seeds of change, much like Joseph Schumpeter's (1950, 83) notion of "creative destruction," which he called "the essential fact about capitalism." In this picture, Schumpeter argues, "analysis of what happens in any particular part of [the economy]-say, in an individual concern or industry—may clarify details of mechanism but is inconclusive beyond that." Similarly, the multiple-orders approach suggests that political life thus rarely settles into stable patterns that persist unchanging for long periods; rather, it may be more fruitful to regard politics in terms of systems, as Robert Jervis (1997) argues, in which multiple sets of interconnected relational patterns interact. Analytically, this turn suggests a move toward a more configurative and relational approach to political change, which focuses "less on the causal importance of this or that variable contrasted with others but more on how variables are joined together in specific historical circumstances" (Katznelson 1997, 99).

Much path-breaking work on political change takes something like this approach. In his important account of changing institutional rules in the U.S. Congress, Eric Schickler (2001) develops a model of "disjointed pluralism," in which different interests drive the process of building coalition's for congressional reform at different times, and various reforms adopted to serve different purposes are layered atop one another. "By disjointed," he writes, "I mean that the dynamics of institutional development derive from the *interactions* and tensions among competing coalitions promoting several different interests. These interactions and tensions are played out when members of Congress adopt a single institutional change, and over time as legislative organization develops through the accumulation of innovations, each sought by a different coalition promoting a different interest" (Schickler 2001, 4; original emphasis). The result is a dynamic process of reform and development, in which members of Congress continually find themselves dissatisfied with their institutional setting, but for shifting reasons as both interests and institutions evolve. No reform is ever complete in that it does not sweep away old rules to create a new, self-contained, coherent order, and it is the constant friction among procedural rules, organizational structure, and members' goals that drives the developmental process forward.

Several recent works in the ideational camp also take this approach (although rather less self-consciously). In his account of the transition from Keynesianism to monetarism in Britain, Peter Hall (1993) shows how a process of social learning created friction not just within the Keynesian paradigm that dominated policy but between the shifting ideological milieu and the institutional structure of British economic policymaking. What made the ideological drift from Keynesianism toward monetarism particularly influential in fundamentally remaking policy was not just the ideological triumph of a new paradigm but the difficulties that ideational change posed for institutional actors—the Treasury, the Bank of England, the Cabinet. Similarly, Kathleen McNamara (1998) locates the causes for the success of monetary union in Europe at the intersection of shifting policy ideas and the increasingly brittle structure of international economic institutions. These works show how the disjunction among differently constituted political orders, both ideational and institutional, can drive processes of political development.

# IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS IN AMERICAN RACE POLICY

As an illustration of how the overlay of ideological and institutional patterns can generate dramatic and unexpected political change, I sketch an example from American political development, the history of race policy in the United States in the 1960s and 1970s. The trajectory of race policy provides ample demonstration of the potential of a multiple-orders approach to explain outcomes that seem to defy analysis in terms of stability and order. In this section, I begin by outlining the puzzle that civil rights policy presents, namely, the surprising emergence of affirmative action. I then sketch the institutional and ideological contexts that seemed to make this development unlikely. Finally, I show how affirmative action arose out of the tension created by this particular configuration of elements by inducing actors to behave in ways that defied the expectations of more linear models of policy development.

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 adopted an explicitly color-blind approach to prohibiting racial discrimination in employment: Title VII of the act outlawed deliberate, individual acts of discrimination such as the refusal to hire or promote individuals because of their race. In doing so, the act appeared explicitly to rule out an alternative, race- and group-conscious approach to recognizing and remedying discrimination in the workplace. It refused to recognize so-called "statistical discrimination" (the inference of discrimination from the mismatch between an employers' proportion of minority employees and the proportion of minorities in the local labor force) and refused to sanction group-based remedies for discrimination, such as targets or quotas for the hiring of minorities. And yet within 10 years of

the act's passage, the United States had adopted just this approach, having developed an extensive set of race-conscious, group-based policies and practices that offer compensatory advantages to members of historically or currently disadvantaged groups—known collectively as affirmative action.

This transition, from a convergence on colorblindness to an embrace of race-conscious remedies for discrimination (ambivalent and controversial, to be sure), poses a sharp challenge for both ideational and institutional explanatory approaches. Color-blindness, as John Skrentny (1996) has pointed out, is part of the taken-for-granted ideological and cultural fabric of American political life: the principle that individuals should be judged and afforded opportunity without reference to their race (or any other irrelevant characteristic). How, then, did American policy effectively turn away from this powerful idea and embrace its opposite, even after major legislation effectively affirmed and institutionalized the notion of color-blindness in national policy (Burstein 1985)? At the same time, the agency created to enforce the Civil Rights Act's vision of color-blind policy—the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)—was given no effective enforcement power and was relegated to a sideline role as conciliator and investigator. It could neither order remedies for discrimination nor file lawsuits. Moreover, the EEOC was embedded in a fragmented and decentralized state that frustrated the aims of civil rights advocates who sought vigorous enforcement. And yet the "weak" American state not only proved surprisingly effective at devising means of enforcing antidiscrimination law, but also managed to challenge the color-blind presumptions of its own law and to forge an extensive network of race-conscious policies and practices that have proven strikingly resilient in the face of political and legal challenges.

Analytically, then, the puzzle is that neither ideas (the apparent triumph of color-blindness in 1964) nor institutions (the apparent weakness of the civil rights enforcement apparatus) predict the emergence of affirmative action in any kind of way that makes sense. Neither approach even comes close; both would lead us to expect anemic enforcement, color-blindness because it rules out collective, compensatory hiring policies and institutional weakness because it leaves the state with little or no coercive power to enforce the law. In statistical parlance, the signs on the parameters are wrong.

Answering this puzzle thus demands a perspective that can account for the development of rather dramatic change out of political elements that seem to point toward stability. The development of civil rights policy was situated in several ideational and institutional orders simultaneously. Ideologically, the debates over civil rights represented the culmination of a long-standing debate in American political and intellectual life between color-blind and race-conscious visions of American society. On one hand, the American liberal tradition demanded color-blindness—the idea that race is irrelevant to citizenship and that the law, the state, and public policy should make no distinctions between persons on account of skin color. The color-blind vision

of civil rights policy invoked the deeply rooted traditions of individual rights and equality before the law (Skrentny 1996, 7). This idea has a long intellectual lineage in civil rights policy, dating at least to 1896, when Justice John Marshall Harlan wrote in his dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896, 559) that "our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law." But Harlan wrote as the lone voice against a decision that, in fact, validated an alternative vision of civil rights policy, an ascriptive tradition of racism that had long challenged liberalism for ascendancy in American politics (Smith 1997). In this view, race was not only a legitimate but an essential political category, and in Plessy's wake racial distinctions could be (and were frequently) invoked to protect white supremacy and state-sponsored segregation.

Not surprisingly, the race-conscious ideological tradition was not popular among civil rights advocates for much of the twentieth century. But in debates over how to prevent racial discrimination in such spheres as education, commerce, and employment, it became increasingly clear that a straightforward color-blind approach would not suffice, because in any context, simply treating race as irrelevant would not outweigh the effects of past discrimination that left many, if not most, African-Americans ill equipped to take advantage of the opportunities that color-blindness might offer. Beginning in the 1940s with the Fair Employment Practices Commission and continuing through the 1950s, civil rights advocates and public officials concerned with racial equality began to debate whether race-conscious means were necessary to achieve manifestly color-blind ends (Burstein 1985; King 1995, 208-9; Kryder 2000, 88-132; Skrentny 1996, 114-17). This dilemma found felicitous expression in the phrase "affirmative action," which was included almost casually in an executive order issued by President John F. Kennedy in March 1961. The phrase was intended not to supplant the order's fundamentally color-blind purpose (to ensure nondiscrimination by federal government contractors) but to supplement it, indicating vaguely that employers ought to take extra steps to ensure that hiring was not biased but not indicating how they were to go about this (Graham 1990, 40-43; Kennedy 1961; Skrentny 1996, 114). Thus the debate surrounding the Civil Rights Act occurred on ideological terrain defined by two competing paradigms, each of which had a deep intellectual legacy as well as institutionally powerful proponents.

These debates took place in several nested institutional settings. They were played out, first, in a Congress still dominated, as it had been for much of the twentieth century, by Southern Democrats, who wielded disproportionate power through a variety of procedural and organizational mechanisms (such as the filibuster in the Senate) and who were by and large committed to protecting their region's autonomy in racial matters (Key 1949). Second, they were shaped by a party system in which race was playing an ever-growing role. In particular, the Democratic party was increasingly divided over civil rights, leaving Republicans in the

pivotal position in the policymaking process (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Katznelson, Geiger, and Kryder 1993). These characteristics of congressional and partisan politics underscored a deep sectional split that had long been a central structural feature of American politics and prevented Congress from passing any civil rights legislation from 1875 until 1957 (Bensel 1984; Key 1949). Third, civil rights policy was made in the context of a chronically weak and fragmented state, in which civil rights authority, such as it was, was already divided among a number of different administrative agencies, most of whom lacked coercive authority. Moreover, the federal civil rights establishment was steeped in the color-blind model of antidiscrimination policy (Skrentny 1996, 34). These institutional factors did not augur well for significant change in civil rights policy; rather, they tended to pull policy toward the status quo or, at least, to foreclose all but incremental moves toward color-blindness.

Two other elements of the institutional context, however, looked more promising. The first was the cyclical pattern of American presidential elections. Both Kennedy and then Lyndon Johnson needed to balance the electoral demands of Southern whites and Northern blacks, each of whom was an essential piece of the Democratic coalition. Consequently, civil rights legislation posed both challenges and opportunities for building a reelection coalition in 1964 (Miroff 1981). Civil rights posed similar challenges and opportunities for Richard Nixon in his own presidential bids, as he sought to pry the South loose from the Democrats' grip while also competing for minority votes (Frymer and Skrentny 1998). For all of these presidents, civil rights offered an opportunity for distinctive and bold action, although one that had to be handled gingerly (Skowronek 1993). The second such factor, and what made civil rights an irresistible political force for these presidents, was the civil rights movement, which embraced race-consciousness in a double sense, both embodying it in its embrace of race as a collective political identity and championing it as a policy paradigm.

The conflict and ambivalence among these contending institutional and ideological forces, particularly between color-blind and race-conscious visions of antidiscrimination policy, were played out first in congressional deliberations over the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Civil rights advocates embraced a policy vision that coupled a race-conscious approach with strong regulatory enforcement by the federal government by creating a new agency with the power to uncover and prohibit broad patterns of discrimination by employers. This approach was opposed not only by Southern Democrats, who were almost-unanimous in their unalterable opposition to any federal action on civil rights, but also by Republicans, who mistrusted the expansion of state power it entailed, and the Kennedy administration, which could ill afford to alienate the South. A somewhat stripped-down bill passed the House in February 1964, only to run into a three-month filibuster in the Senate. The act's final form was the product of a compromise between Senate Republicans and Northern Democrats, with the blessing of the Johnson administration. The compromise, brokered by Senate minority leader Everett Dirksen, resolved both the ideological and the institutional questions that were at the center of the debate. Ideologically, the Dirksen compromise fell squarely in the color-blind camp, defining discrimination as a deliberate individual act and apparently explicitly ruling out collective, race-conscious remedies. Institutionally, the compromise substantially hollowed out the enforcement authority of the new EEOC (Graham 1990).

Although the Civil Rights Act certainly counts as dramatic political change, it was in many ways consonant with much that had come before, both in its embrace of color-blindness and in its withholding of strong coercive enforcement power from the state. Moreover, by establishing an apparently consistent and coherent set of ideological and institutional parameters for civil rights policy, it seemed poised to lock antidiscrimination enforcement into a pattern of weak enforcement. Looking at the situation prospectively from the vantage point of 1964, there are several compelling institutional and ideational reasons to expect this outcome. First was the lack of state power. The EEOC could neither order employers not to discriminate nor sue them. The second was the fragmentation of state power. The EEOC was only one among a veritable alphabet soup of civil rights agencies in the federal government, each with its own turf and resources. It was, like all federal agencies, subject to the oversight of both the president and Congress, which remained subject to the same electoral and partisan forces that had produced the compromise in the first place. A result of ineffectual bureaucratic enforcement subject to contending interests and political interference would not have been at all inconsistent with other regulatory initiatives in this period, as institutional theory has frequently confirmed (Fiorina 1977; Moe 1987, 1989). Finally, the Civil Rights Act institutionalized color-blindness, writing its presumptions quite explicitly into the law. Both the institutional and the ideational settlements of 1964 seemed to create a new status quo, a new equilibrium, that would carry forward, and analytical perspectives that emphasize either institutions or ideas as constraints on political behavior or on ordered patterns in political life would expect this equilibrium to endure. None of these factors points toward the emergence of a strong, race-conscious antidiscrimination enforcement mechanism.

And yet emerge it did. The momentary resolution embodied by the Dirksen compromise generated friction among its ideological and institutional elements that deflected antidiscrimination policy from the path it seemed most likely to take. In particular, the Dirksen compromise produced a critical mismatch between the ideological underpinnings of antidiscrimination policy and the institutional capacity created to enforce it. In general, this friction arose because, despite the compromise, the Civil Rights Act established strong expectations that the federal government would act to combat employment discrimination, expectations that shaped the outlooks and interests of presidents and members of Congress, bureaucrats in the EEOC and elsewhere, and advocates in the civil rights movement,

among others. The model of enforcement implied by the law's color-blind ideological approach was one of retrospective judgment, in which deliberate individual acts of discrimination could be adjudicated and punished after the fact. But—and here is the critical source of friction in the civil rights enforcement regime—the law did not throw the state's institutional weight behind this enforcement model: The EEOC could investigate and conciliate in individual cases; the Justice Department could bring lawsuits, but only in "patternor-practice" cases where it could document systematic, rather than simply individual, discrimination; and, after Johnson's Executive Order 11246 in 1965, the Labor Department could threaten to rescind federal contracts when it could document discrimination (Graham 1990, 180-87; Johnson 1965; Skrentny 1996, 133-34). No arm of the federal government possessed the power to enforce the central employment discrimination aim of the Civil Rights Act. Color-blind antidiscrimination policy, focused on punishing particular individual instances of discrimination by employers, failed to take hold not primarily because of a lack of consensus on color-blindness as a goal but because the institutional setting of civil rights enforcement efforts provided weak support for this model.

More particularly, this mismatch between the ideology embedded in the Civil Rights Act and the institutional capacity that it created affected the incentives and opportunities of political actors in the civil rights field. For presidents, first Johnson and then Richard Nixon, it posed a political dilemma. Vigorous enforcement would please the act's supporters and assuage the still vigorous forces of the civil rights movement but would displease Johnson's fellow Southerners and other skeptics of strong state civil rights authority. On the other hand, a White House task force in June 1964 doubted "that the bill will make for sufficient or sufficiently rapid progress as far as the Negro and a good part of the white community is concerned to placate the forces that have gathered over the past years."6 The Johnson administration responded by temporizing—first by delaying appointing EEOC commissioners, then by only half-heartedly supporting moves in Congress to expand the EEOC's power, and, finally, by developing and then shelving a plan to require minority hiring targets of federal contractors (the "Philadelphia Plan") (Graham 1990, 177–79, 278–97).

Nixon faced a similar dilemma. On one hand, he hoped to pursue a "Southern strategy," winning traditionally Democratic white Southern votes. On the other hand, he had to do something; he could not ignore the prevailing (if precarious) civil rights

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Task Force Issue Paper, Civil Rights, 17 June 1964, Office Files of Lee C. White, Box 3, Lyndon B. Johnson Library (hereafter cited as LBJL).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Memorandum, Lee C. White to Johnson, 28 September 1964, LE, White House Central File, Box 167, LBJL; Memorandum, Lee C. White to Johnson, 5 October 1965, Civil Rights during the Johnson Administration, 1963–1969: A Collection from the Holdings of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, part 1, reel 5; Memorandum, Ramsey Clark to Joseph Califano, 1966 Task Force Report, Legislative Background, Civil Rights Act of 1964, LBJL.

consensus in the rest of the country by burying the problems of employment discrimination enforcement (see Skowronek 1993). Although given the party's right turn on civil rights in the early 1960s a Republican administration was perhaps an unlikely champion of strong federal enforcement, Nixon had in fact long worried that the United States's record on race relations weakened its international position in the Cold War (Dudziak 2000). He opposed expanding the EEOC's power and eventually engineered and signed compromise legislation in 1972 that gave it the power to file lawsuits (although not to issue regulatory cease-and-desist orders). Most important, however, Nixon resurrected the Philadelphia Plan, throwing the weight of the executive branch behind race-conscious antidiscrimination policy with the power of coercive sanctions behind it (Skrentny 1996, 137–39, 193–211). This move—a form of affirmative action as we know it today—allowed Nixon to support enforcement efforts in the North while soft-pedaling the issue in the South (where he was simultaneously winning credit with his vigorous opposition to school busing) and to drive a wedge between African-Americans and labor unions, two pillars of the Democratic party's constituency. It thus proved an apt vehicle for Nixon to negotiate his complex partisan, sectional, and electoral situation.

For other actors as well, the ideological-institutional mismatch of the new civil rights regime presented opportunities as well as constraints. The unfortunate executives and bureaucrats of the EEOC found themselves in a nearly impossible position. Expected to enforce the law but left essentially powerless to do so, the EEOC had to find other outlets to fulfill its enforcement mission. These institutional limitations, however, proved a double-edged sword. On one hand, the EEOC's relative weakness and political vulnerability reflected the general limits on administrative power in American government. On the other hand, these very same institutional constraints created a great deal of slack in the commission's political and administrative environment. Limits on its power forced it to seek other means of influence, particularly by collaborating with other institutions, both inside and outside the state. This imperative drove the problem of antidiscrimination enforcement into the same fragmented and decentralized political arena that had produced the EEOC's incapacity in the first place. The struggle for enforcement would be fought out not in terms of administrative power emanating from Washington but in multiple arenas and jurisdictions around the country. In this context, the EEOC sought to play what role and forge what alliances it could as it sought pragmatic rather than ideological or coercive solutions to the problem of fulfilling its mandate in constrained environment (Skrentny 1996, chap. 5).

In moving away from its prescribed institutional role, the EEOC was also led to move away from the color-blind model of antidiscrimination enforcement. Among the EEOC's key partners in this endeavor were African-Americans themselves, especially groups such as the NAACP that were important proponents of race-conscious approaches to civil rights policy, particularly

of affirmative action in the form of the same kind of hiring targets imposed by the Philadelphia Plan. In particular, these groups were equipped to undertake the fight for affirmative action on the local level. Despite the mass national mobilization that characterized the civil rights era, the attempts to bypass the pervasive localism of African-American politics—in the civil rights movement, the War on Poverty, and the courts did not ultimately forge firm political links between African-Americans and the national state. Despite (or perhaps because of) overwhelming electoral support for Democratic candidates, African-Americans found themselves political captives of an increasingly indifferent party at the national level (Frymer 1999). Instead, African-American political organization flourished at the local level in the late 1960s and early 1970s, continuing the traditional pattern of linkages between African-Americans and the state. But whereas these historical patterns of diffusion, decentralization, and local attachment had long been sources of weakness for the political fortunes of African-Americans, in the present context they were, ironically, sources of strength. In particular, federated organizations such as the NAACP and its Legal Defense Fund could collaborate with the EEOC in pursuing race-conscious remedies for employment discrimination in a variety of local-level forums (Greenstone and Peterson 1973; Lieberman 1998; Morone 1990, chap. 6; Skocpol, Ganz, and Munson 2000).

The principal institutional arenas for these activities were collective bargaining between union locals and employers and lawsuits in the federal courts; both of these arenas allowed the EEOC to get around its lack of coercive authority. In particular, the EEOC's relationship with the federal courts (especially after the 1972 amendments) proved empowering, because it gave the commission access to a politically and organizationally independent means of deciding discrimination cases and enforcing remedies. It was by these alternative routes that the EEOC became a key player in subverting the very color-blind model of race policy that it had been created to enforce. It held hearings to publicize egregious cases of discrimination, pressuring employers to change their personnel practices. It participated with the NAACP and other civil rights organizations in precedent-setting antidiscrimination actions in labor negotiations and the federal courts that shaped antidiscrimination practices in a wide swath of American industry. The EEOC, for example, played a central role in Griggs v. Duke Power Company (1971), the case in which the Supreme Court ruled that employers could not use even ostensibly race-neutral tests or other occupational qualifications that tend disproportionately to bar minority applicants, unless the employer could show that they were a bona fide qualification for the job in question (Graham 1990, 383-90; Stein 1998). Like the presidential initiatives designed to cut through the ideological and institutional confusion engendered by the Civil Rights Act, these moves contributed to the unraveling of the color-blind consensus and the consolidation of a race-conscious policy approach backed powerfully by the state by the early 1970s, an outcome that had seemed most improbable only a decade earlier.

#### CONCLUSIONS

This history suggests that the answer to the problem of understanding puzzling change in American race policy lies at the intersection of ideas and institutions and in the tension between ideological traditions and institutional capacities. In the case of American race policy, the Civil Rights Act seemed to embody a particular ideological approach to racial inequality, but the institutional incentives and opportunities in which key actors were embedded allowed them to mount a challenge to this approach even while claiming to maintain it (and possibly even believing they were doing so). In fact, had the EEOC been given greater coercive powers at the outset to enforce the color-blind vision of antidiscrimination law, it is likely that the impulse for affirmative action would have been weaker, because the EEOC would have turned its attention to an apparently more fruitful set of tasks.

More generally, this analysis suggests that public policies are most fruitfully understood as the results of political conflicts in which particular elements of national cultural and ideological repertoires are mobilized and enacted into policy. These political struggles take place within historical and institutional contexts that define the allocation and exercise of political power and so shape policymaking, especially by constraining political behavior through the operation of rules, norms, and organizational settings (Thelen and Steinmo 1992). At the same time, institutions also create strategic opportunities for purposive political actors to further their interests, and they shape political opportunities for the mobilization of social interests (Tarrow 1994). Similarly, political ideas and cultural traditions institutionalized, taken-for-granted understandings of political and social arrangements—also constrain and enable policymaking, both by limiting the range of policies that are considered rational and by giving policymakers a repertoire of legitimating tactics for their favored policies (Campbell 1998; Dobbin 1994; Hall and Taylor 1996; Powell and DiMaggio 1991).

National political structures thus shape policy outcomes not simply by organizing power but also by acting as gatekeepers for political ideas and cultural dispositions. Policymaking in democratic government is not simply a process of optimizing the choice of policy instruments to solve readily identifiable social problems (Kingdon 1984; Lindblom 1959; Stone 1997). Rather, it entails the formation of coalitions among actors who represent both interests vying for power and diverse policy ideas. Because this coalition-building process combines what Hugh Heclo (1974, 305-6) has called "powering" and "puzzling"—clashes of both power and culture among social interests—the results it produces are not necessarily coherent and orderly but rather tend to build on prior policies without clearing away or dismantling them. The very process of policymaking can perpetuate the system of clashing

ideological and institutional orders and thus push forward the dynamic processes of political change.

The civil rights story underscores the fundamental point—that neither ideas nor institutions can rightly claim priority in an account that purports to explain significant political change (or even to describe it in a richly complex enough way to make a convincing, theoretically grounded explanation possible). What has changed, after all, in the civil rights story is not simply the values of a group of right-hand-side independent variables—public opinion about segregation, say, or the strength of the civil rights movement, or the level of interracial economic competition—resulting in a predictable change (within standard tolerances) of the left-hand-side dependent variable—antidiscrimination policy.

Rather, what has changed is the very relationships among factors that and the processes by which a set of underlying conditions generates outcomes. The evolution of race-conscious affirmative action out of the color-blind premises of the Civil Rights Act resulted not simply from the marginal adjustment of a set of independent variables producing linear policy effects, but from an entirely new configuration of mostly familiar elements—the same elements, in fact, that helped to shape the Civil Rights Act itself: ambivalence and contention over color-blindness and race-consciousness as ideological models for race policy, and fragmented and decentralized political institutions. Neither ideas nor institutions alone are sufficient to explain the trajectory of American race policy in the 1960s and 1970s. But the configuration of these two elements together enabled pragmatic but principled politicians, bureaucrats, lawyers, civil rights leaders, union leaders, corporate executives, and others to grope toward a set of practices that amounted to a fundamental transformation in race policy in a decade or so, one that embraced race-conscious employment practices and strong state action and one that deeply penetrated the state and civil society (Dobbin and Sutton 1998; Farhang 2001; Graham 1990; Skrentny 1996; Stein 1998).

So when *does* an idea's time come? The answer lies in the match between idea and moment. An idea's time arrives not simply because the idea is compelling on its own terms, but because opportune political circumstances favor it. At those moments when a political idea finds persuasive expression among actors whose institutional position gives them both the motive and the opportunity to translate it into policy—then, and only then, can we say that an idea has found a time.

This is not a story of variables but of configuration, not of ordered patterns of ideas or institutions in equilibrium, but of disjunction, friction, and overlap among ideational and institutional elements, none of which is sufficient but each of which is necessary for a more comprehensive explanation of an important episode of political change. It suggests the potential power, even the necessity, of an approach that considers both institutions and ideas as integral to political explanation and it underscores the importance of understanding the ways in which they interact to produce outcomes that, from either partial perspective, seem unpredictable. Above all, it shows off the advantages of an approach that relaxes considerably the traditional social-scientific emphasis on order and embraces what Lionel Trilling (1950, 10), perhaps one of the more unexpected prophets of American social science but a shrewd commentator on the American liberal tradition, called "variousness, possibility, complexity, and difficulty."

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### **Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science**

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This essay makes a case for an anthropological conceptualization of culture as "semiotic practices" and demonstrates how it adds value to political analyses. "Semiotic practices" refers to the processes of meaning-making in which agents' practices (e.g., their work habits, self-policing strategies, and leisure patterns) interact with their language and other symbolic systems. This version of culture can be employed on two levels. First, it refers to what symbols do—how symbols are inscribed in practices that operate to produce observable political effects. Second, "culture" is an abstract theoretical category, a lens that focuses on meaning, rather than on, say, prices or votes. By thinking of meaning construction in terms that emphasize intelligibility, as opposed to deep-seated psychological orientations, a practice-oriented approach avoids unacknowledged ambiguities that have bedeviled scholarly thinking and generated incommensurable understandings of what culture is. Through a brief exploration of two concerns central to political science—compliance and ethnic identity-formation—this paper ends by showing how culture as semiotic practices can be applied as a causal variable.

n epistemologies ranging from literary studies to rational choice theory, issues broadly construed as "cultural" have been animating academic debates, encouraging interdisciplinary exchanges, and inspiring battles over the methods, evidence, and goals of scholarly research. In this essay, I offer a critical analysis of the problems involved in current usages of the term in political science, make the case for a conceptualization of culture as semiotic practices, and show why it has value for, and how it might be employed by, political scientists.

In political science, the concept of culture used to be associated primarily with the literature on political culture that emerged in the context of postwar political sociology, with its interest in policy initiatives intended to reproduce the conditions of Western democratization abroad (Somers 1995, 114). Derived from Max Weber's ([1905] 1958) classic analysis of the "elective affinity" between the Protestant ethic and the rise of capitalism

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<sup>1</sup> Kroeber and Kluckhohn's (1952) historical overview of the changing meanings of the word "culture" in German, French, and English estimated that there were over 160 definitions in use in the 1950s (Brownstein 1995, 313; Steinmetz 1999, 5). Raymond Williams (1983, 90) limited his analysis to four main ordinary and academic uses, but he also observed that culture was "one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language" (Sewell 1999, 39; Steinmetz 1999, 5).

in the West, these studies attempted to show how cultural attitudes and beliefs either hindered or enabled "progress" (Banfield 1958; McClelland 1961, 1963; Pve 1965). Conceived in terms of an alleged set of residual values and norms—what Sherry Ortner (1997, 8-9) has aptly characterized as "a deeply sedimented essence attaching to, or inhering in particular groups"—this notion of culture was prominent in the sociology of Talcott Parsons (1949, 1951, 1965) in modernization theory, and in the American cultural anthropology of Franz Boas (1986, 1911), Margaret Mead, and Ruth Benedict ([1934] 1989), as well as in the behaviorist revolution of the 1950s and 1960s. In political science, it was Gabriel Almond's (1956) seminal essay, along with his subsequent collaboration with Sidney Verba (1963), that produced one of the most influential understandings of political culture in terms of "orientations toward the political system," whereby some populations had civic "cultures" and others did not.2 Samuel Huntington's 1993 article in Foreign Affairs, "The Clash of Civilizations?" and his subsequent book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996) mark perhaps the most prominent and polemical recent example of this kind of political culturalism in political science.

Political culture accounts, with their tendencies toward cultural essentialism, have rightly come in for criticism by many political scientists. Rejecting such views as either fundamentally tautological or empirically invalid, some critics have opted for one or another strictly "materialist" approach, objecting to the consideration of cultural variables in any form (see, e.g., Hirschman 1984, Jackman and Miller 1996, and Tilly, 1975, 603–21). The ascendance of methodological individualism

Middle East studies is one field in which the concept has been especially charged. I have in mind scholars such as Lisa Anderson, Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, and Michael Hudson, all of whom use "culture" to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> This summary of the political culture school admittedly simplifies a complex group of approaches. In political science, the "classic" study was Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba's (1963) *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* See also Pye 1965, 512–60. For one of the most recent influential books in this genre, see Putnam, Leonard, and Nanetti 1993. For an insightful extension of Putnam's concept of "social apital," see Boix and Posner 1996. <sup>3</sup> Middle Fort extension of Putnam's concept of "social apital," see Boix and Posner 1996.

and rational choice theory in the mid-1980s also led practitioners to argue that the analysis of group values or customs such as those associated with the term culture was irrelevant to political inquiry (Przeworski 1985). Politics concerned material interests and the relative success or failure of the individuals articulating them. Symbolic displays and rhetorical practices were epiphenomenal.

Although individual rational choice theorists have often been at pains to reject culturalist arguments as tautological, untestable, or beside the point, faced with explaining postcommunist upheavals, ethnic violence, "identity" politics, religious "fundamentalism," and the ongoing problems of democratic transitions, others have resorted to culture as a "fallback" position, a way of accounting for divergent and often disappointing political outcomes (Kuper 1999, 10). By claiming that "cultures" have "peculiarities" that explain the failure of those nation-states to democratize, or by asserting that political conflict is the outcome of "irreducible cultural differences" (Bates et al. 1998; Greif 1994, 912-50; Rogowski 1997, 14), these theorists have responded to genuine explanatory needs by reviving an outmoded and unhelpful understanding of the concept. A concept of culture defined from the perspective of political science, but informed by the debates in critical anthropology, would require changes in the ways the term is applied and in how political phenomena are analyzed and explained.4

The purpose of this essay is to show how a critical understanding of culture as practices of meaning-making facilitates insights about politics, enabling political scientists to produce sophisticated causal arguments and to treat forms of evidence that, while manifestly political, most political science approaches tend to overlook. Studying meaning-production entails analyzing the relations between agents' practices (e.g., their work habits, gendered norms, self-policing strategies, and leisure patterns) and systems of signification (language and other symbolic systems) (Sewell 1999; see also Ortner 1997). The words "semiotic practices" are shorthand for this approach. This conceptualization operates on two levels. First, culture as semiotic practices

mean identifiable essences or sedimented values inhering in particular groups. Chaudhry (1994), in particular, tends to confuse Samuel Huntington's invocations of the term with any interest in "culture" or cultural studies. See also Anderson 1995, 77–92, and Hudson 1995, 61–76

refers to what language and symbols do-how they are inscribed in concrete actions and how they operate to produce observable political effects. In this sense, culture can be used as a causal or explanatory variable. At the same time, insofar as semiotic practices are also the effects of institutional arrangements, of structures of domination, and of strategic interests, activities of meaning-making can also be studied as effects or dependent variables. Second, culture as semiotic practices is also a lens. It offers a view of political phenomena by focusing attention on how and why actors invest them with meaning. While every activity has a semiotic component, the point here is not to assert that politics must be examined from a semiotic-practical point of view. Whether one does or does not explore processes of meaning-making will be determined by the particular research problem one confronts. At issue are approaches to political phenomena that do seek to encompass cultural considerations. Unlike current invocations of culture in political science, in an empirically grounded, practice-oriented approach to culture, meanings are understood to exist inside historical processes, which themselves are always enmeshed in changing relations of power (Asad 1993, 43).

A practice-oriented cultural approach can help us explain how political identifications are established; how rhetoric and symbols not only exemplify but also can produce political compliance; why some political ideologies, policies, and self-policing strategies work better than others; what terms such as "democracy" (Schaffer, 1998) and "religion" mean to political actors who invoke or consume them and how these perceptions might affect political outcomes; and why particular material and status interests are taken for granted, are viewed as valuable, or become available idioms for dissemination and collective action. By paying attention to the ways in which certain meanings become authoritative while others do not, political scientists can use this practice-oriented concept of culture to help explain why recognizable events or empirical regularities occur. At a minimum, studying culture by identifying relevant semiotic practices has added value to the extent that it allows for nuanced, valid understandings of politics that are capable of undermining previous beliefs and affecting our prior assumptions about the world.<sup>5</sup>

This article is divided into two parts. In Part One, I examine the shared problems and epistemological disagreements that have hobbled debates about culture among political scientists of various orientations. Without overlooking what may be irreconcilable differences, I suggest possibilities for fruitful collaboration. In Part Two, I begin by discussing what practices

<sup>61-76.

&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Two political scientists who do follow debates in critical anthropology and consider everyday practices and systems of signification in their work are James C. Scott (1985, 1990) and Timothy Mitchell (1988). To my knowledge, neither has theorized culture explicitly, however, nor have they focused on the conceptual conundrums posed by the term. A recent book attempting to bring anthropologists working on the "culturally specific" into conversation with rational choice theorists in political science was designed to debate the nature and importance of comparison. Although the encounter may have enabled participants to share "a sense that the world's complexity demands some respect," the engagement did not (nor was it intended to) produce clear understandings of what "culture" means (Bowen and Petersen 1999, 2). Indeed anthropologists associated with the project unwittingly reproduced some of the confusions I identify in Part One. For debates about the culture concept in anthropology and elsewhere, see Bonnell and Hunt 1999, Clifford 1988, Clifford and Marcus 1986, Fabian 1983, Gupta and Ferguson 1997.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> By "valid" I mean—as Bowen and Petersen (1999, 12) write— "the degree to which the account of something picks up processes, ideas, or relationships that are indeed there in the world. Insisting on 'validity' does not imply a correspondence theory of truth (that a true description maps one-to-one onto the world), but only that some descriptions are better than others, and that the kinds of things anthropologists do when in the field—checking with many people, listening in on discussions, and living through events—are particularly good ways to arrive at a good description." I would argue that good descriptions help to ensure accurate explanations of political life.

of meaning-making are and how we should go about studying them. I propose an account of meaning based on intelligibility and then examine concrete methodological strategies for how a version of culture as semiotic practices might be applied as an explanatory or independent variable in political analyses. Through a brief exploration of two concerns central to current research about politics—compliance and ethnic identity-formation—I show how culture can operate as a causal variable, as well as a corrective to prevailing assumptions about political life.

# PART ONE: "CULTURE" IN POLITICAL SCIENCE

#### **Culture Concepts**

Declaring the onset of "a new phase in global history," Samuel Huntington defines "the fundamental sources of conflict" in the current world, not as economic or ideological in nature, but as "cultural." For Huntington, each civilization has a primordial cultural identity, so that the "major differences in political and economic development among civilizations are clearly rooted in their different cultures." He warns, "Culture and cultural identities... are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world.... The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations" (Huntington 1993. 22; 1996, 20, 28, 29). For Huntington, "culture" refers to the purported enduring values harbored by "highly integrated civilizations"—also sometimes confusingly termed "cultures."

This understanding of culture as a specific group's primordial values or traits is untenable empirically. It ignores the historical conditions and relevant power relationships that give rise to political phenomena such as "democratization," ethnic conflicts, and contemporary radical Islamicist movements. The group traits version of culture, moreover, rides roughshod over the diversity of views and the experiences of contention within the group or groups under study. In the case of Huntington's depiction of the Middle East, for example, such claims of sedimented essences have led scholars of culture to pass over such now obviously urgent matters as the contemporary nature of Islamicist movements, the causes of their recent emergence, and the ways in which communities of argument exist over what makes a Muslim a Muslim, what Islam means, and what, if any, its political role should be. Treating culture as a set of traits that purportedly distinguish one group from another also neglects the terrains of solidarity and fluidity that exist among groups, the ways in which political communities of various sorts have depended on the cross-fertilization of ideas and practices. In short, by ignoring historical processes and specific relations of political power, the treatment of culture in political science has downplayed the heterogeneous ways in which people experience the social order within and among groups, while exaggerating the commonality, constancy, and permanence of intragroup beliefs and

values. As a result, cultural essentialist explanations of political outcomes such as ethnic or religious violence tend to naturalize categories of groupness, rather than exploring the conditions under which such experiences of groupness come to seem natural when they do.

Some practitioners of rational choice theory use culture similarly to refer to an already-given community that can be studied by listing its fixed shared beliefs or values. The APSA-Comparative Politics Newsletter of summer 1997 (see "Notes from the Annual Meetings: Culture and Rational Choice." 1997), which features summaries from a roundtable debate entitled "Can the Rational Choice Framework Cope with Culture?" as well as solicited contributions, provides a case in point. exemplifying the conceptual confusions and empirical problems in current formulations of culture. On the one hand, scholars contributing to the Newsletter and those invoked within its pages have various understandings of culture and how it works—as common knowledge (Chwe 2001), as symbolic action (Johnson 1997), as "beliefs off the equilibrium path behavior" (Greif 1994), as pertaining "directly to the production of preference orderings" (Lustick 1997), and as "a socially shared and logically interrelated set of symbols, codes, and norms" (Rogowski 1997 and Lustick 1997). "Culture" is used in these examples as an analytic concept, which, as William H. Sewell, Jr. (1999, 39), points out, is usually "contrasted to some other equally abstract aspect or category of social life that is not culture, such as economy, politics or biology." On the other hand, these same scholars invoke "culture," as Huntington would, to denote the beliefs, values, and customs of a specified group. Despite Rogowski's dismissal of the tautological arguments of "political culture" theorists, for example, he nonetheless takes for granted the existence of "respective cultures" with possible "cultural peculiarities" and "irreducible differences," so that "culture" refers both to a "socially shared and logically interrelated set of symbols, codes, and norms" and to a particular community, such as "Catholic culture" (Rogowski 1997, 14). Similarly, James Johnson's (1997, 9) knowledgeable account of "culture" as a symbolic system or as symbolic action is sometimes confused with "cultures"—the plural, concrete, highly integrated worlds within which symbolic systems (cultures) operate.

Despite the multiple understandings of the culture concept, all of these formulations share problems that can be traced at least in part, to political scientists' heavy reliance on Clifford Geertz (whose own understandings of the term were influenced by his teacher, Talcott Parsons, and by Max Weber). 6 Geertz's

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> I have in mind Geertz's Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (1973); Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology; and his important case study, Negara: the Theater State (1980). In Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba's (1994) influential political science handbook Designing Social Inquiry, the authors rely on one essay by Geertz, "Thick Description," to discuss culture (pp. 37, 38-40). Abner Cohen's (1974) Two-Dimensional Man: An Essay on the Anthropology of Power and Symbolism in a Complex Society—a rational choice analysis of the strategic manipulation of symbols—was also important to rational choice students of culture (Johnson 1997; Laitin 1986, 1998, 1999).

definition of a "system of symbols" was one that insisted upon coherence—on a reified, frozen system of meaning, rather than on what symbols do. When he studied Bali, for example, he looked for a closed and already configured set of meanings and, thus, was blind to the processes by which ongoing practices and systems of meaning change, are sites of political struggle, and generate multiple significations within social groups. Thus Geertz could invoke the same word "culture" to connote both a fixed, synchronic entity, such as Balinese "culture," and the performances through which the researcher interprets meanings, such as cockfights, teeth filing rituals, state pageants, and funeral rites. The dual connotations of culture as an already given community and as a symbolic system were often made analytically compatible in Geertz's work by the suggestion that the tight integration of a particular, bounded culture was determined by its semiotic coherence as a system of meanings. The insistence on semiotic coherence led Geertz to ignore possible discrepancies between the representation of events, conditions, and people and the ways in which such representations were received, negotiated, and subjected to risks by those who produced and consumed them (Wedeen 1999). People's own divergent interpretations of what a particular ritual or practice meant were of little significance. Analyses of meaning-making focused on an already given, consensually understood "cultural schema" continually performed by actors of particular "cultures" who were seemingly unaffected by historical changes. For Geertz, power and processes of meaning-making became purely symbolic, as did culture and analyses of it. In his "significative system" there is no agency, only an intelligible, seamlessly coherent script or master narrative that actors follow in particular "cultures." Such theorizations of culture also led Geertz to sample on the dependent variable, selecting symbols and meanings that were particularly prone to coherence or systematicity (Sewell 1999: 47).

Despite these problems, Geertz's (1973) enormously influential book, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, gave some political scientists a compelling reason to take symbols seriously. As David Laitin (1986, 12) argued, "Symbols are important because they provide to individuals a sense of meaning. For Geertz, these symbols or, better, the various systems of symbols constitute 'culture." Geertz's refusal to produce falsifiable arguments was at odds with the positivist project of rational choice theory, but his attention to meaning allowed political scientists such as Laitin to discover "the nature of group values" (Laitin 1986, 16). According to Laitin

(1986, 16) Geertz's "thick descriptions" of systems of signification were "methodologically useful" because they registered "the deeply held values of a cultural group." For Laitin (1986, 16),

The database consists in symbolic structures. Only with a keen understanding of the meanings embedded in shared symbols...can one adduce cultural preferences without tautologically claiming that preferences can be derived from the behavior of actors who are assumed to be rational.

Geertz invited political scientists such as Laitin to pay attention to culture as a system of symbols from which researchers could read meaning, but political scientists thereby adopted many of the problems of the Geertzian concept of culture: that the system was reified and fixed, that it was identifiable as bounded, and that meanings were always already set in a given "text." Thus in Laitin's reading of Geertz, culture refers both to "systems of symbols" and to the "deeply held values of a cultural group" (emphasis mine). This slippage could remain unacknowledged because, for Laitin, as for Geertz, to refer to culture as a system of symbols was to claim that culture was a contained system of "deeply held" values and beliefs. Of course Laitin's insistence that "thick descriptions" could be treated as a "database" may seem odd, given Geertz's philosophical insistence on ethnography as an enterprise mediated through the anthropologist's creative interpretation. Geertz's own penchant for treating a particular practice, such as the Balinese cockfight, as synecdochic for Balinese culture made him a particularly blatant and, in many ways, self-professed mediator. In short, political scientists beholden to Geertz improved over the political culture literatures of old by producing theoretically motivated work that emphasized the importance of symbols and took ethnographic evidence seriously. However, Geertzians of various stripes unwittingly conflated various uses of culture in their analyses, thereby perpetuating confusions and compromising the term's explanatory purchase by insisting on the semiotic coherence of a particular community, system of symbols, or "culture." Culture became not only what a group has-beliefs, values, or a symbolic system—but what a group is (a Balinese culture). More importantly, theories of culture tended to render historicized analyses of practice and process impossible or irrelevant, explaining political outcomes as the result of empirically untenable, untestable assertions of uniformity and fixity. Most political scientists continue to think of culture as connoting fixed group traits.

# Real Differences: The Individualist Orientation as an Example

Despite shared problems in formulations of the concept, divergent political, methodological, and epistemological commitments also divide political scientists and are responsible for treatments of culture being less robust than they otherwise might be. One commonly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Some critics of Geertz charge that he has no understanding of, or interest in, power relations, but this seems unfair. As Geertz (1980, 120) suggests in his study of political spectacles in nineteenth century Bali, "The pageants were not mere aesthetic embellishments, celebrations of a domination independently existing: they were the thing itself." Moreover, in his famous essay "Thick Description," Geertz claims (1983) that his "interpretive approach," unlike the structuralism he opposes, is going to take into account considerations of power and history. His ethnographic work, however, does not execute this intention.

cited rift is between rational choice theorists and interpretive social scientists (on interpretive social science, see Rabinow and Sullivan 1987). Although I do not intend to reify this distinction, different assumptions, vocabularies, sources of information, and standards of evidence have produced recognizable communities of argument. Unequal access to institutional power and to material resources has also created experiences of groupness that hinder scholarly discussion. For my purposes here, one key difference is the importance the individual plays in analyses of political life.

In rational choice theory—as in the behaviorist political culture literature—the individual is the privileged unit of analysis, even if individual responses are subsequently aggregated for statistical purposes. As George Steinmetz (1999, 19) argues, "This individualistic bias [is] at odds with the point made even by Parsons that culture is not (or not primarily) a property of individuals." This bias tends to produce arguments in which ideas, beliefs, or values, such as "national pride," are often "misleadingly wrenched" from "the social conditions in which they [are] embedded and within which they receive [...] their specific meaning." Similarly, "individualism," as Alexander Wendt (1999, 166, 169) points out, implies that persons are "independently existing" rather than constituted through their linguistic, institutional, and practical relations with others.

Interpretivist approaches, among which can be counted the important innovation of practice anthropology in the 1980s, frequently invoke an agentive individual, but they do not assume a maximizing, costbenefit calculator who is unproblematically divorced from actual historical processes (e.g., Bourdieu 1978). The rational choice formulation of the decontextualized, universalizable individual, whose ideas, beliefs, and values can be extracted from the social and political conditions under which they were generated, produces objects of inquiry that are incommensurable with interpretivist social science. Of course many rational choice theorists do analyze the conditions under which individuals make choices. The individualist bias, however, tends to require that culture be conceptualized as a "constraint" on individual's strategic actions, or "as information for equilibrium selection," or, in the plural, as "manifold equilibria" (Tsebelis 1997). An approach to culture as processes of meaning-construction, in contrast, assumes that actors understand themselves as individuals and as strategic, and as group members and nonstrategic, and that such self-understandings are always mutually constituted and affirmed by others. Meaning-making, in short, implies a social process through which people reproduce together the conditions of intelligibility that enable them to make sense of their worlds—a point to which I return in Part Two. Such a view of culture restores a manifestly collective aspect to political analyses that many individualist accounts lack, without requiring the shared coherence that many culturalist accounts exaggerate.

With innovations in game theory and computational modeling, scholars have begun to introduce learning, information updating, and adaptation into ratio-

nal choice and agent-based analyses.<sup>8</sup> Dissatisfaction with the externalization of preferences in neoclassical economics has encouraged a focus in political science on preference formation, including attempts to make preferences "endogenous" to the models. This concern has led some rational choice theorists to examine how political identities and preferences are formed (Gerber and Jackson 1993; Hardin 1995; Laitin 1998). Yet even in as impressive a study as Laitin's (1998) Identity in Formation: The Russian-Speaking Populations in the Near Abroad, the phenomenon of identity is ultimately reduced to a strategic choice in which individual actors calculate whether to switch from Russian to the titular language on the basis of what they think others will do. These works assume without question that individuals can be adequately conceived for purposes of political science as goal-oriented beings attempting to maximize their interests, given existing constraints (Tsebelis 1997, 16). Indeed, a "constructed" identity, for Laitin (1998, 3-35), is synonymous with a strategically chosen one. Laitin's ethnographic sections are thus devoted to sorting out what his informants were strategic about, rather than analyzing "identity in formation"—how selves are constituted or how language might actually operate, or not, to generate felt identifications.

Rational choice theorists in political science may, of course, differ in the degree of rationality they accord to agents or disagree about how to understand equilibrium, but they are likely to share the common belief among economists that "institutions and patterns of behavior can be explained as the product or outcome of many individual decisions" (Young 1998, 4). Interpretivists might question not only the view of individuals such studies put forth, but also the degree of power or efficacy that individuals have within institutions. The main point to be registered here is simply that insofar as individualism presupposes agents who are forwardlooking strategists forever calculating costs and benefits, there will be a serious ontological and epistemological divide between most rational choice and interpretivist theorists.<sup>9</sup> Interpretivists can rightly claim. in my view, that individualist assumptions prevent rational choice scholars from posing questions that are of manifest importance to politics, not the least of which is how interests are collectively generated and defined, or how we come to know that people maximize their interests, if they do. These disagreements are important ones. It remains to be seen whether further substantive discussion will be worthwhile, but there is no need for such disagreements to foreclose possibilities of cooperation. Nor is there any theoretical warrant, from either side of the epistemological divide, for resisting the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> For a sophisticated consideration of learning and adaptation in rational choice theory, see (the economist) Young (1998). For a computational model that attempts to explain how "culture" disseminates, see Axelrod 1997, 148–77.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> David Laitin (1999) does point out that this understanding of the individual is not necessary from a rational choice perspective, but he does not operationalize another one.

introduction into political science of a post-Geertzian anthropological conceptualization of culture.

#### Fruitful Collaboration

The fact that rational choice theory has engaged with studies of culture invites conversation, and possibly productive argument, between methodological individualists and interpretivists. Game theorists, in particular, have begun to use culture to connote "common knowledge" in their analyses. "Common knowledge" helps to solve games in which preferences and capabilities generate "multiple equilibria"—stable outcomes from which a rational actor has no incentive to deviate. The idea of common knowledge enables rational choice theorists to solve these games by identifying "focal points around which actors' expectations can converge, thereby limiting transaction costs and enhancing the possibilities for coordination under conditions of complexity and uncertainty" (Schelling 1960, 55-56; Chwe 2001, Goldstein and Keohane 1993, Weingast 1995, and Wendt 1999).<sup>10</sup> An oft-repeated example is Schelling's "tacit coordination (common interests)" problem: "You are to meet somebody in New York City. You have not been instructed where to meet; you have no prior understanding with the person on where to meet; and you cannot communicate with each other. You are simply told that you will have to guess where to meet and that he is being told the same thing and that you will just have to try to make your guesses coincide" (Schelling 1960, 55–56). Schelling (1960, 55) tried this problem on an unscientific sample of respondents from New Haven, Connecticut, and found that an "absolute majority" managed to meet at Grand Central Station's information booth, and virtually all persons succeeded in meeting at 12 noon.

Some of the problems with culture as common knowledge are indicated by the example. The concept tends to assume the shared quality or commonness of knowledge rather than to question how—or the extent to which—such understandings are, in fact, tacitly understood or consensually shared. In other words, "common knowledge" derives from a consideration of knowledge that can reasonably be considered common, rather than from a consideration of culture as a manifold outcome of human activity. How do we know whether the outcome in Schelling's Grand Central station example demonstrates common knowledge, or, say, the practicalities of train schedules, or some combination of the two? Are those who do not have this common knowledge outside culture? In those who use Schelling's account, "common knowledge" seems analogous to nature, a background condition—always already there. By naturalizing the concept of culture in this way, rational choice theorists forgo the ability to know whether common knowledge actually exists in any particular instance or whether another, unspecified, variable is doing the work of coordinating action. By tracking how common knowledge gets produced, To be fair, nothing inherent in the idea of common knowledge interferes with asking how that knowledge is acquired or changed, although little practical work has been done on such matters thus far. To put my criticisms in the language of rational choice theory: (a) Common knowledge is one of the descriptors of an equilibrium state; (b) "given that the coordination dynamics on which common knowledge models operate have multiple equilibria, change to different equilibria is theoretically possible; (c) the problem is that noncooperative game theory hasn't seriously modeled the move from one coordination equilibrium to another. Noncooperative coordination games with multiple equilibria are potentially dynamic," but so far have been clunky and static.<sup>11</sup>

Other problems with current uses of common knowledge make it less helpful than it otherwise might be. In a typical example—Michael Suk-Young Chwe's (2001, 7) ambitiously eclectic book, Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledgecommon knowledge means "knowledge of others' knowledge of others' knowledge, and so on." But the examples of common knowledge Chwe provides muddy his analysis and multiply the meanings of the term. Sometimes "common knowledge" means the condition of having the awareness that other people know what you know, and sometimes it seems to indicate the process of coming to know that others know. The "publicity" of public ceremonies sometimes generates common knowledge; at other times publicity refers to "common knowledge generation" (compare pp. 8 and 18). Most importantly, "common knowledge" slips from referring to the knowledge that other people are seeing the same commercial, ritual, or television program to referring to the knowledge that others understand what they see in the same way. And Chwe seems to imply that "common knowledge" is the knowledge that others know that they are interpreting what they see in the same way that each individual viewer does. How do we researchers know (without ethnographic or survey work) that "everyone knows that everyone knows it" or that "knowing it" means the same thing to everyone in question? Perhaps Chwe's assumptions about coordination and conformity have to do with the primary areas with which he was concerned: advertising and rituals. But the latter are often less about generating actual coherence than about representing it publicly. The "common knowledge" that the regime can orchestrate the ritual is not matched by the "common knowledge" of what that ability means: Does it prove societal coherence or demonstrate state power or both, for example? Furthermore, Chwe's operating assumption is that people will want to conform. What about instances of resistance and transgression? What

is subject to change, or is implicated in political relationships of leverage and domination, we can produce robust explanations of why people coordinate their actions when they do, while avoiding erroneous causal inferences.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Game theory's adoption of culture as "common knowledge" is discussed in Wendt 1999, chap. 4).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> This is David Laitin's formulation in a personal communication with the author.

of critiques of prevailing normative orders? What of desires to be different, to be unusual, or to stand out? What of ambivalence? I can imagine conditions under which people conform, basing their actions, as Chwe and others assume, on what they think others are going to do, but I cannot imagine that such pressures are always operative, let alone decisive. Certainly, they are not exhaustively descriptive of politics.

In short, the concept of common knowledge assumes a coherent logic and a level of consensus that may not be empirically demonstrable. It is unclear what added value scholars derive from this a priori treatment of knowledge as common or of desires to conform as given. One justification might be, as Laitin points out, that "if a model has observable (and testable) implications, it can be empirically supported without direct information on the values of the independent variable (in this case, the existence of common knowledge)."12 Yet scholars may thereby impute the presence of common knowledge when it does not exist or when degrees of common knowledge more accurately reflect citizens' experience. Indeed, such studies often produce arguments that rely on the assumption of common knowledge in order to prove it. By assuming deeply embedded understandings rather than showing their existence, scholars tend to produce static, synchronic arguments that do not register transformations in levels, or fractures in systems, of knowledge. Moreover, Chwe's version of common knowledge is sometimes generated by "cultural practices," such as rituals or performances, and sometimes seems to be what culture means. His reliance on a Geertzian understanding of culture makes the work vulnerable to the conceptual confusions, empirical troubles, and theoretical limitations discussed above. In other words, "common knowledge" often operates as a fixed, frozen, "always already there" category, much like a Geertzian script or schema does.

Political scientists' reluctance to tackle post-Geertzian theorizations of the concept forecloses posversions of political culture, appreciative of Geertz and

Contemporary work on culture in anthropology, although indebted to Geertz's cultural anthropology of the 1960s and 1970s, also acknowledges important critiques of that tradition. Recent years have seen analysts, influenced by practice theory in anthropology, challenge culture (in its abstract sense) as a seamless system of meanings whose consistency is logical and resistant to change. Anthropologists inspired by works as diverse as those of Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Derrida, and Michel de Certeau have emphasized the fragility, ambiguities, and historical ruptures evident in symbolic systems.<sup>13</sup> When examining semiotic practices, these theorists have invited us to see practices, texts, and images as signs whose meanings are both fixed by conventions and also always at risk—part of overlapping semiotic systems open to various interpretations and saturated by complicated, contentious relationships of power. "Power," despite the term's considerable conceptual fuzziness, becomes more than just "leverage" in these accounts. It is many-sided, elusive, and diffuse (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). To study culture in the critical anthropology sense is to explore the processes of meaning-construction in which people's practices and their material realities—their political, economic, and social situations—operate in dialectical relationship with their systems of signification. By "dialectical" I mean a relationship in which actors' practices and their systems of signification do more than merely influence each other. Practices and

<sup>13</sup> Despite the different epistemological orientations of these theo-

rists, they are often grouped together under the vague rubric of "post-

modernism" or, sometimes, "poststructuralism." Anthropologists, in

rational choice, or dismissive of the culture concept altogether—would benefit from becoming familiar with an anthropological, diachronic, practice-based notion

sibilities of learning from, and contributing to, current work on culture. This reluctance may have something to do with the unfamiliarity of the language used, particularly in poststructuralist studies of culture. In addition, the disavowal of modernization theory in political science has not been as total as it was in anthropology. Nor have political scientists engaged in the self-reflexive work on knowledge production that has animated research in other disciplines. The focus on the mentalité of the researcher among 1980s anthropologists—which is often what self-reflexivity entailed—dissuaded political scientists from reading anthropology, as did political scientists' preferences for conceptual parsimony over the complicated, messy narratives of anthropological inquiry. Attacks on positivist social science generated by poststructuralism may also have driven away some political scientists. Whatever the reason, all students of politics-whether dependent on Parsonian

particular, have been inspired by Bourdieu's theorizations of practice in Outline of a Theory of Practice (1977) and The Logic of Practice (1990), but Bourdieu's own ethnographic work remains structuralist in its execution—identifying the systems of parallels and oppositions that reveal the structure of a society. Emphasizing ambiguities and historical ruptures has led some practice-oriented anthropologists to cite passages from Foucault's The History of Sexuality, Volume One (1978) that stress resistance, although there is nothing inherent in a study of practices (or in Foucault's work) that makes this necessary or even obvious. For a particularly sophisticated example, see Comaroff 1985. In Comaroff and Comaroff 1991 this emphasis on resistance is coupled with a study of the workings of colonial ideology and "hegemony," inspired, in part, by Gramsci's (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Postcolonial studies more generally invoke the term "practices" and investigate the dynamics of power and resistance to colonial domination, but most scholars assert the power of discourses rather than the ways in which such discourses actually operate in practice. James C. Scott's (1985, 1990) work in political science may also be viewed in the resistance tradition, as can the projects emerging out of subaltern studies. For an essay surveying the literature and critical of romanticizing resistance, see Abu-Lughod (1990, 41-55). Recent studies in practice-oriented anthropology (and sociology) have begun to reverse the trend, minimizing the role of resistance and focusing on the ways in which scientific and social practices generate hegemony. These works are also beholden to passages in Foucault's History of Sexuality, as well as to his theorizations of power in Discipline and Punish (1979). Nadia Abu El-Haj's (2001) Facts on the Ground is exemplary, demonstrating how the practice of archaeology and its disciplinary dynamics work to substantiate historical claims and remake conceptions of territory in Israel.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Personal communication with the author.

signification are defined and generated in reference to each other, yet can come into conflict, both conceptually in their meanings and causally in the world, so that the only way of handling such material is by synthesis—i.e., by maintaining an overview that includes both sides without stifling the conflict or denying their logical incompatibilities.<sup>14</sup> As we shall see, a dialectical understanding of culture allows us to view meaning-making activities as being both stable and changeable, both a single system and internally various and conflicted, an aspect of both structure and agency, both (potentially) an independent and a dependent variable, depending on the research question and strategy adopted. This conceptualization connotes dynamism rather than stasis and allows for inconsistency rather than simply implying strict coherence.<sup>15</sup> Culture in these accounts does not refer to essential values that identify a particular group or to particular traits that isolate one group from another. Rather, culture designates a way of looking at the world that requires an account of how symbols operate in practice, why meanings generate action, and why actions produce meanings, when they do. Such a version of culture does not require forsaking parsimony or the generalizing impulses many political scientists value. Focusing on semiotic practices dialectically may require, however, a theorization of how specifiable contradictions and ambiguities themselves work to produce political order, stimulate change, or generate leverage in negotiations.

It would be tempting to see this view of culture as mapping neatly on to the familiar structure-agency binary. Indeed, practice theorists themselves often argue that practice is "not an antagonistic alternative to the study of systems or structures, but a necessary complement to it" (Ortner 1984, 147). I want to argue somewhat differently: Systems of signification and practice entail both structure and agency. The word "systems," of course, implies structure, but the language and symbols constitutive of any "system of signification" are created, reproduced, and subverted by agents speaking and acting in the world. I am not sure that there can be human signification without agency people doing the work of interpreting and making intelligible signs. We nevertheless reproduce ourselves as agents or "subjects" within the confines of institutional and semiotic "structures," what game theorists call "choice under structural constraint." Practices, moreover, often have a structure to them (e.g., habits, routines, and institutional roles) at the same time that they refer to agents acting in the world, as the term "practice" suggests. Practices are actions or deeds that are repeated over time; they are learned, reproduced, and subject to risks through social interaction. Practices,

like actions (as opposed to "behaviors"), are also, in the sense that I use the term, unique to human beings. Like actions, they involve "freedom, choice, and responsibility, meaning and sense, conventions, norms and rules" (Pitkin 1993, 242). They may be self-consciously executed, but they need not be. They tend to be intelligible to others in context dependent ways. Practices, like human actions, are ultimately "dual," composed both of what "the outside observer can see and of the actors' understandings of what they are doing" (Pitkin 1993, 261). What a practice approach has made possible in anthropology is an attention to politics, to social asymmetry, historical contingencies, and political domination, key dimensions of both action and structure (Ortner 1984, 147). In contrast, the way the concept of culture has generally been understood in political science has limited its utility for political analysis. To the extent that "culture" suppresses lived political experience in its Parsonian, Huntingtonian, and Geertzian formulations, it sacrifices explanatory power.

Our conceptualizations have constrained our way of knowing and the kind of work we do. The concept of "political culture" or "common knowledge" with which most political scientists operate presupposes an internal coherence and stability that is indefensible empirically. My objective is to shift our conceptualization away from culture as a fixed system of meaning to culture as the practices of meaning-making through which social actors attempt to make their worlds coherent. <sup>16</sup> In Part Two, I show that by adopting a notion of culture as semiotic practices, political scientists can ask novel questions, use new kinds of evidence, embrace fresh perspectives, and develop original answers to concerns of abiding relevance to politics.

### PART TWO: THE POLITICS OF INTELLIGIBILITY

## Thinking Through Practices of Meaning-Making

Understanding semiotic practices requires an analysis of the ways in which people use words, establish and interpret signs, and act in the world in ways that foster intelligibility. Intelligibility, in turn, works on multiple levels. Certain kinds of practices are intelligible and their meanings can be ascribed and described without much knowledge of language and context. The political theorist, Hanna Pitkin, whose work draws on ordinary language philosophy, gives one example. We might begin by saying, "I don't know what they mean to be doing, but I can see that in fact their movement scatters those seeds in fertile spots, and later they harvest the fruit. It may be a game or a religious ceremony or something else, but in fact they are planting" (Pitkin 1993, 258). To discover whether the scattering of seeds is a game, a religious ceremony, or something else, ethnographic fieldwork or survey research data or both

 $<sup>^{14}\,\</sup>rm I$  am grateful to Hanna Pitkin for suggesting that I bring this theme to the fore.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Recent essays on "culture" in social movement theory often emphasize the term's contestatory elements. But we do not learn what culture means or what would make a culture one culture (rather than two or 12). Nor do we have a sense of what would make a symbolic system one system (and systematic) to the extent that it is. We learn only that "culture" is not static. See, for example, Johnston and Klandermans (1995).

<sup>16</sup> This formulation is beholden to an anonymous reviewer, to whom I am grateful, at American Political Science Review.

may be required. We would thus be able to consider the attitudes of those who partake in the practice, the language they use to describe it, and the fieldworker's interpretation of what is transpiring. We might conceive of political practices similarly by saying: I don't know what they mean to be doing, but I can see that in fact their movement takes a pen and checks off a box with a name beside it on a piece of paper, deposits that paper in a box, and later they tally the number of times each name is checked off and the one with the most votes makes political decisions for the next four years. It may be a game, a religious ceremony, a farce, a political event, or something else, or it may be a combination of these things. In many cases, what informants say they are doing and what the social scientist claims they are doing are not either/or choices. Rather, informants are "doing one by way of the other" (Pitkin 1993, 259). Social scientists must be able to know and to show that their interpretation is based on a grasp of native intelligibility, that in checking off a ballot the citizen is affirming the community's norms, or voting, or both, or neither. To demonstrate that voting is a way of affirming the community's norms, social scientists may have to relate the practice to local concepts, texts, and traditions. They may also check whether such practices actually work to affirm the community's norms by examining the practice's effects—the ways in which such practices are negotiated by, and generate consequences for, those who participate in them. How social scientists deal with ambiguity, complexity, and the fact of multiple significations will depend on the questions asked and the objectives desired. Although multiple significations often exist, they are not limitless, as the examples of scattering seeds or checking off a ballot make obvious. The contexts within which an action occurs help determine the range of significations that are possible and pertinent.

The advantages of conceiving of meaning-making practices in terms of levels of intelligibility are as follows: Intelligibility does not presuppose grasping an inner essence or getting into the heads of informants who are captive minds of a system but, rather, centers on the ways in which people attempt to make apparent, observable sense of their worlds-to themselves and to each other—in emotional and cognitive terms. In stark contrast to grasping an inner essence, such a conceptualization of culture and of meaning requires thinking pragmatically, discovering what we know (that seeds are beings scattered or ballots are being checked and counted) and what we need to know (what work this seed scattering or ballot tallying is doing, for example), even when we have only a minimal familiarity with context and language. It then prompts us to probe deeper, to ask questions about the conditions under which specific material and semiotic activities emerge (terrorism, for example), the contexts within which they find public expression, the work they do in the world, and the irregularities they generate in the process of reproduction. In short, the approach I am recommending generates empirical findings with observable implications of manifest importance to politics.

Contrary to the claim made by some anticulturalists that studies of culture tend toward too much specificity and are hostile to the generalizing impulses of comparative politics or of social science more broadly, the approach to culture I am recommending requires looking at multiple cases of habit and usage. These cases may be confined to a specific geographically bounded nation-state, but they certainly need not be. Studying culture should not entail insisting on a country's allegedly specific characteristics, values, or beliefs. The conceptualization of culture I am recommending would specifically exclude any such judgment. Nor need a cultural approach exaggerate the coherence of perceptions and practices that structure politics. In this increasingly information-reliant, transnational world, discrete societies, peoples, or "cultures" are far less likely to be wholly discrete than they ever were before, and it is easy to adduce historical evidence that notions of cultural isolation or "purity" have always been based more on myth or political intention than on fact. The notion of boundedness was always "constructed"—in the minds of cartographers drawing the boundaries of nation-states, for example, and by researchers' own categories of groupness or locale.

This is not to argue that geographical territories and semiotic practices are never correlated. There may at times be what Sewell (1999, 49-50) calls a "thin coherence"—a variable, contested, incompletely integrated way in which the inhabitants of a specific territory share a set of semiotic practices. It is probably easy to agree, for example, that people who live in France are by and large committed to some form of republicanism. Any political analysis that seeks to discuss the relationship between republicanism and Frenchness must take into account the following: (1) Republican ideas can come to stand for Frenchness because of the ways in which they have been used (by politicians, historians, and advertisers) to objectify what it means to be French (see Handler's [1988] study of Quebec); (2) non-French people may also subscribe to republican ideals; (3) not all French people adhere to republican ideals; (4) not all French people interpret republicanism or understand its significance in the same way; (5) antirepublican French people may not have the same relationship to republicanism as do antirepublican thinkers and citizens elsewhere, but they may; and (6) it is not clear who counts as a "French" person. Recognizing these possibilities invites theorizing about the historical relationship among regional political practices, nation-building policies and imagery, and the production of republican ideals in France, while also facilitating comparisons and contrasts with other groups or geographical locations. Semiotic logics are themselves an effect of people's actions, institutional power, and historical circumstances. State institutions, like theoreticians of culture, may, in Sewell's (1999, 57) words, "subject potential semiotic sprawl to a certain order—to prescribe (contested) core values, to impose discipline on dissenters, to describe boundaries and norms-in short, to give a certain focus to the production and consumption of meaning."

An understanding of meaning-production as a process through which conventions become intelligible to participants through observable usages and effects suggests that meanings are open to various and changing interpretations, while also sometimes appearing to be overly coherent, fixed, or inevitable. The analyst's task, then, may not be to specify the relationships that govern this semiotic logic (structuralism), or to search for silently intended meanings (hermeneutics). but rather to identify the range of semiotic practices relevant to explanations of a given political phenomenon and explore how such semiotic practices work. Consider, for instance, the study of patriotism in the United States. We might select pledging allegiance to the flag as one semiotic practice in the range a scholar investigates in studying patriotism in the United States. We would want to do more than analyze its content or infer symbolic patriotism from its family resemblance to flag ceremonies elsewhere. We would inquire into the effects of the relationship between pledging allegiance and patriotism, a task that calls for a number of additional studies. We might research the history of pledging allegiance, including the mechanisms by which the ritual was enforced over time. We might observe the practice ethnographically in areas selected for their varying regional, ethnic, racial, class, and political affiliations. We might conduct open-ended interviews and surveys, asking a wide variety of people about the meanings they attribute to pledging allegiance and the effects it produces in them: Was the flag salute mind-numbing, uplifting, apathy-inducing, or irrelevant? Finally, we might collect transgressive materials, such as evidence from court cases and protest movements, as well as source materials from "popular culture" media, such as newspaper reports, films, jokes, cartoons, and songs, that may offer alternative ways of seeing the pledge of allegiance. Such an analysis would allow us to discern whether the pledge of allegiance could be a banal, routinized practice, an activity invested with and productive of patriotism,

Although the meanings people might attach to a particular practice such as pledging allegiance to the flag are multiple and unstable, to be intelligible—by definition—they need to be recognizable by others. As Ferdinand de Saussure argued, the meaning of a sign is a function of its contrasts with other signs in a semiotic system. People form a semiotic community to the extent that they recognize the same set of contrasts and therefore are able to engage in mutually comprehensible symbolic action. Presistance and obedience are intelligible insofar as they make reference to this shared set of oppositions, without which political activities or speech acts would hardly make sense. Saussure's account may exaggerate coherence, but his insight—that intelligibility requires both a minimally shared set of

relations among signs and a group of people able to recognize them—is critical for our thinking about the political import of meaning-production (Sahlins 1985, 143–56; Saussure 1959; Sewell 1999, 23–24). Intelligibility does not imply that linguistic or semiotic meanings are stable, but it does require at least enough stability so that what one actor learned still applies when another speaks. Put differently, intelligibility suggests that instabilities in discourse and in practices make sense only within the signifying operations of a shared conceptual system (Saussure 1959; Sewell 1999, 50; Wedeen 1999, 85).

Initially, this formulation of intelligibility may seem similar to a "common knowledge" approach, but intelligibility differs from common knowledge in at least two fundamental ways. First, "intelligibility" refers to conditions that are observable rather than assumed. Second, intelligibility connotes a minimalist sense of what is shared rather than a highly integrated one; a common conceptual system (intelligibility) is not the same as a shared episteme ("common knowledge"). When we see children pledging allegiance to the flag in elementary school, we do not think that they are ordering an ice cream soda at the drugstore. The words that they utter signal that they are reciting an oath of loyalty to the United States and that the flag symbolizes the United States. We do not know whether they experience this particular recitation as an avowal of their patriotism or indeed whether they ever have such feelings. We do know, however, because of our shared experiences of language acquisition, that their action is intelligible as an outward demonstration of allegiance. Wittgenstein argues that we learn the meaning of words such as "flag" and "allegiance" through other people's uses of words in contexts such as pledging allegiance to the flag. According to Wittgenstein (1958, 225) "What 'determining the length' means is not learned by learning what length and determining are; the meaning of the word 'length' is learnt by learning, among other things, what it is to determine length" (Wittgenstein 225). Similarly, the meaning of the word "flag" is learned by learning, among other things, what it is to pledge allegiance to it.

To summarize, "meaning" connotes intelligibility, which is produced through and compounded by repeated, context-dependent use that is observable. Language and symbols are intelligible insofar as they are made manifest through practices. Practices make sense because they are reproduced historically and conceptualized through language. Practices and signs may be "thinly coherent" (Sewell) in the sense that they relate differentially to other signs (Saussure) and yet have a recognizable range of applications (Wittgenstein). Yet they rarely exhibit the sort of highly integrated, logical consistency attributed to them by structuralists or by semioticians such as Geertz. Attention to dynamism, risk, misunderstandings, ambiguity, and historical encounter calls for an analysis of the effects of semiotic practices: the ways in which, for example, official rhetoric in Syria or negative political advertisements in the United States affect people's actions and interpretations, which, in turn, play a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Saussure's (1959, 14) concerns were with language, which he saw as "the social side of speech, outside the individual who can never create nor modify it by himself; it exists only by virtue of a contract signed by the members of the community." For his discussion of the nature of the linguistic sign, see pp. 65ff.

role in determining future actions. Systems of signs are inscribed in material, observable practices; semiotic practices produce material effects, the observable implications of which are so important for positivist social science. And material effects reproduce systems of signification, which are communally intelligible and therefore open to interpretation.

#### **Applying Semiotic Practices**

How might this understanding of culture as the dialectical relationship between people's practices and systems of signification be applied as an "explanatory" or "independent" variable in current political science research? Through an investigation of two examples—compliance and ethnic identity-formation—I show how culture (as semiotic practices) can be used in causal analyses.

First, in Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria, I (Wedeen 1999) examine the ways in which a particular set of semiotic practices (in this case, patently spurious official speeches and the ironic distancing strategies of the citizenry) works to produce political compliance. The object in that study was the "cult" of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad—all of the rhetorical practices and official imagery that substituted for discussion of substantive political issues in public. For much of Asad's rule (1970–2000) his image was omnipresent. In newspapers, on television, and during orchestrated spectacles, Asad was praised as the "father," the "gallant knight," even the country's "premier pharmacist." Yet most Syrians, including those who created the official rhetoric, did not believe its claims. The book asks, Why would a regime spend scarce resources on a cult whose rituals of obeisance are transparently phony? The answer: Because it works. The book concludes that Asad's cult operated as a disciplinary device, generating a politics of public dissimulation in which citizens acted as if they revered their leader. By inundating daily life with tired symbolism, the regime exercised a subtle, yet effective, form of power. The cult worked to enforce obedience, induce complicity, isolate Syrians from one another, and set guidelines for public speech and

Studying "culture" as semiotic practices with political effects can lead to surprising findings. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the rhetoric and symbols of Asad's cult did not produce "legitimacy," "charisma," or "hegemony," enabling political leaders to win support for themselves and their policies by fostering collective ethnic, national, or class identifications. Yet Asad's cult was neither epiphenomenal nor unimportant. A focus exclusively on material concerns does not explain why the Syrian government expended exorbitant sums of money and scarce material resources on symbolic production, instead of marshalling its limited funds for either increases in punitive enforcement or the positive inducements that goods and services could offer. Ambiguities of Domination shows how official rhetoric and images not only exemplify but also produce power for a regime. Asad's cult cluttered public

space with monotonous slogans and empty gestures. draining citizens' political energies. The insinuation of formulaic rhetoric and self-serving state symbolism into the daily lives of citizens habituated people to perform the gestures and pronounce the slogans constitutive of their obedience. Representations of power and obedience in Syria also operated to generate power and obedience by disseminating credible threats of punishment. Although threats, to be credible, must at least occasionally be carried out, in general they suffice to ensure the compliance of most citizens. In coercive compliance, people obey because they fear being punished. The images of citizens delivering panegyrics to Asad's rule, collectively holding aloft placards forming his face, signing oaths in blood, or simply displaying pictures of him in their shop windows communicated to Syrians throughout the country the impression of Asad's power independent of his readiness to use it. And the greater the absurdity of the required performance, the more clearly it demonstrated that the regime could make most people obey most of the time. Studying Syrian "political culture" in this sense does not entail identifying the traits that inhere in Syrians, but investigating the rhetorical practices and symbols that generate compliance for the regime.<sup>18</sup>

On the basis of ethnographic research, I demonstrate that Syrians under Asad both recognized the disciplinary aspects of the cult and found ways to undermine them. The fact that so many tolerated, politically critical cartoons, films, and television comedies were published or circulated raises the question of why a regime would allow symbolic affronts to its official claims of omnipotence. To ask the question differently: To what extent can such individual artistic "victories" be politically effective ways to resist a regime's politics of "as if"? On the one hand, these practices were politically effective to the extent that they counteracted the atomization and isolation fostered by public dissimulation. Whereas seeing others obey may have made each feel isolated in his/her unbelief, a shared giggle, the popularity of a comedy skit, and the circulation of cartoons and transgressive stories enabled people to recognize that the conditions of unbelief were widely shared. Both permitted and prohibited methods of registering resistance were thus partially effective to the extent that they reasserted this widely shared experience of unbelief. At the moment when a joke is told and laughter resounds in the room, people are canceling the concrete isolation and atomization manufactured by a politics of "as if." They are affirming to themselves and to others their shared status as unwilling "conscripts" (Scott 1990, 15).

On the other hand, and paradoxically, it is precisely this shared acknowledgment of involuntary obedience that can make a cult so powerful. Asad's cult was powerful, in part, because it was unbelievable. Acts of transgression might counteract the atomization and isolation a politics of "as if" produces, but they also shore up another disciplinary mechanism, namely, the ways in which such a cult relies on an external obedience

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> For a sociological formulation of how "culture" as a repertoire or "tool kit" influences "strategies of action," see Swidler 1986.

produced through each citizen's unbelief. Asad's cult disciplined citizens by occasioning continual demonstrations of external obedience. External obedience, unlike good judgment or conviction, depends on a selfconscious submission to authority that is predicated on not believing. Recognizing the shared conditions of unbelief thus reproduces this self-consciousness, without which a politics of "as if" could scarcely be sustained. In short, such resistance might counteract the atomizing effects of a personality cult, but it also reinforces the cult's own mechanisms of enforcing obedience. As the philosopher Slavoj Zizek (1991) points out, even if people keep their ironical distance, even if they demonstrate that they do not take what they are doing seriously, they are still complying, and compliance is what ultimately counts politically.

Studying the ways in which semiotic practices produce compliance for a regime need not be confined to authoritarian cases. One could also imagine scholars of voting behavior, for example, considering the ways in which consistently false campaign promises might operate to depoliticize the electorate. Similarly, scholars of capitalism might analyze advertising campaigns, investigating how images of the "good life"—of comfort, efficiency, and love—are marketed, consumed, and resisted. Such analyses would go beyond readings of public opinion polls, campaign promises, or advertisements as texts and look both toward their effects (the sorts of reactions they stimulate) and to these various practices as themselves effects of specific, historically contingent relations of political power.

Existing political science frameworks either fail to pay attention to rhetoric and symbols, which means that they have no account of the work symbols do, or make claims about symbols that are unwarranted or untested empirically (that they generate "legitimacy," for example). As noted in Part One, some scholars use the term culture to refer to an entirely different area of inquiry—the identification of purported group traits. The way in which we conceptualize culture affects the kind of research we do and the evidence we bring to bear on our projects. Analyzing culture as semiotic practices has significant empirical and theoretical payoffs for political science. Interpreting semiotic practices overcomes the difficulties of what Timur Kuran (1995) calls "preference falsification," giving us insight into the attitudes of citizens, which may be particularly difficult to discern in authoritarian regimes. My work also allowed me to pose a puzzle that had been ignored by political scientists, namely, Why would a regime use rituals of obeisance that are transparently phony? The evidence I gathered to code unbelief—published and prohibited cartoons, underground and tolerated comedy skits, short stories, and risky political jokessuggests the utility of these materials for the analysis of lived political experience. And the process of collecting such evidence prompted new questions about the extent to which individual artistic practices could be considered resistance to the cult's mechanisms of social control. Moreover, the book's dialectical approach allows us to see how both the rituals of obeisance and the transgressive practices poking fun at political life work in tandem to generate compliance. The same dependent variable, compliance, could be explained by arguing that the cult creates charisma. But political scientists lose empirically and theoretically by failing to understand that the mechanisms shoring up the regime are both the "as if" habitual rituals and the practices of transgression. The patterns we see are not reliant on a notion of culture as fixed or natural. Rather, the fissures, tensions, and instabilities in meaning-making practices actually work to produce social order, albeit a fragile one. The explanations the book provides give us a new theory of how symbols operate, why regimes spend scarce resources on their deployment, and why political scientists ought to take such modes of social control seriously.

Turning now to the second example, recent work on ethnic identity-formation and ethnic violence in political science could produce empirically more sophisticated causal accounts and more fine-grained coding schema by taking "culture" as semiotic practices seriously. Here is one possible application: Whereas understandings of the "nation" as constructed and imagined are now taken for granted, "ethnicity" often operates in datasets as a given category of belonging. People are Hutu or Tutsi, Slavs or Germans. Consequently, some work on ethnic violence, particularly in international relations, suffers from the tautological reasoning of former "political culture" analyses: Interethnic tension is caused by the tensions of interethnicity (Brown et al. 1996). As Fearon and Laitin (1996, 715–35), point out, interethnic relations are more often characterized by cooperation than conflict, which suggests that imaginings or "constructions" of ethnicity may be more important than its seemingly objective existence. Put more radically, ethnicity may be less objectively real, or more variable, than some researchers tend to assume. Yet even scholars sympathetic to constructivism have been slow to apply its lessons, in part because the coding work entailed in generating a large, constructivistoriented dataset would be difficult to do (a subject to which we shall return).

Work by anthropologists, such as Liisa H. Malkki's (1996) "National Geographic: The Rooting of Peoples and the Territorialization of National Identity among Scholars and Refugees," suggests the political consequences of different levels of intensity in ethnic identification. Malkki's case examines forms of Hutunessvarious ways in which semiotic practices (narratives of identification and everyday activities) register experiences of belonging that are not captured in standard categorizations of ethnicity. As Malkki shows, residents of a refugee camp established in western Tanzania after the Burundi massacres of 1972 experienced themselves as "pure" Hutus, whereas Hutu-Burundi refugees living in the township of Kigoma did not. Camp refugees constructed their sense of national belonging to Burundi and their ethnic identification with Hutuness in terms of moralizing commentaries about heroism and homeland. In contrast, town refugees championed a rootless and mobile cosmopolitanism—a creolized "impurity." They were not essentially Hutu but, rather, just "broad persons" (Malkki 1996, 446, and Eley and

Suny's [1996, 432] commentary on Malkki; see also Malkki 1995). A semiotic-practical analysis of ethnic identity-formation would compare the relationship between everyday practices and the rhetoric of belonging within refugee camps with the language and everyday practices of those outside the camps. For formal modelers or the quantitatively minded, developing a dataset based on an intensity scale accounting for people's experiences of identification would produce a more precise and generalizable explanation of how the lived conditions of ethnic identity-formation might determine conflict when they do. Attention to the production of cosmopolitan understandings might also help to explain the absence of ethnic conflict in cases where such identifications are weak.

Coding ethnic groups is an inherently perilous enterprise. The importance of particular identifications changes over time, yet scholars have tended to rely on "objective" measures that are one-dimensional, such as linguistic or religious affiliations. These markers may have little to do with people's experiences of identification. Authoritative compendia of linguistic or religious distinctions may suggest the existence of groups whose members do not see themselves as a community or whose shared language or religion have no political salience. Yet because a research project may depend on specifying potential ethnic groups, scholars have to develop criteria for thinking about what makes a group a group and under what conditions experiences of political identification might crystallize along, say, ethnic lines

One promising way to improve on, if not avoid, the estimate bias bedeviling datasets such as Ted Gurr's (1997) MAR one, is to think about degrees of ethnicity—of Hutuness or Tutsiness or Kurdishness or Irish American-ness. To do that, a scholar could first list the range of identifications that might take on political salience, given specifiable criteria, while explaining why others are unlikely to do so. Thus, at the very least we would have to come up with reasons why coding the intensity of ice cream eaters or Pittsburghers would seem silly, while coding the intensity of Hutus and Tutsis would not. Harder to justify is the inclusion or exclusion of various linguistically distinct subgroupings of Ashantis in Ghana or of Spanish-speaking Californians in the United States, but a semiotic practical approach invites those studying "identity" issues to research the conditions under which certain practices take on political meaning and intensify political claims of group affiliation.<sup>19</sup> Listing actual communities and potential ones in terms of the intensity of groupness for a large dataset might require, as Matthew Kocher has argued, treating ethnic or nationalist identification as a phenomenon that cannot be measured directly. but only inferred from a correlation matrix. Factor and principal components analysis might be used to

measure the intensity of identity indirectly, through a specification of factors or components that are measurable.<sup>20</sup>

For example, we might have theoretical reasons to think that interstate war affects nationalist sentiment and thus use it as one factor. But we might also have sound theoretical justifications for arguing that it is the threat of interstate war that consolidates nationalist sentiments. We might then consider factors of a semiotic-practical nature, such as narratives of conspiracy or threat and the impact these have on citizens. That impact might be registered in newspaper reports, protest movements, the formation of organized groups, and political speeches, songs, sporting events, and television serials. Ethnographic and historical work might also be used to check various cases, to see, for example, how the categories of Hindu and Muslim have changed from 1850 to the present, so that a dataset on Indian riots or one that incorporated intensity measures could account not only for violence, but also for the shifting relevance of appeals to ethnicity in riots. We might look for evidence of intensity in the content of stateinitiated formulations of national identity in laws and public spectacles. A semiotic practical approach would also require us to register the observable effects these have on various populations of citizens, perhaps by conducting surveys. In addition, we might supply theoretical reasons for how the presence or absence of catalyzing events, such as September 11, strengthens nationalist feelings and use that as a factor; a semiotic practical approach could help us determine what counts as a catalyzing or traumatic event. The location of a population in a poor, resource-deprived area could also be an indicator of group intensity. Malkki's work on refugees suggests that continual, quotidian experiences of severe poverty can induce intense feelings of groupness, although these may not be articulated along explicitly economic lines. Indeed, political economists who assert that the poor as a group are prone to revolt when they have nothing to lose might explain variations in actual, organized revolts among "the poor" by considering the role semiotic practices play (Boix n.d.; Lipset 1959, 1960; Stokes and Boix n.d.). What work is done by myths such as the Horatio Alger story, for example, in reproducing convictions that economic conditions can be ameliorated through individual effort rather than through collective action? By taking culture as semiotic practices seriously, causal accounts will be more nuanced and precise, even if an accurate coding schema for large datasets eludes social scientists intent on constructing one. Datasets that can take into account intensity in the ways sketched above should be more accurate than current ones.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> I am indebted to Matthew Kocher for sharing his thoughts on ethnic identifications and his experiences attempting to recode the MAR dataset. In a private conversation, he used the example of trying to code a "subgrouping" of Ashanti in Ghana to demonstrate the persistent dangers of estimate bias and of infinite regress.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Mathew Kocher has pointed out to me that the *locus classicus* for factor analysis is IQ. Like intensity of identity, we cannot measure intelligence directly, so scientists have devised a number of tests that operate as "functions of intelligence." A relevant example of confirmatory factor analysis is Laitin's (1998, 217–42, 392–4) use of the "matched guise" test created by Wallace Lambert. Laitin used confirmatory factor analysis to construct indices of "friendship" and "respect" out of survey responses from bilingual students in the former Soviet Union.

These examples are suggestive of how studying culture offers us new purchase on perennial and intractable issues in political science. Paying attention to symbolic displays of power, for example, provides scholars with the opportunity to understand the dynamics of political compliance and to explain why regimes spend scarce material resources on such displays. Scholars can document empirically the skirmishes that take place between ruler and ruled as they are represented in the regime's idealized presentation of itself and in people's reception of it. They can also theorize the ways in which symbols themselves create, sustain, and undermine the disciplinary circumstances through which any regime exercises some of its power. Studying semiotic practices generates explanations of how political identifications are formed, instances of groupness crystallized, and alternative possibilities of belonging foreclosed. Investigating semiotic practices can also help scholars to establish important criteria for differentiating passionate forms of solidarity from vague, mildly constraining experiences of "affinity and affiliation" (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 21). Establishing such criteria would enhance studies of nationalism, ethnic conflict, identity-formation, collective action, and hegemony. A semiotic practice-oriented approach can also assist in answering important questions such as, When will a subversive organization invoke ethnicity to activate violence? How intense are people's identifications in particular nation-states? When will states experience violence from groups who claim ethnicity? When will organizations that claim to represent ethnic groups form? When will they be successful at mobilizing support around ethnic or national claims? and How do groups manage to gain public support and to get their claims taken seriously? A semiotic practice-based approach also draws our attention to the problems of presuming ethnicity as an objective marker. Large datasets using objective categories suffer from selection bias toward conflict (Fearon and Laitin 1996). An intensity measure, devised through a combination of statistical techniques and ethnographic ones, might produce more reliable large datasets or, at least, point scholars in new directions. Generalizable arguments about the conditions under which ascriptive identifications get produced, or become the basis for organized resistance, or rigidify in state institutions focus attention on the meanings of ethnicity in practice, thereby acknowledging some of the actual complexities of political identification, without forsaking commitments to causal stories or large-n work.

#### **CONCLUDING REMARKS**

The gulf between interpretivists and rational choice theorists may be too wide to bridge. In many ways, the concerns of rational choice theorists and interpretivists are simply incommensurable. Epistemological commitments to uncertainty, ambiguity, and messiness invite interpretivists to focus on social movements, political resistance, and modern power in ways that are irrelevant to rational choice theorists. Similarly, epistemological concerns with stability, order, and governance make those who emphasize the "science" part of the discipline or who look to economics for inspiration less compelling to interpretivists than philosophers and anthropologists are. For those with an interest in culture on both sides of the divide, however, there is no reason not to move beyond the traditional understanding of political culture. A semiotic practices approach avoids the ahistorical, empirically untenable formulation of culture currently invoked by political culture and some rational choice theorists. And it gives us explanatory purchase on key dependent variables, such as compliance and ethnic identity-formation. Researching dynamic semiotic practices enables both accounts of general political processes and nuanced causal arguments about particular cases in ways that are more theoretically robust and empirically accurate than mainstream formulations of culture in political science currently permit.

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# Preferable Descriptive Representatives: Will Just Any Woman, Black, or Latino Do?

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body of theoretical literature has developed that explains why historically disadvantaged groups should be represented by members of those groups. Such representatives are commonly referred to as descriptive representatives. This literature has also endorsed various institutional reforms aimed at increasing the number of descriptive representatives, e.g., party list quotas, racial districting, and proportional representation. However, this literature does not articulate criteria that should guide the selection of descriptive representatives to serve in these institutional positions. Indeed, some thinkers claim that such criteria cannot, or at least should not, be articulated. I argue that some descriptive representatives are preferable to others and that criteria for selecting preferable descriptive representatives can, and should, be articulated. Moreover, I recommend one such criterion: Preferable descriptive representatives possess strong mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups.

emocratic political institutions are often evaluated by the gender, ethnicity, and race of elected representatives (e.g., Guinier 1994; Paolino 1995). Implicit in these evaluations is the assumption that democratic political institutions that lack any representatives from historically disadvantaged groups are unjust. Moreover, these evaluations often assume that an increase in the number of representatives from historically disadvantaged groups can contribute to the substantive representation of those groups (e.g., Thomas 1991). For example, 1998 was declared the "Year of the Woman" in the United States because in that year the number of women in the House leaped from 28 to 48, and that in the Senate from two to six. This method of evaluating democratic institutions often assumes that the more women, Blacks, and Latinos, the better for democratic institutions.<sup>1</sup>

These assumptions justify the political practice of setting aside certain political and institutional positions for members of historically disadvantaged groups. These positions are specifically designed to increase the number of representatives from historically disadvantaged groups—that is, the number of what I call "descriptive representatives." Contemporary political theorists have directly and indirectly supported these assumptions by offering several explanations for why political representatives for a historically disadvantaged group should come from that group (e.g., Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Sapiro 1981). In their terminology, they have advanced reasons to think that "descriptive representation," "group representation," "the politics of presence," or "self-representation" is important.<sup>2</sup>

Although the reasons they advance differ significantly. these theorists sound a common theme: To be fully democratic, a society that has denied full political membership to certain groups must be strongly committed to including those groups in its political life. Such a commitment, at least in many circumstances, requires society to take active steps to increase the number of descriptive representatives. On these grounds, these theorists endorse various institutional reforms such as party list quotas, caucuses, racial districting, and schemes for proportional representation. But these theorists have said remarkably little about the criteria that should guide democratic citizens in their choice of descriptive representatives.<sup>3</sup> The emphasis of this literature so far has been on establishing the need for the presence of some descriptive representatives, not on investigating criteria for identifying preferable descriptive representatives.

Which members of historically disadvantaged groups are preferable representatives for those groups? My primary aim is to argue for the need for criteria that will help answer this question. I take the value of having descriptive representatives in public positions as a given.<sup>4</sup> I advance existing discussions of group representation by explaining how democratic citizens should choose among various possible descriptive representatives. Toward this end, I propose one criterion for identifying preferable descriptive representatives: Preferable descriptive representatives have strong mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups. I purposely set aside the question of whether descriptive representatives should be evaluated by the same or different criteria as other representatives in liberal democracies. 5 I focus on a different question: Are there any criteria for guiding

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<sup>3</sup> I use "democratic citizens" to refer to all citizens—that is, to both citizens who are members of historically disadvantaged groups and citizens who possess more privileged social locations.

For an opposing view, see Cameron, Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> I use these terms interchangeably in the rest of this paper.

citizens who possess more privileged social locations.

The need for institutional reforms aimed at increasing the number of descriptive representatives for a certain historically disadvantaged group may be temporary. These reforms may be dropped, if and when the society has advanced to the point where a historically disadvantaged group is no longer politically marginalized.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> I agree with Iris Marion Young's position (2000) that the difficulty in choosing descriptive representatives—what she calls the problem of one person representing the many—is a problem for all

the appointment, nomination, or election of members of historically disadvantaged groups to positions that were created to increase the diversity of actors in the political arena and thereby the substantive representation of such groups? In other words, are there any principled reasons for preferring one *descriptive* representative to another? I offer my criterion to provide guidance for such decisions and to be more explicit about the political commitments that underlie a politics of presence. To put my position boldly, a commitment to a politics of presence would be more likely to support robust democratic relations if descriptive representatives were selected on the basis of their mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups.

## CONSTRUCTING A POLITICS OF PRESENCE: BUILDING AROUND A TENSION

Hannah Pitkin's classic work The Concept of Representation has set the terms of the debate over descriptive representation. For Pitkin, descriptive representation concerns what representatives "look like," rather than what they "do." For this reason, Pitkin (1967, 89) proclaimed that arguments for descriptive representation have "no room for representation as accountability." This line of reasoning—that a politics of presence is somehow incompatible with accountability—has defined the theoretical problem facing proponents of descriptive representation. Early attempts to articulate the need for members of historically disadvantaged groups to represent those groups focused on the conflicting interests of privileged and relatively less privileged groups. Most notably, Virginia Sapiro (1981) showed that trusting some groups to protect another group's interests, e.g., letting husbands take care of their wives' interests, was and continues to be foolhardy. The recurring betrayals of historically disadvantaged groups by relatively privileged groups partially explain why traditional mechanisms of accountability are insufficient. By emphasizing the conflicts between advantaged and disadvantaged citizens, Sapiro laid the theoretical groundwork for a politics of presence. She did so by standing Pitkin's point on its head: Democratic accountability sometimes requires descriptive representation.

Following Sapiro's lead, a rich theoretical literature has developed that defends the intuition that the chronic underrepresentation of women and ethnic minorities is a problem. Anne Phillips (1998, 228) has, very helpfully, laid out four groups of arguments about why descriptive representation matters. The first of these, which Phillips calls "the role model argument," claims that members of historically disadvantaged groups benefit from seeing members of their group in positions

of power. Having a woman in office increases other women's self-esteem and their capacity to assume leadership roles. Second, Phillips maintains that descriptive representatives are needed to compensate for past and continued injustices toward certain groups. According to this second argument, past and present betrayals by privileged groups create a belief that trust can be given only to descriptive representatives. The presence of descriptive representatives can partially compensate for those betrayals. She refers to this second argument for presence as "the justice argument." The justice argument examines patterns of inequality to reveal the need for descriptive representation. Her third argument focuses on "overlooked interests." According to this argument, group representation allows historically excluded groups to get onto the political agenda their perspectives, issues, and interests that had been previously ignored. Deliberations about public policy will be improved by having a more diverse set of representatives. Finally, Phillips advances the "revitalized democracy" argument, which asserts that a commitment to diverse representation is necessary for increasing political participation and strengthening the legitimacy of democratic institutions.

Dismissing the role model argument as uninteresting and without bearing on democratic politics (Phillips 1995, 63),6 Phillips devotes much of her attention to the remaining three arguments. Her work reflects a tendency in the literature on group representation as a whole to stress the value of group representation for considerations of justice, for deliberation, and for revitalization of democratic institutions. For present purposes, I focus primarily on justice arguments—that is, arguments that unfair patterns of inequality indicate a need for an institutionalized voice. These arguments appeal to evidence ranging from formal political exclusions (e.g., the disenfranchisement of certain groups) to economic disparities (e.g., mean incomes falling below the mean incomes of other groups). Such evidence challenges the assumption that all groups in liberal democracies enjoy the political equality that democratic commitments demand. Appealing to this evidence, theorists of group representation assert that justice demands paying particular attention to those in liberal democracies who are worse off. In doing so, they invoke the spirit of John Rawls's difference principle  $(1971)^{7}$ 

Theorists of group representation unambiguously acknowledge that despite the importance of descriptive representation, some descriptive representatives fail to further, and can even undermine, the best interests of historically disadvantaged groups. For instance, Melissa Williams (1998, 6) states that "it would be absurd to claim that a representative, simply

representation. The criteria for choosing descriptive representatives will overlap significantly with the criteria for choosing representatives more generally. However, descriptive representatives who have been appointed, nominated, or elected to positions aimed at increasing the substantive representation of historically disadvantaged groups have particular and unique obligations to those groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> In contrast, I maintain that the ability to inspire and to be an example of a political leader from a historically disadvantaged group could be crucial for mobilizing that group.
<sup>7</sup> Rawls's difference principle asserts that social and economic in-

Rawls's difference principle asserts that social and economic inequalities are just to the extent that they are necessary to the institutional structure that is the greatest benefit to the least advantaged in the distribution. See Rawls 1971, 60, 302.

because she is a woman, therefore represents the interests or perspectives of women generally, or that an African-American representative is automatically representative of all African Americans. The mere presence of members of marginalized groups in legislatures is not *sufficient* for the fair representation of citizens from those groups, even though it is often necessary." Similarly, Phillips (1995, 157) states that "if the presumption is that all women or all black people share the same preferences and goals, this is clearly—and dangerously—erroneous." In some circumstances, a politics of presence can be undesirable. Most theorists of group representation recognize that members of historically disadvantaged groups have diverse interests and beliefs and that a politics of presence by itself is insufficient for revitalizing democratic institutions.

A tension thus emerges in the literature on group representation. On the one hand, theorists of group representation have argued that certain patterns of inequalities justify having an institutionalized voice. Such arguments emphasize the *shared* obstacles facing certain members of particular groups. Highlighting how certain groups are unfairly excluded from political life substantiates their claims that certain policy remedies are desperately needed. On the other hand, these theorists increasingly acknowledge the diversity within historically marginalized groups. This diversity can seem to undermine the presumption that certain shared experiences of oppression justify giving some groups an institutionalized voice.

Generally speaking, the literature has responded to this tension by exploring its implications for the meaning of representation as a whole. In particular, it has emphasized that representation is a dynamic process that must negotiate seemingly contradictory demands. Here the literature makes some of its most insightful contributions to democratic theory. For instance, Williams shows how the contradictory demands placed on representatives lead to understanding representation as a kind of mediation. Williams (1998, 8) identifies three dimensions of political life that representatives must mediate: the dynamics of legislative decision-making, the nature of legislator-constituent relations, and the basis for aggregating citizens into representable constituencies. Williams's understanding of representation as mediation expands the traditional conception of representation, which focuses almost exclusively on the relationship between the representative and the represented.

Iris Marion Young also offers a revised understanding of representation in response to the problem posed by diversity within historically disadvantaged groups. Young warns that attempts to include more voices in the political arena can inadvertently suppress other voices. She (Young 1997, 350) illustrates this point using the example of a Latino representative who might inadvertently represent heterosexual Latinos at the expense of gay and lesbian Latinos. For Young (1997, 351) the suppression of differences is a problem for *all* representation. Representatives of large districts or of small communities must negotiate the difficulty of one person representing many. Because such a

difficulty is endemic to all representation, the legitimacy of a representative is not primarily a function of his or her similarities to the represented. Representation should not be characterized by a "relationship of identity."

Instead, Young uses Jacques Derrida's concept of différance to recommend reconceptualizing representation as a differentiated relationship. Derrida's concept of différance is both extremely radical and subtle. The basic idea underlying the concept of différance is the rejection of polarities or dichotomies, such as that of cause-effect. For those who think that certain distinctions are straightforward, it will be tempting to reject the concept of différance out of hand. But Young (2000, 127) finds this concept useful for capturing the dynamic process of representation: for this concept, she suggests, encourages thinking of oppositions "in terms of the trace, a movement of temporalization that carries past and future with it." Young further explains that the concept of différance promotes a way of thinking about entities in their "plurality without requiring their collection into a common identity . . . . Things are similar without being identical, and different without being contrary, depending on the point of reference and the moment in a process." Using this idea of différance, Young recommends understanding representation as a fluid relationship, instead of a "relationship of identity" between constituents and representatives.

Let me briefly explain how Young applies Derrida's concept of différance to the meaning of representation. The basic move is to argue that the differences between the represented and the representative need to be both acknowledged and affirmed. According to Young (2000, 127), "Conceptualizing representation in terms of différance means acknowledging and affirming that there is a difference, a separation, between the representative and the constituents." For Young, constituents should not look for representatives with their same identity; rather, they should look for traces of accountability and authorization. Representation should be understood as a dynamic process that moves between moments of authorization and moments of accountability (Young 2000, 129). For Young, the movement between these moments makes the process "democratic." A representative process is democratic to the degree that citizens authorize their representatives and then can hold them accountable. Assessments of representative processes will therefore partially depend on the past and future behavior of representatives. Young's description of the dynamic of representation emphasizes that citizens often cannot anticipate the issues that representatives will confront during their term in office. Democratic citizens should continuously suspend or "defer" their evaluations of representatives. Democratic citizens must assess representation dynamically, that is, assess the whole ongoing processes of authorization and accountability of representatives. Young would resist assessing a representative from any one point of reference.

Young is quite right that representation in general is a complex and dynamic process. However, something important is overlooked in the quick move from group representation to representation as a whole. Young's focus on the problems of all representation obscures the distinctive problems of representation facing historically disadvantaged groups. She loses sight of the fact that some differences between representatives and the represented are more politically relevant from the perspective of democratic theory. Some politically salient differences should not be affirmed, e.g., differences that result from unjust and systemic exclusion.8 As Young herself pointed out in her earlier work, some groups face structural obstacles. In Justice and the Politics of Difference, she described real representation as consisting of "the self-organization of groups, the group generation of policy proposals in a context where decisions makers were required to be responsive to their perspectives and a group veto regarding specific policies that affect a group directly" (Young 1990, 184). In her later work, Young (1990, 372; 2000, 144, fn 27) "defers" the question of institutional supports for group representation. Her emphasis on the problems common to all representation downplays how particular institutional supports are necessary for overcoming some structural obstacles. Her admirable concern about the ways in which such institutional supports can suppress differences among historically disadvantaged groups leads her to retract her earlier commitment to certain institutional reforms, e.g., group vetoes. Young does continue to support multimember legislative jurisdictions, caucuses, and party list quotas. Reserved legislative seats should be used as "a last resort and temporary option for representing otherwise excluded perspectives" (Young 2000, 150). Young's desire to avoid excluding certain opinions, interests, or perspectives of historically disadvantaged groups thus weakens her initial support for institutional reforms aimed at increasing the real representation of those groups.

The degree to which Young has changed her mind is of less immediate interest than how the desire to avoid suppressing differences among members of historically disadvantaged groups can prevent theorists from articulating and defending reasons for preferring certain descriptive representatives over others. Simply to affirm all differences, as Young eventually does, ignores how certain politically salient differences between different groups in society (specifically between those who have been oppressed and those who have not) can justify the need for an institutionalized voice. Consider Young's example of the Asian American, who, she claims, has the perspective of an African American. This example shows how much she has weakened the claim that a historically disadvantaged group should be represented by members of that group. If one extends one's understanding of group membership so far as to include certain Asian Americans as members of the African-American community,<sup>9</sup> then existing proposals for group representation, e.g., party list quotas, become untenable, for it is questionable whether such a person could contribute to the self-organization of an African-American community (or should count toward a party list quota for African Americans.) If Asian Americans can possess an African-American perspective and thereby satisfy the requirements of being descriptive representatives for African Americans, so can whites. Young's revised understanding of representation could legitimate an all-male (or all white) legislature as adequately representing women (or people of color) provided that they shared similar interests, opinions, and perspectives. The central claim of the literature on group representation—that historically disadvantaged groups need representatives from those groups—is seriously diluted by Young's notion of representation as a differentiated relationship.

Young's description of the dynamic of representation and her explicit recognition of the diversity within historically disadvantaged groups are useful contributions to theoretical debates about the general meaning of representation. But they provide little guidance to those confronted with the task of evaluating a particular descriptive representative. Such evaluations could be improved by articulating some general criteria for preferring some descriptive representatives to others.

## JUSTIFYING THE SILENCE ABOUT CRITERIA

Silence about the criteria for evaluating descriptive representatives is not accidental. Theorists of group representation have offered two kinds of arguments to justify their silence. I call these two arguments the autonomy argument and the contingency argument.

According to the autonomy argument, members of historically disadvantaged groups should decide for themselves who is a preferable descriptive representative. This argument assumes that autonomy is best equated with being left alone—at least in the case of a group's choice of its representatives. According to this line of thinking, respecting the autonomy of historically disadvantaged groups requires theorists to refrain from advancing criteria for evaluating descriptive representatives. This argument has two main versions. The first suggests that articulating criteria for judging descriptive representatives attributes to historically disadvantaged groups a fixed identity. The second emphasizes the autonomy of the representative.

The first version of the autonomy argument asserts that any proposed criterion for evaluating descriptive representatives presupposes that a historically disadvantaged group has an essential nature. In other words, it presupposes that that such a group has a "fixed

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Democratic citizens should remain vigilant about preventing unjust and systemic exclusions. One way that they can do this is by assessing their choice of descriptive representatives in light of such exclusions. Institutional reforms aimed at increasing the number of descriptive representatives can revitalize democratic institutions if citizens select descriptive representatives based on an understanding of whose interests, perspectives, and opinions are being systemically marginalized.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> I assume here that Asian Americans are not typically considered part of the African-American community. I recognize that biracial and multiracial identities might complicate this assumption. My argument does not assume an essential identity to these groups but is based on existing, historically contingent understandings of group membership.

essence given once and for all, and with traits that are homogeneously distributed among all the group members" (Gould 1996, 182). Such an assumption places undesirable constraints on the behavior of members of historically disadvantaged groups. According to Williams (1995, 6), "No defensible claim for group representation can rest on assertions of the essential identity of women or minorities; such assertions do violence to the empirical facts of diversity as well as to the agency of individuals to define the meaning of their social and biological traits." To explain why some members are less suitable descriptive representatives is to question the authenticity of those members' identity. Such explanations possess an implicit charge that "she isn't really a woman" or "he isn't really black." In this way, discussions about the criteria for selecting descriptive representatives are often interpreted as attacks on the "authenticity" of descriptive representatives. Not only are such discussions overly divisive (Jones 1993; Stasiulis 1993), but they prevent the group from determining its own boundaries. According to this first version of the autonomy argument, members of historically disadvantaged groups should define for themselves the meaning of their group identity, as well as choose their own descriptive representatives.

The second version of the autonomy argument emphasizes the autonomy of descriptive representatives. Phillips, in particular, argues that specifying the criteria for evaluating descriptive representatives would undermine the arguments for group representation. For Phillips, a politics of presence is justified because representatives have some political discretion about their political decisions. Because of this discretion, descriptive representatives should be present where political decisions are being made. To uphold standards of "strict accountability"—that is, to require descriptive representatives to act in certain ways, e.g., to endorse a particular policy—would undermine a primary reason for why certain historically disadvantaged groups need representatives from those groups: namely, that representatives are not mere puppets of their constituents but must exercise their own judgment. To suppose that there is a fixed set of criteria by which descriptive representatives should be judged is to fail to appreciate how the autonomy afforded to representatives justifies the politics of presence. According to this second formulation, it would be misguided to provide a laundry list of "good policies" that a female representative should support and to insist that preferable female representatives can vote only in ways consistent with that list. After all, male representatives could also vote according to a laundry list. The more one knows how a descriptive representative should act, the less it is necessary to have a descriptive representative. Such reasoning led Mansbridge (1999, 630) to conclude that descriptive representatives become less necessary when interests have crystallized.

The second kind of argument for remaining silent about the criteria for judging descriptive representatives is *the contingency argument*. According to this argument, it is impossible to articulate the criteria that should be used to evaluate descriptive representatives

because context matters. Some theorists of group representation, such as Williams (1998, 17), stress that particular historical developments play "an important role in defining the groups whose moral claims are strongest." Others stress that the experiences of historically disadvantaged groups defy generalizations. A priori proposals for criteria will either be irrelevant or do more harm than good. The variations across groups prevent adopting any one set of criteria. Mansbridge provides a particularly illuminating discussion of the relationship between descriptive representation and contingency. She identifies four contingent conditions that could justify preferring descriptive representatives to nondescriptive representatives: "(1) adequate communication in contexts of mistrust, (2) innovative thinking in contexts of uncrystallized, not fully articulated, interests,... (3) creating a social meaning of 'ability to rule' for members of a group in historical contexts where the ability has been seriously questioned, and (4) increasing the polity's de facto legitimacy in contexts of past discrimination" (Mansbridge 1999, 628). For Mansbridge, descriptive representatives are needed when marginalized groups distrust relatively more privileged citizens and when marginalized groups possess political preferences that have not been fully formed. She emphasizes that descriptive representatives are necessary only under certain conditions—that is, when descriptive representatives perform certain functions in certain contexts. Mansbridge's discussion provides some important insights into evaluating when descriptive representation is necessary. Implicitly, her work offers some general criteria for evaluating descriptive representatives—that is, by their ability to satisfy these different functions. However, her emphasis on identifying the contingent conditions under which descriptive representation is preferable to nondescriptive representation makes the actual choice of descriptive representatives secondary, if not irrelevant.

In summary, theorists of descriptive representation refuse to specify any criteria for evaluating descriptive representatives for two good reasons. First, they see offering such criteria as violations of the autonomy of historically disadvantaged groups and/or their descriptive representatives, and second, they view such criteria as insensitive to contextual variation. For these reasons, theorists of descriptive representation avoid a tough question: Who is a preferable descriptive representative? Answering this question is not easy, because it requires privileging the interests, values, and perspectives of certain members of historically disadvantaged groups over those of other members. Answers to this question can therefore have the effect of downplaying, if not excluding, certain interests, values, and perspectives. For this reason, answers to the question of who is a preferable descriptive representative are more likely to be disputed than answers to the question, "Why have descriptive representatives?"

#### THE NEED FOR CRITERIA

Underlying both the autonomy and the contingency arguments is a legitimate concern about who gets to

decide which criteria are best. The impulse to speak for others can be and often is paternalistic and imperialistic (Alcoff 1995). Standards for assessing political performance have often been used to disqualify historically disadvantaged groups from political participation. To articulate criteria for evaluating descriptive representatives runs the risk that those criteria can be used in unanticipated and possibly harmful ways. Some fear that articulating such criteria might also unduly influence members of historically disadvantaged groups.

Such concerns are understandable but ultimately unpersuasive. After all, to articulate such criteria is not necessarily to assume that all members of a historically disadvantaged group have some essential identity. In fact, the very real and politically relevant differences among members of historically marginalized groups point to the desperate need for a theoretical discussion of criteria. There is a difference between articulating particular policies that a descriptive representative must endorse to count as a legitimate descriptive representative and articulating general guidelines for identifying preferable descriptive representatives. For instance, theorists of group representation have agreed that institutional reforms are necessary because historically disadvantaged groups possess overlooked interests. To maintain that a descriptive representative should pay special attention to overlooked interests does not require that she possess a particular view about those interests. 10 Descriptive representatives have autonomy to the extent that she can reasonably interpret those interests in a variety of ways. However, to say that descriptive representatives can legitimately interpret their group's interests in multiple ways is not to say that anything goes. Descriptive representatives who denounce their group affiliations or who deny that they have any particular obligation to their group would fail to achieve the ends for which descriptive representation was introduced (cf. Phillips's four arguments). Descriptive representatives who claim to represent only the common good might be desirable representatives for other reasons; however, they do not satisfy Phillips's "overlooked interests" argument.

One can articulate criteria for evaluating descriptive representatives without violating the autonomy either of historically disadvantaged groups or of their descriptive representatives. To pose criteria for judging descriptive representatives is not the same as imposing those criteria on members of historically disadvantaged groups. Obviously, to impose criteria on such groups,

or on democratic citizens more generally, is wrongheaded. It is crucial according to my view that members of historically disadvantaged groups retain the ability to choose to adopt any proposed criterion.<sup>11</sup>

I would remind those who fear that articulating criteria for evaluating descriptive representatives might exercise an undue influence on a historically disadvantaged group that silence holds similar risks. After all, members of historically disadvantaged groups are not always the ones who select descriptive representatives. Privileged citizens are frequently in charge of selecting political appointees and nominating candidates for public office. To assume that not articulating the criteria for selecting descriptive representatives for committees or party lists is the best way to protect the autonomy of historically disadvantaged groups ignores the power that privileged groups currently hold. As Audre Lorde (1984, 41) aptly warned, "Your silence will not protect vou." Silence about controversial subjects does not necessarily bring about desired outcomes.

Besides, citizens inevitably bring their general standards of representation to bear on their choice of representatives. Critically evaluating the standards for descriptive representatives can facilitate deliberations by democratic citizens, thereby "assisting, and not infringing on" the autonomy of historically disadvantaged groups. 12 Articulating criteria for assessing descriptive representatives does not make the exercise of judgment unnecessary; rather, deliberations about these criteria can refine those judgments. Theorists can offer criteria for choosing among descriptive representatives and still maintain that members of historically disadvantaged groups must determine for themselves whether a specific criterion is appropriate at any particular moment. This leads to the second argument for remaining silent: the role of contingencies in evaluations of descriptive representatives.

Context undeniably does matter. Evaluations of descriptive representatives, like arguments for a politics of presence (Phillips 1995, 46), depend on "historically specific analysis of the existing arrangements for representation." For instance, who is a preferable descriptive representative might depend on whose interests, opinions, and perspectives are currently being stigmatized and marginalized by existing political norms and institutional processes. "Because group identity is orchestrated and produced in part through political institutional processes" (Bickford 1999, 86), citizens should consider the unjust effects of those processes as relevant to assessments of preferable descriptive representatives. Which descriptive representatives are preferable might also depend on the reasons that descriptive representation is necessary, e.g., to increase the trust groups have in democratic institutions or to include overlooked interests on the policy agenda.

Espousing criteria is not the same as requiring that certain criteria be applied in all circumstances. Like

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Like representatives generally, good descriptive representatives should sometimes act as trustees and at other times act as delegates. The standards for good representation cannot be linked strictly to the policy preferences of the represented. Pitkin (1967, 166) expressed this point in the following way: "Neither 'follow their wishes' nor 'ignore their wishes' will do; the decision must depend on why they disagree . . . but the standard by which he [the representative] will be judged as a representative is whether he has promoted the objective interest of those he represents. Within the framework of his basic obligation there is room for a wide variety of alternatives." My criterion for assessing preferable descriptive representatives does not assume one particular understanding of the objective interests of historically marginalized groups.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> A description of the conditions necessary for promoting this ability is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> I want to thank an anonymous reviewer for helping me formulate my position in this way.

most theorists of descriptive representation, I share the suspicion of a cookie-cutter approach to evaluating descriptive representatives. It would be foolhardy to propose a set of criteria that did not consider context or that did not require individuals to use their own judgment to determine whether the criteria apply to the particular case at hand. To recognize the importance of particularities does not preclude articulating criteria for evaluation. It requires having criteria that are sensitive to those particularities.

My final argument for articulating criteria for evaluating descriptive representatives is based on my understanding of a particular role that political theory can and should play. Increasingly, the need for political theory to inform contemporary political controversies has been recognized (Isaac 1998, chap. 7). Contemporary politics is plagued by controversies about the representation of historically disadvantaged groups. Consider the controversies over the leadership of African Americans, such as Louis Farrakhan. Angela Dillard (2001, 4) notes that conservatives among women (e.g., Phyllis Schlafly) and minorities (e.g., Thomas Sowell and Richard Rodriguez) "have been dismissed as traitors, as self-loathing reactionaries who are little more than dupes of powerful white, male, heterosexual conservatives." Recently, Lee Freed, a female president of the Manitoba chapter of the First Nations Accountability Coalition in Canada, accused the male tribal leadership of corruption and nepotism. Such contemporary controversies over the leadership of historically disadvantaged groups confirm that historically disadvantaged groups can possess different understandings about who should be their representatives. They also confirm the suspicion that simply having descriptive representatives is not sufficient to meet the requirements of a democratic commitment to the concerns of historically disadvantaged groups. Descriptive representation can fail to revitalize democratic institutions. It can also undermine democratic institutions if the ruling elites of historically disadvantaged groups use their institutional positions to control those groups instead of mobilizing those groups or bringing their overlooked interests onto the policy agenda (e.g., Cohen 1999). For these reasons, it is important to clarify the criteria for judging descriptive representatives. Evaluations of democratic institutions need to go beyond merely quantitative considerations—that is, the number of descriptive representatives. Evaluations of democratic institutions need to consider the extent to which preferable descriptive representatives are present. The criteria for identifying preferable descriptive representatives need to identify principled reasons for preferring some descriptive representative to others that are in line with the arguments for group representation. By failing to discuss criteria for assessing descriptive representatives, this theoretical literature ignores certain persistent debates about descriptive representation in contemporary politics. It also disregards the possible dangers and disappointments of a politics of presence to democratic politics.

### THE CRITERION FOR EVALUATING DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATIVES

My criterion for evaluating descriptive representatives is a general one: Democratic citizens should consider the degree to which a descriptive representative has mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups as relevant to identifying preferable descriptive representatives. Preferable descriptive representatives will have strong *mutual* relationships with *dispossessed subgroups*. This criterion is composed of two aspects. First, preferable descriptive representatives should possess a particular kind of relationship (mutual), and second, they should have this kind of relationship *with* certain subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups (dispossessed). I explicate both aspects of my criterion below.

#### Mutual Relationships

The importance of relationships to group identity is not a new claim. David Truman (1951, 24) maintained that "interactions, or relationships, give the group its molding and guiding power." Other theorists of group representation discuss relationships between representatives and their constituents (e.g., Williams 1998, chap. 6; Young 2000, chap. 4). However, these theorists typically examine these relationships primarily in terms of whether the constituents "trust" their representatives. Young (2000, 128–30) evaluates the *process* of representation by the extent to which the relationship between representative and constituents "avoids separation" and "renews connection." She does not address how to evaluate particular individuals engaged in the process of representation.

What is distinctive about my criterion is its specification that representatives and members of historically disadvantaged groups must mutually recognize each other. Mutuality requires an interactive relationship between representatives and citizens. Mutual relationships require a historically disadvantaged group to recognize its descriptive representatives in a particular way as well as a descriptive representative to recognize that group in a particular way. Such reciprocal recognition is necessary for descriptive representatives and their groups to coordinate consciously chosen political activities. Descriptive representatives without mutual relationships could be "representative" in the sense that their behavior responds to the policy preferences of their group, but such responsiveness is not sufficient to make the form of representation democratic. Kings could be representatives of their subjects, in this sense, if they sufficiently polled the preferences of their subjects.

Democratic relations demand effective participation on the part of citizens (Dahl 1989, 109). Democratic representation requires that citizens can access and influence political institutions. Descriptive representatives with mutual relations would improve democratic representation by enabling historically disadvantaged groups to influence the political decision-making process. In doing so, historically disadvantaged groups

act in concert with their descriptive representatives. Democratic relationships are therefore ones "in which both parties are active" (Plotke 1997, 29).

In proposing this criterion, I am advocating a new approach to assessing the performance of descriptive representatives. Political scientists often evaluate descriptive representatives' performance by focusing exclusively on notions of interests as identified by policy preferences. Assessing descriptive representatives solely by the way they cast their votes can lead to the conclusion that it does not matter who represents historically disadvantaged groups (Schwarz and Shaw 1976; Swain 1993). This approach ignores other reasons for having descriptive representatives, e.g., introducing overlooked interests or building trust in the political institutions. Cathy Cohen's analysis (1999) of AIDS activism in the African-American community revealed the general failure of black elites to recognize the particular needs of certain subgroups in the African-American communities, that is, black gays and lesbians and IV drug users. Cohen showed that although black leaders often maintained a "good" voting record in terms of AIDS policies, they failed to transform the nature of the political debate in ways that address the particular interests of specific subgroups in the African-American community, e.g., needle exchange programs.

Good descriptive representatives therefore cannot be identified simply by examining voting records. Just as presidential performance is partially judged by the president's selection of staff, descriptive representatives should be judged by who does and does not interact with them. Assessments of descriptive representatives need to consider whether these representatives reach out to (or distance themselves from) historically disadvantaged groups. Preferable descriptive representatives facilitate social networks. Formal as well as informal ties provide the channels through which democratic relationships could work and thereby the means to revitalize democratic institutions. I introduce mutual relationships into discussions of descriptive representation because these discussions need to reflect the fact that what determines policy is not only what political actors do but also whom they know.

It is important to emphasize a consideration implicit in my claim that preferable descriptive representatives possess mutual relationships: The commitment to democratic representation requires that democratic citizens should not be apathetic. Preferable descriptive representatives will inspire their group to act in concert with them. Although it is possible that a descriptive representative could adequately "represent" the concerns of the apathetic insofar as the representative takes positions that reflect the interests or preferences of apathetic citizens, the descriptive representative's actions would not be democratic to the extent that apathetic citizens do not care about the activities of that representative. My criterion prefers descriptive representatives who can and do mobilize a historically disadvantaged group, encouraging the active engagement of that group. Requiring preferable descriptive representatives to have mutual relations is very demanding and therefore likely to support robust democracies.

To possess mutual relations, descriptive representatives must recognize and be recognized by members of a historically disadvantaged group in two ways. First, they must recognize each other as belonging to a historically disadvantaged group, and second, they must recognize each other as having a common understanding of the proper aims of a descriptive representative of the group. To recognize each other mutually in these two ways is to possess a mutual relationship.

Preferable descriptive representatives are those who recognize and are recognized by members of their historically disadvantaged group as being "one of us." In particular, they have a reciprocated sense of having a fate linked with that of other members of their group. Michael Dawson (1994, 77) defines the notion of linked fate in reference to African Americans as "the degree to which African Americans believe that their own self-interests are linked to the interests of the race." To possess a sense of linked fate is to experience "the group interests... as a useful proxy for self-interest." In other words, individuals who believe that their fates are linked to a group believe that "what happens to the group as a whole affects their own lives."

The notion of linked fate reflects the fact that a person's range of choices—that is, his or her perceived opportunities and goals—is both subjective and social. Group identities are partially formed by "the political processes through which concrete notions of collective interest are shaped,... who participates in those processes and who is advantaged and disadvantaged by them" (Reed 1999, 45-46). Recent political theorists have also endorsed the view that the social worldwhat they call culture—limits the range of choices available to individuals. For example, Joseph Raz and Avishai Margalit (1994, 119) state that "familiarity with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable. Sharing in a culture, being part of it, determines the limits of the feasible." In this way, membership is both "something that you are 'born' into and that constitutes you as being who you are and is ascribed to you by others in a way that makes it involuntary from your point of view" (Gould 1996, 182). Thus, even individuals who object to their identities being defined largely in terms of their group membership or who are critical of the ways in which group membership can constrain their choices can still have a sense of sharing their fate with a historically disadvantaged group.

To have a sense of linked fate with a historically disadvantaged group partially entails having a substantive conception of that group that is relevantly similar to those held by other members of that group. Group membership can be based on shared visible characteristics, e.g., color of skin, or on shared experiences (Mansbridge 1999). The substantive content of group membership can vary. Some individuals can belong to more than one group and therefore experience conflicting allegiances to different groups. Members can also possess conflicting views on their group's politics. I am not denying such differences.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> For a discussion of how to measure this sense of linked fate using attitude and opinion surveys, see Dawson 1994, 77–80, 82–84.

But preferable descriptive representatives for a given group share an understanding of the group's boundaries with that group. Descriptive representatives who possess a narrower (and more exclusive) understanding of those boundaries are unable, or at least less likely, to satisfy the arguments that justify group representation. For this reason, an African-American descriptive representative who denies that gay and lesbian blacks are members of the group (or who excludes conservatives, IV drug users, Muslims, or other religious African Americans) would be less preferable than one who includes those members in his or her understanding of the group. 14 After all, justifications for group representation tend to emphasize the extent to which descriptive representatives include overlooked interests, build trust, and foster deliberation. Descriptive representatives who overlook certain members of the group or who deem certain members "inauthentic" are less likely to fulfill these functions. Representatives who possess broader understandings of the group are more likely to overlap with the varied understandings of the represented and therefore satisfy the reasons for having an institutionalized voice.

Inclusive language also has its pitfalls (e.g., Cohen 1999; Minow 1990; Reed 1999, 17). Generalized notions of a group can be so abstract and all-encompassing that they ignore significant differences among members of the group. Hence, U.S. suffragists who claimed to speak for women were justifiably criticized for speaking from an unreflective bias of being middle-class or educated or white (Davis 1983). Abstract notions of the group can also prevent elites from being held accountable to specific people. Speaking about the "underclass," "women," or "Latinos" in general terms can create an illusory unity among members of those groups that can be used to the detriment of vulnerable members of those groups (Reed 1999, 5). For example, it is possible to diminish community support for policies aimed at helping vulnerable members of a community by portraying those policies as attacks on the community. Preferable descriptive representatives possess shared understandings of group membership that recognize salient differences of subgroups. I elaborate on my understanding of such salient differences in my discussion of dispossessed subgroups below.

To understand the importance of mutual recognition of belonging to the group for evaluating a descriptive representative, consider the following case. It is possible to imagine an African-American representative who grew up in a primarily white neighborhood, attended predominantly white private schools, has a white spouse, and has shown no demonstrable interest in the problems of other African Americans. In fact, such a representative could thrive politically by publicly distancing herself from the African-American community.<sup>15</sup> The point of this example is not to

question whether this woman is an "authentic" African American. I believe that she is. 16 Rather, it is to question whether such a representative could satisfy sufficiently the reasons that theorists for a politics of presence gave for increasing the number of descriptive representatives. After all, such a descriptive representative lacks the relationships necessary to satisfy these reasons. She might individually face certain obstacles and experience forms of discrimination because of her identity; however, she lacks the relationships with African Americans that could enable her to achieve mutual recognition with them. The extent to which she disavows her relationships to African Americans indicates the extent to which she is less likely to possess mutual relationships with them. African-Americans would be more likely to distrust her. She would also be less likely to advance overlooked interests of the African-American community and to mobilize that community. Who perceives that representative as "belonging" to the group and whom a representative claims to act on the behalf of are important considerations for evaluating the qualifications of descriptive representatives.

Individuals in mutual relationships not only recognize each other as belonging to the same group, but also recognize that they share an understanding of the proper aims of their representatives. To have shared aims is to possess a similar vision for the future direction of politics—one whose goal is the improvement of the social, economic, and political status of particular historically disadvantaged groups. My understanding of aims has two components: policy preferences and values.<sup>17</sup> A descriptive representative could disagree with members of a historically disadvantaged group about either component, yet still share aims.<sup>18</sup> Some

a less preferable descriptive representative if those in the African-American community did not accept and identify him as a member of their community. Given the current divisions between racial groups, such a revised understanding of racial identity is possible, albeit unlikely. Note that Young's example is presented in a way that emphasizes its potential to be more inclusionary, while my argument suggests that relationships provide reasons for objecting to certain descriptive representatives for particular groups.

For a discussion of the difference between measuring political values and policy preferences, see Stoker 2001 and Rasiniski 2001.

18 To explicate the idea of an aim, it is necessary to differentiate an aim from what Young (2000, 134) calls the "modes of representation"—that is, three aspects of one's identity that need to be represented. Those three aspects are interests (policy preferences), opinions (values, priorities, and principles), and perspectives (starting points of conversations). While Williams (1998, 171) argues that interests and perspectives are more inextricably tied, Young stresses how these different aspects of a person's identity can conflict.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> As can be seen, descriptive representatives with mutual relations do not necessarily possess "progressive" or "liberal" policy agendas. <sup>15</sup> My example bears a strong resemblance to Young's example of an Asian American who has an African-American perspective. However, my argument suggests that such an Asian American would be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> To articulate reasons for preferring some descriptive representatives to others is not the same as questioning the authenticity of a descriptive representative's membership. A full discussion of the relationship between preferability and legitimacy is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Here I purposely limit my discussion to the desirability of particular descriptive representatives, not their legitimacy. I recognize that all members of a historically disadvantaged group are in some sense legitimate descriptive representatives of that group. In other words, Reverend Jesse Jackson, Marian Wright Edelman, Shelby Steele, and Allan Keyes are all legitimate descriptive representatives for African Americans; however, who is a preferable descriptive representative for African Americans depends on who possesses strong mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups. Such subgroups can include conservative and/or poor subgroups.

members might experience a descriptive representative advocating certain public policies as a litmus test for shared aims with that representative, e.g., their position on abortion or affirmative action, while others see shared aims as resulting from a particular combination of policy preferences and values. Individuals can and will have different conceptions of what is necessary for having shared aims. Nevertheless, a descriptive representative who did not share either component with a historically disadvantaged group does not share aims with that group.

In this way, my criterion recognizes that people who share similar political values can justifiably disagree about the desirability of certain public policies. It also recognizes that individuals with different political values can agree about certain public policies. Consequently, I do not always want people who agree with my political values or with my policy preferences. I do want someone who shares my aims. The notion of shared aims recognizes the importance of the interaction between policy preferences and values for selecting preferable descriptive representatives. For this reason, shared aims must be measured in degrees: Descriptive representatives share aims with a historically disadvantaged group to greater or less degrees.

This notion of aims as a kind of direction for politics interjects into discussions of group representation my belief that the actions of descriptive representatives do matter. Pitkin was wrong to draw such a firm distinction between what a representative looks like and what a representative does. My criterion for evaluating descriptive representatives offers one way to follow Phillips's recommendation to integrate a politics of presence with a politics of ideas. Descriptive representatives are preferable to the degree that their actions are perceived by members of a historically disadvantaged group as improving their linked fate. My notion of aims is meant to capture the fact that members of historically disadvantaged groups, despite having different policy preferences and values, can still share a political vision aimed at relieving the plight of their communities. Thus, the actions of descriptive representatives are not irrelevant to who should be considered a preferable descriptive representative. Preferable descriptive representatives recognize themselves, and are recognized by members of a historically disadvantaged group, as sharing the aims of that group.

The importance of shared aims is most readily apparent when one lacks a representative who shares one's aims. One is less likely to accept differences of opinions with those who have different aims than with

For Young, the process of democratic representation relies on all three modes.

Young's analysis of the dynamic processes of representation, though, can divert attention from the proper standards for evaluating particular representatives. Individual representatives are less likely to satisfy all of these different modes of representation than are the processes of representation. I know of no representative who shares all of my interests, opinions, and perspectives. These modes of representation are too narrow to provide much guidance for identifying preferable descriptive representatives. For this reason, I argue that members of historically disadvantaged groups should seek descriptive representatives who share their aims.

those who share one's aims. My discussion of shared aims reflects evidence that African Americans tend to give their leaders the benefit of the doubt in the face of controversies, e.g., controversies over Louis Farrakhan. Historically disadvantaged groups are willing to "own" a representative with whom they disagree (Dawson 1994). The reason is that they possess a linked fate and shared aims with these leaders.

Both a sense of belonging to a group and shared aims are important for mutual relations, for individuals whose fates are linked can have different aims. For example, ultraorthodox Jewish women are forbidden from studying general subjects such as math and embrace their traditional role in the house. Moreover, many ultraorthodox women believe that women are incapable of making important decisions (such as voting). For some of these women, it is proper to arrange their social and political lives around the assumption that women are inferior. The presence of these ultraorthodox Jewish women in Israel affects how Israeli women (including Jewish secular or even Palestinian women) are perceived. Nonpracticing Jewish women, Palestinian women, and ultraorthodox Jewish women thus share fates in Israel, even though these different subgroups have contradictory policy preferences and values. This example demonstrates that members of historically disadvantaged groups can share fates, even though their aims differ.

Preferable descriptive representatives are those who possess mutual relationships with their constituents. But, as has been shown, this relationship consists in descriptive representatives and their historically disadvantaged groups recognizing each other as having a linked fate and sharing aims. This mutual recognition thus provides some substantive guidance both for which descriptive representative is preferable and for what a descriptive representative should be doing. In these ways, mutual relationships between a descriptive representative and a historically disadvantaged group provide that group with a stake in politics: They can influence the political agenda through acting in concert with their descriptive representatives.

#### **Dispossessed Subgroups**

I now clarify the second aspect of my criterion—what I mean by a dispossessed subgroup. Dispossessed subgroups should not be understood as those groups that literally do not possess any private property, possessions, or resources. Rather, I use the term dispossessed in a narrower way to refer to groups that are unjustly excluded from and/or stigmatized by the political process and consequently lack the political and economic resources necessary for effective representation. Often dispossessed subgroups suffer oppression not only as members of their overarching group but also as members of the subgroup. They are therefore members of historically disadvantaged groups, yet they face further political obstacles—what Cathy Cohen (1999, 70) describes as secondary marginalization—that is, the ways in which members of marginalized groups construct and police group identity as to regulate behavior,

attitudes, and the public image of those groups. Perhaps it is in virtue of the combination of the forms of oppression that they lack the financial, time, and social resources necessary for political participation. Class, sexuality, drug use, geographic location, relationships to welfare, criminal records, and religion are all possible markers of dispossessed subgroups.

This second aspect of my criterion offers a way to return to the commitment found in the literature on group representation to those groups that have been and continue to be marginalized within the existing political system. A commitment to group representation entails a commitment to those whose interests have been overlooked, who have been and continue to be unjustly excluded from political participation, and whose presence could revitalize democratic institutions. Group representation therefore requires being vigilant about groups that lack a political voice. Preferable descriptive representatives would be those who seek out and establish mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups.

To demonstrate the importance of mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups, I focus on the ways in which class inequalities can constrain effective representation.19 Such inequalities can undermine democratic citizens' political resources. My discussion of dispossessed subgroups is by no means limited to the experiences of poor subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups. Other subgroups that lack the political and economic resources for effective representation would also count as dispossessed. I use poor subgroups to illustrate my understanding of dispossessed subgroups for two reasons. First, this example highlights the necessity of mutual relationships for improving the substantive representation of historically disadvantaged groups. Second, this example demonstrates the interactions among different forms of oppression.

Theorists of group representation often implicitly recognize the importance of class in their arguments. Almost all proponents of group representation (e.g., Phillips 1999, 151; Williams 1998, 15–18; Young 2000, 92–99) appeal to the economic structural inequalities that certain marginalized groups face, e.g., the rates of victimization, of poverty, of housing, and of job discrimination, to justify group representation. In this way, they recognize that economic inequalities are one indicator that a group deserves a political voice.

Nevertheless, just as in previous times women and ethnic groups were considered adequately represented by the presence of white male representatives, theorists of self-representation do not adequately acknowledge problems with poor subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups being represented by econom-

ically more privileged members of their group. Some explicitly deny that class should be incorporated into political solutions for presence. For example, Phillips argues that the politics of presence should be treated as distinct from issues concerning class. Phillips offers several reasons for this distinction, e.g., the difficulty in defining class. However, Phillips (1995, 170-78) admits that these reasons for treating class separately are "insincere," stating that "when it comes down to it, the real reason for my silence on class is simply that it does not lend itself to the same kind of solutions."20 This admission implies that considerations of class cannot be adequately incorporated into the types of institutional reforms necessary for increasing the number of descriptive representatives. Interestingly, this admission contradicts her arguments for a politics of presence. Phillips is quite explicit that a politics of presence is not a guarantee for a robust democratic politics. A democratic politics must balance the commitment to presence with another commitment: what Phillips calls "a politics of ideas." For Phillips, the politics of ideas refers to the commitment to particular opinions, preferences, and beliefs. The politics of ideas would include one's position on class issues. In contrast, a politics of presence is a commitment to the intuition that it matters who expresses those opinions, preferences, and beliefs. For Phillips, democratic practices will flourish when democratic citizens start integrating these two commitments. Phillips's claim that class should not be incorporated into a politics of presence violates her own understanding of the conditions necessary for robust democratic relations.

Others minimize the significance of socioeconomic factors by choosing examples that focus almost exclusively on only one form of oppression. Often these examples explore the ways that groups are formally excluded from political participation. For instance, Williams focuses on the structural obstacles faced by U.S. women and African Americans in their efforts to gain full political standing. She cites economic inequalities as indicators that institutional reforms are necessary, yet her proposed institutional reforms are aimed exclusively at formal political exclusions.

Williams's emphasis on formal political exclusions reflects the tendency among proponents of group representation to notice the oppressive nature of socioeconomic status without incorporating this observation into their arguments for group representation or into their proposed institutional reforms. These proponents also have not incorporated the insight that one must understand the interactions among multiple forms of oppression (e.g., Collins 1990; Higginbotham 1992; hooks 2000).<sup>21</sup> One cannot simply "add on" an analysis of class after advocating for increasing the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> I explicitly reject an understanding of class that is based on categories and classification schemes; rather, I am concerned with how class relations are produced and maintained through political institutions. Phillips argues that the category of class is substantively different from conceptions of race and gender. For example, one loses one's class when one becomes an elected official. For an alternative understanding of class, see Acker (2000, 197), who defines class as "social relations constructed through active practices, not as categories or classifications of people according to socioeconomic characteristics or occupational status."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> For her full discussion of class, see Phillips 1995, chap. 7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> The failure of the literature on descriptive representation to incorporate this insight is readily apparent in its proposed institutional reforms, e.g., party quotas. For instance, these reforms do not specify whether Asian Americans should count as descriptive representatives for African Americans and therefore should count toward an African-American party quota, as Young's example implies. Nor do they provide any way for determining whether African-American

representation of women and people of color. Deborah King illustrates the inability to add on class by noting that education can increase the income potential among different groups disproportionately. King (1993, 223–24) claims that the economic benefits "of a post-secondary education, a college degree or higher, are greater for black females than for white females while among those with less than a college degree, black females earn less than white females." In this way, King reveals that focusing too much on only one form of oppression can mask the obstacles faced by certain segments of historically disadvantaged groups.

Williams's analysis of self-representation would have benefited from an example in which the dynamic of multiple forms of oppression was considered. For instance, Margaret Wilkerson and Jewell Gresham (1993, 297) have argued that the "feminization of poverty" cannot be understood as distinct from the "racialization of poverty." Wilkerson and Gresham claim that the focus on the economic inequalities faced by women "negates the role played by racial barriers to black employment, particularly among males." Theorists of group representation tend to give examples in which the dynamics of race, class, and gender are prominent only a cursory treatment, if any treatment at all. They also tend to downplay how political norms and practices within the democratic institutions, e.g., recruitment practices, can marginalize certain subgroups. Consequently, their understandings of group representation ignore that inclusion in politics can promote instrumental political bargaining at the expense of transformative politics (Dryzek 1996; Reed 1999).

More specifically, theorists of group representation do not adequately address the particular barriers to effective representation experienced by poor subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups. For instance, given the practice of disenfranchising convicts, the high incarceration rates of poor blacks and Latinos cut off traditional avenues for seeking political representation:

Every state but three imposes some type of ban on voting by those convicted of serious crimes. Most states bar voting by felons while in prison, but restore the right to vote once the individual has served his sentence or completed parole. In 14 states, a felony conviction can mean a permanent ban on voting. (Braceras 2000)

The current practice of disenfranchising convicts cast doubts on whether certain subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups should rely primarily on electoral procedures for achieving substantive representation. Theorists of group representation need to address the obstacles that are produced through the interactions among different forms of oppression and that unjustly constrain certain subgroups.

Theorists who emphasize electoral reforms that increase the number of descriptive representatives also

women should "count" under the number of all women or have their own quota in the party lists. The failure to address these issues in this literature reveals the failure to incorporate an interactive understanding of race, class, and gender. tend to ignore the kinds of resources necessary for poor subgroups to advance their political agendas. Traditional means for getting policy preferences onto the political agenda—studies, public relations campaigns, lobbying efforts—advantage citizens who are financially better off and resource-rich. Being able to stay informed about political issues, let alone to participate in politics, requires time and economic resources. Elected officials increasingly spend their time fund-raising. Citizens with economic resources can buy access, but those without economic resources tend to have relatively less access. Consequently, those with economic resources do not necessarily need as much of an institutionalized voice as those who lack those resources.

Typically, citizens who lack economic resources need to register their preferences through non-institutional and confrontational tactics. Frances Fox Piven and Richard Cloward (1979, 3) have argued that "protest tactics which defied political norms were not simply the recourse of troublemakers and fools. For the poor, they were the only recourse." According to Piven and Cloward, poor citizens need alternative tactics, such as protests, for effective representation. These tactics depend on numbers and relationships. Piven and Cloward's position reflects the common belief in the literature on social movements that more disruptive tactics are more likely to be successful (e.g., McAdam 1983; Tarrow 1994; Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly 1975). The social networks surrounding descriptive representatives are therefore relevant to their preferability. A descriptive representative who possesses mutual relationships to poor subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups is more likely to have the political resources necessary for advancing those subgroups' interests. Such descriptive representatives also hold the promise of expanding the boundaries of political participation.

One should not assume that class "perspectives" are necessarily better represented if ethnicity, race, and gender are better represented in legislatures. After all, research has documented the economic disparities within various racial groups (e.g., Dawson 1994, chap. 2; Hochschild 1995; Wilson 1980). Such disparities are increasing. Although they continue as a group to be economically and socially worse off than whites, African Americans are increasingly economically divided in ways that affect housing, jobs, death rates, and the likelihood of being a victim of crime. Such disparities among African Americans have led some to conclude that black identity will increasingly be tied to considerations of class as opposed to race—what Kilson (1983) called "status deracialization" and Wilson (1980) titled "the declining significance of race."

For Dawson (1994), the economic polarization of blacks does not necessarily lead to political polarization. Economic polarization, though, does affect the extent to which poor blacks participate politically. After examining falling rates of political participation among poor blacks, Hochschild (1995, 50) concluded that "the worst-off in general are losing political influence, and the worst-off blacks in particular are losing most." This observation is especially troublesome when considered in conjunction with Cohen's (1997)

claim that historically disadvantaged groups are policed internally. If Cohen is correct, then the choice of descriptive representatives is crucial for understanding why some dispossessed subgroups lack substantive representation. This choice is also crucial for the proposed institutional reforms, e.g., party list quotas and proportional representation, to be able to revitalize democratic practices.

Of course, low economic status is not the only reason that citizens do not participate in politics. Cohen (1999, 346) revealed that black gays and lesbians who were HIV-positive did not participate in AIDS protests from fear of being seen by other members of the black community. Such fears were particularly acute for members who relied on that community for support while sick. As Cohen's example demonstrates, other political norms and practices besides the formal exclusion of historically disadvantaged groups can exclude certain subgroups of historically disadvantaged groups. For this reason, preferable descriptive representatives can have mutual relationships with other types of dispossessed subgroups.

My criterion for evaluating descriptive representation should not be interpreted as arguing that the selfrepresentation of women or of African Americans or other minorities is secondary to the representation of the poor. Such an argument would merely mimic the common claim that identity politics is divisive while class is more unifying (Gitlin 1995). Nor am I repeating claims that class is more politically salient than race (e.g., Loury 1987; Murray 1984; Sowell 1984). Instead, I maintain that who is a preferable descriptive representative depends on how different forms of oppression intersect, for example, how race can work in conjunction with class is relevant to determining who is a preferable descriptive representative. Democratic citizens need to evaluate descriptive representatives in ways that attend to how political institutions marginalize certain groups. Young was right that institutional reforms aimed at increasing the number of descriptive representatives can entrench certain interests, e.g., by privileging heterosexual Latinos at the expense of gay and lesbian Latinos. Moreover, evaluations of descriptive representatives are particularly messy when segments of a historically disadvantaged group reject a descriptive representative. For Young, the diversity within historically disadvantaged groups can be so great that schemes of group representation will necessarily result in the suppression of difference.

However, recognition of the diversity within historically disadvantaged groups does not change the fact that some groups are chronically underrepresented. In other words, it does not change the fact that some groups need institutional reforms to enhance their substantive representation. For the institutional reforms to work successfully, democratic citizens need to select descriptive representatives in ways that are sensitive to how institutional norms and practices unjustly marginalize dispossessed subgroups. My criterion offers one way to take into account the dynamic among different forms of oppression: Who is a preferable descriptive representative depends partially on

whose interests, opinions, and perspectives are being excluded. Recall that a descriptive representative's shared aims and sense of belonging to a group provide some substantive guidance for what that representative should be doing. In this way, my criterion depends on context. Those selecting descriptive representatives (for appointments, committees, or public office) need to attend to the mutual relationships that descriptive representatives possess with dispossessed subgroups. They should not assume that "just any woman will do" or that "just any black will do." Institutional reforms aimed at increasing the number of descriptive representatives are more likely to revitalize democratic institutions if citizens assess descriptive representatives using my criterion.

For this reason, I submit that when one has a choice between two descriptive representatives, one who has strong mutual relationships to dispossessed subgroups and another who does not, one should (ceteris paribus) prefer the former. I have so far avoided the question of what to do when choosing among descriptive representatives who possess mutual relationships to different dispossessed subgroups. Such moments do not have generalizable or easy answers. In such circumstances, citizens face tough choices that require exercising their own political judgment. To recognize that the dispossessed too can have diverse interests is to acknowledge that my criterion might not settle the question of who is a preferable descriptive representative. However, the refusal to examine the criteria being used for selecting descriptive representatives can reinforce the norms and practices that unjustly exclude dispossessed subgroups. Public deliberations about the proper criteria could therefore help refine those decisions and prevent such exclusions.

If historically disadvantaged groups do possess such deep divisions that they must consistently choose among interests, opinions, and perspectives of competing dispossessed subgroups, then those groups are less likely to be legitimately represented by only one representative. In other words, if certain groups possess intractable divisions, e.g., between liberal and conservative African Americans or between heterosexual and gay and lesbian Latinos, then such groups would need more than one descriptive representative. This observation affirms Young's conclusions (1999) about the need to pluralize group representation. The presence of multiple dispossessed subgroups indicates the need for more descriptive representation, not less. Unfortunately, there is often a limit to how many descriptive representatives a given group can have. 22 Such limits require principled criteria for selecting descriptive representatives. As we have seen, the refusal to articulate any criteria for preferring some descriptive representatives to others has led some theorists, such as Young, to weaken their commitment to the position that historically disadvantaged groups should be represented by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> This argument could lead to the proliferation of descriptive representatives. For a helpful discussion on how to identify historically disadvantaged groups, and thereby subgroups, that deserve group representation, see Williams 1998, 15–18.

members of their group. As I have also pointed out, this refusal could also prevent the proposed institutional reforms from revitalizing democratic institutions: Some descriptive representatives may perpetuate or even aggravate the marginalization of historically disadvantaged groups.

Proponents of group representation are likely to agree that it is important to attend to the relationships between descriptive representatives and dispossessed subgroups. In fact, my criterion arises from the same normative commitments that justify group representation. According to this logic, the extent to which a politics of presence can include those who have been systemically excluded from political life is also the extent to which a politics of presence can bolster democratic participation and the legitimacy of democratic institutions.

However, one needs to understand that democratic representation excludes as well as it includes. The act of excluding is not in itself objectionable on democratic grounds. After all, representative institutions require selecting some representatives at the expense of others. I introduce my criterion in an effort to provide some guidance for preferring certain descriptive representatives to others. I hope that others will expand on my criterion in ways that are sensitive to the reasons for supporting group representation and to data on the political marginalization of different groups. Introducing a criterion such as mine into existing discussions of group representation offers a principled way to balance a commitment to the diversity within historically disadvantaged groups with a commitment to group representation.

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# **Ameliorating Majority Decisiveness through Expression of Preference Intensity**

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In pairwise voting, when a simple majority rule produces a winner, that winner is robust to the minority's preferences. The typical means of protecting the minority from the decisiveness of the majority is by increasing the required majority or by augmenting the simple majority rule with constitutional constraints. In the former case the required majority q becomes larger than one-half, and this implies that the q-majority rule becomes biased in favor of one of the alternatives, usually the status quo. In the latter case the augmented rule becomes biased in favor of the minority. The main issue examined in this paper is whether the amelioration of majority decisiveness can be attained by unbiased voting rules that allow some restricted expression of preference intensities. Our results clarify that the use of scoring rules provides a positive answer to the above question when voters resort to variable degrees of coordinated strategic voting. The results are illustrated in the special cases of the plurality and the Borda rules.

n elections where the outcome is determined by a pairwise simple majority rule, a Condorcet (1785) winner need not exist. In other words, the simple majority rule is often unstable, and therefore, in general, this rule is not a well-defined voting rule (Austen-Smith and Banks 1999). Another weakness of the simple majority rule is that whenever the majority happens to share the same view regarding the best candidate, the majority consensus candidate is always selected, regardless of the minority preferences and, in particular, intensity of preferences (Sen 1970). This second problem of majority decisiveness, namely, the universal robustness of the selection of the majority consensus to the intensity of the minority preferences, can be resolved by increasing the required simple majority to a special or supramajority q, q > 1/2, or by augmenting the simple majority rule with constitutional constraints that protect the minority. In the former case the resulting q-majority rule is biased in favor of one of the alternatives, usually the status quo. As established by Greenberg (1979), a sufficient increase in  $q, q \ge (k-1)/k$ , also resolves the instability problem. In the latter case the resulting rule becomes biased in favor of the minority. The main objective of this paper is to show that the amelioration of the simple-majority decisiveness can be attained by unbiased voting rules that allow some restricted expression of preference intensities, viz., by scoring rules. As is well known, these rules are also not vulnerable to the first stability problem, that is, they are well-defined voting rules.

The notion of majority decisiveness is related to the classical notion of majority tyranny, which has drawn a lot of attention, especially since the second half of the eighteenth century. The *locus classicus* is the *Federalist* No. 10 (Madison 1787) and the Madisonian arguments

group pursuing goals contrary to the rights of others or to "the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." For John Stuart Mill, a tyrannical majority violates someone's liberty to do as pleased when not harming others. Tyranny of a majority is thus characterized by two basic elements: (i) factionalism, that is, effective implementation of goals pursued by a specific majority group; and (ii) "unjustness" of at least one favored alternative x imposed by that majority group. Using modern terminology, tyranny of a particular majority group T means that the set of groups that are decisive with respect to those undesirable alternatives consists of T and all the groups that contain it. The point of departure of this study is the different notion of decisiveness of the majority, any majority, which is an important property of preference aggregation rules or of voting rules that has been extensively studied by social choice theorists (Arrow 1963; Sen 1970). In the context of voting theory, majority decisiveness is defined as the ability of any majority group to impose its will whenever its members share a common view regarding the desirable collective decision.1

elaborated by Dahl (1956). For Madison, tyranny of the

majority was an instance of factionalism—of a majority

Although majority decisiveness and tyranny of the majority are different notions and one does not imply the other, they share a common problematic aspect, namely, their existence entails a large set of losers (the members of the permanent minority group or the members of any minority group) likely to be deeply alienated from the political system. Majority decisiveness is nevertheless a weaker, a less menacing, and, perhaps, even an acceptable property of voting rules relative to the tyranny of the majority for two reasons. First, the incidence of effective concentration of decision-making power implied by majority decisiveness is not restricted to a specific permanent majority group, so it does not imply factionalism. Second, the incidence of majority

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This ability depends on whether the majority-coalition members resort to sincere or to coordinated strategic voting.

decisiveness is not restricted to "unjust" alternatives, so it is not necessarily bad or undesirable.

In the context of voting systems, the attempts to resolve the problem of a specific tyrant majority and the lesser problem of majority decisiveness have been based on the application of biased voting rules that do not allow the expression of preference intensities. Such biased rules discriminate in favor of voters, the members of the minority group, and/or alternatives, the "just" ones.<sup>2</sup> By definition, unbiasedness toward voters, the anomymity condition, ensures that tyranny of a (specific) majority does not exist. However, it does not necessarily rule out decisiveness of any majority. As already noted, the main objective of this paper is to examine whether the amelioration of majority decisiveness can be attained by applying unbiased (anonymous and neutral) voting rules that allow expression of preference intensities.<sup>3</sup> Our results clarify how the use of scoring rules can provide a positive answer to the above question. Surprisingly, the role of expression of preference intensities through unbiased rules, in particular, of scoring rules as a means of preventing majority decisiveness, is hardly discussed either in the vast literature on the issue of majority tyranny or in the more formal (social choice) literature on scoring rules. Filling this gap, our main novel contribution is the clarification of the effectivity of scoring rules in alleviating the problem of majority decisiveness.4

Scoring rules can be defined in terms of fixed or flexible scores. Under a flexible unconstrained scoring rule voters are assigned an equal number of scores and no constraint is imposed on the allocation of the initial endowment of the scores among the alternatives. One may think that a flexible scoring rule that enables perfect expression of preference intensities better serves the purpose of avoiding decisiveness of the majority relative to any scoring rule based on fixed scores. Our

results imply that this expectation is unfounded. The problem of majority decisiveness can be resolved only by scoring rules that allow a limited common degree of expression of preference intensities.

We present a general definition of majority decisiveness that allows variable degrees of coordinated strategic voting. The two extreme cases of zero and an unlimited degree of such coordinated strategic voting that are encountered in discussions on majority decisiveness can be viewed as the two canonical special cases. Suppose that the severity of the problem of majority decisiveness is directly related to the size of the dominated minority and is inversely related to the difficulty for the majority to coordinate its strategic voting. Then the severity of the problem of majority decisiveness of size  $\alpha$  resorting to coordinated strategic voting of degree d decreases with an increase in  $\alpha$  and apparently with an increase in d, if such an increase implies a harder coordination task.

Our first result clarifies to what extent a given scoring rule alleviates the problem of majority decisiveness when voters sincerely reveal their preferences. The second and main general result clarifies the effectivity of a given scoring rule in resolving the problem of majority decisiveness when voters resort to strategic voting. Assuming that voters do not take advantage of strategic voting or that they fully take advantage of such voting, the results are illustrated in the special cases of the well-known plurality and Borda rules. The main result is also used to identify the scoring rules that prevent all possible degrees of majority decisiveness under unconstrained coordinated strategic voting. It turns out that scoring rules can eliminate all possible decisive majorities.

In the next section we introduce our setting and the two assumptions of voting rules unbiasedness. The notion of majority decisiveness is then presented, followed by the results and their implications. Concluding remarks are contained in the last section. Formal definitions and proofs appear in the Appendix.

 $^2$  Biased voting rules violate the two standard symmetry properties of voting rules, namely, neutrality and anonymity.  $^3$  Recently, Saari and Sieberg (2001) explain why it can be quite likely

that a majority loses over most of the issues in a different setting of pairwise voting

#### **ASSUMPTIONS AND SETTING**

Let  $N = \{1, ..., n\}$ ,  $n \ge 3$ , denote a finite set of voters and A a finite set consisting of k distinct alternatives,  $k \ge 3$ . Individual preference relations are defined over A and are assumed to be strict (indifference is not allowed). In this study we focus on unbiased voting rules that are usually referred to as scoring rules. A voting rule specifies for any given preference profile a nonempty set of alternatives in A. Unbiasedness has two aspects: unbiasedness toward voters and unbiasedness toward alternatives. Unbiasedness toward voters (anonymity) requires invariance of the voting rule with respect to permutations of voters' preferences; if the preference relations of the voters are permuted, then

of pairwise voting.

There are two main classes of studies of scoring rules and, in particular, of the Borda (1781) rule. On the one hand, there are those studies that seek to expose the weakness of these rules. The most notable disadvantages of scoring rules are their demanding informational requirements, their susceptibility to manipulation (Nitzan 1985; Smith 1999), and their vulnerability to some disturbing anomalies, the socalled voting paradoxes (Brams 1976; Fishburn 1974; Nurmi 1999; Saari 1989, 2000). On the other hand, there are those studies that can be conceived as proponents of scoring rules. These studies emphasize five types of advantages of scoring rules: first, their stability advantages, viz., their success in securing voting equilibria and, thus, ensuring political stability (Moulin 1988; Mueller 2003; Saari 1995; Sen 1970); second, their axiomatic advantages, namely, their uniqueness in satisfying alternative sets of desirable properties of social choice functions (there are more than 40 axiomatizations of scoring rules [see Chebotarev and Shamis 1998 and references therein]); third, their success in selecting an alternative that is the closest to being unanimously preferred according to some reasonable metric between preference profiles (Lerer and Nitzan 1985); fourth, their important advantage of allowing expression of intensity of preferences, in marked contrast to the commonly used majoritarian rules; and, finally, their success in implementing proportional representation (Chamberlin and Courant 1983).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> In the literature scoring rules are sometimes referred to as positional rules (Gardenfors 1973) or as point-voting schemes (Mueller 2003; Nitzan 1985).

the outcome of the voting rule is not affected. Unbiasedness toward alternatives (minimal neutrality)<sup>6</sup> requires appropriate variance of the voting rule with respect to permutations of the alternatives in A; if the alternatives are permuted in the preferences of the voters on A, then the alternative(s) selected by the voting rule changes accordingly. This property ensures that the labeling of the alternatives is immaterial, all that matters is the voters' preferences.

**Definition.** Let  $\{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_k\}$  be a monotone sequence of real numbers,  $S_1 \leq S_2 \leq \cdots \leq S_k$  and  $S_1 < S_k$ . Each of the *n* voters ranks the candidates, assigning  $S_1$  points to the one ranked last,  $S_2$  points to the one ranked next to the last, and so on. Under a *scoring rule* a candidate with a maximal total score is elected. If the sequence  $\{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_k\}$  is strictly monotone, that is,  $S_1 < S_2 < \cdots < S_k$ , the scoring rule is called a *strict scoring rule*.

Scoring rules allow intrapersonal preference intensity because scores are assigned to the alternatives according to their ranking. The intensity of preferring one alternative to another one can be represented by the difference in their scores. Scoring rules also allow a special restricted form of interpersonal preference comparisons because under these rules preference intensities of all voters are implicitly assumed to be comparable and identical, as long as the relative rankings of the compared alternatives are identical. The most common scoring rules are the plurality and the Borda rules.

**Definition.** The plurality rule is a scoring rule where  $\{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_k\} = \{0, 0, \ldots, 1\}$ . Hence, the candidate who is ranked first by the largest number of voters is elected. The plurality rule is the most commonly used scoring rule.

**Definition.** The *Borda rule* is a strict scoring rule where  $\{S_1, S_2, ..., S_{k-1}, S_k\} = \{0, 1, ..., k-2, k-1\}.$ 

<sup>6</sup> The definition of neutrality follows that of Moulin (1988, 233).

For an axiomatic characterization of the plurality rule, see Richelson 1978.

Under the Borda rule each voter reports his preferences by ranking the k candidates from top to bottom (ties are not allowed), assigning no points to the candidate being ranked last, one point to the one being ranked next to the last, and so on, up to k-1 points to the most preferred candidate. A candidate with the highest total score, called a Borda winner, is elected.

The Borda rule is the most well-known strict scoring rule. <sup>10</sup> Notice that under this rule the preference intensities of all individuals are comparable and equal as long as the difference between the relative rankings of the compared alternatives in the voters' preference ordering is the same (the relative rankings of the compared alternatives need not be identical).

#### **DECISIVENESS OF THE MAJORITY**

When the size of a decisive majority group is T, |T| = $\alpha n$ , we say that there exists an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness,  $1/2 < \alpha < 1$ . Henceforth  $\alpha$  is assumed to be a fraction with denominator n. As noted in the introduction, the severity of the decisiveness problem depends on the size of the majority, namely, on  $\alpha$ , as well as on the extent of strategic voting manipulations performed by the members of the majority coalition. Ceteris paribus, the severity of the problem decreases with an increase in the majority size. A decisiveness of 90% of the voters is less of a problem than a decisiveness of 55%. 11 A less obvious characteristic of majority decisiveness is the degree of coordinated strategic voting exercised by the members of the majority coalition. In the nonstrategic voting theory voters are assumed sincerely to reveal their (true) preferences. That is, voting manipulations of any sort are ruled out. However, in the more recent strategic-voting theory, typically, any conceivable preference manipulation is allowed, which clearly facilitates the attainment of decisiveness. The existence of a decisive majority in the former case of nonstrategic voting is more menacing and severe than the existence of a decisive majority in the latter case of unconstrained strategic voting, which hinges on more demanding requirements (stricter informational requirements and possibly a higher degree of coordination among the majority-coalition members).

In the current study we allow the above two extreme degrees of manipulation (i.e., sincere voting and unconstrained coordinated strategic voting) as well as intermediate degrees of strategic voting that may characterize the political-economic environment. These degrees represent an essential characteristic of the political culture of the voters, reflecting, for example, the limit to the voters' self restraint in trying to enhance their interest. The degree of strategic voting d is the maximal deviation between the ranking of any

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> The fact that scoring rules use information on preference intensity and not just information on the voters' ordinal preferences implies that they do not satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. Arrow's (1963) IIA condition is stated as a property of an aggregation function that transforms a preference profile to a social preference relation. This condition is naturally adapted to our context, where the aggregation function is a voting rule that transforms a preference profile to a subset of alternatives; see, for example, Austen-Smith and Banks 1999.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Remarks a process of the promise of a discourse of the state of the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> For axiomatic characterizations of the Borda rule, see Nitzan and Rubinstein 1981, Saari 1990, and Young 1974.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Certainly the problem does not exist when  $\alpha = 1$ . When  $\alpha = (n-1)/n$  the problem is minimal. In fact, in such a case "decisiveness" might be considered desirable and it might be referred to as "minimal democracy" (Austen-Smith and Banks 1999).

alternative in the true and reported preferences of the voters.

**Example 1.** Suppose that individual i's true and reported preferences on the five alternatives a, b, c, e, and f are as in Table 1. The fourth column specifies the deviation in the ranking of the reported alternative. The maximal deviation is obtained for alternative f. In the reported preferences this alternative is ranked second, while according to the true preferences it is ranked fifth. Hence, in this example of a single voter the degree of strategic voting is three.

TABLE 1. Example 1				
			Deviation in the	
	True	Reported	Ranking of the	
Rank	Preferences	Preferences	Reported Alternative	
1st	а	b	1	
2nd	ь	f	3	
3rd	c	а	2	
4th	e	e	0	
5th	f	С	2	

The degree of strategic voting exercised by the members of the majority coalition can be represented by d. In the literature the two commonly assumed values of d are the extreme values 0 and k-2. When d=0, the voters report their true preferences. When d=k-2, strategic voting is unconstrained. The case d=k-1 is disregarded because the definition of decisiveness is based on majority consent regarding the most preferred (top-ranked) alternative. In such a case manipulation is performed over the remaining k-1 alternatives, which implies that the degree of strategic voting does not exceed k-2.

In this study the voting rules are assumed to satisfy the unbiasedness requirements, namely, anonymity and neutrality. Unbiasedness toward voters implies that if there is an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness of some specific group, then there is an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness of any group of size  $\alpha$ . That is, due to the anonymity property, decisiveness is contagious: The incidence of effective concentration of decision-making power is not restricted to a specific majority group. In other words, permanent factionalism is impossible. This already rules out the classical tyranny of a specific permanent majority. Unbiasedness toward alternatives implies that if there exists an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness of some group that can impose a particular ("unjust") alternative, then it can impose the selection of any alternative. That is, due to the neutrality property, decisiveness is contagious in another sense: The incidence of the effectivity of the decisive majority coalition is not restricted to a specific alternative or subset of alternatives but is unlimited.

By definition, then, under anonymous and neutral voting rules the classical tyranny of the majority is impossible. However, the lesser problem of majority decisiveness may still exist. Such decisiveness means that *every* majority group resorting to sincere or coordinated strategic voting can *always* impose its will (its most desired alternative). That is, it can ensure the

selection of the majority consensus under any preference profile. <sup>12</sup> In general, elimination of the classical tyranny of the majority and amelioration of majority decisiveness are two different issues. In our setting, however, where the voting rules are unbiased toward voters and toward alternatives, the only relevant issue is the amelioration of majority decisiveness.

By definition, a decisive coalition T resorting to a degree of manipulation d can impose its will without having any knowledge of the preferences or the votes of the individuals outside T. This means that whenever T has a consensus candidate its members can adopt contingency-free voting strategies that ensure the selection of the consensus candidate regardless of the voting strategies adopted by the members of the remaining minority. Whether or not majority decisiveness exists depends on the voting rule V applied by the voters. If there exists a decisive majority of size  $\alpha$ , we say that the voting rule V is vulnerable to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness.

The following example illustrates the possible existence of majority decisiveness under the unbiased Borda rule.

**Example 2.** Suppose that there are three voters whose true preference relations over the four alternatives a, b, c, and e are presented in Table 2. In this case, alternative b is selected by the Borda rule because it receives the largest number of points (seven), where alternative a, which is preferred by a majority of 66%, receives only six points. However, voters 1 and 2 can guarantee the selection of alternative a, even without knowing voter 3's preferences. Suppose that voters 1 and 2 report the preferences presented in Table 3. In this case, independent of voter 3's preferences, the selection of alternative a is guaranteed, since it already receives six points from voters 1 and 2, where every other alternative receives only two points. The maximal score that can be assigned by voter 3 to any of these alternatives is three points, which cannot change the sure selection of alternative a. Notice that in this example the majority group consisting of voter 1 and voter 2 delivering a d-message (d = 2) is decisive. Since similar examples can be constructed for majority coalitions that consist of voters 1 and 3 or of voters 2 and 3, there exists a two-thirds-majority decisiveness.

Resolution of the problem of majority decisiveness requires that such decisiveness does not exist. In our setting the problem is therefore resolved if there exists no coalition T,  $|T| = \alpha n$ ,  $1 > \alpha > 1/2$ , which is d-decisive,  $0 \le d \le k - 2$ .

The following three notable attempts have been made to resolve the problem of majority tyranny. Unlike this study, these attempts resort to biased voting rules that are not neutral or not anonymous. The first attempt is based on the application of special-majority

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Usually (Arrow 1963; Sen 1970), a coalition is called decisive if it can always impose the common preference relation of its members on the social preference relation. Here we define majority decisiveness in terms of the ability of the majority-group members to impose the selection of their common most preferred alternative.

TABLE 2.	Example 2, Part I			
Ponk	Voter 1's	Voter 2's	Voter 3's	Darda's Dank
Rank	Preferences	Preferences	Preferences	Borda's Rank
1st	a	a	b	b (7 points)
2nd	ь	b	<b>'e</b>	a (6 points)
3rd	C	e	C	e (3 points)
4th	e	c	а	c (2 points)

TABLE 3.	Example 2, Part II			
	Voter 1's	Voter 2's	Voter 3's	
Rank	Preferences	Preferences	Preferences	Borda's Rank
1st	а	а	?	a (at least 6 points)
2nd	b	e	?	? (max. 5 points)
3rd	С	c	?	` ? ` ′
4th.	e	b	?	?

rules.<sup>13</sup> Such rules are anonymous, that is, the alternatives chosen by these rules are insensitive to permutations of the voters' preferences. Hence, if tyranny of some T-majority coalition is avoided, then tyranny of any S-majority coalition of equal size, |T| = |S|, is also avoided. However, these rules are not neutral. As noted above, control over  $\alpha$ , viz., an increase in the required special majority, directly reduces the severity of the tyrant majority problem but does not eliminate tyranny.<sup>14,15</sup>

The second attempt is based on the relaxation of the anonymity property to guarantee respect for the preferences of some predetermined subsets of society, namely, the preferences of some minority groups. The protection of rights of some minority groups is typically secured by constitutional means. The issue of majority tyranny often comes up in the context of the debate about simple majoritarian concepts of democracy versus concepts of liberal democracy that focus on the protection of minority rights (Dahl 1956; Riker 1982).

The third attempt is based on the incorporation of an anonymous veto function into the voting rule. Such a veto function allows every individual, or some coalitions of individuals, to veto one or more alternatives, where the larger the coalition is, the higher the number of alternatives the coalition may veto. The function leaves at least one alternative that is not vetoed by anyone.

Respect for the minority principle requires that every coalition (and, in particular, small ones) has some minimal effect on the voters' selected alternatives. Note that while the first two attempts give up respect for

the minority principle, the third one does respect this principle.

The main claim of this study is that there exists an alternative effective means of alleviating the problem of majority decisiveness. Allowing any degree of strategic voting, our proposed protection of minority rights is based on the use of the well-known family of anonymous and neutral voting rules, namely, the scoring rules. This alternative resolution of the problem differs from the existing solutions. First, by definition, the use of scoring rules does not imply the requirement for a special majority. Second, scoring rules do satisfy the anonymity and neutrality properties. And, third, scoring rules do not imply the existence of any veto function.

#### RESULTS

In this section we examine the effectivity of scoring rules as a means of resolving the problem of majority decisiveness, first under sincere voting, d=0, and then under coordinated strategic voting,  $0 < d \le k-2$ . The implications of the results are derived for the two extreme cases of sincere voting and unconstrained coordinated strategic voting, focusing on the two most commonly used scoring rules: the plurality and the Borda rules. For a given number of alternatives k, the following result characterizes the values of  $\alpha$  for which a particular scoring rule is not vulnerable to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness.

**Theorem 1.** Under sincere voting, d = 0, a scoring rule is immune to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness,  $1/2 < \alpha < 1$ , if and only if

$$\alpha(S_k - S_{k-1}) < (1 - \alpha)(S_k - S_1).$$
 (1)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> In a binary decision context, the requirement for a special majority is usually justified when there exists asymmetry in the payoffs of the two possible alternatives. The use of such a rule makes the barrier to change from a status quo alternative commensurate with the significance (payoff implications) of the change. The use of such rules may, however, entail a significant cost because it may stultify any choice other than the status quo, thus greatly limiting the ability of the group to act.

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>$  Such rules are sometimes referred to as supramajority or qualified-majority rules.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Notice that the severity of the problem of majority decisiveness can sometimes be indirectly reduced by control of d, viz., by reducing the exercised degree of manipulation.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Instability of supramajority rules also reduces the problematics of majority tyranny. According to this interesting observation (Miller 1983), "The pluralist political process leads to unstable political choice and such instability of choice in fact fosters the stability of pluralist political systems."

**Proof.** See the Appendix.

The proof of this theorem is based on the following idea: First, identify the most unfavorable circumstances (preference profile) for the majority and, then, derive the condition that ensures that, even in those circumstances, the  $\alpha$ - majority can impose its will. This condition certainly ensures that in any other more favorable situation the majority is capable of imposing its will. Hence, if this condition is not satisfied, the scoring rule is immune to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness. The most unfavorable preference profile for the majority has the following two characteristics. First, the members of the majority coalition share the same view regarding the first and second most preferred alternatives. Second, the most preferred alternative for the majority is the worst for the minority members and the second-best alternative for the majority is the best alternative for the minority members. The idea of the proof is illustrated in the following example.


**Example 3.** Suppose that the voting rule is the Borda rule and that there are four voters and five alternatives. In this case,  $S_k - S_{k-1} = 1$  and  $S_k - S_1 = 4$ . By substituting these values in inequality (1), we obtain that under sincere voting, when n=4 and k=5, the Borda rule is immune to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness if and only if  $\alpha < 4(1-\alpha)$ , from which we obtain that  $\alpha < 0.8$ . In this case, then, even a majority of three of the four individuals is not tyrant. A typical most unfavorable profile for the three-member majority coalition consisting of individuals 1, 2, and 3 is presented below; a and b are the first and second-best alternatives of the majority group, and voter 4's best and worst alternatives are, respectively, b and a. The preferences of the four individuals over the five-alternative set  $\{a, b, c, e, f\}$  are presented in Table 4.

TABLE 4. Example 3			
	Preferences of	Voter 4's	
Rank	Voters 1–3	Preferences	Borda's Rank
1st	а	b	b (13 points)
2nd	b	С	a (12 points)
3rd	c	e	c (9 points)
4th	e	f	e (5 points)
5th_	f	a	f (1 point)

In this most unfavorable unfortunate case for the majority, the majority coalition cannot impose its will (alternative a) and alternative b is selected, because the difference between the total points given by the majority to alternatives a and b does not exceed the largest possible difference in the points assigned to these two alternatives by the minority group member, voter 4. Figure 1 presents the combinations of  $\alpha$  and k resulting in immunity of the Borda rule to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness, under sincere voting.

By definition, the problem of majority decisiveness is resolved if the scoring rule is immune to decisiveness of any  $\alpha$ - majority,  $1/2 < \alpha < 1$ . In such a case the rule must therefore be immune to majority decisiveness for  $\alpha = (n-1)/n$ . Immunity to majority decisiveness im-

FIGURE 1. Vulnerability of the Borda Rule to an  $\alpha$ -Majority Decisiveness for k Alternatives Under Sincere Voting (d = 0)



plies not that every voter is a vetoer, but that every voter has a veto power under at least one preference profile. Theorem 1 has the following direct consequences. Under sincere voting, d=0:

(i) A scoring rule is immune to majority decisiveness if and only if

$$(n-1)(S_k - S_{k-1}) < (S_k - S_1).$$
 (2)

This is directly verified by substituting  $\alpha = (n-1)/n$  into inequality (1).

- (ii) Under the plurality rule, where  $S_k = 1$  and  $S_{k-1} = S_1 = 0$ , inequality (2) reduces to n 1 < 1, which can never be satisfied. Hence, independent of n and k, the above inequality cannot be satisfied. This implies that the plurality rule is always vulnerable to majority decisiveness. In fact, inequality (1) cannot be satisfied for  $S_k = 1$ ,  $S_{k-1} = S_1 = 0$ , and any  $\alpha$ ,  $\frac{1}{2} < \alpha < 1$ . This means that, independent of n and k, under sincere voting, the plurality rule is vulnerable to any  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness.
- (iii) Under the Borda rule, where  $S_k = k 1$ ,  $S_{k-1} = k 2$ , and  $S_1 = 0$ , inequality (2) reduces to n < k. Thus, the Borda rule is vulnerable to decisiveness of the majority if and only if  $n \ge k$ . In fact, independent of n, the Borda rule is immune to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness if  $\alpha < (k-1)/k$ . An alternative form of the condition ensuring the immunity of the Borda rule to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness is  $k > 1/(1 \alpha)$ . That is, a sufficient increase in the number of alternatives is an effective means of preventing the decisiveness of an  $\alpha$ -majority.

Theorem 1 and its consequences focus on majority decisiveness under sincere voting. Let us turn to the generalization of the theorem in the context of coordinated strategic voting.

**Theorem 2.** Let  $\alpha n = m(d+1)$  for some integer m. Under coordinated strategic voting of degree d, a scoring rule is vulnerable to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness,  $1/2 < \alpha < 1$ , if

$$\alpha > \frac{S_k - S_1}{2S_k - S_1 - \bar{S}}, \text{ where } \bar{S} = \frac{1}{d+1} \sum_{j=k-(d+1)}^{k-1} S_j.$$
(3)

**Proof.** See the Appendix.

The condition that guarantees the vulnerability of a scoring rule to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness requires that  $\alpha$  should be larger than an expression that depends on three factors: (i) the score assigned by every individual to the worst alternative,  $S_1$ ; (ii) the score assigned by every individual to the most preferred alternative,  $S_k$ ; and (iii) the average score  $\bar{S}$  assigned by the individuals exercising a degree of strategic voting d to the d+1alternatives whose rank was strategically coordinated. The proof of this theorem is based on the following idea: First, identify the most favorable circumstances (preference profile) for the majority and, then, derive the condition that ensures that, even in those circumstances, the  $\alpha$ - majority cannot impose its will. This condition certainly ensures that under any other less favorable situation the majority is unable to impose its will. Hence, if this condition is not satisfied, the scoring rule is vulnerable to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness. The most favorable preference profile for the majority has the following two characteristics. First, the members of the majority coalition share the same view regarding their most preferred alternative. Second, the coordinated voting strategy of the majority group attempts to spread the total scores left to the group equally over the other alternatives and thus minimize the maximal total score assigned to any of the remaining alternatives. The following example clarifies the idea of the proof.

**Example 4.** The true preferences of three voters over the four alternatives a, b, c, and e are given in Table 5. Under sincere voting the Borda rule would select alternative b. However, the first two voters can report preferences as in Table 6, which would result in the selection of alternative a, provided that the reported preferences of voter 3 do not change. The alternative voting strategy of voters 1 and 2 might be plausible only if they form some particular beliefs regarding the reported preferences of voter 3, since the latter voter might as well report that his preference relation is e > c > b > a, in which case candidate e is selected, again, preventing the selection of e. Nevertheless, the two voters have an optimal coordinated voting strategy

TABLE 5. Example 4, Part I			
	Preferences of	Voter 3's	
Rank	Voters 1 and 2	Preferences	Borda's Rank
1st	а	b	b (7 points)
2nd	b	С	a (6 points)
3rd	С	е	c (4 points)
4th	e	а	e (1 point)


TABLE 6. Example 4, Part II			
Preferences of	Voter 3's		
Voters 1 and 2	Preferences	Borda's Rank	
а	b	a (6 points)	
e	С	e (5 points)	
С	e	c (3 points)	
b	а	b (3 points)	
	Preferences of Voters 1 and 2 a e	Preferences of Voter 3's Voters 1 and 2 Preferences  a b e c c e	

that guarantees the selection of alternative a, regardless of the reported preferences of the third voter. According to this strategy the two voters sincerely report a as their best alternative and spread their remaining total points equally over the other three alternatives. That is, voter 1 reports the preference relation a > c > e > b and voter 2 reports the preference relation a > b > e > c. In this case, regardless of the preferences of the third voter, alternative a gains enough points to secure its selection (even if it receives no points from the third voter).

Under sincere voting, d=0,  $\bar{S}=S_{k-1}$ , and  $\alpha > (S_k-S_1)/(2S_k-S_1-S_{k-1})$  is the necessary and sufficient condition for the vulnerability of a scoring rule to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness. This result is an alternative statement of Theorem 1.

Under unconstrained coordinated voting strategies, that is, when d=k-2,  $\bar{S}=[1/(k-1)]\sum_{j=1}^{k-1}S_j$  is the lower bound of the maximal score that can be assigned by the majority coalition to a candidate differing from the majority consensus. If  $\alpha n=m(d+1)$  for some integer m, then this bound is equal to that maximal score that is, in fact, the score assigned by the majority coalition to all k-1 candidates who are not the majority consensus. Theorem 2 has the following direct consequences.

- (i) Under unconstrained coordinated strategic voting, d=k-2, a scoring rule is immune to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness,  $1/2 < \alpha < 1$ , if  $\alpha < (S_k S_1)/(2S_k S_1 \bar{S})$ .
- (ii) If  $\alpha n = m(d+1)$  for some integer m, then a scoring rule is immune to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness,  $1/2 < \alpha < 1$ , if and only if  $\alpha < (S_k S_1)/(2S_k S_1 \bar{S})$ .
- (iii) By inequality (3) it can be readily verified that when d > 0, the plurality rule (where  $S_k = 1$  and  $S_1 = 0$ ) is vulnerable to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness for any  $\alpha$ ,  $\frac{1}{2} < \alpha < 1$ .
- (iv) Under unconstrained coordinated strategic voting, d=k-2, and a sufficiently large number of voters, the Borda rule is immune to the decisiveness of an  $\alpha$  majority as long as  $\alpha \leq \frac{2}{3}$ . Figure 2



presents the combinations of  $\alpha$  and k resulting in immunity of the Borda rule to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness under unconstrained strategic voting (d=k-2). The area of immunity in this case is contained in the area representing immunity under sincere voting (d=0).

The plurality rule is a scoring rule that can be considered as a restricted form of approval voting.<sup>17</sup> Theorem 2 implies that the vulnerability of the Borda rule to majority decisiveness is equal to the vulnerability of the scoring rule defined by the scores  $\{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_n\}$  $S_{k-1}, S_k$  = {0, 0, ..., 0, 0, 1, 1, ..., 1, 1}. This rule is another restricted form of approval voting. In fact, the vulnerability of the restricted forms of approval voting to majority decisiveness can be equal to that of other representative scoring rules. Restricting the voters to the use of these rules may therefore preserve the potential of standard scoring rules such as the Borda rule to ameliorate majority decisiveness while considerably reducing the informational requirements of the elections. Put differently, majority decisiveness can be ameliorated by the simple and easy-to-implement restricted forms of approval voting.

When voting is sincere, the size of a decisive majority is relatively large. Under coordinated strategic voting the size of a decisive majority is reduced. However, coordinated strategic voting might be realistic in small committees but it is highly unrealistic when the number of voters is large. It can be shown that majority decisiveness is sustained by strong Nash equilibrium strategies. The decisiveness of the majority could therefore be based not on the requirement of coordinated strategic voting, but on the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. This implies that the implications of Theorem 2 are relevant for strategic voting by few or by many voters.

The last question we examine is whether effective unconstrained manipulations that result in an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness without requiring any knowledge or even any beliefs regarding the minority preferences can be prevented by the use of an appropriate scoring rule. The above four consequences of Theorem 2 directly imply that the answer to this question is positive.

**Theorem 3.** Under unconstrained strategic voting, d=k-2, and any number of voters  $n, k \ge n$ , there always exists a scoring rule that is immune to majority decisiveness.

**Proof.** See the Appendix.

#### CONCLUSION

The resolution of the problem of majority decisiveness is usually based on the application of voting rules that neither are unbiased toward the voters and/or toward the alternatives nor allow the expression of preference intensities. The question motivating this study is whether the amelioration of majority decisiveness can be attained by unbiased voting rules that do allow expression of preference intensities. The affirmative answer to this question is the main message of our analysis. It implies that the amelioration of majority decisiveness need not be based on a voting rule that is biased in favor of alternatives (the "just" ones) or in favor of voters (the minority-group members). Specifically, scoring rules are the unbiased voting rules that enable the resolution of the majority-decisiveness problem by allowing the expression of preference intensities. The effectivity of these rules as a means of resolving the problem of tyrant majorities has been demonstrated under sincere voting as well as under any degree of coordinated strategic voting.

Scoring rules are defined in terms of fixed scores. Our analysis implies that a possible rationale for this rigidity is that the restricted common pattern of expression of preference intensities imposed on voters who use a scoring rule is precisely the means that enables the resolution of the majority-decisiveness problem. The unrestricted point-voting scheme is a flexible scoring rule where voters are assigned an equal number of scores and no constraint is imposed on the allocation of the initial endowment of the scores among the candidates.<sup>19</sup> Under this flexible scoring rule, the optimal strategy for every member of a majority coalition interested in securing the selection of the majority consensus, the most preferred candidate from the viewpoint of the majority is to overload his vote points on the majority consensus. Such a strategy is always effective in ensuring the selection of the candidate preferred by the majority. In other words, it results in decisiveness of the majority. The fixed scoring rules impose a fixed uniform pattern of expression of preference intensities on all voters. Despite this restriction, voters can still vote strategically and assign the enforced fixed scores in a way that best serves their true interest. Under a scoring rule, the most effective strategy for every member of a majority coalition interested in securing the selection of the majority consensus candidate is to report sincerely that candidate as his most preferred one. As for the remaining candidates, effective strategic majority voting requires that the members of the majority coalition coordinate their reported preferences to avoid overloading of vote points as much as possible. Specifically, the interest of the majority coalition is to spread the coalition's assigned points equally over the remaining candidates, subject to the constraint of the point allocation permitted by the scoring rule. Whether or not such a strategy is effective depends on the scoring rule in use and on the size of the majority. Our main result states the condition ensuring the effectivity of a scoring rule in preventing decisiveness of the majority.

As is well known, the use of scoring rules involves payment of a price because these rules are highly manipulable and vulnerable to some embarrassing voting

<sup>17</sup> See footnote 8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> We are indebted to Steve Brams for calling our attention to this point. Note that our analysis is confined to the existence of a decisive  $\alpha$  majority, that is, to situations in which members of an  $\alpha$ -majority group prefer the selection of the same candidate. In such situations there are multiple strong Nash equilibria characterized by inequality (3), given d and the scores  $S_1, \ldots, S_k$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> See footnote 8.

anomalies. The question is whether their well known axiomatic advantages and their ability to resolve the decisiveness majority problem, an advantage that has been the main concern of this study, justify the payment of such a price.

In the literature voting rules have been compared in terms of their axiomatic properties, in terms of the degree they satisfy a particular desirable property such as the Condorcet (1785) criterion or decisiveness (stability), in terms of their informational requirements, or in terms of their vulnerability to strategic manipulations or some undesirable voting anomalies. In this paper we proposed a new criterion for comparing voting rules, namely, their susceptibility to decisiveness of the majority. We have applied this criterion in the comparison of two notable voting rules, the plurality rule and the Borda rule. A comprehensive comparative study of other voting rules based on the proposed criterion, which is beyond the scope of our study, will certainly constitute a further contribution to the theory of voting.

#### **APPENDIX**

Let  $N = \{1, ..., n\}, n \ge 3$ , denote a finite set of voters; A, a finite set consisting of k distinct alternatives,  $k \ge 3$ ; and L(A), the set of linear orderings (complete, transitive, and asymmetric relations) over A. Voter i's preferences,  $i \in N$ , are denoted  $u^i \in L(A)$ . A preference profile is an *n*-tuple  $u = \{u_i\}_{i \in N} \in L(A)^n$ , the set of linear profiles on  $A^{20}$  A voting rule V is a mapping from  $L(A)^n$  to the set of nonempty subsets of A. V(u) describes the alternatives selected by the voters at the preference profile u. In this study we focus on voting rules that are usually referred to as scoring rules.21

**Definition.** The degree of strategic voting, d, an integer that satisfies  $0 \le d \le k-2$ , is the maximal deviation between the true and the reported ranking of any alternative by any voter.

**Definition.** A d-message is a preference profile in which the degree of strategic voting is equal to d.

**Definition.** Given a voting rule V, a coalition of voters T is d-decisive if at every preference profile  $u^{a(T)}$  where alternative a is the T-majority consensus, T has a d-message in  $L(A)^{t}$ , t = |T|, that ensures the selection of a.<sup>22</sup>

Majority decisiveness can now be defined in terms of ddecisiveness.

**Definition.**  $\alpha$ -Majority decisiveness means that there exists a coalition T,  $|T| = \alpha n$ ,  $1 > \alpha > 1/2$ , and a degree of strategic voting d,  $0 \le d \le k - 2$ , such that T is d-decisive.

**Definition.** Majority decisiveness means that an  $\alpha$ majority decisiveness exists for some  $\alpha$  and d,  $1 > \alpha > 1/2$ ,  $0 \le d \le k-2$ .

A tyrant  $\alpha$ -majority is represented by the parameters  $\alpha$ and d, namely, by the size of the decisive majority and by the degree of strategic voting exercised by its members. Recall that the severity of the decisiveness problem decreases with both of these parameters.

A veto function is defined as follows (Moulin 1988, 72).

**Definition.** Given the set of alternatives A and a group of voters N with respective cardinalities k and n, an anonymous veto function is a nondecreasing function v from  $\{1, \ldots, n\}$  to  $\{0,\ldots,k-1\}$ , where v(t)=m means that any coalition of size t can veto (prevent the election of) any subset with at most m alternatives.

**Theorem 1.** Under sincere voting, d = 0, a scoring rule is immune to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness,  $\frac{1}{2} < \alpha < 1$ , if and only

$$\alpha(S_k - S_{k-1}) < (1 - \alpha)(S_k - S_1).$$

**Proof.** Consider a preference profile where all  $\alpha n$  members of an  $\alpha$ -majority coalition,  $\frac{1}{2} < \alpha < 1$ , share the same preference regarding the best (most preferred) alternative a and regarding the second best alternative  $b^{23}$ . Also suppose that in this profile the minority voters' best alternative is b and their least preferred alternative is a. Notice that if the majority consensus alternative a is selected under such a most unfavorable profile, namely, under a profile where the majority consensus a gets minimal support from the minority and the challenger b receives maximal support from the members of both the majority and the minority coalitions, then the majority consensus a is selected under any other profile, so, by definition, the majority is decisive. Hence, an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness does not exist if, under the assumed most unfavorable profile, the total score of alternative a is less than the total score of b. That is, the condition ensuring immunity to decisiveness of an  $\alpha$  majority is

$$\alpha nS_k + (1-\alpha)nS_1 < \alpha nS_{k-1} + (1-\alpha)nS_k,$$

which is equivalent to (1). The proof is therefore complete.

**Theorem 2.** Let  $\alpha n = m(d+1)$  for some integer m. Under coordinated strategic voting of degree d, a scoring rule is vulnerable to an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness,  $\frac{1}{2} < \alpha < 1$ , if

$$\alpha > \frac{S_k - S_1}{2S_k - S_1 - \bar{S}}, \quad \text{where} \quad \bar{S} = \frac{1}{d+1} \sum_{j=k-(d+1)}^{k-1} S_j.$$

**Proof.** Consider a preference profile where all  $\alpha n$  members of an  $\alpha$ -majority coalition,  $\frac{1}{2} < \alpha < 1$ , share the same preference regarding the best alternative  $a.^{24}$  To impose the selection of its consensus alternative a, that is, to be d-decisive, the  $\alpha$ -majority coalition must prevent the selection of any alternative other than candidate a at all possible preference profiles. An optimal strategy for attaining this goal must have two components. First, such a strategy requires that every member of the majority coalition sincerely reports the majority consensus a as his most preferred candidate. Second, such a strategy requires the minimization of the maximal total score assigned by the majority coalition to one of the remaining k-1 alternative candidates, that is, to the "coalition's reported second-best" candidate. This means that the majority-coalition members need to coordinate their reported preferences to avoid overloading of scores as much as possible. That is, they have to spread the coalition's assigned scores equally over the remaining k-1 candidates, subject to

 $<sup>^{20}</sup>$  The notation and the definitions of scoring rules follow those of Moulin (1988).

<sup>21</sup> See footnote 5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> d-Decisiveness is a special case of the widely used notion of winning (see, e.g., Moulin 1988). Given a voting rule V, a coalition of voters T is a winning coalition if, for every candidate a, coalition T has a message  $u_T \in L(A)^t$  that ensures the selection of a. That is,  $\forall u_{N-T} \in L(A)^{n-t}$ ,  $V(u_T, u_{N-T}) = a$ .

 $<sup>\</sup>overline{^{23}}$  To simplify the proof and with no loss of generality, we select  $\alpha$ such that  $\alpha n$  is an integer. <sup>24</sup> Again, to simplify the proof and with no loss of generality, we

select  $\alpha$  such that  $\alpha n$  is an integer.

the constraint of the scores  $\{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_{k-1}\}$  that must be assigned to these candidates and subject to the constraint on the permitted degree of manipulation d. Under these constraints, even if the coalition members share the same preference relation (not only the same best alternative), where the score assigned by the coalition to its true second-best alternative under sincere voting is the maximal possible score  $(\alpha n S_{k-1})$ , the  $\alpha$ -majority coalition can ensure that the average score Sassigned by its members to the coalition's reported secondbest candidate is only equal to  $1/(d+1)\sum_{j=k-(d+1)}^{k-1} S_j$ . Since, by assumption,  $\alpha n = m(d+1)$  for some integer m, this average score is achieved when the coalition members' reported preferences are cyclical over the d+1 alternatives that are ranked as second, third, and so on, up to the d+2 position (the scores assigned to these alternatives range from  $S_{k-(d+1)}$  to  $S_{k-1}$ ). Such a strategy is effective, that is, the  $\alpha$ -majority coalition is decisive if the lowest possible total score assigned to candidate a under any preference profile,  $\alpha nS_k + (1-\alpha)nS_1$ , is greater than the highest possible total score that can be assigned to any other alternative under any preference profile,  $\alpha n \bar{S} + (1 - \alpha) n S_k$ . That is, a sufficient condition for an  $\alpha$ -majority decisiveness is

$$\alpha nS_k + (1-\alpha)nS_1 > \alpha n\bar{S} + (1-\alpha)nS_k$$

which is equivalent to the requirement that  $\alpha > (S_k - S_1)/$  $(2S_k - S_1 - \bar{S}).$ 

**Theorem 3.** Under unconstrained voting manipulations, d=k-2, and any number of voters  $n, n \ge k$ , there always exists a scoring rule that is immune to majority decisiveness.

**Proof.** Consider the strict scoring rule defined by the strictly monotone sequence  $\{S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_k\}$  that satisfies  $S_k < (n-1)/(n-2)\bar{S}$ , where  $\bar{S} = [1/(k-1)] \sum_{j=1}^{k-1} S_j$ . By implications (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2 and the definition of majority decisiveness, this scoring rule is immune to majority decisiveness. The existence of the inequality is guaranteed by the possibility to control  $\bar{S}$ , making it as close as needed to  $S_k$ .

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Notice that  $S_k < (n-1)/(n-2)\bar{S}$  is equivalent to  $(n-1)/n < S_k/n$  $(2S_k - \vec{S}).$ 

### **Informative Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication**

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Te develop an informational model of judicial decision-making in which deference to precedent is useful to policy-oriented appellate judges because it improves the accuracy with which they can communicate legal rules to trial judges. Our simple model yields new implications and hypotheses regarding conditions under which judges will maintain or break with precedent, the constraining effect that precedent has on judicial decision-making, the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices, the relationship between a precedent's age and its authority, the effect of legal complexity on the level of deference to precedent, the relative stability of rules and standards, and long-term patterns of legal evolution. Perhaps most importantly, we demonstrate that "legalist" features of judicial decision-making are consistent with an assumption of policy-oriented judges.

olitical scientists have long recognized the importance of courts as political actors. However, while an extensive literature examines the judiciary's strategic interaction with the other branches of government (e.g., Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; Gely and Spiller 1992), less attention has been paid to the effects of the institutional structure of the courts themselves on patterns of judicial decision-making. Yet models of the judiciary's unique institutional dynamics are essential to understanding the courts, just as analyses of congressional committees (e.g., Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; Shepsle and Weingast 1987) or the bureaucracy (e.g., Moe 1982) are essential to understanding the legislative and executive branches. We develop a formal model that demonstrates how the problem of communication between different levels of a hierarchical court system. such as the one in the United States, can, under some conditions, give judges incentives to defer to precedents established in prior cases and how this constraining effect influences the policy decisions made by the

This approach sheds light on one of the most perplexing and controversial problems in the social-scientific study of judicial behavior: the debate over the relative importance of legal and policy concerns in judicial decisions. Scholars subscribing to policy-oriented models of judicial behavior argue that judges are concerned with the external effects of their rulings on allocations of risk, wealth, power, or opportunity. Judges may be

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motivated by policy concerns because of partisan loyalties, a sincere desire to effect particular changes in the world, or pursuit of promotion or reelection. Whatever the reason, the policy-oriented judge cares about actual judicial "outputs" more than any particular method of arriving at those outputs. Others, however, argue that judges are concerned with "legalism," that is, with correctly following the rules and norms of proper judicial reasoning. A legalist judge maximizes utility by adhering faithfully to these internal rules, regardless of the external result. The purely policy-oriented judge and the purely legalist judge are of course ideal types, and few scholars, if any, believe that judges are motivated solely by concern with external effects or by fidelity to internal norms. Nonetheless, these two sets of factors are often presented as competing explanations for judicial behavior, and their relative importance is the subject of heated debate (e.g., Knight and Epstein 1996; Segal and Spaeth 1996a, b; Songer and Lindquist 1996).

We contribute to the discussion of the nature of judicial decision-making by demonstrating that "legalist" principles are, at least in some cases, compatible with and in fact explained by-judges' concerns with the external policy effects of their rulings. Focusing on one central principle of judicial decision-making in Anglo-American legal systems—stare decisis, or deference to precedent—we show that purely policy-oriented judges will often defer to legal precedent, even when doing so requires them to issue decisions that deviate from the rulings they otherwise would prefer. The reason for this is that appellate judges can use prior cases to increase the accuracy of their communication with trial judges. Often, a judge is willing to modify the substantive ruling in order to purchase this increased accuracy in communication. Thus, in the model we present, it is not the case that policy-oriented judges ignore precedent, nor is it the case that judges care about precedent instead of, or in addition to, caring about policy. Rather, judges care about precedent because they care about policy.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Both the "attitudinal model" (Segal and Spaeth 1993) and the "strategic model" (Knight and Epstein 1998) of judicial behavior are "policy-oriented," in that both models assume judges are primarily concerned with substantive outcomes.

In addition to demonstrating this basic idea, our model has the advantage of being able to account systematically for both adherence to and departure from precedent. Specifically, our comparative static analysis shows how variation in four parameters—the distance between the existing legal rule and the deciding judge's ideal, the age of the existing precedent, the difficulty of intelligibly integrating existing precedent with new rulings, and the precision or imprecision of communication between judges—affects the relative likelihoods that a judge will adhere to or break with existing legal precedent. Our model also has implications for how much judges are able to change the substantive law without ever openly breaking from established precedent. Further, our informational model of stare decisis sheds light on other important empirical puzzles in the study of judicial decision-making. We reconcile the seemingly contradictory observations that arguments from precedent play a major role in U.S. Supreme Court deliberation and adjudication, and yet justices consistently vote their preferences rather than following established precedents. Our approach also offers an explanation for why long lines of cases might evoke both deference and skepticism. Finally, our model yields several novel hypotheses, including predictions regarding the types of legal issues in which long lines of precedent will emerge, the relative stability of clear rules versus flexible standards, and patterns of longterm legal evolution.

### COMPETING THEORIES OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

We focus on the principle of stare decisis,<sup>2</sup> which dictates that judges ought to apply rules and principles laid down in prior cases, because it is, or at least is claimed to be, one of the most important principles of judicial decision-making in the Anglo-American common law system (e.g., Schauer 1987). Judges are not, in ordinary circumstances, supposed to overturn "settled law" (Nelson 2001).3 Our focus on stare decisis is also due to its salience for the more general question of the nature of judicial preferences. Judicial deference to established precedent is a focus of the debate between the policy-oriented and the legalist models of judicial decision-making because these models seem to offer such different predictions for how important precedent will be in practice. A legalist judge is expected to place great weight on the stare decisis principle and consequently is expected to defer to prior decisions even

when that judge would have decided the precedentsetting case differently.<sup>4</sup>

In contrast, it is not clear why a policy-oriented judge would ever defer to constraints imposed by prior decisions. It may be that judges often agree with the principles laid down in old cases and follow them for that reason, but if this is the case, then stare decisis is merely a description of—rather than a reason for—patterns of judicial decision-making. To the extent that a legal precedent exerts a causal influence on at least some judicial decisions, it must be the case that in these decisions judges would prefer to issue a different ruling if the precedent did not exist. Thus, a policy-oriented judge would be expected to attach little importance to established precedent when making decisions.

Scholars have offered a number of reasons why even a policy-oriented judge might want to respect established legal precedent. One argument—the one most familiar to lawyers—is that stability in the law is in itself a valued policy goal, and judges would therefore be willing to defer to an established legal rule because the act of deference itself advances their policy preference for stability. But this explanation has a difficult time accounting for adherence to precedent in areas of law where stability and the need for long-term planning are less salient. Perhaps more importantly, stability in the law is a collective good; for a given judge to sacrifice other policy goals for the sake of stability, that judge must believe that other judges will also value stability sufficiently highly that they will not overturn precedent. But if a judge believes that other judges do place a high value on stability, that judge may be tempted to break with precedent and establish a new legal rule, since it will be respected by future courts with little overall loss in legal stability. Additionally, the value of legal stability to a judge is considerably reduced if the stable legal rule is objectionable (Kornhauser 1989). While the need for stability may be enough when the judge is indifferent between legal rules, it is a less plausible basis for deference to precedent when the judge has strong substantive preferences between rules.

Another suggestion as to why policy-oriented judges might respect the principle of stare decisis is that judges want their own precedents followed and, therefore, follow precedents set by others (Landes and Posner 1976; Rasmusen 1994). Because judges prefer a world in which all precedents, including their own, are respected to a world in which no precedents are respected, they will attempt to enforce universal respect for precedent by punishing judges who "defect." While there may be some of this tit-for-tat in the real world, this

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Stare decisis et non quieta movere—"Stand by the thing decided and do not disturb the calm."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> One aspect of this principle is the idea that lower courts are supposed to follow the precedents set by higher courts (vertical stare decisis). This is not much different from the principle in many hierarchical organizations that subordinate units are supposed to follow the directions and guidelines laid down by their superiors. A more interesting aspect of the stare decisis principle—and one more unique to judicial decision-making—is the principle that courts are supposed to follow their own prior decisions (horizontal stare decisis).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This might not always be the case since there might be some other "legal" principle, e.g., the proper interpretation of a statute, that could trump the principle of deference to decided cases even for a legalist judge. Nonetheless, as a general rule it is safe to assume that legalist judges in a common law system would attach substantial weight to precedent.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> If there is not specific, targeted retaliation against particular judges for failing to follow precedent, the general judicial interest in precedent-following alone is insufficient because respect for precedents is a collective good and individual judges' dominant strategy would be to free-ride (Macey 1989).

explanation has several problems as a general account of the practice of *stare decisis*. First, it relies on the empirically dubious assumption that judges look to other judges' respect for legal precedent when determining whether to follow precedent set by those judges. Second, it has trouble accounting for why the precedents of retired judges are ever followed without reference to even more complicated, and empirically problematic, punishment mechanisms. Third, in the absence of such mechanisms, this explanation also does not explain well why some judges break with some precedents but follow others. In a simple model where judges expect general retaliation for any break with existing precedent, if they break once, they have no reason not to break always.

A third possibility is that policy-oriented judges do not care about precedent per se but recognize the need to preserve their institutional power and legitimacy. Because this legitimacy derives in part from a public belief that judges apply a specialized set of legal skills, including the ability to interpret and apply established legal precedents, as well as a belief that judges are politicallyneutral interpreters of law, policy-oriented judges will want to perpetuate the belief that they make decisions according to precedent (Cox 1976; Maltz 1980). This may in turn lead them to modify their decisions sometimes to show more respect for precedent in order to enhance their institutional power. However, the collective action objection applies to this explanation as well; the overall effect of any particular decision on institutional legitimacy is likely to be small, while the policy ramifications of the case itself often are large. Moreover, the effect of a decision on public perception of the court's legitimacy may have more to do with the content of the decision than whether it involved overturning a precedent (e.g., Hyde 1983; Nelson 2001).

Finally, several studies point out that deference to precedent may be valuable even to policy-oriented judges because of the informational function that judicial precedents serve (e.g., Rehnquist 1986; Shapiro 1972). The informational perspective comprises two types of explanations for deference to precedent. First, reasoning from precedents may improve communication between appeals courts, allowing for judicial specialization and error correction (e.g., Kornhauser 1989; Macey 1989). A more pessimistic version of the same basic argument is that the practice of *stare decisis* is essentially an "information cascade" in which rational agents ignore their own information and imitate the behavior of preceding decision-makers, often leading to uncorrected inefficient results (Talley 1999).

We suggest a second informational function that the doctrine of *stare decisis* might serve. This function involves communication between high courts and lower courts. The basic idea is that the development of lines of cases can communicate a legal principle better than any individual case could. An initial case may invoke a general phrase or principle, such as "due process," "reasonable," or "compelling interest"; future cases develop and give meaning to these inherently vague phrases. Hence, a lower court can learn more about the appellate court's view of the proper interpretation

of, say, a due process balancing test by examining a line of 10 cases in which the same test was applied than by reading the first (or the last) ruling the appeals court issued. Similarly, an initial case might declare a bright-line rule that, though clear, is both over- and underinclusive. Further cases can carve out exceptions and make qualifications so that the line of cases applying the rule offers lower courts a much more nuanced test than that announced by the original decision.

Our model explores this second type of informational use of legal precedent, a use that we believe has been neglected in the scholarly discussion of judicial decision-making and that has not been formally developed or rigorously analyzed. In so doing, we provide an account of judicial decision-making that explains why policy-oriented judges are expected to be influenced by precedent, while also capturing cases where judges break from precedent.

#### THE MODEL

Consider a simple judicial system consisting of an appellate judge and a trial judge. The appellate judge hears a limited number of cases, and, through the decisions in these cases, the appellate judge can announce how the law ought to be interpreted. The trial judge decides the vast majority of cases. We make the simplifying assumption that when making decisions the trial judge attempts to apply established law, without reference to the trial judge's own personal policy preferences. There are several possible substantive defenses of this assumption that could ultimately be modeled explicitly. These include considerations such as promotion being dependent on strict adherence to the law established by appellate decisions, a desire not to be overturned on appeal, and other factors. For the purposes of this model, it suffices to assume that some mechanism exists that leads the trial judge to behave as a faithful agent of the appellate judge. While we assume a nonstrategic trial judge, we do address the conditions under which a strategic trial judge might behave in this way later in the paper.

The trial judge's understanding of appellate rulings is imperfect, and the trial judge often does not decide cases exactly as the appellate judge would have. The appellate judge cannot correct all these "mistakes" by altering or reversing the trial court's decision on appeal. This may be because the appellate court's jurisdiction is discretionary and many appeals are not heard (e.g., U.S. Supreme Court review of circuit court decisions) or because many cases are not appealed despite the existence of an automatic right to an appeal (e.g., federal circuit court review of district court decisions). Thus, the appellate court judge, to influence the application of the law to the majority of cases successfully, needs to communicate a preferred interpretation of the law to the trial court as accurately as possible, subject to time

and resource constraints.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> A bright line rule is a rule that minimizes ambiguity by setting well-defined and simple categories of prohibited and permissible behavior.

The appellate judge has preferences over the legal rule defined on a unidimensional continuum. Denote the appellate judge's ideal point  $j \in \mathbb{R}$ . The policy continuum might represent, for example, the level of care exercised by a defendant in a civil action, with j representing the minimum amount of care the appellate judge believes a defendant must exercise to avoid liability. That is, the appellate judge in this example believes that all defendants who exercise a level of care less than j ought to be liable, and all defendants who exercise a level of care above j ought to escape liability. As such, j is the appellate judge's ideal legal rule. The trial judge has no preference over the policy dimension per se; rather, the trial judge tries to implement whatever the appellate judge has declared to be the proper legal rule.

When deciding a case, the appellate judge issues a ruling with two components. First, the appellate judge announces a substantive holding on the proper application of the legal rule to the case at hand. This substantive holding corresponds to a point in the policy space, denoted  $r \in \mathbb{R}$ . Second, the appellate judge declares whether this substantive holding is consistent with existing precedent or whether the appellate judge is breaking with precedent. "Precedent" here means the line of appellate cases on the relevant legal issue that have been decided prior to the present case and that have never been overruled by a subsequent appellate case. Prior decisions are not assumed all to have been made by the current appellate judge. Rather, one can think of the game beginning with an existing line of precedent that may have been established before the current appellate judge took office. If the appellate judge issues a holding and declares that it is consistent with precedent, then the case is added to the relevant line of cases, and the trial judge will interpret the appellate judge's substantive holding in the context of the other substantive holdings in the line to ascertain the legal rule the appellate judge wishes to enact. If, however, the appellate judge declares a break with precedent, then a new line of cases is established, and the trial judge will treat the most recent appellate decision as the exclusive statement of the legal rule.8 The number of cases in the line of precedent, including the decision being made in the current round, is denoted t. Thus a line of precedent is a series of substantive rulings  $(r_1,$  $r_2, \ldots, r_{t-1}$ ), where  $r_{t-1}$  is the most recent ruling and the current appellate judge issues ruling  $r_t$ .

The declaration that the appellate judge is maintaining or breaking from precedent is communicated perfectly to the trial judge. However, the communication of the substantive holding of each ruling is inher-

ently noisy. Thus the trial judge, when attempting to understand an appellate ruling, observes t signals, each drawn from a normal distribution with variance  $\sigma^2$ . The means of these distributions are the rs associated with the substantive holdings of the different cases in the line of precedent. The trial court judge averages these signals to estimate the legal rule. Thus, the trial judge's estimate of the legal rule is a sum of a series of normally distributed random variables. Such a sum is itself a normally distributed random variable. Consequently, the trial court's estimate can be treated as if it were a single signal, denoted x, drawn from a normal distribution with mean  $\mu_t = (\sum_{i=1}^t r_t)/t$  and variance  $\sigma^2/t$  (DeGroot 1970).

It is important to stress that the trial judge does not actually believe that all of the observed signals are drawn from a single distribution. If the trial judge did believe this, signals far from the estimated mean would make the trial judge less confident in this estimate. However, the trial judge recognizes that the various observed signals are drawn from different distributions with different means, reflecting earlier decisions, potentially made by different appellate judges. Given that the trial judge aggregates these signals, each additional signal, no matter how far it is from the mean, decreases the variance of the trial judge's estimate of the legal rule to be implemented. This variance is the variance of the trial judge's estimate of the variance of a single underlying distribution.

If the appellate judge breaks with precedent, there is only one decision in the line of cases, so t=1 and the trial judge receives a signal drawn from a normal distribution with mean  $r_{t=1}$ , the most recent appellate holding, and variance  $\sigma^2$ . The mean of the distribution

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> We refer to the judge's preferences over this continuum as policy preferences; however, we use policy broadly, to reflect public-policy preferences, normative judgments regarding fairness or justice, or a weighted combination of various factors.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> The discrete binary choice between maintaining and breaking with precedent is a simplifying assumption. Clearly, in the real world, multiple lines of precedent may be in play in any given decision and the judge may decide to maintain parts of existing precedent. Framing the issue in the manner that we do captures in starkest form the same essential decision problem that would arise in more complex adjudicative choices.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> The trial judge could, in theory, aggregate these signals in some other way (for example, by taking a weighted average), and this would in turn change the optimal decision of the appellate judge. We focus attention on a simple average for the following reasons. First, including the possibility of a weighted average would not alter the appellate judge's basic decision problem—the trade-off between greater precision (if the appellate judge's holding is aggregated with those of other judges) and the opportunity to announce the judge's most preferred legal rule (if the trial judge looks only at the appellate judge's ruling). The unweighted average is thus the simplest among a class of similar aggregation rules, any of which might be reasonable depending on other background institutional assumptions. Second, calculating the optimal weighted average is itself a complex problem that depends on the appellate judge's deriving the optimal weights as a function of the appellate judge's preferences and existing precedent. Third, not only is this calculation complex for the appellate judge, but the proper weights, once calculated, would have to be communicated to the trial judge. This communication, like the communication of the substantive holding, would be inherently noisy. Thus, the calculation and transmission of appropriate weights-essentially, a more refined and sophisticated principle of stare decisis—introduces another level of complexity that, though interesting, is beyond the scope of this paper and is therefore left to future research.

In particular, if  $X_1, \ldots, X_n$  are independent random variables and  $X_i \sim N(\mu_i, \sigma_i^2)$ ,  $i = 1, \ldots, n$  and  $a_1, \ldots, a_n$  are constants such that  $a_i \neq 0$  for at least one i, then the random variable  $a_1 X_1 + \cdots + a_n X_n$  is normally distributed with mean  $a_1 \mu_1 + \cdots + a_n \mu_n$  and variance  $a_1^2 \sigma_1^2 + \cdots + a_n^2 \sigma_n^2$ . (DeGroot 1970, 38). In our case, the trial judge is taking an average,  $a_i = (1/t)$ ,  $\mu_i = r_t$ , and  $\sigma_i^2 = \sigma^2$  for  $i = 1, \ldots, t$ . Consequently the average of the signals is itself a random variable with mean  $\mu_t = (\sum_{t=1}^t r_t)/t$  and variance  $\sigma^2/t$ .

of the signal in the period prior to the current appellate judge's decision is denoted  $\mu_{t-1}$ , and we refer to this value as "existing precedent." Because x (the value of the draw from the distribution of the trial court's estimate) is the only information that the trial judge has, it is the trial judge's best guess as to what the appellate judge wants. Consequently the trial judge will treat x as the controlling legal rule when deciding cases.

The appellate judge's utility has two components. First, the appellate judge would like the decisions of the trial court judges to be as close as possible to the appellate judge's own ideal point. That is, the appellate judge wishes to minimize |x-i|. The reason for this is that any cases that fall in this interval are cases that the trial judge will get "wrong" from the appellate judge's point of view. Again, consider a case in which the policy dimension represents the level of care taken by a tort defendant. If the defendant exercised a level of care less than the minimum of x and j, the trial court will correctly find the defendant liable. Similarly, if the defendant exercised a level of care above the maximum of x and j, the trial court will correctly find the defendant not liable. However, when the defendant exercised a level of care in the interval between x and i, the trial court will rule incorrectly. In this event, if x > j, the trial court will mistakenly find liability, while if x < j, the trial court will mistakenly find no liability. The larger the size of the interval |x-j|, the larger the number of cases that will be decided incorrectly. We assume that the appellate judge's utility function is quadratic—that is, the appellate judge wants to minimize the expected value of the square of the distance between x and j, which is equal to  $((\mu_t - j)^2 + (\sigma^2/t))$ .

Second, if the appellate judge does not announce a break with precedent, it is costly to offer a ruling,  $r_t$ , that is substantively different from the existing precedent,  $\mu_{t-1}$ . We are agnostic as to the relative importance of these two factors in the appellate judge's utility calculation; we weight the importance of the latter by the parameter  $\alpha \geq 0$  on which we perform comparative static analysis.<sup>11</sup> Thus, the utility cost associated with changing the law while claiming to adhere to precedent is  $\alpha(\mu_{t-1} - r_t)^2$ . If the appellate judge breaks with precedent, this cost does not apply.

This cost arises because writing an opinion that intelligibly integrates existing precedent with a change in the substance of the legal rule becomes increasingly difficult as the distance between precedent and the substantive holding grows. Thus, there are real costs in intellectual effort and research associated with such a decision. If these costs are not invested, that is, if the appellate judge were to declare that a decision was consistent with precedent without explaining how the

substance of the ruling and prior rulings could be intelligibly integrated, then the trial judge would be unable to make decisions with reference to the full line of cases. This aspect of the model captures the intuition that trial judges would have difficulty simply averaging signals that are quite distant from one another. Trial judges are able to aggregate such signals only if the appellate judge has invested substantially in explaining how to do so. This effort is costly to the appellate judge and becomes more costly the greater the distance between the appellate holding and existing precedent, reflecting the increasing difficulty of the trial judge's task. In our model the intuition that it would be difficult for the trial judge to aggregate a sharply divergent holding into existing precedent is captured by the costliness to the appellate judge of making such a holding.

One might object to the assumption that judges bear a cost when maintaining precedent but do not bear a cost when breaking with precedent. However, the assumption is benign with respect to the conclusions of our model. Our analytic results are unchanged by the addition of a fixed cost for breaking with precedent. Such a cost would change the actual point at which appellate judges break but would not affect the comparative statics. There is a second, more conceptual justification for making this assumption. Any cost from breaking with precedent, beyond the loss of information already modeled, would arise from legalist values. We omit legalist values from the judicial utility function to see whether the norm of stare decisis is consistent even with purely policy-oriented judges and, indeed, whether what appear to be legalist values may emerge as a result of policy motivations.

The expected utility to the appellate judge is therefore

$$EU = -\left((\mu_t - j)^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{t}\right) - \tilde{\alpha}(\mu_{t-1} - r_t)^2,$$

where  $\tilde{\alpha} = \alpha$  if the appellate judge maintains precedent and  $\tilde{\alpha} = 0$  if the appellate judge departs from precedent.

#### **ANALYSIS**

#### The Appellate Judge's Decision

The appellate judge has two choices to make. The appellate judge must select a substantive holding  $(r_t)$  and must also decide whether to declare a break with precedent. These two decisions are interrelated. To determine whether or not to break with precedent, the appellate judge must first know the expected outcomes, which are a function of the different substantive rulings that the appellate judge would issue depending on whether or not precedent is maintained. Thus, we work backward, first determining the appellate judge's optimal substantive holding contingent on whether the judge has broken with or maintained precedent.

If the appellate judge breaks with precedent, the second term in the judge's expected utility function is zero, because  $\tilde{\alpha}=0$ . Further, because the appellate judge has broken with existing precedent, t reverts to 1. Therefore, the line of cases considered by the trial judge

 $<sup>^{11}</sup>$  If  $\alpha>1$ , this implies that the cost of writing the decision is weighted more heavily than how close the trial court's decision is to the appellate court's ideal point. If  $0 \leq \alpha < 1$ , the closeness of the trial court decision to the appellate judge's ideal point is weighted more heavily. If  $\alpha=0$ , adherence to precedent is costless no matter how much the legal rule is changed substantively; in this special case, the appellate judge would always claim to adhere to precedent, because doing so imposes no constraints whatsoever on the distance the appellate judge can move the legal rule.

contains only the appellate judge's most recent decision, that is,  $\mu_{t=1} = r_{t=1}$ . It is obvious that the appellate judge's expected utility in this case is maximized when  $r_t = \mu_t = j$ . Thus, if an appellate judge breaks with precedent, the substantive holding will be the judge's ideal legal rule, and the judge's expected utility in this case, EU(break), is  $-\sigma^2$ .

If the appellate judge does not break with precedent, the decision is more complicated. The appellate judge would like to issue a ruling that moves precedent toward the judge's own ideal point but is constrained by the cost of deviating too much from the line of precedent of which this decision becomes a part. The appellate judge thus chooses  $r_t$  by solving the following maximization problem:

$$\max_{r_t} \left\{ - \left[ (\mu_t - j)^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{t} \right] - \alpha (\mu_{t-1} - r_t)^2 \right\}.$$
 (1)

Note that  $\mu_t$ , the mean of the distribution of the trial judge's estimate of the legal rule, is a function of  $r_t$ . In particular,  $\mu_t = [(t-1)\mu_{t-1} + r_t]/t$ . Thus, we can rewrite the maximization problem

$$\max_{r_t} \left\{ -\left[ \left( \frac{(t-1)\mu_{t-1} + r_t}{t} - j \right)^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{t} \right] - \alpha(\mu_{t-1} - r_t)^2 \right\}. \tag{2}$$

Solving for the first-order condition yields

$$r_t^* = \mu_{t-1} + \frac{t(j - \mu_{t-1})}{1 + \alpha t^2}.$$

Knowing the optimal substantive holding,  $r_t^*$ , allows us to calculate the mean of the new distribution from which the trial court judge will draw an estimate of the proper legal rule. This new mean,  $\mu_t^*$ , is given by

$$\mu_t^* = \frac{(t-1)\mu_{t-1} + r_t}{t} = \frac{j + \alpha t^2 \mu_{t-1}}{1 + \alpha t^2}.$$
 (3)

Now, to find the appellate judge's expected utility from issuing a decision consistent with precedent, EU(maintain), we substitute  $r_t^*$  and  $\mu_t^*$  into the expected utility function. This yields

$$EU(\text{maintain}) = -\left[\left(\frac{j + \alpha t^2 \mu_{t-1}}{1 + \alpha t^2} - j\right)^2 + \frac{\sigma^2}{t}\right]$$
$$-\alpha \left[\mu_{t-1} - \left(\mu_{t-1} + \frac{t(j - \mu_{t-1})}{1 + \alpha t^2}\right)\right]^2,$$

which simplifies to

$$EU(\text{maintain}) = -\frac{\alpha t^2}{1 + \alpha t^2} (j - \mu_{t-1})^2 - \frac{\sigma^2}{t}.$$
 (4)

In our model the central benefit to appellate judges of maintaining precedent is informational. The more cases the trial judges have to refer to, the more accurately they will understand the legal rule for which that line of cases stands. Thus, the appellate judge wishes to maintain precedent because it makes communication with trial courts less noisy. However, the use of precedent comes at a price. In particular, appellate judges bear a cost for deviating substantively too far from the line of precedent that they claim to uphold. This constrains judges who are maintaining precedent from implementing a legal rule that matches their personal ideal, as can be seen in the model. When precedent is maintained,  $\mu_t^* = (j + \alpha t^2 \mu_{t-1})/(1 + \alpha t^2) \neq j$  (unless  $\alpha = 0$  or  $\mu_{t-1} = j$ ). The rule applied by the trial court when precedent is maintained is biased away from the current appellate judge's ideal point (i) in the direction of the old precedent  $(\mu_{t-1})$ . Further, it is interesting to note that the appellate judge, when maintaining precedent, chooses the holding  $r_{t}^{*} = \mu_{t-1} + [t(j - \mu_{t-1})/(1 + \alpha t^{2})],$ which is not equal to existing precedent  $(\mu_{t-1})$  or the appellate judge's ideal point (j) unless, by chance,  $j = \mu_{t-1}$  or  $t = 1 + \alpha t^2$ . This ruling is always in the direction of the appellate judge's ideal point, but may be more or less extreme, relative to existing precedent. If  $t > 1 + \alpha t^2$ , the appellate judge will issue a ruling farther from existing precedent than the appellate judge's ideal point. Otherwise, the appellate judge will issue a ruling between the ideal point and existing precedent.

While the appellate judge can make sure, by announcing a break with precedent, that the mean of the trial court's signal is equal to the appellate judge's ideal point, the variance of this signal (that is, the noisiness of communication) will be higher. Again, this can be seen clearly in the model, since  $\sigma^2 > \sigma^2/t$  as long as t > 1. The appellate judge thus faces a trade-off between the accuracy with which the legal rule is communicated to the trial courts and the proximity of that rule to the appellate judge's ideal. The appellate judge determines whether or not to break with precedent by comparing the expected utilities associated with each choice, breaking with precedent if and only if

$$EU(\text{break}) - EU(\text{maintain})$$

$$= \sigma^2 \frac{1 - t}{t} + \frac{\alpha t^2}{1 + \alpha t^2} (j - \mu_{t-1})^2 > 0$$

$$\Leftrightarrow \frac{\alpha t^3}{(t - 1)(1 + \alpha t^2)} (j - \mu_{t-1})^2 - \sigma^2 > 0.$$
(5)

#### The Trial Judge's Decision

The trial judge in this model is not a strategic actor. Rather, the trial judge simply follows the instructions of the appellate judge, aggregating all existing holdings in the line if precedent has been maintained but considering only the appellate judge's most recent ruling if precedent has been broken. Because the focus of our model is the appellate judge's decision, taking the trial judge's aggregation rule as given, we do not formally analyze the ramifications of strategic behavior by the trial judge. Nonetheless, because we justified this simplifying assumption in part by claiming that trial judges want to please their superiors on the appellate

bench or avoid being overturned on appeal, one might wonder if the trial judge would be better off attempting to deduce and implement the current appellate judge's ideal point, rather than following existing precedent. This turns out, however, not to be the case.

The trial judge could, of course, form an unbiased approximation of the appellate judge's ideal point by inverting the maximization problem that the appellate judge solved in equation (2), conditioning on the trial judge's estimate of preexisting precedent,  $\mu_{t-1}$ . That is, the trial judge could observe the signals associated with the first t-1 rulings in the line of precedent and use this information to estimate the precedent the current appellate judge faced. Then, conditioning on this preexisting precedent, the trial judge could invert the appellate judge's maximization problem to estimate what value of j would have caused the current appellate judge to issue the ruling the trial judge observed. This estimate is unbiased because the expected value of the trial judge's observation of any holding,  $r_i$ , in the line of precedent is  $r_i$ .

Notice, though, that the information regarding preexisting precedent can be used only to help the trial judge figure out what the current appellate judge's maximization problem was. Having done this, the only information the trial judge has regarding the appellate judge's ideal point is the signal that the trial judge observes, which is drawn from a normal distribution with mean equal to the current appellate judge's ruling,  $r_t^*$ . The variance of this distribution is  $\sigma^2$ , not  $\sigma^2/t$ . Consequently, following this inversion procedure cannot lead the trial judge to a better estimate of the appellate judge's ideal point than would be achieved if the appellate judge had simply broken with precedent and issued a ruling exactly at the appellate judge's ideal point. Indeed, because the trial judge approximates preexisting precedent with error, the estimate of j deduced from the inversion procedure is less precise than the estimate the trial judge would have formed if the appellate judge had broken with precedent.

The appellate judge maintains precedent only when the ruling of a trial judge who follows that precedent (that is, averages all the signals) will, in expectation, be closer to the appellate judge's ideal point than it would have been had the appellate judge broken with precedent. Since the trial judge's estimate of the appellate judge's ideal point formed by the inversion procedure is even worse than that produced by a break with precedent, the trial judge is more likely to please the appellate judge (and less likely to be overturned) by following precedent than by trying to deduce the appellate judge's ideal point. If this were not the case, the appellate judge would have broken with precedent. Thus, the trial judge would be better off acting as a faithful agent of the appellate judge, deciding cases according to precedent when instructed to do so.13

#### **RESULTS**

#### **Comparative Statics**

Comparative static analysis on the parameters of this model yields a number of results regarding how these parameters affect the relative desirability of maintaining or breaking with existing precedent.

It is clear from equation (5) that the desirability of breaking with precedent decreases as  $\sigma^2$ , the noisiness of each individual signal, increases. The intuition is that as communication between appellate and trial courts becomes less precise, the extra information provided by situating a decision in a line of precedent becomes more valuable to the appellate judge. Equation (5) also implies that increasing  $|j - \mu_{t-1}|$ , the distance between the appellate judge's ideal point and existing precedent, increases the attractiveness of breaking with precedent. Because a large distance between existing precedent and the appellate judge's ideal point constrains how much the appellate judge can move the expected trial court decision, the appellate judge is less willing to trade off control over the substantive rule for increased accuracy of transmission.

Equation (5) additionally shows that breaking with precedent becomes more attractive as  $\alpha$ , the marginal cost of making a substantively divergent decision within an existing line of precedent, increases. The reason for this is that, when  $\alpha$  is close to zero, the appellate judge can move  $\mu_t$  very close to j, even while maintaining precedent. Thus, the informational benefit of situating the current decision in a long line of cases comes at very little cost in terms of substance. However, as  $\alpha$  grows, the appellate judge's ability to move the legal rule close to j becomes more constrained, making adherence to existing precedent less attractive. One can see this by examining equation (3). Assuming that precedent is maintained, the distance that the legal rule will be moved is given by  $|\mu_t^* - \mu_{t-1}| =$  $|(j-\mu_{t-1})/(1+\alpha t^2)|$ , which is clearly decreasing


Deriving the comparative statics on t, the number of cases in the line of precedent, is more complicated. Because t is a discrete variable, to calculate the change in the attractiveness of breaking with precedent as the age of the precedent increases, we take the first differences of equation (5) with respect to t:

$$[EU_{t+1}(\text{break}) - EU_{t+1}(\text{maintain})] - [EU_{t}(\text{break}) - EU_{t}(\text{maintain})] \equiv FD(t) = -(j - \mu_{t-1})^{2}$$

$$\times \alpha \frac{\alpha t^{4} + 2\alpha t^{3} + \alpha t^{2} - 2t^{3} + 2t + 1}{(1 + \alpha t^{2} + 2\alpha t + \alpha)(1 + \alpha t^{2})t(t - 1)}.$$
(6)

 $<sup>^{12}</sup>$  This is possible only if the trial judge knows  $\alpha$  and  $\sigma^2$ . If not, the trial judge is unable even to entertain the possibility of trying to deduce the appellate judge's ideal point from the observed signals.  $^{13}$  This is not to say that an aggregation rule other than averaging might not lead to superior outcomes in some circumstances.

As discussed earlier, the optimal aggregation rule is a function of a host of complex institutional factors beyond the scope of this model. Nonetheless, the basic logic—that the appellate judge's choice to maintain precedent implies that the trial judge will do better by following precedent than by attempting to deduce the appellate judge's ideal point—holds under any aggregation rule



A little algebra demonstrates that this first difference can be positive or negative, depending on  $\alpha$  and t. In particular,

$$FD(t) < 0$$
 if  $\frac{2t^3 - 2t - 1}{t^4 + 2t^3 + t^2} \equiv \bar{\alpha}(t) < \alpha$ ,  
 $FD(t) > 0$  if  $\frac{2t^3 - 2t - 1}{t^4 + 2t^3 + t^2} \equiv \tilde{\alpha}(t) > \alpha$ . (7)


Increasing t decreases the desirability of breaking with precedent when  $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}(t)$ ; otherwise increasing t increases the desirability of breaking with precedent. It is important to note that this threshold,  $\bar{\alpha}(t) = (2t^3 - 2t - 1)/(t^4 + 2t^3 + t^2)$ , is itself a decreasing function of t. There are two cases to consider in understanding this result. The first is when  $\alpha > \bar{\alpha}(2)$ [the lowest possible values of  $\bar{\alpha}(t)$  when the appellate judge chooses to maintain existing precedent]. In this case, for all values of t, the attractiveness of breaking with precedent decreases as t increases. That is, for a sufficiently large  $\alpha$ , older precedents are always less vulnerable than younger precedents. This case is illustrated in Figure 1. If, however,  $\alpha < \bar{\alpha}(2)$ , then increases in t increase the attractiveness of breaking with precedent for a certain number of periods. Specifically, increases in t will increase the likelihood of breaking as long as  $\alpha$  is below the threshold value of  $\bar{\alpha}(t)$ . But as t increases, this threshold value decreases, meaning that  $\alpha$  will eventually be greater than the threshold. At that point, the effect of increasing t switches so that increases in t decrease the desirability of breaking with precedent. This case is illustrated in Figure 2.

To understand the intuition behind these comparative statics, recall that an increase in t has two effects on the desirability to the appellate judge of maintaining the line of precedent. On the one hand, an increase in t increases the constraint on how much the judge can move the substantive legal rule, making older precedents less attractive. On the other hand, an increase in t improves the accuracy with which the legal rule is communicated to the trial court, making older precedents more attractive. When  $\alpha$  is sufficiently high, the information effect always overwhelms the constraining effect. The reason for this is that when  $\alpha$  is high, the appellate judge's ability to move the legal rule is already so constrained that the marginal effect of an increase in t on this constraint is negligible. However, when  $\alpha$ and t are sufficiently low, the constraining effect of an increase in t is more important to the judge than the effect on information, thereby making an increase in t increase the attractiveness of breaking with precedent. As t increases further, the information effect of marginal increases in t will eventually overwhelm the constraining effects; no matter how low  $\alpha$  is, when t is sufficiently high the appellate judge is already so constrained that the marginal constraining effect of an increase in t is again negligible. 14

#### Limits of Legal Change

An interesting question in the context of our model is, How far on the substance dimension can a legal

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Note also that as t goes to infinity, the appellate judge is completely constrained by the old precedent. In this case, the value of  $\alpha$  does not matter, and the payoff of an appellate judge who maintains precedent converges to  $-(j-\mu_{t-1})^2$ .



rule move without a judge ever claiming to have broken from precedent? Is this distance bounded or unbounded? That is, how far would precedent move if, over an infinite series of turns, each appellate judge's ideal point was such that that judge was exactly indifferent between moving existing precedent and breaking, leading these judges to move  $\mu_t$  as far from  $\mu_{t-1}$ as is possible—always in the same direction—without declaring a break from existing precedent? Returning to the tort liability example discussed earlier, imagine that over time appellate judges want a progressively stricter standard of care. We want to know whether it is possible for the standard of care to become infinitely more strict than the original standard announced by the first judge to consider the question, without any judge ever openly breaking with established precedent.

Of course, the idea that there are multiple appellate judges deciding cases in sequence implies a dynamic model, beyond the scope of this project. Nonetheless, our model does provide a framework that allows us to gain some theoretical leverage on this problem. If an appellate judge does not know what the ideal points of future judges will be, it is reasonable for the current judge to assume that the probability of a future judge having preferences any given distance to the left of existing precedent is the same as the probability of that judge having preferences the same distance to the right. Under such a symmetry assumption, the expected ideal point of a future judge lies at existing precedent. Consequently, the appellate judge's best guess of future precedent is current precedent, and so the decision problem in the dynamic model reduces to the one-shot problem analyzed above.15

Therefore, we can find the maximum distance the legal rule can move under these conditions (i.e.,  $\max |\mu_{\infty} - \mu_1|$ ) by solving the following constrained infinite sum:

$$\sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \{\mu_t^* - \mu_{t-1}\} = \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \left\{ \frac{j + \alpha t^2 \mu_{t-1}}{1 + \alpha t^2} - \mu_{t-1} \right\}$$

$$= \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \left\{ \frac{j - \mu_{t-1}}{1 + \alpha t^2} \right\},$$

$$s.t. \frac{(j - \mu_{t-1})^2 \alpha t^3}{(1 + \alpha t^2)(t - 1)} - \sigma^2 = 0.$$
(8)

By making the constraint an equality, we impose the condition that in each round the preferences of the appellate judge are such that the legal rule moves as far as is possible without the appellate judge preferring to break with precedent. Solving the constraint for  $(j - \mu_{t-1})$  and substituting, we find that the sum is equal to

$$\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\alpha}} \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \frac{1}{t} \frac{\sqrt{t-1}}{\sqrt{t}\sqrt{1+\alpha t^2}}.$$
 (9)

Notice that if  $\alpha \neq 0$ , this can be bounded above as follows:

$$\frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\alpha}} \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \frac{1}{t} \frac{\sqrt{t-1}}{\sqrt{t}\sqrt{1+\alpha t^2}} < \frac{\sigma}{\sqrt{\alpha}} \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \frac{1}{t} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\alpha t^2}}$$

$$= \frac{\sigma}{\alpha} \sum_{t=2}^{\infty} \frac{1}{t^2} = \left(\frac{\pi^2}{6} - 1\right) \frac{\sigma}{\alpha}.$$
 (10)

Thus, the distance that can be moved in one direction without a break from precedent is finite, even over

 $<sup>^{15}</sup>$  Of course, this is also the case if each appellate judge is myopic, caring only about the payoff in the current round.

an infinite number of turns. Specifically, the legal rule cannot move a distance greater than  $((\pi^2/6)-1)(\sigma/\alpha)$  from the decision in the first case in the line of precedent without at least one judge deciding to break. We can find comparative statics on the actual point of convergence by referring directly to equation (9). Notice that if  $\alpha$  is very small, so that judges are relatively unconstrained by the precedential line in which they are writing, this distance is quite large, whereas as  $\alpha$  gets large the distance shrinks. Similarly, as  $\sigma$  becomes large, the distance that can be moved gets larger because judges are willing to write opinions in line with precedent even when the substantive holdings of those decisions are very far away from the substantive position of the existing precedent.

#### **DISCUSSION**

#### **Resolution of Some Empirical Puzzles**

Our model provides a new perspective on when, why, and how judicial decisions are constrained by existing precedents. This perspective helps account for empirical observations of judicial behavior that are otherwise difficult to reconcile. To take a striking example, consider the role of deference to precedent in Supreme Court decision-making. On the one hand, a rigorous analysis of voting patterns on the Court finds that justices who vote against a "landmark" case—that is, a case that establishes an important precedent-tend not to switch their voting pattern in subsequent cases, even though the "landmark" case decision ought to constitute a legal precedent (Segal and Spaeth 1996a). This seems to be strong evidence that judges, at least at the Supreme Court level, do not feel constrained by legal precedents as such. On the other hand, if it is really the case that the justices do not attach much importance to precedent, then it is hard to explain why they devote so much time and intellectual energy to it in their deliberations and why they place so much emphasis on it in most of their decisions. Analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court decision-making process, after all, reveals that arguments from precedent vastly outnumber all other kinds of arguments in attorneys' written briefs, the Court's written opinions, and the justices' arguments in conference discussions (Knight and Epstein 1996; Phelps and Gates 1991). If it were really the case that judges cared about case outcomes rather than precedent, then all the emphasis on arguments from precedent would seem to be a waste of resources. But if precedent is really influencing justices' decisions, then the persistent patterns of continuous dissent from landmark decisions is difficult to explain.

Our model accounts straightforwardly for this seeming contradiction. Justices care about precedent precisely because they care about policy; if they can sufficiently improve their communication of the proper legal rule by integrating their decision with an existing line of cases, they will do so, even if it means somewhat modifying the legal rule they announce and expending some energy on writing a compelling and coher-

ent opinion that integrates seemingly divergent rulings. Thus, though our model does not formalize the process of formulating a judicial opinion, it is entirely consistent with the observation that judges put a lot of time and attention into trying to integrate their preferred outcome into an established line of cases.

However, in our model, if an appellate judge decides that the additional accuracy is not worth the sacrifice in terms of substantive policy, then the judge will vote to break with precedent. If a given judge dissents in a landmark case, therefore, that judge will usually continue to dissent in subsequent cases. After all, in our model judges do not care about precedent per se, so there is no reason for a judge to vote to uphold a legal rule that is far from that judge's ideal simply because that rule had been established in a prior case. An appellate judge will vote to adhere to precedent only if, in doing so, the legal rule can be moved sufficiently closer to the judge's ideal point that the gain in terms of accuracy is worth the cost in terms of substance.

A second apparent empirical anomaly that our model illuminates is the seemingly schizophrenic attitude of judges toward long-established precedents. On the one hand, many would quote approvingly Justice Holmes's (1897) quip that "it is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past." On the other hand, it is often thought that a legal rule with a long history is worthy of particular deference. Thus, lawyers and judges sometimes argue, implicitly or explicitly, against tampering with long-established legal rules even while disagreeing with their substantive content. Again, our model suggests a simple reconciliation of these apparently contradictory notions. Recall from the comparative statics that increasing t has two effects. It constrains the judge's ability to affect the substance of the legal rule, leading to the frustration embodied in Holmes's remark. However, an old precedent—i.e., a long line of cases though difficult to move, has a great deal of informational value. The consequence is that old precedents become entrenched so that even when judges disagree with the substantive rules they are reluctant to overrule them.

#### **New Hypotheses**

In addition to offering new insights into these important empirical puzzles, our model also suggests a number of new hypotheses regarding patterns of judicial decision-making. First, recall the comparative statics on the parameter  $\sigma$ , which measures the inherent difficulty in communication between appellate and trial judges. The model demonstrated that as  $\sigma$  increases, the attractiveness of breaking with precedent decreases. Substantively, this implies that areas of law that are highly complex and not amenable to simple legal regulation are more likely to develop long lines of cases, with both high levels of deference to precedent and evolution and

change of legal rules within the precedent. However, when the legal issue is simple, making communication of the legal rule less difficult, judges have little use for precedent. They will either follow the old rule exactly or change it completely.

Next, our model offers a new perspective on the long-standing debate about the relative merits of rules and standards (e.g., Kaplow 1992; Schlag 1985; Sullivan 1992). Typically, standards contain general principles for example, "due process" or "negligence"—whereas rules use more specific and precise language. Strict liability tort regimes and statutes of limitations are examples of such legal rules. In terms of our model, rulelike holdings might correspond to relatively higher values of  $\alpha$ , whereas standards might correspond to lower values of  $\alpha$  (recall that  $\alpha$  measures the costs to judges of effecting substantive legal changes while claiming consistency with an existing line of precedent). This is because it is easier for judges to adapt the broader, more general language of standards while claiming fidelity to the original principle than it is for judges to alter an unambiguous legal rule. As shown above, as  $\alpha$  increases the distance that a judge will move the substance of existing precedent while maintaining that precedent decreases, but as a result, the desirability of breaking with precedent increases. Thus, our model calls into question the conventional view that rules are more stable and predictable than standards. We find a trade-off between two types of stability. Rules will be associated with periods of little substantive change punctuated, more frequently, by sudden breaks. Standards, on the other hand, will be characterized by more constant, but gradual, substantive change but will be overturned outright less often. While we do not have a normative position regarding this trade-off, our model demonstrates that the question of whether rules or standards foster greater stability and predictability is more complex than is commonly appreciated.

Finally, our model suggests patterns that should emerge in the long-term evolution and development of law in an Anglo-American common law system. Recall that when  $\alpha$  is sufficiently low, legal rules are less vulnerable to being overruled when they are very young and when they are very old. A judge can easily adapt the substance of a young precedent to reflect personal policy preferences, making a break with precedent unnecessary. And, while a very old precedent strongly constrains a judge's ability to influence the substance of the law, it provides tremendous informational value. Middle-aged precedents are more vulnerable to being overruled. Thus, when  $\alpha$  is sufficiently low, we might expect the following pattern of legal development. When courts initially confront a new legal issue, the law will likely be characterized by a number of false starts. The legal rule specified by the first judge to confront the issue will be refined by a number of subsequent judges, but as the rule solidifies, it becomes more vulnerable to being overruled. This occurs because as the rule develops it may begin to exert a significant constraint on the decisions of judges before it can provide sufficient informational benefits to compensate for this constraining effect. Thus, we expect several rules to be proposed,

refined, and ultimately rejected. However, once a legal rule survives the precarious intermediate stage of its development, it will become increasingly entrenched, overturned only if it is confronted by a judge with substantially divergent preferences.

#### CONCLUSION

We have developed an informational model of judicial decision-making in which deference to precedent is useful to outcome-oriented appellate judges because it improves the accuracy with which they can communicate legal rules to trial judges. Although we believe that our model makes a significant contribution to understanding judicial decision-making, it is important to highlight that much work remains to be done in developing informational theories of judicial behavior. For example, while we have discussed a series of judicial decisions made over time, we have only modeled judges as one-shot decision-makers. A formal treatment of repeated decision-making might offer important insights, especially regarding the potentially moderating effect of the belief that one has multiple opportunities to effect changes in a substantive legal rule. Further, several possibilities exist for game-theoretic extensions of our simple decision-theoretic model. A particularly interesting avenue to explore would be a game with multiple appellate judges with diverse policy preferences. Another possibility is to model trial court judges as strategic actors with policy preferences of their own.

Nonetheless, our model yields interesting implications and hypotheses regarding conditions under which judges will maintain or break with precedent, the constraining effect that precedent has on judicial decision-making, the voting behavior of Supreme Court Justices, the relationship between a precedent's age and its authority, the effect of legal complexity on the level of deference to precedent, the relative stability of rules and standards, and long-term patterns of legal evolution. Perhaps most importantly, we have demonstrated that "legalist" features of judicial decision-making are consistent with an assumption of policy-oriented judges. Thus, the informational approach to the study of judicial behavior can generate new insights and help to reconcile long-standing debates in the literature.

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# **Equal Votes, Equal Money: Court-Ordered Redistricting and Public Expenditures in the American States**

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ourt-ordered redistricting in the mid-1960s eradicated severe disparities in the populations of U.S. state legislative districts. We examine the geographic distribution of money by states to counties. Cross-sectional analysis shows that counties with relatively more legislative seats per person prior to redistricting received relatively more transfers from the state per person. Over time, counties that lost legislative seats subsequently received a smaller share of state funds per capita. We calculate that population equalization significantly altered the flow of state transfers to counties, diverting approximately \$7 billion annually from formerly overrepresented to formerly underrepresented counties, an effect missed by past studies. For those concerned with the design of democratic institutions around the world today, the American experience provides clear evidence of the political consequences of unequal representation.

ourt-ordered redistricting in the 1960s radically altered representation in the United States. Through a series of important cases, beginning with Baker v. Carr in 1962, the U.S. Supreme Court established a criterion of strict equality of state legislative and U.S. House district populations. Prior to judicial intervention, unequal representation was the norm in U.S. legislatures, and in some states districts had extremely unequal populations. In 1960, the state legislative districts in only two states, New Hampshire and Wisconsin, approximated the one-person, onevote standard in both chambers (David and Eisenberg 1961). At the other extreme was the California state senate, with the smallest counties having 400 times as much representation as Los Angeles, the largest county in the state. Less than a decade after Baker v. Carr, every state in the country reshaped its legislative districts to comply with the Court's rulings.

Baker revolutionized representation and, we argue, fundamentally transformed the politics of public finance in the American states. Legal and legislative battles ended unequal representation in the state legislatures and the U.S. House by the close of the 1960s. We examine how political representation affected the distribution of state funds to counties in the United States from the 1950s through the 1980s.

Our interest in the consequences of *Baker* v. *Carr* derives from three broad problems for contemporary democracy. First, there is a persistent and nagging question for political scientists: Does representation matter? Do people benefit materially from having formal legislative representation? Some economists argue that

government policy responds to market forces rather than voters' interests, and some political scientists argue that the key determinants of public policy are the activities of interest groups or the state of public opinion, rather than formal political representation. Second, Can courts truly shape public policy or do their decisions merely reflect society's norms? Recent judicial scholarship argues that the courts have little direct impact on public policy in the United States. Early studies of the effects of redistricting, which show no effect of redistricting on public spending, are taken as a case in point (Carp and Stidham 1993; Rosenberg 1991). Third, around the world today many democratic governments are forming and reforming, and many nations have created legislatures with highly unequal representation of the populations. Among comparative political scientists and development economists there is growing concern that unequal political representation produces unequal distribution of public money in a variety of federal systems, though there are few unambiguous estimates of the effects of malapportionment on the distribution of public expenditures (Gibson, Calvo, and Falleti 1999; Samuels and Snyder 2000). We view Baker v. Carr and the resulting reapportionment of the American state legislatures as an important natural experiment with which to address these questions.

At the time of the *Baker* decision it was widely thought that equalization of representation would lead directly to equalization of public expenditures on highways, schools, and other important public programs. Gaining their "fair share" of public funding was, in fact, a central motivation of the plaintiffs in *Baker* v. *Carr*. The Intervening Petition to the District Court in *Baker*, filed by Mayor Ben West of Nashville, provides extensive statistical data showing "the direct relationship between excess representation in the unlawfully constituted General Assembly of Tennessee and the obtaining of an excess share in the monies collected by the State of Tennessee . . . and the converse, the direct relationship between the lack of proportionate

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representation in the General Assembly and the bearing of an excessive and disproportionate share of the expense of government."<sup>1</sup>

Despite these strong expectations, social science research to date provides at most only weak support for the conclusion that equalizing state legislative representation altered policy outcomes. Research published in the late 1960s and early 1970s probed the relationship between state-level measures of unequal representation prior to Baker and statewide levels of public expenditures on a variety of programs. On the whole, these studies found no or slight effects of unequal district populations on public spending overall or on specific programs.<sup>2</sup> Studies examining changes in state expenditures in the years immediately after redistricting found some effects, but typically the results were mixed and the methods problematic (Fredrickson and Cho 1970; Hanson and Crew 1973; Pulsipher and Weatherby 1968). Nearly 40 years after Baker, the conventional wisdom among legal scholars and political scientists is that court-ordered equalization of legislative district populations had little if any effect on how states allocate public funds (Carp and Stidham 1993, 370; Rosenberg 1991, 292-303).

Could the immense change in representation that occurred in the American states from 1962 to 1972 have had large and demonstrable effects that were overlooked in previous research or obscured by methodological problems? Early research implicitly assumed that the effect of malapportionment would be reflected primarily in *levels* of spending, overall or on specific programs. We study how one-person, one-vote changed the *distribution* of state spending as it changed the distribution of seats to geographic areas.

We investigate perhaps the simplest hypothesis about the effect of redistricting: When a geographic area gets more power it will receive a greater share of state money. We know of no previous study that has looked directly for such redistribution. We examine both the cross-sectional relationship between each county's representation and its share of state transfers and the change in each county's share of state transfers that occurs following redistricting. We find strong and consistent evidence in support of this hypothesis.

#### DATA AND METHODS

We analyze the distribution of state money to and the political representation of the 3,155 U.S. counties. Counties are the basic unit of analysis in this study for three reasons. First, state governments report their electoral and government finance data at the county level. Reports of electoral and finance data are available at other levels, such as cities, but county data are much more complete. Second, counties have very stable boundaries that are determined exogenously to the districting process. We can, therefore, measure changes in the dependent and independent variables over time for these units. Using political units, such as legislative districts, creates potential endogeneity problems because the legislatures determine these boundaries and make the revenue decisions. Third, there was ample variation in the political strength of counties prior to court-ordered redistricting.

#### **Measuring Representation**

Our primary independent variable of interest is the representation of individuals in the state legislatures. We measured this at the county level by calculating the number of legislative seats per person in each county. Because the sizes of legislatures and populations vary across states, any measure of voting power that is to be compared nationwide must be converted to a common metric. Following David and Eisenberg (1961), we measure the number of legislative seats per person in a county relative to the number of seats per person in a given state. When a county is split across more than one district the index equals the weighted average of the representation of the various parts of the county. We call this the Relative Representation Index (RRI).<sup>4</sup> A county with an index value equal to 1 has representation equal to the ratio one would expect under an exact one-person, one-vote rule. Values <1 reflect underrepresentation and values >1 indicate overrepresentation.

An example helps with the interpretation of the index. Suppose that a state has 40 legislative districts and 2,000,000 people; thus, there are, on average two seats for 100,000 people. The denominator of the index, then, is 2/100,000. If a county contains three legislative districts and 100,000 people, the numerator of the index equals 3/100,000. The county in question, thus, has 50% more representation than the typical county in the state, for an index value of 1.5.

Following David and Eisenberg, the RRI for a state's entire legislature is the average of the index for the upper and lower chambers. For the legislative district lines in the 1950s and early 1960s, we rely on David and Eisenberg's measurement of this index. By 1972, populations of state legislative districts were nearly equal in every state (*Book of the States, 1972–1973*, 64, 65). Throughout, we treat the RRI as equal to 1 after 1972.

In 1960, the disparities in county representation in state legislatures were substantial. For the lower houses, the mean of the RRI was 1.65, indicating that

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> The quote is from pages 2 to 3 of the "Amendment and Supplement to the Intervening Petition Filed by the Plaintiff, Ben West, Mayor, City of Nashville, Tennessee. Civil Action No. 2724." The data covered are school funds and highway revenues, which are distributed through state transfers to local governments. We are grateful to Harris Gilbert, attorney for the city of Nashville in the *Baker* suit, for providing these materials.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Classic articles in this vein include Jacob 1964, Dye 1965, and Brady and Edmonds 1967. Bicker (1971) provides an extensive survey and a critique of the first generation of studies.

<sup>3</sup> For other statements to this effect.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For other statements to this effect, see, for instance, Erikson 1973, 280, and McCubbins and Schwartz 1988, 388. Analysis of malaportionment arising from representation of states in the U.S. Senate produces additionally ambiguous results. Atlas et al. (1995) find effects of underrepresentation in the Senate, but Lee (1998) finds substantively small and statistically weak effects.

David and Eisenberg (1961) use the term "Right-To-Vote Index."

the average county had about 65% more representation than it would have had if its share of the legislature equaled its share of the state population. The average within-state standard deviation in the RRI was 1.23. For the upper houses, the average value of the RRI was also 1.65. The average within-state standard deviation was 1.47. After establishing the one-person, one-vote standard, the Court allowed deviations from equal population of no more than several percent. In an ideal world, this would make the RRI equal to 1 in all counties; the mean would then be 1 and the standard deviation would be 0.

Unequal legislative district populations prior to the 1960s tended to reflect urban-rural divisions, but this is only part of the story. The correlation between the RRI (in logarithms) and the county population (in logarithms) is -.58. In 20 states, the correlation is above -.9. However, suburban counties were often as poorly represented as urban counties. In New York state, Nassau, Suffolk, and Westchester counties were more underrepresented than New York City. In Illinois, Lake and Dupage counties had less representation than Cook County (Chicago). In Maryland, the City of Baltimore had three times as many legislative seats per person as neighboring Baltimore County. Some rural counties were also badly underrepresented in some states. Tennessee, for example, gave fewer legislative seats per capita to rural counties in the eastern half of the state. Because urban residents tend to vote Democratic and suburbanites tend to vote Republican, the expansion of the franchise often had uneven effects on the partisan composition of state legislatures (see also Erikson 1973).

The exceptions to the underrepresentation of metropolitan areas deserve mention for a methodological reason. Noting the underrepresentation of urban areas, some studies have examined the *level* of state expenditures on "urban" programs, or total state intergovernmental transfers to the largest urban counties, using the states as the units of observation (Brady and Edmonds 1967; Fredrickson and Cho 1970). This approach introduces a large amount of measurement error, because "urbanness" is an imperfect measure of "underrepresentation," especially when the data are aggregated to the state level. As a result these studies probably yield biased estimates.

#### Measuring Public Expenditures

We seek to explain the distribution of public money to counties. The Census of Governments is conducted every 5 years; we use data from 1957, 1962, 1967, 1972, 1977, and 1982. We focus on the first two and last two years in this series. The years 1957 and 1962 depict expenditures before *Baker*. Battles over equalization of district populations occurred mainly from 1962 through 1968. Because of lags in districting, budgeting, and legislative organization, it is difficult to pinpoint when changes in representation should have begun to affect transfers. Transfers to counties in 1977 and 1982, thus, measure the distribution of expenditures

once one-person, one-vote was in place. To smooth year-to-year variations in expenditures, we average the 1957 and 1962 reports and the 1977 and 1982 reports. Our findings are the same when analyzing each year separately.

We study total transfers from states to all local governments within counties. Though certainly not all state money, these transfers account for a large share of state expenditures: 35 to 38% of all money in this time frame. Roughly half of all money transferred to local governments was for education, one-fifth was for highways and roads, and one-sixth was for general aid to local governments.<sup>5</sup>

Our motivations for examining this variable are threefold. First, this is the variable used in much past research on this topic. Using this variable aggregated to the state level, researchers found no effects of reapportionment. Second, the geographic distribution of transfers is readily identified. It is very hard to determine the geographic distribution of the remaining 60% of state expenditures. Third, total state transfers to counties cumulate a large number of programs and, we expect, should reflect the influence of legislators on public finances generally. Measuring the effects of representation on isolated programs may be problematic if there is vote trading or logrolling across programs.

There is one important detail regarding our main dependent variable. State intergovernmental transfers to local government are not composed entirely of money that originates inside the state, but include some federal "pass-through" money—funds sent from federal accounts to the states that are then transferred to local governments. This is an accounting issue and practices vary from state to state. In only a few states are federal pass-throughs greater than 15% of the total state intergovernmental transfers. When we exclude these states from our analysis the results are unchanged.

Transfers from states to counties varied considerably across states and over time. State transfers to counties in 1962 averaged \$71 per person, with a standard deviation of \$40. State transfers to counties in 1977 averaged \$128, with a standard deviation of \$58. To compare these figures across states, we calculate each county's share of per capita transfers, divide the total transferred to each county by the county's population, and then divide this by the average per capita amount transferred to counties in the state. This is analogous to the definition of the RRI.

As we would expect if one-person, one-vote affected public finances, some degree of equalization of transfers occurred over the span of our study. If every county got its "fair share," then the counties' shares of per

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For more details on the composition of intergovernmental transfers see the U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Census of Governments*, vol. 6, *State Payments to Local Governments*, various years.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> In all states, pass-throughs include some portion of federal spending on Title I aid to education, school lunch programs, and adult and vocational education. In some states, pass-throughs also include funds for hospital construction and local health services, disaster relief, airports, and forest reserve payments. See the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Governments vol. 6, State Payments to Local Governments, various years.

capita transfers from the states would be exactly equal to 1. From the 1950s to the 1970s, both the mean and the variance of counties' shares of per capita transfers shrank. The average relative per capita expenditures in 1957 and 1962 equal 1.25, and the variance around this average is .17. The average relative per capita expenditure in 1972 and 1977 equals 1.06, and the variance around this average is .09. In other words, in the wake of the redistricting cases of the 1960s, the transfers to the typical county more closely approximated the equal division of funds (with a mean near 1), and disparities across counties were cut in half (the approximate reduction in the variance).

#### Other Factors

In addition to our measure of county representation, many other variables might affect the distribution of public money. We address this in three ways.

First, we include variables for demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors. To minimize the danger of omitted variable bias we include the poverty and unemployment rates, median income, percentages of the population that are school-aged, black, and elderly, and population change (growth). Poverty and income are included because many state spending programs transfer money to low-income citizens. Unemployment rates are included because some state funds pay for shortterm relief. The school-aged population is an important predictor of transfers because approximately half of all money transferred from states to locales is for education. Black and elderly populations are often targeted for assistance. Population change captures lags in the adjustment of the budget process to demographic shifts and the consequent depression of per capita transfers in fast-growing counties.

Political factors, in addition to representation, may affect the distribution of state money, including county voter turnout and partisanship, party control of the legislature and governorship, and the relative power of the governor versus the legislature. Counties with high turnout rates may be expected to receive more state money, because for state-level elected officials (such as the governor) the political rewards to providing public goods to counties with higher turnout rates will be greater, other things equal (Husted and Kenny 1997). We measure county partisanship by county gubernatorial vote. State-level fixed effects capture political control of the overall state government. We further consider whether partisanship of the electorate interacts with party control of the state legislature or the party of the governor to capture the possibility that politicians favor those counties with more agreeable partisan leanings.<sup>7</sup>

Second, we regress the change in each county's share of state transfers on the change in the county's representation. This eliminates the influence of any omitted variables that are approximately constant over time.

Finally, we include dummy variables for each state in all model specifications. In our cross-sectional regressions, inclusion of state-level dummy variables eliminates the need to include any additional variables that are restricted to the value 0 or 1, such as variables for region of the country or "democratic majority in the state legislature." When we regress the change in a county's share of state transfers on the change in that county's representation, including a dummy variable for each state captures the effect of any contemporaneous changes in state-level variables, such as the state's adoption of the line item veto or a change in majority party control of the state legislature. Table 1 presents the variables used in the analysis.

## REPRESENTATION AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDS WITHIN STATES

Our analysis of the effects of representation on spending breaks neatly into two empirical questions. First, did counties with relatively more legislative seats per person prior to 1962 receive relatively more money per person? We address this question by examining the relationship between representation and transfers across counties in 1960. Second, did equalization of voting strength produce a more equal distribution of state transfers per person to counties? We address this question by examining the relationship between representation and transfers across counties in the 1980s and by examining changes in transfers and representation over this 20-year period.

#### **Differences Across Counties**

Immediately before the Court imposed one-person, one-vote on the state legislatures, there was a strong positive relationship between legislative seats per person and state intergovernmental transfers per person. Figure 1 displays the relationship between revenue shares and vote shares (both in logarithms) for the national sample. We convert the revenue and vote measures to logarithms to reduce the heavy skew in these measures, making the relationships between the transformed variables nearly linear.

Controlling for other factors, the estimated effect of representation on the distribution of public expenditures is very large and highly significant. Table 2 reports regressions predicting counties' relative shares of state transfers controlling for political and demographic factors. The estimates in Table 2 confirm that unequal district populations correspond with substantial inequalities in the shares of funds in the 1960s. The coefficient on the RRI is .34 (SE=.01) without any control variables. Controlling for other demographic and political factors, the coefficient on relative representation is .17 (SE=.01). Other things equal, doubling a county's representation is predicted to increase its share of state money by almost 20%, a substantial effect on its share of state revenue.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> An extensive literature investigates partisan and ideological effects on budgeting at both the federal and the state levels, with mixed findings. See, for example, Dye 1984, Plotnick and Winters 1985, and Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1989.

Variable Name	Definition
State transfers per capita, 1960 <sup>a</sup>	log((relative per capita intergovernmental transfers in 1957 + relative per capita intergovernmental transfers in 1962)/2)
State transfers per capita, 1980 <sup>a</sup>	log((relative per capita intergovernmental transfers in 1977 + relative per capita intergovernmental transfers in 1982)/2)
Population growth rate, 1950–60 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative population in 1960) - log(relative population in 1950)
Population growth rate, 1970–80 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative population in 1980) – log(relative population in 1970)
Population change, 1960–80 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative population in 1980) – log(relative population in 1960)
Per capita income, 1960 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative per capita income in 1960)
Per capita income, 1980 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative per capita income in 1980)
Percent poor, 1960 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative percent of families >\$3000 in 1960)
Percent poor, 1980 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative percent of families in poverty in 1980)
Percent in school, 1960 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative percent of population enrolled in grades K–12 in 1960)
Percent in school, 1980 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative percent of population enrolled in grades K–12 in 1960)
Percent unemployed, 1960 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative unemployment rate, civilian labor force, in 1960)
Percent unemployed, 1980 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative unemployment rate, civilian labor force, in 1980)
Percent black, 1960 <sup>b</sup>	Relative percent of population that is black, 1960
Percent black, 1980 <sup>b</sup>	Relative percent of population that is black, 1980
Percent 65 and over, 1960b	log(relative percent of population that is age 65 or older, 1960)
Percent 65 and over, 1980 <sup>b</sup>	log(relative percent of population that is age 65 or older, 1980)
Percent turnout, 1960°	log(relative percent of voting age population voting in gubernatorial elections, average 1958–62)
Percent turnout, 1980°	log(relative percent of voting age population voting in gubernatorial elections, average 1978–83)
Percent democratic vote, 1960°	log(relative percent voting democratic in gubernatorial elections, average 1958-62)
Percent democratic vote, 1980 <sup>c</sup>	log(relative percent voting democratic in gubernatorial elections, average 1978-83)
Republican control, 1960	Republicans had a majority in both chambers of the legislature 60% or more of the time from 1953 to 1962.
Republican control, 1980	Republicans had a majority in both chambers of the legislature 60% or more of the time from 1973 to 1982.

*Note*: Footnotes refer to data source. <sup>a</sup>Census of Governments, various years.

<sup>b</sup>City and County Databook, various years.

<sup>c</sup>General Election Data for the United States, 1950–90, ICPSR study 13. Data on line item veto are from *Book of the States*. Gubernatorial power indices are from Schlesinger 1965 and Beyle 1983. Data on committee and party leadership positions are from various state legislative handbooks. Party control of legislatures from *Book of the States*, selected years.

The effects of the control variables in the regression generally square with our intuitions regarding the ideological commitment to redistribution associated with the New Deal and Great Society and arguments from the public finance literature about government spending. Areas with higher poverty rates and lower median income received substantially more state revenue per person. More money flowed to areas with higher unemployment rates. Counties with more persons in school received more state money, though there was no significant effect of high percentages of old or black citizens. Consistent with the possibility that budgeting lags population growth, areas experiencing faster population growth receive less per capita state transfers. With the exception of the variable for county turnout, the political controls have no important effect. Consistent with Husted and Kenny (1997) and Stromberg (1999), counties with relatively high turnout in statewide elections received relatively more revenue per person.

Analysis of the distribution of funds two decades after *Baker* serves as a check that the result for 1960 is not spurious. By 1980, after district populations had been equalized, the RRI in 1960 should have little or no

effect on the distribution of revenues. Figure 2 parallels Figure 1, but for 1980.

Regressions of 1980 transfer levels on 1960 RRI shows that RRI is, at most, only weakly correlated with enduring county-level differences associated with the distribution of state funds. A regression parallel to that in Table 2 for 1980 yields a coefficient on the 1960 RRI of .04, with a standard error of .01. The residual effect might reflect the persistence of agrarian legislators in positions of power in many state legislators. By 1972, all state legislative districts were in compliance with the one-person, one-vote standard.

Considering regional differences in American politics, we examined whether the patterns we detected nationally also held within the South by rerunning the regressions reported in Table 2 separately for the Southern and non-Southern states. Regional variation did not prove substantively important. We also examined whether the percentage black in a county altered the relationship between RRI and transfers, and we found no interaction effect.

The key result from the cross sectional analysis, then, is that counties that had less representation received relatively less money during the pre-Baker era. The




TABLE 2. Cross-Sectional Analysis: Transfers and Votes (Dependent Variable: Relative per Capita Intergovernmental Transfers)

nanoicio,		
Independent Variable	1960	1960
Relative representation	.34 (.01)	.17 (.01)
Population growth rate		—.19 (.03)
Average income		—.01 (.04)
% poor		.22 (.03)
% unemployed		.06 (.01)
% in school		.40 (.05)
% age 65 or older		03(.02)
% black		02(.02)
% turnout		.19 (.02)
% Democrat x non-Republican		
control		.04 (.03)
% Democrat × Republican		
control		02 (.04)
N	3,048	3,048
$R^2$	.33	.50
Note: Dummy variables for each regressions.	state in	cluded in all


analysis does not appear to be driven by either the unique aspects of Southern politics or unmeasured county differences that are correlated with both state transfers and county representation.

#### Changes from 1960 to 1980

Cross-sectional analysis, even when control variables are included, can generate spurious results due to

omitted variables. One possible critique of our crosssectional analysis is that malapportionment merely reflected a county's political power, rather than causing it. If so, some common feature might have led a county to have both overrepresentation in the legislature and a large share of the state's transfers. To minimize the chances that omitted variables led to incorrect inferences about the effect of districting, we next look at how revenue to a county changed over time in response to a change in the county's voting power. District populations were equalized in a very short period of time—from 1962 to 1968. If political representation influenced the distribution of public finances, then counties, especially those extremely over- or underrepresented, should have witnessed substantial changes in the revenues per person that they received from the state, relative to the amounts other counties received.

Increases in a county's representation did in fact produce dramatic increases in revenues per person. Table 3 presents regression results from an analysis predicting changes in revenue shares from 1960 to 1980. The estimated coefficient on  $-\log(RRI)$  in the multivariate regression reported in Table 3 equals .16 (SE = .01). Controlling for other factors, doubling a county's representation increases its revenues per capita by 16%. This effect is nearly identical to the cross-sectional estimates we report in Table 2, as expected if the cross-sectional results are not spurious. The effects of the control variables are, again, generally consistent with our expectations and with the results reported in Table 2. We also tested for possible interactions among our representation index region, levels of government



Independent Variable		
Changes in relative representation	.23 (.01)	.16 (.01
Change in population growth rate		32 (.03
Change in population, 1960 to 1980		26 (.02
Change in average income		.04 (.03
Change in % poor		.14 (.02
Change in % unemployed		.02 (.01
Change in % in school		.56 (.05
Change in % age 65 or older		22 (.03
Change in % black		.18 (.05
Change in % turnout		.07 (.02
Change in % Democrat × non-Republican control, both periods		.17 (.04
Change in % Democrat × Republican control, both periods		36 (.10
Change in % Democrat × non-Republican to Republican Control		<b>36</b> (.23
Change in % Democrat × Republican control to non-Republican control		07 (.11
N	3,048	3,048
$R^2$	.16	.37

spending, and other demographics, but no interaction effects emerged.<sup>8</sup>

The racial composition of the counties captures another facet of representation. At the time of the reapportionment cases, legal and legislative actions sought

to increase representation of blacks through the districting process. The results in Table 3 reveal that, over time, counties with increasing black populations showed substantial gains in their shares of transfers from the state. Of course, this effect reflects changes in social attitudes and policies as well as changes in redistricting practices. One possibility is that our estimate of the effect of reapportionment reflects mainly the gain among black counties. It does not. We test for such a possibility by interacting percent black with RRI in the regressions. The coefficient on the interaction is very small and statistically insignificant. In other

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> We also tested for the influence of federal spending improperly included in the state transfer totals. We created dummy variables identifying states that were large recipients of federal funds in 1960 or enjoyed large increases in federal funds over the period covered by the study. The effect of the RRI on transfers was the same for those states with high versus low initial levels of federal spending and high versus low levels of growth in federal spending.

words, underrepresented black and white counties gained equally from reapportionment.<sup>9</sup>

The estimates in Table 3 are remarkably robust on a state-by-state basis. <sup>10</sup> In bivariate regressions of the effect of the RRI on county transfers state by state, the median state coefficient estimate was -.19, with 50% of the state-level regressions producing values between -.11 and -.41. In only four cases was the coefficient negative. In only one case (South Carolina) was the estimate statistically significant; the remaining three cases (North Dakota, Oregon, and Washington) were among the least malapportioned states pre-Baker.

To test the robustness of the results further, we exclude the major urban areas. Cities tended to gain seats following redistricting, and the 1960s witnessed greater public attention to the problems of urban areas. We ran the regressions reported in Table 3, after excluding the 100 counties with the largest 1960 populations, counties with at least 300,000 people. The estimated coefficient on the RRI is .21 in the bivariate regression and .15 in the multivariate regression; neither is statistically different from the coefficients reported in Table 3. Changes in state transfers tracked changes in political power even among suburban and rural areas.

Finally, we examine whether political institutions distort the effect of representation on public finances. A large literature examines the effects of political institutions on public finances, including fiscal centralization, relative power of the legislature and the governor, power within the legislature, divided government, and popular control over the legislative processes.<sup>11</sup> Our analyses implicitly hold constant the direct effects of these institutional factors through fixed effects for states and, in Table 3, for each county. We also explored whether any of these institutional factors interact with the representation index, magnifying or shrinking the effects of malapportionment on the distribution of public funds.<sup>12</sup> With one exception, fiscal centralization, none of these factors proved to interact with the RRI. A county's per capita share of the legislative seats (RRI)

had a large and positive effect on the distribution of transfers in both fiscally centralized and decentralized states, though the effect of the RRI was somewhat smaller in more centralized states. We are unsure if this is a real effect. One possibility is that this interaction itself reflects malapportionment, as voters in highly malapportioned states may have trusted the state legislature less and kept more control over public finances locally.

Overall, the findings reveal that representation directly affects the distribution of public spending. Institutional and demographic factors do not mediate the effect.

### Effects on the Level of Overall State Transfers

Equalization of legislative district populations in the mid-1960s may have affected the level of spending, in addition to altering the distribution of public expenditures. Transfers from states to counties grew from \$365 per person in 1960 to \$659 per person in 1980 (in 1999 dollars). One might expect Baker to have contributed to an expansion of state government in the 1960s and 1970s for three reasons. First, underrepresented areas may have had a higher demand for public expenditures than overrepresented areas. Underrepresented areas typically had a higher per capita income, and demand for public spending tends to increase with income. Second, expanding the size of government may have been politically more expedient than cutting programs that benefited voters who had been overrepresented in the past. Third, expansions of democracy have generally been associated with expansions in government spending, as new voters bring new demands for public expenditures (e.g., Husted and Kenny 1997; Lindert 1996).

Most prior research on the effects of malapportionment examined its effects on *levels* of spending, overall and on particular programs. Table 4 presents estimates of the association between changes in a state's overall degree of malapportionment and the growth in total state transfers to counties. As noted earlier there are many ways to measure state-level equality of representation. We considered three: the mean of the log of RRI, the standard deviation of the log of RRI, and the difference in the log of RRI between the county with the most representation and the county with the least representation (labeled the RRI range). We regressed the change in the log of total intrastate transfers to counties on the various state-level measures of malapportionment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Looking more closely at the data indicates why. Population and percent urban are by far the strongest predictors of the RRI index. The racial composition and party composition of counties explain very little of the variation in the RRI index. This says nothing about the distribution of funds *within* counties, which might have been affected by racial politics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Previous scholars have noted that, when states are pooled together in an aggregate analysis, important differences across states might be obscured even when state dummy variables are included (Stein 1982).
<sup>11</sup> Garand (1988) surveys a range of institutional factors affecting growth of government spending. Stephans and Olson (1979) and Rich (1989) survey a range of factors that affect federal aid. Abney and Lauth (1997) discuss the relative power of the governor, with specific emphasis on line item vetoes. On the role of political parties, see Levitt and Snyder (1995). On power within legislatures, see Ritt (1976).

<sup>12</sup> Our measure of fiscal centralization was the share of state and local government expenditures or revenues accounted for by the state. Our measures of governor power included the presence of a line item veto, appointment power, budgetary power, and overall power. Our measures of popular control was whether the state had initiatives and referenda and whether the state had an open meeting law. We interacted each of the variables with the RRI in the cross-sectional and over-time specifications.

 $<sup>^{13}</sup>$  Using data from the Statistical Abstract, we calculated the share of combined state and local revenues that originated at the state level and then created a variable equal to 1 for counties in states that were more centralized than the median and -1 otherwise. We then interacted this variable with the RRI. We reran the regression model in Table 3, column 3, including the new interaction variable. The effect of the RRI remained .16 (SE=.01), and the coefficient estimate for the new variable was -.04 (SE=.01). Similar findings are obtained when the centralization measure is based on spending rather than revenue.

Independent Variable				ŀ		
Change in average RRI	.28 (.18)			.31(.24)		
Change in standard deviation of RRI		.25 (.19)			.26 (.26)	
Change in range of RRI		, ,	.07 (.04)		, ,	.05 (.05
Change in population			, ,	—.26 (.24)	31 (.23)	37 ( <b>.2</b> 2
Change in average income				-1.45 (.62)	-1.36 (.61)	-1.29 (.61
Change in % poor				.42 (.26)	40 (.27)	44 (.26 <sup>°</sup>
Change in % unemployed				<b>–.41 (.17</b> )	41 (.17)	<b>–.38</b> (.17
Change in % in school				.48 (.83)	.58 (.83)	.58 (.83
Change in % age 65 or older				.03 (.14)	.03 (.15)	.03 (.15
Change in % black				.71 (.37)	.72 (.39)	.67 (.37
N	48	48	48	48`´	48`	48`
$H^2$	.05	.04	.09	.31	.30	.30

Consistent with past research we find that equalization contributed little to the growth of transfers from state governments to counties. All three state-level measures of malapportionment predict positive correlations with total state transfers per capita to all counties in a state from 1960 to 1980. However, none of the coefficients of interest reach conventional levels of statistical significance. And the effects are substantively very small: A one-standard deviation change in one of these measures predicts only a 3 to 4% growth in total revenue per capita transfers.<sup>14</sup>

#### WHAT IF CARR HAD WON?

Our findings clearly show that representation affects the distribution of public funds. Using the regression estimates, we can investigate an important counterfactual. Had the Court not imposed one-person, onevote, what would the distribution of state revenues have looked like in 1980, the end point of our study?

Without the Court's action a, high degree of malapportionment would likely have existed in 1980, and even today. State legislatures created most of the malapportionment that existed in the 1960s through inaction, leaving in place district boundaries that were created at the end of the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth century (Dixon 1968). Had the 1960 apportionment held in 1980, gross discrepancies in district populations would have existed in 1980, the end point of our analysis. The 300 most over represented counties in 1960 contained 5.3 million people by the 1980 census. The 300 most under represented counties in 1960 contained 85.1 million people by the 1980 census.

What would the distribution of public expenditures have been had this degree of malapportionment existed in 1980? We construct the counterfactual using predicted values from the regressions presented in the previous section. Algebraic manipulation of the regression

specification produces a simple formula for calculating how much per capita state revenues in 1980 differed from what would have been had the county representation remained as unequal as it was in 1960.<sup>15</sup>

The amount of redistribution that followed from *Baker* was substantial. In the most underrepresented counties, the lowest 5% in terms of RRI, equal votes increased state revenues by \$90 per person per year. In the most overrepresented counties, equalization of state legislative populations reduced revenues transferred from the state by \$270 per person per year. The cumulative effect was to shift approximately \$7 billion annually toward counties that had been underrepresented prior to the imposition of one-person, one-vote. <sup>16</sup>

#### DISCUSSION

Baker v. Carr exposed an age-old and fundamental flaw in the design of constitutional democracy—a flaw

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> The standard deviations of the average of the logarithm of the RRI and of the standard deviation of the logarithm of the RRI are approximately .2 and the standard deviation of the hi-to-lo log RRI is .88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> The difference between the predicted state revenues per capita in a county had the 1960 distribution of votes held and the predicted state revenues under the 1980 district lines equals  $Y^* - Y_{80} = Y_{80}[(RRI_{60})^2 - 1]$ , where  $Y^*$  is the hypothetical level of per capita spending in a county if the 1960 districting held,  $Y_{80}$  is the actual level of per capita state spending in the county, RRI<sub>60</sub> is the RRI measure for the county in 1960, and .2 is the elasticity from Table 3. We make one simplifying assumption in making this calculation: Equal voting power did not contribute to the growth in overall state transfers to counties, which seems reasonable from the section Effects on the Level of Overall State Transfer.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> The very small standard errors for the RRI coefficient imply that the prediction standard errors are very small. To calculate the amount of redistribution we computed the amount gained by those who would have been underrepresented had Carr won. The 150 counties with the lowest RRI (bottom 5% of the distribution) had an average RRI of .49 and contained 62 million people. The difference between the predicted and the actual per capita transfers  $(Y^* - Y_{80})$  equaled \$87.62, which implies that these counties gained a total of \$5.36 billion annually. The 150 counties with the next lowest RRI (fifth to tenth percentile) had an average RRI of .72 and a total population of 24 million people. The difference between the predicted and the actual transfers equaled \$41.91, and the total equaled \$1 billion annually. The remaining underrepresented counties (between the tenth, and the twenty-fifth percentile) had an average RRI of .94 and 72 million people. The average predicted difference in per capita transfers equaled \$8.10, and the total equaled \$600 million annually.

elegantly described by John Locke (1960, 419) in the Second Treatise of Government:

... We may be satisfied when we see the bare Name of a Town, of which there remains not so much Housing as a Sheep-coat; or more inhabitants than a Shepherd is to be found, sends as many Representatives to the grand Assembly of Law-makers, as a whole County numerous in People, and powerful in riches. This Strangers stand amazed at, and every one must confess needs a remedy. Though most think it hard to find one, because the Constitution of the Legislative being the original and supreme act of the Society... no inferior Power can alter it.

In the United States, the Supreme Court imposed on the state legislatures a solution to the American version of the problem of "rotten boroughs." The Court's power in this situation is beyond doubt. The doctrine of one-person, one-vote transformed political representation in the United States. Within six years of the *Baker* ruling, nearly every state legislature was in compliance with the principle of one-person, one-vote.

Equally clear is the value of representation. Within 15 years of the *Baker* ruling, the doctrine of one-person, one-vote resulted in a substantial *equalization* of the distribution of public funds within states. This conclusion shifts the focus of research on the value of representation. Prior research has examined mainly the effects of representation on *levels* of spending, overall or on specific programs. The conclusion from such studies has been that unequal representation by and large does not effect levels of public spending, a conclusion that apparently questions the very value of political representation. That conclusion may be right, but it misses the true effect of representation on public spending. Representation affects the distribution of funds—who gets what—rather than how much government spends.

The reapportionment revolution in the 1960s also carries a very important insight about political power within legislatures. Many political scientists analyze and interpret legislative politics as bargaining among equals—the individual legislators. An alternative view treats distributive politics as bargaining among predetermined voting blocs or interests that may be quite unequal in strength. Indeed, many scholars and politicians have defended overrepresentation of rural areas as necessary to prevent the large urban areas from dominating the state legislatures: an urban bloc will take more than its "fair share" of public expenditures (see, e.g., Perrin 1962 and de Grazia 1962, chap. 5). Our findings strongly support the notion that distributive politics consists of bargaining among equals. We document that the overrepresented areas, which were primarily rural, received more than their fair share of public expenditures in the decades before the imposition of one-person, one-vote. In the decades following Baker, urban blocs did not dominate state legislatures' budgeting decisions. Rather counties have received shares of the public expenditure in proportion to their per capita representation. Equal votes produced equal distributions of money.

In the world today, questions of political representation are no less pressing than 40 years ago. Malap-

portionment is widely observed. It is the norm in federal systems, and it is common among emerging democracies (Samuels and Snyder 2000). For those concerned with the design of representative institutions, the American experience provides a clear and simple lesson. Apportionment of legislative seats determines the distribution of political power in legislatures and the resulting allocation of government resources.

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# Speak Softly and Carry a Big Stick? Veterans in the Political Elite and the American Use of Force

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ther research has shown (1) that civilians and the military differ in their views about when and how to use military force; (2) that the opinions of veterans track more closely with military officers than with civilians who never served in the military; and (3) that U.S. civil-military relations shaped Cold War policy debates. We assess whether this opinion gap "matters" for the actual conduct of American foreign policy. We examine the impact of the presence of veterans in the U.S. political elite on the propensity to initiate and escalate militarized interstate disputes between 1816 and 1992. As the percentage of veterans serving in the executive branch and the legislature increases, the probability that the United States will initiate militarized disputes declines. Once a dispute has been initiated, however, the higher the proportion of veterans, the greater the level of force the United States will use in the dispute.

...My feeling is that [National Security Advisor Anthony Lake] must always be conscious when it comes to making military decisions on the use of military power that the president has not served and that he has not served.

General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (as quoted in DeParle 1995)

n his autobiography, General Colin Powell relates his difficulty in dealing with the academic and "nonmilitary" style of the Clinton foreign policy team. He describes his patient efforts early in President Clinton's first term to instruct civilian leaders on when and how to use force. During one such session, Madeleine Albright, then ambassador to the UN and later Secretary of State, asked General Powell in frustration, "What is the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" Powell reports that he thought he "would have an aneurysm. American GIs were not toy soldiers to be moved around on some sort of global game board" (Powell and Persico 1995, 576–77).

It is tempting to dismiss the Powell–Albright exchange as merely a *contretemps* between two powerful and idiosyncratic personalities. But nearly every post-Cold War use of U.S. military force was conducted against the backdrop of some sort of civil–military dispute, and these disputes in broad brush seemed to conform to the Powell–Albright pattern: Civilian leaders seemed more willing than military leaders to deploy the military in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Kosovo, and so on (Desch 1999; Feaver n.d.). Of course, exceptions abound, with some prominent civilian politicians showing reluctance and some prominent military

officers showing a greater willingness in a given case (Avant 1996/97). At the most senior policymaking levels, the civil-military distinction is blurry and only awkwardly fits the neat categories of classical civil-military relations theory (Roman and Tarr 2001). Nevertheless, reports persist that post-Cold War civil-military relations in the United States are characterized by repeated clashes between promiscuous civilians and reluctant warriors (Mandelbaum 1996; Weigley 2001).

We examine the extent to which these disputes are a function of an enduring civil-military gap. Other research has shown that military experience "matters" in the sense that civilians and military personnel tend to give different responses on surveys asking about the appropriate criteria for when and how to use force. Moreover, this research has indicated that civilians who are military veterans give responses that track more closely with those of military officers than with those of civilians who never served (Feaver and Gelpi 1999, n.d.). Likewise previous research has shown that differing civilian and military opinions shaped policy debates at the highest decision-making levels within the United States during the Cold War (e.g., Betts 1991, Gacek 1994, and Petraeus 1989). We assess whether this opinion gap "matters" in terms of the actual conduct of American foreign policy.

Specifically, we examine whether the prevalence of military experience among the policymaking elite affects the propensity of the United States to use military force. Because veteran opinion corresponds with military opinion, we use veteran presence in the political elite as a proxy for measuring the civil—military gap over time. Relying on a composite measure of military experience across the executive and legislative branches of government, we examine the impact of elite military experience on the U.S. propensity to initiate and to escalate militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) between 1816 and 1992.

#### FROM BELIEFS TO BEHAVIOR: THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP AND INTER-STATE CONFLICT

Analyses of U.S. decision making during Cold War crises point to a general civil-military pattern of

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disagreement across two dimensions: (1) the decision regarding whether/when to use force and (2) the decision regarding how to use force. Civilian leaders tended to be more willing to use the military to address a diplomatic problem but favored using the military in a constrained way to minimize the chance that the crisis would escalate out of control. Military leaders tended toward greater reluctance in adopting a military solution to a diplomatic problem but, if the military was to be used, favored fewer restrictions so the military could use force in a quick and decisive manner (e.g., Betts 1991, Gacek 1994, and Feaver 1995).

A similar pattern emerges in recent surveys of civilian and military elites. Compared to midcareer activeduty military officers, civilian elites are somewhat more interventionist with regard to the range of issues over which they will support the use of force by the United States. Military officers report what may be called a "realpolitik" view that reserves the use of force for interstate issues that represent a substantial threat to national security, such as control of territory, the maintenance of geostrategic access and position, and the defense of allies. Civilian elites, on the other hand, are somewhat more likely than military officers to report an "interventionist" view that extends the use military force to address additional issues that do not fit within this interstate security paradigm. Such goals include human rights abuses, the internal collapse of governance, and the desire to alter a state's domestic regime. Thus, interventionists will generally have a wider set of issues across which they will support the use of force, while realpolitik thinkers will support force only over a narrower range of issues.2 In other words, civilian and military views converge somewhat when considering potential realpolitik uses of force but diverge more sharply when considering potential "interventionist" uses of force. Significantly, respondents in the civilian elite who had previously served in the military report views that track more closely with active-duty military officers than with nonveterans in the civilian elite (Feaver and Gelpi 1999, n.d.).

Regarding the issue of how to use military force, civilians tended to endorse a greater willingness to place constraints on the manner in which force is used, whereas military respondents tended to endorse a position that has come to be known as the Powell Doctrine of overwhelming force (Dauber 1998; Stevenson 1996). The doctrine calls for using force only when the political will to do so essentially without restrictions—or only with very broad restrictions such as the prohibition of nuclear weapons—is clearly present. The Powell

<sup>1</sup> During earlier periods in U.S. history, other matters such as the defense of American commercial interests were more prominent "interventionist" issues. Recent survey results also indicate that military officers are less likely to view U.S. economic relationships as "a matter of national security" (Feaver and Gelpi n.d.).

Doctrine is based on the putative lessons of Vietnam but can be traced back to the "never again" or "all or nothing" school of senior military disenchanted with the restrictions imposed by political leaders during the Korean War (Gacek 1994). This view could not contrast more starkly with those of civilian elites such as Albright, who vigorously contended that "[the use of force] doesn't have to be all or nothing. We should be able to use limited force in limited areas." Once again, existing research suggests that military veterans within the civilian elite give responses that track more closely with active duty military officers than with nonveterans such as Albright (Feaver and Gelpi 1999, n.d.).

How, in theory, might these opinion differences affect the actual conduct of American foreign policy? The American military has never openly challenged the fundamental principle of civilian control. Nonetheless, even within the basic framework of civilian control, one can imagine varying levels of military influence. Military preferences shape U.S. foreign policy to a greater or lesser extent through at least three significant mechanisms. First, given their obvious expertise regarding the use of force, military advisors have the opportunity to persuade civilian policymakers to adopt views that reflect the beliefs and preferences of the military. Second, military officers have the opportunity to influence policy by shaping the kinds of options that are presented to civilian leaders. Third, even if military advisors are unable to alter the views of policymakers, their preferences may constrain policymakers because of the leverage that the military can give to competing civilian elites (e.g., elite members of a competing political party or faction). The norms of civilian control may inhibit military leaders from openly and publicly challenging civilian decisions regarding the use of force, but competing civilian elites are under no such constraint. Research indicates that one of the keys to maintaining public support for the use of force is the existence of a supportive elite consensus (Larson 1996).

We hypothesize that military preferences will have greater influence on civilian policy choices when the civil-military gap is narrow (i.e., when civilian leaders preferences are similar to those of the military). Because civilians who have served in military have preferences that are closer to the those of the military, ceteris paribus, the presence of veterans in the civilian leadership can serve as a proxy measure for the width of this civil-military gap: the more veterans there are in the civilian leadership, the greater the influence of military preferences on civilian policy choices.

Of course, the decision to use force is influenced by many factors, of which civil—military relations may not be the most important. The presence of these other factors presents a challenge for testing the influence of the civil—military opinion gap over time. Even so, it should be possible to isolate the impact of civil—military relations relative to other contributing factors that shape the use of force. The hypotheses that follow, then, are all subject to the *ceteris paribus* condition; controlling

of national security" (Feaver and Gelpi n.d.).

<sup>2</sup> Jentleson (1992, 1998) makes a further empirical distinction between interventions designed to alter the regimes of other states and those designed to prevent human rights abuses. Our survey analyses (Feaver and Gelpi n.d.) did not reveal such a distinction in opinion at the elite level. Moreover, our measures of conflict behavior cannot capture the distinction between a humanitarian and a state-building intervention.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Comments made on *The News Hour with Jim Lehrer*, January 9, 2001

for all the other factors that affect the decision to use force, we expect the following.

Hypothesis 1. As the proportion of civilian policymakers with military experience increases, the probability that the United States will initiate militarized disputes will decrease.

Hypothesis 2. The impact of policymakers' military experience on American decisions to initiate militarized disputes will be more pronounced with regard to interventionist threats rather than realpolitik threats.

Once the decision to use military force has been made, the nature of the military's advice to civilian elites will reverse. Regardless of whether the mission is "realpolitik" or "interventionist," the military always prefers the large-scale use of force to the limited use of force. Thus, once civilian policy makers have decided to use force, military advisors will always counsel strongly for using force on a large scale. Once again, we expect this advice to be more influential when the civil—military gap is small.

Hypothesis 3. As the proportion of civilian policymakers with military experience increases, the level of force the United States uses in disputes it initiates will increase.

# MEASURING THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP ON AMERICAN CONFLICT BEHAVIOR

To test these hypotheses, we relate the civil—military gap to U.S. conflict behavior over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries while controlling, as far as possible, for other factors that are known to shape the use of force.

#### Scope

We test for the impact of the elite civil—military gap on American decisions to use force with a cross-sectional time-series dataset composed of interstate dyads of which the United States was a member between 1816 and 1992. State membership is determined by the Correlates of War (COW) definition of membership in the international system. One difficulty in using such dyadic-pooled time-series data is determining which states were capable of interacting. During the latter part of the twentieth century, this issue seems less salient because of the frequent opportunities for

interaction among states. As we move back in time through the nineteenth century, however, it becomes less plausible to assume that all states were capable of fighting with one another. Following a number of prominent analyses of the use of force, we address this problem by analyzing only "politically relevant" dyads (Maoz and Russett 1993; O'Neal and Russett 1997), which are defined as (1) any pair of states in which at least one of the states is a major power or (2) any pair of states that share a border or are divided by less than 150 miles of water.<sup>5</sup>

Since the United States became a major power (according to the COW Capabilities dataset) in 1898, this rule implies that we analyze all interstate dyads including the United States from 1898 onward. Prior to 1898, the rule implies that we analyze American relations with all of the major powers during that period as well as American interactions with Mexico.<sup>6</sup>

## Dependent Variable 1: Initiation of Force by the United States

Our first dependent variable is the *propensity* of the United States to initiate the use of force. We code American initiations of force based on the COW MIDs dataset, which defines the initiation of militarized disputes as explicit threats to use force, displays of force, mobilizations of force, or actual uses of force (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). This variable is coded on an annual basis for each dyad, set at 1 for each year that the United States initiated a militarized dispute against the other state in the dyad and at 0 otherwise. 8

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This dataset was defined through the use of EUGene, a data generation program produced by D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam (1998). The analysis of binary-pooled time-series data has recently come under considerable methodological criticism. We approach the problem of temporal dependence in the manner advocated by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998). In addition, we rely on Huber–White robust standard errors that allow for clustering on each dyad to deal with spatial autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. Because of the skewed distribution of the dependent variable, we also tested King and Zeng's (2001) rare event logit estimator. It produced identical results, so we retained the traditional logit specification.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> The analysis of "politically relevant" dyad-years versus all dyad years has been a source of some debate. In general, the effect of analyzing politically relevant dyads should be to increase the size of estimated coefficients by reducing the problems associated with analyzing rare events (King and Zeng 2001). Because the United States became a major power in 1898, our analysis does look at all dyads in the twentieth century. The impact of veterans remained consistent across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, suggesting that the selection of politically relevant versus all dyads is not an issue for this analysis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> This excludes U.S. conflicts with Native American tribes because the COW datasets do not identify these groups as nation-states.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> We also investigated the possibility that the presence of veterans might be associated with the probability that the United States would become a target in a militarized dispute. No such hypothesis emerges from our data on civilian and military preferences, but we investigated the possibility that other states might anticipate levels of U.S. "interventionism" and alter their behavior based on the perceived preferences of U.S. leaders. We found no support for this hypothesis. Thus—as expected by our argument—the initiation of U.S. MIDs is related to the presence of veterans but the targeting of MIDs against the United States is not. This pattern increases our confidence that we are identifying a causal relationship rather than a spurious correlation between veterans and the overall frequency of disputes.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> As is the case with all analyses of dispute initiation, the distribution on this dependent variable is quite skewed. The United States was a member of 8,790 politically relevant dyad years from 1816 to 1992 and it initiated disputes in 111 of those cases. U.S. dispute initiations were relatively rare (1.26% of the cases) but did differ substantially from the frequency of dispute initiations in a random sample of politically relevant dyad years. As noted below, King and Zeng's (2001) rare-events logit estimator yielded results identical to those presented here.

## Dependent Variable 2: Level of Force Used by the United States

Our second dependent variable is the level of force used by the United States in the disputes that it initiated. In the MIDs dataset the highest level of force used by each side in a dispute is coded on a five-point scale, as follows: 1 = no militarized response to a MID initiation by the other state, 2 = threat of force, 3 = show of force, 4 =use of force, and 5 =war. For our purposes, of course, the first category of this variable is irrelevant, for we analyze the level of force only if the United States initiated a dispute. Threats of force involve verbal actions that are not supported by militarized behavior. A show of force involves the actual movement and use of troops but stops short of extended or direct combat. The use of force involves direct military hostilities but short of full-scale war. Wars are defined as military engagements in which the combatants suffer at least 1,000 battle deaths.

# Key Explanatory Variable: The Elite Civil–Military Gap

We have no way of directly measuring the preferences of policymakers regarding the use of force across the span of American history. However, we can measure the military *experience* of American policymakers. As we discussed above, this measure acts as a surrogate indicator for the presence of "military views" within the civilian policymaking elite.

Focusing on military experience as a measure of the gap fits nicely within the causal chain with which we link the civil-military gap to the use of force. We view the impact of the gap as a two-stage process. First, military experience shapes individuals' attitudes and preferences regarding the use of force. Second, these differing preferences, in turn, alter American conflict behavior. That is, although our aggregate analysis of American conflict behavior draws a direct linkage between military experience and dispute behavior, we view attitudes as an intervening variable between military experience and American foreign policy.

Our approach requires us to assume that the link between opinions about the use of force and military/veteran status has been more or less constant over the time. Specifically, we assume that the general structure of civil-military differences has remained fixed over time. Considerable evidence suggests that this assumption is reasonable. Although changes have occurred at the margins, the broad contours of recent survey results (Feaver and Gelpi 1999, n.d.) are consistent with the findings of several studies of U.S. civilmilitary relations during the Cold War (Betts 1991, Petraeus 1987, 1989), with Huntington's (1957) canonical consideration of the sweep of U.S. civil-military relations since the founding of the Republic, and with Upton's (1917) classic critique of nineteenth-century American civil-military relations. Compared to military officers, American civilian leaders have tended to be more willing to use force as a foreign policy tool and

more willing to constrain how that force is used. As Albright said, "Limited force in limited areas." Importantly, if our assumption is invalid and veteran status is not associated with foreign policy preferences in a consistent manner, then our estimates will generally tend to be dampened toward zero and we will thus be less likely to uncover any statistically significant relationships.


The next issue is the determination of whose military experience might be relevant for predicting the use of force. The President's military experience should be an important aspect of this process, but the President's own military experience should by no means be the only factor. The President inevitably relies on advice from members of his Cabinet and his national security team, so surely their military experience will shape the views and the information they convey to the President. In addition, the President must also be concerned about how other policymakers will respond to his decisions regarding whether and how to use force. Congress has often publicly debated American decisions to use force, and as we noted earlier, public support for a military operation may depend critically on the existence of an elite consensus in support of the operation (Larson 1996). Thus, the President must be concerned with whether legislators will hold hearings or make public statements that question the administration's policy. Congress also retains an important budgetary and constitutional link to American uses of force, and the President may consult directly with prominent members of Congress who have expertise in foreign affairs.

Consequently, our measure of the military experience of policymakers encompasses the executive and legislative branches. We do not include the military experience of the Supreme Court or other aspects of the judiciary because judges have not historically played a role in American decisions to use force, nor have they debated such decisions publicly. For the executive branch, we recorded the percentage of veterans serving in the Cabinet for each year. Thus we include the military experience of the President, the Vice President, and any other Cabinet officers serving during that year. Data for this variable are from the Biographical Directory of the Executive Branch, 1774–1989 (Sobel, 1990)<sup>9</sup>. For Congress, we use the percentage of veterans serving in the House of Representatives for each year.10

To convey a sense of what these data look like, we display both of our measures of military experience in Figure 1. The proportion of veterans in the House ranged between 13% and 72%, while the percentage of veterans in the Cabinet ranged from 0% all the way to 92%. Both measures were low in the early nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and both rose after the conclusion of the Civil War, World War I, and World War II.

 $^{10}$  We thank William T. Bianco (2001) for generously sharing these data with us.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Data for 1990–92 were taken from the biographies of Cabinet secretaries available at the web sites of each Cabinet department.



The two variables are closely related to one another, correlating at .85 (p < .01). Thus, we combine these two indicators into a single composite measure of elite military experience by simply taking their average.<sup>11</sup>

# Secondary Explanatory Variable: Interventionist vs. Realpolitik Uses of Force

One important aspect of our argument is that civilians differ from those with military experience in terms of their willingness to use military force to address issues that are outside the realpolitik scope of American security policy—especially those that involve intervention inside other states. To test this hypothesis, we divided dyads into two categories: states whose actions could represent a threat to the core bases of American security and states whose actions could not represent such a threat. The former category we labeled "realpolitik" targets, and the latter we labeled "interventionist." We defined interventionist targets as any state that (1) faced worse than a 99:1 disadvantage against the United States in terms of relative military capabilities and (2) was not allied with a competing major power. Such small, nonaligned states clearly do not have the capability to threaten American security in a realpolitik manner. Instead, disputes with such states were likely to involve U.S. intervention inside the minor state because of domestic turmoil or because the United States was

dissatisfied with the policies or behaviors of the ruling government of such states. States that enjoyed less than a 99:1 disadvantage against the United States or were allied with a rival major power were coded as "realpolitik" targets. This coding rule results in approximately 51% of the dyad-years in our dataset being coded as "interventionist."

This division is crude, but it captures the essence of what we mean by U.S. "interventionism." Our measure of interventionism is intended to identify states against which the United States was likely to be using force for reasons other than the defense of traditional national security goals. To the extent that the United States initiated militarized disputes against "interventionist" states, it was targeting extremely weak states that were not allied with rival external powers. In such cases the United States was likely to be intervening in the domestic politics of such states to alter their governments or their governments' internal policies. Our hypothesis is that policymakers with military experience would be more reluctant to engage in such interventions.

#### **Control Variables**

A large literature on international conflict has already identified numerous factors that affect the use of force, including distance, military capabilities, and democracy, for example. To the extent that the elite military experience is correlated with any of these factors, the failure to include that factor in our analysis might bias our estimate of impact of elite veterans. As far as possible, we have controlled for every plausible alternative argument in our empirical analysis. Including additional control variables *cannot* artificially inflate the estimated impact of our variable of interest. It can, however, introduce problems such as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Because the two variables correlate so highly, however, differing functional forms had little impact on the results. For example, weighting the military experience of Cabinet members twice as heavily as that of House members had no impact on our results. Below we demonstrate that our findings are robust across several other variations in these coding rules.

multicollinearity.<sup>12</sup> Such problems would inflate the standard errors of the coefficients and could reduce the statistical significance of our results. Thus, the inclusion of control variables can only provide a more stringent test of our hypotheses. 13 Including these variables also allows us to compare the impact of elite military experience to the influence of other prominent causes of conflict.

The variables that we utilize are clustered into three categories: variables that that address likely counterarguments or potential sources of spuriousness for our results; variables that are not likely sources of spuriousness but are known to be important determinants on the use of force and thus are useful for illustrating the comparative importance of our main explanatory variable; and variables that are needed to address other methodological concerns.

#### **Potentially Confounding Variable 1:** Log of Casualties in a Previous U.S. War

Controlling for the human costs of U.S. participation in a war helps address one of the most obvious counterarguments to our finding of a relationship between elite veterans and the use of force: American war experience. The presence of veterans in the political elite is obviously a function of U.S. participation in a war and it is reasonable to expect American conflict behavior to change after a major war. Perhaps this war memory or "war weariness" is the true causal factor, and the presence of veterans in the political elite merely an artifact of the costs of that war. Our measure of war weariness is the natural log of the number of U.S. fatalities suffered by the United States in its most recent war. 14 Data on

<sup>12</sup> Multicollinearity levels do become high (auxiliary  $R^2 = .8$ ) for the elite veterans variable because of our specification of an interaction with interventionist targets. Auxiliary regressions for the balance of military capabilities also revealed relatively high collinearity levels (auxiliary  $R^2 = .71$ ). Nonetheless, elite veterans, its interaction term, and military capabilities all retain their statistical significance, making the issue of multicollinearity irrelevant. The dummy variables for the major power status of the United States and its partner in the dyad also suffer from some moderate collinearity problems (auxiliary  $R^2$  values are .5 and .71 respectively), which could account for their statistical insignificance; however, the relatively small size of their coefficients appears to be a more likely cause. Comparing their coefficients to our estimate for the impact of the Cold War (also a dummy variable making such comparisons possible), we can see that the standard error for the U.S. major power status variable is smaller than the standard error for the Cold War variable. Its coefficient, however, is less than one-fourth the size of the impact of the Cold War. Auxiliary regressions on all other variables revealed auxiliary  $R^2$  values of less than .2.

One circumstance in which it could be inappropriate to include a variable as a "control" would be if that factor actually served as an intervening variable between our antecedent variable (elite military experience) and our dependent variable (the use of force). Controlling for an intervening variable may cause the antecedent variable to "disappear" from the equation because its influence is exerted only through the intervening factor. The insertion and removal of the intervening factor could be used to demonstrate the nature of the causal linkage, but one should not infer from such an analysis that the antecedent variable has no effect.

We estimated a variety of decay functions for the decline of the war-weariness effect over time. However, the simple log of U.S. casualties fit the data best.

U.S. war fatalities were drawn from the Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (Statistical Information Analysis Division), U.S. Department of Defense (http://www.web1.osd.mil/mmid/casualty).

#### **Potentially Confounding Variable 2:** Percentage of Veterans in the American Public

Controlling for the percentage of veterans in the American public provides a further test of the war-weariness hypothesis. The percentages of veterans in the elite and the mass are likely to be correlated because they are both affected by the extent of U.S. participation in major wars. Perhaps any correlation between political elite veterans and the use of force is an artifact of a deeper relationship between the general public and conflict proneness. That is, perhaps the political elite is merely responding to the broader currents of war weariness in the general public. Data for the number of veterans in the U.S. public were received from the Department of Veterans Affairs, and data for the total U.S. population figures were drawn from the COW dataset on national capabilities.<sup>15</sup> The percentage of veterans in the American public is displayed in Figure 1.

#### Potentially Confounding Variable 3: **Cold War Years**

As noted above, the percentage of veterans reached its height in the years following World War II. This time period, of course, was also the period of the Cold Warthe most intense security competition in U.S. history. Thus, we would expect the United States to have exhibited a greater propensity to initiate the use of force quite independent of any civil-military effect. The Cold War broke out for reasons that were exogenous to (but correlated with) the increase in veterans among U.S. policy makers. Thus the failure to control for the Cold War period would lead us to attribute changes in American behavior to other factors when they were most likely due to the new global role that the United States assumed in the wake of World War II.<sup>16</sup> This indicator is a dummy variable that equals 1 during the years 1946 to 1989.

#### Potentially Confounding Variable 4: **U.S. Involvement in Other Disputes**

Both presidents and the mass public may be more likely to select policymakers with military experience when

After presenting our results, we discuss a number of sensitivity analyses that address the robustness of our findings across various

historical periods-including the Cold War.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Data on the number of U.S. veterans were available only from 1865. Thus, we estimate our equations both with and without this control variable. Missing data points after 1865 were interpolated from the time series using STATA version 6.0. Because the time series is generally smooth, the interpolated values appear to provide a good fit. We tested the interpolation process by interpolating the entire time series based only on one observation per five-year period. Regressing these interpolations on the true values yielded an  $R^2$ of greater than .96.

they perceive the United States as facing substantial security threats. Thus, if elite military experience is positively related to American involvement in disputes, this result may be an effect rather than a cause of that involvement. Our first step toward solving this problem was to define our dependent variable as American *initiations* of disputes. In addition, however, we also control for the number of disputes the United States was involved in each year (as either initiator or target) outside the dyad under consideration.

# Potentially Confounding Variable 5: Political Party in Power

Recent evidence suggests that military officers increasingly identify with the Republican Party (Holsti 2001). In addition, recent Republican administrations have been perceived both as having greater military representation among their ranks and as being more sympathetic to the views of the military than have Democratic administrations. At the same time, Republican administrations have frequently been depicted as relatively hawkish on foreign policy issues. Thus we control for the political party in power to distinguish the impact of military views from the impact of the Republican Party.

# Potential Confounding Variable 6: Balance of Military Capabilities

One robust finding in the literature on conflict propensity is that states of vastly unequal military capabilities are unlikely to engage in conflict with one another (Blainey 1973; Organski and Kugler 1980). America experienced dramatic increases in power around the turn of the twentieth century and after World War II. Shortly after each of these changes, the percentage of veterans in the policymaking elite increased as well. Thus we must control for American capabilities to distinguish their influence from the impact of elite military experience. We measure the balance of military capabilities within a dyad with COW data on national material capabilities. For each year we calculate the proportion of the capabilities within each dyad that is controlled by the United States (i.e., U.S. capabilities/(U.S. + adversary capabilities), subtract 0.50, and take the absolute value. The resulting variable ranges from 0 (perfectly equal capabilities) to 0.50 (capabilities entirely controlled by one state in the dyad). We then rescale this variable from 0 to 1 to make it consistent with standard measures of relative capabilities.

## Comparative Variable 1: Shared Alliance, Ties

-States that share security interests should be less likely to engage in militarized disputes with one another (Bueno de Mesquita 1981; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992). Accordingly, we include a  $\tau$ -b measure of alliance portfolio similarity between the United

States and the other dyad member in each dyad-year. In principle, the  $\tau$ -b similarity score ranges from -1 to 1, with higher values representing more similar alliance patterns; in our data, similarity scores range from -0.46 to 1.17

#### **Comparative Variable 2: Major Power Status**

Another well-established finding is that major powers are substantially more likely to become involved in disputes (Bremer 1992). Because the United States became a major power roughly halfway through the time period, and because this status altered the set of "politically relevant" dyads, we control for whether both the United States and its potential adversary were major powers. Again, major power status is coded on the basis of the COW dataset on national material capabilities.

# Comparative Variable 3: Adversary's Level of Democracy

The extensive literature on the democratic peace has established democracy as one of the most robust and important determinants of international conflict (Bremer 1992; Maoz and Russett 1993; Ray 1995). Thus, we include the level of democracy in the opposing state. Consistent with most of the literature on the democratic peace, we measure democracy on the basis of the Polity III dataset (Gurr and Jaggers 1996). We create a net democracy score for each state, defined as its democracy score minus its autocracy score. This variable ranges from -10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy).

### Comparative Variable 4: Distance between States

One of the strongest findings in the study of international conflict is that states that are near one another are more likely to engage in military conflict (Bremer 1992). Thus, we control for the distance between the United States and its potential adversary in the dyad. We measure this as the log of the number of miles between capital cities, unless the two states are contiguous, in which case the distance is defined as 0. States are coded as "contiguous" if they share a land border or if they are separated by less than 250 miles of water.

### Comparative Variable 5: Adversary's Level of Force

We control for the level of force used by the opposing state, which is measured according to the five-point scale described above.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> A dummy variable identifying states with which the United States shared a direct alliance tie yielded similar results.
<sup>18</sup> Our use of the level of force used by the opposing state as a control

variable in explaining the level of force used by the Opposing state as a control variable in explaining the level of force used by the United States is a rather crude specification of crisis escalation. In fact, the United States and its adversary were likely to be interacting strategically as

## Methodological Control 1: Peace Years in the Dyad

We correct for temporal dependence in our binary time-series cross-sectional data by accounting for the number of years that have elapsed since the previous conflict within the dyad (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998). We model the impact of time by including dummy variables for each elapsed year of peace because this method is both simple and flexible in dealing with any possible pattern of temporal correlation. As it happens, the dummy variables are statistically significant for peace years 0 through 4; thus, we retain only these five dummy variables.

### Methodological Control 2: Selection Effects Parameter

As in any analysis of crisis escalation, we must cope with the issue of selection effects. Since the United States had to initiate a dispute before it could engage in escalation, the cases in which we can observe American decisions regarding escalation are self-selected. This nonrandom selection process can bias the coefficients in the analysis of the level of force used by the United States. We account for the nonrandom selection of crises by modeling the initiation and escalation decisions as a set of simultaneous equations.<sup>20</sup> In the selection equation we estimate a predicted probability of dispute initiation. We then insert this predicted value as a control variable in our analysis of escalation. By accounting for the expected probability of a dispute, we correct for the self-selection process.<sup>21</sup>

# DOES THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP INFLUENCE AMERICAN CONFLICT BEHAVIOR?

We conducted a logit analysis of every politically relevant interstate dyadic relationship in which the United

they escalated a militarized dispute. This strategic interaction creates a problem of censored data (Signorino 2000; Smith 1999). Fortunately, our results remained robust when we specified the escalation of the United States and its adversary as endogenous variables in a bivariate probit. We retained the current specification so that we could use the full range of the COW escalation variable rather than dichotomizing it for the bivariate probit.

19 Controlling for peace years with a spline function yielded identical results.
 20 A necessary condition for the identification of a system of equa-

A necessary condition for the identification of a system of equations is that at least one exogenous variable be excluded from each equation. In our analysis, the hostility level of the adversary is excluded from the selection equation because the dispute initiation by the United States is temporally (and causally) prior to the opponent's escalation decision. The impact of peace years in the dyad and the number of years since U.S. participation in a war are excluded from the escalation equation because these temporal effects are no longer relevant once a dispute has been initiated.

relevant once a dispute has been initiated. <sup>21</sup> In addition to this two-stage selection model, we also estimated a Heckman selection model that estimates the initiation and escalation equations simultaneously. Once again, our results regarding the impact of veterans remained robust across both estimations. Again, we retained the current specification so as to utilize the full COW

escalation scale.

States was a partner from 1816 to 1992. Table 1 presents our analysis of the propensity of the United States to initiate militarized disputes. Our results provide strong and striking support for hypotheses 1 and 2. As predicted, the negative coefficient for elite veterans is statistically significant, indicating that the more veterans there were in the political elite, the less likely the United States was to initiate the use of force. Also as predicted, the effect of veterans on the propensity to use force was even greater in "interventionist" cases. As indicated in column 3 in Table 1, the coefficient for this variable for realpolitik dyads is only -.19 (p < .10). With regard to interventionist dyads, on the other hand, the coefficient is calculated by adding that value to the coefficient on the interaction between the percentage of veterans in the policy elite and an interventionist threat (-.47, p < .01). Thus the overall effect of elite veterans for interventionist dyads is -.66—more than three times the impact for realpolitik dyads.

Figure 2 displays the predicted probability that the United States would initiate a militarized dispute as the percentage of veterans in the Cabinet and Congress ranged from its historical near-minimum of 10% to its historical near-maximum of 80%.22 When only one policymaker in 10 had military experience, the probability that the United States would initiate a dispute within a given dyad was approximately 3.6%. At first glance, this might look like a relatively low risk. But because militarized disputes are rare events, a 3% probability of a dispute between a given pair of states actually indicates a relatively high risk. Moreover, the large number of dyads in which the United States was involved each year magnifies the effect of a 3% probability. For large portions of our dataset the United States was engaged in more than 100 such dyads per year. Thus, a 3% per dyad probability of a dispute yields a prediction that, holding all other factors that influence the decision to use force hypothetically constant, the United States might initiate several additional militarized disputes per year because so few policymakers had military experience.<sup>23</sup>

Conversely, of course, as the percentage of policy-makers with military experience increases, the probability of dispute initiation drops substantially. The impact of these changes is slightly nonlinear, with the greatest decreases in the probability of a dispute occurring as the percentage of veterans ranges between 10% and 67%. By the time the rate of military experience among policymakers reaches 67%—the probability that the United States would initiate a dispute

<sup>23</sup> An event count model that estimated the overall number of disputes initiated by the United States each year estimated the marginal impact of moving from 10% veterans to 80% veterans as an average

of 1.3 initiations per year.

 $<sup>^{22}</sup>$  We select this range of variation because approximately 95% of the cases we observe are within this range. The historical minimum percentage of veterans is 6.5% and the maximum percentage we observe is 81.2%. The mean value for this variable is 46.7% and the standard deviation is 20.3%. The median percentage of veterans in office is 50%, while the first and third quartiles are 28% and 61%. Thus our variation from 10% to 80% represents a plausible set of hypothetical values for judging the marginal impact of this variable.

TABLE 1. Impact of Elite Military Experience on the Probability that the United States Will Initiate a Militarized Dispute<sup>a</sup>

		Elite & Mass	Realpolitik vs.
	Elite Veterans	Veterans	Interventionist
Explanatory Variables	Model	Model	Threats
Percent veteran in Cabinet & House	032***	031**	019*
	(.011)	(.014)	(.011)
Elite vets $\times$ interventionist threat	`— ′	` <b>—</b> ´	−.047***
			(.012)
nterventionist threat	<del></del>	<del>_</del>	1.02**
			(.46)
n of previous war's battle deaths	− <i>.</i> 16***	<b>22</b> **	−.17***
·	(.056)	(.092)	(.056)
Percent veteran in U.S. public	· — ·	042	· —
		(.059)	
Cold War era	1.70***	2.17***	1.83***
	(.50)	(.76)	(.52)
Republican administration	.44	.41	.45
	(.28)	(.31)	(.28)
J.S. involvement in other disputes	070	065	061
	(.060)	(.063)	(.06)
Balance of military capabilities	<b>—1.75***</b>	1 <b>.8</b> 4***	-1.15
	(.61)	(.72)	(.74)
Alliance similarity	-1.41**	<b>-1.36</b> **	<b>—1.77**</b>
	(.65)	(.70)	(.79)
J.S. is a major power	39	<b>−.76</b>	<b>–.61</b>
	(.38)	(.69)	(.40)
Adversary is a major power	39	43	29
	(.69)	(.86)	(.70)
Adversary level of democracy	−.045**	061**	·037*
	(.023)	(.026)	(.023)
n distance between states	<b>30</b> ***	<b>30</b> ***	<b>28**</b>
	(.029)	(.031)	(.027)
Years since U.S. initiation in dyad			
Constant	-1.29	-2.38	, .61
	(.90)	(1.80)	(1.04)
Number of observations	8739	8464	8739
Initial log-likelihood	-594.92	-534.37	-594.92
Log-likelihood at convergence	-469.72	-419.82	-456.54
$\chi^2$	601.74 (17d.f.)***	727.95 (18d.f.)***	560.77 (19d.f.)***
<u> </u>	601.74 (17a.l.)****	121.95 (Tou.I.)	560.77 (190.1.)

Note. Huber-White robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors allow for clustering by adversary. \*p < .10; \*\*p < .05; \*\*\* p < .01.


within a given dyad drops from 3.6% to 0.7%—more than an 80% decrease from its previous value. Further increases in elite military experience up to 80% reduce the probability of a dispute within a dyad to nearly 0.4%.

Also in Figure 2, we compare the impact of elite veterans on the probability that the United States would initiate a crisis against realpolitik and interventionist threats. As one would expect from the results in Table 1, the impact of elite veterans is much greater for interventionist cases. When few veterans are in office the United States is much less likely to initiate a dispute against realpolitik and interventionist targets. Specifically, when only 10% of policymakers are veterans, the probability of a U.S. initiation in a realpolitik dyad is about 4%, and in an interventionist dyad it is approximately 6%. As the percentage of elite veterans

increases the probability of a dispute drops within both sets of dyads, but the decline is much steeper in the interventionist group. In fact, by the time the percentage of veterans reaches 50%, the United States is actually more than three times as likely to initiate force against a realpolitik threat. When the percentage of veterans nears its historical maximum, the probability of initiation against a realpolitik threat is 1%, while the probability of initiation against an interventionist threat is only 0.08%. These results are made all the more striking by the crude nature of our distinction between realpolitik and interventionist threats. More careful theorizing and empirical work on these categories would surely increase the decisiveness of this distinction.

Many of our control variables also have a significant impact on U.S. dispute initiation, but none of these effects can account for the impact of elite veterans. For

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>a</sup>For reason of space the temporal dependence coefficients are not reported here. As expected, years since the previous U.S. initiation did have a significant and nonlinear effect on U.S. dispute initiation as expected by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).



example, our analysis supports the war-weariness hypothesis. The coefficient for the log of U.S. casualties in the previous war is negative and statistically significant, but it does not account for the impact of elite veterans. The percentage of veterans among the U.S. public, on the other hand, has no significant effect. The fact that elite military experience matters while military experience among the public does not fits precisely with the elite-level causal mechanism that we hypothesized. The coefficient for Republican administrations was consistently positive but did not quite achieve statistical significance (p < .11 for the model in column 1, Table 1). Thus any possible association between the U.S. Military and the Republican Party cannot account for the relationship between elite military experience and American conflict behavior.<sup>24</sup>

Most of the other control variables perform as expected, consistent with the established literature. Not surprisingly, for example, the positive coefficient for the Cold War years indicates that this period witnessed a significantly larger number of American dispute initiations than other periods of U.S. history. The negative coefficient on the opponent's democracy score indicates that the United States is significantly less likely to initiate disputes against other democratic states. The

balance of military capabilities also has a significant impact on American initiation of disputes. This negative coefficient indicates that the United States is less likely to initiate disputes in dyads where military capabilities are highly unequal. Common security interests (as measured by alliance similarity) also had a significant dampening effect on American initiations of disputes. And not surprisingly, distance also had a dampening effect on America's propensity to initiate disputes. American involvement in other disputes, on the other hand, had no impact on decisions to initiate additional disputes. America's status as a major power also had no impact on its initiation of disputes, nor did the major power status of the adversary.

How does the substantive impact of the civil—military gap compare to the impacts of the control variables? In Table 2, we list the statistically significant variables and the range across which we varied them to generate the predicted effects. In the third and fourth columns, we display the changes in the probability and in the relative risk of a dispute initiation.

Clearly, the impact of elite military experience continues to be substantial, even when we compare it to other prominent and well-established sources of international conflict. Specifically, our model predicts that a change in the percentage of elite veterans from 10% to 80%—a shift from slightly less than two standard deviations below the mean to slightly less than two standard deviations above—will generate a 3.7% reduction in the probability of U.S. dispute initiation across all dyads. This change corresponds to an 88% reduction in the relative risk of a dispute.

Even the Cold War, which obviously had a substantial impact on American involvement in militarized disputes, did not have as large an impact as elite military

 $<sup>^{24}</sup>$  It is also worth noting that we find little evidence of a general relationship between Republicanism and elite military experience. Since the onset of two-party competition between the Democratic and the Republican parties in the midnineteenth century, Republican Cabinets have averaged approximately 5% more veterans, but this gap is not statistically significant. In the House of Representatives, on the other hand, the percentage of veterans was more than 18% higher under Democratic control (p < .01). However, this gap seems more likely to be a chance result of the timing of Democratic control than a direct link between military experience and Democratic partisanship.

TABLE 2. Marginal Impact of Significant Variables on the Risk of U.S. Initiation of a Militarized Dispute

Explanatory Variable	Change in Explanatory Variables	Change in Probability of a Dispute %	Change in Relative Risk of a Dispute %
Percent veteran in Cabinet & House	10% to 80%	-3.1	-88
Cold War years	Yes to no	-1.0	-80
Adversary's level of democracy	10 to 10	<b>–1.1</b>	-59
Balance of military capabilities	70% to 100%	-1.0	-49
Alliance similarity score	3 to .7	-1.4	<b>-72</b>
Previous war's battle deaths	383 to 400,000	-1.6	<b>–67</b>
Distance between states	10,00 to 9,000 mi	<i></i> 7	-44

Note: Relative risk is calculated based on predicted probabilities generated from the first model in Table 1. Predicted probabilities were generated by varying each independent variable while holding others at their means or modes.

experience. The United States was at an 80% lower risk of initiating militarized disputes prior to the outbreak of the Cold War, but as large as this effect is, it remains smaller than the 88% reduction in risk associated with increased veteran representation in the political elite. Other traditional "realist" variables such as relative military power and alliance ties also had a substantial impact on American dispute behavior, but neither of them outstripped the impact of elite military experience. These results are particularly important in light of the amount of attention that the Cold War, military capabilities, alliances, and the structure of the international system have received as explanations of international conflict and American foreign policy. Our results suggest that American military behavior had been as powerfully influenced by the military experience of its leaders as it has by America's position in the international system.

Similarly, the much-touted impact of democracy is smaller than the impact of elite military experience. A shift in the democracy score of the opposing state from its minimum value of -10 (pure authoritarian state) to its maximum of 10 (pure democracy) reduced the probability that the United States will initiate a dispute by 1.1%—a reduction in relative risk of 59%. This impact is undoubtedly substantial, but it remains considerably less than the 88% reduction in risk associated with closing the civil-military experience gap among the political elite.

Put another way, our results raise questions about the primacy that post-Cold War administrations have given to spreading democracy around the world as a way of reaping the so-called democratic peace. To be sure, the spread of democracy is a substantial and important factor and, once the democratization process has taken root, can be expected to dampen the likelihood that the United States will use force. This strategy may ultimately yield a peace dividend, but our results suggest that an even more effective way to reduce the

likelihood that the United States will use force, other things being equal, is to increase the percentage of veterans serving in policymaking positions.

### DOES THE CIVIL-MILITARY GAP INFLUENCE HOW AMERICA USES FORCE?

Does elite military experience also have an impact on the American escalation disputes? The answer to this question—displayed in Table 3—appears to be an unqualified "yes." Our results indicate that higher percentages of veterans in the political elite were associated with greater levels of force by the United States—if the United States did initiate the use of force. The coefficient for the percentage of veterans in the Cabinet and in Congress is positive and statistically significant, and the impact of this variable is substantial.

Figure 3 indicates that as the percentage of veterans in the Cabinet and Congress increases from 10% to 80%, the probability that the United States would engage in direct combat (use of force coding) increases from 2% to 73%. This same increase in the percentage of elite veterans increases the probability that the United States will escalate the dispute to the level of becoming a war from 0.06% to 9%. The latter increase is particularly substantial given the rarity of wars (0.2% of the dyad-years) and the gravity of escalating to such a level. Most of this impact is felt after the percentage of policymakers with military experience exceeds 33%. Thus policymakers with military experience may well have favored something like an informal Powell Doctrine long before any such doctrine was articulated, far back in American history.

Table 4 compares the marginal impact of changes in policymakers' military experience with the impact of other statistically significant variables in the model. We see that the impact of elite military experience is large in comparison to these other variables. Only the Cold War, which we take to be a surrogate for nuclear deterrence, arguably has a greater impact on the level of force employed by the United States. The Cold War reduced the probability that the United States would engage its forces directly by 56% and reduced the probability that it would escalate to war by 18%. The impact of major power status is dwarfed by the impact of

 $<sup>^{25}</sup>$  We use minimum and maximum values because of the bimodal distribution of this variable. Opposing states with democracy scores below -6 or above 6 comprised well over half of our dataset. In fact, opposing states with democracy scores of -10 comprised more than 5% of our dataset and opposing states with a democracy score of 10 comprised more than 15% of the cases.

TABLE 3. Impact of Elite Military Experience on the Level of Military Force Used by the United States in a Dispute

Explanatory Variable	Coefficient & SE
Percent veteran in the	.089***
Cabinet & Congress	(.024)
Republican administration	<b>−.42</b>
	(.47)
Cold War years	<b>-4.31***</b>
	(1.24)
Balance of military capabilities	-1.93
	(1.45)
Alliance similarity score	.89
	(1.11)
U.S. is a major power	1.91**
_	(.79)
Adversary is a major power	-2.73***
	(1.01)
Adversary level of democracy	.066
	(.049)
U.S. involvement in other disputes	10
	(.13)
Contiguous state	<b>68</b>
	(1.016)
Distance between states	0002
l	(.0002)
Adversary's level of force	.61***
<u>.</u>	(.16)
Selection effects parameter	5.17*
	(3.15)
Threshold 1	61
T	(1.87)
Threshold 2	2.86*
T. 1.110	(1.90) 7.08***
Threshold 3	
	(2.04)
Number of observations	111
Initial log-likelihood	-112.54
log-likelihood at convergence	-92.47
$\chi^2$ (10 d.f.)	40.13 (12 df)***
Note: Huber-White robust standard error	
parentheses.	s ioi coemicients itt

military experience among American policymakers. America's status as a major power, for example, increases the probability that it would engage its forces directly by 12%. Conversely, the United States was 14% less likely to intervene directly against another major power. Neither of these variables, however, had any substantial impact on the probability that the dispute would escalate to war. Even the impact of the adversary's level of force is not as large as the impact of elite veterans. A change in the adversary's actions from "no response" to "full-scale combat" increased the probability of an American "use of force" by only 39%.

#### **ADDITIONAL TESTS FOR ROBUSTNESS**

We performed a variety of checks of the robustness of our results. Because elite military experience and "interventionist" targets are complex concepts with no

"standard" indicators, we reestimated our analyses of both dispute initiation and escalation with alternative measures of both concepts. For elite military experience we tested a measure that excluded the military experience of Cabinet members whose positions were not relevant to national security, as well as a measure that excluded the military experience of House members and focused only on the military experience of Cabinet members on the national security team (President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense/War). The impact of elite military experience remained consistent for both the initiation and the escalation of disputes and remained statistically significant across all these estimations. In fact, a dummy variable identifying when the Secretary of State was a veteran was consistently significant at the .10 level. It is worth noting, however, that a simple dummy variable coding whether or not the President was a veteran was not statistically significant for either the initiation or the escalation equation. This result is consistent with the idea that the preferences of presidential advisors (and potential critics) are relevant to U.S. foreign policy behavior. With regard to "interventionist" targets, we conducted analyses that identified any state facing greater than a 99:1 military disadvantage as an interventionist target regardless of its alliance ties to other major powers. We also conducted analyses that identified any minor power state that was not allied to a rival major power as an interventionist target. Our results remained robust.

Our pooled time-series analysis of dispute initiation heavily weights the post-World War II period because of the very large number of dyads during that period. To ensure that our results are stable across the span of American history, we also analyzed a single 177-year event count time series in which the dependent variable was the number of disputes initiated by the United States in each year. The coefficient for elite military experience remained negative and statistically significant (-.036; p < .002) and the impact of elite veterans remained substantively large. For example, the average number of dispute initiations per year over the 177year period is 0.56, or about one dispute every other year. The model predicts that a shift in the percentage of veterans in the policymaking elite from 10% to 80% would reduce the average number of dispute initiations by 1.3 per year.

We also distinguished various historical eras and then removed each era from the analysis to ensure that our findings are not limited to a specific period. Specifically, we used major military conflicts (the Spanish–American War, World War I, World War II, and the Cold War) to divide U.S. history into the following periods: pre-1898, 1898–1914, 1915–45, 1945–89, and post-1989. Our results remained consistent even when each of these historical eras was removed from the analysis. Although its substantive size varied somewhat, we found a consistent impact of elite veterans across the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and across the pre- and post-World War II periods.

Finally, we investigated whether the type of military service experienced by policymakers mattered and




TABLE 4. Marginal Impact of Signif	Change in Change in		Change in	
	Explanatory	Probability of the	Probability	
Explanatory Variables	Variable	Use of Force %	of War (%)	
Percent veteran in Cabinet & House	10% to 80%	71	9	
Cold War years	No to yes	<b>–56</b>	-18	
U.S. is a major power	No to yes	12	.3	
Adversary is a major power	No to yes	-14	4	
Adversary level of force	0 to 5	39	2	

found that it did not. Specifically, we found no distinction between the impact of elite veterans who served as officers and the impact of those who served as enlisted personnel. These results suggest the existence of a rather broad set of "military foreign policy preferences." Moreover, since those who served as officers generally did so by choice while those who served as enlisted personnel may have been drafted, these results suggest that "military preferences" may remain fairly consistent regardless of whether one's service was voluntary. Unfortunately, two potentially important distinctions we were not able to capture were combat experience and the timing of military experience (i.e., serving in wartime or peacetime). Consistent and reliable data on combat experience and the precise timing of military experience among the policymaking elite were not available.

#### **CONCLUSIONS**

Civil-military relations at the policymaking level often seem to be dominated by personalities. Contrast the problems of President Clinton with his war-hero predecessor, President Bush; compare the rumpled tenure of Secretary Aspin or the academic acerbity of Secretary Albright to the no-nonsense corporate mentality of Secretary Rumsfeld; or consider the unusual charisma and political clout of General Powell. Personalities matter and may be decisive in certain cases. Nonetheless, the findings presented here suggest that, at least when it comes to the use of force, we can identify consistent civilian and military tendencies in policymaking.

Other research has shown that elite civilians with military experience behave like "Colin Powells" and elite civilian nonveterans are like "Madeleine Albrights"—at least when it comes to opinions on the use of force (Feaver and Gelpi n.d.). What creates these different types? Why do civilians without military experience tend to have foreign policy views that systematically differ from the views of those who have served? We cannot definitively answer that question. We would contend, however, that service in the U.S. military is an important socialization experience that shapes individuals' attitudes. The military teaches lessons about

the role of military force in American foreign policy and lessons about how military force ought to be used. These lessons do not appear to be forgotten when individuals leave the military and enter civilian life. Of course, we cannot yet specify the precise mechanisms at work in this socialization process, and our data may be consistent with other explanations as well.26 Nonetheless, our results suggest that the relationship among military experience, foreign policy attitudes, and conflict behavior merits further attention.

Whatever the causes of this civil-military opinion gap, we have shown that the gap had a profound effect on American military behavior from 1816 to 1992. As expected, we found that the higher the proportion of American policymakers with military experience, the lower the probability that the United States would initiate a militarized dispute. Also as expected, we found that the impact of military experience on dispute initiation became even larger when we focused on states that represented "interventionist" rather than "realpolitik" threats to the United States. Finally, also as expected, we found that the higher the proportion of American policymakers with military experience, the higher the level of force used by the United States if it had initiated a dispute. Throughout these analyses, the impact of elite military experience was substantively large and often outweighed the impact of variables that have received considerably more attention in the study of international conflict.

It may be "normal" for military personnel and civilians to develop distinctive views regarding the use of force, but when this divergence of views begins to have an impact on American conflict behavior, one cannot simply shrug off the difference and say, "Who cares?" The difference in views between those with and those without experience in the American military is a profoundly important issue that is in need of public attention and discussion.

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<sup>26</sup> An important competing hypothesis, of course, is that the civilmilitary gap is created by self-selection rather than socialization. That is, the civil-military differences we observe may be due to the fact that the military tends to attract individuals who already share its foreign policy views. In the absence of panel survey data looking at individuals' attitudes before, during, and after military service, we cannot definitively resolve this debate. However, several available pieces of evidence suggest that socialization is a more plausible explanation. First, our survey data (Feaver and Gelpi 1999) indicate that the reason that military respondents gave for why they joined the military did not have a significant effect on their foreign policy views. Similarly, as we discussed above, the presence of veteran policymakers who served as officers (self-selected) had the same impact on U.S. behavior as the presence of veteran policymakers who served as enlisted personnel (less likely to be self-selected).

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## **BOOK REVIEWS**

### **Political Theory**

More Than a Historian: The Political and Economic Thought of Charles A. Beard. By Clyde W. Barrow. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2000. 289p. \$39.95.

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Clyde Barrow's *More Than a Historian* provides a fascinating intellectual history of Charles Beard, a political scientist whom he places in the "pantheon of thinkers that most scholars no longer read" (p. xvi). With 42 books, scores of coauthored books, and hundreds of articles and book reviews, Beard can be only characterized as amazingly prolific. Yet the only book that still resonates in political science and American history is *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* (1913). Barrow's history of Beard gives us ample reason finally to read it or read it again.

Barrow summarizes the argument in An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution in one line: "[C]apitalistic interests had dominated the constitutional convention and, consequently, they authored a founding document that appealed 'directly and unerringly to identical interests in the country at large" (p. 4). Struck by this powerful argument, Barrow suggests that a whole array of populists, progressives, liberals, radicals, and socialists used it as evidence that the Constitution was drafted by, and for, American capitalists. At the same time, he shows that an almost equally impressive array of academics, from Edward Corwin and Louis Hartz to Richard Hofstadter and John Diggins, have denounced An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution. More recently, Theda Skocpol "complained" that interest in the book wavers little since it represents "unquenchable proclivity in American historiography" (p. 243).

Barrow's central argument is that Beard has been woefully misread. Both scholars and the public on the Left and the Right got it wrong, Barrow suggests, by calling him a "dissembling Marxist" or a "disenchanted New Deal liberal" (p. xviii). To Barrow, Beard was influenced by three distinct yet overlapping schools of thought that carried great weight in the United States. The first is the German historical school or the philosophical tradition of Hegelians and neo-Hegelians. In an absorbing account, Barrow details how Beard selectively appropriated the ideas of neo-Hegelians like the Italian Benedetto Croce. The second is the institutional economics of the school of John R. Commons. The third influence is Marxian revisionist socialism.

Yet Beard was no mere imitator. Barrow meticulously explains how Beard's ideas of socialism differed from those of Marx. Believing that class struggle could never be resolved and that there was therefore no point in abolishing private property, Beard argued that labor could be recognized as a form of property and given the same constitutional protections that land and capital already enjoyed. Influenced by E. R. A. Seligman's The Economic Interpretation of History (1902), Beard differed from Marx in using James Madison's idea of class conflict. In particular, he relied on Madison's Federalist Number Ten, which includes conflicts between those who own property and those who do not; creditors and debtors; and those battling over different kinds of property, like land or capital. Beard abandons Marx's notion of exploitation by giving up the theory of value in favor of a concept of class struggle grounded in historical claims, which are open-ended and political. The "puzzle" for Beard, as Barrow puts it, involved explaining how the Federalists had

"wrenched political change from a seemingly insurmountable agrarian majority" (p. 48).

Chapter 5 offers a cogent discussion of Beard's ideas about a worker republic. Beginning in the 1930s, Beard became enthusiastic about a planned economy, supporting legislation like the National Industrial Recovery Act and the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Far left of the New Deal, he outlined a plan for economic and political restructuring that went beyond the boundaries of welfare-liberal New Deal economic policy. Beard recommended that a highly progressive income tax structure be associated with the redistribution of public expenditures for social goods. He also thought Congress should build a National Economic Council that would write an economic program promoting the public interest by creating what he described as a national standardof-life budget. Tallying up the total goods and services necessary to maintain an official standard, this council would be different from the European welfare states, which Beard claimed encouraged dependency on doles and transfer payments. The progressive tax structure, in combination with a constitutional amendment that gave workers the same rights as the owners of property and capital, would increase worker productivity.

Why bother setting the record straight by writing an intellectual history of a historian? To Barrow, Beard's oeuvre offers students of American political development, notoriously short on theory, a "highly original metanarrative" which can provide them with "critical insights" about the crisis of the American welfare state by pointing them in the direction of a post-Marxian socialist political theory (p. xviii). Barrow even suggests that Beard set the stage for "new historicism" in American political thought. Recasting the meaning and development of political ideas in terms of relations to authorial intentions, Beard was someone who helped democratize political theory by studying not just the works of major political theories but also those that other academics consider relatively minor.

By the end of the book, this reader was convinced that Barrow had rightfully resurrected Beard. Yet, like many biographers, Barrow is somewhat defensive about his subject. In taking on Beard's critics, Barrow devotes so much attention to his academic record that he does little to explain the political, economic, and cultural reasons behind his rise as such a great public intellectual. For instance, Barrow relays how members of a New York Republican club could barely hide their contempt for Beard, but he fails to explain what made them invite him in the first place. More than a Historian would have been more engrossing had Barrow done a little new history himself, showing exactly why a radical like Beard should have had such influence for almost a century in a conservative country like the United States.

**The Logic of the History of Ideas.** By Mark Bevir. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999. 350p. \$60.00.

History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives. Edited by Iain Hampsher-Monk, Karin Tilmans, and Frank Van Vree. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998. 320p. \$42.50.

The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction. By Melvin Richter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. 224p. \$49.95.

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How have our conceptions of politics changed, and how have these changes altered politics and its possibilities? These are the burning questions at one of the biggest campfires in political theory, and the answers are disputed as these three volumes show.

The History of Political and Social Concepts: A Critical Introduction is based on five essays published by Melvin Richter between 1986 and 1995. The revised essays describe the intellectual project of Begriffsgeschichte, or conceptual history of the transition to modernity in German political and social life. Richter compares this project to a related investigation of mentalités around the time of the French Revolution, and then contrasts the German and French versions of conceptual history with studies of "ideas in context" associated with J. G. A. Pocock, Quentin Skinner, and the so-called Cambridge School. The point of this comparison is to suggest ways in which the historiography of political and social concepts employed by English-speaking peoples might benefit from the insights, methods, and practices of Begriffsgeschichte.

Begriffsgeschichte combines history, social theory, and conceptual analysis in lexicons compiled by teams of scholars. All the teams on one project employ the same investigative protocols, but the protocols vary across projects. Thus, shifts in the meaning of philosophical concepts are recorded in the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, which does not attempt to link developments in philosophy with changes outside of it. Such linkages are central to other Begriffsgeschichte projects, however, and Richter devotes most of his attention to these lexicons, which he describes in considerable detail.

The Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (GG) focuses on dramatic changes in the language of German-speaking Europe between 1750 and 1850. A historical dictionary, the GG consists of lengthy entries showing how massive political, social, and economic changes were understood by various groups at the time, and how changes in these understandings furthered the process of modernization and made it irreversible. The entries are organized around specific concepts, and Richter includes a list of concepts treated in the GG. He also identifies entries that are particularly strong (bürgerliche Gesellschaft, civil society), or rather weak (Politik, politics). This is useful information for readers seeking entree to a work that fills eight volumes, including one devoted entirely to an index.

By way of demonstrating the value of the GG for political theory, Richter summarizes the changing meanings of Herrschaft uncovered by Reinhard Kosselleck and his team. Richter then suggests that our understanding of Max Weber might be improved by situating his usage of Herrshaft in historical context. This claim involves a discussion of the adequacy of English translations of Economy and Society, and the difference between "authority" and "legitimate domination," two common renderings of *Herrschaft*. Richter points to the semantic superiority of "legitimate domination," and argues that Weber's understanding of Herrschaft was not at all neutral or value-free. To the contrary, Weber's use of the term signaled his position in an ongoing debate over the legitimacy of opposition to political rulers. By suggesting that domination could be legitimate, Weber undercut utopian critiques of state power, which held that consent was the sole basis of political legitimacy.

French philosophes were among the utopians criticized by Weber, and so it is instructive to see how they understood the social and political world of their time. Toward that end, Richter reviews the work of Rolf Reichardt and others in the Handbuch politisch-sozialer Grundbegriffe in Frankreich, 1680–1820 (HB). Entries in this lexicon focus on "how previous conceptualizations of the political and social world were transformed, abandoned, or supplanted during the outbreak and course of the Revolution" (p. 80). These conceptualiza-

tions are construed broadly; they consist of *mentalités*, or pervasive understandings and representations of collective life. Concepts figure in these mentalités, but they are not the focal point of analysis, which further departs from GG in stressing popular rituals and practices over elite culture.

Richter includes a list of concepts treated in the HB, and he identifies Roger Chartier's article on civilité as a leading example of Begriffsgeschichte à la française. A strength of Chartier's work, and indeed of the HB, is the description of changes in whole networks of concepts. Thus, civilité is treated in relation to politesse (politeness), honnêteté (honor), and bienséance (decorum). This underscores the politicization of civilité during the French Revolution; what was once a social grace came to be seen as an essential republican virtue. The transformation was not accidental, since the intellectual battles of the Revolution were fought in, over, and through the terms of political discourse.

The pivotal chapter of Richter's book summarizes the work of J. G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, representing the socalled Cambridge School of conceptual history. The purpose of this exercise is to show how Begriffsgeschichte and projects of the Cambridge School might inform each other. According to Richter, there are no insurmountable differences between the two approaches to conceptual history, and considerable advantages in uniting them. As he sees it, the work of Skinner and Pocock reveals the complexity of political language and its strategic resources at a given moment in time, and is therefore better at "synchronic" analysis. The German project is more systematic, treats a broader range of materials over time, and therefore offers a superior "diachronic" analysis. Put this way, the complementarities seem obvious and Richter advocates for a unified approach to conceptual history.

More specifically, Richter calls for historical treatment of social and political concepts in the English language, that is, a Begriffsgeschichte for English-speaking peoples. He does not say what form this lexicon should take; it could be modeled on Kosselleck's GG or it might resemble Reichardt's HB. Given the differences between these projects, as well as their internal diversity, Richter's agnosticism seems misplaced. Surely, the choice depends on which style lends itself best to a synthesis with the Cambridge School, and for that matter, which variant of the Cambridge School is most compatible with Begriffsgeschichte. For treatment of these issues, readers must look beyond this critical introduction.

The anthology entitled History of Concepts: Comparative Perspectives includes brief characterizations of the major approaches to conceptual history by Kosselleck, Reichardt, and Terence Ball, whose "critical conceptual history" extends the program of the Cambridge School. More or less sympathetic critiques of these approaches are offered by Hans Bödecker, Iain Hampsher-Monk, and Martin van Gelderen. Their essays confirm the existence of broad similarities between Begriffsgeschichte and Cambridge School projects, but they also identify significant differences in historiography and interpretive methods. These differences reflect Begriffsgeschichte's preoccupation with specific concepts and their meaning, whereas the Cambridge School is more interested in idioms that, taken together, constitute political discourse. In light of these differences, readers might be skeptical about the possibility of achieving the sort of grand synthesis or fusion of interpretive horizons proposed by Melvin Richter.

Beyond this, the *History of Concepts* makes two contributions. First, the volume expands our stock of conceptual histories. Thus, Maurizio Viroli describes the origin, meaning, and diffusion of *ragione di stato*, or "reason of state," in seventeenth-century Europe. Hans-Jürgen Lüsebrink shows how the concept of nation, which had republican (and hence

potentially universal) overtones in revolutionary France, was defined in Germany in ethnic (and hence exclusionary) terms. And Willem Frijhoff traces the evolution of "cosmopolitan" discourse in the republic of letters, an intellectual association that originally transcended national boundaries in Europe. All three essays take a broad view of conceptual history, refusing to remain within the confines of a single language or culture. Instead of seeking a unified approach to conceptual history, Viroli, Lüsebrink, and Frijhoff present (or at least anticipate) comparative histories of specific concepts.

The interest in comparison is further served by an emerging history of Dutch concepts discussed in this anthology. The Dutch case does not merely add another tradition to the mix of German, French, and English conceptual histories. As Hampsher-Monk notes, the Low Countries have long been a crossroads, intellectually and commercially. In that sense, Dutch provides a "linguistically open site" that is ideal for investigating the diffusion of concepts in Europe. The diffusion is evident in books and other printed materials, but also in graphical productions used within cultures and exchanged between them.

This is the second contribution of *History of Concepts*. In keeping with current developments in literary criticism, the volume takes a broad view of what constitutes a text. Because images may be "read" and interpreted, there is no particular reason to base conceptual histories solely on the basis of books, tracts, newspapers, and legal documents. Hence, Bram Kempers explores the relation between word and image in Raphael's Vatican Palace frescos, showing how they represent papal power and its intellectual underpinnings. Eddy de Jongh discusses "painted words" in Dutch art of the seventeenth century, arguing that an iconographic reading of genre painting is an important aspect of Begriffsgeschichte.

Also in this vein is Rolf Reichardt's brilliant interpretation of board and card games depicting the logic of events leading to the French Revolution. This is Begriffsgeschichte at its best, constructing conceptual history from materials that were themselves meant to instruct others about concepts and their relation to each other. Reichardt traces the political logic of revolution as it was understood at the time, showing how the mentalité of the ancien régime was undermined by republicans operating within the framework of Enlightenment. Anyone who doubts the value of moving beyond texts when doing conceptual history must confront Reichardt's work.

In The Logic of the History of Ideas, Mark Bevir offers a philosophical account of how the history of ideas ought to proceed in order for its claims to be valid. He outlines the logic of inquiry and forms of reasoning that justify historical interpretation, just as Carl Hempel did for scientific explanation. In that sense, Bevir provides a basis for assessing the adequacy of Begriffsgeschichte and critical conceptual history, although his argument obviously has broader implications for philosophy and the humanities.

Bevir insists that the history of ideas must be conceived as the study of hermeneutic meaning, that is, the meaning of specific utterances for particular individuals. This is not as narrow as it seems, nor as precise as it sounds. The meanings in question might be conscious, subconscious, or unconscious, and the individuals for whom utterances have meaning include listeners as well as speakers, readers as well as authors. Thus, Bevir rejects interpretations that equate meaning with the intentions of those who make speeches, write books, or create images. But he also argues that contextualist and conventional accounts of meaning are incomplete insofar as they neglect the particular meanings associated with specific utterances or expressions of belief. For this reason, Bevir criticizes Pocock and Skinner for not providing philosophical accounts of meaning rich enough to sustain their historical investiga-

tions of conceptual change. Given its structuralist tendencies, the same criticism might be leveled with even greater force against Begriffsgeschichte, although this brand of conceptual history is not discussed in the volume.

According to Bevir, the proper interpretation of hermeneutic meaning proceeds by way of "procedural individualism," which is to the history of ideas what methodological individualism is to economics: a starting point for analyzing the revealed preferences of individual human agents. Under procedural individualism, utterances are treated as expressions of belief, and these expressions are at least initially presumed to be sincere, conscious, and rational. If these presumptions hold, specific beliefs may be apprehended by placing them within a web of beliefs, and a web of belief may then be understood in terms of its relation to an intellectual tradition. The result is what Bevir calls "synchronic explanation," which ostensibly preserves the sense of specific utterances or expressions while embedding them in larger configurations of meaning.

For Bevir, "diachronic explanation" proceeds by revealing dilemmas, which arise when individuals accept as authoritative new meanings that pose questions for their existing web of beliefs. When existing webs of belief are modified or extended in order to accommodate new beliefs, meaning changes and history unfolds. But how can we recover meanings from the past, or rather, on what basis can we claim to have done so successfully? This is ultimately an epistemological question, and because he denies the possibility of foundational claims, Bevir concludes that historians can only defend their interpretations as being more accurate and comprehensive than others in relation to the agreed facts; as being more consistent in applying standards of evidence and reasoning; and as being more open to criticism and change. All of this has a Lakatosian ring to it, although the argument is less radical when applied to the humanities and social sciences.

Synchronic and diachronic explanation are variants of the dominant form of explanation in Bevir's conception of the history of ideas. Both presume that beliefs are sincere, conscious, and rational. When utterances or expressed beliefs are not sincere, conscious, or rational, a subsidiary form of explanation is required. Insincerity, self-deception, and irrationality occur when people express beliefs they do not hold because they think such expressions will satisfy personal needs or desires. The latter are "rogue pro attitudes," or motives that can be invoked by historians to explain instances of deception, self-deception, or behavior that is evidently irrational.

Bevir's explanation of distorted meaning is strained and unconvincing, which is unfortunate from the standpoint of critical conceptual history. Language is the medium of politics, and the terms of political discourse are subject to dispute. The disputes are generally partisan, and frequently involve insincerity, self-deception, and irrationality. Any philosophical account of the history of ideas that fails to incorporate this dimension of political language is incomplete. An interesting question is whether Bevir's account could be completed without modifying or abandoning procedural individualism and its interpretive presumptions.

Procedural individualism may be too limiting in another respect, as well. In his contribution to the *History of Concepts*, Terence Ball observes that conceptual history often deals with the unintended, but nevertheless meaningful, consequences of action. Even a weakly intentionalist account of meaning will be challenged by such phenomena. In the end, political theorists may have to decide whether the history of ideas ought to be regulated by a postanalytic, postmodern account of meaning that does not, and indeed cannot, countenance extant versions of conceptual history.

**Biology and Political Science.** By Robert H. Blank and Samuel M. Hines, Jr. New York: Routledge, 2001. 183p. \$80.00.

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What is biopolitics? The authors are well-published scholars in this field, and their answer to this question supplied in this book should give hope to those who are disappointed with the direction and progress of political science. Many of the questions about politics that biopolitics addresses were first asked by ancient political philosophers, such as Aristotle. The field of biopolitics, however, is only 30 or 40 years old. Over that time the field has strengthened its institutional base. Of equal importance, it has produced a growing body of scholarship in such fields as political theory, comparative politics and international relations, methodology, political behavior and decision making, and public administration and public policy. Unfortunately, largely because the field is interdisciplinary, only a small portion of this scholarship has been published in the major political science journals, so that most political scientists and other social scientists are largely unaware of what this field is and what it has to offer.

Biopolitics is interdisciplinary. Its foundation is the theory of evolution by means of natural selection, proposed 143 years ago by Darwin and Wallace, but substantially amended and updated since then. This theory, I would add, purports to explain the traits of every living thing on planet Earth, H. sapiens included. It has been a very successful theory—nobody has yet observed anything that has contradicted it. Thus, it deserves serious attention by political scientists who want their scholarship to contribute to what E. O. Wilson called *Consilience* (1998), or a joining together of the social and natural sciences.

The authors critique political science for its continued reliance upon the standard social science model. This model, which largely ignores human biology, compels political scientists to search exclusively for social environmental explanations of political behavior. The problem is that this model ignores much of what is known about human behavior from various life sciences, including, among others, biological psychology, ethology, genetics, evolutionary psychology, neurobiology, pharmacology, physical anthropology, and sociobiology. The biopolitics model is an interactional model of behavior that acknowledges the importance of both the genotype and the environment. In biobehavioral biopolitics, the study of behavior proceeds at the micro level and analyzes how the central nervous systems of individuals generate behavior in particular settings. In evolutionary biopolitics, the study of behavior proceeds at the macro level and analyzes behavior and its significance for multiple levels in the hierarchy of life, including genes, individuals, populations, societies, and species. Such explanations are evolutionary in the sense that they identify the function of a behavior or how it contributed to survival and reproduction in the environments

The authors list significant historical developments in biopolitics. The founders of biopolitics include Roger Masters, Lynton Caldwell, Peter Corning, Glendon Schubert, Albert Somit, Steve Peterson, and the late Thomas Wiegele, to whom this book is dedicated. In 1980, Thomas Wiegele established the Center for Biopolitics at Northern Illinois University and invited a number of postdoctoral scholars, including Joseph Losco, Donna Baird, James Schubert, and the authors of this book. A landmark development in biopolitics was the establishment of the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences in 1985. The association's journal, *Politics and the Life Sciences*, is published semiannually. Over the

years, the association has become increasingly international and interdisciplinary.

The authors discuss the contributions of biopolitics to political theory. Most significant here is that biopolitical scholars seek to realign political theory so that it is based upon a scientific understanding of human nature. Although many ancient and modern political theorists speculated about man in a "state of nature," they knew little or nothing about the actual state of nature. Anthropologists know this to be hunter-gatherer society, a form that prevailed for 99 percent of our species' cultural history. Biopolitical scholars, using the methods of comparative zoology, identify politically relevant traits, such as social dominance hierarchies, that H. sapiens shares with those of other primates, such as the chimpanzee. Biopolitical scholars study the causes of political evolution, explaining the transition from simple hunter-gatherer societies to complex nation-states and empires. They examine why the existence of states and bureaucratic structures is problematic, given the centrifugal forces created by human nature and the "free rider" problem. They argue against the idea of inevitable progress. Historically, democracies are uncommon, appear only when numerous preconditions exist, and survive only because of the evolved human capacity for indoctrination.

Biopolitical scholars have used methods borrowed from ethology and other behavioral sciences to study political elites. They have used experimental methods to study the responses of subjects to political elites based upon their appearance, their facial displays, and their speech. They have used direct observation and recording methods, including audio tape recorders, event data recorders, and field notes, to code interactions among, for example, city council members. They have drawn blood samples to analyze the relationship between leadership style and whole blood serotonin. The authors argue that as powerful as interview techniques and survey methods may be, many important things about politics will not be learned from using them.

Biopolitical scholars have focused attention on complicated, salient, and controversial issues that have emerged from technological developments in the biological sciences. The authors identify 26 individually oriented biopolicy issues, mostly involving ethical issues of appropriate medical care and intervention (e.g., assisted reproduction). They identify 12-society-oriented biopolicy issues (e.g., population control), and 11 globally oriented biopolicy concerns (e.g., environmental issues, such as global warming). Existing institutions and political processes have generally done a poor job in dealing with and finding solutions to the multitude of problems linked with these issues. A number of these issues (e.g., global warming, loss of biodiversity, population growth) challenge the very notion of modernity. Can liberal, democratic capitalism and its faith in reason and economic growth be pursued on a global level without threatening the longterm survival of H. sapiens?

The authors make a strong case for biopolitics. They do an excellent job surveying the field and its accomplishments. They offer a sophisticated discussion of methodological issues, including reductionism and determinism. A minor shortcoming, perhaps, is that the authors may overestimate readers' levels of biological knowledge. For example, the book mentions the concept of inclusive fitness without defining it. Although this concept is key to understanding much of social behavior, few political scientists likely have heard of it or understand its significance in this regard. Thus, the book might have benefited from a short glossary. The book is well written and organized. It should be welcomed by political scientists and others who would like to know more about biopolitics and its accomplishments. As the authors argue,

biopolitics has the potential to transform the discipline of political science by providing a theoretical basis for the integration of various fields within political science and also the establishment of closer linkages with the natural sciences.

**Natural Law Modernized.** By David Braybrooke. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001. 351p. \$70.00.

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Natural law theorizing, it seems, will not die, even in this socalled postmodern era. For some, apparently including David Braybrooke, this is reason to think that there is something true about natural law doctrine, and in *Natural Law Modernized*, he sets about to convince us of this very point. He thinks that natural law theory, once it is suitably modernized and refurbished in the fashion he recommends, has strengths that may make it preferable to alternative ethical theories, particularly utilitarianism and contractarianism.

Most of the chapters that make up *Natural Law Modernized* have seen the light of day previously, either as published material or as presented papers, but they work well together and readers will find a consistency of argument too often lacking in such collections. Still, volumes of this sort have unavoidable drawbacks, and readers may find themselves wishing for a more thorough discussion of key issues left rather undeveloped and unrefined. The book also contains two essays by students of Braybrooke: "Ibn Khaldun Modernized," by Michael McLendon, and "Natural Law in Classical Chinese Philosophy," by Xiusheng Liu. Both are valuable contributions in their own right and do much to contribute to Braybrooke's argument.

Braybrooke claims at the outset that he has a twofold purpose in the book. First, he wants to demonstrate that the medieval natural law doctrine he associates with Aquinas survived into the modern era and is actually on display in such old friends as Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes, and Hume. Thus, he is skeptical about the familiar distinction between medieval and modern natural law theory, insisting that the fundamentals of the Thomistic notion of natural law were "superseded and lost from sight" in the modern era, but that the theory itself "did not collapse" (p. 17). Second, he wants to demonstrate that natural law theory is modern "because it is current, or deserves to be" (p. 4). That is, he thinks his modernized natural law argument can withstand any objections from contemporary philosophy, including, he hastens to add, postmodernist objections.

Yet this turns out to be a bit of false advertising. Braybrooke's argument is not really designed to demonstrate that Locke, Rousseau, Hobbes, and Hume were closet Thomists; nor does he address the kinds of objections postmodern thinkers are likely to bring against what turns out to be a fairly straightforward defense of a naturalist ethic. Instead, he collects (Braybrooke's word) various elements of a naturalistic ethic from the modern thinkers he engages and then puts his argument in contemporary dress by placing it alongside the argument of David Copp's (1995) Morality, Normativity, and Society.

To modernize natural law, that is, to make it current, Braybrooke thinks it necessary to make it both secular and empirical, and he believes it possible to discover such a theory in Aquinas by foregrounding certain elements of Thomistic doctrine and deemphasizing or ignoring others. A secular and empirical natural law theory, it turns out, is constituted by a set of rules that serve to meet human needs and make possible the thriving of individuals and society. Since prescription is the flip side of description in naturalistic ethics, he thinks it also legitimate to say that these rules ought to be accepted

and followed in order to guarantee individual and societal thriving. The rules gain empirical support by looking to basic human needs and acknowledging their obvious importance for human well-being. Since human beings require basics like food, shelter, and security, it is necessary to build a social support system capable of providing these goods, and the rules necessary for the continued success of this social enterprise are presumed by Braybrooke to qualify as natural laws.

The author finds support for this, first, by comparing Locke with Aquinas and deriving from their respective views the required secular and empirical defense of rules necessary for a thriving society. He finds additional support for the empirical foundation of his argument in Rousseau, but more importantly, he looks to Rousseau in order to build a theory of the common good that supports both individual and social thriving. It is interesting to note that Braybrooke's natural law is neither clearly teleological nor evidently deontological; he balances individual thriving against social thriving without privileging one over the other. Hobbes, again along with Aquinas, helps him generate a laundry list of rules to serve as natural laws, and the discussion of Hume presumably enables him to demonstrate that the natural laws can be considered true, thus supporting the moral realism required of natural law theory.

On the bright side, the book is provocative, engaging, and challenging. Braybrooke deliberately avoids the subject of sexual morality (and the accompanying conservative polemic) that entertains many contemporary natural law enthusiasts, crafting a theory that is both current and curiously liberal. In this regard, his argument does produce the promised alternative to contemporary contractarian and utilitarian ethics, and no doubt many will welcome it as such. On the darker side, the aim of the work is ambitious, and his arguments do not always live up to their promise.

Naturalistic ethics always seem rather slippery to me, and Braybrooke's version is no exception. It seems curious to insist that the natural law is objective and holds similarly for all persons everywhere but can also vary at times depending upon the circumstances. And it seems unhelpful to insist that certain rules are necessary to facilitate individual and social thriving, but not say more either about what this means or why all persons should, after a fashion, think of thriving (and not just surviving) in similar terms. Additionally, his argument presumes a basic egalitarianism; all persons have equal standing under his natural law. This may hardly seem troubling in itself, but in a secularized natural law argument, it would be good to know why we must necessarily see things this way. One worries that perhaps Braybrooke has written his own (conventional) modern liberal egalitarian sympathies back into his natural law—a difficulty that invariably haunts natural law argument—leaving it a good deal less natural than advertised and a good deal less able to fend off contemporary objections as well.

Talking Feminist Politics: Conversations on Law, Science, and the Postmodern. By Eloise A. Buker. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999. 240p. \$60.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

The Future of Differences: Truth and Method in Feminist Theory. By Susan J. Hekman. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999. 173p. \$66.95 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Alessandra Tanesini, Cardiff University

There are differences between human beings, and some of these differences are, for many, a matter of identity. Some people are men, and some are white. Some people are poor, others are wealthy. These identity-constituting differences are deeply connected with different kinds of injustices. Susan Hekman's main contention in *The Future of Differences* is that a new epistemology is required if we are to acknowledge all these differences (p. 27) and, consequently, address these injustices.

What Hekman fails to acknowledge is that there are many important differences between differences. Some differences are the result of economic injustices: for example, that between rich and poor. Others give rise to cultural injustices. For instance, gay people, whose identity is despised, are on the receiving end of this sort of injustice. Many differences, race and gender for instance, are a mix of the two (see Nancy Fraser, Justice Interruptus, 1997). This distinction is important because Hekman's strategy of deconstruction of dichotomous identities (p. 27) seems appropriate only to those differences that are the locus of cultural injustice. When it comes to poverty, what is needed is economic redistribution. The difference between rich and poor is one we want to erase, through the transformation of the economic system, rather than deconstruct.

There are two different sources to Hekman's claim that politics focused on difference requires a new epistemology. These seem to me to be largely independent of each other, although Hekman does not present them as such. One source is her concern with the epistemological notion of the subject employed in modern epistemology. The second source concerns problems with the methodology of social sciences due to specific features of social reality. I see no reason why somebody who endorses Hekman's approach to the first topic would be moved to agree with her on the second, and vice versa. Perhaps, the two complement each other.

The first topic is familiar ground for Hekman, who has covered it elsewhere (see Gender and Knowledge, 1990). She argues that given the traditional model of the subject, women cannot fully achieve this status. They can stop being women, thereby erasing their difference from men, and become subjects. Or they can be women, and accept the status of nonsubjects. What Hekman advocates is a rejection of this framework and of the notion of subjectivity it entails (Chapter 5). For some, this approach is tantamount to overcoming epistemology, rather than developing a new one. Be that as it may, it is her discussion of this topic that leads Hekman to characterize her position as a third strategy for feminism.

The second topic is developed in detail in the central chapters of this book. Here Hekman argues that respect for differences requires that we accept that there are no overarching social theories (pp. 69, 87) and no universal concepts (p. 87), although there are general categories (p. 53). She deploys Max Weber's concept of the ideal type to develop her methodological approach. There is much that seems correct in Hekman's theory, but I fail to see how it is generated by a respect for differences. Rather, its underlying motivation lies with the awareness that it is hopeless to search for exceptionless laws in the social sciences, and that an important aim of social critique is to illuminate the significances of social reality, rather than to describe facts.

However, we can take these claims on board without accepting some of the further points that Hekman seems to derive from them. For instance, they offer no support to her claim that there is a contradiction between the view that reality is socially constituted, and that some perspectives on that reality are epistemically superior to others (p. 31). Even if reality is not independent of us, there remains a conceptual gap between how we take reality to be and how it is (in its socially constituted ways). Some perspectives are superior to others if they are less prone to error.

In this context, it is significant that Hekman fails to mention a crucial feature of standpoint epistemology against which she

raises this criticism, namely, that the perspectives on social reality that are epistemically privileged belong to people who are crucial to the continuation of the system that oppresses them. They have firsthand knowledge of this aspect of social reality, and that is why they are better positioned to know it. It is quite revealing that this feature of standpoint drops out of Hekman's picture, since it is another instance in which a difference that results from economic oppression is ignored in her account. That said, some of her other criticisms of standpoint's tendency to downplay the importance of differences among women do stand.

In *Talking Feminist Politics*, Eloise Buker is almost exclusively concerned with feminism in the United States. More specifically, her sustained discussions of feminist jurisprudence, feminist epistemology, and postmodernism are intended to foster the development of a novel model of citizenship in the context of North American democracy. Feminist jurisprudence modifies current legal practices so as to help ordinary citizens take women's situations into account when judging what is the just thing to do in a given situation. Feminist epistemology helps citizens become informed about the connections between science and social life. Finally, postmodernism helps one to understand that all social analyses must be contextualized.

Surprisingly, Eloise Buker has very little to say explicitly about differences, since this has become a crucial topic for feminist discussions of political citizenship. What she has to say is, however, revealing. She writes: "If politics can bring together... outsiders... then politics offers ways to connect with others on the basis of a shared humanity that is inclusive.... Such a politics builds community on differences that are to be respected, encouraged, and appreciated" (p. 25). Buker, too, forgets that there are differences that are not to be encouraged. Further, her appeal to "a shared humanity" is problematic. The track record of political definitions of human nature and the human good is, to say the least, checkered. They have often been used to impose on some people the view of humanity held by the dominant group in society.

Buker's claim can perhaps be explained by her seeming to believe that political conflicts can always be settled to the benefit of every group in society (p. 45, n. 25) by means of an appeal to the law. I doubt that this is true. Some conflicts have no resolution. Others have just resolutions that do not benefit all involved. If a group has gained an unfair advantage over others, a just resolution requires that members of that group be worse off as a result. I find Buker's belief in the justice of the U.S. legal system puzzling. I doubt that anybody who keeps clearly in mind the frightening statistics about the number of African American men currently in jail would put such faith in the role of the courts to achieve justice for all women, including those who are poor and those who are black.

I also find Buker's support for current institutions, and implicitly the economic system of which they are part and parcel, somewhat naive. She claims that "banks, factories... and churches, for example, offer organizational structures within which opportunities for citizenship exist and which function better when participants are empowered to act as citizens by taking responsibility for making the organization work better" (p. 28). Claims such as this betray a misunderstanding of the very nature of citizenship. Membership in a group could be a form of citizenship only if, at the very least, the group is constituted to protect and pursue the interests of its members. Factory workers who cannot sack their bosses, but can be sacked by them, are not members of an organization that has been instituted to protect their interests; quite the opposite.

Buker also links her discussion of justice in the context of jurisprudence to epistemological questions. Specifically, she addresses the issues of truth in science and of the justification of ethical claims. In her discussion of this latter topic, she endorses a morality of care, whose implementation depends on the wise judgment of citizens (p. 189). Although she is aware that the implementation of such a position is open to abuse, she seems to be optimistic about its possibilities. I doubt whether the dispossessed will feel the same way.

Cultural Pluralism and Dilemmas of Justice. By Monique Deveaux. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. 205p. \$35.00.

Becoming Free: Autonomy and Diversity in the Liberal Polity. By Emily R. Gill. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. 292p. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Susan Mendus, University of York, U.K.

What does liberalism imply about our duties to minority cultures, and what do the claims of such cultures imply about the nature of liberalism? These may seem like different ways of asking roughly the same question and, in a sense, so they are. Both formulations invite us to consider the relationship between liberalism and diversity, and both do so in the specific context of group, as distinct from individual, identity. However, and as these two books demonstrate, it makes a difference which question we take as our starting point. Emily Gill begins with a question about the fundamental commitments of liberalisn, and having answered that question, she then goes on to investigate the implications for cultural membership. By contrast, Monique Deveaux begins by asking what justice requires for cultural minorities, and having answered that question, she then goes on to investigate the implications for our understanding of liberal democratic theory and practice.

At first blush, Gill's approach is the more tough-minded of the two. She writes: "(I)n a liberal polity, then, our focus should be on ensuring the existence of a context of choice maximizing the probability that cultural membership will indeed proceed from critical reflection and thus function as an expression of autonomy" (p. 7). And she goes on to insist that diversity is not valuable for its own sake, but only for the way in which it may function in individual lives as an expression of autonomy. Moreover, and intriguingly, she notes how many of those who favor special rights for minority groups do so in the name of individual choice. It is, in the end, neither culture nor community but autonomy that is of central importance. Thus, "membership in some culture is a precondition of any sort of human agency, but membership in any particular community on maturity is an expression of autonomy. My focus, then, is on the nature of the preconditions that maximize the likelihood that cultural membership will represent an expression of autonomy" (p. 88).

For Deveaux, this is not the way it is—or at least, not the way it ought to be. She agrees that many of those who would protect cultural membership do so in the name of individual choice, but concludes that this is a wholly inadequate reason, not least because it may "overlook valuable aspects of cultural membership which not only do not necessarily enhance individual autonomy, but also may actually stand in tension with it" (pp. 121–22). And what this, in turn, highlights is both that autonomy-based liberalism may be restrictive in the kinds of groups it will be willing to support, and (yet more worryingly) that autonomy-based liberalism, even when it favors the protection of some groups, will do so for reasons that fail to resonate with members of those groups themselves: "[M]embers of minority groups (especially more traditional

ones) by no means unanimously affirm the ideal of personal autonomy, nor do they necessarily accept it as the overriding reason for introducing special political arrangements to support their way of life" (p. 132). The argument from autonomy is a distinctively liberal argument and, as such, it will not necessarily find favor with members of minority groups themselves.

In assessing these two approaches to the question of diversity, much seems to hang on which way round we ask the initial question. Are we taking liberalism (suitably defined) as the fixed point and then asking whether and to what extent it can accommodate cultural commitment, or are we taking cultural commitment as the fixed point and then asking whether and to what extent its demands can be incorporated within the liberal framework? One might think that these different approaches would result in quite distinct policy provisions: Gill's emphasis on autonomy seems, at least prima facie, to imply a rejection of groups that are not autonomy-valuing, while Deveaux's emphasis on the intrinsic value of cultural commitment suggests a more sympathetic response to illiberal, or nonautonomy-valuing, groups.

However, these expectations are only partially fulfilled. Both writers discuss the implications of their theoretical views for practical policy, and both consider cases in which members of minority groups that place a low value on autonomy wish to remove their children from the state education system. On these, Deveaux concludes that "many traditional religious and ethnic communities that do not actively encourage or foster their members' capacities to form and pursue independent life plans may still deserve respect and protection. As the examples of Muslim schools and the Amish opting out of mainstream education show, there are reasons to support some traditional cultural structures that sit uneasily with liberal sensibilities. At the very least, there are no good grounds for rejecting such practices in advance of extensive public deliberation with the cultural groups concerned" (pp. 135–36). Deveaux does not give an exhaustive explanation of her reasons for thinking that such groups are worthy of respect, but simply contents herself with the general reflection that insofar as they do not jeopardize or restrict their members' capacities and opportunities to make any decisions about their own lives, they do not risk violating democratic principles. To that extent, we must suppose, they are to be permitted, and to the extent that they provide contexts for the development of a sense of identity and belonging, they are to be encouraged.

What, then, of Gill? Her insistence that cultural membership should proceed from critical reflection and thus function as an expression of autonomy strongly suggests that she will have no truck with those cultural groups that reject autonomy, and no sympathy for those who wish to remove their children from state education. This conclusion would, however, be too quick. In her final chapter, Gill insists that "in spite of Rawls's attempt to avoid education for autonomy, I do not believe that eschewing this kind of civic education is compatible with liberalism as I interpret it" (p. 219). But she immediately goes on to acknowledge that this insistence leaves untouched the central dilemma of how to offer a civic education that does not force autonomy on those who are indifferent to it or reject it altogether. In the end, therefore, she reluctantly concurs with the court decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder because "separation is not instrumental to being Amish but is intrinsic to and constitutive of what being Amish means" (p. 238). More generally, she concludes that as liberals, it behooves us to be aware of the limitations of our own moral categories and to recognize that our own emphasis on self-assessment and selfunderstanding is but one narrative among others. Moreover, this recognition is one that can enable us to develop our own autonomy, by allowing us to imagine living different ways of

life, and by promoting our ability to question, examine, and possibly revise our conceptions of the good. Despite their different starting points, and their different theoretical allegiances, Gill and Deveaux often arrive at remarkably similar conclusions, particularly where matters of practical policy are concerned, and this is both intriguing and reassuring.

Taken individually, each of these books represents a significant contribution to the liberal debate over multiculturalism. Deveaux acknowledges from the outset that her approach is the result of reflection on distinctively Canadian problems, whereas Gill's attention is focused on American cases, and often on American legal cases. Hence, perhaps, Deveaux's concern for examining liberalism through the lens of cultural commitment, and Gill's concern for examining cultural commitment through the lens of liberal individualism. For those who are in need of a thorough, detailed, and sensitive discussion of the varieties of modern liberalism, I wholeheartedly recommend Gill's book. Its command of the literature is hugely impressive, and her ability to disentangle the many threads that go to make up modern liberalism is both instructive and stimulating. Hers is a book that both demands and repays careful attention by the reader, but its sheer detail can sometimes bewilder. By contrast, Deveaux's book is more succinct and her own voice is more clearly audible, but the reader (this reader) is sometimes left wanting rather more by way of positive argument. For instance, Deveaux's criticisms of the liberal perfectionism of Joseph Raz and Will Kymlicka are certainly telling, and she is surely right to emphasize that their appeal to individual autonomy fails to capture communities' own views about what is important in cultural membership, but her own appeal to the value of belonging needs to be spelled out in more detail if it is to do the philosophical work required of it.

To say all this, however, is simply to say that these books, like all books, have the defects of their virtues. It is important to add that in these cases, the virtues are very considerable. If, taken individually, each book represents a significant contribution to the liberal debate over multiculturalism, taken together they offer alternative, yet complementary, visions of the way in which liberalism might develop in the twenty-first century. Put differently, the books are not merely critical but also constructive. They fire the reader's imagination by their anticipations of a liberal polity that can genuinely do justice to minority groups. Those of us who teach in this area of the discipline could do no better than to recommend that these two books be read as companion pieces. They will not fail to spark informed debate in an area where debate is all too common, but informed debate is a rare commodity.

**Constitutional Self Government.** By Christopher L. Eisgruber. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 260p. \$45.00.

Mark Tunick, Florida Atlantic University

Christopher Eisgruber takes a pragmatic approach to judicial review. Most judges and scholars would decide whether a branch of government acts legitimately by asking whether its actions were authorized or prohibited by some provision in the Constitution. The common assumption is that during the constitutional convention, states agreed to give up some of their powers in order to establish a new federal government with enumerated powers, at the same time explicitly setting limits both to the federal government and to states. By turning to the terms of this agreement, Supreme Court Justices seek to answer whether Congress, the president, or the state or local government in question acted within its rights. Eisgruber regards such assumptions about state sovereignty as "mysti-

cal" (p. 186). Instead, he would have us question, in deciding whether, say, Congress should be permitted to regulate the possession of guns in school zones, that this is the sort of thing a national government can "do well" (p. 186). Whether it was the intention of those who wrote or ratified the Constitution to give Congress this power is, to Eisgruber, more or less irrelevant.

Eisgruber thus adds another sustained argument against originalist theories of constitutional interpretation to the considerable existing arsenal. His defense of a Supreme Court that has discretion to go beyond the original intentions of the framers or even the conventional meaning of the text is based not only on pragmatic considerations but also on a theory of "constitutional self-government." The idea is that by virtue of the procedures used to select the Supreme Court—nomination by the president and confirmation by the Senate—the Court is best viewed as an institution whose function is to practice democracy by invoking its own best judgments regarding political issues that it is particularly well suited to address (pp. 4, 8, 40, 48). Echoing familiar defenses of judicial review, Eisgruber argues that because they have life tenure and are not likely to have higher aspirations for which they might seek political favors (pp. 58, 60), justices are more inclined than elected officials or the voting public to be guided not merely by interests but by values or moral principles (Chapter 2). While opposing originalism and theories that would have justices strictly adhere to the plain meaning of the text, which is, as many have noted, a futile task, he does not recommend that justices simply ignore the Constitution (pp. 205-6), or exercise unbridled discretion. His defense of judicial review rests on the assumption that justices are best suited to apply discrete moral principles, which he attempts to distinguish from comprehensive principles (p. 170). Justices are ill suited to apply comprehensive principles, which call for assessment of an entire system of social interaction rather than specific forms of government action (p. 171), and should therefore steer clear of such issues as redistricting or the balance of powers between states and federal government, for here the Court is beyond its competency and should leave things to be settled by other political institutions.

The argument that judicial review is a means of selfgovernment hinges on the Supreme Courts being a representative institution, and Eisgruber thinks that the reason we have for thinking this is that the justices are "political appointees" (p. 64). Given the importance for his theory of our accepting the democratic pedigree of the justices, it is troubling that we do not get more in this book than a few paragraphs about how the selection process truly lets us regard the justices as representatives. Eisgruber notes that we could have selected justices through civil service exams, rather than by nomination and consent (p. 65); but if the Court was truly intended to be representative, we could have made it elected—he notes, in a footnote without comment, that some states do this for some of their judgeships (p. 228, n. 86). A detailed discussion on representation theory and the extent to which the nomination and confirmation process manifests the will of the people would seem to be crucial to the theory, but we do not find it here. If the justices were to be truly representative, why not have them consult polls in deciding cases, as Lon Fuller has Justice Handy do in his famous "The Case of the Speluncean Explorers" (1949; reprinted in Harvard Law Review 112 [1999]: 1851-75)? Eisgruber might respond that justices fulfill a special role in democracy of protecting minority rights by appealing to moral principles, and following opinion polls may disable them from fulfilling this role. But if, as Eisgruber argues, justices are no more morally insightful than the people, their advantage being only their disinterestedness (p. 62), it is hard to see why they should

not consult issue polls, as opposed to election results. Fuller artfully contrasts Handy's legal philosophy with a number of alternatives. Since Eisgruber defends a controversial legal philosophy in which judges are guided by their own judgment and do not act merely as agents of lawmakers "now long dead" (p. 205), it would have been helpful had he engaged more of the literature on these alternatives.

There are many examples of Eisgruber thoughtfully responding to counterarguments (see p. 67, for example) and providing fresh and stimulating positions on particular constitutional controversies (for example, his discussion of U.S. v. Lopez on pp. 198-99). But there are also a number of instances where his reasoning is less than compelling. In his discussion of whether there is a constitutional principle that would invalidate state laws restricting sexual freedom, Eisgruber rejects Justice Harry Blackmun's suggestion that sexual liberty is vital to a person's identity. Eisgruber does not think that "kinky sex" is any more indispensable to human flourishing than other pursuits of pleasure that the state may wish to regulate, such as, to use his example, eating raw hamburgers at home (pp. 158-59). Instead, he argues that "what matters is not that people define their identities by having sex, but that they sometimes do so by condemning other people's sexual behavior" (p. 160). The constitutional principle he settles on is that we should be protected against regulations motivated by a desire for social prestige or domination (pp. 160-61), although he does not explain why a legislature's motive should be determinative in deciding whether government coercion is acceptable, and he gets to this principle by making what many will regard as an implausible assumption, that pursuing intimate sexual relations is substantially no more meaningful than the pursuit of gastronomic delicacies.

To take another example, Eisgruber assesses the issue of whether we should defer to state governments on the ground that they are "closer to the people." The view he settles on is that we cannot be sure they are, and that in some ways, local and national governments are less anonymous and unaccountable than state governments. As evidence, he cites an informal survey a law professor conducted of his students that reveals that the students "know less about their state representatives than they do about national and local ones" (p. 193). He recognizes that this is an "unscientific" survey, and so he asks us then to reflect on our own attitudes toward local, state, and national politicians. (When I did this I found myself more aware of state legislators who were threatening to cut my university's budget than of city council members). And as still further support that state legislatures may be more anonymous, he argues that "there are fifty states, and it may not be clear which state any given citizen should watch—many Americans cross state lines every day when they commute to work" (p. 194). But Americans live and work in different local jurisdictions as well, so why infer from the fact that some may live and work in multiple states that they are inattentive to state governments, and why not infer from the fact that a far larger number of people live and work in multiple local jurisdictions that more people are inattentive to local government? Eisgruber may be right that state governments are less accountable than local or national governments, but his reasoning is disappointing. As a final example, he seems to be willing to use the "necessary and proper" clause of Article I as a means to support any sort of power that it would be a good thing to have in the hands of Congress (p. 190), despite its clear stipulation that it refers only to "all foregoing powers" and other powers specifically "vested by this Constitution."

Although these arguments may not inspire confidence, there are a number of examples of sound reasoning and fair consideration of objections, especially earlier in the book. The book is uneven, but it is an interesting addition to antioriginalist theories of constitutional interpretation. Eisgruber articulates what will seem to some a radical view; but just as it would take a much longer review for me to do justice to the way Eisgruber deals with a number of complex issues, including whether his distinction between discrete and comprehensive principles is workable, it would take a much longer book that is more attentive to representation theory and legal philosophy if his view is to amount to a truly convincing theory, rather than more ammunition in a worthy battle against originalism.

#### The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth. By Liah Greenfeld, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 541p. \$45.00.

Mark N. Hagopian, American International College

In this book Liah Greenfeld tackles the problem that preoccupied Max Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1930). Like many others, she disputes Weber's claim that modern capitalism emerged uniquely in Northwest Europe because of the attitudes and behavior promoted by Protestant Christianity, especially in its Calvinist variety: The "worldly asceticism" and peculiar form of economic rationality involved spawned an economic system that eventually helped change the world. Critical of this precise argument, Greenfeld is in the Weberian camp in centering the problem where he did and in stressing the differences between modern capitalism and age-old commercial profit making found virtually in all civilizations. Similarly sound is Weber's methodological posture that sees culture, that is, ideas, ideals, and values dramatically influencing the emergence, growth, and durability of economic systems. Those who, like the whole Marxist tradition, maintain that underlying "structural" factors such as technology and environment are the prime movers of history have succumbed to untenable deterministic philosophies. History and social structures, unlike the works of simple nature, are constructed by human agency, which itself is often provided by outstanding thinkers and doers.

Greenfeld applies this open-ended view of history to nationalism itself. Instead of reflecting innate natural qualities as "primordialists" in theory and ethnonationalists in practice contend, nationalism itself is a constructed product of human history. In other words, it is something effected by choice, chance, and accident. However, unlike Eric Hobsbawm and (somewhat differently) Ernest Gellner, she does not see nationalism created or employed to cater to capitalism's need for a homogeneous social organization. Quite the contrary: Nationalism most often promoted capitalism as a chief component of its own agenda.

The "capitalism" of which the author speaks is influenced by the classic ideas of W. W. Rostow. This capitalism is privately owned, profit-oriented economy that features economic growth as a competitive weapon in an international framework. It is a capitalism, moreover, that emerged first and foremost in England, particularly after the Restoration, and then diffused (adopting appropriate cultural variations) to places like France, Germany, Japan, and America. The whether, why, when, and how of this diffusion of the capitalist spirit is the central concern of this book: "The sustained orientation of economic activity to growth, the characteristic 'spirit of capitalism' which makes modern economy modern, owes its existence to nationalism. In general this 'spirit of capitalism' is the economic expression of the collective competitiveness inherent in nationalism—itself a product of the members' investment in the dignity or prestige of the nation"

(p. 473). To validate this thesis, the author devotes a chapter, each to England-Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, and Germany and two chapters each to Japan and America. While detailed analysis of these chapters is impossible here, certain key points likely to cause contention can be at least sketched.

In general, these chapters combine political history, economic history, and the history of economic ideas to illustrate Greenfeld's interpretation of the capitalism-nationalism nexus. In Chapter 1 on England-Great Britain, she deals with the lead-up to and aftermath of Adam Smith's publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776. She rightly stresses that there is more to Smith's thought than tunnel-visioned apotheosis of laissez-faire. More controversial perhaps is her attempt in Chapter 2 to downplay the Netherlands in favour of England as the locus classicus of modern capitalist diffusion. Accordingly, she denies the nationalist credentials of the Dutch in early modern Europe, even during their fabled late-sixteenth-century revolt against Spanish domination. Countering among other things the old Marxist saw that the Netherlands Revolt was the premier "bourgeois," that is, capitalist, revolution, she charges that the Dutch even later in the seventeenth and eighteenth century "did not choose to become modern" and remained so tied to a narrowly individualist economic ethos that "they were not a nation" (p. 90). Dutch historians will doubtless question this conclusion.

According to the author, a major reason for English success and Dutch failure in producing a modern nationalism is religion. She finds that the Dutch were too mired in religious matters to take this road, whereas the English at least by the time of the Restoration had moved forward to a more secular and authentic national consciousness. Her whole line of reasoning reflects a general underestimate of the role of religion in the development of modern nationalism. Whatever the case with the Dutch, certainly English nationalism was a centerpiece of the era of the 1640s and 1650s (not entirely misnamed the Puritan Revolution). English nationalism was wedded to Protestantism for a long time thereafter.

Chapter 3 discusses France as the "first convert" to the nationalist-capitalist convergence. Here we find that even the early and imperfect "mercantilist" capitalism, as it evolved from simple bullionism to more sophisticated notions of the balance of trade, was intimately tied to nationalistic concerns. Various French thinkers anticipated the type of "economic nationalism" that is the focus of this study. Chapter 4 looks to the roots of German nationalism among the post-Napoleonic intelligentsia. However, German nationalism under the influence of Romanticist thought develops a collectivist or organic version of nationalism that distinguishes it significantly from the more individualistic and civic nationalism of the British. French, and Americans. The culmination of various trends of thought, such as the vast literature of "Cameralism," is found in Friedrich List's extremely nationalistic System of National Economy (1837).

The last four chapters of *The Spirit of Capitalism* examine the emergence of nationalistic economic thinking and public policy in Japan and America. Japanese economic development in the post-Meiji period (1868) truly reflects the conscious attempt to defend the country and "nation" against the clear and present danger of Western domination. In Japan, the connection between a nationalism stimulated by foreign contact and an ancient culture stressing the primacy of the community seems clear. It is nationalism that rather successfully has produced the synthesis of a traditional warrior ethic with the requisites of an economy of growth. The concluding two chapters on America cover such topics as the economic nationalism inherent in Alexander Hamilton's *Report on Manufactures* or Henry Clay's "American System" and the emergence of economics as an academic discipline.

This is an important book. It will spark a variety of controversies. Its neoconservative orientation will antagonize those left of center. Area specialists and historians, as is their wont, will fasten onto whatever errors of omission or commission a book of such scope is bound to incur. Students of nationalism will question this or that historical or conceptual point. And yet, the very daring of its central thesis on the connections between nationalism and capitalism is to be commended. Whether it finally lays to rest Weber's strictures on the Protestant Ethic remains to be seen. There is no doubt, however, that a book on an intriguing and important subject, featuring a flexible view of why things happen in history, and also displaying a lively sense of argument and ample documentation, is to be welcomed. It is a powerful and thought-provoking study.

Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics. By Sonia Kruks. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 200p. \$35.00 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

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Just over 50 years ago, Simone de Beauvoir published The Second Sex, an essay on the situation of women written from the point of view of an existentialist ethic. Her essay had an enormous impact and spawned influential descendants, most of which rode roughshod over the essay's existentialist and phenomenological background. De Beauvoir's great success in The Second Sex was to have described the experience of becoming a woman in such a way as to allow many women to theorize their situation, and she spurred a generation to attempt to change it. Effectively, however, her insights became absorbed into the liberal feminist tradition, and with the rise of poststructuralism, have been criticized for their abstract individualism, commitment to a discredited Enlightenment notion of the subject, and participation in a logocentric philosophy of the Same. Sonia Kruks attempts, in this series of linked essays, to defend de Beauvoir and the tradition to which she belonged from being so quickly dismissed. She sets out the perspective of existential phenomenology and argues for its superiority to the poststructuralist philosophy that has become influential during the last 30 years.

The first essay, "Freedoms That Matter," recaps an argument Kruks first published in the late 1980s that attempts to distance de Beauvoir from Jean-Paul Sartre. Here she suggests that de Beauvoir's account of subjectivity owes more to Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who had developed an account of embodied and effectively constrained subjectivity, than to Sartre, who notoriously asserted in Being and Nothingness that the slave in chains is as free as his master. Kruks appears, in this essay, to be implicitly accepting the feminist and postmodern critique of Sartre, who has been cast as the last defender of abstract universal humanity. She defends de Beauvoir by claiming that despite her protestations to the contrary, she was not simply applying Sartre's philosophy. Although Kruks's reading of de Beauvoir and Merleau-Ponty is nuanced and initially plausible, there are problems with it. It is rather uncharitable to de Beauvoir, since it implies that she misrepresented her own views. It is also uncharitable to Sartre, since it underplays the distance he had already moved toward an account of oppression in "Anti-Semite and Jew."

In many ways, the need to read de Beauvoir in opposition to Sartre is undermined by Kruks's own later essays, in particular the third, "The Politics of Recognition: Sartre, Fanon and Identity Politics." In this essay she points out the neglected debt that Frantz Fanon's Black Skins White Masks owes to Sartre's "Anti-Semite and Jew." Since this work, and its sequel, Wretched of the Earth, had enormous influence on black

and postcolonial liberation movements, Sartre's importance as a political catalyst deserves to be recognized. As Kruks outlines, "The situation of the Jew in Sartre's account is above all one constituted by the anti-Semite—just as that of women can be said to be constituted by the sexist, or that of people of colour by the racist" (p. 92). The first draft chapters of The Second Sex followed soon after the 1946 "Anti-Semite and Jew." So the most economical way of understanding the theory of the subject in de Beauvoir's essay is to see it as developing the account of concrete relations with others, found in Being and Nothingness, in a similar direction to that taken by Sartre in "Anti-Semite and Jew." The crux of this interpretative issue seems to lie in what de Beauvoir meant by "a fall into immanence." If we take this to imply loss of status as a conscious being (reduction to an in-itself), then her theory of the subject is clearly not Sartrean. However, if what she means is that women find themselves in a situation that encourages the attitude epitomized by Sartre as love, language, and masochism, and so treat themselves as objects, there is no reason to think that de Beauvoir has gone beyond Sartre's account of the subject.

Kruks's second essay, "Panopticism and Shame: Foucault, Beauvoir and Feminism," points out the debt, also noted by others, that Michel Foucault's account of panopticism owes to de Beauvoir's and Sartre's account of the look or the gaze. It argues that Foucault's notion of the "interiorization" of the gaze is inconsistent with his avowed "no-subject" theory, and urges the superiority of the de Beauvoir/Merleau-Ponty account of the subject, also recently revived by Elizabeth Grosz (Volatile Bodies, 1994), according to which external social conditions effect a conscious interiority, which is nevertheless always bodily. Without some such account of the subject, the experience of oppression and urge for liberation become mysterious. The fourth essay, "Identity Politics and Dialectical Reason: Beyond an Epistemology of Provenance," turns to feminist standpoint theory and argues for the superiority of the account of the practical situated subject, developed by Sartre in Critique of Dialectical Reason, over the description of the situated subject developed by Nancy Hartsock and Donna Haraway. In particular, Sartre gives an account of the way in which individuals are connected through various forms of praxis, and so is able to "avoid the fragmenting tendencies implicit in identity politics, as well as other forms of multipledifference feminism" (p. 127).

The last two essays advocate, in different ways, a return to the phenomenology of lived experience in order to find some commonality among women and to rescue feminism, both from the silencing of those who are outside discourse and from its disintegration into a plethora of different discourses. For such are the theoretical impasses to which poststructuralism has brought us. These chapters form the center of Kruks's own version of phenomenological existentialism, but I found them the least convincing. Her project is one of retrieval. An extremely influential philosophy, the phenomenological existentialism of de Beauvoir, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, has been unduly neglected. This is problematic partly because many ideas that are associated with later thinkers have their origins in this philosophy, but their source is not acknowledged. And more importantly, many of the ways in that we think of the phenomenon of oppression, and the paths to liberation that then suggest themselves, are due to the writings of these theorists, yet are not subject to critical scrutiny. As a project of critical self-comprehension, a retrieval of phenomenological existentialism is important. But whether this philosophy can any longer show us the way forward is another matter.

There is, of course, a great deal that could be retrieved from it. There is the early Sartrean notion of bad faith, the middle period attempt to develop an existentialist ethic and give an account of situated freedom, and the later project of a synthesis, always awkward, of Marxism and existentialism. But these are not what appeal to Kruks. It is rather "the commonalities of feminine bodily experience . . . that can inaugurate a concern for others [which] invite us to endeavor respectfully to travel to the worlds of others in fuller and more ambitious ways" (p. 175). But this is at best the threshold of a way forward. If there is one place where poststructuralism has had some success, it is in questioning any simple notion of experience. But even if we concede a shared experience, and are concerned for the fate of our sisters, this does not solve the hard question: What should we do? This question is hardest when Islamic women or Aboriginal women challenge us as Western, capitalist, and colonial. Sartre did attempt to come to terms, in his later work, with the complex structuring of relations of inequality, which can make one bourgeois and black, or patrician and female. He thought we should strive for genuine material equality, and he thought that achieving it would require a revolution. Kruks is silent on such matters, but it is here, I suspect, that both retrieval and critique is required, as we face Sartre's promised revolution in the unexpected guise of a global Islamic uprising.

Kruks's writing is intelligent and well worth reading. Yet in proposing to retrieve existential phenomenology from its recent neglect, she fails to address its limitations. She does not, for instance, demonstrate where Claude Lévi-Srauss's critique of Sartre's distinction between analytic and dialectical reason broke down. So when she advocates a return to Sartre's way of thinking, it is unclear that she is offering a more coherent outlook than the poststructuralist one that developed out of Lévi-Strauss's critique.

Joseph Schumpeter's Two Theories of Democracy. By John Medearis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 263p. \$45.00.

Jeffrey C. Isaac, Indiana University

Joseph Schumpeter's "elitist" theory of democracy has been the subject of much discussion in political theory. It is commonly considered to have been seminal for the "empirical" approaches to democracy that emerged in American political science after World War II. In this excellent book, John Medearis presents an impressive, careful, and relatively comprehensive account of Schumpeter's writings on the topic of democracy. He argues that Schumpeter has been widely misunderstood, and the richness of his thinking has been wrongly reduced to the chapters of *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (1942) in which the "elitist" theory is developed.

According to Medearis, Schumpeter had not one but two theories of democracy. The later, and more famous, theory identifies democracy with a method of electoral competition whereby political leaders are selected by those over whom they rule. Medearis argues that this theory needs to be understood as a response to an alternative, "transformational" conception of democracy that was central to much of Schumpeter's early political writing. The "transformational" view, on Medearis's telling, stresses "the importance of democratic beliefs and ideology" and highlights "the radicalizing, dynamic effects of movements that attempt to realize democratic values and act on democratic ideologies" (p. 4). On this view, democracy is egalitarian and expansive theory and practice not reducible to a method of leadership selection.

Medearis charts Schumpeter's encounters with this more radical, transformational conception, first in post-World

War I Austria, where he participated in public debates and discussions about the council movement, the socialization of large-scale industry, and the prospects for democratization; and later in the United States, where he observed and commented upon the industrial radicalism of the New Deal period. The best part of the book is the dialogue that Medearis establishes between Schumpeter and the seminal Austro-Marxists Otto Bauer and Karl Renner. Here, Medearis accomplishes two important tasks: on the one hand, emphasizing the impact of the theoretical and programmatic arguments of these writers, and of Austrian Social Democracy more generally, upon Schumpeter; and on the other, foregrounding Bauer's important and overlooked views on the topic of democracy and its various political embodiments. Medearis locates Schumpeter's own views on these topics within the tradition of conservatism broadly understood. And he compares Schumpeter's views with those of Max Weber, Gaetano Mosco, and Wilfredo Pareto. But he also makes clear the extent to which Schumpeter's aversion toward radical conceptions of democracy was rooted in his own early career as an Austrian "Tory democrat" linked to the Austrian Christian Social Party.

What emerges from Medearis's account is a view of Schumpeter as a complex, transplanted, Central European scholar and public intellectual deeply engaged in the political debates of his time and place. Such a view is a far cry from the way in which Schumpeter has been received in the American academy. This contextualization of Schumpeter is an important accomplishment. But Medearis goes further, engaging Schumpeter's texts, especially Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, in careful critical argument, and linking the limits of Schumpeter's "elitist" conception of democracy to the residues of the transformational view that remain in his later work and that, according to Medearis, must be central to any adequate account of democracy. In developing these themes, Medearis does more than shed new light on Schumpeter. He contributes, albeit indirectly, to current debates both about the limits of public choice approaches to democratic theory and about the meanings of democracy.

I highly recommend this book for what it accomplishes, for the conception of political theory that lies behind it, and simply because it is a very well written book that makes an enjoyable and informative read. It is an ambitious book, covering many aspects of Schumpeter's intellectual biography, and shedding light on all of them. There are places, such as digressions on Schumpeter's gendered language and on his anti-Semitic proclivities, where it loses focus. The book also suffers, in a very minor way, from a certain rhetorical slippage that occurs whenever Medearis maintains that Schumpeter "had" two antithetical theories of democracy. What Medearis in fact argues is that Schumpeter recognized two conceptions of democracy, attributed much causal power to a radical view, acknowledged its impact on events, and sought with intellectual and practical ingenuity to oppose it. It is true that Schumpeter "had" a transformational theory of democracy in the sense that he recognized the reality of this theory. But in another way, it is misleading to say that he had this theory, because to say this implies that he subscribed to this theory, and Medearis is clear that he did not, ever, identify with the transformational view. There are places in the book where greater semantic clarity about this point would have enhanced the argument. But, overall, the argument is clear, and Medearis, by delineating Schumpeter's understanding of the transformational possibilities of democracy, has done a great service to all interested in either intellectual history or democratic theory.

Political Nature: Environmentalism and the Interpretation of Western Thought. By John M. Meyer. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 210p. \$55.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

John S. Dryzek, Australian National University

Nature is political, John Meyer argues, because it constitutes people and so their politics; moreover, interpretations of nature can only be controversial and so contested. Meyer is an environmentalist who believes that contemporary theoretical thinking about politics and the environment is mostly mistaken. Environmental philosophy, in particular, is criticized as involving wasted effort because it emphasizes justifications for intrinsic value in nature. This emphasis implies that the political challenge is one of convincing enough people to adopt some ecologically benign worldview. But as Meyer rightly points out, most people already evidence a vague commitment to environmental values, and so the real question is how to activate such commitments.

Though not as plentiful as environmental philosophy, environmental political theory is today growing in quantity and sophistication (as Meyer grudgingly admits). But he condemns it for being dominated by two fallacies. The first is dualism: the idea that most political theorists throughout the ages have portrayed humanity in complete isolation from nonhuman nature, such that the task for ecological political theory is to overcome this separation, and re-embed politics in ecosystems. The second is derivation: the idea that a normative model of an ecologically sound polity can be derived from a model of how nonhuman nature works. Derivation tempts those green theorists who believe that the problem with the world is its current domination by a mechanistic model of nature, which ought to be replaced by an ecological model. While Meyer chooses his targets well, these fallacies are perhaps not quite so universal among green theorists as he suggests.

Meyer does discuss dualism and derivation in his contemporaries, but spends much more time on their roots in the history of political thought. Most of the book is devoted to Hobbes and Aristotle. This material is very effective. Meyer takes aim at the major interpreters of Hobbes and Aristotle who have discerned either dualism or derivation in these two thinkers, and finds such interpretations mistaken. Instead, Meyer argues, in their very different ways, both Hobbes and Aristotle share the basic idea that nature (with both nonhuman and human aspects) helps to constitute who we are as political beings, though as pre-ecological thinkers, neither could have thought in terms of ecological nature. This move, then, "allows us to place questions related to nature at the center of our political agenda" (p. 125), which is fair enough. Meyer has undoubtedly made a major contribution to the (environmental) history of political thought. But in light of the intentions with which he began, the big question is: How can these interpretations of Hobbes and Aristotle inform contemporary environmental political thinking and practice?

The justification for attending to Hobbes is that his mechanistic view of nature is widely seen as underpinning the modernity that some ecological theorists want to supersede. (Aristotle, for his part, represents a teleological alternative that may be attractive to some greens.) But showing that Hobbes himself is not a simple dualist or derivationist is really not decisive, if it is the misinterpretations of him that are both dominant and consequential—and are consistent with the modernist paradigm that begins in the seventeenth century. In short, even if Meyer is right about Hobbes, it may not matter much.

Another difficulty arises in that our world is separated from that of Hobbes not just by the ecological thinking that begins in the twentieth century (which Meyer analyzes) but by Darwin. If, as Meyer believes, nature helps constitute humans, then surely nature as revealed by evolutionary biology has a part to play in this constitution, even if that part is contested. Moreover, if Meyer really wanted to take aim at "derivative" misuses of nature in political theory, he could have targeted (or at least mentioned) all those who over the past century and more have argued that Darwinian nature justifies their preferred political project. Unregulated capitalism, dialectical materialism, (eco-)anarchism, progressivism, liberal democracy, organic statism, and Nazism have all been justified in Darwinian terms—often to extremely important political effect. "Darwin" and "evolution" cannot be found in Meyer's index.

At the end of the book, Meyer turns to a brief discussion of the implications of his constitutive view of political nature for the theory and practice of environmental politics, especially in terms of a politics of experience and place. His view of environmental politics is expansive in seeking to escape the idea that "the environment" is just an issue area, and inclusive in the kinds of movements and viewpoints that he wants to draw into the conversation. The movements he applauds are those for environmental justice in the United States, "ecological resistance" in the Third World, and—more surprisingly—the Wise Use Movement in the western United States. He defends the latter as a movement to maintain "a dignified rural existence" (p. 151). But how can a movement that can see this existence only in terms of traditional and unsustainable (on any definition) extractive resource use be described as "environmental"? How can a movement that demands heavy taxpayer subsidy of a rugged individualist antigovernment lifestyle be described as "dignified"? It is not hard to see what sorts of political uses might be made of an environmentalism that rubbishes ecosystemic thinking and praises the Wise Use Movement. Unfortunately, Meyer does not leave himself space to mount an adequate defense, discussing each movement in around three pages.

Political Nature is a landmark in the environmental history of political thought, particularly compelling in its analyses of Hobbes and Aristotle. Whether contemporary environmental thinkers should accept the lessons that Meyer draws for them is an altogether different question. He has plenty to do in terms of spelling out exactly what he has in mind for contemporary green political theory and practice, although he has demonstrated the ability to both unsettle established thinking and raise an original voice in some important debates. His real work has just begun.

# **Taylored Citizenship: State Institutions and Subjectivity.** By Char Roone Miller. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001. 224p. \$66.00.

Stephen Schneck, Catholic University of America

Few political scientists would recognize the name Frederick Winslow Taylor. Yet by Char Roone Miller's analysis, Taylor's early-twentieth-century "scientific" reforms in management and administrative practices play out in a ubiquitous and subtle process that shapes citizenship in modern America. The application of Taylor-inspired techniques to the reform of the military in the mid-twentieth century and their curiously parallel application in educational reforms receive Miller's closest attention. Much in the spirit of Michel Foucault's (1975) Discipline and Punish, Miller is concerned with demonstrating that ostensibly progressive efforts at efficient organization effectively routinize the production of consciousness, desire, and even the body.

As Miller would have it, the key feature of Taylorizing is the engineering of fixed citizen identities to be deployed for ulterior purposes: military effectiveness, industrial productivity, consumption, social order, and so forth. Gender, race, intelligence, and other differences are engendered by the Taylorizing process for the construction of these identities.

Well-known societal changes that took place in American society in conjunction with World War II take on an unsettling quality when considered through Miller's lens. Consider, for example, the impact of the procedures of the Veterans' Administration on the education of citizens, on the rise of suburbs, on patterns of citizen participation in politics, on race and on ethnicity, and on everything else. Who could deny that such procedures exercised a profound influence on citizen identity? Similarly, in education the period in question is associated with a number of progressive reforms, including standardized testing, the administrative use of public education for "socialization," sexual education, vocational education, mental and physical hygiene, and civics-all of which might be perceived as moving the formation of subjectivity into the operations of public administration. "Education and military service," Miller explains, "transformed social facts into identifications and citizens into actors." Hence, he continues, "by the World War II period, identities were conceptually organized to support national power" (p. 171).

Miller has a keen eye for discerning the techniques and processes by which societal forces, public institutions, and the state involve themselves in the formation of who we are. At one level, this is not news. A basic premise of social science is the role of societal factors in the formation of identity. Nor is it news to political philosophy, which at least since Plato's deportation of poets has wrestled with the conundrum of citizenship and right. Is there anyone who cannot imagine that school-administered IQ tests or military boot camps do not have implications for citizenship or citizen subjectivity itself?

At a different level, though, Miller's argument really rivets attention. That widespread military experience of World War II and twentieth-century educational reform changed the nature of American citizenry is commonplace knowledge. Social scientists and historians are also aware that Tayloresque management and administrative techniques were widely adopted by reformers in the military and by educational planners, as Miller's superb documentation of the secondary literature outlines. It may even be that such postwar social scientists as B. F. Skinner or Harold Lasswell or a philosopher like John Dewey were even able to connect the dots and recognize the role that progressive institutional reforms were playing in the transformation of the citizenry. But Miller may be the first comprehensively to problematize the process.

Yet while Miller's analysis is pathbreaking, his theoretical argument wobbles at a few points, generally in regard to difficulties with poststructuralism and Foucauldian genealogy. Miller barely raises, for example, the legitimation crisis that his analysis seems to identify. Simply put, if citizen identity is a construction of Tayloresque efforts by the state, then the legitimacy of that state is in crisis if it purports to derive its sovereignty from a free citizenry. While palpably sympathetic with such concerns, Miller cannot easily speak of such a crisis since he thinks, nodding to Foucault, that the idea of a free citizenry is problematic because the citizen is always being made, and is not born. Even "[t]he soul or human freedom is birthed in punishment and discipline," Miller contends. And, while he would prefer that such construction of identity derive from something other than "the highly coercive non-reciprocal power of the state" (p. 174), he denies himself grounds for such preference because he rejects the idea of a

universally authentic human condition, or a human nature, or a teleological purpose for freedom in human life. If freedom and identity are always constructions of power, then the so-called legitimation crisis loses much of its urgency. We are left only to lament the hegemonic power of the state in the process, wishing instead for a multiplicity of powers, and thus grasping at the thin ontology of difference.

The result is unsatisfying. The desire for liberation from relations of power hovers unrequitedly around such thinking. But always the explanation is that we must settle for less, for disturbing the relations of power a bit, for catty satires hoping to unsettle normalizations, or most idealistically for a very small dollop of autopoiesis. Miller's otherwise fine and eye-opening book reveals the author chafing against post-structuralism's tragic wimpiness. The adjectives that accompany his analysis of Taylorism and its effects convey a sense that such techniques of organizational management repress and deform the possibilities of an authentic human existence. Would that he dared to speak of that authenticity and the action and liberation that it begs.

Regardless, *Taylored Citizenship* is an important book. Its potential audience should extend beyond political theory's continentalists to include scholars in public administration, and American politics, as well as educators, historians, and organization theorists. Political theorists, in particular, should benefit from consideration of Miller's compelling use of historical research and his documentation of actual military and educational practices. His mapping of actual policies and practices lends his thesis a compelling rhetorical weight that will surprise theorists who rely only on books and ideas. Finally, *Taylored Citizenship* is a book that needs to be slipped onto the desks of the many who argue for more civic virtue, more civil society, and all who would involve public processes in the crafting of citizenship.

After Politics: The Rejection of Politics in Contemporary Liberal Philosophy. By Glen Newey. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 253p. \$68.00.

Simone Chambers, University of Toronto

This is a very smart book that comes to some very questionable conclusions. Glen Newey takes issue with contemporary liberal philosophy on two counts: Not only does it fail to address the "real world of politics," but it actually aims at the suppression of politics. Included in the list of those guilty of suppressing politics and failing to provide "philosophical reflection on politics—at least not on politics as it is" (p. 15) are John Rawls, Jürgen Habermas, Brian Barry, Joseph Raz, Michael Walzer, Michael Sandel, Will Kymlicka, Amy Gutmann, and others. Clearly, a great deal hangs on what Newey means by "politics as it is," and I will say at the outset that I found his definition wholly unconvincing. But along the way, Newey says some very intelligent things about the leading lights of liberal political philosophy. The book has two layers. In the first, Newey takes up particular philosophical arguments embedded in various liberal theories. At this level he shows us his considerable analytic skills in carefully argued, if somewhat technical, investigations of philosophical weaknesses. So, for example, his discussion of moral internalism and its problems is very good, as is the discussion of neutralist side-constraint as an insufficient reason requirement. Anyone interested in really looking under the hood of contemporary liberal philosophy can get something out of this book. But when Newey moves to the second layer, he tries to tie all his various arguments together under one big claim: the rejection of politics claim, and this is problematic.

When Newey says that contemporary liberal philosophers reject politics, he has, of course, a particular idea of politics in mind. He starts from three "uncontroversial assumptions about politics": 1) politics is characterized by endemic disagreement about what counts as politics; 2) politics is characterized by endemic disagreement over those things we have decided count as politics; and 3) politics essentially involves the use of power (pp. 7-8). None of the philosophers that concern Newey would disagree that all three of the things mentioned are central aspects of politics. So where is the problem? It really comes down to the third characteristic. Newey assumes but never defends what could be called a Machiavellian view of politics. Politics is down-and-dirty conflict in which power and contingency are the two most important factors, not norms and rationality. He does not say this is an aspect of politics that has not been given enough attention by contemporary liberals (a perfectly reasonable criticism to make). He says this is politics, and therefore they have nothing to say about it.

Let's call Newey's view of politics, politics.<sup>1</sup> The first thing to note is that his book is no more about politics<sup>1</sup> than are Rawls's Political Liberalism (1993) Barry's Justice as Impartiality (1995). Indeed, I will argue that it is a good deal less about politics<sup>1</sup> as the arguments are highly abstract and are about texts that are themselves once removed from politics.<sup>1</sup> However, as I have no problem with political philosophy being once even twice removed from politics,<sup>1</sup> I will not pursue this line. I want to make two points. The first is that politics<sup>1</sup> is a problematic or at least controversial view of politics. And second, even if we were to accept this narrow definition, it is not true to say that theorists like Rawls, Habermas, Barry, Raz, et al. are not interested in politics<sup>1</sup> or wish for a world in which we have overcome politics.<sup>1</sup>

According to Newey, political philosophy should offer philosophical explanations of politics. We should be taking the world as it is and trying to understand and explain it. Contemporary liberalism, in contrast, is really a branch of ethics or moral philosophy. Now this is true. There is a set of mainstream liberal theory (which hardly covers all of political theory, let alone all of liberalism) that has taken an ethical turn, and we might want to lament this. Perhaps we need more would-be-Webers and fewer would-be-Kants. But this is not to say that people like Rawls and Raz are not really political philosophers because they do moral philosophy. Newey can say this only because he draws a rather pedantic disciplinary line between moral philosophy and political philosophy. This line reflects a more significant distinction between ought and is: For Newey, ethics is about ought and politics is about is, and the two apparently have very little to do with each other. This is neither the time nor place to get into the is/ought distinction. Suffice it to say that Newey's view of the study of politics as being wholly separate from the study of ethics needs more defense than is offered; indeed, I was unable to find any defense of this view. It is treated as uncontroversial. Certainly Aristotle (someone Newey claims to admire) thought that politics was a branch of ethics. But Newey points out that Aristotle, at least, joined his ethics with sound "empirical considerations" whereas contemporary liberals do not. But Newey suggests no sound empirical considerations that should be addressed, except perhaps the consideration that the real world does not operate along perfectly moral lines. A point not lost on most political philosophers. In fact, the philosophical works cited by Newey all contain empirical considerations, claims, arguments, and observations. We might disagree with considerations or find them false or irrelevant. But to pursue this line of argument one would have to enter into a discussion about the truth or relevance of facts about human beings, and Newey never does that.

One empirical consideration that, like Aristotle, interests most of the people on Newey's list is the way institutions shape and inculcate behavior and contribute to political stability. But is this really politics? Newey says no. Political design, he says, is not political. Political design might not be political in the sense that running for office is political or maneuvering oneself through a messy power struggle is political, but it is political in the sense of pertaining to the public pursuit and organization of the good life. Lets call this more Aristotelian view of politics, politics.<sup>2</sup> It might very well be the case, as Newey implies, that we will never achieve the perfectly good life; we might always have things to fight about. Indeed, part of what it means to be human and to live in organized society is that we have things to fight over. So politics1 is always with us. And Rawls, Barry, Habermas, Raz, et al. are all intensely interested in politics. It is precisely because they recognize the endemic nature of conflict/power that they pursue a strategy of political design. What is the difference between politics in contemporary America and politics in Renaissance Italy? The difference is the institutional framework through which actors chase after politics.<sup>1</sup> The study of institutions (how they are and how they ought to be) has always been a part of the study of politics. And I see no reason to exclude it now. Furthermore, one cannot get a grasp on politics<sup>1</sup> without a firm grasp of politics<sup>2</sup> because one needs to know the rules of the game to understand the game. Are the rules of hockey not part of the game of hockey because the rules do not smash each other against the boards, or because players break the rules, or because the rational justification for the rules are not always the factor motivating players? The rules and the reasons that we might want these rules rather than other rules (or no rules) are part of the game of hockey, just as institutions and norms (and their justifications) are part of the game of politics. And although liberal institutions are designed to constrain and circumscribe conflict, they are not designed to do away with conflict.

All these thinkers can be criticized for taking certain things off the political agenda that we may feel should be left on that contentious agenda. That is a good criticism of liberal theory. Saying that liberalism is interested in doing away with politics because it is primarily interested in the rules that constrain and limit conflict and power is a bad criticism.

Sex and Social Justice. By Martha C. Nussbaum. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. 488p. \$45.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. By Martha C. Nussbaum. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. 334p. \$28.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

Nancy J. Hirschmann, Cornell University

These two books by leading U.S. philosopher Martha Nussbaum take up the issue of women's inequality in a U.S. and international context. Both are hard-hitting, in Nussbaum's characteristic take-no-prisoners style, setting out a clear case that women endure ignominious oppression in the name of culture and religion, and that feminists and liberals alike should tolerate it no longer.

Sex and Social Justice is a collection of previously published essays (with the exception of one on American feminism, which includes an effective and, to my mind, accurate critique of Christina Hoff Sommers), that have been revised to various degrees, on a diversity of topics loosely relating to the issues of sex and equality. The essays range from gay rights, to prostitution, to Virginia Woolf's To the Lighthouse, to cultural relativism. Nussbaum considers feminist theory's often hostile, and always ambiguous, relationship to liberal-

ism, and particularly the ways in which liberal ideals, though so frequently excoriated by Western feminists, are of central importance to women and feminists in the developing world; the unacceptability of female genital mutilation and the failure of Western liberals and feminists alike, so concerned to respect cultural difference, to stand up for women and criticize this practice; the use of Plato in considering Colorado's attempt to legislate against any policy or law that recognizes homosexuals and lesbians as protected categories entitled to rights; and the moral implications of the economic relations of the sex industry. The essays are all well reasoned and argued, but taken together they do not add up to much of a thesis or argument, except for a general multipronged defense of liberal human-rights values. A heavy book by empirical standards—weighing in at almost 500 pages—it covers a lot of ground but does not offer much depth. It is well written and an easy read, however-some of the essays were published in popular media outlets, such as The New Republic and the Boston Review, others in academic journals and volumes. The essays on international issues were more thought provoking and original than those on U.S. issues, in my opinion; the latter, though well written and often persuasive, covered familiar territory and dic not stimulate me to think about these issues in particularly new ways. But this is a good book for those who want an introduction to, or survey of, Nussbaum's recent thinking on popular issues.

By contrast, Women and Human Development presents a controversial and powerful thesis that Nussbaum seeks to develop in a systematic way in order to capture the readers' attention and engages them in a thoughtful dialogue. Originally delivered at the Seeley Lectures at Cambridge University, and originating in a World Institute for Development project on international development, Nussbaum's argument is informed by the empirical experiences she had in the field. Guided by many of the same general concerns as Sex and Social Justice, Women and Human Development seeks to ask more specifically whether feminism can develop universal principles that do not contradict feminism's commitment to difference. She argues that the phenomenon of which feminists have been so critical is not universalism per se; rather, it is a conceptualization and deployment of univeralism that is defined by and from the perspective of privilege—gender and class privilege in particular—an "obtuse universalizing" that reduces or ignores difference (p. 31). As a result, respecting "culture," she points out, often ends up meaning respecting men's power to subordinate women, who "lack essential support for leading lives that are fully human" (p. 4) because they are kept illiterate, poor, powerless, and subordinate.

Nussbaum believes that feminists can achieve a different, and indeed more genuine, universalism "framed in terms of general human powers and their development" (p. 7) that is compatible with cultural sensitivity. The key lies in Amartya Sen's capabilities argument, the basic notion that humans have a fundamental, perhaps even "natural," right to a number of basic conditions of life, such as clean water, literacy, conditions for health, work, leisure, and so forth. Nussbaum initially discusses the use of a capabilities approach in several of the essays in Sex and Social Justice, developing a list of 10 "capability functions"—life, bodily health, bodily integrity, imagination and thought, emotions, practical reason, affiliation, other species, play, and control over one's environment—which all humans must have, and which all cultures must provide (SSJ, pp. 41-42). In Women and Human Development, she pursues this idea further. The capabilities argument is not that people have to do specific things to be free, or to constitute themselves as "fully human," but rather that they have to have the ability and the resources to do

these things if they want to. Like Sen, Nussbaum notes the problem of adaptive preferences: People can adapt their desires, preferences, and views to a wide variety of oppressive circumstances; they can be "colonized" to want what those in power want them to want. At the same time, however, both feminism and liberalism demand that we respect agency, the ability of women to make choices. This apparent paradox can lead to self-defeating positions, such as when a victim of domestic abuse chooses to remain with her abuser. Nussbaum says that the only way to negotiate this double-edged sword is to focus on capability, not functioning: not necessarily leaving the abuser (since some women might not want to leave), but having realistic options and resources, such as economic independence and no cultural sanctions, to make leaving a real option. By focusing on capabilities, we have reduced the chance that women will make self-defeating choices, without at the same time coercing women to make the "right" choices.

Women must be able to participate in defining the culture, in affecting its practices and in deciding how a culture operates and develops. Rather than reject universal discourses of human rights, Nussbaum says, feminists should take women's lives as a legitimate foundation for a universal theory of rights. Taking women as a starting point for human rights means not simply that rights apply to women; for after all, as the past two decades of feminist critique have shown us, if such rights are defined from the perspective of male experience, applying them to women might not accomplish very much. Rather, women should be the starting point for the definition of rights: of what rights should be to, of what rights humans should have, of how these rights should be conceived and deployed (p. 34).

While such an argument might seem pretty basic to Western liberals who are dedicated to free choice, within the context of the developing world, and particularly India, Nussbaum notes, this is actually asking for quite radical change. Although she acknowledges that India is incredibly diverse, and has about as much of a "national culture" as the United States, India is one of the poorest countries in the world (138 out of 175 on the Human Development Index [p. 26]), and its dire poverty, widespread illiteracy, high infant mortality rates, shortened life expectancies, poor or nonexistent public utilities, including water, and inadequate medical care, translate into particularly harsh oppression for women and children, through child marriage, dowry murders, and forced prostitution (all of which are legally prohibited, but culturally practiced). In such a context, it is difficult not to agree with her that Western arguments for cultural diversity sound suspiciously like luxuriant whinings of the privileged. Yet Sex and Social Justice suggests that her capabilities argument is even fairly radical for the West, where prostitutes and gays alike are persecuted, in different ways, and denied basic capabilities of control over their bodily integrity; and where women do not participate to the same extent as men, and the poor do not participate to the same extent as the wealthy, in defining the norms that set the parameters for choice.

Nussbaum's call for a new conception of universalism has much in its favor, for despite considerable differences in cultural practice, certain aspects of women's oppression seem too similar around the world. A husband may beat his wife in the United States because his dinner is late, in Afghanistan because she left the house without him, but "the body that gets beaten is in a sense the same all over the world, concrete though the circumstances of domestic violence are in each society" (p. 23). As she argues, "Certain basic aspirations to human flourishing are recognizable across differences of class and context" (p. 31). Her argument that "[c]ultures are dynamic, and change is a very basic element in all of them" (p. 48) is attractive in the ways it opens up the meaning of

"culture" to those, such as women, who are normally excluded. But at the same time, it produces a certain problem of nonfalsifiability: If "the ideas of every culture turn up inside every other" (p. 49), then there is no way to define or differentiate specific cultures. If cultures are changing, flexible, and ongoing, and contain so many different and even possibly conflicting traditions within them already, then just about anything can count as belonging to culture. That does not necessarily make the argument incorrect; it may be the case that globalization has actually produced "the death of culture." But why call women's efforts to change, circumvent, or violate cultural practice a part of culture, instead of resistance to it? Indeed, women often implicitly engage in countercultural resistance even when apparently operating within culture, such as when women's veiling permits them to engage in paid employment.

Because Nussbaum is writing about societies in which many women are extremely poor and have extremely few options, and is seeking only to establish a minimal threshhold of capability functioning, it is difficult to argue that we all would not choose, for instance, to have clean water for drinking and bathing (pp. 113-14). But at the same time, this "threshold," while vital to basic justice, may also be too basic for an elaborate philosophical scheme of universalism. Furthermore, her argument is heavily influenced by the fact that India has a history of colonialism that may have produced a greater compatibility with Western values than other contexts, such as Saudi Arabia or Afghanistan. Finally, her focus on the state and constitutionalism as the way to make sure that the 10 capabilities are provided by society seems unnecessarily limited, given that, as she notes, India already outlaws many of the cultural practices she identifies.

Still, I found myself caught up in Nussbaum's arguments, and when I taught *Women and Human Development* to a seminar filled with antiliberal graduate students, this book gave them a terrific challenge. It is a book that, though perhaps not always right in what it argues, is always extremely good in arguing it. Even those who strongly disagree with liberalism and are strong supporters of cultural diversity and relativism will be forced to confront the questions Nussbaum raises and to think critically about these issues. Political philosophers can ask for nothing more.

Gandhi, Freedom, and Self-Rule. Edited by Anthony J. Parel. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000. 164p. \$70.00 cloth, \$23.95 paper.

Pratap B. Mehta, Jawaharlal Nehru University

The life and thought of Mahatma Gandhi continues to be a reproach to ideologies and dispositions that produced the horrors of the twentieth century. But his complex legacy suffers from a paradox. His ideas appear to be both necessary and improbable at the same time. To many, Gandhi's thought becomes even more relevant in a context in which the vision of modernity that he critiqued so powerfully has triumphed, the violence that he stood against has become an ineliminable feature of political life, and the practice of freedom has come to be dissociated from the exercise of virtue. But the very same historical momentum that inspires the authors in this volume to turn to Gandhi also seems to make Gandhi an even more distant and unlikely figure for our times. This volume, a product of sincere and careful scholarship, is largely an effort to keep Gandhi's thought alive. It focuses on the central category of Gandhian thought, swaraj (selfrule). Anthony Parel's essay usefully distinguishes between four meanings of freedom for Gandhi: freedom as national independence, freedom as freedom from poverty, political freedom for the individual, and freedom as the capacity for self-rule or spiritual freedom. This typology will provide a helpful initial orientation to readers unfamiliar with Gandhi's thought.

The rest of the essays concentrate largely on the fourth dimension of freedom, freedom as self-rule. Anthony Copley points out that Gandhi's conception of freedom is far from a libertarian endorsement of people's choices, whatever they may be. Indeed, Gandhi's distrust of formal political institutions, his insistence on a "politics of virtue," makes his conception of freedom rather unorthodox and more intrusive than libertarians might accept. In his characteristically thorough essay, Ronald Terchek demonstrates that he understands Gandhi's conception of freedom in terms of autonomy, and he makes a powerful case that Gandhi provides an acute diagnosis of the various impediments to autonomy. Fred Dallmayr's essay shows the ways in which Gandhi's conception of freedom can help us overcome many dichotomies inherent in our current understandings of liberty. Gandhi's conception of freedom straddles both positive and negative liberty, it provides for a personal space without retreating into a debilitating subjectivism, and it makes the idea of social cooperation a part of the conception of freedom. Judith Brown argues that while modern human rights activists have appropriated Gandhi, his philosophical allegiances make him an odd ally of human rights discourses. This is because Gandhi's commitment to the rights of the oppressed did not spring from a commitment to an individualism that is deeply skeptical of ideas of society and humanity itself. Such a commitment underlies modern human rights discourses, while for Gandhi, such rights would have been unintelligible unless framed in the context of a moral universe that exists independently of human will.

Sudarshan Kapur's essay describes the ways in which contemporary Hindu fundamentalism has perverted Gandhian ideals into a collective narcissism. In perhaps the most challenging essay in the book, Denis Dalton gives an account of Gandhi's originality. He argues that in the twentieth century, Gandhi alone made the relationship between ends and means the central question of politics. Almost all ideologies in the last century, including Marxism, anarchism, and even liberalism, have at various times legitimized violence, and Gandhi was alone in making violence the central challenge for political theory. This essay makes useful comparisons with a host of twentieth-century writers on the relationship between ends and means: Trotsky, Goldman, Maritan, Nehru, and so on. But it misses an opportunity to take on the standard objection to Gandhian techniques, namely, that they cannot work in the face of extensive violence. Stephen Hay's essay reminds us of the potential of Gandhi's conception of swaraj, his ideal of empathetic service, and his emphasis on prayer as a political technique.

For readers unacquainted with Gandhian thought, this volume will provide a reliable introduction to his idea of freedom. But it adds little that is new to Gandhian scholarship, in part because most of the authors themselves have published extensively on the subject before. In particular, Parel, Terchek, Dallmayr, and Dalton have been, along with Bhikhu Parekh, responsible for establishing without doubt that Gandhi ought to be taken seriously as a political theorist. But the fact that their essays are such scrupulous renditions of Gandhi's thought also makes them less probing interlocutors of Gandhi's legacy than they might otherwise have been. To return to the paradox I began with, why does Gandhi seem such an improbable figure in the twentieth century? Is it because of our failings or the implausibility of his assumptions? For those interested in furthering the cause of Gandhian ideals, these remain the most challenging questions.

Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights. By Ayelet Shachar. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 207p. \$55.00 cloth, \$20.00 paper.

Bhikhu Parekh, London School of Economics

Liberal multiculturalism contains a tension. It values culture as the source of individual identity and development, and seeks to accommodate cultural differences by granting the relevant groups special rights, exemptions, and, in some cases, varying degrees of autonomy. However, it also values basic individual rights that some of these groups might deny or severely curtail, especially in relation to women. Liberal multiculturalism is therefore faced with a conflict between what it takes to be two important goods, or what Ayelet Shachar calls the paradox of multicultural vulnerability. If it privileges cultural differences, it compromises and even jettisons its liberalism; if it privileges individual rights, it ceases to be multicultural. Is there a way of conceptualizing and organizing society such that both these goods can be realized? Shachar thinks there is, and devotes her thoughtful and well-argued book to outlining and defending it.

Shachar argues that the tension lying at the heart of liberal multiculturalism can be resolved by revising the traditional two-dimensional political theory in two important respects. We should conceptualize political life in terms not only of the state and the individual but also of the cultural group, the third and often neglected unit of moral and social life. And we should not see the state as the sole source of legal and political authority but, rather, as sharing the latter with cultural groups. In such a view, individuals remain the center of moral concern, and are seen as having two kinds of affiliations and being subject to two kinds of authority, namely, the state and the cultural group. Their culturally significant activities are to be decided neither by the state nor by the cultural group alone but by both together.

This principle of joint governance, as Shachar calls it, requires a judicious and mutually regulative division of jurisdiction between the state and the cultural group, institutionalized cooperation between the two, and the freedom of individuals to decide which of them should have jurisdiction over which of their affairs and to opt in and out of their cultural groups. Shachar suggests that such a process of accommodation is not static but transformative, leading over time to a redrawing of the boundaries between the state and the cultural group, a redefinition of their relationship, and internal changes in both. Rather than force cultural groups to make appropriate internal changes, Shachar's strategy relies on incentives and internal pressures. She rightly argues that since different societies have different histories and traditions and face different problems, the principle of joint governance takes different forms in them.

Shachar's book addresses an important problem and is full of rich insights. Taking different human activities, she shows how the principle of joint governance would work in practice and what kind of institutional structure it would require. As she shows, many multicultural societies, including the liberal, have often felt it necessary to resort to some form of joint governance. She critically examines their experiences, highlights their tensions, and offers a more coherent way of dealing with them.

Shachar's approach is not free of difficulties. The individual does not belong to one cultural group, as she generally tends to assume, but to several. She does not say how their jurisdictions are to be civided, and their inescapable conflicts resolved. It is not entirely clear, either, how Shachar decides which matters fall within the jurisdiction of a cultural community and which ones within that of the state. Education of

children, for example, concerns both, and we need to decide whose claims are stronger and trump those of the other. Since she offers no coherent principles, much is left either to the vagaries of the political process or to the political power of a cultural community, and neither is a good basis for redressing the inequality between different groups or for contesting the state's likely oppression of some of them.

The principle of joint governance, on which Shachar heavily relies, rests on the problematic assumption that the state and cultural groups enjoy a broad equality of status. The state represents and speaks in the name of all its citizens, and its authority is consensual and publicly accountable. This is not the case with cultural groups whose "authority" is inherently vague and weak. They and the state cannot therefore be treated as equal. Furthermore, once the state is placed on a par with cultural groups, we have no means of deciding which takes precedence when the two come into conflict. We need a broader theory to help us determine and regulate their respective jurisdictions and authorities, and Shachar offers none. Her approach requires considerable philosophical work if it is to carry conviction.

For Moral Ambiguity: National Culture and the Politics of the Family. By Michael J. Shapiro. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001. 248p. \$47.95 cloth, \$18.95 paper.

Frederick M. Dolan, University of California at Berkeley

Michael J. Shapiro reflects on "the politics of the family" from the point of view of an outlook on political life inspired by "genealogy," an approach originated by Friedrich Nietzsche and refined by Michel Foucault. Although Shapiro would not characterize it quite in these terms, that outlook is roughly as follows. Ideas about political regimes are typically governed by the values of unity, agreement, or consensus. But that is highly misleading. A consideration of how political concepts and institutions come into being (that is, a genealogy of the political, as opposed to a theorization of it) leads to a picture in which disagreement and conflict are as central as consensus and harmony. Words like "authority," "democracy," and "freedom" are continually redefined as people put them to different uses in changing contexts of conflict and interpretation. What they are thought to mean at any given moment will be an incomplete, contested, and on the whole incoherent echo of actual usage. Individuals, too, shape their outlooks by means of clashing and contradictory desires, norms, and perspectives. For this reason, the goals and beliefs that move any actually existing political regime (and any given individual) will typically be ill defined, ambiguous, and amenable to additional equivocation and conflict.

However, our prejudice in favor of consensus makes it difficult for us to remain attuned to all this. Rather than accepting that ambiguity and conflict are normal and trying to identify areas of confusion or disagreement that are troubling for some further reason, we identify conflict per se as the problem and strive to replace it with consensus. This we do by appealing to some putatively "neutral" (hence, universally acceptable) principle. Because (pace Jürgen Habermas) no such principle exists, the consensus is invariably felt to be imperfect, imposed, and therefore unstable. If we were to lessen the intensity of our desire for unity and coherence, however, and accept the essentially conflictual and contingent character of political life, we might discover opportunities to ease the demand for conformity we make on ourselves and others. We could then assume a relationship to political life that is freer, more spontaneous, and more creative. In recent years this perspective, which was outlined in 1887 by Nietzsche in Zur Genealogie der Moral, has informed work by Foucault, William E. Connolly, Thomas L. Dumm, and Shapiro himself.

Accordingly, Shapiro confronts moralizing certitudes about "family values" with the dissonances and ambiguities that feature permanently in all social life but which are plausibly regarded as on especially vivid display in the family. His aim is not to contest the moralizing view with some other judgment but to reveal the extent to which the family's complexity demands an approach to judgment that is altogether more flexible than mere moralizing. He does not neglect classical theories of the family, such as Plato's and Hegel's, and he also deals with more recent commentators, such as Jacques Donzelot, Jean Elshtain, and Christopher Lasch. But most of the book is taken up by a series of comparisons constructed from an immense and colorful variety of cultural artifacts. The novels Shapiro discusses include Russell Banks's Cloudsplitter, Don DeLillo's White Noise, Joe Gores's 32 Cadillacs, Vladimir Nabokov's Lolita, and even Samuel Richardson's Clarissa, among others. Films discussed include Robert Altman's Kansas City, Atom Egoyan's The Sweet Hereafter (an adaptation of the Russell Banks novel), Jim Jarmusch's Dead Man, Elia Suileman's Chronicle of a Disappearance, and such others as Boogie Nights, Boyz N the Hood, The Sound of Music, and Patriot Games. Art Spiegelman's Maus, Aeschylus' Seven against Thebes, and the thirteenth-century Icelandic Njal's Saga share these pages, as do treatments of works by Edouard Manet and Richard Wagner.

Yet Shapiro's approach is not merely eclectic; he is deeply interested in how the articulation of family life responds to the pressures exerted by the various genres in which it is expressed. The ubiquity of genre, he suggests, is an asset rather than a liability. By appropriating, reinterpreting, and rediscovering genres, each new generation enacts its conflicts with its precursor generation, invents distinctive voices, rethinks obligations and opportunities, and in general achieves transformations in our sense of what family life means. The result is a view of the family in which adjustment and contestation are the norm, and the questions are not whether but how the family is changing and how one ought to respond to its metamorphoses.

Shapiro is more than convincing about how the family serves as a symbol for broad ideological conflicts. He shows in detail how saying something about the family can be an act that challenges structures of power and authority. Anticipating the objection that his rejection of "the humanist subject of consciousness" leaves him without a moral foundation, he also asserts that his writing on the family is a challenge to authority issuing from a "democratic ethos" that constitutes the locus of "the political" nowadays (p. 173). I am less certain of the latter claim. The democratic ethos that Shapiro's work is said to sustain is, he writes, "a way of...being open to difference" that cultivates a hospitable attitude toward the strange and unprecedented, along lines drawn from Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Giorgio Agamben (p. 174). To speak of an ethos is to speak of a way of life rather than a political state. In our world, an ethos can realistically be imagined only as a way of life that individuals are able to choose because they enjoy the freedom from intrusive regulation that is characteristic of a liberal democratic state. So the ethos would depend on a justification for such a state, the received justification being the idea of individual autonomy or self-determination that Shapiro rejects as "the humanist subject of consciousness." In other words, we are invited to imagine autonomous self-determiners choosing to live according to an ethos of openness to the strange and enigmatic. It is not strictly impossible, but neither is there any strong reason to look forward to it. In a modern, affluent civilization the amount and variety of opportunities for fulfillment are vast, most are concerned exclusively with joining like-minded individuals in the pursuit of private interests, and there seems no reason to suppose that arrangements cobbled together in this way will gel into a democratic ethos of the kind Shapiro imagines. It is therefore unlikely that openness to difference is going to constitute the political. It is safe to say that the political will remain where it has been for a long time: in the problems surrounding the rise of the liberal democratic state.

Speaking broadly, this state's main problem concerns the way in which its success has been accompanied by extremes of wealth and poverty, corruption, waste, the moronization of culture, and the destruction of nature. Is this price worth paying, merely to sustain the notion that having the power to decide for oneself how to live is the supreme political value? Merely to sustain the feeling of moral superiority enjoyed by those whose constitution invites them to regard themselves as self-determining agents? Is it really the case that the obscenely wasteful policies of the liberal democratic state must be respected because they issue from the will of a free people? These are the questions today, they are likely to remain, and even if the democratic ethos of openness to difference were to constitute the political—if it succeeded in building organizations capable of contesting the legitimacy of the liberal democratic states—there is, unfortunately, no reason to suppose that it would be better suited to addressing such matters than any of the other perspectives on the horizon.

**Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do.** By Cass R. Sunstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 304p. \$29.95.

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A venerable question has once again become a dominant issue confronting public law scholars. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, ostensibly democratic states have emerged throughout the areas formerly designated as the Second and Third Worlds. The establishment of these new regimes has invariably been accompanied by the promulgation of written constitutions. For public law scholars, this sequence has posed the question of the utility of written constitutions: What, if anything, do these documents add to nation, state, and society?

In Designing Democracy, Cass R. Sunstein argues that "the central goal of a constitution is to create the preconditions for a well-functioning democratic order, one in which citizens are genuinely able to govern themselves.... I contend that a constitution should promote deliberative democracy, an idea that is meant to combine accountability with a high degree of reflectiveness and a general commitment to reason-giving" (pp. 6–7). This is a novel and intriguing argument.

To advance his argument, Sunstein does not engage in an extensive exploration of how constitutions function in most democracies. Except for a few passing references to South Africa and Israel, he discusses only the United States. The book will be valuable to comparativists only to the extent that they buy into Sunstein's theory of deliberative democracy and then seek, on their own, ways to adapt that theory to other nations.

Nor does Sunstein offer a fully developed theory of deliberative democracy. He is content to "link the project of constitutionalism with the notion of deliberative democracy, not to elaborate that notion on its own" (p. 7). Instead, he develops his argument by a series of "case studies" about such issues as secession, impeachment, citizenship, homosexuality, and so on. Every one of these chapters is well worth reading. And while each is illustrative, no chapter fully articulates his argument. What follows, therefore, is this reader's attempt to come to grips with Sunstein's thesis.

First, its novelty. Historically, written constitutions are the capstone of the ages-long struggle to limit arbitrary governmental action. In the immortal words of James Madison: "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions" (*The Federalist #51*). Constitutions are, in Madison's language, a principle auxiliary precaution.

A written constitution has proven to be the most expedient way to regulate the government because it almost always addresses a number of perennial issues: How are the rulers to be selected? How are the rulers to utilize the organs of government to implement policies? How are the people in a country to inform their rulers about their interests and concerns? A constitution identifies the common objectives of the people and their rulers, the procedures that the government may use to enact and implement policies, and the human rights that the government must respect.

Democracy, as a political concept, is highly supportive of a written constitution. Democracy is premised on the idea that the government is the agent of the people, and that for the people to exercise that role they must enjoy a full range of human rights. The various mechanisms and procedures of democracy are designed to ensure that government is respectful of those rights while being responsive to the needs and wants of the people. Historically, those objectives have been accomplished without a written constitution, but most democracies have found it useful to instruct and limit their governments via a written constitution. Thus, all but two—San Marino and the United Kingdom—of the 118 democracies in the United Nations have written constitutions.

As Sunstein notes, the frequently hypothesized conflict between democracy and constitutionalism has not proved irreconcilable. At the conceptual level, democracy need not be confined to simple elected majoritarianism. Like other theorists, he sees a written constitution as a precommitment strategy that incorporates the citizens' willingness to function within predetermined limits in order to protect fundamental rights.

What makes Sunstein's argument distinctive is the way he extends this precommitment argument to incorporate his theory of deliberative democracy. Thus, in the section on "Constitutions as Precommitment Strategies" (pp. 96–101), his first seven points are fairly conventional; his last point is not: "We can also see many constitutional provisions as mechanisms for *ensuring* discussion and deliberation oriented toward agreement about the general good rather than factionalism and self-interested bargaining" (p. 101, emphasis added).

This is the intriguing, fascinating, aspect of Sunstein's argument. Yes, we can, if we so choose, believe that the Framers of the United States Constitution *hoped* to establish a deliberative democracy. Yes, as he notes, "Madison saw differences and diversity as democratic strengths rather than weaknesses, if channeled through constitutional structures that would promote deliberation and lead groups to check, rather than exploit other groups" (p. 97). But that is not the same thing as saying that the American Constitution *ensures* deliberation. Are we to be forced to be deliberative?

To avoid that issue, Sunstein argues that Supreme Courts, when interpreting a constitution, should whenever possible avoid basing their decisions on complete political theories. Rather, they should tend to utilize minimal, incomplete theories—agreed upon principles, really—that decide the

case at hand while leaving the larger issue to be resolved by the people and their elected representatives. But how likely is that to happen in the *deliberative* manner so warmly endorsed by Sunstein's theory of democracy? Even the briefest comparative study would indicate that it depends more upon a nation's political culture than its constitution. Surely there is little in the American experience to support his belief that our political culture encourages deliberation rather than self interest, whether defined as individual autonomy or economic advantage. Nor does the social science literature about the American electorate, Congress, the presidency, our political culture in general—which Sunstein systematically ignores—indicate the likelihood of a deliberative democracy emerging in the near future.

So we are left with an incomplete argument for seeing the American Constitution as supporting deliberative democracy. For all my long-term support of that theory as the preferred way to interpret the Constitution (Martin Edelman, Democratic Theories and the Constitution, 1984, Chapter 11), Designing Democracy is to be valued most for the many insights that Sunstein supplies on the substantive issues he discusses. Perhaps that is enough. After all, it was Justice Holmes who recommended books on the basis of their "apercus."

The Soul of Justice: Social Bonds and Racial Hubris. By Cynthia Willett. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 241p. \$46.50 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Ange-Marie Hancock, Pennsylvania State University

When is freedom possible? In the silence of a shared heart-beat, when desire is not consumed by the wounds of social forces, hubris, or the historical memory of such violations. According to Cynthia Willett, the locus of that desire is in the socially embedded person. She argues that crimes against the individual as a social person constitute political wounds that should be healed via emancipatory love (p. 214).

Overall, this book aims to shift the foundation of moral philosophy from liberalism's autonomous individual to the person "who expresses his or her individuality through the capacity to form libidinous relationships with others" (p. 167). Reclamation of the ancient Greek crime of hubris as a political violation of social relationships involves a pursuit of justice for marginalized groups via protection of the socially embedded individual. Ironically, quasi-biological, psychoanalytic evidence of presubjective individuals is presented as proof.

Recent communicative ethics debates have pitted Jürgen Habermas against feminist theorists like Nancy Fraser and Carol Gilligan. Siding with the feminist theorists, Willett agrees that Habermas's discourse ethic is a necessary but insufficient condition for a comprehensive view of political life (p. 47). Hidden narratives prevent the discourse ethic from satisfying questions of inequality and political alienation. The larger question is how to acknowledge differences in the structure of moral judgment (e.g., between men and women) in a way that does not privilege one structure (rational) over another (care). Habermas appeals to the rational structure, depending on psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg's work, partly out of a desire to find a capacity that all individuals possess, regardless of their usage of it. Gilligan similarly argues that the ethic of care is another capacity present in all—just used predominantly (but not exclusively) by women. If both structures are in fact hardwired into humans, as most psychologists would have us believe, then are not their emergences as gendered predispositions the result of socialization and ultimately assimilable into a single model of moral judgment suitable for the pursuit of justice?

Willett seems to believe so. Arguing for attention to "the forces that make us feel alive and connected," she seeks to insert a counternarrative of justice as a universal consideration in moral discourse. This act would presumably enrich the discussion of social relationships (p. 78) so important to an ethic of care, as well as remedy group-based injustice. For Willett, our social predisposition is another necessary but insufficient condition for addressing global inequalities that cross nation-state boundaries.

The question then becomes, who establishes the parameters of this universal counternarrative and the appropriate response to changing social forces? The "outsider-within" perspective, defined most clearly in Patricia Hill Collins's (1990; 2001) *Black Feminist Thought*, grounds Willett's turn to slave narratives as a useful surrogate for monolithic master narratives like race. Privileging outsiders-within requires an expanded conception of citizenship (p. 92). Left unmentioned is the required concomitant reformulation of state sovereignty, which in a context of global inequality is most risky for countries at the margins.

Willett convincingly supports her assertion that a counternarrative of social justice necessitates a reconstitution of the citizen as a social person, ultimately redefining freedom. This changed definition of freedom implies different social norms and different laws (p. 180). One particular social norm is the prohibition of hubris, exemplified by racial arrogance in chapters on Beloved and Frederick Douglass. Taken from ancient Greece, hubris is "an assault on social bonds" (p. 183), capable of destroying not merely an individual victim but society as we know it. African American writers of the slave experience have translated the notion of hubris into a threedimensional vision of freedom: ideals of freedom and identity attached to the erotic, a concept of the person as a social event, and an approach to restoring freedom via rites of reconnection rather than liberalism's stoic separation. Willett concludes that "we must work instead for the spiritual renewal of social bonds" (p. 185) with authority.

These rites of reconnection are absent where Willett turns—to Herbert Marcuse's theory of eros and freedom, partly due to the problems within Marcuse's original vision. The minor point she makes from her laborious analysis—that motherhood and the social values produced from it point us in new directions for social transformation (p. 117)—is persuasive. Yet Marcuse leads her far away from her larger goal of inserting a social justice counternarrative. Supplementing Marcuse with the psychoanalytic theory she challenges in other chapters, she permits the paternalistic terms of his revolutionary model to proceed unquestioned. In other words, is the kind of revolution Marcuse advocated (student and intellectual led, dependent on technology) a desirable or viable goal in a twenty-first century of globalization?

This Marcuse rehabilitation is ill equipped to empower "those who reside on the other side of the social divides" (p. 69). Freedom, defined as self-determination grounded in relationships with others, prioritizes the need to protect the individual from hubristic market and cultural forces. Yes, people are alienated by the "racialized distortions of social space." In Willett's slave narrative of choice, Beloved, freedom and ultimately empowerment are based upon one's capacity to determine who or what you love (p. 207). Frederick Douglass's writing further implies that self-representation is key (p. 191). Must not we empower those residents of "the other side" to choose modern, "rational" structures in addition to what seems more appealing—neo-Freudian, erotic social bonds? bell hooks's call for "love as the practice of freedom," along with Martin Matustik's vision of a multidimensional dialectic (p. 103), enrich Marcuse's notion of eros and freedom. But hooks in other arenas focuses on the work of Paulo Freire as a springboard for accomplishing just what Willett seeks—bringing those who live on the margins into the center. Freire's empowerment pedagogy contrasts directly with Marcuse's idea of revolution, and would bring us closer to the aspect of self-determination both Willett and other theorists consider a critical component for eradicating group injustice.

This largely convincing account raises important questions for democracy. If we insert hubris codes and a norm of social justice into the discourse, what additional purchase do outsiders-within gain? The question of sanction and recompense for crimes of hubris are briefly explored. Willett distinguishes between hubristic criminals and "those who carried out acts of revenge against the hubris of their oppressors" (p. 192). Contemporary acts of revolt or revolution are dizzyingly complex in an era of Rwandan genocide and September 11. Psychological processes of social judgment focus upon attribution of responsibility for an offense. We often advocate different consequences based on whether we consider the person ignorant, negligent, or having malicious intent. In the ancient world, lack of knowledge that one commits a crime of hubris does not exempt the offender from the consequence. How do we adjudicate justice when, to paraphrase Mahmood Mamdani's evocative title, victims repeatedly become killers in Rwanda? Willett's book sends us in new directions to answer questions with ancient origins.

**Socratic Citizenship.** By Dana Villa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 370p. \$65.00 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Gerald Mara, Georgetown University

The publication of Dana Villa's Socratic Citizenship coincides accidentally with recent events that have shaken and solidified American society. Yet the issues his book addresses are directly relevant to how a democratic society confronts such challenges. Villa investigates various forms of democratic citizenship and argues for a kind of civic activity that has been dangerously obscured within modern debates about democracy. Particularly within periods of regime stress, liberalism's good citizen who votes, pays taxes, and plays by the rules seems underequipped to meet the commitments the times require. The framework of the communitarians or the civic republicans wherein one discovers the value of "a shared commitment to something bigger than one's self... [endorsing a] life of community or civic engagement" (p. x) seems more helpful. Villa's concern is that this view of citizenship too easily enlists the community's members in projects of collective affirmation, while ignoring the importance of a critical rationality that asks skeptical questions about the content and the moral consequences of a politics driven by a "newly rediscovered sense of political membership" (p. x). In response, he rediscovers the possibility of a form of citizenship that places "intellectual doubt at the heart of moral reflection," demanding not commitment but conscientiousness (p. xii). It is this form of citizenship that seems most compatible with moral individualism, and thus with the basic premises of democracy. He plausibly finds the origin of this kind of citizenship in the practices of Socrates as they are portrayed within the early Platonic dialogues, Apology, Crito, and Gorgias.

Villa begins with an interpretation of these dialogues, but his major concern is to reveal the fate of Socratic citizenship within modern political thought. He focuses particularly on five thinkers, J. S. Mill, Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, Hannah Arendt, and Leo Strauss. While all of them take "strong stands on the relevance of Socratic moral individualism to modern politics" (p. 59), they all, to different degrees, understand citizenship in ways that undercut rather

than respect "the Socratic idea of philosophical, dissident citizenship" (p. 59).

The interpretation of the dialogues differentiates and endorses conscientious Socratic dissidence, as compared with the assertive Periclean citizenship promoted within the remarkable funeral speech. Villa's Socrates contests the aggressive agenda of the funeral oration, not in the name of a moral expertise that can discover the truly right way of organizing common life, but out of a more individualized criticism of common ideals guided by the moral imperative to avoid injustice (pp. 24, 58). Socrates' commitment to this imperative is reflected both in his speeches against Polus and Callicles in the Gorgias and in his own behavior as described in the Apology. When he refused to cooperate with the Thirty Tyrants in the judicial murder of Leon of Salamis and when he declined to bring the unconstitutional indictment of the Arginusae generals before the assembly, Socrates essentially invented (p. 1) a model of philosophically dissenting citizenship that has been largely forgotten within modern political thought.

For Villa, Socrates' example has been overlooked due to a broad skepticism about "the viability of a philosophical form of citizenship under the conditions of the nation state and increasingly universal suffrage" (p. 59). It is in Mill's work that the promise of Socratic citizenship comes closest to being fulfilled, within the praise of the activities of thought and discussion and the paean to creative individualism in On Liberty (p. 75). Yet this opportunity is lost (p. 124) when Mill's pessimism about the capacities of the lower classes leads him to endorse political deference to elites (in Representative Government) (p. 122). After Mill, departures from Socratic citizenship become more pronounced. Though Nietzsche is committed to affirming the overman's intellectual integrity, he ends by radicalizing this commitment into a call for the rejection of rationality in the name of the "the myth and value-creating powers of art" (p. 181). And by suggesting that the overman's intellectual integrity is a radically individualized achievement, Nietzsche lays the foundation for the claim that philosophy and citizenship are mutually exclusive.

In spite of the significant differences among Weber, Arendt, and Strauss, Villa sees this last assumption informing all of their positions (p. 129). Weber responds to the disenchanted culture of modern mass society by confining the independence and autonomy that Socrates sought to encourage among all citizens to political leaders (p. 206), who embrace political goals less from thoughtful reflection on political purposes than from devotion to a cause (p. 219). For Villa, the very different projects of Arendt and Strauss are connected in their opposition to this Weberian view of politics and power. Arendt proposes a return to the Periclean ethos of active citizenship whose connection to skeptical thought is at best ambiguous (p. 273). Strauss argues for a certain kind of philosophical politics, where the relevant form of philosophy is not Socratic dissidence but the more affirming and directive philosophy of Plato (of the later dialogues) and Aristotle. This direction cannot be the transmission of philosophic truths through political education, for the city is at bottom resistant to philosophy (p. 294). Thus, good citizenship becomes deference to opinions articulated within a habituating political culture managed by the decent (p. 294). Arendt's Pericleanism and Strauss's Platonism are thus counter-Socratic, for both end by supplanting independent, critical thought.

This book deserves a wide, appreciative readership, both for the importance of the argument and for the depth and breadth of the interpretations that support it. Villa seems right to say that too many proposals for more engaged democratic citizenship discourage the critical distance that allows scrutiny of individual commitments and public purposes. And by calling this critical stance "Socratic," Villa counters the

unhelpful notion that political problems and resources are segmented within "premodern," "modern," or "postmodern" cultural contexts. In making his case, he develops a sophisticated interpretive argument without obscuring the complexities and anomalies of the sources in question. He pursues rather than ignores texts that complicate or challenge his argument, and while the book offers a powerful and important pragmatic message (p. 309), the individual interpretations are all valuable in themselves. There are times when the effort to detect the presence of Socratic moral individualism within these modern texts may lead to exaggerations or understatements. Mill's praise of the self-creative individual in On Liberty seems at least as Periclean as Socratic, in tone if not in content. And the Nietzsche committed to reforming culture appears (pp. 282ff) perhaps later than he should. Still, Villa's overall readings are rich and provocative. Each of the voices heard here is distinctive, yet they all have things to say to one another. He brings both the distinctiveness and the engagements to the fore with admirable sophistication, fairness, and clarity

One might make two more general points, posed less as criticisms than as observations. First, while Villa engages a variety of modern voices, there are others who are less prominent than they might be. Tocqueville plays only a supporting part within the interpretation of Mill, and he is, in general, the conservative Tocqueville, suspicious of the majority and lamenting the demise of tradition (p. 66). But there may also be a need to make room for the critically distant Tocqueville, whose stance on emerging political innovations is far from unidimensional. The more positive (than Weber's) sociology of Jürgen Habermas and its framing theory of communicative rationality are considered only as potential masks for widely shared prejudices (p. 180), as if participatory democracy and communitarianism were identical. One wishes to hear more from Villa on both authors.

Second, this interpretation may underplay ways in which Socratic citizenship is incomplete. Without a more active form of civic involvement, Socratic citizenship may come perilously close to the self-absorbed purity of the beautiful soul (p. 55). Villa finds the benefits of Socratic citizenship in the dissemination of Socrates' skeptical rationality across a broader spectrum of citizens (p. 56), yet this seems inadequate for political contexts where decisions need to be made and actions taken. Thus, even among Socratic apologists, some more active citizen(s) may need to become involved if Socrates' dissolving rationality is to be politically salutary. Socrates' commitment to disconnect himself from the injustices of the Thirty does not do Leon of Salamis much good (p. 26). Within Xenophon's narration (Hellenica 1.7) of Socrates' courageous refusal to bring unconstitutional charges against the Arginusae generals, it is left to the more active citizen Euryptolemus to speak assertively (though unsuccessfully) in support of Athens's own democratic procedures. It is therefore questionable whether the Socrates of (any of) the Platonic dialogues wishes simply to reproduce his own skepticism among the Athenians he interrogates. However, any encouragement to practice politics always seems to acknowledge that active citizenship must accept as settled and salutary some of those conclusions that Socratic citizenship treats as questionable or dangerous. Even the counter-Periclean funeral oration that is represented in the dialogue Menexenus asserts a spirit of Hellenic ethnic homogeneity (245 c-d) that is foreign to thoughtful criticism but perhaps necessary in politics. Critical rationality and citizenship may qualify as well as enhance each other.

There may also be more of a need to address the resources and destinations of critical rationality. Absent some sense of a human good that can be damaged by political assertiveness,

the dissidence of the critical citizen seems more agonistic than reflective. Conversely, the dissident citizen's explaining why certain widely shared views court injustice may lead him or her to discover more about the human content of the just and the good. This need not be a quest for remote foundations; it may simply reflect the need to explore the bases and implications of one's critical judgments. It seems too minimalist to identify the content of Socrates' political rationality primarily on the basis of what he says to Crito or Callicles.

Both forms of incompleteness seem acknowledged within the Platonic dialogues. Villa is reluctant to accommodate these contributions in part because he accepts as conclusive the division between the early "Socratic" (aporetic) dialogues and the later "Platonic" (dogmatic) ones (p. 2). In spite of the long-standing and well-respected scholarly tradition behind this division, its validity is not altogether obvious. The bases of these reservations are less important than the implications. If the Socrates of the *Apology* is continuous with the Socrates of the *Republic*, there may be a sense in which Socratic citizenship (understanding it and trying to practice it) can be enhanced and not destroyed by Platonic political philosophy.

**Augustine and Politics as Longing in the World.** By John von Heyking. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2001. 278p. \$37.50.

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John von Heyking's inquiry into Augustine's politics of "longing" is a provocative contribution to the growing genre of "Augustine redux" literature written to resonate with our fin de siècle sensibilities. These valuable pearl-diving expeditions bridge scholarship and literate conversation, careful textual exegesis and political advocacy. Not surprisingly, they also illustrate the challenges of writing for multiple audiences with mixed messages. This work enters an already crowded field of recent crossover texts with Peter Brown's Augustine of Hippo (2000), Gary Wills's Saint Augustine (1999), Hannah Arendt's Love and Saint Augustine (1996), and Jean Elshtain's Augustine and the Limits of Politics (1995). A further trip back in time to the Cold War and the politics of "realism" turns up Herbert Deane's The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (1963), another retrieval project written to persuade as well as inform. And this is just a very short list.

Augustine's ironic voice paired with the evident fervor of his faith, from the Sermons to The City of God, make as compelling reading today as when they were written. His legacy to worldly philosophers, particularly the political sort, continues to arouse passionate debate precisely because he is such an unexpectedly worldly saint. A dominant leitmotif running through Augustine's classic rendition of decline is the increasing discontinuity between the de jure and the de facto, between justice administered by the institutions of both church and state and the daily experience of individuals living in communities defined, as he famously put it, by their respective "loves." This tension is especially striking in his relentless reportage on the chasm between the founding virtues of the Roman Republic, immortalized by Cicero and Virgil, and the morally questionable loves of his late Roman, largely Christian, fellow citizens. Cleverly avoiding the pitfalls of Manichean dualism, Augustine neither fully damns the Roman state, as had Tertullian, nor fully invests it with a sacred aura, as had Eusebius. Political life for Augustine is always ambiguous.

At one level, the current study also has a message in mind, targeting an audience of "Moderns," predominantly "liberal democrats," who are looking for a way to keep a "regime of

tolerance" from degenerating into a "regime of secularism" (p. 260). Augustine's thoughts are "timely," the author believes, because they relocate human longing for true justice and happiness on a "transcendent" plane of divine deliverance, but make "a civic attitude of gratitude" and moral suasion a crucial earthly component of a pilgrim's progress. At a second level, however, the author presents a nuanced, historically based reconstruction of Augustine's thoughts on public life. His exploration of the word "consul," teasing out as many possible meanings as Augustine himself might have extracted from Roman writers and deployed in his own rhetoric, is particularly interesting (pp. 71–76). These forays into Augustine's literary world are illuminating chapters, rich in linguistic reconstruction and based not only on *The City of God* but also his pastoral writings.

Yet there is a third strategic argument at work. Here the audience is more specialized, confined to the schools of political thought founded by Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss. Von Heyking's agenda is to rehabilitate the saint's reputation as a Christian virtue ethicist and move him from the periphery to the center of the "cosmion" as a philosopher of natural virtue. The dominant interpretation, inside and outside Straussian-Voegelinian circles, is that Augustine is a political realist when it comes to the scope and limits of public institutions and a Christian moralist with respect to the lives of the faithful. The author quotes Leo Strauss's lament that "there is a valid hierarchy of ends, but there are no universally valid rules of action." Augustine "is thought to fail miserably on this score" (p. 6), the author adds, only because his "rightby-nature" ethics has not been fully appreciated, even by Strauss and Voegelin who mistakenly think Augustine "denies the world's inner goodness." Such dark readings open the door to modernism's inner demons-"millenarianism, alchemy, gnosticism and revolutionary ideology" (p. 13).

Augustine's rhetorical style, which von Heyking calls "extreme" but which, ironically, others have termed surprisingly modern, defies categorization. His signature "cities" of God and man are spiritual communities animating political and religious institutions but mixing mysteriously in the workings of both. Intending his words as a spiritual seduction, Augustine entices his fifth-century readers along a path of reason until they are captured by the powerful Christian faith lurking behind it and drawn into his simultaneous defense of Christianity and of the worldly virtues the Romans were in the process of losing. However, the current study with its trinity of pursuits does not provide the reader with as satisfying a journey. The reason is that its scholarly and rhetorical agendas undercut each other to the detriment of the strongest strand of argument—the author's careful exploration of Augustine's understanding of civic virtue and its importance in the lives of the faithful and nonfaithful alike. The overall effect is to elevate the moral capacity of political, social, and ecclesiastical institutions as reflections of the "longing" for natural virtue on the part of the citizen-faithful as they approach the "ground of (divine) being." Augustine's tragic sense of the conflicting obligations of Christians in public life, and of the mixture of loves among both citizens and faithful members of the church, is not foregrounded. The family, the "city" as a moral community, Voegelin's "cosmion" as a regime or "little world," and actual historical entities such as Rome flow into one another without the friction that often characterized Augustine's writing in the minor key (pp. 174–75).

The thematic core of this study is the metaphor "right-bynature." It is deployed as if it were in common usage among scholars and hence unproblematic. In fact it is neither, except among those specialists who speak the language of Straussian or Voegelinian discourse. The reader must look to footnotes (p. 4, n. 4, and p. 8, n. 12) for its source in an article by James Rhodes ("Right-by-Nature," Journal of Politics 53 [May 1991]: 318-38). Further digging discloses the root of the idea in Aristotle's Ethics. Many scholars might read Aristotle's discussion of physei dikaion in Book V as referring primarily to natural "justice" and not "right" in the modern moral sense. But the author, without extended explanation, renders the phrase as "right," making it a Platonic "natural theology to guide the city" (p. 8). Augustine, in turn, becomes a political theorist of Christianized natural theology. As such, his writings can be used to transform the idea of civic virtue into the "equivalent to the biblical concept of righteousness" (p. 8, n. 12). The operational meaning of Augustine's idea of virtue, the author will go on to explain in the rest of the study, is always specific to local conventional mores. Yet the saint's prudential approach remains firmly anchored to the view that human virtue in the saeculum longs to share in the "nature" of goodness reflected in the universe as God's Creation. By so doing, the author argues, Augustine provides an antidote to "Moderns" who have fallen into "Machiavellism" and "other forms of extremism" because of their loss of faith in the moral possibilities of public life (p. 9).

And yet this is also a work of careful scholarship. Von Heyking demonstrates with more textual fidelity than most Augustinian commentators that the saint mobilized every metaphor at his command, from the family to bands of robbers, to engage his readers in understanding the importance of personal morality, earthly peace, and justice. Emperors and subjects, thieves and pirates, fathers and slave masters are enjoined to establish a worldly order of obedience and rulership for the good of the governed and not just in the service of their own lust for power. The author explores the great chains of analogies summoned up by Augustine to explain to a skeptical Roman-Christian world that "order," whether of peaceful citizenship, human "loves," or nature, is a universally prized good as well as God's intention. As Augustine famously notes, even bands of brigands must have an agreement among themselves about basic practices if their enterprise is to prosper.

What is at stake in this study of the theology of civic virtue is the meaning of "nature." Most of the authors cited here understand Augustine to be periodizing history, with the Fall of Adam, the birth of Christ, and the impending demise of the Roman world as nodal points. For Augustine, institutions of both church and state are not natural in the sense of "original," but are inserted in history as part of God's strategic plan to keep the peace among a population whose loves are decidedly mixed. As a result, tyrants and republicans rule with equal legitimacy. The author, however, places his emphasis on institutions of family, society, and politics as vehicles of moral education. On this reading, they are part of the "natural order" of sociability and personal moral enrichment that began in Eden and continues through the family to social life, to citizenship, and on to religious observance. Augustine's dark vision of the state as the "barbed hooks of the executioner" seems more a rhetorical device than a true measure of the saint's belief.

Yet Augustine-the-Bishop was a Roman by education and sensibility, acutely aware of the different realms of public law and human society, although in his official capacity, he did Rome's as well as the church's work in Hippo Regius. Augustine would always settle for the great gift of peace on earth, even if that required using the Roman Empire to crack down on Christian dissidents whom he considered violent terrorists. For every Augustinian statement about an enhanced moral life possible when Christian public officials rule, most often written in the subjunctive mood, there is an equal and countervailing comment about "submission" to an absolute state that coercively enforces customary loves, whether sinful or saintly.

No work on Augustine can omit his brilliant deconstruction of Cicero's hopes for a moral republic. Von Heyking's riff on this classic theme is characteristic of his project. Augustine says that "a people is a community of a rational multitude which is associated by a communal concord of the things it loves" (p. 83). To evaluate the "character of any people" requires the observational exercise of noting "what they love." "A superior people" will be "bound together by higher things" (p. 83). Generations of scholars have marveled at the flexibility of the saint's sliding scale, with its acknowledgment of the givenness and diversity of public life. However, the author's reading of the interchange with Cicero is subtly different. He says that "just as one becomes godlike by imitating Christ, one's soul is dispersed into the flux of the world when one inordinately pursues worldly goods" (p. 83). In other words, "political societies become more like the objects they love" (p. 83). To the author, Augustine is not relativizing the analysis of polities and their legitimacy but rather thinking "about elemental, existential and transcendental representation" (p. 83). Here again the author's three conversations are carried on simultaneously, distracting attention from the careful scholarship that is the great strength of this work. One is reminded of Augustine's observation in The Confessions, "Is justice therefore ... changeable? ... No, rather the times which it rules over are not identical for the very reason that they are times" (John K. Ryan, ed., 1960, p. 86).

Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory. By Stephen K. White. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 158p. \$49.50 cloth, \$15.95 paper.

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A play on the legendary statement attributed to Stalin—"When I hear the word ontology I reach for my gun"—captures the anticipated reaction of some to Stephen White's provocative work. It would be better if these readers were slow to draw. For White demonstrates that, wittingly and unwittingly, poststructuralist, postmodernist, and other theoretical types who eschew foundationalism nevertheless commit themselves to ontologically "sustained" (prefigured) ethical and political "affirmations" (judgments, values, insights, theories). He documents their "turn" to a new form of ontological justification. "Weak ontology" produces strong political theory, an important discovery for all theorists who are also post-Stalinists.

On one level, Sustaining Affirmation is a masterful comprehension of the thought of George Kateb, Charles Taylor, Judith Butler, and William Connolly, or, if a reader's interest runs to the generic, of versions of liberalism, communitarianism, feminism, and poststructuralism/postmodernism. Each theorist White examines has been prolific, and often difficult, which speaks to the great value of a thorough critical work that explicates and clarifies without simplifying. At a deeper level, his purpose is to lay bare the ontological infrastructure of the aforementioned theoretical genera, the weak ontology that in different ways and to different extents animates the political theory of the four thinkers representing them, a task accomplished powerfully.

Weak ontology is late modern in contrast to the modernity and premodernity of foundationalist strong ontology. Strong ontology's claims to universality and certainty, its hostility to contingency and indeterminacy in thinking about political life, are opposed by its weak ontological counterpart, which likewise opposes the strong ontological basis of traditional liberal theory, notably its disengaged, unencumbered subject. Weak ontology's opposition is anchored in an insistence on the essentially contestable nature of all concepts fundamental

to political theory, emphatically those of self, other, and world intrinsic to thought, designed to adequately orient us ethically and politically to late modern life. Contestation is directed not only toward contending theoretical positions. It is a continuously self-reflexive movement that every political theory must build into itself to disrupt its own fundamentals, their coalescence, and the systematizing structure that coalescence produces. This "folding" or "enactment" of contestation, in White's ontological terms, installs a mechanism for arresting theoretical tendencies toward reification, the hallmark of strong ontologies.

Weak ontology conceptualizes subjectivity as "sticky"agency is linguistically entangled, mortal, and conscious of its finitude, capable of novelty while self-identified with an ultimate source of its being to which it is attached steadfastly as it evokes its reverence and wonder. These (contestable) universals, the anatomy of weak ontology, are fleshed out in the analysis of his four theorists and come to life differently by means of their different embodiments in each theory. Each clothes these universals in various "figurations" of meaning, bearing imprints of the historical circumstances in which theory necessarily is entangled. Through universals, weak ontology creates in political theory an aesthetic-affective sensibility to the world, enabling it to think and feel the world in definite ways. As the source of political theory's opening to the world through which its thinking and feeling absorb existence, weak ontology must be "cultivated." Cultivation requires time and care to shape the figurations of being that finally "prefigure"—orient us cognitively and affectively—to ethical and political insights and judgments. Here I found White's idea of political theory to be especially poignant. Political theory's debt to weak ontology, through which images of existence are able to pass in order to play their role as prefigurations of possible ethical and political forms of life, is repaid by a beauty reflected in its openness to the world. After considering White's readings of several theorists, it is this aesthetic quality of political theory that loomed larger than any other. Springing from weak ontology, the aesthetic becomes political theory's lifeblood.

White discovers properties of weak ontology in Kateb's theory of "democratic individuality" that enable him to theorize social and individual existence in ways adequately prefiguring the value he accords to individual rights, individuality's equal recognition of the other in the creation of its own identity, and constitutional democracy. Kateb's prefiguration of ethical and political judgment falters with a conception of justice immune to the way the identity of the other is effaced in individuality's self-creations of identity, a shortcoming, White proposes, remediated through a more robust ontological engagement with language and finitude. Underscoring the important weak ontological work that God's absence performs in Kateb's confrontation with problems created by thinkers on whose shoulders he stands, White also criticizes his dismissal of theism and appears to suspect him of artificially shoring up his prefigurations with compensatory ontological moves. Taylor offers White proof that theism need not entail a strong ontology and is compatible with a weak ontological model's prefigurations of the political. Theism, for instance, does not prohibit Taylor from immersing subjectivity in the linguistic stickiness underrepresented in Kateb's theory. It is precisely the linguistic dimension of Taylor's weak ontology that prefigures his communitarian liberalism, with its stress on the normative good of culture for its partial constitution of identity.

Whereas Taylor's theory of language enriches his weak ontology, Butler's weak ontological framework tends toward a certain "thinness," owing to a linguistically overdetermined deconstruction of identity. This ontological deficit is egregious

where White discovers a deep ethical impulse at work in her analyses of discourse and power, a sympathy for "bodies that do not matter" connected to an idea of community where the language/power nexus would be negotiated in ways more generous to the self. This ethos of generosity wants for an adequate ontological prefiguration. Thinness surfaces again where the inertia of deconstruction creates a disposition toward viewing all identity as oppressive and to be discarded. Attention to finitude, White argues, would imbue identity with greater weight, chastening Butler's allegiance to the human being as an "infinite becoming machine."

Connolly's weak ontology nearly parallels White's model of prefiguration. Particularly important is Connolly's cultivation of the aesthetic-expressive dimension and of reverence for being, which are tied intimately to his notions of being and becoming and prefigure his ethos of critical responsiveness. White is especially interested in the way this ontologically framed ethos of critical responsiveness informs Connolly's critique of pluralism, his idea of expanding pluralization through a micropolitics of the self, and in how political liberalism can be shored up by at least a partial accommodation of Connolly's ethos. Critical responsiveness still proves to be inadequately prefigured. Turning to Martin Heidegger, who throughout the book has been brought in to rescue ontological-ethical/political connections, White outlines an approach for strengthening Connolly's weak ontological prefigurations. Connolly's weak ontology is the strongest of the four thinkers. His political theory is richer because it is richer as a weak ontology.

Weak ontology raises interesting questions where it also may be problematic. The question of origins: Does White tease weak ontology out of the fabric of contemporary political theory, or does he first assemble it from elsewhere and bring it to bear critically on theory? If the former, political

theories are addressing implicitly the same ontological issues, meaning that something of deep philosophical importance is going on in recent political thought. If the latter, weak ontology may be obscuring significant nonontological differences among theories. The question of sustaining weak ontology: Although its fundaments are contestable, does defending a weak ontology reproduce the paradox that plagued strong ontologies—providing a foundation for a foundation? Or if weak ontology sustains strong political theory, is it then also sustained by the strength of a theory? Justification becomes circular. The question of outing: At times, White wants a tighter connection between weak ontological figurations and the ethics and politics they prefigure. Does this tighter connection betray an underlying desire for a strong ontology? Finally: White may error in thinking Kateb a liberal; Kateb relates individuality to a purer idea of constitutional representative democracy than liberalism permits, which affects how his thought can be redescribed ontologically. The late modern democratic world may have overcome finitude in ways that lend plausibility to Butler's concept of the self as an infinite-becoming-machine. Connolly's amoral source for sustaining his ethics and politics is not external to life and not open to Taylor's connection between external amoral sources and violence, as White contends. If the compatibility of Taylor's theism and weak ontology does not affect the latter's contestability, does weak ontology need theism at all? This question can be posed in several forms.

While it is possible to review only a few arguments of this tightly woven examination of the philosophical scaffolding of contemporary political theory, it should be clear that Sustaining Affirmation is a highly original project that is brilliantly executed and leaves recent political thought looking different than in any other of our current attempts to understand it.

#### **American Politics**

Southern Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives. By Stanley P. Berard. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001. 250p. \$22.95.

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The rise of partisanship in Congress has been one of the most conspicuous features of American politics during the 1990s. David Rohde's (1991) Parties and Leaders in the PostReform House demonstrated that much of this rise in partisanship could be attributed to the convergence in congressional voting between Northern and Southern Democrats. Since the New Deal, the latter had traditionally allied with Republicans on many issues in a bipartisan conservative coalition that generally dominated both Houses of Congress and constrained liberal legislative outcomes. While Rohde and Barbara Sinclair (Legislators, Leaders and Lawmaking, 1995) have emphasized how institutional rule changes in the 1970s created a much greater incentive for party loyalty among members of Congress, relatively little attention has been paid to the extent to which enhanced partisanship in Congress has been driven by "bottom-up" electoral imperatives. Stanley Berard's new book on Southern Democrats in the House convincingly shows that major changes in the southern electoral environment were equally important in promoting convergence in the voting records of Northern and Southern Democrats, leading to a more partisan House overall.

Utilizing a combination of survey data and roll call voting analysis, Berard shows that a variety of interrelated factors have forced Southern Democrats to respond to very different electoral constituencies in the past two decades. He also makes good use of Richard Fenno's (Homestyle, 1978) concept of the different "primary" and "reelection" constituencies that House members have to accommodate, in order to illustrate the conflicting electoral pressures on Southern Democrats. Southern black voters are now enfranchised and constitute the Democratic voter base in southern congressional elections. At the same time, most of the most conservative white Democratic voters have moved to the Republican Party as a genuine two-party system has evolved in the South. Federal court decisions have also led to the creation of a greater number of urban districts in the South, which are less ideologically conservative and tend to favor more liberal Democrats.

Underlying this southern electoral realignment, Berard's analysis reveals, is a highly complex and fluid picture of Democratic congressional electorates in the South. With the departure of conservative whites to the GOP, both "primary" electorates and the broader "reelection" constituencies became closer ideologically to northern Democratic congressional electorates during the 1980–96 period. This was particularly evident on economic issues, but during the 1990s, there was increasing convergence between northern and southern reelection constituencies on civil rights, social/cultural issues,

and foreign policy issues as well, although southern Democratic "reelection" constituencies remained somewhat to the right of the national norm on most of these matters. The author also finds, moreover, that the urbanization of the South has created a new urban Democratic constituency of (largely upper-middle-class, professional) white liberal voters who are ideologically aligned with liberal positions nationally—particularly on the so-called "social issues" like abortion, affirmative action, and gay rights. Indeed, his analysis reveals that V. O. Key's finding (Southern Politics, 1949) that southern white conservatism tends to rise directly in accordance with the size of the black population in a particular area, while still accurate with regard to the rural South, no longer holds up for the urban areas of the region where the opposite now appears to be the case.

Berard finds that regional convergence is even more apparent with regard to "primary" electorates, and following Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson's model of issue evolution (Issue Evolution, 1989), he expects that the broader "reelection" constituency of southern Democratic congressional voters will eventually reflect the views of party elites. The impact of core electorates and voter mobilization in this context is worthy of further study, however. Berard does not discuss the increasing role of national Democratic-supporting interest groups (gays and lesbians, teachers' unions, trial attorneys, black organizations, feminists) in providing funds and activists for Democratic congressional candidates, but the influence of national interest and activist groups and of the national media has surely been significant in the rise of increasingly convergent party congressional campaigns and electoral constituencies. The impact of "primary" electorates on members in an age of political action committee financing and declining electoral participation was demonstrated by the 1998 House vote on the impeachment of President Clinton. Most Republicans voted to impeach Clinton in defiance of national polls because they (correctly) judged that their primary electoral constituency would be more likely than not to be in complete agreement with their actions. Similarly, all but a handful of southern white Democratic congressmen voted against impeachment, although their states and districts generally appeared to have had a low opinion of the former president's conduct.

Berard argues (pp. 158-60) that the 1990 redistricting and the creation of 13 new black-majority districts in the South ultimately had little impact on the 1994 Republican landslide in the region, which was more determined by national issues. In fact, Republican gains in 1992–94 were disproportionately in the southern states, and Republican numbers of U.S. House members increased markedly in almost all southern states while those of white Democrats went down. This was not due to the defeat of Democratic incumbents but was the creation of more open seats after redistricting and the retirement of many white Democratic incumbents, who faced the difficult prospect of running against an African American Democrat in the primary in a black-majority district or, alternatively, facing a Republican in a lily-white district almost completely bereft of the Democrats' base voters. Redistricting in the South certainly was a crucial factor in increasing the number of Republican seats in the region in 1992–96 and maintaining a Republican majority (albeit narrow) in the House since 1994.

Overall, this is a very fine and worthy piece of scholarship on an interesting and relevant topic. Berard convincingly marshals his data to make his case, and the book is lively and well written. Given that the forces driving both parties toward polarization and internal convergence are not likely to depart the political scene anytime soon, we can expect the increasing homogeneity of national Democratic and Republican congressional electorates to continue over the course of the next decade.

The Trouble with Government. By Derek Bok. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2001. 493p. \$35.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

John R. Hibbing, University of Nebraska-Lincoln

When first presented with this book, I confess to harboring two strong reservations—both, as it turns out, badly misplaced. First, perhaps because the author is a widely known American who was once the president of Harvard and, therefore, spent considerable time among movers and shakers, I was prepared for a broad, rambling, and discursive book peppered with anecdotes, personal musings, name-dropping, and disconnected prescriptions for change. Second, no doubt because I have never been fond of the overarching evaluation exercises that so enthrall foundations, when I read in the introduction that this volume on government had been commissioned by three major foundations, I feared I was about to read another governmental report card accompanied by the obligatory and often vacuous justification for the grade assigned in each area.

But this book is not at all superficial and self-indulgent, just as it is not at all a predictable foundation report card. Instead it is thorough, serious, and creative. The book betokens an author who has done a tremendous amount of work, who has a detailed knowledge of the relevant scholarly literature, who cares about his country, who is thoughtful, and who writes well. Though Derek Bok does come close to doing so in preliminary chapters, at no point in the book does he assign grades to any portion of government. The book is too inventive and prescriptive for that. My preconceptions were wrong and I am ashamed of myself.

The Trouble with Government begins with a description, drawn heavily from Bok's previous work, of the issues the United States government seems to have handled well and the issues it seems to have handled poorly from the 1960s to the 1990s. By Bok's reading of the data, for example, the country has made substantial strides in such areas as research and technology, race relations, the arts, the environment, and the well-being of children as well as the elderly, but personal responsibility and crime have worsened. Bok's focus then shifts to a comparison of progress in the United States with the progress made by other developed Western democracies, and his conclusion here is much less anodyne. Progress in the United States compares unfavorably in all areas except scientific research and a few isolated other measures. This disappointing appraisal sets the stage for the book's central questions: why is the U.S. government not performing better and what can be done to improve its often desultory performance.

Much to his credit, Bok's answer is clear. He believes there to be three central problems with how government operates. First, the U.S. system generally and Congress specifically are parochial, overly decentralized, unaccountable, and more eager to appear to be solving problems than to be solving problems. Second, the U.S. regulatory system is based on a rigid, legalistic, adversarial model, rather than on the flexible and cooperative design that characterizes some other countries. Finally, citizens of "modest means," particularly working people and those who would like to be working people, are not engaged in government, and therefore policies meant to assist them are inadequate or perhaps nonexistent. As a result of these problems, statutes are badly designed, regulations make citizens and businesses hopping mad, and working people and the poor fare badly and are disaffected.

What to do? Bok is distinctly unpersuaded by the ability of currently popular reforms to bring much improvement. He is appropriately dismissive of efforts to bring government closer to the people by having more initiatives and referenda, by creating opinion panels, or by devolution. He has only a little faith in typical efforts to reinvent governmental, especially bureaucratic, procedures. And he does not believe campaign finance reform addresses the core of the problem. Rather, Bok seeks to give more direction and unity to government by strengthening parties, by weakening such alternative power bases as congressional committee chairs and legislative rules that protect the rights of minority opinion, and by weakening the separation of powers. He even flirts with the idea of "requiring voters to choose between each party's slate of candidates for federal office instead of allowing them to vote for a president from one party and a senator or member of Congress from the other" (p. 287). With regard to regulations, Bok wants to rely more on the marketplace, he wants to use more comparative risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis, and he wants regulators to listen more carefully to those being regulated so that a spirit of cooperation can be established and silly, unreasonable regulations will no longer be promulgated. And he thinks that citizens of modest means can be engaged by further reform of electoral law (perhaps even compulsory voting), by strengthening unions and otherwise promoting workplace democracy, and particularly by increasing people's involvement in organizations and clubs. such as community development corporations.

This is an intriguing blend of remedies in that it seeks to unify the institutions that Montesquieu and Madison separated, to restore the vivacious associational life that de Tocqueville noted 150 years ago, and to establish a more corporate and European relationship between business and government. Bok longs to combine parliamentary-style institutional change, group-based social capital, and regulatory reform: a marriage of James McGregor Burns and Robert Putnam with Ronald Reagan presiding. There is something for most everybody here. Liberals will be attracted to Bok's desire to empower the underclass; conservatives will applaud his wish to allow the regulated more influence in the drafting of regulations; and good-government reformers will support his desire to make government simpler, more accountable, and more popular.

I have my own view of these proposals, but that view is not as relevant to this review as the probability that these proposals will not achieve the outcome Bok seeks and that they are, in that sense, badly misguided. If the goal is to renew people's faith in their government, why start by increasing the clout of the very entities they dislike the most? People despise interest groups and political parties, yet Bok calls for institutional reforms that will enhance the electoral-governing role of parties and the regulatory role of special interests. The people do not want Enron and Haliburton writing energy regulations any more than they want the Sierra Club doing so. They do not want the AFL-CIO or the National Association of Manufacturers to be given more influence. The people do not want either the Democrats or the Republicans to be given a clear path to enact change, and they do not want party leaders in Congress to be given more power than they already have.

More controversially, I would maintain that the "citizens of modest means" that Bok so badly wants to involve in government would rather not be involved in government. They find it distasteful and not particularly relevant, and they have other things they would much rather do with their time. Motor-voter did not help, and making voting day a holiday would not help much either. And does anyone seriously believe that making voting mandatory would lead people to feel better about their government? Joining groups and

otherwise working together undoubtedly have many good consequences, but no evidence exists that they make people more appreciative of government or more involved in it (any correlation between joining groups and political involvement is almost certainly spurious). Indeed, recent experimental work has indicated that when people provide input to a decision maker believed to be somewhat self-interested, they actually feel less influential and more frustrated than when they have no input at all. So the notion (which Bok shares with many well-intentioned reformers) that if only we could get the uninvolved to participate they would be pleased with government, would participate more in the future, and would help the government to make better decisions is both terribly inviting and terribly wrong.

But agreement with the author's prescription for improving the United States government is not necessary to make *The Trouble with Government* a worthwhile read. I found his evaluation of government to be much more persuasive than I thought I would, and it is difficult to argue with many features of his description of the problems. Writing actual recommendations for change is by far the most difficult part of any book on government, and so I think stimulation, not agreement, should be the standard for judging prescriptions—and I certainly found Bok's prescriptions stimulating. I recommend this wide-ranging, learned, insightful book to all who care about U.S. government.

Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society. By Dennis Chong. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000. 292p. \$45.00 cloth, \$18.00 paper.

Howard Margolis, University of Chicago

Dennis Chong proposes an account of how to forge a merger between rational choice and sociological explanations of the role of norms, values, and symbols in politics. The core idea is that norms and values (not just self-interest) are indeed essential for understanding political choice (as a sociologist would expect), but that norms and values have to develop. Those in place today change over time. And rational choice enters in guiding that evolution.

So on this account, we could expect that norms and values in place within a community lean toward serving the interest of that community, but with a lag. Conditions change, and norms change in response to that, but not immediately. We get a sort of Bayesian view of the evolution of norms and values, where what used to make rational sense in a community is the analogue of a Bayesian prior, which holds back full adoption of what may now make sense. Both the sociological (expressive politics) and economic (rational choice politics) views are essential.

Chong's labels are "dispositions" and "incentives." Once dispositions are in place they do not easily change. But over time they do change, in response to rational incentives. Defining what interests are, however, turns out to be troublesome, since interests are not necessarily narrowly material interests. Anyone who watches how actual human beings behave (in contrast to only calculating how game theoretic rational actors ought to behave) is very likely to agree. But this leads to analytical ambiguities. Chong's proposal here supposes that empirical experience gradually teaches a person how changes in values and norms would improve the situation. But this seems easier to agree to with respect to norms than to values. And even for norms there is Mancur Olson's collective action problem: Norms may make us all better off, but often an individual would be better off if everyone else complied but he or she avoided the obligation. So how do norms evolve under Chong's model of individual choice?

Chong develops the argument over a series of chapters specifying how he takes these interactions to work, but leaving rather open his answers to the questions just noted. Nevertheless, he has interesting things to say about the elements of his argument (the links between individual choice and the dynamics of groups, defense mechanisms that slow the response to new conditions, and why to some extent they are functional.) This includes development of a formal model in Chapter 2, although use of the model turns out to be not very central to the enterprise. There are insightful case studies in the later chapters, especially of the evolution of racial norms in the South under pressure from the federal government. There is a detailed case study of the response of a Texas community on the far outskirts of Austin to the tension between the promise of economic development and the concerns of a very conservative community about the kind of people tolerated in Austin who are becoming a major force in Williamson County. Another case concerns the response of the New England fishing community of Gloucester (of "perfect storm" fame) to the appearance of the Unification Church (Moonies).

All this is put effectively to work to show the strength of Chong's view (as against a single-mindedly sociological or single-minded rational choice view). He is alert to the feedback of changing norms, not only on the costs and benefits of norms that have not (yet) changed but on how the effects are themselves valued. If you think you ought to do something, that does not guarantee that you will like to do what you now think you ought to do, but it certainly increases the prospect of tastes moving in that direction.

There is not much reference to the formal modeling in the case studies—none at all, really, in the Williamson County case, which is the most detailed—but Chong returns to the modeling near the end. I did not see much that was substantial in the modeling, but there is a good deal of room for varying styles in such things. What one person finds exciting another can see as just mathematical hand waving. Formal modelers will want to think about Chong's modeling. But those with no taste at all for such stuff can safely skim past it. Nearly everyone, I think, will get something out of the sharply observed case studies. And the basic perspective—that we will profit from careful, increasingly precise thought about how rational choice incentives and social influences interact and mutually influence each other—is surely correct.

**Championing Child Care.** By Sally S. Cohen. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 397p. \$52.50 cloth, \$26.00 paper.

Joyce Gelb, City University of New York

Sally Cohen has written an important and comprehensive analysis of child-care policy in the United States, challenging the conventional wisdom that no such federal policy exists and that child care is not a major government priority, in contrast to other democratic welfare states (e.g., the Scandinavian countries and France).

The book is premised on the hypothesis that changes in political institutions and organized interests shape the outcomes of policy. To this one might add another aspect of policy change that Cohen well documents: demographic changes, including the large numbers of working mothers with young children (62% of women with children under three years of age in 1996). The numbers of children in day care quadrupled from the late 1970s to 1990 (75% of American children utilized some type of child-care arrangement by 1995), and early childhood programs for the 13.3 million children living in poverty have proliferated as well (pp. 3, 7, 11). However,

as Cohen points out, if the number of working women alone determined policy outcomes, different solutions would have been arrived at years ago. The analytic framework the book employs utilizes the concepts of major public policy analysts: Baumgartner and Jones's punctuated equilibrium, Sabatier and Smith's advocacy coalitions, and the "new institutionalism" and "historical institutionalism." Cohen looks to the latter's emphasis on path dependency, stressing the difficulty of reversing long-standing patterns that negated the importance of addressing national child-care policy.

In her 30-year review of child-care policies, Cohen begins with the Nixon veto in 1971 of comprehensive child-care legislation. She then guides us through less familiar eras of policy making on child care, including developments in the late 1980s that led to the passage of landmark legislation in 1990, and finally the 1996 welfare reform act and its impact on child-care policy. Her approach is to try to explain why these three critical junctures for policy occurred when they did and also to illuminate processes that sometimes led to unlikely (e.g., Republican conservative) sponsorship in a policy area normally promoted by Democrats. The book deftly connects child care with welfare reform and support for children in poverty, and it emphasizes the federal aspects of child-care policy, particularly through Title XX and more recent policies, which have provided state funding for child care.

Cohen demonstrates the intricacies of policymaking on child care, documenting conflict over vouchers and clashes between advocacy groups and members of Congress from both parties. Another source of conflict has been the issue of funding child-care providers with religious affiliations. Concern over federal standards and state prerogatives also impeded legislation for a long period. It is clear from the analysis presented that the complexities of the federal system profoundly affect child-care policy, which relies on state implementation. The book is strengthened by the painstaking attention Cohen gives to the complicated implementation process after the passage of each piece of legislation; for example, she examines conflicts regarding standards, licensing, and early education (such as the Head Start program) within the context of devolution of policymaking to the states.

The book provides detailed information on the littleknown policy negotiations of 1990, which led to what Cohen views as pathbreaking "breakthrough" legislation on child care in the first Bush administration as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (p. 130). The law provided particular assistance to low-income families, although the Child Care and Development Block Grant was the first federal childcare program not connected with welfare. The At Risk Child Care program marked an important and unusual congruence between the executive and congressional branches of government. Cohen emphasizes the key role of committees in the process, stressing the importance of rules changes that enhanced the participation of greater numbers of members of Congress, the support of the president, and the advocacy of the Children's Defense Fund in explaining the policy change. She attempts to shed light on the factors that led to positive change under Republican presidents and right-wing control

The 1996 welfare reform bill (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act), with specific focus on its impact on child-care policy, is the third policy issue analyzed in depth. Among other aspects of the legislation was withdrawal of a federal guarantee for child care, as well as decreased funding for other child-care programs, though there was reauthorization of funding for many of the 1990 reforms. And, although they are less dramatic, Cohen points to initiatives during the latter part of the Clinton administration, including increased attention and support for policy dealing with after-school care

for children, as well as further research as child-care-related issues were redefined to broaden support.

It is difficult to fully assess the child-care initiatives documented here and the progress that Cohen asserts has occurred, that "the child care development block grant has institutionalized child care within the federal government" (p. 303). A chart of the federal structure of responsibilities on this issue would clarify the nature of institutionalization. Is there a coordinated federal effort around issues of child care at present; can the view that federal policy matters be documented? Data would also help our understanding of what has been accomplished by the enactment of these policies: those who have benefited from the initiatives in child-care policy and those who have not. A comparative lens would aid in clarifying policy gains as well. For example, how do child-care initiatives compare to others in such related policy arenas as health care and the Violence Against Women Act? A particularly significant omission in the book is the absence of analysis of tax credits and deductions as major instruments of child care policy in the United States.

The strength of this book may lie in documenting processes and policy outcomes, in itself a major achievement, rather than in providing full explanations for them. What factors are most responsible for the policy changes examined? More attention to the limited role of women's groups in the policies analyzed would be welcome. In the final analysis, as Cohen suggests, the study fails to fully confirm the perspectives of those policy analysts whose frameworks she employs (p. 278). Perhaps it is necessary to look beyond these to others, exploring the notions of "incubated innovations" and "redistributive" policymaking more fully (p. 278).

Cohen has done an admirable job of aggregating a record of accomplishment in a policy arena unfamiliar to many students of social policy. However, a truly comprehensive national child-care policy for the United States is still not a reality. As she suggests, the next stage may necessarily involve a focus on child care beyond welfare.

Fenced Off: The Suburbanization of American Politics. By Juliet F. Gainsborough. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 191p. \$70.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Gerry Riposa, California State University, Long Beach

By the 1970s—and, some might argue, a decade earlier—America had shed its urban persona and had metamorphosed into a suburban nation. Yet in comparison with research done on cities and urban politics, little work had focused on this transition and ensuing suburban politics. Juliet Gainsborough's work seeks to reduce this deficiency by examining the suburban movement, its motivations, and their linkage to political behavior. Thankfully moving beyond previous discussions of mortgages and work commutes, the author narrows the focus of this short monograph to how living in the suburbs affects voter choice and policy preferences by altering the decision-making calculus (p. 8).

The author's thesis is that public opinion and behavior are related to resident location. Her hypothesis is that suburban dewellers—defined here as those who live in a metro area but reside outside the boundaries of the central city—think differently about national politics and, as a consequence, vote differently (p. 4). Hence, the guiding question throughout the book: Do suburban dewellers have unique political views that are conditioned by where they live, or are their views related to individual-level characteristics that would operate the same way regardless of residence?

Her data are drawn from the Congressional Research Service, 1990 Census, and the American National Election Studies 1952–1992. Using homeownership as her independent variable, the author examined relationships with party identification, support for congressional and presidential candidates, and policy preferences on government spending and welfare spending.

Providing a useful literature review on the definition, development, and myths of suburbs, Gainsborough offers the following argument. The move to suburbia is not the result of some gravitational pull toward conformity, but rather a retreat to defend local boundaries. In the author's words, "the fencing off of a community is not only a rejection of what lies outside but also a fear of losing what lies inside" (p. 17). Thus, living in suburbia shapes political behavior and generates a conservative tendency that can be demonstrated through candidate and policy preferences. As the country becomes more suburban, the likelihood that they will be represented by conservative politicians increases, and with it more conservative decisions on federal spending and less support for central cities. Simply put, she argues that place matters.

The author's findings generally support her hypothesis and argument. While suburbs are diverse, their political behavior demonstrates certain generalizable trends (p. 71). Suburban residence does relate to increased support for Republican Party candidates and opposition to government spending for service provisions for cities and welfare (pp. 68, 75). This opposition is less pronounced for social security, leading the author to conclude that if benefits are perceived as primarily middle class, government service is more acceptable. Both findings suggest a distinctive suburban political character that is not accounted for by differences in socioeconomic characteristics (p. 77). Still, the strength of the relationship, though frequent, remains small (p. 80).

But are suburban voters distinctive, tending to be more conservative because of where they live, or are conservativebased populations self-selecting, tending to move to a place they perceive as appealing to conservative values? This study is unable to separate or tease out which has the greater independent effect. According to the author, it is probably a combination of both. As she puts it, "Particular kinds of people leave the city for the suburbs and once there their behavior is reinforced" (p. 77). Home ownership alone does not carry the predicted impact, but owning a residence along with others who seek to insulate themselves may generate the distinctive suburban character. Regardless, the relationship between suburban living and political behavior is evident when the author controls for socioeconomic variables and when party identification is taken into account. Her reasoning is that if preexisting political attitudes are causally related to suburban migration, then one would expect that including party identification would negate the suburban effect and it does not (p. 77).

For Gainsborough, the greater point is that suburban place matters in American politics, and with unabated numbers continuing to move to the suburbs, the impact of this spatial relationship to political behavior will only become more influential. This migration—what Gainsborough calls a geographic sorting of voters along racial and economic linessuggests that the clustering of middle-class and higher incomes in these resident communities explains the move to the political right and the ascendancy of conservative candidates and policies (p. 111). In the offing, central cities and low-income and working-class communities will be disadvantaged in the competition for federal support, particularly if Democrats move to the right in an effort to capture some portion of this rising suburban constituency. This cleavage between urban and suburban is not absolute. As suburbs become older and experience the same problems as cities, they tend to lose their distinctiveness from cities. Nevertheless,

the author concludes that this form of localism will make its presence felt for some time, unless community and common bonds are defined across city/suburbs lines (p. 139). She suggests that intergovernmental agencies should take the lead in promulgating policies to make this connection. As to what policies and strategies are best suited for creating a nexus between city and suburbs, she leaves to future research.

For those interested in how spatial arrangements shape America politics, this monograph is worth the read. In a compact, accessible analysis, the author strips away some of the myths and ambiguity surrounding suburban living and its role on political behavior. For those supporting decentralization and conservative primacy in national politics, these findings will bring a measure of comfort. For those interested in a more progressive presence in national politics, this book is your wake-up call.

Governance and Performance: New Perspectives. Edited by Carolyn J. Heinrich and Laurence E. Lynn, Jr. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000. 349p. \$65.00 cloth, \$23.95 paper.

Improving Governance: A New Logic for Empirical Research. Laurence E. Lynn, Jr., Carolyn J. Heinrich, and Carolyn J. Hill. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 212p. \$60.00.

Dianne N. Long, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

Carolyn Heinrich, Laurence Lynn, and Carolyn Hill are public management and policy scholars who puzzle over the workings of government. Their efforts aim not only to add to our understanding of these workings but also to provide a template for future study. The first volume by Heinrich and Lynn is designed around a set of working papers originally introduced at a conference of government and policy scholars in May 1999 at the University of Arizona, and are oft referred to as "the Arizona papers." The publication is the result of a research project funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts to study best practices in government management. The second volume authored by Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill argues for a theoretical framework to guide future research.

The Heinrich and Lynn book could easily be called "workings." It focuses on issues of organizational design in answering the questions: "What does government do?" and "What difference does it make?" The exploration of research lays out the most recent advances in theories and statistical methods. In organizational parlance, this set of observations considers government organizations as whole systems, rather than as patterns of policy behavior. The authors consider the study of governance as "regimes of laws, administrative rules, judicial rulings, and practices that constrain, prescribe, and enable government activity" (p. 3). The authors consider legislative mandates, administrative structures, and formal organizational features, such as networks. Much of the discussion concerns what can be called "the logic of governance." This logic incorporates legislative actions and its bureaucratic responses. As a collective work, this book presents valuable insights into bureaucratic behavior and government programs, including Chicago's schools, jobs programs, welfareto-work, legislative regulation committees, and health

The cases presented center on providing a theoretical and empirically based literature on government institutions. The sense of the volume is in harmony with central questions of the classical school of organizational behavior: What is the ideal organization? What is the one best way to deliver a product or service? What factors enhance outcomes? These

questions have never been absent from our inquiry related to administrative theory and organizational behavior.

The set of cases focuses on contemporary governments carrying out policy initiatives. Various features of today's organizations are clearly considered by this set of well-known scholars. Melissa Roderick, Brian Jacob, and Anthony Byrk provide an analysis of student achievement data. The study finds that extra instructional time and investment in student progress are important factors to success. Heinrich and Lynn (the editors) provide a descriptive analysis of the Job Training Partnership Act. They find strong association between policies and incentives and with administrative forms that shelter programs.

A number of cases deal with welfare-to-work programs. Edward T. Jennings, Jr., and Jo Ann G. Ewalt look at both top-down and interpersonal system approaches in state welfare delivery by using interviews of state administrative personnel. Lowered caseloads remain a hope in future welfare reform. Jodi Sandfort examines the effect of welfare-to-work organizations and outcomes in 82 Michigan counties. Interviews with managers and discussion of administrative data reflect a range of interventions and related outcomes. James Riccio, Howard Bloom, and Hill consider administrative records of welfare-to-work programs and survey data in sample counties in eight states. Their interest is primarily in factors that increase earnings and recipient motivation for staying on the job.

Within another policy perspective, Jack H. Knott and Thomas H. Hammond consider deregulation legislative outcomes in banking, trucking, airlines, and telecommunications. They look at how legislation shapes regulatory committees and competition among policy actors. In another case study, Laurence J. O'Toole, Jr., and Kenneth J. Meier provide a narrative of a formal model of hierarchy, networks, and management arrangements. They suggest that management roles become less important as hierarchies become more defined. Patricia W. Ingraham and Amy Kneedler Donahue also consider management arrangements in their review of management uses of financial, human resources, capital, and information technology "subsystems." The case emphasizes the importance of integration for management results. Lastly, John W. Ellwood provides a skeptical argument on modeling governance. He voices ideas raised by Herbert Simon and lays out such questions as "Who should determine policy choices when goals are unclear?"

The writings clearly explain delivery of public policy from a holistic organizational approach. The unique, sometimesquirky behavior of individuals and their motivation is less important in these case studies. The writings as a whole are provocative and insightful. While they may not become predictive models of governance and performance, they provide a solid survey of what government researchers are talking about. They raise questions, propose study approaches, make tentative findings, and point the way for future researchers. The volume is a good overview of organizational design issues for those who have an interest in bureaucracy and policy, as well as for those who would embark on any study of government.

Reading the first volume facilitates an understanding of the thinking behind the second volume, *Improving Governance: A New Logic for Empirical Research*. Here Lynn and Heinrich team up with Hill to provide a literature review of the theories, models, and methods of the social sciences applicable to public management research. The authors take on public assistance child protection, job training, drug abuse treatment, and public education while considering the challenges such programs present for the researcher. A synopsis of the first governance volume takes hold here. The

conversation continues to lead into considerations of the researcher. For example, they puzzle over data issues: "A central empirical problem in governance research is obtaining data that will enable investigators to explore causal relationships beyond a narrow perimeter of theoretical possibilities that leave too much out of the picture" (p. 18). Their research model has strong parallels with the market model used in economics to inform behavioral research. The core of the model considers the elements of legislative choice and political assessment together with governance. Here we see the influence of political economy, bureaucratic control, and socialized-choice paradigms. The struggles of the researcher are central to the discussion of issues. Research design is a critical piece in the book. Here the authors consider design in detail and lay out models, methods, and data sets. They provide a solid review of the literature using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. In the end. they confront the constrained environment inherent in such research.

The volume is a useful review of the literature, much like the "In Search of Excellence" review of organizational behavior works. Further, it provides insights that come from practical experiences and research disappointments. *Improv*ing Governance is a valuable book for those who undertake organizational and policy research and for those desiring to do so.

In the end, the authors provide a useful moral to the tales woven in the text. "Whatever the difficulties arising from divergences between the worlds of research and practice, and however effective the policy analyst or research broker is in overcoming them, the fact remains that the influence of governance research on practice depends on practitioners who appreciate its potential value. Practitioners have an influence on governance only to the extent that they comprehend the institutional contexts in which they operate and the opportunities for influence these contexts afford" (p. 176). Amen.

A Two-Way Street: The Institutional Dynamics of the Modern Administrative State. By George A. Krause. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999. 256p. \$45.00.

Larry B. Hill, University of Oklahoma

George A. Krause has undertaken a statistical analysis of the relationship between the president and the Congress and the enforcement activities of two regulatory agencies: the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice for the years 1949–92. He finds that the president and the Congress often influenced each other, but neither of the political branches succeeded in dominating the bureaucracies. These findings are consistent with the interpretations of presidential-congressional-bureaucratic power of most journalists, sociologists, historians, political scientists, and public administration scholars.

The findings are rank heresy, however, to one small group: the principal-agent theorists who set up shop within political science in the 1980s. They asserted that it was appropriate to apply the assumptions of organizational economics to the relationships between a political institution (the "principal") and a bureaucracy (the "agent"). The main assumption was that the political principal could—or should—control the bureaucratic agent through "hierarchical" authority. Unfortunately, the theorists could not agree on the identity of the political principal; some said that the president was, or should be, in charge of the bureaucracy; some said Congress. When they belatedly discovered that the American system split power over the bureaucracy between the elected branches

and that talk of the political principal was simplistic, some of the theorists developed a fallback position under which Congress and the president became "multiple principals."

The problem is that the concept of the president and the Congress as joint principals is an impermissible violation of the theory's strictures, as this scenario illustrates: At the same time, two competing insurance companies (multiple principals) direct a salesperson (agent) to sell a client a single policy. No organizational economist would argue that the conditions necessary for a principal-agent relationship existed. But the principal-agent theorists in political science skillfully used their complex jargon and methodologies to deflect attention from the shortcomings of their assumptions and analyses. In recent years, however, several researchers—cited by Krause—have pinpointed those shortcomings.

This book addresses the controversies spawned by the principal-agent approach. Krause's research framework is distinctive in that he depicts the relationships among the main actors as being dynamic (they change over time) and interdependent (they constitute a system). Furthermore, bureaucracies may either be acted upon or initiate action—the "two-way street" notion of the title. When he used complex formulas to compare the outputs of the two agencies (administrative proceedings, investigations, and injunctive actions for the SEC; antitrust cases and investigations for the Antitrust Division) with the "budgetary-preference signals" coming from the president and the Congress (Office of Management and Budget requests and congressional appropriations), he found that the interrelations between the elected officials were complex: "In some instances the anticipated component of budgetary-preference signals shows that presidents may influence Congress, the latter may exert influence over the former, or they may jointly influence each other" (p. 106). Krause also found that bureaucracies reacted to the politicians' attempts to control them with a variety of "sophisticated behaviors" that helped those bureaucracies to "shape their political environment. This is borne out by the empirical fact that the SEC and Antitrust Division each play a notable role in affecting the budgetary-preference signals received by each agency from its political principals" (p. 115).

Krause's study directly confronts the principal-agent approach, and his findings sharply contradict its assertions: "Both bureaucratic agencies investigated in this study display support for the notion that these institutions do not merely respond to democratic institutions in a Pavlovian fashion but instead actively shape their respective policy environments through their enforcement activities. In no single case is there empirical support for the conventional notion of political control over the bureaucracy that is found in principal-agent models espousing this perspective" (pp. 113–14). Those true believers who have not yet accepted that principal-agent theorizing has reached an intellectual cul de sac will find no comfort here. But, for three reasons, the importance of Krause's findings does not shine through as clearly as it might in this book.

First, Krause is often too deferential to principal-agent theorizing. For example, he repeatedly goes out of his way to find points of agreement with its prominent proponents, who are cited more often than appears appropriate. And, despite his anti-principal-agent theoretical framework, much of the analysis is conducted using principal-agent jargon. A book that uses with approval such terms as "multiple principals," or simply "political principals," many dozens of times bows to the influence of principal-agent theorizing, even if its research design and findings flatly contradict the theory.

Second, although this is a short book—only 127 pages, exclusive of notes and appendices—it seems longer because the introductory chapters, the introduction and conclusion to the

substantive chapter, and the appendices contain much repetitive material, as does the concluding chapter. But readers must be wary of skimming passages that are mostly redundant because new material that may help clarify the difficult abstractions is sometimes interjected. The redundancies reduce the power of the book's message.

Third, the book is overlarded with jargon (not just principal-agent jargon) and with abstractions. For example, the author is enamored with "endogenous" and "exogenous," which have a technical (and counterintuitive) meaning in terms of the statistical model, and the overuse of which may leave the reader confused. Furthermore, the style of presentation is altogether too abstract. For example, "policy innovations," or "shocks," or "perturbations" play an important role in the analysis. But determining exactly what is meant by the terms requires concentrated effort, and virtually all of the explanations are provided in abstract form—most clearly in the course of elaborating upon a complex equation on page 32. In the substantive chapter, we learn that the bureaucracies' reactions to "shocks" show "sophisticated" and "strategic" behavior, which means that they exercise considerable degrees of autonomy from the president and Congress. But the lengthy discussion provides no illustration of this "sophisticated" behavior that would move us out of the realm of abstraction.

Krause has made a significant contribution to our understanding of presidential-congressional-bureaucratic relationships. His major contribution is that he pounds another nail—perhaps the final one—in the coffin of principal-agent theorizing and brings us back to traditional political analysis, which understands that these relationships are highly complex and variable from one bureaucracy to another and from one policy area to another. Furthermore, he demonstrates that however important one of the political branches might be at a given time, American bureaucracies retain sufficient power resources so as to exercise significant degrees of political autonomy—but that political outcomes always are contingent.

Judicial Review in State Supreme Courts: A Comparative Study. By Laura Langer. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. 192p. \$62.50 cloth, \$20.95 paper.

Donald R. Songer, University of South Carolina

Interest in strategic approaches to an understanding of judicial decision making, including the implications of the separation of powers (SOP), has grown dramatically in recent years. Unfortunately, almost all the research on these SOP interactions has been limited to those involving the U.S. Supreme Court. Laura Langer's book provides a refreshing alternative to the exclusive Supreme Court focus by examining the significance of separation of powers concerns for the exercise of judicial review by state supreme courts.

Langer starts by making a convincing case for the importance of studying judicial review in state supreme courts. She demonstrates that these courts are important policymakers, tackling a number of important issue areas for which no review by the U.S. Supreme Court is possible.

The basic thesis of this book is that judicial review in state supreme courts is shaped by the pursuit of political ambitions, the institutional rules and arrangements governing courts in the states, the nature of the policy adjudicated by the court, and the political context in which the courts operate. Strategic models of judicial behavior are developed to explain both agenda decisions of the courts and the decision on the merits stage. Under a strictly attitudinal model, judges would vote their personal ideological preferences without regard to the

contextual and institutional features of state politics. In contrast, Langer argues that judges will be reluctant to overturn state laws in salient policy areas when other state elites hold divergent views unless there are institutional features that tend to shield the judges from the sanctions of other elites.

To test these strategic models, Langer examines all constitutional challenges to state action in four issue areas decided by state supreme courts for the period 1970–93. She hypothesizes that the extent to which judges behave strategically will be directly related to the saliency of the issue under consideration

In the most ideologically salient area, campaign and election laws, the results largely fit the predictions of the strategic models. Most notably, courts are less likely to docket constitutional challenges to legislative decisions when the ideological distance between the court and other elected elites is large. However, the presence of institutional features that might protect courts, including a difficult constitutional amendment process and a judicial retention process in which judges do not need the direct support of either the governor or the legislature, increases the chances that a constitutional challenge will be docketed. In the decisions on the merits, the evidence is mixed. As predicted by the attitudinal model, the personal preferences of the judges are strongly related to their votes, while the ideological distance between the court and other elites does not have the effect predicted by strategic models. However, several institutional features that might protect judges from retaliation by other elites do increase the chance that a challenged law will be overturned.

For the least salient policy area, welfare laws, agendasetting decisions are much more consistent with an attitudinal explanation. Most notably, as the ideological distance between the court and other elites increases, the probability that the court will hear a constitutional challenge increases. However, at the merits stage the results are inconclusive.

Overall, this book makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the role of courts in the American political system. The focus of most of the previous literature on the U.S. Supreme Court has made it impossible to adequately understand the role of institutional features and, consequently, has made it impossible to adequately test strategic models of judicial decision making. In general, the design of this study is more sophisticated than the design of most "tests" of either the attitudinal or strategic models of U.S. Supreme Court decision making, and as a result, its findings may suggest new insights for understanding Supreme Court behavior in a broader perspective. For example, the findings that state supreme courts under certain conditions will engage in strategic, rather than strictly attitudinal, voting raises questions about the widely assumed (e.g., see Segal and Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 1993) but untested theory that the factors necessary for attitudinal voting on the U.S. Supreme Court include docket control and its status as a court whose decisions are not subject to further judicial review. In contrast, the widespread finding of extensive attitudinal voting on the U.S. Supreme Court would be predicted from the findings of Langer's study that a number of institutional features possessed by the Court all decrease the probability of strategic voting. Among those features are the presence of an intermediate appellate court, long judicial terms, the difficulty of the executive or legislative branches to affect the retention of the judges, and the difficulty of constitutional amendment. This study further enhances our understanding of the effects of separation of powers by demonstrating that the effects that vary substantially across issue areas depend on the saliency of the issue. It is unfortunate that the importance of issue saliency is absent from most studies of separation of powers effects on the U.S. Supreme Court.

The careful design, extensive data collection, and rigorous analysis make Langer's study an important contribution to the understanding of strategic decision making by appellate courts. Nevertheless, some of the choices on analytical design and operationalization of variables tend to reduce the impact of what remains a fine study in spite of these limitations. Most disappointing, the manner in which the "legal" variables are operationalized makes it difficult to draw any significant conclusions on the relative impact of the legal model versus the impacts of strategic versus pure attitudinal models. The key legal variables are whether or not the court's opinion relies on independent state grounds and on the level of scrutiny employed (see p. 52). Unfortunately, neither of these variables is independent of the decision, and thus it is inappropriate to use them to "explain" those decisions.

Less troublesome, the methods sections need to more clearly define some of the variables. In particular, many readers will not be familiar with the measure of judge ideology adopted (see p. 44) and may need further assurances that the ideology of judges and the ideology of other state elites are really measured according to a common metric that makes it reasonable to compute distance scores between the two measures.

Finally, while the direct effects of the independent variables in the models are interesting and theoretically important, it would have been useful to explore the interactions between judge ideology and/or ideological distance and some of the institutional variables.

The Dynamics of Rules: Change in Written Organizational Codes. By James G. March, Martin Schulz, and Xueguang Zhou. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000. 228p. \$55.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Elinor Ostrom, Indiana University

James March, Martin Schulz, and Xueguang Zhou address the fascinating question of how rules evolve in a complex organization with a unique data set. Stanford University was founded in the decades before the turn of the last century. The authors searched and coded a vast Stanford archive of materials on rules related to student contact, the student honor system, faculty appointment and tenure procedures, faculty governance, and finally rules related to accounting, purchasing, and other administrative functions of a university. They are able to examine questions concerning the external and internal stimulants to rule creation, change, and suspension. No other book equals this one in regard to the breadth of the questions asked and the mode of analysis.

The basic approach of March and his colleagues is to examine how rules evolve over time in response to internal or external problems. They see rules as recording history and accumulating the learning that individuals in an organization acquire, including the ways to cope with repetitive problems. Because they see rules as a written residue of past efforts to regularize responses to internal and external problems. they argue that one has to do historical analysis in order to understand the problems that generated the creation or modification of the rules at an earlier period. Thus, they explore a wide diversity of external or internal factors occurring over time that are posited to affect rule origin or change. Some rules may be very useful in solving a particular problem in a specific era but become an unused residue at a later time. In other words, all organizations may have rules-in-form that are rarely used, due to the fact that the problem-set they help to solve has changed over time and no one has had their attention called to the fact that a rule is no longer necessary.

Further, the authors address important questions related to organizational structure and change. They develop competing hypotheses that are analyzed with the fantastic data set they have developed. One set of competing hypotheses relates to the effects of changes in one rule on changes in other rules. Given assumptions about bounded rationality, a core question has to do with how members of a complex organization pay attention to the possibility of changing rules. The four hypotheses they develop are 1) The Contagion Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule generate attention to other rules, thus increase changes elsewhere"; 2) The Competition Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule distract attention from other rules, thus decrease changes elsewhere"; 3) The Multiplier Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule necessitate changes in others, thus increase changes elsewhere"; and 4) The Substitution Hypothesis: "Changes in one rule substitute for changes in others, thus decrease changes elsewhere" (p. 70).

In addition to these four hypotheses, they address a host of others that focus on when rules are adopted, how fast they are modified, and when they are dropped. They ask whether internal sources of problems related to conflict of interest or to technical coordination are most responsible for rule changes. They also examine environmental factors, including the proportion of the university's budget stemming from federal government sources. They use sophisticated multivariant statistics to examine their long series of event histories.

Among the surprising findings of this study is that increases in federal government funding are associated with *negative* rates of rule revision rather than positive rates, as most organization theorists would expect (p. 187). They also find that rule change is faster in meeting diverse pressure from the technical environment (involving accounting and purchasing) than it is in meeting the political pressures that exist on all university campuses (p. 190). Their findings also challenge some of the conventional views that changes in rules are stimulated primarily by the effort to manage complexity. They find "very few size and program effects in any of our models of rule birth and rule change" (p. 170).

Scholars interested in the study of institutional arrangements will find this a valuable part of their library. The methodology is one that needs to be applied to a diversity of organizations. Following an organization from its very founding is an excellent way of studying the growth of rules as a function, both of the internal coordination problems of a growing organization and the external problems that any university has faced, especially during the twentieth century. The concept of rules as "carriers of knowledge" turns out to be a powerful way of approaching the study of rules.

Institutional theorists with both a rational choice and a sociological approach to organizations will find valuable aspects in this book. Chapter 1 presents a healthy skepticism about the optimality of rules and the presumption made by some that changes in rules usually result in improvements in outcomes rather than the reverse.

Not surprisingly, March and colleagues adopt a strong assumption that individuals use a logic of appropriateness. They assume that individuals "act to fulfill identities, defining what is implied by a particular identity or what is expected, socially or morally, in a particular situation" (p. 6). The identities of individuals, however, are somewhat too strongly presumed to stem from rules. After the recent Enron scandal, one has a hard time accepting the following: "Rules define organizational identities and boundaries and stabilize linkages with other organizations. Accountants do what proper accountants do. Managers do what proper managers do. Each follows rules that define appropriate behavior for the role he or she plays" (p. 9). If only that were to have characterized the behavior of the accountants and managers of Enron and other

complex organizations, major financial disasters would have been avoided.

With a focus on rule change rather than rule following, Chapters 2 through 8 go far beyond the restrictive assumptions of Chapter 1 to make this a truly pathbreaking book that will have a long impact on the study of rules.

With the Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power. By Kenneth R. Mayer. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 298p. \$39.95.

George A. Krause, University of South Carolina

Given the recent events in the realm of presidential policymaking over the past decade, Kenneth R. Mayer has produced a timely book chronicling the use of executive orders that will be of considerable interest to political scientists, historians, legal scholars, and journalists alike. Existing research on the topic of executive orders has been largely addressed by constitutional legal scholars who possess little interest in emphasizing a generalizable understanding of this tool of executive authority. In recent years, a small yet growing-body of political science research has tried to obtain a social scientificmotivated portrait regarding the institutional and behavioral dimensions of executive order issuance by presidents. Mayer makes a strong case for using new institutional economics (NIE) as a "way of making sense of the wide range of executive orders issued over the years" (p. 28). The NIE theoretical approach that Mayer applies to presidential leadership takes a long-term view, compared to other works on presidential leadership, by positing "that presidents can achieve substantive (policy) results not simply by giving commands, but by creating and altering institutional structures and processes" (p. 29).

This book is comprised of three distinct components. The first is a general explanatory model of executive order activity by postwar U.S. presidents. The second is the application of NIE theory to several important cases where executive orders have strengthened presidential power in executive branch administration during the twentieth century: The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 and Regulatory Review in the form of Executive Order (EO) 11821 in 1975 (requiring executive agencies to conduct price inflation impact statements on major regulations); EO 12291 in 1981 (requiring executive agencies to apply a cost-benefit analysis litmus test to determine the efficacy of proposed rules and regulations); EO 12498 in 1985 (requiring executive agencies under EO 12291 to publish an annual index of anticipated regulatory actions with the purpose of providing the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] with advance notice of new regulations that the latter could do away with if they were deemed to duplicate or conflict with existing rules); and EO 12866 in 1993 (imposing a 90-day time limit on OMB to review proposed rules, while also limiting this activity to those likely to impose more than \$100 million in costs). The third component is an analysis of legal authority underlying executive orders in the areas of civil rights and foreign policy.

The first component, pertaining to empirical examination of the aggregate use of executive orders by postwar U.S. presidents, is met with mixed success. The statistical model is both sophisticated and well conceived from an econometric and model specification standpoint and goes beyond existing studies based on "determinants of executive orders." The use of distributed lag effects to capture important shocks that might affect executive order issuance is a novel refinement to the current state of empirical research on this topic. Regrettably, the empirics are not connected in any meaningful way to NIE theory, which is the central thesis to this book, but instead

appear as a rather loose set of empirical generalizations with the subsequent results interpreted accordingly (see pp. 87-102). For instance, inclusion of the unified and divided government is not linked to strategic action within the context of executive order issuance in accordance with NIE theory. Relatedly, these findings appear to show mixed support for such a relationship (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5, pp. 98-100). Moreover, there is no inclusion of presidential policy preferences into the statistical model, save for dummy variables accounting for individual administrations consonant with the idiosyncratic presidency (pp. 87-94). Thus, the reader is left to wonder where presidents' policy preferences lie in relation to other institutional actors, and its implications for presidential action in a system of separated and shared powers that is commonplace in existing research using NIE as a theoretical paradigm.

The second component of this book makes some progress in our general understanding of the design and issuance of executive orders, yet falls short of reaching its full potential since it does not constitute an original theoretical contribution to the study of the presidency. Specifically, the theoretical insights imparted by the author are hardly novel for those already familiar with the literature on the institutional presidency penned by Terry Moe (and various collaborators) over the past decade and a half, for example, the view that "executive orders are an instrument of power that presidents have used to control policy, establish and maintain institutions, shape agendas, manage constituent relationships, and keep control of their political fate generally" (p. 28). This view not only is taken from Moe and Wilson (Terry M. Moe and Scott A. Wilson, "Presidents and the Politics of Structure," Law and Contemporary Problems 57 [Winter/Spring 1994]: 1–44), as aptly noted by the author in a corresponding endnote (Chapter 1, note 128, pp. 235-36), but is also practically indistinguishable from Moe's related NIE-motivated work on presidents' responsive competence of the executive branch (Terry M. Moe, "The Politicized Presidency," in John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson, eds., New Directions in American Politics, 1985), and presidential advantage over congressional institutions via unilateral action (Terry M. Moe, "The Presidency and the Bureaucracy: The Presidential Advantage," in Michael Nelson, ed., The Presidency and the Political System, 1995; Terry M. Moe and William Howell, "The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 15 [March 1999]: 132-79). While the author's use of NIE theory to explain these case studies seems plausible, they do not add any new twists or original insights of their own that constitute a unique departure from our current theoretical understanding of the institutional presidency.

Furthermore, the author's theoretical argument could have been enhanced by explicitly considering rival explanations or hypotheses that might account for the evolution of presidential use of executive orders. For instance, the growing institutionalization of the presidency might not empower the officeholder in a monotonic fashion as implied by the author (p. 220), but instead serve as a double-edged sword that hinders presidential action as these structures develop and proliferate beyond an optimal size. Thus, executive orders are used less for discretionary policy purposes in such instances, but instead increasingly are employed for taming the institutional structures that were originally intended to provide the president with greater policymaking authority vis-à-vis other institutional actors. While the author is correct to infer that their NIE theoretical account is a valid way to examine how postwar U.S. presidents have utilized executive orders, it is by no means the only or, perhaps, even best story to account for this activity. Greater scrutiny to alternative accounts would have placed the author's theoretical argument on much stronger footing than is the case here.

The final component relating to the legal basis for executive orders is this volume's greatest strength. In both the areas of foreign policy (Chapter 5) and civil rights (Chapter 6), the author does an admirable job of bridging normative constitutional law analysis to new institutionalism. In doing so, this treatment provides an alternative explanation for the standard normative legal perspectives that is less nuanced (e.g., see Ruth P. Morgan. The President and Civil Rights Policy-Making by Executive Order, 1970; Philip J. Cooper, "By Order of the President: Administration by Executive Order and Proclamation," Administration and Society 18 [May 1986]: 232-62) by contending that presidents purposively used executive orders to constrain the feasible set of potential policies in a manner that is more preferable to them. One specific compelling instance involves President Eisenhower's issuance of Executive Order 10656 in 1956 that established the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, which was designed to halt Senator Mike Mansfield's (D-MT) legislation that would establish a new centralized joint congressional oversight committee of intelligence activities (pp. 170-71). This is just one example among several in this component of the book, where issues of constitutional legality and purposive institutional action by presidents are conjoined in both a thoughtful and novel manner.

Although With the Stroke of a Pen falls short of making a novel theoretical contribution to the study of the presidency, this book admirably succeeds as an important substantive contribution to understanding how and why presidents use the oft-overlooked but essential tool of executive orders as a policymaking means to wield their influence. For this reason, Mayer has written a book that should be of keen interest to anyone wishing to learn about how executive orders fit into the larger landscape of the institutional presidency.

Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve: The Politics of American Monetary Policy-Making. By Irwin L. Morris. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000. 190p. \$45.00 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

John Williams, University of California at Riverside

Political scientists have been fascinated with the role of the Federal Reserve in making monetary policy. It has long been recognized that the Fed has a tremendous amount of power for a regulatory agency that has so much independence from political bodies. Students of comparative monetary institutions have marveled at the contrast of United States policy to that of the rest of the world, with the exception of Germany's Bundesbank. Yet political scientists and economists continue to try to identify how politics shapes American monetary policy. Irwin Morris's book offers a major corrective to some of the flaws of earlier efforts.

Morris diverges on most extant literature on U.S. monetary policy by taking a multi-institutional approach. Most research is either executive, bureaucracy, or Congress oriented, but he explicitly analyzes the interaction of the president, the Fed, and congressional coalitions. The basic theoretical approach depends on a unidimensional assumption that Fed policy can be aligned from the left to right, from easy monetary policy to tight monetary policy.

The process of the basic model is as follows. The Fed chooses a policy course, Congress decides whether to overturn this policy, the president then may veto Congress's action, and Congress can override. I find this model interesting for what some would conclude to be an odd reason—its lack

of empirical veracity. Let me explain the latter and then I will elucidate the former. Everyone knows that Congress has been a very interested observer of monetary policy, especially in the turbulent period of the 1970s stagflation. There were threats from Congress to eliminate the independence of the Fed, threats that were never implemented. Of course, Congress has enacted many policies that have affected financial markets and thus the Fed's ability to make monetary policy. But the basic function of the Fed has remained relatively unchanged since its inception.

That said, Morris's basic model leads to keen insights. The basic model is one of hypotheticals. These hypotheticals determine the action of the Fed. That is, counterfactuals are what drive the results. If the Fed does not follow an equilibrium policy, then Congress may override it. But the Fed's actions depend on the institutional situation involving Congress and the president. While the theoretical analysis is not particularly sophisticated in a technical sense, his willingness to address the institutional process in such an abstract way is very intriguing. And I believe it pays off in his empirical analysis.

Morris's multi-institutional model also can be used for a more traditional focus. Many conclude that a major power of the president is in the power to appoint members of the Fed. The author convincingly argues that this is not so because the Fed's ideal point only marginally influences monetary policy direction. The evidence is convincing, and it is certainly consistent with recent trends in Fed policy.

This book is rich with empirical data. Morris produces an econometric model that attempts to show how congressional policy positions influence Fed policy. He creates a "pivot" variable from ADA scores and shows that this variable influences the real Federal Funds rate when controlling for many political and economic variables. I would quibble with the specification in the econometric analysis, and the analysis has all the problems associated with a reactions function model. In addition, I would like to see more dynamics in the model, as the author is forced to use generalized least squares to deal with serial correlation in the disturbance terms. It would be nice to see a Granger causality test so that we would have more confidence, in the presence of an analysis controlling for more dynamics, that the pivot variable would still be able to predict the real Federal Funds rate. But the analysis is certainly credible, and given that it derives from the theory, is at least a good first cut.

All this said, the analysis is based on a sophisticated view of monetary policy. However, it could be more sophisticated. Among monetary theorists, there are many very innovative ways in which scholars have been trying to identify monetary policy. The idea that the real Federal Funds rate is a good indicator because the Fed controls it is a bit irrelevant. The issue is that we need to uncover when rate increases are caused by policy changes and when rate increases are due to external factors. This is very difficult. So I do not fault Morris with using this measure of policy, but it would be nice if he made clear that it is, to some extent-according to whomever you talk with—faulty. Rather than fully defending the measure as he does in Chapter 6, it would be better to admit the flaws, balance the evidence, and give the results. His finding about the effect of the pivot variable is important—if submitted to more sensitivity analyses—and at least provides some validity about the choice of his dependent variable.

Very useful is the analysis of the organizational characteristics of the Fed in relation to Congress and the president. The synthesis of various ideas about the institutional position of the Fed is by itself a major contribution. Morris clearly is one of the most knowledgeable scholars about the institutional position of the Fed. Indeed, it is his keen knowledge of the institution that leads him to develop a multi-institutional

approach. Because the Fed is in such a unique institutional position, his clarifications, observations, and interpretations of the organizational processes that determine Fed behavior and policy are in themselves a major contribution.

In summary, this book has much to recommend it. There is a tendency among scholars to focus on a single causal explanation of policy. Morris recognized in his research that this would be a major mistake in trying to understand monetary policy in the United States. He uses rational choice theory to make predictions about policy choice, and his empirical analyses support his theoretical models. If a student came to me wanting to study the Fed, this would be the first book I would recommend reading.

Constituting Workers, Protecting Women: Gender, Law, and Labor in the Progressive and New Deal Years. By Julie Novkov. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 336p. \$44.50.

Carol Nackenoff, Swarthmore College

Trained in both law and political science, Julie Novkov has made a major contribution to an understanding of the transitions from the Progressive Era to the New Deal that will be especially important for new institutionalist scholars of the Supreme Court, for students of American political development, and for scholars of gender and politics, women's history, and labor history. It also instructs those activists both inside and outside the legal community who turn to the courts.

This is a richly theorized work that engages in a careful investigation ranging well beyond the confines of Supreme Court case law. Novkov's data come from all reported cases in state and federal courts from 1873 to 1937 that involved legal regulation of workers in the workplace. She finds the Supreme Court's position in *West Coast Hotel v. Parrish* foreshadowed by earlier rulings in state high courts. She also draws on arguments made before the Court and the arguments of advocates.

One new argument Novkov makes is that West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, a pivotal case of the 1937 New Deal Court, is actually a culmination of a line of development that began even prior to Lochner, rather than a repudiation of it. Reading against the traditional portrait in which West Coast Hotel is a radical break with the past and a capitulation of the Court to the will of Congress and the President, Novkov argues that the innovation lay in the extension of the standard developed for female workers to all workers. The new framework considers the extent to which the legal community came to envision male workers "as subjects in need of protection" (p. 270) as well. By "centering the gender of regulated workers in the analysis of the legal battles" (p. 2), Novkov instructs previous analysts of this era, including Howard Gillman, whose institutionalist approach she draws upon (The Constitution Besieged: The Rise and Demise of Lochner Era Police Powers Jurisprudence, 1993), how the intersection of women's history and labor history that prevailed in Lochner still helped direct the Court's reasoning in West Coast Hotel. While Bruce Ackerman, Robert Post, Cass Sunstein, Howard Gillman, and Barry Cushman have also contributed importantly to revisioning this era, they have not, in Novkov's view, recognized the centrality of gender in framing the debate over worker liberty and public interest.

The author also draws on scholars who have recently been reweaving constitutional narratives to take account of the significant role played by other actors in the interpretive community (e.g., Ronald Kahn, "Institutional Norms and the Historical Development of Supreme Court Politics: Changing 'Social Facts' and Doctrinal Development," in *The Supreme Court* 

in American Politics: New Institutionalist Interpretations, ed. Howard Gillman and Cornell Clayton, 1999; Charles Epp, "External Pressure and the Supreme Court's Agenda," in Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist Approaches, ed. Cornell Clayton and Howard Gillman, 1999), engaging in a rich examination of what has been recently termed "outside-in" scholarship.

Novkov's work extends the recent body of scholarship on the role of maternalists in shaping the modern welfare state (e.g., Theda Skocpol, *Protecting Soldiers and Mothers*, 1995). The roots of modern employment law and the modern doctrine of liberty "have grown in deeply gendered ground," she argues (p. 35). In fact, "much of the doctrinal framework for the modern interventionist state arose through battles over female workers' proper relationships with the state" (p. 13).

Novkov is centrally concerned with the questions of how doctrinal change occurs. This is a richly complex process in which judges do not monopolize control; the process extends beyond the formal boundaries of law. Attorneys and activists also help shape the discussion over doctrine; in the Progressive Era, social science research conducted within a maternalist framework played an important role. During periods of contestation, decisions leave ambiguities and lacunae in doctrine that are taken up and used by other actors involved in the process of interpretation. Investigating doctrinal change requires Novkov to engage textual analysis of cases and briefs, as well as social debate over protective legislation.

The "period of negotiation," during which courts were addressing attempts, both inside and outside the legal community, to balance and channel tensions and conflicts occasioned by the rise of a modern industrial economy and a modern regulatory state, begins with Myra Bradwell's attempt to use the new Fourteenth Amendment to argue for substantive rights (liberty and equality). Novkov ends this period of negotiation with West Coast Hotel but continues her consideration briefly into the early 1940s.

A key concept in Novkov's analytical framework is that of "nodes of conflict." These are contested narrative spaces, or "moments in the development of doctrine during which the various groups of actors who have access to the legal community struggle among themselves and with each other to establish their interpretations of a particular legal concept or phrase as the dominant norm" (p. 16). She organizes her book around four such nodes or periods of investigation, devoting a chapter to each of them. The first node, from 1873 to roughly 1897, is described as a period of "generalized balancing" between Fourteenth Amendment liberty and more traditional police power, where the courts did not consider statutes in specifically gendered terms. The second period, from 1898 to roughly 1910, is characterized in terms of "specific balancing" between workers' liberties and the state's power to regulate; judges and lawyers began to advance a separate analysis for cases involving protective legislation for women. The third node of conflict, from 1911 until 1923, represents a shift toward "labor-centered analysis," in which women's legislation was foregrounded and courts looked at the laborers themselves that statutes sought to protect. Doctrinal lines in litigation concentrated primarily on women's characteristics, more than on the issues they faced as members of the working class. The final period, from Adkins (1923) through West Coast Hotel, was a period of "gendered rebalancing," in which debate over the legitimacy of minimum wages took place in the context of a larger question over "whether the state had the legal capacity to regulate the terms and conditions of labor for all workers" (p. 183). Novkov argues that this debate featured gender rather than class. Whether or not the periodization of these debates is quite as neatly delineated as she argues, the identification of areas of contestation in these four different nodes of conflict is extremely useful.

If Novkov's story is one in which New Deal workers are brought into the logic of protection developed during a struggle involving women's labor—so that class piggybacks on gender—is there any sense in which this story is a partial victory for and vindication of the maternalist strategy? For Novkov, "some paths bear more risks of co-optation by hostile actors than others" (p. 265), and maternalism was such a path. Women's organizations saw their political advocacy transformed into legal language, but Novkov tells a cautionary tale: "[R]eformers need to think carefully about the legal categories they create and how the next set of arguments down the road will transform these categories" (p. 265). Maternalist feminists should have been more wary of their allies; some judges and pro-regulation attorneys-general were seeking to validate statutes reinforcing traditional gender roles. Novkov yearns for a deeper rebalancing on the basis of gender than maternalists were able to achieve—one less dependent on the state's interest in reinforcing and protecting women's maternal roles. While one could wish for a fuller discussion of the consequences of the West Coast Hotel perspective for workers and for the relationship between work and citizenship in the New Deal era, Constituting Workers, Protecting Women is a powerful piece of scholarship.

**Democracy in Suburbia.** By J. Eric Oliver. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001. 263p. \$47.50 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Dennis R. Judd, University of Illinois at Chicago

In this pathbreaking book, J. Eric Oliver proposes to answer an ambitious and important question: Has suburbanization brought about a decline of civic engagement in America? This question is, obviously, immensely important because more than half of all Americans live in suburbs. Whatever they think and how they vote and however much they participate in the civic life of their communities has enormous consequences, not only within the suburbs but also for the nation as a whole. The question is also consequential in light of the national debate that seems to have been provoked by the recent work on social capital. As Oliver notes, Robert Putnam has blamed suburbanization for part of the alleged loss in social capital in America. The general claim that suburbs have killed community and civic engagement is hardly new, and it has recently been amplified by (among others) advocates of the new urbanism. Oliver boldly states that "such claims are without any empirical basis" (p. 2), and he takes it as his task to supply the missing evidence that might answer the question. In doing so, he has produced a remarkable book, literally the first one ever published to present definitive evidence on the crucial issue of the impact of the suburbs on American democracy.

Oliver derives most of his data on political activity from the 1990 Citizen Participation Study conducted in 1989 and 1990. More than 15,000 Americans were interviewed by telephone to ascertain their voluntary and political activities and demographic characteristics, and more than 2,500 follow-up interviews were conducted to gather more detailed information. By merging data from this study with city- and metropolitanlevel census information on economic and social characteristics and data from the 1996 American National Elections Study, Oliver has constructed a unique series of data sets. By constructing contextual models employing multivariate regression analysis, he is able to bring to bear a formidable array of evidence to show that suburbia does influence civic participation.

Scholars have long assumed, and asserted, that small communities promote personal connections and civic participation. Oliver's evidence bears this out: His data show that the residents of small communities tend to contact local officials more, to attend board meetings and meetings of organizations, to vote more frequently in local elections, and to participate in informal civic activities. In general, these relationships hold even when social context varies significantly; city size matters to some degree, for example, regardless of varying education levels.

Things get much more ambiguous when Oliver considers the influence of social-class segregation on civic participation. He offers convincing evidence that metropolitan areas are highly segregated between rich and poor, and that municipal boundaries tend to match up with these patterns. He shows that populations trapped within poorer municipalities tend to participate at a lower rate, a finding that will surprise no one. But he also shows, somewhat unexpectedly, that people living in homogeneous affluent suburbs also participate less. Why is this so? According to Oliver, "the exclusionary practices that help create and sustain a suburb's affluence also limit the range of social problems and political conflicts within their borders" (p. 95). Homogeneity breeds boredom, while diversity within a governmental unit creates issues that sustain residents' interest. This finding offers a refreshing new angle on an old debate over the merits and consequences of governmental fragmentation. Should the suburbs be organized to encourage political engagement across class and racial lines, or should they be regarded merely as a marketplace offering people the "choice" of sorting themselves out? Not only does Oliver contest the basic premise of the public choice model by pointing out that only the affluent can exercise any reasonably free market choice (a familiar argument); he also arguesfrom his evidence—that political fragmentation breeds an escape from politics that erodes a "sense of connection and obligation to the larger society" (p. 98).

The relationships between racial segregation and civic participation appear to be more complex. Oliver's data show that the residents of predominantly white cities tend to participate less than do people living in racially mixed places, but there are many nuances. Many racially mixed cities may be "overpoliticized" because they tend to be more crowded and more beset by a variety of social problems. This fact may encourage people to escape to more peaceful pastures. When they do so, they may be striking a bargain to give up political engagement altogether.

Near the end of this book, Oliver reaches the conclusion that "America's current arrangement of local political institutions is not conducive to maximizing the civic capacity of its communities or promoting the benefits of civic engagement for its citizens" (pp. 2-6). Rarely do they live up to Oliver's "authentic governing principle" that "America's municipalities and other local institutions...should function so as to bring together most people within a geographic vicinity to collectively solve problems related to their area" (p. 5). Nor do contemporary governance arrangements nurture what Oliver calls "civic capacity," which he defines as "the extent to which a community's members are engaged in both political and civic activities" (p. 6). Are these goals so important that they justify a renewed commitment to reform metropolitan governance? Or are Americans more attached to the metropolis as marketplace than as fertile ground for civic engagement? Oliver's book allows us to bring a fresh perspective to such questions. It virtually forces the reader to step outside old debates and assumptions and examine anew the consequences of America's preference for fragmented governmental arrangements.

When the State Kills: Capital Punishment and the American Condition. By Austin Sarat. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001. 314p. \$29.95.

Andrew Norris, The University of Pennsylvania

As the United States begins fighting a war devoted not to the overthrow or liberation of a particular government but, rather, as Mr. Bush put it, to rid the world of "evildoers," it is easy to forget that our state is also busy at home killing people in the service of a similar oversimplified moralism. Austin Sarat's most recent book is, then, an important reminder. Since the Supreme Court reinstated capital punishment in 1976 the country's appetite for it has steadily increased: More than 3,600 people now sit on death row, and their numbers continue to swell. While there have been some welcome signs of a slackening in the nation's tolerance for the killing of the mentally retarded and the innocent, the Rehnquist court has been streamlining the appeal process in an attempt, in the Chief Justice's words, to "get on with it." Sarat rightly protests against the ensuing compromises of the rights of those caught up in the system, a disproportionate number of whom are, as everyone knows, poor and black. He argues that routine killing by the state is not just illiberal in its corrosive effect upon the Bill of Rights but in conflict with the institutions and spirit of our democracy. Where democracy calls for a willingness to seek reconciliation and the improvement of institutions through dialogue, and hence a willingness to admit that one's own perspective is limited and one's own judgment fallible, capital punishment requires that we assume the mantle of infallibility, and it is sustained by a spirit of rage that it in turn nurtures. One of the strongest features of Sarat's book is its insistence that none of this is accidental: "State killing... is part of a strategy of governance that makes us fearful and dependent on the illusion of state protection, that divides rather than unites, that promises simple solutions to complex problems" (p. 247). It is easier and less anxiety-producing to tell ourselves familiar comic book stories about the battle of good and evil than to get down to "the difficult, often frustrating work of understanding what in our society breeds such heinous acts of violence" (p. 14). And if we believe the stories we tell, it is hard to imagine living without the protection of a powerful and threatening state that can match the violent forces arrayed against us. For those who profit politically or financially from the present forms of that society, that is all to the better. Protego ergo obligo.

Sarat's response in this passionate and thoughtful book is to advocate what he terms "a new abolitionism," one that would eschew appeals to the sanctity of life, the moral horror of a state killing its own citizens, or the inherent cruelty of the death penalty. Each of these approaches focuses on the victims of state killing, and in part as a result of this they have all had little success in moving the American electorate, two-thirds of whom still support the death penalty (p. 12). Given this, we are better off challenging state killing on its own terms, instead of contesting the moral values and institutions with which it is bound up. Following the lead of Justice Blackmun's 1994 Callins v. Collins dissent and the American Bar Association's 1997 call for a moratorium on state killing, Sarat argues that the death penalty as currently administered violates due process, undermines our central legal values and the legitimacy of the law itself, and cannot reasonably be expected to be applied in ways that do not reflect the racism prevalent in our society (pp. 253, 255-56). The admission of none of this requires one to feel sympathy with the men and women on death row.

Sarat hardly limits himself to such arguments, however. His book considers state killing from a wide variety of political, moral, and analytic perspectives, and with 54 pages of notes it engages the relevant literature in political theory, public law, penology, and even narrative theory. All of this allows it to provide thoughtful considerations of topics as varied as the representation of capital trials and executions in popular culture, the attempt to make state killing (appear) painless so as to distinguish its victims from the victims of non-statesponsored killing, the contribution and self-understanding of death penalty lawyers, the role the jury plays in the legitimization of state killing in a democracy and the forces that encourage the members of juries to play that role, the manner in which the victim's rights movement draws upon a 60s-style distrust of the government even as it turns to the government for redress, and the way in which the recent allowance of victim impact statements in the sentencing stages of capital trials blurs the lines of private revenge and public retribution upon which the validity of public justice itself is built.

It is in defense of such a distinction that Sarat contests Wendy Lesser's claim that executions ought not to be televised: Capital punishment is by definition a public matter, involving as it does the state's response to the violation of its laws; it follows that it should take place in public. Moreover, performing executions in public will prevent us from continuing to hide from the truth of what we are doing. While Sarat is certainly right that our present hypocrisy serves us ill, not all of his readers will share his confidence in the American people here, and many will suspect that the general public would either become inured to or actually enjoy the sight of "evildoers" being killed. In the course of a discussion of the role of narrative construction and preservation in capital trials, Sarat cites Thurgood Marshall's wise observation that "whether a punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on whether its mere mention 'shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people,' but on whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable" (pp. 182–83). Such education would, I think, be necessary for us to see what a televised execution is showing—and not showing. Sarat suggests that the debate that televised executions would provoke might be education enough (p. 208). And one might point to the secrecy within which the government has shrouded both executions and—since the Vietnam warwarfare as evidence that the state at least agrees with Sarat that the sight of our fellow citizens dying galvanizes us against the state that is killing them. But, as Sarat himself demonstrates, the state's search for a painless form of execution has led to the widespread embrace of a technique that "shows" almost nothing. One cannot feel confident that the slight exhale of breath of a man being killed by lethal injection will have the effect that the pictures of soldiers dying in Vietnam did. However, even if this objection is well taken, it hardly compromises the value of Sarat's book. Because if what we need is an education in the politics and injustice of capital punishment before we can (truly) see what we are doing, Sarat's book is an important contribution to that education.

Is the Fetus a Person? A Comparison of Policies Across the Fifty States. By Jean Reith Schroedel. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. 256p. \$29.95.

Alesha E. Doan, California Polytechnic State University

The conceptual—and legal—division between a woman and a fetus is most recently rooted in the Supreme Court's 1973 Roe v. Wade decision, which established the trimester framework designed to balance a woman's right to privacy with the state's interest in protecting potential life. Prior to Roe, a woman and her fetus were legally viewed as having identical interests because of their biological tie. The trimester framework,

however, established a precedent for viewing the maternal-fetal relationship as an adversarial one, where a woman and her fetus have conflicting interests. Indeed, as states demonstrate their willingness to protect fetal health—via restrictions on access to abortion—the fetus is increasingly being viewed as a separate entity that is entitled to protection and recognition as a person. The questions of when and under what conditions a fetus is a person have policy implications beyond the scope of the abortion debate.

Jean Reith Schroedel's Is the Fetus a Person? is a wellresearched book that makes a unique contribution to our understanding of reproductive policy. Schroedel examines three seemingly unrelated reproductive policies that are actually linked by the question of fetal personhood—abortion, substance abuse by pregnant women, and third-party fetal killing. While these policies are related, the political rhetoric used to discuss them, and the policy outcomes regulating each, is radically different. Exploring the inconsistencies and differences—within and across states' policies—regarding the legal status of a fetus is the crux of this book. For example, why is the state more inclined to establish abortion policies protecting a fetus—essentially granting it greater personhood status—in the third trimester of pregnancy, but reticent to create the same protection from domestic violence? Similarly, why do states' policy approaches to substance abuse by pregnant women vary from punitive-based policies, which view the interests of the mother and fetus separately, to treatmentbased policies where they are treated as having identical interests? To answer these questions (and many more), she provides a thorough historical account of fetal policies and, it is important to note, amasses an impressive data set examining each policy area.

Schroedel begins by linking together abortion, substance abuse by pregnant women, and third-party fetal killing by providing a detailed, analytical history of fetal personhood throughout the centuries. She explores the moral and legal nexus of these three issues, highlighting significant theological shifts, that have influenced policy development over time. Relatedly, as technology has advanced, the state has accorded a fetus more legal rights and an elevated personhood status, yet the personhood status of women has remained fairly stagnant over time, providing the state with more leverage to regulate the behavior of women. She uses the historical lessons to hint at an important empirical and theoretical finding in her research: Viewing the fetal-maternal relationship as one of competing interests leads to poor policymaking for prenatal drug exposure and third-party fetal battering (women and their fetuses fundamentally have a joint interest in ending addiction or battering).

In the next two chapters, Schroedel examines each policy in detail, attempting to answer the underlying question of whose rights—or personhood—matters more, a woman's or a fetus's. She compiles state-level data on abortion, fetal substance abuse, and third-party fetal battering policies. Unlike in other studies, the author does not simply count the number of policies in each state; rather, she creates indices, which weigh the significance of every regulation within the three policy areas. Chapters 3 and 4 conclude with a comprehensive and systematic picture of abortion, fetal substance abuse, and fetal battering policies across the United States.

Schroedel begins to unravel the variance in states' policy responses to these issues. Using rhetoric advanced by the prochoice and pro-life camps, she derives and tests several hypotheses. In particular, she examines the pro-life claim that the fetus is synonymous with "person" and should be protected at all stages of development. Logically, states that are pro-life (measured by the severity of abortion restrictions) should exhibit similar patterns in the other two policy ar-

eas (drug exposure and battery). It is interesting that her analysis—which contains a blend of qualitative and quantitative methods—suggests that empirically, there is no support for this proposition. Pro-life states are not committed to promoting the well-being of the fetus beyond abortion decisions, as evidenced by their lack of comprehensive policies. "Simply, pro-life states make it difficult for women to have abortions, but they do not help these women provide for the children once born" (p. 157), the author writes. Her analysis demonstrates that women are consistently accorded a lower economic, social, and political status in pro-life states. While this is not a novel discovery, her analysis is unique in that it examines the relationship between the status of women and fetal personhood in a range of reproductive policy areas.

In short, Is a Fetus a Person? has much to offer. It provides a comprehensive map of abortion, fetal drug abuse, and fetal battering policies. Schroedel painstakingly compiles a thorough data set containing all criminal laws relating to fetal personhood status and creates several empirical tests aimed at explaining the differential treatment of these reproductive policies across the 50 states. Unfortunately, the book does not provide a comprehensive theoretical framework for other scholars to apply.

Schroedel discusses abortion, fetal drug abuse, and fetal battering policies as morality policies. She asserts that the morality politics framework only works as a starting point for her research because it fails to adequately account for policymaking in fetal drug abuse and fetal battering policies: "I believe its application must be extended to a broader range of political circumstances to account for status differences among the parties that harm the fetus and for the impact of cultural values" (p. 62). Extending and improving on the morality framework would indeed be a significant theoretical contribution to the field; however, this book falls short in this endeavor. Although the theoretical omission is disappointing, Schroedel delivers a wealth of information and suggests a road for future studies on reproductive policies. Is the Fetus a Person? is one of the first books to examine the policy implications and consequences of expanded definitions of fetal personhood beyond abortion policy. This book will be of interest to students of state politics, reproductive policies, and gender politics.

Trading Blows: Party Competition and U.S. Trade Policy in a Globalizing Era. By James Shoch. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 388p. \$59.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Frederick Mayer, Duke University

In this history of American trade politics, James Shoch argues for the centrality of political parties in the making of trade policy. His thesis, simply stated, is that parties matter, and matter a good deal more than the literature generally acknowledges. As he depicts it, the historical record is something like a heavyweight prizefight, in which the Democratic and Republican Parties, driven by constituency pressures, ideological differences, and, especially, the quest for political advantage, spar ceaselessly over trade issues.

A focus on partisanship is timely, given the increasingly partisan nature of American trade politics in the last decade. Since the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1993 and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1994, both with substantial Democratic support, Congress has become increasingly divided along party lines. The almost straight party-line vote in 2001 on the (shamelessly named) "Bipartisan Trade Promotion Bill" demonstrates just how sharply divided the two

parties have become. Shoch's book reminds us that partisanship is nothing new, and that the bipartisan consensus on trade that largely prevailed from the end of World War II is not the historical norm.

Trading Blows traces trade politics from the Civil War to the present, giving considerably more attention to recent history than past. In his first chapter, Shoch sketches a "multilevel analytic framework," on which the subsequent "analytic narrative" draws. His framework incorporates an extraordinarily wide range of theoretical constructs, among them critical realism, rational choice, new institutionalism, political economy, trade theory, public opinion, and others. The theoretical discussion is comprehensive and insightful.

Ultimately, however, the book's strength is its rich description of trade politics, particularly of the inside political maneuverings of presidents and congressional leaders as they seek to advance their political and policy interests. The interpretation is clearly informed by theory, but it is not driven by it, in that the author draws on whatever theoretical framework seems best to apply. One could quibble that at times the interpretations offer such complex explanations for phenomena that it is difficult to determine what really matters, but on the whole this is preferable to the kind of reductionism that plagues some more theoretically driven analyses.

The value of Shoch's approach is most evident in chapters on the elections of 1994 and 1996, which describe the culmination of a long process in which the Democratic and Republican Parties switched sides on trade. He shows how after Republicans captured control of Congress in 1994, the increase in union activity and campaign contributions and the simultaneous decrease in business support for Democrats altered the pattern of constituency pressures on members of Congress and led to much greater polarization on trade. Although Democrats supported GATT in 1995, there was almost no Democratic support for President Clinton's request for new "fast track" negotiating authority in 1997, despite strong pleas from a president of their own party.

Notwithstanding its many strengths, *Trading Blows*, by focusing so much attention on party conflict, tends at times to overstate the degree of conflict and to underplay the importance of other factors at work in trade politics and trade policymaking. For example, in his characterization of the politics of the 1980s, Shoch contests the dominant view that the high degree of consensus on trade policy that characterized the post-World War II era continued into the 1990s (see, most notably, I. M. Destler, American Trade Politics, 1995). Shoch argues that this consensus was always somewhat less than claimed and that by the 1980s, during the Reagan and Bush I administrations, there was a good deal more conflict than generally admitted. It is true, as he documents, that the growing trade deficit, particularly with Japan, led to complaints about "unfair" trade practices, that this complaint found its way into Democrat-sponsored legislation with elements of reciprocity, and that Republicans tacked to co-opt the Democratic position. But on the whole, and on the big issues, the consensus held. The United States did not raise its tariffs, it negotiated and signed a free trade agreement with Canada, and it launched the Uruguay Round of the GATT, all with broad bipartisan support. Indeed, bipartisanship largely held, despite signs of its imminent demise, for the NAFTA and GATT votes in the first two years of the Clinton administration.

In part because it somewhat overstates the conflicts of the 1980s, and in part because its focus is primarily on the inside maneuverings of policymakers, *Trading Blows* somewhat understates the sea change in the political environment for trade that took place in the 1990s. Although it passed, NAFTA deeply politicized trade in a way that had not been seen for half a century. The political forces in the society that engaged in the NAFTA tussle, far from disbanding after the vote, stayed on the scene. Not only did the labor unions remain primed for battle, so too did the host of environmental, civic, religious, and other organizations that first surfaced in 1993. Shoch largely ignores this phenomenon, and the larger antiglobalization movement it has become.

The characterization of the politics of trade in the book also misses a subtle shift in the nature of trade issues. For the most part, Trading Blows characterizes trade policy as contested along a single free trade versus protectionist dimension. For most of American history, this was the essential question. But it is certainly no longer the only policy question. For more than two decades now, the United States has had a weighted average tariff of less than 5%. To be sure, we continue to protect certain of our industries (textiles, sugar, and steel top most lists), and the degree of protection afforded them remains an issue, but for most of the economy, on the traditional issues of tariffs and quotas, the game is largely over. Many of the core issues today are not so much about free trade as about regulation: worker rights, environmental standards and enforcement, intellectual property, food safety, and the like. These issues engage different actors in society, resonate differently with public opinion, and engage political parties in different ways.

Notwithstanding these minor shortcomings, *Trading Blows* is a fine book that largely accomplishes what it sets out to do. It demonstrates the value of close historical analysis illuminated by theory, and makes a compelling case for the importance of partisan calculation in trade politics and policy. It is an informed and insightful addition to the literature on American trade politics.

Uncertain Hazards: Environmental Activists and Scientific Proof. By Sylvia Noble Tesh. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. 192p. \$35.00 cloth, \$16.95 paper.

Richard A. Harris, Rutgers University-Camden

Uncertain Hazards is an ambitious book, in two respects. First, it tackles an important issue for political science as well as sociology and history, namely, the impact that social movements have on reshaping the societies in which they mobilize. Second, in adopting a case study approach to this issue, the author explores the development of the modern environmental movement and its purported reframing or hegemonic reversal of environmental science and risk assessment in America. In effect, this volume is two separate but related studies. Indeed, Sylvia Noble Tesh suggests as much when she notes in her acknowledgments that her "theme shifted as the book took shape" (p. xi).

One of the critical insights developed by Tesh is that the environmental movement ought not be viewed as a unified or monolithic entity. By carefully organizing her analysis of environmental organizations into the "mainstream group" most familiar to students of environmental politics (e.g., Sierra Club, NRDC, National Wildlife Federation, etc.), "grassroots groups" usually formed locally around public health issues, and "grassroots support groups" that provide scientific, organizational, and political back-up to local groups, she provides a richly textured and nuanced analysis of the environmental movement.

Tesh also rescues the topic on risk assessment from the sterile debate between those who hold that risk assessment is a legitimate economic/scientific basis for making policy decisions and those who would maintain that it is merely a Trojan horse for providing regulatory relief to business interests. She persuasively argues that risk assessment and, for that matter,

environmental science reflect an approach that environmentalism has successfully challenged by reframing not only the questions asked, but also the standards of evaluation used in policy analysis.

These significant contributions notwithstanding, Uncertain Hazards does display certain limitations. Perhaps these are inevitable given the ambitious, dual assignment of analyzing both the role of social movements in society and the clash between environmentalism and science that Tesh has taken on. One of the most surprising things about this book is the paucity of references to the extensive literature on environmental politics and public interest groups. These are both well-developed fields of study, and except for works of wellknown environmental advocates, such as Rachel Carson or Barry Commoner and some newer students of environmental policy, Tesh does not take advantage of this body of work. Scholars such as Linton Caldwell and Walter Rosenbaum clearly come to mind when thinking about key environmental politics scholars, as does Samuel Hays when thinking of social/intellectual historians who have studied environmentalism. More broadly, the work of Andrew McFarland and Jeffrey Berry bears directly on the issues of public interest advocacy or influence.

The danger of overlooking this scholarship is suggested by Tesh's claim that only in recent years have we begun to move beyond Rachel Carson's concern with carcinogenic pollutants to consider "a connection between environmental pollution and other outcomes in wildlife and nature" (p. 67). In fact, connections between pollution and asthma or endangered species have been part of environmental advocates' stock-intrade since the early 1970s. Indeed, the same can be said of her assertion that the "first big rush of publicity singling out children as especially vulnerable to environmental toxins came in 1989" (p. 70). An examination of testimony at congressional hearings on the Clean Air Act of 1975 or the buildup to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in the late seventies clearly shows that the special vulnerability of children and the elderly figured prominently in public debate. Moreover, the Endangered Species Act indicates that concern with wildlife has long occupied a place in environmental policy.

One may also question whether Tesh's assertion that "science is a social construct" (p. 2) is a bit overdrawn. Few would dispute her claim, developed in a chapter on environmental science, that the experience and views of scientists help to explain the questions they investigate. Nor is her exposition on the importance of Kuhnian paradigm shifts particularly controversial. However, to the extent that science, even environmental science, is a method predicated on posing falsifiable hypotheses, it is distinguished from metaphysical argument, that is, ethical or political principles. This is not to suggest that ethical or political arguments are any less legitimate in policy debate; indeed, it is arguable that they should have more standing. However, the two kinds of claims, scientific and metaphysical, should not be conflated as Tesh intimates in her examination of guiding environmental principles.

Finally, the quite appropriate point that the relationship between society and social movements is a two-way street could have been connected to the substantial body of work on the Progressive Era and the New Deal, which clearly draws a connection between the labor, women's, and agrarian reform movements on the one hand and the rise of modern liberalism on the other. This work by historians and new institutionalists buttresses Tesh's argument and may well have shed considerable insight on her analysis. While she does draw an important contrast between classical liberalism and environmentalism, which purportedly reflects a Gramscian or new left view of the world, her work missed an opportunity to acknowledge

the debt that environmentalists owe to the modern liberal political tradition. In fact, it might be interesting to contemplate the possibility that mainstream environmental groups fit into the modern liberal tradition, while grassroots and grassroots support groups do indeed fit the Gramscian tradition. This possibility would suggest an interesting dynamic within the environmental movement.

Regardless of the questions raised above, *Uncertain Hazards* will provide all students of social movements and environmental politics with a challenging and provocative read.

From Neighborhood to Nation: The Democratic Foundations of Civil Society. By Kenneth Thomson. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2001. 195p. \$50.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Richard M. Flanagan, The College of Staten Island, CUNY

It was New York Governor Al Smith's famous dictum that the ills of democracy could be solved with more democracy. Many agree with him some 75 years later. The shelves of political science overflow with books lamenting the decline of intermediary institutions that once plugged the hearts and minds of citizens into government and civic life. Democracy scaled down to the town and neighborhood allows people to address problems that are experienced in the routine of everyday life. Stripped of abstraction, politics loses its mystery and the sense of alienation that accompanies it. But Americans no longer gather at the political club, the town meeting, the church, and the union hall. Citizens are plugged into television, the family, or perhaps the job, interested in private concerns. In response, pundits, professors, and politicians call for a revival of local political and civic life. President George W. Bush's "Faith-Based Initiative," which would use federal funds to support church social service programs, can be viewed as a response to the national mood of a people adrift. While many have forwarded tiresome critiques of what ails us, Kenneth Thomson does the nitty-gritty empirical work that should mark social science's unique contribution to this debate.

Thomson, a coauthor of the award-wining book that surveyed individual attitudes in the cities, *The Rebirth of Urban Democracy* (1993), mines the data collected from that project, shifting the level of analysis up a level to analyze organizational forms and functions. Attention turns to neighborhood associations in four cities: Birmingham, Dayton, Portland, and St. Paul. These cities take their officially recognized neighborhood associations seriously, providing funding to make them work, and involving them in an advisory policy role.

Thomson devised an innovative index to measure the strength of neighborhood associations, capturing such characteristics as staff size, meeting frequency, and attendance, as well as 18 other measures of organizational activity. Multivariate analysis leads him to the most important finding of the book: Well-organized, active neighborhood associations have an independent, positive impact on participation in local politics, holding constant for socioeconomic status. Community-based organizing, if it is done right, pulls people out of their personal bubbles into political life.

The author also developed a normative model for analyzing the success of community organizations that focuses on three measures: the participatory core, the link to the community, and the link to government policymaking. Vital neighborhood organizations are democratically run, seek out new members, and have a real impact on policy. Thompson found that for the most part, neighborhood organizations are run by a good cross section of neighborhood residents and allow

for open debate on matters of community concern. Most residents are satisfied that their neighborhood group is run fairly. The author also found that neighborhood organizations reach out to residents and involve them in the political process, including many people who would not otherwise be involved in politics. On the third element of the model, the policymaking link, the neighborhood organizations miss the mark. While they do a fine job of solving neighborhood-level problems and have the potential to tackle broader matters, they seldom do. The mind-set of the neighborhood organizations and citywide elected officials is unimaginative, leaving the beneficial effects of small-scale participatory democracy at the border of the neighborhood. Thomson suggests that this policymaking link could be improved if citizens clamored for change. There is nothing inherent in local participatory democracy that prevents the neighborhood organizations from dealing with a broader set of citywide, state, and national issues. It should also be noted that the more active neighborhood organizations were more likely to meet the requirements of the normative model, demonstrating the reparative impact of democratic action on democratic health. He argues that the more we invest in local democratic institutions like neighborhood organizations with funding support and legitimacy, the greater the return, in terms of citizen trust, efficacy, and deliberative, participatory democracy.

This short work raised questions that I wished had been addressed, since Thomson has the training, knowledge, and careful eye to weigh in thoughtfully. The author does not probe the dark side of neighborhood life. Fear of the outsider is among the most effective tools of participatory politics. The commonly heard lament of "not in my back yard" and the historical practice of exclusionary housing covenants designed to keep blacks and others out suggest that it is not axiomatic that illiberal impulses will be held in check by more participatory forms. Like many communitarian social scientists, Thomson is cagey about the concrete policies new procedural reforms will create. The other matter left unaddressed is a central claim of the book and title, the idea that neighborhood associations can wrestle with national-level problems and devise national-level policies. As the author notes, the neighborhood associations in the study had little interest in or impact on citywide problems. It is difficult to see how local institutions can make the great leap into state and federal politics. The great advantage of the neighborhood associations is that they tackle bite-sized problems that residents have a tangible stake in resolving. The inherent "meat and potatoes" conservatism evident in such matters provides a simple, democratic education that might be jeopardized if the neighborhood associations wade into more abstract, ideological waters.

From Neighborhood to Nation is an important contribution to the literature on participatory democracy, citizen politics, and local politics. Thomson has given political scientists important conceptual tools and empirical measures of grassroots organizations that can be replicated in future studies.

Death and the Statesman: The Culture and Psychology of U.S. Leaders During War. By Joseph B. Underhill-Cady. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 256p. \$39.95.

Patricia Lee Sykes, American University

Death and the Statesman appeared in print one month after the terrorist attacks on September 11, and the timing of its publication alone might attract a wide audience. The book deals with a significant subject of immediate interest to scholars and citizens alike—namely, what drives political leaders as they decide when and how to conduct war. Joseph Underhill-Cady argues that members of the foreign policymaking elite

remain preoccupied with their own mortality. He suggests how their metaphors and rituals reveal their persistent fear and high anxiety about death, and he shows how their decisions to go to war can be read to reflect this preoccupation. For the foreign policy elite, the conduct of war constitutes an "immortality project." According to the author, "As the elite sought to overcome their physical limitations, they likewise attempted to ensure the nation's transcendence of its mortal bounds" (p. 10). Underhill-Cady notes the genderspecific nature of foreign policymaking (p. 45). Macho men deny the inevitability of their own deaths and suppress their emotions, while they labor to ensure that the nation shall long endure. He traces the roots of their immortality projects to the Christian tradition: Man has fallen, but he can achieve salvation and thereby gain eternal life (pp. 52–55). The author renders a plausible, thought-provoking argument, although the evidence he produces could be more convincing.

Underhill-Cady constructs his narrative along the following lines. Chapter 1 critiques some of the literature in international relations and focuses on the limits of rational choice reasoning. Chapter 2 presents the author's alternative approach, which he describes as an analysis "based on political culture and the ontological concerns of foreign policy makers" (p. 10). According to the author, elite decisionmakers conduct their immortality projects at three levels—as individuals (Chapter 3), as government officials (Chapter 4), and as a nation at war (Chapter 5). Finally, the book concludes with speculation about twentieth-century changes in the conduct of war and the implications of high-tech warfare. The final chapter also includes the author's advice to policymakers that they embrace a more feminine "acceptant discourse" (p. 154). To many readers, the author's extensive (albeit basic) critique of rational choice reasoning and his concluding advice will seem strangely out of sync with the spirit of poststructuralism that otherwise informs his study.

As a cultural study of U.S. leaders, this book falls short of its goal. The author fails to identify any metaphor or trope that might be construed as uniquely American. When he explains why his study focuses exclusively on the United States, he cites practical constraints, including "the fact that I live in the United States" (p. 6). If that were a valid reason, then no political scientist in the country would study any other nation. As a source of popular culture, the author extracts metaphors from James Bond films. As he explains, "Bond is the epitome of the unemotional, 'civilized' man who embodies the illusion of being able to control and overcome all contingency and opposition in the world" (p. 121). Bond is also British. Throughout the book, the author refers to Anglo-Saxon culture and Anglo-American sensibility. (For examples, see pp. 122-23.) His understanding of the foreign policy elite appears to include decision makers in other Anglo nations. In fact, if the fear of death drives decision making and if that fear is universal, then the book's central argument would apply to all world leaders.

Readers might also question why Underhill-Cady chose particular leaders as subjects for his study. He focuses on (but does not limit his analysis to) Theodore Roosevelt, his Secretary of State John Hay, Senator George Hoar, Secretary of the Navy John Long, Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Lyndon B. Johnson, and George Herbert Walker Bush. The author states that he selected these subjects because he "found enough in common among them... to describe an evolving culture among foreign policy officials" (p. 7). He implies that he picked the people whose rhetoric and rituals suited his own narrative. He also explains, "I was interested in those campaigns in which the direct threat to the United States was relatively small, and where America might actually be seen as the aggressor, for

it is in those instances that justification of death in battle becomes most difficult" (p. 8). In that case, when focusing on George Herbert Walker Bush, why include the Gulf War but totally exclude "Operation Just Cause" (the U.S. invasion of Panama)? In addition to the seemingly arbitrary selection of subjects, the author's inclination to jump back and forth between cases might leave most readers (unable to identify the Secretary of the Navy during the Spanish American War) a bit bewildered and confused by the cast of characters.

Underhill-Cady's selection of textual evidence might also leave readers unconvinced by his argument. He examines narratives, metaphors, and tropes that he extracts from their context and often takes from secondary sources. (Early in the book, he warns us, "My research consisted of reading extensively about these powerful American men who made decisions about war, and finding passages or events about them that struck me as odd or interesting" [p. 3].) On page 38, for example, the author writes that LBJ "often used the metaphors of paralysis and raging rivers in his discussion of policy," and then he cites Doris Kearns Goodwin's book Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (1976). Underhill-Cady might have followed up that statement by providing examples or illustrations of LBJ's use of those metaphors, but instead he switches to an exploration of the words and actions of another political actor. Later in the text when he returns to LBJ, the author does include direct language, but once again, he relies on Goodwin's text as the source. He states that following Kennedy's assassination, LBJ described the elite as "like a bunch of cattle caught in a swamp...simply circling 'round and 'round," and Johnson added, "I could not allow the tide of grief to overwhelm me" (p. 84, n. 44). A lengthier quotation in which LBJ describes the Great Society as an aging woman appears on page 111, but the author also takes this quotation from Goodwin's book. Readers might wonder whether they are learning more about the fears and preoccupations of Doris Kearns Goodwin than those of LBJ. The highly selective nature of quotations and the author's reliance on secondary accounts leaves readers suspecting that he has overlooked alternative narratives.

In the last chapter, Underhill-Cady does discuss one alternative narrative, which those who construct immortality projects sometimes express. Occasionally, members of the elite have assumed a more passive stance, entertained selfdoubt, acknowledged their own shortcomings, and even identified with the enemy (p. 154). The author expresses the hope that the elite will assume this feminine posture more often, and he advises decision makers to become more self-aware. Even if this happens, the consequences remain unclear, as the author explicitly denies any causal link between psychological health and the outcome of decision making (p. 153). Moreover, both time and place might dash his hopes. If the presidency and the foreign policy establishment are masculine institutions—demanding strength, determination, and firm conviction—then it will be difficult for the elite working in these institutions to express their doubts and emotions or assume an acceptant stance. (Even in the chapter that deals with actors as government officials, the author fails to entertain the possibility that institutions might influence the character of elite discourse.) Furthermore, junctures in political development might determine the nature of discourse. The author observes a shift throughout the twentieth century as war becomes technologically driven, but he neglects fluctuations. Perhaps even "time" can be construed as masculine or feminine. In 2001 in the White House, Cowboys replaced the Sensitive New Age Guys. Now the message is "Wanted dead or alive," not "I feel your pain." The men in the current administration are unlikely to acknowledge and explore their feminine side.

For all its limitations, Underhill-Cady's study invites us to listen closely to foreign policy decision makers today. Will technology reduce the psychological and emotional costs of war, as Underhill-Cady suggests (p. 167), making it even more difficult to discuss death? Listen to Vice President Richard Cheney talk about his heart: He describes in detail the wonders of the mechanical device that keeps his heart ticking and sets its pace. Perhaps more revealing, consider how President George W. Bush recalls his recent brush with death. While sitting alone watching television, he chokes, passes out—the fate of a nation of couch potatoes? (pp. 101-2)then awakens and recovers. Jokingly, Bush explains: "My mother always told me to chew my food carefully before I swallow." Does he render a metaphor for how America will conduct its "New War"? Perhaps we should be alert and attentive to the metaphors and rituals this president displays. After all, he has already been reborn.

**The Politics of Empowerment.** By Robert Weissberg. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1999. 272p. \$50.00.

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The Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s produced strong pressure on all levels of government to give "power to the people." This urgent demand came not only from radical activists in the streets but also from the halls of academia, where scholars churned out a massive volume of studies encompassing detailed recommendations for filling the power vacuum between authoritative public and private decision makers and disadvantaged citizens whose lack of sufficient economic and political resources condemned them to the bottom rungs of the American social order. Although most of these studies were considered positive and progressive, they were not without their detractors. The most searing critique of "bottom up" schemes for empowering the disadvantaged has come from the pen of Robert Weissberg in his book, *The Politics of Empowerment*.

Weissberg advances the argument that the calls for self-determination and autonomous control by the disadvantaged are naive, unrealistic, and irretrievably flawed. It is his position that admonitions of this kind are unnecessarily radical and disruptive. They anticipate a major transformation of societal relations, and seek to radically alter the fundamental foundations of our social and political existence. They also discourage consideration of more realistic alternatives. Thus, destitute people seeking a remedy for their pauperism might be better served by learning a trade or taking classes in English literacy and mathematics than by joining a community organization and mobilizing for control over welfare bureaucracies.

The main lines of Weissberg's arguments run in the following direction. If poor people wish to achieve a higher bundle of benefits, they must earn them like everyone else. Community leaders who do not inform their constituents that the capacity on the part of government to deliver extraordinary benefits is limited are doing them a disservice; they are guilty of imparting to them unrealistic expectations that create conflict without advancing opportunities for genuine progress. Real empowerment for the poor must rest on the old-fashioned American values of obedience, duty, and respect. Political mobilization must be seen as one item on a broad and diverse menu that must be created to achieve massbased social justice in a democratic society. And poor people must understand that the mobilization process requires that they forge alliances with others and defer to the superior resources and wisdom of those who occupy higher positions on the power continuum. They must know that self-subjugation

to overwhelming authority is not an automatic recipe for poverty and misery. They must also learn to live with low rather than high expectations, since it is well established that achieving power is not especially effective in securing economic benefits, personal happiness, or social acceptance. Those who counsel them otherwise are acting irresponsibly. In the final analysis, this society may have to face the fact that the best remedy for poverty is to help the poor accept their lot as inevitable. Clearly, we cannot continue to blame society for the inept decision making by the poor that has consigned them to their own misery. To the extent that empowerment advocates ignore the innate weaknesses in the human personality of the unfortunate, they contribute to the escalation of urban social problems and make it more difficult to devise realistic solutions to the dilemmas of the poor.

In one major section of the book, Weissberg attempts an analysis of the black empowerment movement to demonstrate the major fallacies inherent in empowerment theories. He believes that the black model is an extremely important one because most black people have bought into the connection between empowerment and expanded societal benefits, and because the black empowerment movement has given birth to empowerment campaigns by other groups. Weissberg believes that one major problem with the black empowerment model is its reliance on electoral politics as a method for advancing the interest of blacks in society. This analysis, he contends, overlooks the fact that blacks are a hopeless minority in the country and can therefore exercise only a sliver of political power nationally, despite major gains in their election to public office since the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act. The widely touted potential benefits of electoral politics are also undermined by constraints endemic in the American constitutional system. In a constitutional democracy like the one operative in the United States, the government cannot control all of the social and economic forces required to achieve the objectives of black empowerment legally. Thus, if white businesses decide to leave a city governed by a black mayor, and this decision undermines the city's tax base, the government is in no position to command these businesses to stay or, once having left, to return.

Constitutional constraints aside, Weissberg contends that a variety of other factors prevent the translation of black empowerment in theory into empowerment in fact. In this context, he points to the weak and factional nature of black politics. Black mayors have failed to build permanent organizations and are challenged by black factions that are disappointed in their seeming inability to radically transform local government, and by white factions that oppose their efforts to satisfy escalating black demands for a wide range of social and economic benefits. Black empowerment is further undermined by the black infatuation with the "cult of personality," the yawning disconnect between mobilization and benefit delivery, growing dependence by black politicians on coalition politics as the principle avenue to elective office, and the incapacity of black mayors to satisfy public demands for the delivery of quality services by filling city bureaucracies with competent black employees.

Weissberg's The Politics of Empowerment is a political tract disguised as an academic treatise. It is one thing to argue that black politics is in internal disarray; it is quite another to argue that it has not been productive. The proof is in the pudding. Black mayors have not liberated black communities, but they have brought social and economic benefits to their constituents that would not have been available in their absence. To say that the distributional networks in major American cities have not altered is to ignore 30 years of critical development in American local politics. Both the symbols and the substance of racial politics in these cities have changed. The

changes have been both external and internal to the black community.

Externally, it is virtually impossible to build winning electoral coalitions in major American cities without the pivotal involvement of the black community. This fact may not always produce black control, but it does guarantee influence. It is a fundamental mistake to confuse the two conditions, as Weissberg does over and over again in his book. Internally, black political mobilization has produced a highly significant transformation in the psychological bearing of the black community. Blacks all across the country now approach the ballot box with a high degree of political and racial consciousness. This means, among other things, that they are voting instrumentally, and not at the blandishments of white-dominated political organizations. Instrumental black voting represents a sea change in black political behavior from the model of machine politics that pervaded the political landscape of many cities in the 1940s and 1950s. Weissberg's book does not capture this shift in black perspective because it is the product of armchair speculation disconnected from the foundations of black politics in America.

Weissberg refuses to acknowledge the reality of institutional racism in America. In *The Politics of Empowerment*, he constantly intimates that problems in the black community issue basically from weaknesses in the character traits of the black population. This blame-the-victim approach raises images of the confusing, distorted, circular arguments presented by Richard J. Herrnstein and Charles Murray in *The Bell Curve* (1994). It leads Weissberg to the false conclusion that political empowerment cannot significantly alter the policymaking influence of the black community, or the effective power position of citizens living in disadvantaged communities across the United States.

False Alarm: Why the Greatest Threat to Social Security and Medicare is the Campaign to "Save" Them. By Joseph White. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 320p. \$42.50.

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Few public policy issues have drawn more popular attention, generated more media commentary, or produced more books than the national debate over the dark fate of Social Security and Medicare. In a new book, noted policy scholar Joseph White argues that the "entitlement crisis" and the future insolvency projected by so many experts, politicians, and opinion makers are myths that badly need exploding. White insists that although we should be very concerned about the viability of each of these two essential government programs, we should not be carried away by the hysteria amplified by radical reformers and saviors of every political coloration. Rather, we should attempt to formulate a clear-eyed analysis of the purposes and constraints of social insurance that will produce genuine programmatic solutions that do not radically weaken the nation's social safety net.

White's primary goal in the pages of False Alarm is an attack on the emerging conventional wisdom that Social Security and Medicare are both entitlement monsters whose spiraling "unaffordable" costs will soon drastically undermine the economy and imperil future generations. The author wants to show that there is no social insurance crisis of the magnitude described by critics. Furthermore, most of the widely heralded "solutions" can be justified neither by the savings and alleged benefits they are likely to generate nor by ill-conceived and exaggerated predictions of budgetary meltdown. Instead, he claims, we should address the financing challenge facing Medicare and Social Security with an

incrementalist approach that recognizes the value primacy of these massive programs and that takes small, informed steps to make the necessary adjustments in them.

The first part of False Alarm focuses on the rationale, benefits, and financing of these two programs. Its three chapters explain what Social Security and Medicare actually do in practice and attempt to explain both the significant stakes involved and the contradictory reaction of most Americans to insurance versus entitlement programs. The second part examines the various spending trends, sociodemographic factors, and political value judgments that created a friendly environment for the multiplication of all the myriad doomsday scenarios that show these two programs threatening the prospects of future generations. Next, in Chapters 8 through 10 of Part III, White reviews and rejects the major proposals for radical reform like privatization, health vouchers, means testing, eligibility requirements, and reductions in costof-living adjustments (COLAs). In the last two chapters in the book's final part, the author defends his own detailed "responsible reform" agenda and follows up with projections for the likely effects of these reforms.

White identifies Social Security and Medicare as two of the most important institutions of American life and, given demographic shifts, he expects them to be even more important in the future. Although he rejects what he sees as a conservative antientitlement hysteria, he also parts with liberal defenders of these programs since he favors substantial change in financing and benefits and does not believe that the current surpluses in the trust funds should be spent on new programs. Ŝerious concern, he asserts, is warranted despite the absence of a crisis, and sensible adjustments should be phased in now to ensure fairness and practical administration. The schedule for this incremental reform agenda should include protecting the surpluses, increasing payroll taxes, diversifying trust fund investment, experimenting with competition or vouchers within Medicare, and adding years in the workforce to age in eligibility requirements. If these and other policy measures are adopted, he projects a positive future scenario during which time voters and their representatives will have 50 years to determine just what kind of program they

This Century Foundation book is compelling in almost every way. The volume is well written and the author's core propositions are well argued. Although it is intended for a popular audience, it contains all the spending estimates, actuarial tables, projections, data analysis, and comparative policy discussion that should appeal to policy experts. White takes

on all challengers, and he does so with a clarity and simplicity that downplays the depth of his understanding of complex issues. While he demolishes the pundits' gloomy predictions of generational warfare, he is more than willing to adopt some of the more modest programmatic tools and is perceptive enough to question his own values, anticipations, and insights. Along the way, the author marshals a substantial body of evidence and develops a number of arguments that I have not heard or read about before. White even provides the reader with a popular website (www.socsec.org) that offers a wide array of additional information explaining the two programs and the ways to reform them.

Of course, not all readers will find this book equally valuable. Obviously, would-be saviors of Medicare and Social Security will find fault with the positions White takes, just as they will find his arguments difficult to refute. He has harsh words for the policy debate in the 2000 presidential election and the campaign planks of both candidates Al Gore and George W. Bush. The book will also disappoint anyone seeking long-term programmatic solvency guarantees or certainties about the nation's economic future. At the same time, the author devotes little space to any discussion of radical proposals like national health insurance or the former Clinton administration's panacea "managed competition." Nor does White discuss nonentitlement reform or address other ways in which the federal government's budget might be balanced without Congress's resorting to raids on the trust funds.

Unfortunately, False Alarm is unlikely to achieve its author's most ambitious goals. I suspect that despite its careful and persuasive analysis, the book will attain only a small mass readership and that it will have only a limited impact on the national policy debate in Washington, D.C. Prophets of pending disaster and radical-change advocates often make the best-seller lists, while the works by proponents of more limited adjustments in the status quo tend to languish on the shelves. President Bush is no friend to the book's primary message, and the president seems intent on pursuing the privatization proposals and tax cuts on which he campaigned. Some of the book's proposals, such as safeguarding the trust fund surpluses, have already been rejected through recent government action. Clearly, good sophisticated arguments and careful analysis do not ensure good national policy. If they did, much of the author's agenda would already be in place. So Joseph White may have to wait for the next national election, another administration, or even a severe threat to Social Security and Medicare before his book gains the audience it so thoroughly deserves.

## **Comparative Politics**

The Rise of "The Rest": Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing Economies. By Alice H. Amsden. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 416p. \$35.00.

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Alice Amsden is one of the founders of the "statist" or "revisionist" school of East Asian economic development. Her earlier book, Asia's Next Giant (1989), refuted claims that growth in South Korea and other Newly Industrialized Countries was simply a function of high investment rates and correct prices, based in turn on the small-government fundamentals of stable, private property rights, macroeconomic stability, and trade liberalization. Amsden, along with others, emphasized the benefits of sector-specific state interventions distinctly at odds with neoclassical prescriptions.

But Amsden's work was distinct in several ways: She highlighted reciprocity and discipline, in which the state provided a range of rewards, such as protection in the domestic market and low-interest loans, in exchange for successful performance in areas such as exports, R&D investment and new product introduction. She portrayed late development as a process of learning, often through large, diversified business groups, rather than of invention or innovation. And she paid special attention to the shop floor, where engineers and technicians were critical toward the acquisition of project execution and design capacities.

Amsden's new book, The Rise of "The Rest", builds on these and other themes to explain how a dozen countries—seven in Asia, four in Latin America, and one in the Middle East—"rose to the ranks of world-class competitors in

a wide range of mid-technology industries" (p. 1). The first third of the book describes superficial pre-World War II industrialization in the "rest" due to halting and haphazard implementation of the "three pronged investment necessary to compete in modern industries: in large-scale plants and up-to-date equipment, in technological capacities and management teams, and in distribution" (p. 98). Despite its weaknesses, this prewar manufacturing, even under foreign ownership, generated a new cadre of engineers and managers who, Amsden argues, proved critical to postwar growth, especially where foreign ownership was weakened by decolonization.

The book's second section explores the "rest's" postwar growth through the lens of what the author considers key components of developmental states: development banking; criteria for sectoral targeting (e.g., mature technologies, foreign exchange savings) and for continued state support (e.g., export performance, localization); selective protection; and "national firm leaders." This section also points to two factors-income equality and labor rates-to explain why South Korea and Taiwan excelled in building indigenous technological and managerial skills (about which more later). The last section of the book traces emergence of the rest into "independents" (Taiwan, Korea, as well as India and China) and "integrationists" (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Turkey). The former are concerned with "getting institutions right and building skills"; the latter emphasize "getting prices right and buying skills" (p. 293). Amsden argues that despite the increasing pressure for global liberalization, there remain ample opportunities through which the independents can expand indigenous technical capacities. Taking advantage of these opportunities is critical; the challenge to the rest is not deindustrialization but denationalization.

The Rise of "The Rest" is thus one of the rare works on economic development that not only stresses technological learning but traces this process from the shop floor to the business group and to national policy incentives. Contesting the "accumulationist" view of East Asian success, Amsden confirms that while investment in physical and human capital has been necessary, the integrationists have demonstrated that such investments were insufficient. It is one thing for firms to accumulate sufficient capital to purchase machinery; it is quite another for them to learn about, risk operating, and master technologies new to the country (Richard R. Nelson and Howard Pack, "The Asian Miracle and Modern Growth Theory," Economic Journal 109 [July 1999]: 416-32). But if firms are the locus of productivity gains, they are not the sole source. Indeed, Amsden's emphasis on productivity and quality varying cross-nationally among firms in the same industry lends further support to an understanding of growth as a consequence of "entrepreneurship, innovation and learning, all encouraged by the policy regime" (Nelson and Pack, p. 418). Her account thus suggests the relevance for the developing world of national institutional frameworks, such as "production regimes" and "national innovation systems" based on varieties of capitalism in the industrialized market economies.

What are the origins of such national "policy regimes"? Amsden's answer lends support to the importance, indeed the benefits, of equality and broad coalitions. But she enriches this perspective by suggesting specific causal mechanisms: Relative income equality allowed Korea to implement the "antiegalitarian" strategy of promoting large, diversified business groups. And the acceptance of generally rising labor costs prompted both Korea and Taiwan to "start building institutions and raising finance for R&D" due to fear that they would be priced out of global markets for unskilled products, even as foreign firms refused to sell them advanced technology (p. 245).

One weakness of the book is its tendency to force all the countries of the rest into an uncomfortable institutional mold. Amsden argues that "roughly from the 1950s through the mid-1980s, all countries in 'the rest' shared to an extraordinary degree the same set of developmental institutions, defined by a reciprocal control mechanism" (p. 281). If by reciprocal control mechanism is meant a variety of state measures to promote exports, structural change, and local value added through industrial investment, then the argument holds. But Amsden's view of reciprocal control implies state capacity to provide support in exchange for measures of "upgrading" technological improvement and market performance (e.g., product quality specifications). Despite impressive policy statements and intentions, such mechanisms were simply not in operation in several of the rest, including Thailand, whose Board of Investment Amsden praises for its "daring-cum-bureaucratism" (p. 28).

A related problem is the book's tendency to infer institutional capacities from outcomes. It is true, for example, that Indonesian plywood exports grew significantly in part under state pressure. But to infer that such pressure reflected reciprocal control mechanisms and state monitoring capacities while passing off allegations of corruption as economists' criticism (p. 176) misses an important part of the story. It also neglects an opportunity to integrate corruption and other political factors into the analysis. The more successful of the rest did not wipe out corruption; they instead limited, managed, and/or hived it off in ways that supported key political coalitions while not interfering with performance in key sectors (e.g., David C. Kang, "Bad Loans to Good Friends: Money Politics and the Developmental State in South Korea," *International Organization* 56, no. 1 [Winter 2002]: 177–207).

The problem of inferring state institutional and political capacities from economic outcomes reflects evidentiary weakness. Amsden's account would have been strengthened significantly by going beyond correlations between government programs and industry performance to include structured analyses of links between policy and investment decisions. Such accounts are also important in order to provide a clearer picture of state capacities: The successful cases would presumably involve public-private sector interactions that provided the mechanism for information exchange, program design, policy credibility, client "buy-in," and feedback. Otherwise, we are left with an implausible story, even in South Korea and Taiwan, of state officials as all-knowing directors, as opposed to highly motivated and politically sensitive learners.

Specifying causal mechanisms would help to address the charge that statist writings have been apolitical. It would encourage scholars to explore the sources of state preferences, such as interelite conflicts, resource endowments, and external security threats. It would also encourage us to specify the institutional mechanisms—including political arrangements—through which those preferences were expressed (e.g., Gregory W. Noble, Collective Action in East Asia: How Ruling Parties Shape Industrial Policy, 1998).

Amsden has made a powerful historical and cross-national case for the developmental importance of "getting institutions right and building skills." She has shown the costs and benefits of diverse models of capitalism within specific global contexts. Exploring the politics of growth in the "rest" will help us to assess the applicability of the rest's experiences to other developing countries. This is especially important in light of the danger that local institutional innovations—of the sort so effectively highlighted by Amsden—are being discouraged by globalization pressures.

Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. By Peter Andreas. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. 176p. \$39.95 cloth, \$15.95 paper.

Frank O. Mora, Rhodes College

The difficulty of policing a complex border like that between the United States and Mexico, specifically stemming the flow of illegal drugs and immigration, demonstrates, according to Peter Andreas's insightful and pathbreaking analysis, the challenges associated with globalization, diminished sovereignty, and economic integration between developed and developing economies. In fact, as he notes, intensifying law enforcement on the U.S.-Mexico border has had several unintended consequences, including enhancing the incentive and thus the flow of illegal drugs and migrants, which, in turn, create obstacles to the expansion of legal flows. Throughout the book an implicit question emerges: How do you balance the positive gains from globalization with the negative or dark side effects of free trade, that is, drug trafficking and illegal immigration? Taking the dilemma further, how can states in a global, borderless economy promote two contradictory policies simultaneously: strong prohibitionist, law-enforcement policies to enforce state sovereignty and economic neoliberalism and integration?

Andreas's political economy approach to examining state responses to the illicit consequences of globalization is an attempt to explain the sharp escalation of border policing on the U.S.-Mexico border at a time when both states, particularly since the early 1990s, have been encouraging and expanding cross-border economic flows. According to the author, "increased policing can simply be understood as a natural policy response to an increase in illegal cross-border flows and a corresponding increase in public pressure on the state to secure its borders" (p. 7). This is referred to as the reconfiguration and reinforcing of the border. The challenge is that as long as economic integration remains central to the global economy and economic growth and prosperity, the commitment to policing the border and regaining "control" is largely ceremonial, "not only a means to an end but an end in itself" (p. 11). This is the book's most revealing argument concerning the complex and tense relationship between globalization and politics.

The literature on globalization is extensive and rigorous, though often redundant. However, Andreas's research raises a number of new and critical theoretical and policy questions that focus on the illicit effects and concomitant state responses to integration and its natural consequence diminished sovereignty. The general public and policymakers in the United States have reacted forcefully to the problem of sovereignty by augmenting law enforcement at the border; the author suggests that such a response is counterproductive and shortsighted. Escalation of law enforcement and the emphasis on supply-side counternarcotics and immigration policies have the unintended consequence of increasing the risk and profit of illicit trafficking. This creates an image of an uncontrolled border, which, in turn, leads to greater demand for more law enforcement. As a result, border policing "has ultimately been less about achieving the stated instrumental goal of deterring illegal border crossers and more about politically crafting the image of the border and symbolically reaffirming the state's territorial authority" (p. 85). Therefore, failed state policies are directed not at resolving the problem but at projecting an image of control and success to justify the existence of federal bureaucracies and increased budgets.

Andreas utilizes the metaphor of a "game" to explain why the state pursues policies that focus on the "perforative and audience-directed nature" of the sport and not on what makes for good, effective border management (p. viii). Border Games implicitly indicates that in the tension between restructured state-market relations, it is the market, legal and illegal, which triumphs. The state simply lacks the capacity and willingness to patrol the border so long as globalization intensifies and the objective of economic neoliberalism and free trade remains the desired aim.

The author's response to this paradox and the challenge of diminished sovereignty is to emphasize the need for enhanced levels of bilateral and regional cooperation. Border Games incorporates the comparative case of the European Union to show how by escalating law enforcement through a multilateral process of "pooling sovereignty," it can control drug trafficking and illegal immigration without negatively affecting the goal of integrating Western Europe. The author refers to the multilateral framework of the Schengan Accords, an intergovernmental agreement to police external borders, as an example of a mechanism that could help alleviate the challenges on the U.S.-Mexico border. However, according to the evidence provided, the accord and other measures have not necessarily addressed the challenge of illegal trafficking at the border, but, in fact, have only "enabled German policymakers to pacify conflicting audiences" (p. 123). Thus, it seems that the Europeans are better at the game of symbolism, while being nearly as incapable as the United States at stemming illegal cross-border flows.

This is where Andreas's line of thinking gets a bit puzzling. What exactly is effective policing of a border, if a more multilateral approach does not necessarily stem illegal flows? Are the Europeans just better at playing the symbolic game by using a regional approach to legitimize ineffectiveness? If the border challenge is more ideological-political than physical, as the author indicates, then the border is certainly irrelevant, and any attempt at controlling for the negative side of globalization is impossible. Are there real strategies to reaffirming physical control, or is illegal activity simply a reality of globalization that states must accept? *Border Games* does not give a satisfactory answer to these questions, other than to emphasize image as central to the state's reassertion of control.

Andreas's insightful and rigorous study is an important contribution to the literature on globalization and transnational illicit trade. Beyond describing the challenge of policing one of the busiest borders in the world, he alludes to the difficulty and consequences of managing the integration of developed and developing economies. The author leaves much room for further research on this issue, which promises to be increasingly important as the United States and the European Union expand integration with developing countries.

The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics. By Zoltan Barany. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 384p. \$70.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

Ladis K. D. Kristof, Portland State University

Whoever has spent some time in the Indian state of Panjab and is to some extent acquainted with the East European Gypsies must have concluded that this was their original home. But as in Europe, so also in Panjab, even at the local Chandigarh University where an international conference debated the problem, little is known and understood about Gypsy ethnopolitics or ethnoculture. European interest in the Gypsies at the university level goes back at least to the middle

of the nineteenth century, but it focused on regional languages and folklore as, for instance, can be seen in the correspondence between Bogdan P. Hasdeu (Ghijdeu), a Romanian academic, and Franz Miklosich, an Austrian philologist.

The volume under review is the first ever to approach the Gypsy problem from a comparative sociopolitical and socioeconomic perspective based on systematic statistical inquiries and interviews in each of seven countries, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Regrettably, the situation of the Roma in Serbia is only occasionally mentioned, although for comparative studies it is an especially interesting case.

This study begins with a brief coverage of the historical impact of the disintegration of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires, followed by an in-depth discussion of the social and economic consequences for the Gypsies of the collapse of the Soviet communist regimes, under which the Gypsies were regimented (like the rest of the society) and deprived of the possibility of practicing their own traditional social and cultural way of life, but, in exchange, assured of some minimum social and economic survival and, to some extent, protected from social hostility. Now they were left floating and exposed to the aggression of the rising wave of nationalism throughout Eastern Europe. The latter impacted Western Europe by causing a relatively large migration/escape of Eastern Gypsies to the West. Demographically, this migration was not too important, but politically, it rebounded forcefully on Eastern Europe through a mobilization of critical Western public opinion and the intervention of international political bodies in defense of Gypsy interests, especially their rights guaranteed by international law.

Briefly, their rights qua citizens of their home countries, above all, equality before the law, began for the first time ever to gain some meaning, largely because the several Eastern countries hoped in their turn to become equal members of the European Union. Of course, equality before the law does not necessarily guarantee the elimination of all marginality in practice (a problem emphasized by Zoltan Barany). Within the expanded European Union, both the new member states and the Gypsies are going to remain for a time marginal until, on the one hand, acceptance of sociopolitical diversity and economic practice is broadened and, on the other, the individual differences of life quality are to some extent reduced. These differences exist everywhere on the individual country level, but to varying degrees. Romania, for instance, obviously has by far the largest Gypsy minority-perhaps under one million, or perhaps three millions, possibly even four millions and growing fast (depending on who "counts")but given the rather laissez-faire nature of Romanians, the weight of numbers was not very important as long so one did not attach specific rights (benefits) to specific numbers (percentages). Growing nationalism notwithstanding, it is to this day quite acceptable in conversation to describe a neighbor as "Gypsy-like," which presumes some Gypsy ancestry, or physical appearance, but does not negate his Romanianness. In Poland, it would be impossible to make such a wishywashy identification. You are either a Pole or a Gypsy, and specifically a Polish Gypsy, not one of those "dirty" Romanian Gypsy immigrants.

Incidentally, the question of national identity of Gypsies is often closely tied to their (assumed) religious identity, and it is regrettable that the author devoted so little attention to this problem. In Poland, to be Polish you practically have to be a Catholic and show it on various prescribed occasions. In the Orthodox countries, where religious observance is often much more casual, the Gypsies can easily be in and out of the church without much commitment or attracting much attention, even when it comes to baptizing their children. Their

participation is much more frequent, and often specifically invited, in various funeral and cemetery traditions that possibly have pagan roots; these are occasions when free food and some coins are distributed, thus adding to their attraction.

New and very important is Barany's extensive coverage of Gypsy leadership on the national level in the several countries, as well as on the international level. Some of this leadership is traditional in the sense that who gets rich becomes automatically an admired member of the community, able to dispense various favors and consequently influential and automatically a spokesman for the community, though not necessarily genuinely concerned about, or understanding, its genuine long-term interests. Far less common, indeed very rare, are those who are university educated, have not lost contact with their family and ethnic roots, and are able to converse on an equal level with representatives of international organizations and top members of national governments. Often, all too often, the very fact that they are educated, think differently, and especially lead a different life style alienates them from the community for which they should and could be valuable spokespersons. This is frequently the problem when it comes to electing members of parliaments or representatives to international bodies. Barany cites many examples of violent clashes between simple local leaders and higherlevel representatives, who are accused of being interested, for instance, in imposing some artificial uniform language on all Gypsies, as well as various goals and values that have nothing to do with the genuine problems of the Gypsy population, which struggles with only one fundamental issue, simple

To sum up, Barany offers us a pioneering comparative study on a subject of considerable importance to students of Eastern Europe and of relevance to all who labor in the field of comparative politics where regime change, marginality, and ethnopolitics come to the fore.

Constitutions in a Nonconstitutional World: Arab Basic Laws and the Prospects for Accountable Government. By Nathan J. Brown. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. 244p. \$65.50 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

As'ad AbuKhalil, California State University, Stanislaus

This work is by a serious scholar who had previously written a fine book on peasant politics in Egypt. Interest in constitutionalism in the Arab world may be dismissed as naive given the notorious reputation of the region for autocracy and dictatorships. Yet Nathan Brown insists on taking constitutional developments in the region seriously, and he meticulously covers most constitutional developments over the span of the last century. But the book could have been easily condensed into a scholarly article. In the first part of the book, for example, which stretches into page 94, he provides the reader with a blow-by-blow account of constitutional developments in select Middle East countries. It contains very few insights, and the author breaks no new grounds; the developments were previously covered in many other works (for example, Elie Kedourie, *Politics in the Middle East*, 1992).

The author also fails to persuade the reader as to why it is important to study constitutional developments and legislative bodies when he acknowledges that they constitute "a weak force in Arab politics to date" (p. 93), and when he stresses that Arab parliaments are left emasculated (p. 196) by a variety of absolutist and unaccountable leaders. This is not to dismiss the study of constitutionalism altogether, and Brown was right in pointing out the validity of the method (pp. 198–99). But this is where the book fails. He raises many important questions regarding the causes behind

constitutionalism and the actual roles of parliaments, but he does not draw the useful links and contexts in which constitutions are drafted and parliaments are created. What we are left with is an anthology of detailed constitutional references and citations that seem to be offered in a political vacuum.

There are few references, if any, to regional or international developments and their impact on Arab constitutional politics. For example, the state of war with Israel has allowed several Arab governments to suspend constitutional and parliamentary life all in the name of the battle for Palestine. Furthermore, the author makes no references to Arab public opinion and Arab popular aspirations. In fact, the Arab people are missing from a book dealing with political life and struggles, as if the public does not make demands on governments even when those governments are not necessarily responsive or accountable.

In addition, if the validity of the study of constitutions is even questionable in Western democracy where actual politics often deviate from constitutional designs, it is even more questionable when constitutions descend from above often for purposes of political legitimation (a concept that should have been pursued by Brown). In fact, the creation of constitutions and bodies of ostensible political representation serves as a measure of regimes' estimation of popular opinions and aspirations. Regimes often respond to popular demands for political openness and liberalization by creating the facade of an accountable political system. Of course, the Arab peoples are not naive and often realize the emptiness of governmental gestures, which explains the limited political legitimacy that is possessed by most Arab governments.

One may also strongly disagree with Brown's contention that Arab constitutions are "rarely blatantly violated" (p. 7). It is easy to document, and human rights organizations have done just that, the extent to which Arab constitutions and political promises are routinely and blatantly violated. The Iraqi constitution, for example, states in Article 2 that "the people are the source of authority and its legitimacy," while Article 19 guarantees the equality of all before the law. And the Libyan constitution states in Article 10 that "the creation of honorary titles and civilian ranks is prohibited," while Article 25 of the Syrian constitution maintains that "freedom is a sacred right. The state protects the personal freedom of the citizens and safeguards their dignity and security." Obviously, the citizens of those countries would dismiss Brown's contention in this regard. Constitutions are only adhered to insofar as they provide political rationalizations and justifications for actions and policies of the government, and they also provide an ideological sourcebook for the political legitimacy of regimes.

In talking about the Egyptian constitutional council of the nineteenth century, Brown states that "democracy was hardly an issue: the Council, though elected, was essentially a way to ensure representation primarily of the provincial notability" (p. 29). This is certainly not unique to Egypt, and may in fact apply to the founders of the U.S. Constitution. But it is customary to attribute lofty ideals and motives to founders of Western democratic institutions, while Easterners are seen as always devoid of principles and ideals besides self-interest. He also observes that independence "occasioned the writing of a constitution" (p. 61), again as if this is unique to the Arab world. His disregard of regional and international factors is most evident when he refers to the Syrian military coup of Husni Az-Za'im that ended civilian rule (p. 69) without informing the reader that it was engineered by the CIA, as we now know. The choice of the case studies is often curious: The author includes Iran (a non-Arab country), while he largely ignores Lebanon, which has had the most effective and independent parliament in the entire Arab world. It was only in Lebanon where a government was voted out of office altogether and where the top post of government is open to contestation.

The second part of the book is more analytical and interesting, although some redundancies occur. The author is most knowledgeable about Egypt, and he offers interesting remarks about the role of the judiciary in Eygptian political life. But the weakest section of the book deals with Islamic constitutionalism where he traces constitutional evolution to the nineteenth century without even a passing reference to ideas of governance in Islamic political thought. The author should have considered the limitations set on political authority in Islamic political treaties (see p. 178). Further, many political thinkers sanction the overthrow of a tyrannical ruler. Islamic philosophers also justify the necessity of governance on rational grounds, and not merely on grounds of prophetic revelation as the theologians have done.

In sum, the book is a disappointment and fails to provide its own raison d'être.

Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran. By Daniel Brumberg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. 306p. \$55.00 cloth, \$21.00 paper.

Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Syracuse University

This is a book about a man who may be considered "the twentieth century's last example of a 'pure' charismatic leader" (p. 5). With these words, Daniel Brumberg begins to analyze the thoughts and legacy of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–89), who came to power in Iran in February 1979. In his introduction, the author maintains that his study provides "an accurate, objective, yet sociologically empathetic evaluation of the very complex process of ideological change in the Islamic Republic of Iran" (p. 8).

By examining a wide variety of cultural, political, psychological, and social forces operating within the Iranian political milieu, Brumberg offers an insightful account of the multifaceted nature of revolutionary charisma. Dissatisfied with both the symbolic and instrumentalist theories of charismatic rule, he maintains that "the images of authority that political actors bring to social and political conflicts are not mere rationalizations of material interests; nor are they reflections of some cultural essence" (p. 6). To capture the complex nuances and the chaotic and nonlinear traits of competing authority systems, the author adopts a historical institutionalist perspective heavily supplemented by insights from the literature on political culture.

Brumberg introduces four analytical concepts to capture the nuances of charismatic authority in Iran: multiple biographies, multiple shared imaginations, dissonant institutionalization, and complex routinization. "Multiple biographies" denotes a leader's absorption of contending concepts of authority, while "multiple shared imaginations" refers to the existence of an assortment of political visions in a given society. "Dissonant institutionalization" is the dynamic process whereby contending visions of political authority are reproduced within various state and social institutions, as well as in the political lexicon of the ruling elite. Finally, "complex routinization" applies to the prolonged, chaotic, and indeterminate process through which political struggles either obstruct or advance the transformation of revolutionary organizations and ideology.

Brumberg considers dissonant institutionalization the "defining feature of the Islamic Republic" (p. 35), and asserts that thanks to its nature and effect, the system of contending authorities in Iran will endure for the foreseeable future (p. 246). The author also regards the "most enduring trait" of Iran's revolution as the "twin valorization of a zealous

quest for utopia alongside the pragmatic struggle for political order" (p. 13).

According to Brumberg, Khomeini was the embodiment par excellence of this twin valorization. Here was a magnetic leader capable of combining charismatic, traditional, and utilitarian visions of political authority (p. 80), yet one who did not have a coherent, consistent, or straightforward blueprint for revolutionary action (p. ix); a man with a stoic character who believed in the vanguard theory of revolution (p. 89), yet was concerned about the paradoxical consequences of clerical rule (p. 117); a cleric whose versatile understanding of Islam "was conditioned by notions of power, expediency, and interest" (p. 84), yet whose predilection for Islamic mysticism would often lead to contradictory pronouncements and an erratic praxis.

While Reinventing Khomeini is a thought-provoking account of modern Iran's political development, it is not without its shortcomings. This reviewer believes that Brumberg's penchant for the charismatic theory of political authority and psychological explanations leads him to overemphasize the significance of Khomeini's personal deprivations of youth (losing both parents) and to exaggerate the extent and weight of his charismatic prowess. Did he really manage to exude mystical charisma as early as the 1930s when he was just entering the third decade of his own life? Is it not true that in the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, he had to live in the shadow of more prominent religious leaders of the time, such as Ayatollah Ha'eri-Yazdi, Ayatollah Kashani, and Ayatollah Borujerdi? If we were to discount the hero worship style of historiography prevalent in the postrevolutionary era, we would have to answer the former question negatively and the latter affirmatively. Sure enough, Khomeini was respected within the confine of religious seminaries for being a learned teacher, virtuous cleric, and courageous man, yet the fact remains that he was not the highest religious authority in the 1930s, 1940s, or 1950s, nor is there much evidence that he enjoyed a great deal of mass following during these decades.

In this regard, some of Brumberg's omissions are rather troubling. For example, he maintains that Ayatollah Khomeini became more political in his outlook during the 1940s and 1950s. However, the author does not provide any explanation as to why this charismatic cleric was conspicuously absent from politics during the tumultuous events of 1951–53 when the Iranian attempt to nationalize oil was rewarded with a CIA-inspired coup. Should one hypothesize that this is a deliberate omission since its acknowledgment could have cast a shadow of doubt over the author's narrative?

Furthermore, Brumberg ends his book with a rather controversial—and in my view erroneous—conclusion. He maintains that Iranians have a deeply imbedded and intrinsic attraction to charismatic leaders, and that modernity in Iran needs to be accommodated to the quest for a spiritual life (p. 247). As proof, he refers to how Iranian "leaders," regardless of their position on the political spectrum, do not wish to let go of Khomeini's legacy. Does the latter argument, however, solidly support the former? Why should the incessant opportunistic appropriations and perennial bickering about Khomeini's legacy among the "political elite" be interpreted as a sign of the whole society's penchant for charismatic leaders or spiritual life? Have not the existing criticisms of the political elite literature convinced us to avoid equating without question the preferences of the ruling elite with that of the masses? Are not the widening rifts within the clerical establishment, criticisms of the cult of personality, the rampant debates about democracy and civil society, and so on—all of which Brumberg himself refers to in the closing chapters of his book—enough evidence that Iranian society is moving toward greater democracy, modernity, and secularization? Moreover, if we were to accept that Iranians do have an intrinsic attraction to charismatic leaders and spiritual life, does not that somehow contradict—or at least diminish the centrality Brumberg had earlier assigned to dissonant institutionalization as the defining feature of political life in contemporary Iran?

Finally, mention should be made of the fact that the scarcity of primary sources used in the book and the absence of a bibliography, coupled with typographical errors—I counted some 20 examples—have somewhat blemished the value of a book that offers much food for thought. Despite these shortcomings, *Reinventing Khomeini* is a rewarding read for students of Third World ideologies in general and those interested in political Islam in particular.

Tearing the Social Fabric: Neoliberalism, Deindustrialization and the Crisis of Governance in Zimbabwe. By Padraig Carmody. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001. 240p. \$67.95.

African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999. By Nicolas Van De Walle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 304p. \$59.95 cloth, \$19.95, paper.

Michael F. Lofchie, UCLA

Sub-Saharan Africa continues to underperform the world's developing regions, remaining a region of pronounced economic stagnation at correspondingly frightful human and social costs. Exactly why this is so has been the subject of extensive debate both among academics and within the policy community. Since most sub-Saharan African countries have been implementing neoliberal economic reforms, there has been particularly heated discussion about whether or not these policies have helped to improve the economic environment.

Much of the literature on this topic has been ideological. There is a highly visible left-right spectrum that divides those who favor market-friendly economic reforms from those who oppose them. The former believe that, at the very worst, structural adjustment has helped arrest and even turn around a process of precipitous economic decline. Advocates of this view argue that even 2% economic growth is a dramatic improvement over -3%. On the other side are those who see liberal economic reforms as worsening an already bad situation. Those on this side of the ideological divide believe that neoliberal economic measures have contributed to deindustrialization and, thereby, worsened the continent's pandemic political and social crises.

It is unlikely that either of the two groups will be able to persuade the other, but of the two books reviewed here, Nicolas Van De Walle's deserves to be read by all scholars interested in serious discussion of the issue. For although his work could be roughly categorized as center-right in its orientation, that is, pro-reform, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis shows a careful scholar's painstaking and thoughtful reflection about all sides of this issue, including the deeply perplexing question of why liberal economic measures have fallen so far short of early hopes and expectations. Padraig Carmody's book on Zimbabwe occupies the ideological left, making a straightforward argument that Zimbabwe's efforts at neoliberal reform are the root cause of its economic woes, including deindustrialization and a badly torn social fabric. The viewpoint is not original, nor will his presentation of it appeal to those who would seek a more nuanced treatment.

Africa can test the mettle of even the most resolute social scientists, for the region's socioeconomic data is fundamentally untrustworthy, woefully incomplete, and frequently contradictory. Even such seemingly basic questions as whether countries that have undertaken to liberalize their economies have enjoyed higher growth rates than those that have not seem to defy empirical resolution. Nevertheless, some scholars exhibit the patience to sort through the truly encyclopedic literature on economic performance, hoping to tease out a plausible understanding of the elusive connection between policy reform and economic growth. Van De Walle's work has this merit and provides a useful road map of a jumbled and bewildering economic world.

By contrast, Carmody's book on Zimbabwe fills in an alltoo-familiar template and will largely satisfy only those who have already decided that market-based economic reforms and the institutions that advocate them are at the root of Africa's economic woes. His core argument is that the liberal economic reforms urged on Zimbabwe by the International Lending Institutions (ILIs) have caused a collapse of the country's textile, clothing, and footwear industries. Carmody does not consider the obvious alternative viewpoint. Proponents of economic reform might welcome the collapse of industries that "developed" in the first place only because they were sheltered within a cocoon of protectionism, and that survived only on the basis of costly subsidies that represented a major drain on scarce economic resources. In this alternate perspective, the deindustrialization of loss-producing enterprises is best viewed as a necessary first step toward setting the stage for a more sustainable pattern of industrial

African Economies is more impressive on several criteria. First, it presents a painstaking and highly accessible review of much of the political economy literature on Africa. It is also valuable for its willingness to extract a measure of explanatory merit from various analytic positions. Several of the authors Van De Walle cites will be pleased to find their views strengthened by the clarity with which he restates them. By avoiding the sort of simple "blame the markets" approach that pervades Carmody's work, Van De Walle also convinces us that Africa's problem is infinitely complex and therefore not amenable to any single-factor interpretation. His basic conclusion—that the principal fault lies in the nature of the African political process—is neither startling nor surprising. But the care, detail, and sensitivity to others' research with which he develops this position provide more than sufficient reason that his book should be read in its own right as an important contribution to our understanding of Africa's economic plight.

Van De Walle acknowledges that market-friendly economic reforms have largely failed Africa, but he sees the reason for this in the underlying character of the African political process. African political systems are based on neopatrimonial forms of authority that provide corrupt political leaders with the strategic flexibility to evade the reform process or manipulate it to political advantage. Briefly, neopatrimonial forms of authority are highly personal and almost always feudal in nature, and thinly but only partially veiled within a burka of modernity. He argues that neopatrimonial governments cause economic failure because they subvert economic resources to the private and wasteful use of political leaders whose overriding goal is the maintenance of political power. Such governments are also highly prone to rapidly metastasizing corruption: Public expenditures in particular are calculated on the basis of their contribution to the maintenance of power, rather than the opportunity to address real social needs.

The epicenter of the neo-patrimonial idea is that modern institutional arrangements, such as functionally organized bureaucracies and formally representative patterns of authority, are merely outward trappings that disguise a very different inner reality. That reality consists of all pervasive dyadic (patron-client) relationships that subvert the purpose of the public realm by permitting its most powerful figures to appropriate public and private resources for their personal use. This essential idea has appeared in a number of different forms, including, for example, Richard Joseph's (Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria: The Rise and Fall of the Second Republic, 1987) classic use of the term "prebendal" to describe the way in which Nigerian political leaders systematically pillaged the public treasury to maintain themselves in positions of power and wealth.

The secret to longevity of neopatrimonial systems is their remarkable flexibility. Neopatrimonial forms of authority have adapted themselves readily to the parliamentary institutions imposed by departing colonial powers, to pressures for structural economic change from the international lending institutions, to more recent pressures for democratization by the bilateral donor community, and even to pressures for a more participatory political environment by Africa's renascent civil society. Van De Walle's analysis is particularly illuminating when he shows how well the neopatrimonial political format has lent itself to the prebendal use of foreign public assistance. Joel Barkan once observed that certain of Africa's political leaders have become singularly adept at aiming for a C+ on the donors' democracy scale: just enough democratization to satisfy donor conditions for economic assistance, not enough to loosen their real hold on political power. Much the same could be said of the way Africa's neopatrimonial governments handle foreign economic assistance. The operative strategy is to accept just enough liberalization to satisfy the permissive scrutiny of multi- and bilateral organizations that wish to avoid political confrontation, while avoiding farreaching changes that would jeopardize the patron-client networks that support corrupt regimes in power. By adroit maneuvering, neopatrimonial governments subvert the intended purposes of foreign economic resources, squandering donor wealth on projects that are politically intentioned, not developmental.

This analysis is subject to one criticism. The exact connection between neopatrimonial authority and poor economic performance is underexplained. For in the last analysis, the notion of neopatrimonial authority has only limited utility. Its primary validity is descriptive, not explanatory. What the concept of neopatrimonialism provides is a highly generalized, broad-brush portrait of the nature of political authority throughout much of modern Africa. Who could deny Africa's seemingly all-pervasive reality of patron-client ties, corrosive corruption, and power-driven politics? Or that the realworld power structures of African regimes have only the most fleeting connection with its formal institutional framework of modern bureaucracy and representative structures?

As an explanatory idea, however, neopatrimonial authority has certain weaknesses. It cannot, for example, explain differences over time in economic performance within countries, nor can it explain the rather striking variance in economic performance across countries. This results in an argument that, while outwardly compelling, does not sustain close inspection. Van De Walle is convinced of the following logic. Neopatrimonial authority is ubiquitous in Africa. So is poor economic performance. Therefore, the former causes the latter. To make this argument stick, however, he would need to go much further and address a host of presently unanswered questions. Are there governments in Africa that exhibit other forms of authority? If so, how have these performed? If, on the other hand, all of Africa's governments are neopatrimonial, then how can we explain why they vary so greatly in economic performance?

Some examples may help illustrate this weakness. During the 1960s and 1970s, Ivory Coast and Kenya were sometimes referred to as Africa's economic "miracles" to describe their highly positive growth performance. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, both economies began to stagnate. Did both suddenly become more neopatrimonial? If so, how and why? If not, what was their form of authority while their economies were performing well? Similarly, during the 1980s and 1990s, Ghana and Tanzania began to perform measurably better than they had during the previous two decades. Did they become less neopatrimonial?

The challenging intellectual task is not to establish the presence of neopatrimonialism throughout Africa. Elements of this political pattern can undoubtedly be found everywhere, including this country. The more challenging project is to explain why African countries vary so greatly in how well they do, both over time and in contrast to one another. Is there room for differing developmental subcategories within the neopatrimonial rubric?

There is great awkwardness in raising these issues. For elsewhere in his work, Van De Walle has been an intellectual leader among the tiny number of Africanist political scientists seeking to bring rigorous quantitative methods into this field. African Economies might have benefited from that approach. Even so, the book is well worth reading because of its sensitive and thoughtful effort to wrestle with dauntingly difficult questions. For those who would venture into this literature, Van de De Walle's road map provides a useful guide through a particularly conflicted literary domain. Like the very best road maps, it is especially valuable at the beginning of the journey. Less so at the end, where unanswered questions remain.

The Breakdown of Class Politics: A Debate on Post-Industrial Stratification. Edited by Terry Nichols Clark and Seymour Martin Lipset. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 352 p. \$18.95.

Jytte Klausen, Brandeis University

This book is a collection of essays from a 1996 conference that brought together a number of political sociologists to discuss an article from 1991 by the coorganizers, Terry Nichols Clark and Seymour Martin Lipset, originally published in International Sociology. They argued that the collapse of blue-collar industries and other changes in occupational and income structures associated with postindustrial social stratification had lead to a breakdown of class politics. Two years later, the journal published a rebuttal by Mike Hout, Clem Brooks, and Jeff Manza that class conflict remained important but that the political parties ignored it. The two articles and a 1993 response by Clark and Lipset are republished here together with a series of response papers written for the 1996 conference. Hout et al. criticized Clark and Lipset for failing to distinguish between class as a social phenomenon and the political representation of class. "Class interests may remain latent in the political arena," they wrote, "but this does not mean that they do not exist" (p. 64).

The debate over the breakdown of class politics is mostly about theory and interpretation, as nobody disputes the facts. Paul Nieuwbeerta clears the ground by addressing a controversy over the most commonly used measurement of class voting, the Alford Index, which has been criticized for being too sensitive to shifts in occupational structure. Comparing different measurements, Nieuwbeerta finds that all show an increase in class cohesion in voting patterns in 20 advanced industrial countries from 1945 to the 1960s, a beginning decline in the 1970s, and ubiquitous decline in the 1980s.

Responding to Hout et al., Clark, Lipset, and Michael Rempel elaborate their "decline" thesis. Class still exists, they agree, but the experience of class is less rigid and stratification patterns have changed. Using the Alford Index, they show that class voting fell to below 20 index points in the 1980s in Great Britain, Germany, and France, reaching a level of (lacking) articulation of class comparable to that of the United States. (Although class cohesion also declined in Sweden, it did not drop as low.)

A more recent chapter by Lipset lists the "Third Way" electoral victories—from Britain's Tony Blair to Germany's Gerhardt Schröder, New Zealand's David Lange to Australia's Bob Hawke, including even France's Lionel Jospin—as further evidence for the "decline of class politics" thesis. Lipset also points to the intuitive evidence that a numerically diminished working class has lost political clout, compared to that of the 1950s or the 1960s. Employment in nonmanual occupations has risen to nearly 60% and declined in manufacturing to about 16% in the United States. In other countries, a similar shift has taken place, even if manufacturing employment still stands at a slightly higher percentage of all employment.

John H. Goldthorpe argues that both sides in the debate are "flogging a dead horse." The importance of class voting was exaggerated already in the 1960s by political sociologists, because the primacy-of-class thesis implied an incorrect dichotomy between attracting working-class voters and voters from other classes (p. 108). Goldthorpe's view is that there has been no consistent long-term change to the association between class and voting since class de-alignment was first pronounced in 1959, after the British Labour Party and the German Social Democrats "modernized" their party programs. The evidence for class de-alignment is scant, Goldthorpe claims, but it appears that a realignment is in process, with skilled workers moving to the right and lower levels of nonmanual voters moving left (p. 114). He concludes, somewhat mysteriously, that all we have is "trendless fluctuation." That is also David L. Weakliem's conclusion, although the data presented in the chapter show an unambiguous decline in the importance of class as a primary source of political attitudes among voters born before or after 1935 (p. 211).

Dick Houtman provides an interesting analysis of education as a source of social liberalism, and he contrasts it with social-economic exposure (without education) as a source of economic liberalism but social conservatism (p. 183). He does not elaborate on the importance of his findings for left politics, but it seems obvious that he has identified an important tradeoff faced by left parties, who risk offending working-class cultural conservatism when they embrace social liberalism.

Critics may be right that the decline thesis fails to provide an interpretative theory for the causal link between social stratification patterns and changes in party appeals, but from a practical point of view, how can one argue that the political salience of class has not diminished? Herman L. Boschken does so by arguing that public policy institutions are inherently biased in favor of the "upper middle class," a group that he curiously refers to as the "UMC genre," apparently unique to U.S. society, and "defined by modern and postmodern institutions" (p. 228). His hypothesis is that the more the UMC genre is represented in the target populations of an agency, the better the agency performs. He measures biaswhich he calls "outcome skewness" [sic]—by means of index measures based on performance data from 42 urban transit systems published by the U.S. Department of Transportation. He concludes that "an anonymous UMC matters in skewing outcomes," but also that he could not "more precisely infer the power of the upper middle class" (p. 243). The jargon and methodology fail to obscure a simplistic elite theory.

In the final chapter, Clark argues that we have a New Political Culture (NPC). He proposes (in algebra) that voting is a function of party programs, occupation, demographics, and political attitudes, but provides no estimates for the value of each variable in his equation. The evidence is drawn from content analysis of party program changes over several decades in some 30 countries. Clark and his collaborators found a near-simultaneous erasure of issues of particular interest to labor beginning in the early 1980s by both left- and rightwing parties. The chapter also draws upon another research project investigating municipal policy choices with respect to the trade-off between fiscal austerity and social services. The connection to the New Political Culture thesis is tenuous, particularly as austerity measures often aim to preserve social programs.

Ultimately, it is the lack of attention to some of the most obvious causes of Third Way politics that frustrates the reader. The Third Way politics of the 1990s aimed to encapsulate a new left coalition capable of holding onto power for extended periods, by bringing middle-class voters and women voters, along with an old but much transformed working-class constituency, together on a defense of the welfare state.

The "pink-collar" revolution was less about class than about gender, and to that extent the "class still matters" folks have a point. Female service-sector workers are still workers. The encapsulation of middle-class voters and women voters as part of the Third Way political bloc required policy initiatives and party reforms that sidelined blue-collar and manual labor. It is a pity that neither side debating in this book bridged the gap between sociology and party appeals by theorizing the connection among occupational change, interests and identities, and electoral strategies.

Empowering Women: Land and Property Rights in Latin America. By Carmen Diana Deere and Magdalena Leon. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001. 544p. \$55.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Still Fighting: The Nicaraguan Women's Movement, 1977–2000. By Katherine Isbester. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001. 272p. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Leslie Anderson, University of Florida

The titles of these books point both to their common concern and to the difference between them. Still Fighting underscores the extent to which Latin American women (in this case, Nicaraguans) are still struggling, from a disadvantaged position, to achieve recognition of their own personal value and identity, as well as a better social, political, and economic position. Empowering Women underscores, instead, the extent to which women's struggle is about achieving power in the form of legal title to land. The former stresses gender identity while the latter emphasizes personal empowerment. The first accentuates setbacks experienced and the work still to be done; the latter highlights accomplishments while acknowledging that much work remains. Carmen Diana Deere and Magdalena Leon locate their work within gender studies in Chapter 1, stating their orientation toward redistribution rather than recognition (p. 9). Although Katherine Isbester does not refer to gender studies, her work is about the struggle for identity and the role it plays in strengthening a social

Both volumes share a common theme: The outward political experience of a nation or region, either with regard to democratization, land reform, or titling, is not necessarily the experience of women within the situation. Where a nation has democratized, women have been included in democratic participation to a much lesser degree than men. Where land has

been redistributed, men have benefited far more than women. Where peasant landowners have received title, the majority of recipients are male. The extent to which both volumes illustrate the difference in gender stories underscores the degree to which studies of political reform need to attend to the difference in the way reforms affect the genders. Changes that look positive may only be positive for men. Accordingly, if the goal of reform is a more just society, close attention to the experience of women within revolution, democratization, and agrarian reform is in order. To assume that political progress has equally benefited all members of society is to ignore and perpetuate the extent to which positive changes may only have helped men.

Deere and Leon's book, *Empowering Women*, is an extensively researched volume on the land ownership rights of Latin American women. Reaching across the continent and over history, the book offers admirable scope and extensive detail on the changes in women's land ownership. It begins by examining this ownership in colonial times, and then describes changes throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Chapters include a review of land reform under the Alliance for Progress and with neoliberalism. Each chapter outlines the limits to reforms with regard to female land ownership.

The attention to detail and historic comparison reveal surprising findings. For example, the legal codification of property that came from Europe in the colonial period left women and women's property less protected in the New World nations that inherited English common law than they were in nations that inherited the Spanish legal system. Additionally, Chapters 7 and 8 illustrate that the indigeneous, pre-Spanish legal system accorded more protection to women's property rights than previously understood. In regions where indigenous land rights have affected property ownership, women are more likely to own land than they are where indigenous influences have been eliminated.

One irony of changes in land ownership laws is the outcome of neoliberal reforms. With its emphasis on individual liberty, neoliberalism has sometimes enhanced the economic position of women by increasing their land ownership to its highest level ever. As the book reaches the end of the twentieth century, it concludes that real progress has been made on the continent. Various reforms combined with revolutions and other pressures for change have made laws more gender neutral. Where these are enforced, women's property ownership has increased. Nonetheless, much work remains and the book concludes with a sense of urgency because land-titling programs are underway virtually everywhere in Latin America. Insofar as gender-neutral laws can be utilized, the legal and economic position of women will improve.

Regrettably, the book does not address the extent to which changes in property ownership have improved the life situation of Latin women. Deere and Leon say that such questions are beyond the scope of the volume. The omission, however, limits the inferences we can make about the relationship between property rights and women's empowerment. Similarly, the book's failure to place its findings within a sytematic theoretical framework, and the decision instead to concentrate on detailed legal history, constrains any generalizations about women's empowerment in other places and times. Such limitations, however, should not overshadow the book's great scholarly accomplishments. *Empowering Women* is a monumental study of the legal history of women's property rights in Latin America, with utility to legal scholars and historians, as well as to political scientists and women's studies.

In contrast to the Deere and Leon book, Isbester's Still Fighting is a detailed study of the women's movement in one

nation: Nicaragua. Grounding her work in the social movements literature, Isbester uses resource mobilization (RM) theory to consider both the accomplishments and the limitations of different movements and subgroups of women in Nicaragua over two decades. She considers women's position in the revolutionary insurrection, throughout the Sandinista years, and under the Chamorro regime. Where the women's movement or subsections of it succeeded, withered, or failed entirely, she shows how resource mobilization theory helps explain those outcomes.

Although Isbester never summarizes her theoretical position, the thrust of it eventually emerges. Ultimately she is dissatisfied with RM theory, stessing instead the contribution of identity theory in understanding social movements. Resource mobilization theory considers the material goods available to a social movement and explains success or failure within this materialist conception. Yet it fails to account for the perception of what a "good" actually is (p. 13), an evaluation that may well be related to participants' identities. For example, whereas oppression is often a disadvantage to a social movement, when combined with a struggle for identity that itself defies oppression, it can be an asset. This reality is captured by identity theory but not by RM theory. Isbester illustrates how an emphasis upon women's identity, including a demand that society recognize that identity in a positive way, enhances movement strength.

Isbester does scholarship on Nicaragua a great service in separating the "Sandinista story," essentially a male story, from the experience of women within the Sandinista revolution. A movement that was supposed to be liberating and reformist was more so for men than for women. Yet one wonders if the picture painted is too dark and the responsibility for limitations imbalanced. Progress on women's issues did emerge under Sandinismo, and Violeta Chamorro's traditionalism did soften during her government. If Isbester had placed Nicaragua in comparative context or examined the Aleman years, the difficulties she describes might appear relative. In Deere and Leon's continental study, Nicaragua is often one of the more progressive cases.

More importantly, however, and omitted from Isbester's account, is the responsibility of Nicaraguan women themselves for their predicament. Women provided majority support for Chamorro's election, while men tilted slightly toward Daniel Ortega. And women voted for both Arnoldo Aleman and Enrique Bolanos more strongly than did men. Isbester overlooks women's support for candidates antithetical to their interests. While she is correct that Sandinismo could have done and could do more, Nicaraguan women have supported governments that have done far less.

Although Isbester's consideration of the women's movement within social movement theory is one of the strongest aspects of her book, grounding her work in gender theory as well would have allowed her to recognize women's own responsibility. The role of the state and the limits of organization, both of which she addressed, are only part of the explanation for women's restricted progress in Nicaragua. The other part lies with the limits and contradictions of the women themselves and of their demands. Sonia Alvarez's distinction between "feminine" and "feminist" goals (Engendering Democracy in Brazil: Women's Movements in Transition Politics, 1990) illustrates that women may constrain their own progress toward liberation by the traditional nature of their demands. If Nicaraguan women's claims are more feminine than feminist, leading them to support a traditional female candidate, then that position can still improve women's lives. But it will also restrict long-term progress toward women's liberation, a constraint that is only partly the responsibility

of the government and parties. Ironically, the strength of Isbester's work—her emphasis upon identity within social movement theory—is also its weakness. While identity theory enhances RM theory, the stress upon recognition instead of redistribution, identity instead of empowerment, leaves women's demands constrained and their responsibility for those constraints unrecognized.

Nevertheless, Isbester deserves credit for her extensive research and data collection in a nation where both are extremely difficult. She has also shown considerable courage in her willingness to criticize the Sandinistas. Her work demonstrates that the revolution did not produce gender equality, while the Chamorro regime may well have slowed progress forward. The question of why that is the case still remains to be fully explained.

In sum, these volumes make substantial contributions to our understanding of political development in Latin America and of the fate of women within progress. The shortcomings of the volumes in no way undermine the contributions they make but, rather, point toward new avenues of research and additional theoretical considerations of the findings they offer.

Rebellious Civil Society: Popular Protest and Democratic Consolidation in Poland, 1989–1993. By Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 296p. \$22.95.

Framing Democracy: Civil Society and Civic Movements in Eastern Europe. By John K. Glenn, III. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001. 289p. \$45.00.

Creating a Democratic Civil Society in Eastern Germany: The Case of the Citizen Movements and Alliance 90. By Christiane Olivo. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 293p. \$55.00.

Andrei S. Markovits, University of Michigan

A decade after the epochal events of the late 1980s and early 1990s, we have come to see them not as quasi miracles the way we did then but almost as prosaic way stations in the ever-present process of societal change. To be sure, there has been a stream of often pathbreaking scholarship in the fields of comparative politics and political sociology, with a special emphasis on social movements, civil society, the transition from authoritarian to democratic societies, and the complex consolidation of the latter that has rightly contributed to the demystification of these events. Yet, as citizens as well as scholars, we still remain so riveted by what happened in those few years in East Central Europe that the point of diminishing returns potentially afflicting additional research and writing on the subject remains distant.

All three books under review here do both things brilliantly: They demystify and explain with intellectual acuity and scholarly rigor, but-precisely by doing so-they also show what an amazing, indeed unique, time this was. The three books share a few important features. They concentrate on the same geographic area. Grzegorz Ekiert and Jan Kubik focus on Poland, though in an explicit, if subordinate, comparison with Slovakia, Hungary, and East Germany. John Glenn's book, the most overtly comparative of the three under review, analyzes Poland and what then was still Czechoslovakia. And Christiane Olivo features the former East Germany. While Olivo and Glenn concentrate their analyses on what could be called the transition processes narrowly construed—that is, the key events and rapid changes of 1989 and 1990 proper-Ekiert and Kubik are more interested in the aftermath of these events, thus the years 1989 to 1993. Lastly, all three studies are deeply steeped in the extensive literature in comparative politics, political

theory, and political sociology that—in good part, though not exclusively-emerged precisely as an attempt to place these amazing events into a proper theoretical framework and to use them as important empirical cases to expand already existing theories. In particular, all three books give much space to erudite discussions of the vast literature on civil society in which East Central Europe has arguably played the most important geographic and conceptual catalyst. They do the same for the so-called new social movements, where the literature of the 1970s and 1980s that focused almost exclusively on Western Europe and North America received a most welcome theoretical infusion in the 1990s by having to incorporate the events in East Central Europe of the late 1980s and early 1990s. All three books show their authors' fine command of the "transition" and "consolidation" literatures, which—again featuring the events in East Central Europe under consideration—have arrived at important theoretical insights by comparing the changes wrought in that part of the world to ones in Latin America roughly at the same time and to those in southern Europe circa a decade earlier.

Ekiert and Kubik pursue a simple question in their study: What is the role of protest in the consolidation of a new democracy? The book at hand is merely the Polish part of a large cross-national study that presumably will at some point yield similar monographs on East Germany (which the authors classify together with Poland as being a fast reformer) and Hungary, as well as Slovakia, which Ekiert and Kubik classify as slow reformers. The authors explicitly write the story of what they call "non-elite actors constituting civil society" (p. 12). In what to me was arguably the most informative part of their book, they present two introductory chapters in which they anchor their subsequent detailed study in its proper historical context. It is via the fine narrative of these two chapters that we truly come to understand what the authors rightly call "Polish exceptionalism," meaning a rich tradition of protest and dissent that became an integral part of Polish politics and society from 1956 until 1989, and which was so woefully absent in virtually all other socialist countries of East Central Europe. While East Germany and Czechoslovakia—the two other cases in the books under review—did in fact experience unrest of their own (1953 in the former, 1968 in the latter), neither had anything near the string of crises that mobilized thousands, even millions, of Poles in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980/81, to mention the most salient events of protest. To their immense credit, Ekiert and Kubik offer a persuasive picture of what could be called a failed de-Stalinization, in the sense that the ruling institutions of the state and the Communist Party simply could never recoup the authority and power that they had before Stalin's death. According to the authors, these two pillars of the communist establishment basically spent the next three decades futilely fumbling for a proper mixture of repression and concession that was inherently doomed because it could never fulfill the rulers' needs nor the people's wants. With this excellent background, it comes as little surprise that, in a sense, we actually read the story of a continuity—that of the Polish exception—instead of that of a massive change that we fully expected, given the enormity of the shifts in 1989/1990.

This is not to say that there did not occur an immense increase in the quantity as well as the audacity of protest politics after 1989. Ekiert and Kubik demonstrate in their immensely data-rich study how Poles came to embrace protest as an integral part of their quotidian politics in the early 1990s. Indeed, using some comparative data with the other three countries of the larger study, it is clear that Poles were much more active protesters between 1989 and 1993 than East Germans, Hungarians and Slovaks, in that order. But even this bevy of protests on every imaginable level of society and for—as

well as against—virtually all possible causes still puts Poland in the medium range of protest politics in a list of advanced industrial democracies, and well behind the peak periods of the latter, which they experienced in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Ekiert and Kubik conclude their study with a sober assessment of protest politics as an integral aspect of functioning democracies and remind us once again how a deep understanding of any ancien regime's intricacies is indispensable for the proper assessment of any new order.

It is here that Glenn's work is by far the most daring of the three, yet ultimately fails to fulfill his own immensely ambitious goals. In a genuinely comparative work, Glenn sets out to explain how the changes in Poland and Czechoslovakia occurred, and—of equal importance—what rendered them so different from each other. Anchoring his work in the literature on social movements, political bargaining, and opportunity structures, Glenn makes the powerful argument that the eventual outcomes of these two "revolutions" owed at least as much to the former framework and actual demise of what he calls "Leninist regimes" as they did to what the "revolutionaries"—a broad-based 10 million-member trade union in Poland and a tiny minority of intellectuals and actors in Czechoslovakia—attained during the heady days of 1989. But unlike Ekiert and Kubik, who also invoke events of the ancien regime to buttress their case of the present, Glenn does so too meekly and unsystematically. For Glenn's argument to be really persuasive, he would have had to dwell at least as much on details of these Leninist regimes as he did with such distinction on the actors in the Polish and Czechoslovak events. What were these Leninist regimes? How did they operate? How, if at all, were they different in Poland and Czechoslovakia? What happened to their major carriers once they were confronted by what clearly amounted to the most fundamental challenges to their political existence, possibly their very lives, as was the case in Hungary in 1956? Why did they not resist? Especially in the Czechoslovak case, which Glenn correctly characterizes as witnessing the Leninist regime completely ensconced in power until the middle of November 1989, why did the Leninist regime not choose the Tienanmen Square option? With this side of the story never told, the book falls victim to its own immensely laudable ambition. Lastly, Glenn's jargon-laden language rendered the reading of his intellectually exciting project unnecessarily cumbersome.

While less central to Olivo's project than to Glenn's, she, too, fails to address why the East German regime did not pull the trigger at the Leipzig demonstration on October 9, 1989, thus foregoing a "Chinese solution" for which the state was fully prepared and equipped. Unlike in Poland where the Leninist regime was gradually hollowed out after 1956, as Ekiert and Kubik show, in East Germany and Czechoslovakia it remained strong to the very last minute, simply opting to implode in a most precipitous way. One thing is quite clear: The citizen movements that are the focus of Olivo's study most certainly represented no threat to this regime at all and would have been easily defeated had the international system not changed so rapidly on account of the Gorbachev-led reforms in the Soviet Union. Her book on the East German citizen movements and opposition is the finest that I have read on this topic. It tells the story with rigor, and her analysis is based on meticulous research. And still, I am discomforted by the essential thrust of her argument that is nothing short of a paean to deliberative or participatory democracy that Olivo sees as superior in form and content to the lifeless proceduralism of liberal democracy. I concur. Where we part company is her glorifying description of the East German citizens' movements, which Olivo extols as agents of precisely such a "real" democracy and whose importance she overestimates massively, particularly when she spends a substantial part of the last segment of her book trying to convince the reader that these movements' significance continues in today's eastern states of a united Germany. Like most enthusiastic advocates of deliberative democracy, Olivo, too, assumes that the participants in it and its very nature must always be emancipatory, liberating, egalitarian—simply congruent with the author's laudable moral preferences. Above all, there is always the explicit assumption that something about these movements renders them "authentic," as opposed to the implied and alleged inauthenticity of form-obsessed liberal democracies. There is an underlying tenor throughout the book that had the West Germans not "taken over" the unification process and thus East Germany, these authentic and democratic citizens movements would have dominated East Germany and made it into the most—perhaps only—democratic society in Europe (perhaps the world).

Alas, as we now know about East Germany during the 1980s when Olivo correctly locates the nascence of these enlightened movements, far more typical for that society's counterhegemonic challenges than these democratic social movements were the growing racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia that engulfed much of East German civil society. And way beyond the East German case, there is simply neither a conceptual nor an empirical guarantee that deliberative democracy will always favor the "good guys" and exclude racists, bigots, and enemies of the very democracy that Olivo (and I) extol. By having been perhaps a tad more detached in her normative sympathies vis-à-vis these commendable citizen movements, Olivo could have shed more conceptual light on the relationship between these uniquely intense manifestations of democratic politics and systemic instability and transition. Could it be that these kinds of democratic arrangements are particular to precisely such periods studied by Olivo? Might it be that the normalcy of quotidian politics somehow remains inimical to such highly involved and exacting expressions of democratic participation? Gauging from the Ekiert and Kubik book, there is some evidence in this direction since in the Polish case, the Citizens' Committees-roughly the Polish equivalents to Olivo's East German protagonists—became the first casualties of the emerging political parties.

Japan's Economic Dilemma: The Institutional Origins of Prosperity and Stagnation. By Bai Gao. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 328p. \$54.95 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Takaaki Suzuki, Ohio University

The once-formidable Japanese economy has fallen upon hard times. After posting a roughly double-digit rate of real annual growth from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, and generally outperforming the economies of other advanced industrial democracies during the 1970s and 1980s, the Japanese economy suffered a prolonged period of stagnation throughout most of the 1990s. Given this dramatic reversal, Bai Gao sets about the ambitious task not only of explaining why the Japanese economy has soured, but of providing a broad institutional framework that underscores the common factors behind the high growth period, the bubble economy of the 1980s, and the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s. To achieve this task, Gao applies what he terms "the logic of reverse reasoning"; he takes the rise and collapse of the bubble economy as the "starting point for theoretical reasoning," examining the institutional mechanisms that purportedly produced it. He then works backward in time to reexamine how these institutional mechanisms operated during the high-growth era, and to identify the "environmental changes" that account for the reasons these institutional mechanisms produced such varied outcomes over time (pp. 6–7).

Following a brief introduction in Chapter 1, Gao presents in Chapter 2 his main theoretical arguments. The key independent variable that emerges from his analysis is the collapse of the Bretton Woods system. According to Gao, the breakdown of Bretton Woods triggered two "structural shifts": a shift from trade and production to finance as the predominant mode of economic expansion and exchange, and a shift from an emphasis on social protection to one that accords greater primacy to the market (pp. 22-29). After identifying these two shifts as the crucial "environmental changes" that altered the basic setting upon which the Japanese economy functioned, he then proceeds to locate two key types of domestic institutions that filtered these changes to produce radically different economic results. The first involves the institutional configuration of Japanese corporate governance. In Gao's estimation, coordination and control are "two intrinsically conflicting tasks of corporate governance," and the Japanese case represents one that has placed, since the 1950s, a heavy emphasis on the coordination of contractual exchange among separate companies at the expense of corporate control and management (pp. 30-33). The second entails the institutions and mechanisms that safeguard social stability. Here, too, he sees an apparent trade-off between social stability and economic efficiency, and he generously places Japan alongside European countries in its commitment to social stability, as measured in terms of its ability to maintain "total employment" and income equality at the household level (pp. 40-43).

In Gao's analysis, these two domestic institutions were optimally situated to produce and sustain high economic growth during the Bretton Woods era, when exchange rates were fixed and trade and production remained the dominant mode of economic expansion and exchange. The former provided unlimited capital to Japanese manufacturers for production and trade, while the latter fostered the political stability necessary to stay the course. However, with the collapse of Bretton Woods and the two "structural shifts" that emerged in its wake, Gao argues, these two domestic institutions became more a liability than an asset, producing speculative investments in real estate and the stock market while protecting inefficient sectors of the economy. After the bubble was created, it was simply a matter of time, according to Gao, before it would burst to produce the economic stagnation witnessed in the 1990s (p. 243). In support of such claims, the empirical core of the book examines in detail the evolution and performance of these two types of institutions in chronological order.

Japan's Economic Dilemma is a fascinating book, and there is much to be gained from studying its theoretical arguments and historical approach. Perhaps the most striking aspect of this book is its effort to identify and integrate long-term structural shifts in the global economy with an analysis of domestic-level institutions, and to do so by incorporating key insights from a wide range of disciplines. In just his analysis of the global economy alone, Gao draws heavily on the work of the historical sociologist Giovanni Arrighi (The Long Twentieth Century, 1994), the economic models of Robert Mundell and Robert Triffin, and the hegemonic stability literature in the study of international relations. Though laudable, however, Gao's effort to combine these different insights into a single framework would have been more persuasive had he provided a more detailed analysis of how these separate insights are tangibly linked together. Unfortunately, the theory chapter devotes fewer than six pages of text to this part of his analysis. This is somewhat understandable; the book's main focus is on tracing the transformation of the two types of

domestic institutions from the high growth period to the bubble economy. However, since the global shifts that the author identifies are the key independent variables that trigger this transformative process, which in turn allegedly produce the different economic results he ultimately seeks to explain, a greater elaboration of the causal mechanisms behind these global shifts would have clarified some ambiguities in his analysis.

To give an example, Gao repeatedly asserts that the "Mundell-Flemming trilemma" was the key factor that produced the speculative bubble (pp. 14, 38, 54, 153, 171, 245), but it is not entirely clear from his analysis why this is so. The basic insight of the Mundell-Flemming model is that a country can only achieve two of the following three objectives: a fixed exchange rate, monetary autonomy, and capital mobility. With the collapse of the fixed exchange-rate regime, monetary autonomy could presumably be maintained even with the liberalization of capital in the post-Bretton Woods era, especially in the case of Japan, given the large size of its economy, its persistent current account surplus, and the large pool of domestic savings. Gao even seems to recognize this point when he argues that there were, in fact, two bubbles in the post-Bretton Woods era (one in the early 1970s, the other in the late 1980s), and that both were caused by combining an expansionary monetary policy with an expansionary fiscal policy (pp. 154–157). But then, in a somewhat puzzling turn, he remarks later in the same chapter that the "bubble did not appear" in the 1970s case because "the Bank of Japan kept raising interest rates" (p. 182). Putting aside the question of how one reconciles these two propositions, or whether indeed Japan adopted an expansionary fiscal policy in the late 1980s (a point refuted by Yukio Noguchi, "Budget Policymaking in Japan," in Samuel Kernell, ed., Parallel Politics: Economic Policymaking in Japan and the United States, 1991, p. 139), the reader is left wondering how the bubble economy can be traced to the Mundell-Flemming trilemma. Indeed, Gao's own remarks suggest that the Japanese government simply made bad, but avoidable, macroeconomic policy decisions.

This last point raises the broader question of where political institutions and political agency fit into Gao's analysis. The two key types of domestic institutions that are the main focus of the book reside primarily in the Japanese corporate sector, and they are posited as "dilemmas" or "two pairs of intrinsic contradictions in capitalist economies" (p. 265). Gao provides persuasive theoretical reasons why they embody these contradictions and gives ample empirical evidence to prove his point. But missing in this analytic framework is the relationship and potential contradiction between a democratic polity and a capitalist economy, or between politics and markets more generally. Also missing are the domestic political factors that account for specific macroeconomic policy decisions. Accordingly, while his institutional "dilemmas" serve to reveal important economic trade-offs within the corporate sector, his analytic framework does not adequately explain the variations in Japanese macroeconomic policy decisions that are crucial to his argument about Japan's economic performance. Indeed, one wonders whether the economic stagnation of the 1990s would have been as deep and prolonged had the Hashimoto administration not killed the economic recovery underway by adopting a contractionary fiscal policy in 1996.

These problems aside, *Japan's Economic Dilemma* makes a significant contribution to the comparative literature on Japanese political economy. Whether one agrees with its arguments and assessments or not, its theoretically innovative and historically grounded study of the private sector institutions that manage corporate governance and social stability adds an important, and often neglected, dimension to our

understanding of the challenges that confront the Japanese economy.

Local Partnerships and Social Exclusion in the European Union: New Forms of Local Social Governance? Edited by Mike Geddes and John Benington. London: Routledge, 2001. 254p. \$90.00

Duane Swank, Marquette University

This book, the product of collaboration by an international team of European social scientists, focuses on the emergence and operation of local partnerships to combat social exclusion in European Union nations. This timely study is built on case analysis of samples of local partnerships in 10 EU nations; seven are given chapter-length treatment in the book. The central goals of the authors are to explain the cross-national diversity in frequency and form of local partnerships and their successes and failures in addressing poverty and social exclusion.

In two introductory chapters, the editors synthesize a substantial amount of relatively well-known material about the "new poverty" and social exclusion. Social exclusion is rooted squarely in the process of postindustrial transformation of European societies. Post-OPEC macroeconomic performance problems, de-industrialization, internationalization, and associated sociocultural changes and fiscal pressures on developed welfare states have contributed to general rises in poverty and structural unemployment; more fundamentally, they have contributed to difficulties of access to fulltime employment, health, housing, education and training, social services, and the political process for increasing numbers of citizens. Young as well as older workers, the disabled, women, migrants, and racial and ethnic minorities are more likely than other social aggregates to be socially excluded from full participation in economic, social, and political life. Moreover, these socially excluded populations are typically geographically concentrated in de-industrialized urban areas, ethnic ghettos, spatially isolated public housing projects, and some rural areas.

In the view of the authors, the institutional strategy of local partnership is, in theory, particularly well suited to address spatially concentrated poverty and social exclusion in an era of retrenchment and restructuring of national welfare states. Local partnerships consist of collaborative efforts among the public sector, employers and labor unions, voluntary groups, and community organizations to coordinate, implement, and, occasionally, formulate policies to ameliorate poverty and joblessness, as well as promote social and political inclusion. Partnerships are horizontal in that local associations typically anchor the network of collaborative relationships. However, partnerships are also vertical in that networks of international, national, regional, and local governments (and occasionally private market and voluntary associations) simultaneously participate in, and often lead, local collective action. In fact, local partnership has been most centrally promoted by the European Union, especially in implementation of EU Structural Funds and EU Poverty 3 programs.

From the perspective of proponents, local partnerships may foster experimentation and innovation in social policy content and delivery; they may also prove far more flexible and adaptable in combating the multifaceted problems attendant on contemporary (spatially concentrated) social exclusion than extant welfare state structures. In addition, they may harness, and coordinate application of, a variety of nongovernmental resources and, thus, supplement fiscally constrained public budgets. Moreover, partnerships may foster participatory and associative democracy and, thus, potentially lesson

the legitimacy problems of the democratic state in postindustrial capitalism.

The volume offers relatively extensive evidence on the disparate records of local partnerships in seven countries. Mikko Kautto and Matti Heikkilä assess the very limited development of local partnerships in the context of a centralized, universalistic, and social democratic welfare state, Finland. Patrick Le Galès and Patricia Loncle-Moriceau provide a similar analysis of France, where the dirigiste system, weak private market and voluntary associations, and few precedents contributed to the irregular and limited development of local partnerships. For Germany, Karl Birkhölzer and Günther Lorenz also highlight a modest development of local partnerships. Here, with the exception of the social corporatist Alliance for Jobs, partnerships have been principally championed by voluntary organizations and only weakly supported by Land and EU resources. Fernanda Rodrigues and Stephen R. Stoer's case study of Portugal and Jordi Estivill's analysis of partnerships in Spain offer similar assessments of the ways in which economic and political structures and policy legacies have shaped and limited local partnership development on the Iberian peninsula. On the other hand, Jim Walsh's analysis of the Irish case, and to a lesser extent Mike Geddes's case study of partnerships in Britain, demonstrate that local partnerships have emerged in significant numbers and achieved modest successes in some contexts. The Irish case is most notable. In the context of a national social corporatist strategy to manage economic restructuring, the national government sponsored roughly a hundred partnerships among local governments, the social partners, and community associations to target long-term unemployment, poverty, and

The case studies and comparative analyses generate two major conclusions. First, despite the growth of poverty and exclusion and EU pressures and incentives to pursue the partnership strategy, the degree and form of development of local partnerships have been fundamentally shaped by national welfare state structures, overarching configurations of national political institutions and culture, and recent policy legacies. Second, the rhetoric surrounding the potential benefits of the partnership strategy, especially at the EU level, far exceeded the reality of actual development and accomplishments. In fact, the volume's authors point out that despite discrete examples of moderate success, the paucity of policy evaluations and data collection by the partnerships themselves make it very difficult to gauge partnership impacts on poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion.

Overall, the volume makes several contributions to contemporary welfare state studies. First, the book offers the most extensive documentation and analysis of local partnerships to date; it simultaneously provides a useful synoptic treatment of social exclusion in Europe. Second, it contributes to the large literature on EU policymaking by concretely depicting the complex dynamics of contemporary intergovernmental relationships and multilevel politics in antipoverty policy. Finally, the volume generates a variety of evidence for the debate on the degree to which contemporary welfare state change is dominated by path dependency, neoliberal convergence, or more hybrid reform trajectories of welfare state pluralism. In the area of local partnerships, the weight of the evidence suggests that while significant policy innovation is possible (as the Irish case demonstrates), welfare states remain heavily path dependent in spite of the significant challenges posed by the new poverty and social exclusion.

Despite these contributions, the book is weakened by three sets of problems. First, other than a conceptual discussion of social exclusion and partnership, the editors do not pro-

vide a theoretical framework to systematically orient the case studies and comparative analysis. The book would have been much stronger had the authors more explicitly grounded the study in the contemporary literature on welfare state change, and organized the case studies around a core set of hypotheses on how features of welfare state regimes, national political institutions, and extant distributions of political power should shape the development and success of local partnerships. Second, the design of the study could have been improved. Ten countries were chosen for study on the grounds that they are arguably representative of the political, economic, and social diversity of Europe (and seven of these are highlighted in the book). The authors proceeded by collecting data on six to eight partnerships per country and by intensive analysis of three of these. However, the sample seems heavily weighted to southern Europe with Portugal and Spain (and Greece) included, while only Finland among the Nordic systems was selected. Moreover, the authors admit that the samples of partnerships for general or intensive analysis were not selected randomly. The upshot of these considerations is, of course, that the reader must wonder about the degree of distortion (e.g., from nonrandom samples) present in the case study and comparative conclusions. Finally, both the comparative and case study analyses lack rigor. Other than one summary table of the frequency of partnership participation by type of actor, little in the way of systematic evidence from the individual partnership studies is presented. In addition, widely used EU and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development data on poverty, long-term unemployment, features of social exclusion, and national welfare programs are notably underutilized throughout the volume. In sum, an orienting theoretical framework and substantially more rigor in design and execution of the study would have led to a much better book.

With these qualifications in mind, the book can still be recommended to students and scholars of European political economy, public policy, and politics. It is appropriate for both upper division undergraduate and graduate courses.

Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy. Edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 376p. \$70.00 cloth, \$25.00 paper.

Scott Mainwaring, University of Notre Dame

The core message of this book comes through clearly in every chapter: Formal political institutions affect economic policy-making and—less directly—policy results. The book advances thinking about how institutions affect policymaking, especially about how political institutions affect the stability (or resoluteness) and adaptability (or decisiveness) of policy.

The book brings together a superb group of collaborators. Many of them had previously made major contributions to the analysis of political institutions; others had done so on political economy. Here they work at the intersection of these two fields.

Chapters 2 and 3 lay out the basic theoretical framework of the book, and for this reason I single them out for most attention. Chapter 2, "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy-Making" by Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins, lays out an institutionalist approach to political economy in broad and bold terms. The authors begin with a distinction between the legal separation of power and a separation of purpose, which means that a multiplicity of actors with different preferences, rather than an essentially unitary actor with virtually similar preferences, controls some points of power within the state. They note two key democratic

tradeoffs: first, between the capacity of state leaders to undertake sweeping policy change ("decisiveness") and policy stability ("resoluteness"); and second, between public- and private-regardedness of policy. They argue that how democracies tackle both trade-offs depends on the incentives created by political institutions. Other things being equal, one would expect greater policy stability and less capacity to undertake policy change when there are many veto players and when actors have a greater separation of purpose. The separation of purpose, in turn, depends on incentives to cultivate a personal vote, the electoral rules that affect the number of parties, and party factionalization.

Although this chapter does an excellent job of presenting big-picture hypotheses about the effects of institutions on economic policymaking, initially Cox and McCubbins claim too much for institutionalist arguments. They do not substantiate their sweeping statement that "the diversity of economic policies is rooted in the diversity of democratic institutions in each country" (p. 21). Different ideas about the economic policies that are most effective, differences in economic objectives, and the preferences of top-level policymakers (the president, his/her ministers, and the heads of the Central Bank and a few other powerful economic policymaking agencies) also have a significant impact on the diversity of policies pursued. The distribution of power in different societies also affects policymaking; institutions do not function in a vacuum, but rather in the context of societies in which structural factors are important. Other works by Cox and McCubbins acknowledge these points, but some of their claims in this chapter

Even if institutions fully determined the extent to which policy is decisive or resolute and public- or private-regarding, some institutions that are not in their analysis have a major impact on decisiveness. For example, other things being equal, the existence of an independent Central Bank bolsters policy resoluteness. The efficacy of the legal system affects whether policy is public- or private-regarding; with an ineffectual legal system, there are no sanctions against even patently corrupt private-regarding policies. Finally, they neglect presidents' constitutional powers, which, as Matthew Shugart and Stephan Haggard argue in Chapter 3, influence policy decisiveness.

The rest of the book presents less-sweeping claims about the impact of institutions on economic policymaking. In their excellent chapter, Shugart and Haggard focus on the tradeoff between policy decisiveness and resoluteness. They analyze how formal political institutions shape this trade-off in presidential systems, focusing on presidents' constitutional powers, electoral cycles, party-centered versus candidatecentered electoral rules, and the congruence of or divergence between the president's and congressional electoral constituencies. By analyzing presidents' constitutional powers, Shugart and Haggard include the institutional capacity of the executive to push change forward in addition to the institutional capacity of veto players to thwart it. They should include federalism in their list of factors that affect the "separation of purpose" because it allows a multiplicity of actors with different preferences to control policy and resources at the subnational level, frequently with important consequences for the resoluteness of policy at the national level.

Case studies about the impact of political institutions on budgetary policy (Chapters 4 to 6) and regulatory policy (Chapters 7 to 9) follow the two theoretical overviews. The authors all fruitfully view institutions as a package, rather than examining the effects of specific institutions in isolation. A few of the case studies stick closely to the initial theoretical focus on how formal political institutions affect the resoluteness of economic policymaking. Others (for example,

Mark Jones's fine chapter on how political institutions shape Argentina's budget policy) do not focus as tightly on this issue. Rather than pointing to a few institutions to explain economic policymaking across national cases, the case studies indicate that many different institutions have an impact.

Although this book advances the institutionalist agenda, the editors wisely acknowledge that it leaves open many questions. Perhaps foremost among them is the importance of institutions as opposed to other factors in explaining policy resoluteness—a thorny question about which cumulative knowledge is still limited. Ultimately, social scientists will need to test more rigorously the deductive hypotheses about the effects of institutions that the two theoretical chapters so compellingly chart. It is not clear how important institutional factors are, compared to such other factors as the commitment of the top-level economic policymaking elite to maintain or change policy. Institutions constrain and shape outcomes, but top leaders' preferences and abilities are also important. The book also leaves open the question of how formal institutions interact with structural factors in shaping economy policymaking.

Reforming Parliamentary Committees: Israel in Comparative Perspective. By Reuvan Y. Hazan. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001. 216p. \$50.00.

Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Williams College

This book is the result of a five-year research project that had as its goal the reform of the committee system in the Israeli Knesset. It had the full support of the leadership and members of that legislative body, and was conducted under the sponsorship of an important Israeli think tank, the Israel Democracy Institute. In undertaking this investigation, Reuvan Y. Hazan quickly discovered an additional reason for devoting so much time to this subject—the challenge of addressing "a flagrant deficiency in the political science literature" (p. 2), the dearth of comparative literature on parliamentary reform of committees.

In the end, however, it is the original impetus behind the book that is most strongly represented in the author's contributions to the scholarly literature. Thus, he is at his best when discussing reform possibilities in the context of recent structural changes that have occurred in the larger political system of Israel. While Hazan's comparative findings and analysis provide some useful perspective on proposals for reform, the somewhat perfunctory quality of these explorations prevents them from illuminating as much of the problem as one might have hoped.

Hazan begins his study with a summary of the purposes and functions of parliamentary committees that reduces to the two familiar categories of legislation and oversight, both of which are critical for achieving democratic accountability. He then introduces the comparative examples, chosen in each instance for their distinctive functions and structures, and for their relevance to the Israeli case. They are the British House of Commons, the German Bundestag, the Italian camera dei Deputati, and the Dutch Tweede Kamer. Each of the four chapters devoted to these studies considers several criteria, which serve as the "conceptual apparatus" that structures the argument and recommendations of the book. These criteria are concerned with the political environment affecting committees, their basic arrangements and procedures, methods of recruitment, leadership styles, and resources. The presentation of all of this material proceeds within the space of 33 pages, a detail noteworthy only for being suggestive of the rather sketchy analysis emerging from this section's comparative excursion.

It is certainly worthwhile to identify the distinctive features of these countries' political environments-for example, the lack of a written constitution in Britain, the ups and downs of Dutch consociationalism—but for there to be appreciable comparative dividends from this sort of research investment, more engagement with the political cultural underpinnings of law, parties, elections, and the like is required. If the functioning of a committee system is, as the author contends, critical in delivering on the promise of democratic accountability, then descriptions of the political environment need to penetrate more deeply into the underlying matrix of ideas that support extant institutional arrangements. For instance, Hazan mentions the lack of a written constitution in Britain as a contributing factor to explain the absence of any checks and balances on executive dominance of parliamentary sovereignty. But without reflection on the background to this anomalous constitutional tradition, it is not only difficult to determine why the lack of one (a written constitution) is related to the absence of the other (oversight); it is also impossible to establish with any confidence what implications follow for Israel, where the similarity in constitutional circumstance obscures a fundamentally different explanation for the political/constitutional environment.

When Hazan turns specifically to the Israeli political context, the results are better. While some of his recommendations for reform seem painfully obvious-for example, that committees should be filled with members who know something about the issues within their jurisdiction—the author's placement of the committee issue within the larger debate in Israel over the shape of the electoral system yields some quite interesting insights. Indeed, the author's analysis of the various phases of Israeli political development in the context of the general worldwide phenomenon of executive dominance of the legislative branch effectively clarifies the main issues on the agenda of committee reform in ways that inform beyond the immediate case at hand. In general, "[t]he goal of committee reform has...been to reverse the radical imbalance that has been created over time" (p. 78). Hazan's account of the various structural permutations of recent Israeli politics illustrates some of the limits and possibilities bound up in this effort.

In the early 1990s, several important reforms were implemented, the most important of which were the direct election of the prime minister, primaries for the selection of party candidates, and additions to the Basic Laws that led to an enhanced role for the judiciary in the enforcement of rights. The most innovative of these changes—direct election—was found wanting and has already been cancelled. But the uncertainty surrounding the question of whether the system had been transformed from a parliamentary to a presidential regime provides an analytic opportunity for fruitful comparative inquiry. It is in the context of these competing models, rather than in the somewhat formulaic application of crossparliamentary political variables, that one comes fully to appreciate the role of committees in establishing a democratic counterweight to the ascendance of executive power in constitutional polities.

Hazan's analysis could have benefited from greater attention to the available scholarly literature, in particular the pathbreaking work of Richard Fenno (Congressmen in Committees, 1973). It could also have profited from a more grounded and vivid presentation of the political environment, in which the reader might have come to know some of the actors prominent in the narrative of political reform that is otherwise ably presented. Reforming Parliamentary Committees has much to offer the student of the legislative process, but it only begins to remedy the political science deficiency that is projected in its ambitions.

A Fistful of Rubles: The Rise and Fall of the Russian Banking System. By Juliet Johnson. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000. 244p. \$29.95.

Gerald M. Easter, Boston College

For the field of Russian comparative politics, the collapse of Soviet communism abruptly shifted attention from commissars and commanders to businessmen and bankers. Since the mid-1990s, it has become increasingly evident that a small cohort of newly rich financiers was influencing the course of Russia's transition. Yet it was not always clear in what ways and to what extent these upstart tycoons were acting as political players. With this book, the field at last has an authoritative, systematic rendering of the banking sector. Juliet Johnson chronicles the good, the bad, and the ugly of Russia's big bankers during the postcommunist regime's formative decade.

By means of the banking case study, Johnson seeks to contribute to the larger theoretical debate on political and economic institution building, which continues to enliven post-communist studies. On this issue, she takes to task the advocates of the neoliberal-inspired "trickle down" approach, who, she contends, wrongly presumed that resetting macrolevel incentive structures would spontaneously give rise to Western-like institutions (pp. 21–23). Instead, Johnson argues that this reform strategy was flawed from the outset, given the inheritance of communism's command economy. "Institutional legacies are important," she maintains, "because they structure the initial power relations among the actors" (p. 20). The analysis is consistent with the conceptual premises of a "weak state," as opposed to a "grabbing state." It was the inability of existing institutions to readily adapt to the transition environment that created the opportunity for big bankers and the state to become intertwined in a way that ultimately led to crony capitalism, instead of a market economy. Moreover, crony capitalism, once entrenched, thwarted the further development of Russia's nascent democratic institutions during these fateful early years.

The theoretical assertions are based on the empirical findings of a single case study on the Russian banking sector from the initial reforms of 1987 to the financial crash of 1998. Comparison to other cases is limited to brief asides. The research focuses mainly on the big bankers in Moscow, although it also entails extended side glances at regional bankers in two Russian provinces, where the author conducted fieldwork. While some of the contextual material and anecdotes are by now quite familiar to specialists, the systematic focus on the banking sector makes for an original case study. The case is constructed largely from the Russian press, including previously untapped regional and specialist sources, and personal interviews with a number of well-placed banking officials. The evidence is presented in a well-organized and nicely written narrative, which leaves little doubt as to the author's opinion on things. The case study is especially good in its coverage of the unintended breakup of the Soviet banking system, the vexing role of the Russian Central Bank in economic reform, the mutually attractive benefits that first brought together the state and big bankers, and the desperate circumstances that later sundered their relationship.

To what extent does the case study support the theoretical claims? One main assertion is that unappreciated institutional legacies and inappropriate policy choices combined to produce undesired and distorted outcomes. The narrative provides ample anecdotal evidence to support this contention. For example, Johnson cites the case of the newly created Russian Central Bank, which Western advisors insisted must have institutional autonomy to insulate it from political pressures. In practice, however, the autonomous central bank

fueled inflation by generously issuing investment credits to unreformed enterprises, to the frustration of the Russian government and befuddlement of Western economists (pp. 69–73). The central bank's unexpected Soviet-like largesse demonstrates that outcomes are not determined by formal arrangements per se, but by the personal dispositions and informal ties of actors.

Another key assertion concerned the botched handling of fiscal policy that led to the 1998 ruble crash. "The ultimate cause," Johnson argues, "lay in the evolving relationship between the Russian state and the banking system" (p. 217). Certainly, there is no disputing that the government and the bankers had ensnared themselves in a short-term credit trap. But how does one reckon this development with other factors? The financial debacle can easily be explained with alternative "ultimate causes," such as the lack of elite consensus among the major political parties, the government's exchange rate policy, or the price of a barrel of oil. The research design, however, does not provide for an examination of alternative explanations.

Finally, the study claims that Russia's big bankers undermined the development of democratic institutions by forming patronage ties to politicians, penetrating the policymaking process, and disregarding the nascent middle class. While the study's introduction laid out several criteria to indicate how bankers may affect democracy, it was not obvious how these distinctions should be applied. When is a banker who finances an election campaign a democracy-supporting "interest group" and not a democracy-usurping "patron"? Johnson is convincing on how not to build democracy, but is less persuasive on a better approach. Her assertion that democracy requires property rights, impartial administration, and political accountability (p. 232) identifies institutional features associated with democracy, but begs the question of how to construct them. In conclusion, Johnson maintains, "[wle in the West have been slow to grasp Russia's status as a late developer" (p. 232). That may or may not be so, but democracy is hardly a trait commonly ascribed to late-developing states.

The book should enjoy a wide readership. The nontechnical prose and clearly presented argument makes this complex subject accessible to upper-level undergraduates. The book is probably better suited for graduate students learning their way around the maze of postcommunist Russian politics. For Russian specialists, the book provides a tidy packaging of the messy issues involving big bankers, the state, and economic reform. General comparativists likewise should profit from the richly detailed case study of commercial bankers and the state. Overall, the book is a noteworthy contribution to the study of the political economy of the postcommunist transitions.

Institutions and Innovation: Voters, Parties, and Interest Groups in the Consolidation of Democracy—France and Germany, 1870–1939. By Marcus Kreuzer. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 224p. \$52.50

Alice H. Cooper, University of Mississippi

As its title indicates, this book explores the links between institutions and innovation—specifically, between electoral systems and parties' capacity to innovate. The latter, in turn, is considered a crucial determinant of democratic performance because it shapes parties' capacity in times of economic crisis to offer policy prescriptions sufficiently attractive to limit voter defection to nondemocratic alternatives.

Marcus Kreuzer investigates these relationships by looking at France and Germany from 1870 to 1939. During the 1870–

1918 period, Third Republic France and imperial Germany had the same electoral law, the double-ballot system (singlemember districts and two-round elections with runoffs in the second round). During this period, the parties' main challenge was to adapt their campaign techniques and platforms to the advent of mass politics. Parties in both countries were "reluctant entrepreneurs" in this regard. For ideological reasons, for example, socialist and conservative parties were divided in both countries over whether to innovate, as new campaign techniques and platforms would violate traditional tenets. The important point, as Kreuzer argues, is that French and German socialist parties were more similar to each other than either were to the conservative or liberal parties of their respective countries, and vice versa. Under similar institutional configurations (electoral systems), French and German parties all behaved similarly, with the main differences between parties being ideologically driven.

After World War I, in contrast, French parties became more similar to one another than to their German counterparts, and vice versa. French socialist, liberal, and conservative parties were all relatively adept at modernizing their party organizations and responding to economic crises, whereas German socialist, liberal, and conservative parties failed on both counts. Why? France maintained its single-member-district two-ballot electoral system, whereas Germany's Weimar Republic introduced a system of virtually pure proportional representation (PR). Electoral institutions in the two countries differed dramatically from 1919 on, and these systems created dramatically differing incentives for innovation by parties as well.

Electoral mechanisms strongly influence candidate selection processes and levels of career uncertainty, campaign finance requirements, and levels of strategic voting. Thus, Germany's high district magnitude and vote-pooling mechanisms centralized the candidate recruitment process, reducing career uncertainty for individual politicians but destroying their autonomy from party leaders, and thus their opportunities for innovation. Large districts and frequent elections increased electioneering costs for German candidates and increased their dependence on financial benefactors—the party leadership and economic interests that contributed to party coffers. Finally, Germany's PR system eliminated incentives for strategic voting, so that political actors in turn had little incentive to adapt to shifts in voter preferences. In contrast, the effects of the French electoral system were to decentralize candidate recruitment and raise career uncertainty, keep campaign costs relatively modest, and encourage strategic voting in the second round. All three of these effects promoted innovation in policy platform and campaign strategy by French politicians, while discouraging them in the German

These relationships are not merely of theoretical interest, argues Kreuzer, but they also had huge implications for democratic performance in France and Germany. Both countries faced rampant inflation after World War I, horrendous industrial unemployment after 1929, and agricultural depression. Electoral mechanisms encouraged French mainstream party politicians to innovate sufficiently to keep voters' loyalties and discourage defections to the extreme right or left. In contrast, mainstream German politicians lacked such incentives, and their parties lost voters in droves to the upstart communist and Nazi parties. The rest, as the saying goes, was history.

In this elegantly argued and very well written book, Kreuzer roots himself explicitly in rational-choice institutionalism, and he uses it to explain the historical differences between French and German interwar democratic performance. To complement the rational-choice institutionalism.

he argues that historical contingency and contextual factors interact with institutions and limit their effects. Rearranging his empirical material into national, cross-party comparisons (holding institutions constant so as to observe the impact of contextual factors), he finds that "history matters since neither did all French parties retain their level of support nor did all German parties lose votes at the same rate" (p. 159). Moreover, while the effects of strategic voting and career uncertainty were relatively consistent across the various parties in both France and Germany, the effects of electioneering costs varied, depending on the logistical endowments of parties; Germany's liberal parties suffered much more than other parties. So, concludes Kreuzer, "the influence of historical contingency varies with different institutions" (p. 161). These are welcome insights, but even for a concluding chapter they are developed somewhat sketchily.

As for democratic performance, Kreuzer joins the fight against the various theories of German "exceptionalism," which account for National Socialism in terms of such longpast events as failed democratic revolutions. Instead, he sides with those who argue that German development was not so very exceptional, and he points to the effects of contemporary, Weimar-era (electoral) institutions to account for the failure of democracy there. Thus, while he bases his argument largely on structural factors (as opposed to relying simply on historical contingencies like the Versailles Treaty or the Great Depression), these structural factors are contemporary, rather than rooted in the distant past. These insights also have considerable appeal.

Although Kreuzer's argument seems persuasive in terms of explaining the differences in party and democratic performance in France and Germany, questions arise as to the generalizability of the argument. In my view, the book would have been considerably strengthened by a chapter which (briefly!) tested his argument in at least several more cases. To this reader's "naked eye," it is not immediately clear why, in the 1930s, the Swedish Social Democrats were able to innovate (by adopting Keynesianism) despite their system of proportional representation, whereas the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) failed to adopt (proto-)Keynesianism before 1933 because of (in Kreuzer's view) the incentive structure embedded in their similar (though not identical) PR system. Similarly, in the 1930s, the British Labour party failed to adopt Keynesianism despite their single-member-district system, which presumably shared many incentives with the very French system that enabled French socialists, according to Kreuzer, to adopt Keynesianism. (Although it lacks the French system's second ballot, the incentive structure of the British system is surely closer to the French system than to PR, given the single-member districts in each).

An answer to such questions might require a more detailed exploration of the relationship between institutions and historical contingency than that presented in Kreuzer's elegant treatise. One place to start would be with intraparty politics; recent literature points to its importance for successful adaptation to changing competitive environments. For example, Herbert Kitschelt's (1994) The Transformation of European Social Democracy relates the innovative capacity of social democratic/socialist parties in the 1980s to their internal organizational structures and distribution of power. Both Kitschelt and Frank Wilson, in "The Sources of Party Change" (in Kay Lawson, ed., How Political Parties Work, 1994), point out the impact of particularly effective leaders. Finally, Sheri Berman ("The Life of the Party," Comparative Politics, 30, no. 1 [1997]: 101–23) points to the importance of historically rooted ideological flexibility; the Swedish Social Democrats' practice in forging crossclass coalitions (with farmers in the 1930s and middle-class groups in the 1950s) was replicated in the party's undercutting of the Swedish Greens by coopting postmaterialist themes in the 1980s. To push Kreuzer's line of research further, it would be quite fascinating to investigate in greater depth whether or how electoral systems contribute to any of these conditions, particularly to parties' internal organization. One would also want to know more about how parties in PR systems do in fact manage to adapt over time, given Kreuzer's argument that PR systems contain disincentives for innovation.

State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810–1900. By Fernando López-Alves. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2000. 295p. \$49.95 cloth, \$17.95 paper.

Lawrence Boudon, Library of Congress

One of the most vexing questions posed over time by political scientists is: Why do democratic polities develop in some countries, but not in others? In his seminal work Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1986), still read today by most students of comparative politics, Barrington Moore strove to answer that question by examining the historical process in which commercial agriculture emerged in Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and China. In his book, Fernando López-Alves takes the framework that Moore provided and applies it to three countries in Latin America whose trajectories in the nineteenth century led to different polities and experiences with democracy—Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay (he also makes brief reference to Paraguay and Venezuela as so-called control cases). While conceding the need for "further testing" (p. 220), he arrives at conclusions that differ significantly from Moore's, even though he does not attempt to dismiss that earlier work.

Relying on historical data (and the comments of historians), López-Alvez argues eloquently how, rather than the conversion to commercial agriculture, it was conflict and the actors involved therein that shaped the polities of these countries. It mattered whether the state—making was carried out primarily by political parties (Colombia and Argentina) or by national armies (Argentina and Paraguay). The type of conflict—not the frequency—also mattered: "[T]he degree to which regime outcomes turned out more democratic or authoritarian [is] partially explained by whether the locus of the revolutionary wars was supported by the city or by the countryside" (p. 37). In Argentina, the military efforts were associated with urban elites, whereas in both Colombia and Uruguay, they involved rural-based caudillos.

Another important factor was the way in which the rural poor were mobilized: "The fourth and final claim is that the mode of incorporation of the rural poor into war and politics substantially shaped institutions and the type of resulting regime" (p. 44). In Colombia and Uruguay, the mobilization occurred via the political parties, resulting in weaker states but more inclusive polities. Uruguay was the most democratic due to the fact that there, the elites had less fear of rural uprisings than in Colombia. In Argentina (and Paraguay), incorporation was via the army, resulting in stronger states and restrictive polities. The other case examined, Venezuela, experienced mobilization by caudillo armies, also resulting in a more restrictive polity.

In this qualitative work, López-Alvez cleverly utilizes both the method of agreement, when comparing Argentina and Uruguay, and the method of difference, when comparing Uruguay and Colombia. The first pair share many similarities, making a comparison possible. The second pair have little in common, except for the mostly democratic outcomes. As he shows us, however, the conflicts in Uruguay and Argentina

differed. In Uruguay, wars were fought between followers of the urban-based Colorados and the more rural-based Blancos over control of the state. In Argentina, on the other hand, the wars were either against invaders or other countries, or were waged far from Buenos Aires, where a military developed that impeded, the author claims, the development of parties.

In the first chapter of the book, not only does López-Alves justify his research by reiterating some of the classic arguments on state building (i.e., Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States [1990]; Barrington Moore, Social Origins... [1986]; Ruth B. Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena [1991]; Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power [1993]; and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne H. Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy [1992]), but he also makes clear why many of those works fall short in explaining the different outcomes of the state-building process in Latin America. He argues cogently that the key period for state building was not the late 1800s and early 1900s, as much of the existing scholarship posits, but the period from independence to the late 1800s, before most of the new countries had made the transition to commercial agriculture. By the end of the chapter, his argument is neatly laid out in a flow chart depicting the independent and intervening variables, a table comparing the five cases and their outcomes, and a single statement summing everything up: "In agrarian postcolonial societies, types of war and the type and scope of mobilization of the rural poor during state formation shaped institutions, civil-military relations, and regime outcomes" (p. 46). The statement is italicized in the book for added emphasis.

In the next four chapters, López-Alves proceeds to flesh out his argument by looking at each case in some detail, starting with Uruguay. Here, he underscores the sharp geographical divisions and the centrality of the two parties in state building. However, he also notes that it was the Colorado Party, under the enlightened leadership of José Batlle y Ordoñez, that crafted the most inclusive polity of the three major cases. The Colorados more firmly controlled the army, and the lack of a cohesive conservative opposition allowed Batlle to carry out social reforms. On the contrary, in Colombia, an alliance between the powerful Catholic Church and the Conservative Party resulted in a lack of reforms and a more restrictive polity, even though party mobilization was central there as well. In Argentina, he gives ample credit to Juan Manuel de Rosas, but notes also that Buenos Aires remained largely unscathed by the various wars, allowing for a stronger state to develop. Finally, he briefly examines Paraguay and Venezuela, both of which tend to confirm his findings, even though in the latter case, rural mobilization was different from the four other cases.

The book is a must read for anyone interested in the evolution of the state in Latin America, and it complements rather than supplants—some of the works previously mentioned. If there is any criticism of the book, it is that the conclusions are much too brief. The argument is restated too quickly, leaving the reader feeling somehow empty and not totally convinced. It would be indeed interesting to take the theories developed therein and apply them to the rest of Latin America, to see if they hold up elsewhere. How would they apply to Mexico, for instance? Mexico's wars were fought mostly against invaders, and peasants were mobilized by the army, at least in the 1800s; a party system did not develop. However, does the fact that the peasantry then rose up in revolution in 1910 suggest a new path, or a different outcome? And Mexico then evolved into a single-party dominant system that was largely restrictive. At a glance, then, it would appear to fit in with López-Alves's model, but the revolution is not fully explained. And what about other countries that experienced revolutions—Bolivia, Cuba, and Nicaragua? Are these separate outcomes that need to be explained? In the final analysis, I see this work as an admirable start and a valuable contribution to our understanding of Latin American politics.

Northern Ireland and the Divided World: The Northern Ireland Conflict and the Good Friday Agreement in Comparative Perspective. Edited by John McGarry. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 374p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

David E. Schmitt, Northeastern University

John McGarry and a distinguished group of comparativists have produced a volume important not only for scholars interested in the study of Northern Ireland but also for those concerned with ethnic conflict and nationalism generally. Although its success is certainly not assured, the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, a consociational (power-sharing) settlement of the Northern Ireland conflict with international confederal dimensions, has sparked much interest by scholars and practitioners concerned with other ethnonational conflicts. The agreement was achieved with considerable pressure and support from international actors. The international community has played an increasingly important part in the resolution, management, and containment of ethnonational conflict, and the success or failure of the Good Friday Agreement may hold important lessons for international efforts elsewhere. From both a theoretical and practical perspective, this is a fine edited volume with internal coherence and useful contributions.

An introductory chapter by McGarry argues for the importance of comparative analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict. He documents the many instances in which politicians and partisans have used comparisons in advancing their cause, and he summarizes the various theoretical approaches to the analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict.

Part I presents five chapters dealing with theoretical and general issues. Rupert Taylor argues that a social transformation approach through group contacts, such as integrated schools, is the best solution for Northern Ireland's difficulties. From Rupert's perspective, consociationalism entrenches ethnic animosities. In an insightful analysis of the 1998 agreement, Brendan O'Leary emphasizes the need for a consociational and confederal settlement in such circumstances as the Northern Ireland conflict. He argues that one significant flaw in the agreement is the British Parliament's capacity to override its provisions, as it did in temporarily suspending the Northern Irish Assembly in the year 2000. O'Leary also takes issue with Arend Lijphart's work on the optimal electoral mechanisms within consociational frameworks. In a substantive chapter John McGarry also supports consociationalism as necessary for settlement, disagreeing with the criticism that power sharing entrenches ethnic identities and prevents the development of inclusive civic identities. He notes, for example, that the agreement has provisions requiring cross-community cooperation (e.g., consent by both unionist and nationalist members of the Assembly for election of the first and deputy first ministers). In a sophisticated critique of the agreement, Donald Horowitz argues that stark consociationalism is rare and risky in severely divided societies because, among other things, it can penalize moderate parties. As he has done in seminal earlier work, Horowitz advocates an incentives approach, consistent with majoritarian principles, that encourages moderation and crosscommunity elite cooperation and that prevents domination by ethnic majorities. Feargal Cochrane analyses the growth in the importance of peace-conflict resolution organizations

in the peace process. These organizations frequently arose with the goal of alleviating particular symptoms of the conflict and are diverse in their ideological objectives. In addition to promoting the inclusivist goals of moderate political elites in Northern Ireland, Cochrane notes that they also constituted an alternative path for people committed to paramilitary activity.

Part II presents seven case studies that compare Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, Canada, Lebanon, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine. This section also has useful chapters on "Lessons from Europe" by Anthony Alcock and a comparative analysis by Adrian Guelke of Ireland's status as an island. Alcock, who served on the Ulster Unionist Party team during negotiations on the Good Friday Agreement, maintains that its acceptability to mainstream unionists resulted partly from the fact that the cross-border aspects of the agreement were consistent with patterns in the European Union. Among other important issues was the renunciation by the Republic of Ireland of its constitutional territorial claim to Northern Ireland. Guelke argues that the international community supports the territorial integrity of islands and is sympathetic with the Good Friday Agreement partly because of its cross-border provisions, such as the North-South Ministerial Council. He offers insightful comparisons with the conflicts in Sri Lanka, Cyprus, and other islands

Michael Keating's chapter on the Basque Country notes that both primordialist and modernist analyses of the Northern Ireland and Basque Country are inadequate for explaining nationalism in these settings. Instead, a focus on political factors and the evolution of social forces provides more insight. Keating argues that identity in both cases is continually being made and remade. S. J. R. Noel's chapter on Canada focuses on the nineteenth-century consociational bargain developed in secret by Canadian elites themselves without significant outside interference. The fact that the Northern Ireland accord was not developed by the Northern Irish elites themselves augurs poorly, in Noel's view, for a successful long-term outcome.

The major obstacle to the success of the Good Friday Agreement has been the decommissioning of weapons by paramilitary organizations, particularly the Provisional Irish Republic Army (IRA). Kirsten Schulze's chapter compares the contentious nature of this issue in Northern Ireland with the successful and relatively quick decommissioning in Lebanon. Among the reasons examined for Lebanon's success was an explicit statement in the Ta'if Accord for a quick surrender of weapons, with harsh sanctions for violations. Also important were provisions for the reintegration of paramilitaries into the army and police. The chapter comparing Northern Ireland to South Africa by Padraig O'Malley is particularly strong in its guidelines for successful negotiation of settlements. In his discussion of the key similarities and differences between the two conflict and settlement processes is the argument that the actions of the African National Congress constituted a just war, while the violence committed by the IRA did not. Sammy Smooha's chapter compares partition in Israel/Palestine and Ireland, with a focus on partition as a mode of conflict regulation. He argues that partition is inevitable in the Israeli/Palestinian case, i.e., Palestine will become an independent state. By contrast, partition will probably weaken in Ireland, with the border becoming less relevant over time.

Scholars will inevitably disagree with some of the diverse perspectives and interpretations in this book, but all of the chapters are well done, with some representing significant contributions to the field. John McGarry and his colleagues have produced an important and interesting volume. Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from Peel to Blair. By Iain McLean. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 256p. \$65.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Terrence Casey, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology

In Rational Choice and British Politics, Iain McLean applies William Riker's concept of "heresthetics" to British political history. In contrast to rhetoric (the art of persuasion), heresthetics is "the art and science of political manipulation" (p. 10). Rather than trying to convince others of one's position, heresthetics is about transforming the question and altering political dimensions so as to change the rational calculus of key actors and manufacture a supportive coalition. McLean employs the device of "analytical narratives" (historical analysis informed by rational choice methodology) to explore critical junctures in British political development, including the repeal of the Corn Laws, the Second Reform Act, the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1922, and the political and economic revolution of Margaret Thatcher. He also explores broader political movements, including the realignment of Victorian political parties and the attempts by Joseph Chamberlain and Enoch Powell to connect race and empire into winning coalitions.

How might a heresthetically informed narrative run? Take the repeal of the Corn Laws under Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel. Why would Conservatives in the Commons and the landed gentry in the House of Lords repeal a law directly benefiting them? Peel transformed the issue by linking it to the Irish famine, thus garnering almost all of the opposition Whigs to support him and only needing a segment of the Tories for passage in the Commons. (The rest voted for protection.) Peel then convinced the Duke of Wellington, leader of the Lords, that defeat would bring down the government. Seeing the issue not as tariffs but support for the queen's government, Wellington sank his energies into getting repeal passed in the Lords. By altering the question, Peel manufactured a winning coalition where there previously was none.

Overall, McLean's research is excellent, his writing is polished and witty, and his cases are well selected to cover some of the truly fascinating moments of British politics. But his ambition is to provide more complete accounts than rival explanations and use them to build theoretical generalizations (p. 17). Unfortunately, ambition exceeds result.

His cases are well-tread historical ground, and so the rationale for revisiting them is to gain new insights through the lens of rational choice: "[A]n analytical narrative in the rational choice tradition adds some points to the why" (p. 191). Does he provide better answers to the "why questions"? Take his account of the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Lloyd George was determined that negotiations not break down over Ulster, where the British position was weakest, and thus maneuvered the Irish delegation toward questions of the status of a free Irish state within the empire. But the Irish delegation was divided. The swing vote was Robert Barton, sent by Eamon De Valera to gain complete separation from the crown. The final treaty in fact granted dominion status to the Irish Free State. So why did Barton sign? The traditional view (as noted by McLean on p. 191) was that with the threat of renewed war looming, he cracked under the pressure after others agreed to sign. In McLean's narrative, Barton cracked because it became a "sequential signature game" with Barton as the last player. If he failed to sign, he would be solely responsible for war. The difference between the two interpretations is rather fine grained.

The plots of some of McLean's narratives also turn on rather selective or peculiar evidence. The Tories backed

Disraeli on extending the franchise because they "seem to have responded to the thrill of the chase" (p. 70). Joseph Chamberlain's imperial preference plan failed largely because he did not control an economic ministry (p. 127), discounting that Chamberlain's Conservative Unionists lost in 1906 (43.4% to the Liberals' 49.4%) on a campaign fought on free trade. For the Thatcher premiership, "the inescapable conclusion is that Mrs. Thatcher made people feel better because she won the Falklands war, not because of anything she or her government did for the economy" (p. 212). This ignores the economic recovery after 1982 and support for her government's actions to control labor unions.

McLean's narratives moreover fail to answer the most important why questions: Why did the key players adopt a particular set of preferences? Why did Wellington place service to the queen over a policy with which he disagreed? Why would the Lords reject Lloyd George's "people's budget" knowing that it might lead to their emasculation as an institution? Why did Michael Collins prefer dominion status over no agreement, while Eamon De Valera opted for the opposite, leading to the Irish Civil War? Why would Margaret Thatcher chant "there is no alternative" when common wisdom suggested it would lead to electoral disaster? Answering such questions would inherently raise issues of interests and ideology rather than strategic manipulation, concepts that McLean has difficulty capturing in his particular analytical net.

In his defense, rational choice explores political interaction among actors with a given set of preferences, not preference formation. Doing so allows assumptions and hypotheses to be deductively and logically connected, facilitating theory construction. So all might be forgiven if shortcomings in historical narrative were offset by theoretical gains. Regrettably, the integrity of McLean's theoretical framework does not hold throughout. His chosen herestheticians do not connect goals and strategy consistently across time. Some are cynically focused on electoral advantage (Disraeli), while others undertake quixotic crusades regardless of result (Enoch Powell). He does not provide any assumptions or arguments relating to when, where, and why heresthetics is employed, or the conditions under which it is likely to succeed (other than for case-specific reasons). Even within his cases, it is difficult to tell when interest or ideology or personality are at work, rather than heresthetics. Nor can one easily distinguish rhetoric from heresthetics in practice. McLean poses Thatcher as a (reluctant) heresthetician, but the quintessential "conviction politician" could just as easily be classed as a master rhetorician. As these choices become increasingly arbitrary, the clarity of the concept suffers, eroding the rationale for a formalized interpretation of these events.

Riker's The Art of Political Manipulation (1986), of which this book is clearly a progeny, was written as a manual for politicians as much as a theoretical text. Rational Choice and British Politics would be a useful read for Tony Blair. From a scholarly perspective, there are some novel and interesting parts to McLean's work, such as his analysis of parliamentary interest and ideology under Peel, or on the impact of Enoch Powell on the Conservative vote in 1970 and 1974. As a coherent theoretical approach, however, the work is lacking. Strategic manipulation is a useful addition to our analytical toolbox, but heresthetics does not appear to be as useful a tool as McLean implies. In terms of the general appeal of this work, those already converted to the theoretical utility of rational choice will find a clever and well-constructed application of these ideas. Those not already converted to this research tradition are unlikely to have their opinions swayed.

Out of the Red: Building Capitalism and Democracy in Postcommunist Europe. By Mitchell A. Orenstein. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 184p. \$54.50 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Ellen Comisso, University of California, San Diego

Nowadays, it is easy to forget just how pessimistic observers were in 1990 about the possibility of simultaneously introducing capitalism and competitive politics to the ex-socialist states of Eastern Europe. Often, debates seemed to hinge simply on which would subvert which, that is, whether the economic shocks of reform would destabilize democratic governments or whether populist appeals to the losers of economic adjustment would derail economic reform. That popularly elected government and systemic economic change could mutually reinforce each other seemed, at the time, to describe a fool's paradise. Yet now that the dust has begun to settle, this appears to have been exactly what happened.

Mitchell Orenstein's new volume, a careful and astute comparison of the interplay between economic and political change in Poland and the Czech Republic after 1989, explores why this was the case. Orenstein argues persuasively that the alternation of parties in power made possible by electoral competition was a critical condition of sustainable reform. Rather than producing either economic or political instability, regular changes of ruling coalitions prevented leaders from outrunning or ignoring their constituencies, while allowing unpopular measures to be corrected and refined once their consequences—both social and economic—became known. Thus, he suggests, the Czech economy stumbled badly in the late 1990s precisely because it was the only country in the region in which incumbents were reelected. Filled with confidence as a result, the liberal coalition of Vaclav Klaus became overly dedicated to its voucher privatization program and antiregulatory platform, dismissing problems with enterprise governance and securities transactions as simply the predictable laments of the opposition, until finally, the Czech banking system began to implode. It was only in 1998 that a minority social democratic government took office and began to enact the measures to regulate banking and financial markets that its predecessor had steadfastly rejected. In Poland, political cohesion dissipated more rapidly. There, the political fallout from the radical "shock therapy" measures of 1990 not only forced early Solidarity governments to introduce modifications but finally brought a "left" coalition to power in 1993. Privatization subsequently moved more slowly and with greater attention to the constituencies affected by it, yet economic growth continued on the robust path that began in the early years of the decade. And even as the Right returned to power in 1997, it came back more willing to deal politically with the opposition, especially since much of the recalcitrance came from its own ranks.

Orenstein thus concludes that the key to sustainable reform in a democratic political order is a party system characterized by cohesion-oriented and market-oriented competitors that can alternate in power without leading to polarization. It is quite an unobjectionable thesis, but given that both of his cases are generally included in the "success" stories of the transition, it is not entirely clear that the evidence offers an appropriate test of the thesis. That is, while we may well approve of some governments more than others, it is not clear that the economy in either country performed significantly better than the other. Even with "cohesion-oriented" governments, unemployment in Poland was and is far higher than in the Czech Republic. Polish economic growth, once the valley of the transition was crossed, was more robust than that in the Czech Republic, but once one bears in mind the far greater

depth of the initial downturn and the far more disastrous state of the Polish economy in 1989, it becomes clear that the 1990s marked a recovery simply to the GDP levels reached under socialism in both countries—with a smaller and more productive labor force, a wider assortment of consumer goods, and greater inequality and unemployment.

In any case, Orenstein's volume is notable for its very informative analysis of political and economic change in highly turbulent times. It shows nicely that there is no single path to capitalism and that the ability to correct policy mistakes is at least as important as being able to select a strategy in the first place. The tale is told well, and the volume is well worth reading.

Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. By Roger D. Petersen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 338p. \$59.95.

Jan Kubik, Rutgers University

The most challenging task in today's comparative politics is crafting a fruitful combination of a general theory of political behavior with a nontrivial and sufficiently rich portrayal of that behavior's social, cultural, and historical context. At the same time, a consensus is emerging that holism is out, individualism is in, and the discipline's intellectual effort should be primarily focused on the reconstruction of the rules (mechanisms) governing the strategizing behavior of individuals in various social and cultural contexts. Macro-historicalstructural explanations are largely out of favor. Given this intellectual climate, the premium is placed on studies that employ rational choice/game theoretical framework and test its applicability and limitations in the study of non-Western political systems. Such tests of applicability inevitably involve a confrontation between slim and parsimonious gametheoretic models and detail-rich ethnographic or historical reconstructions. Sometimes such confrontations end up in fruitless, mutual acrimony; recently, however, they have led to many instances of cross-fertilization and productive revisions of both sides' analytical assumptions.

The tremendous merits of such cross-fertilization are amply represented in Roger D. Petersen's Resistance and Rebellion, one of the best works in the emerging new genre that seeks to combine formal theory and detailed ethnographic portrayal. The theory Petersen employs should be very attractive to comparativists. He approaches the problem of resistance and rebellion with an Olsonian dilemma in mind (Why should they rebel at all?) and shows that there are several mechanisms that account for people's move from passive acceptance of oppression to resistance and rebellion (or active collaboration). Those mechanisms range from rational calculation (instrumental rationality) to nonrational, psychological (for example, resentment formation or the tyranny of sunk costs) to social (community-based norms of reciprocity or types of community) to cultural ([non]existence of relevant focal points).

Building on the earlier works that analyze the tipping process (for example, Kuran Schelling, Dennis Chong), Petersen offers a more complex analysis of this process by demonstrating how it is influenced by such sociological variables as the community type or the distribution of normative orientations (linked to the membership in specific subgroups, each espousing a separate set of norms). Thus, he contributes to the welcome and long-overdue rehabilitation of sociology in the study of strategic behavior in political science (prominently signaled in the award-winning James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin's "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," APSR 90 [December 1996]: 715–35).

The theoretically most elaborate part of the book (Chapter 2) is focused on a detailed and rigorous though quite accessible, modeling of the sociological mechanisms and group features that help to explain why individuals in certain communities (at certain times) tend to rebel against oppressors while others, embedded in different communities, tend to remain passive or collaborate. Petersen's model opens a way for a rigorous analysis of such attributes of the community as 1) the initial distribution preferences and constraints concerning the risk of rebellion; 2) the types of norms (of honor or family obligation, for example) that define the types of subgroups; and 3) the distribution of those subgroups within the larger community. This part of his work is indebted to network analysis.

Two important innovations should be singled out in Petersen's analysis of the dynamics of mobilization (or movement formation). First, he divides this process into two stages: a) from passivity to resistance and b) from resistance to rebellion. Then, he considers separately the problem of rebellion's sustainability. For each stage or problem he identifies a different set of mechanisms and shows how they mutually reinforce each other, propelling the process forward (to rebellion) or "backward" (to collaboration). Second, he relies on the concept of role—a useful though somewhat forgotten tool—to make sure that his strategizing individuals are not unnecessarily atomized and that the changing social contexts of their actions are analytically captured.

What is particularly attractive about the author's theorizing is his focus on identifying causal mechanisms (not universal causal regularities or covering laws) that 1) logically resemble the once-prized middle-range generalizations (Robert Merton) and 2) can be grouped together according to the level or domain of reality in which they operate (individual rationality, individual habits, emotional attachments, community's structure or community's culture, and so on).

Once the model is detailed, the book moves on to the presentation of ethnographic evidence. The empirical material comes primarily from Lithuania and its people's resistance and rebellions against the Soviet and Nazi occupiers. The most detailed and ethnographically rich Chapters 3 and 4 deal with the first Soviet occupation (1940–41). It is here that Petersen demonstrates the true power of his analytical apparatus. He is rightly careful to note that his empirical work in no way constitutes "an adequate test of the theory" (p. 133), but he is justified in claiming that his theoretical scaffolding is very useful in both illuminating the mechanisms of rebellion and explaining different levels of resistance and mobilization in various communities.

Chapter 5 deals with the controversial issue of "Lithuanian collaboration" with the Nazis (1941–44). Using his model and methods, Petersen shows that the claims of both extremes (all/most Lithuanians were collaborators versus all/most Lithuanians were anti-Nazi resistance fighters) are false. He provides evidence that most Lithuanians remained rather passive and uninvolved, and—more importantly—he demonstrates theoretically why it had to be so. Chapters 6 and 7 serve to test the approach in new settings that include post-World War II Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Montenegro during the war is also briefly discussed. Chapter 8 focuses on the perestroika period and provides further tests for various mechanisms identified and analyzed earlier. The cases include Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, and Lithuania.

Chapter 9 provides a fascinating though somewhat cursory attempt to address the puzzle of the "first actors." While an analysis of cascading mechanisms explains how people overcome various thresholds and join rebellious groups, it obviously does not say much about the leaders or "fanatics" who

decide to rebel without any "safety in numbers." Petersen admits that a single theory accounting for a first actor's actions is going to be complex and multilayered. His own contribution to such a theory is still preliminary and sketchy, but he offers several extremely promising insights and analytical clues, most of which prod us to refocus our theoretical lenses on cultural mechanisms (for example, the formation and usage of such cultural schemas as "martyrdom").

Such an ambitious and theoretically innovative work obviously has its lacunae. Briefly, here are three. First, given the theoretical ambitions of Petersen's analysis and the impressive scope of his references, it is striking that he does not often cite the voluminous literature on protest, social movements, and revolutions that has been developed by the likes of Charles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, and many others (e.g., see Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, 1996). This literature deals with many similar issues, and it would be interesting to see how Petersen sees the relationship between, say, his concept of focal points and their concept of framing. Second, although Petersen is very effective in moving beyond the unconvincing parsimony of explanations based on instrumental rationality by complementing them primarily with sociological mechanisms, his underdeveloped theorizing of cultural mechanisms comes as a surprise. It is a surprise because those mechanisms play a central role in his analysis; and, more generally, it seems that their significance is on a par with the sociological mechanisms he construes so aptly. Third, the power of his analysis resides in his careful theorizing and empirical reconstruction of mechanisms of resistance and rebellion on a microscale, in small communities. Therefore, the analysis of some of his comparative cases, approached at a more general level and without the empirical depth of his Lithuanian case, is less convincing; it is simply difficult to determine if his analysis holds or not. Those are, however, minor squabbles; Resistance and Rebellion is an immensely rewarding and inspiring work.

Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives. Edited by David Pion-Berlin. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001. 352p. \$55.00 cloth, \$22.50 paper.

Ariel C. Armony, Colby College

As David Pion-Berlin explains in his Introduction, this collection of essays seeks to link the field of Latin American civil-military studies to major theoretical approaches in mainstream political science. Accordingly, the contributors draw from the rationalist, structuralist, and culturalist approaches in an effort to break what the editor of this book views as a long-standing isolation of Latin Americanists in general, and the region's civil-military specialists in particular, "from the major intellectual traditions, currents, and debates in political science and in the field of comparative politics" (p. 16). Therefore, the stated purpose of this volume is to reexamine civil-military relations in Latin America, taking into account major contextual changes (the wave of democratization in the region, the transition to free market economies, the end of the Cold War) and the potential contribution of mainstream analytical perspectives to new insights into this important theme in Latin American politics.

Pion-Berlin has assembled an impressive group of scholars for this project. The high quality of the chapters results in a fine collection. I am highlighting the book's achievements as well as the challenges it poses for future research with a look at five of the nine chapters.

Wendy Hunter's contribution offers an analytical exercise on the virtues and limits of rational choice models to explain the decline of military influence in Brazil. This exercise is a gem. Concepts are clearly defined and placed in the context of relevant debates in the discipline. The treatment of the Brazilian case, with a look at other Latin American countries, though necessarily brief, provides an excellent background to the conceptual discussion. More important, Hunter incisively dissects the rational choice approach as applied to the research question, showing how a failure to incorporate structure and culture may dampen the usefulness of this approach.

The chapter by J. Samuel Fitch addresses two critical questions in the study of civil-military relations in Latin America and, I would say, new democracies in general. First is the need to define standards against which the democratization of civil-military relations can be evaluated, especially if the final goal is to develop cross-national comparative work on this subject. Fitch's contribution in this respect is important, though it would have been useful to place it in the context of recent challenges to teleological notions of democratic development modeled on the paradigmatic case of well-established democracies—in plain terms, arguments in favor of measuring new democracies by their positive attributes rather than by what they lack. Second, Fitch focuses on the methodological problems of studying civil-military relations in Latin America. He gives careful consideration to such issues as selection bias and the connection between theory and empirical methods of research. This analysis serves the book's goal of closing the gap between area studies and mainstream political science, though much of Fitch's methodological discussion will sound repetitive to scholars familiar with recent debates on quantitative and qualitative methods in the field of comparative politics.

In his chapter on Argentina, Pion-Berlin untangles, from an institutional perspective, an interesting paradox: Why has the Argentine military remained subordinate to civilian authorities notwithstanding a weak and ill-prepared defense ministry? In search for an explanation, Pion-Berlin analyzes institutional differences in the Argentine state, concluding that "the institutional strengths of the Ministries of Economics and Foreign Relations and the Congress have been used to offset the weaknesses in the Ministry of Defense" (p. 147). In doing so, he shows how, in a democratic setting, the new rules of the game may allow policymakers operating within "strong" institutions with no formal authority over the armed forces to influence, effectively, the nature of the military's leverage and mission. Beyond the specific paradox addressed in the chapter, Pion-Berlin's analysis is a fine contribution to an understanding of how processes of democratization are often defined by the outcome of complex interactions among state institutions endowed with different power capacities.

Felipe Agüero's comparative chapter examines the evolving patterns of civil-military relations following the collapse of authoritarian regimes in southern Europe and South America. His thesis is that variations in civil-military relations resulted, primarily, from differences in the "founding conditions" of the new democracies, namely, "the way the military exit took place, the main features of the transition, and the early institutional arrangements that gave shape to the new postauthoritarian order" (p. 197). Bounded by specific historical-institutional conditions, Agüero explains, military and civilian actors engage in strategic interactions whose outcome would be largely determined by the opportunities and constraints defined, for each group, by the equation "access plus resources." This is a sound framework for understanding, from a comparative perspective, different outcomes in the process of achieving civilian control over the military.

In the final chapter, Brian Loveman presents an overview of the historical legacies that frame today's civil-military relations in Latin America. While there is nothing inherently innovative in this analytical perspective, the inclusion of a historical chapter keeps the editor's effort to reduce the gap between area studies and mainstream political science from resulting in a negation of the past in understanding Latin American civil-military relations. As Loveman explains in his study, "a complex set of enduring... collective expectations, beliefs, social memories, and institutionalized patterns of behavior" serves as a "subtext" of contemporary patterns of civil-military relations in the region (pp. 246, 264). One of Loveman's most interesting claims is that the authoritarian practices that permeate the political and social spheres of most of the region's democracies today cannot be attributed solely to the military regimes that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s. Military rule activated and intensified deeply embedded, long-standing institutional, political, and cultural trends in the region.

Among the few weaknesses of the book, let me mention two. The first is editorial, specifically, the unnecessary pattern by which each contributor makes an explicit reference to the editor's Introduction in the concluding section of his/her chapter. This seems to be an attempt to show the reader that all the parts fit nicely into the whole, but, in general, these comments seem artificially imposed and do not add to the cohesion of the volume, which stands by itself. The second comment is more substantive: Why do only a few of the chapters succeed in integrating the different analytical perspectives? As Hunter shows in her chapter, a particular perspective (e.g., rational choice) may have more explanatory power than other approaches to solve certain conundrums, but that does not mean that it can stand alone, disengaged from more comprehensive explanations (e.g., those which incorporate structural and cultural variables as well). In this sense, I think that Hunter's piece could have provided a useful blueprint for more elaboration in some of the other studies.

This book is a major contribution to the literature on civilmilitary relations and, in general, democratization in Latin America. It is of great value for both area specialists and comparativists. Hopefully, this volume will stimulate more collaboration among scholars working on civil-military relations in different regions, leading to a new set of studies solidly grounded in theory and broadly comparative in scope.

Welfare Capitalism in Southeast Asia: Social Security, Health and Education Policies. By M. Ramesh with Mukul G. Asher. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 217p. \$65.00. Social Welfare Development in East Asia. By Kwong-leung Tang. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 214p. \$65.00 cloth.

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The debate about the history and future of the welfare state is gradually expanding beyond the advanced industrial countries to encompass the middle-income developing countries and the formerly socialist economies of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union. This debate is particularly interesting in Asia. The newly industrializing countries in that region have had great success in increasing incomes, reducing poverty, and maintaining an equitable distribution of income. At the same time, the countries in the region are highly "globalized"—a factor often associated with increased economic insecurity—and until the 1980s were for the most part ruled by labor-repressive authoritarian regimes. By traditional measures of effort, they also appear to have surprisingly shallow public commitment to social welfare.

The emerging explanation for these apparent anomalies combines economic and political components. The region's rapid growth was labor absorbing, and as a result was accompanied by rapid expansion of employment, steadily rising real wages, and high household savings rates. Not only did such growth provide a sound basis for private and familial social insurance, it also deflected more extensive demands for government intervention. The political side of the story is a confirming mirror image of the expansion of the European welfare state. Ruled by pro-business authoritarian governments, with no left parties and with labor movements on a tight leash, these countries had little political space for welfare state politics. Where governments did devise social policies, they reflected the interests of narrow constituencies (such as the military and civil service) and favored a "regulatory" approach to welfare provision in which employers and employees, rather than the state, bore the brunt of financing welfare commitments. (The most important recent statement of this model is Roger Goodman, Gordon White, and Kwon Huk-ju, eds., The East Asian Welfare Model, 1998, and particularly the outstanding comparative essay by Kwon.) Outside of periodic political crises, when welfare commitments would expand, it took the transition to democratic rule in the 1980s and 1990s and the financial crises of 1997-98 to generate new demands for social insurance.

These two new comparative books confirm the broad outlines of this consensus, provide important amendments, but also underline that there is still much analytic and empirical work to be done on Asian social policy. M. Ramesh focuses on the five major Southeast Asian countries—Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore—and in contrast to Kwong-Leung Tang, organizes his very systematic empirical material by policy area: social security, health, and education. His purpose is a dual one that sometimes pulls at the fabric of the book; he seeks not only to explain social policy outcomes but also to evaluate them. But as a result, his assessment of policy outcomes is richer than Tang's, which tends to be more critical.

Ramesh's focus on discrete policy areas also allows him to make an important empirical observation that needs to structure future research. While Southeast Asian countries do indeed have relatively limited commitments to social insurance, such as unemployment insurance and pensions, their commitments to basic health care and particularly education were early and comparatively expansive. Tang's book shows that the same is true of the Northeast Asian cases as well.

Ramesh argues that the provision of basic social services was a function of governments' developmental orientation. This functional line of thinking is a well-developed one in the literature on the East Asian newly industrializing countries. Just as there was an elective affinity between exportled growth strategies and labor control, so basic education and health contributed to the promotion of labor-intensive manufacturing. Yet there is little evidence provided to support this claim. Educational choices predated the relevant development policy choices, the expansion of the educational franchise appears to follow from political demands associated with decolonization, and important anomalies exist, such as Thailand, where educational attainment is surprisingly modest. Despite the often cited fact that East Asia's educational attainment was a crucial component of its success, we still have surprisingly little monographic research on the politics of education policy and reform. Why precisely did East Asia get it right? And where does the relatively paltry public commitment to health insurance fit into this picture?

In the core theoretical chapter on "The Political Economy of Social Policies"—which comes oddly at the end rather than the beginning of the book—Ramesh takes on political

issues more frontally. He argues that the expansion and maintenance of social welfare spending comes in response to calculations of political survival. The nature of these challenges varies from case to case, and Ramesh's argumentation is somewhat post hoc. Rather than identifying political challenges ex ante and testing for their effects, he examines periods of program expansion and relates them to a variety of different political challenges, which range from revolutionary movements, to labor mobilization and electoral politics. Nonetheless, the spirit of Ramesh's argument is exactly right: to look at the political dynamics behind welfare commitments.

Tang's analysis is organized by country, and it covers the "first wave" of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs): Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Like Ramesh's volume, it draws well on the work of local scholars, including extensive citation to the Chinese language literature. Like Ramesh, Tang also begins with a fairly exhaustive review of the full range of theories on the welfare state. Unlike Ramesh, however, Tang is more sharply focused on making a theoretical statement. Unfortunately, the nature of that statement is less well articulated than it might have been and at times marks a step backward from the more nuanced political account that Ramesh is working toward.

Tang identifies himself with the developmental state literature. In its sophisticated variants, this literature focused attention on three key features of East Asian political economy: "strong" authoritarian systems that enjoyed substantial political autonomy; relatively competent and meritocratic bureaucracies that played an important role in policy formulation; and an interventionist approach to industrial policy that supported export-oriented manufacturing. Tang notes that the first of these characteristics is clearly an important factor in understanding East Asian social policy. For example, it provides the basis for comparing Hong Kong's pro-business colonial government with the other newly industrializing countries, and it is clearly important in explaining the limited social commitments in the four cases.

Yet even in these sophisticated variants, the developmental state literature ran into trouble explaining what it was, precisely, that motivated state elites to act. Chalmers Johnson (MITI and the Japanese Miracle, 1982), was more honest than others in recognizing the problem and turned to ideology for a solution. Others, particularly Bruce Cumings ("The Origins and Development of the Northeast Asian Political Economy," in Fred Deyo ed., The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism, 1987) and Jung-eun Woo (Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization, 1991) looked to international politics and the nature of alliance commitments. But the developmental state literature often spiraled into tautology: Developmental states pursued development, and moreover, were successful in doing so!

At times, Tang's account veers in this direction. All four countries are treated as developmental states, but the precise dimensions of the state that are germane for explaining policy-political autonomy, the bureaucracy, industrial strategy—are not clearly articulated. Rather, Tang opts for characterizations that emphasize broad political tasks and resultant policy outcomes. Singapore is a "capital investment state" [sic] that is preoccupied with nation building and in which the People's Action Party ideology plays a central role. Taiwan is a social insurance state that is driven by its competition with the mainland and fundamental survival concerns. Korea is an authoritarian-developmental state, and so on. Distinctions are not drawn between major political epochs, so clearly democratic governments are treated as developmental states no different than their predecessors. At times, this gives rise to quite fundamental confusions, as when Tang refers to the Kim Young-sam government in Korea as presiding over a "developmental-military" state (p. 110). The overall thrust of the argument is sometimes lost among a host of competing and sometimes contradictory causal factors, from the bread and butter of the European welfare state literature, such as the role of labor and the existence (or absence in this case) of social democratic parties, to Confucianism, to development strategies, to purely idiosyncratic factors.

Both of these books push the debate along, and the Ramesh study in particular provides an introduction to social policy in the region that manages to be succinct yet detailed at the same time. Tang's book also provides a good overview of his cases. Both need to be read by anyone working on the topic. But our approach to these questions needs to get back to some methodological basics. First, there is some confusion in both books about what is really being explained. What are the stylized facts? Is it the relative paucity of social commitments in Asia, the variation across policy areas, changes over time? Some of these questions may require interregional comparisons, for example, to Latin America or Central Europe. Important differences exist across countries in the region as well, despite the ongoing search for a unifying model. In some cases, we have to go back quite far in order to find the origins of those differences. In Singapore and Malaysia, for example, the origins of both the central provident fund model and public health care can be traced to the British, while the Philippine welfare system is imitative of the United States. The effects of both democratization and economic crises, to which the region was subjected in 1997-98, provide opportunities to link this literature both with other regions and with the debate on globalization.

Despite the progress engendered in these two works, there is clearly a lot of room for intellectual arbitrage between the ongoing work on the welfare state in Europe and what is emerging in developing countries.

**The Politics of Daycare in Britain.** By Vicky Randall. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 232p. \$65.00.

Greg McCarthy, University of Adelaide

This illuminating account of child day-care policies and practice in Britain casts a dark shadow over equality in that country. Through the exploration of the simple question of why the public provision of child care has been so meager in Britain, Vicky Randall presents a compelling account not just of policy failure but of a general disinterest in child care as an equal opportunity issue. For her, there are intrinsic flaws in British society that have hindered the provision and funding of public child care in that country. The reason for this systemic inequality is to be found, principally, in the British brand of liberalism, combined with the country's institutional structures, both of which have operated from the premise that child care is a private concern.

To explore her hypothesis, Randall uses a combination of feminist insights and neoinstitutionalist thought to explore the peculiarity of the British approach to child care. In regard to feminism, Randall applies Bob Connell's notion of a "gender regime" to explore how issues relevant to women are lowly placed in the policy hierarchy (R. W. Connell, "The State, Gender, and Sexual Politics," *Theory and Society* 19 [1990]: 507–44). She uses this method to investigate the British state, which she depicts as embodying assumptions and practices that militated against child-care reform. When child care did appear on the policy agenda, it was always made subordinate to other policy concerns, with the underlying assumption being that it was a family matter. Even the marked expansion of day nurseries and child care during World War II

was quickly abandoned at the onset of peace, if for no other reason than to quell the desire of mothers to supplement their income (p. 45). Randall notes that what was remarkable about the 1950s and 1960s, despite rising demand for public child care by mothers, was a notable lack of recognition of child care as a policy issue by any government. The cause of this blindness was, in no small part, due to the absence of child-care advocates, even from the feminist movement. Rather, child care became an issue for mothers to negotiate themselves through such means as child minders, day care, play groups, nannies, or the various nursery arrangements.

Randall argues that this lacuna is a symptom of the form of liberalism dominant in Britain, which unquestioningly excludes mothers from its notions of individual choice. She ties this philosophical weakness to the character of the British state, arguing that what was notable about the British public sector was its disinterest in child care. The public provision of child care, in its multiple forms, was divided between two basic institutions; for the "under threes," it was the Department of Health, and for the "over threes," it was the Department of Education. Both institutions competed to capture the preschool agenda but did very little with it, once it was under their control. For Randall, this was not just a case of non-decision making spread over two decades but also an articulation of a patriarchal ideology, which remained unchallenged whether Conservatives or Labour were in power. When child-care problems did arise on the political agenda, these institutions shifted the onus onto one another or to some other body (often local government), which was ill resourced to deal with the issue.

In a quite ingenious manner, Randall then notes that in each of the moves between governments, there is a certain tragicomedy about the politics of child care in Britain. For instance, in the mid-1970s just when child care was finding political voice and agency through the women's movement, trade unions, and the Left of the Labour Party, it was swept aside by Thatcher's neoliberal agenda. The Thatcher revolution with its pro-family focus and rhetoric of small government stifled the demand for public child care. Under a wide-ranging assault, the women's movement went on the defensive, resisting government attacks on equal opportunity, the right to choose, and other inspirational political issues, but at the expense of child-care reform. Moreover, the childcare lobby groups were fragmented and divided in their response to the government's contradictory agenda. Ironically, the Thatcher revolution proved positive for child care in that it destabilized Whitehall's staid incrementalism. As a consequence, the child-care agenda became more open to change from both inside and outside the bureaucracy.

Under John Major, this open agenda took a particular, if not borrowed, form. Following the United States, the issue of child care was linked to the supposed moral problem of lone mothers and the need for employment programs to break their economic dependency on welfare. To suppress the alleged appeal of social security benefits, single mothers were encouraged (pressured) to use child care as a means by which they could enter the workforce. Notwithstanding the ideological premise on which this moral anxiety was built, it did at least raise the economic link between motherhood and choice. It was this link that Tony Blair made part of his 1997 election manifesto, where child care was given a high priority as a part of his program for modernizing the British welfare state (p. 188). Nevertheless, Randall is somewhat skeptical of the Blair reforms, which she sees as big on rhetoric but short on substance.

To reinforce the argument that Britain was a laggard nation in regard to child care, Randall presents a cross-country comparison of child-care policies, in which she compares Britain against Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, Sweden, West Germany, and France. The comparison is conducted at a variety of levels, including an examination of the dominant ideologies of the respective countries and the provisions of child care and primary education, to the place of women in society, and to the overall policy agendas and institutions of the countries under examination. Randall concludes that the best explanation for the differences in child-care provisions is to be found in the linkages among philosophy, policy legacies, and institutional frameworks.

Although this book is a tour de force, it is important to note a few minor quibbles about its methodology and approach. While the analysis is aware of discourse theory, it is remiss that Michael Foucault's perspective on discourse is not discussed, as it would have reinforced the book's arguments on institutional impediments to change. Similarly, while the historic account is replete with cultural references, these are not related to any cultural theory per se. Such an awareness would have assisted in the explanation of the dominance of the male breadwinner model in Britain and of the attraction of feminists to media-grabbing issues, rather than motherhood and child care. Finally, the cross-country analysis contained some minor errors; it was Bob (not Bill) Hawke who led the Australian Labor (not Labour) party in 1983, and who oversaw the expansion of child-care funding, which in the end came at the expense of the community-based childcare sector.

In sum, this book is an outstanding achievement, dealing with a much-neglected subject, revealing how the provision of child care offers an exemplary case study not just of institutional and governmental politics but also of the detrimental affects of the combination of liberalism and patriarchy. Last but not least, the analysis is an adroit critique of public policy theory, with Randall taking to task traditional institutional analysis, network and community theory, and various policy typology models, showing how all fail to explain the peculiarity of child-care policy in Britain.

The Tragedy of Russia's Reforms: Market Bolshevism Against Democracy. By Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2001. 768p. \$55.00 cloth, \$29.95 paper.

Darrell Slider, University of South Florida

The fate of Russia's economic and political reforms is the subject of this interpretative history of the last years of the Soviet Union and the Yeltsin period, The book provides a useful, if controversial, introduction to the events of this crucial period in Russian political development, from 1990 to 1999. Special attention is given to the events surrounding important turning points in Russian history; there are particularly detailed treatments of the August 1991 coup, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Boris Yeltsin's forcible disbanding of the parliament in October 1993. In the end, though, the large number of events the authors seek to analyze is a liability because it tends to detract from and dilute the main argument.

That argument is centered on the critical decisions made in 1991–92 about economic reform and its accompanying political strategy. Peter Reddaway and Dmitri Glinski offer an insightful analysis of the choice of reform strategy and the impact this had on subsequent developments. The consequences are not in dispute: hyperinflation in the early years, a depression-like decline in Russian output, the impoverishment of the nascent Soviet middle class, the appearance of big-business "oligarchs" and mafia groupings, the rise to economic dominance of the communist-era nomenklatura, rampant corruption, popular disenchantment with politics and

a decline in civic activism, and a breakdown of the socialsupport mechanisms that had been one of the strengths of the Soviet system.

The blame for this turn of events is placed primarily on Yeltsin and his chief political and economic advisers. Western leaders, the International Monetary Fund, and particularly Western economists are also accused of encouraging Russian leaders to follow an inhumane set of policies. The overall reform strategy, generally in line with what has come to be known as the Washington Consensus or "shock therapy," emphasized monetarist approaches, price deregulation, rapid privatization of industry, and the end of government-provided subsidies and social safety nets. One of the most important contributions of the book is its explication of the behind-the-scenes political maneuvering that produced the reform strategy. Especially useful are the insights on the various protoparties and political movements that struggled to establish a political foothold in the chaotic developments of the period. Reddaway and Glinski coin the term "market bolshevism" to describe the political mindset of the winners—the political figures such as Anatoly Chubais who implemented shock therapy—a disregard for public opinion and a manipulative approach that manufactured mass support only when absolutely necessary, as during Yeltsin's bid for reelection in 1996.

This is a book that provides an overabundance of detail, and almost no evidence relevant to its main thesis is overlooked. Some of the evidence that contradicts the thesis is perhaps dismissed too readily, however. The authors view the period of shock therapy as having lasted seven years, rejecting arguments by reform defenders that the Yeltsin government quickly backtracked and that compromises made because of political weakness undermined the foundations of many of the reforms. Instead, Reddaway and Glinski present this "seesaw" approach as the intended strategy. Further, a number of phenomena—such as the rise of criminal mafias—that were presumably unanticipated consequences of the policy choices made are presented as if they were part and parcel of the reformers' strategy.

The authors present alternative paths as real options, although they seem beyond what was possible in Russia at the end of the 1980s, beginning of the 1990s. Popular discontent a "grassroots anti-nomenklatura upsurge" (p. 253)—that supposedly could have been mobilized into a movement in support of another kind of reform did not appear to have the kind of usable potential that the authors suggest. In order to tap this presumed source of support, the authors argue that Yeltsin should have relied more on the nascent democratic movement. In particular, they favor the nationaldemocratic wing, such political figures as Sergei Baburin and Oleg Rumiantsev. In the early 1990s, these figures were marginalized politically, and they joined the opposition that conspired to seize power in October 1993. Reddaway and Glinski also side with opposition economists such as Sergei Glaziev, who has long advocated an economic strategy based on government support of key industries and strong social programs for the victims of reforms.

There is an unfortunate tendency in some of the analysis to relay as evidence conjecture and conspiracy theories that figure so prominently in the Russian media. For example, the shortages of consumer goods in the late Soviet period are viewed not as evidence of the collapse of the previous system but as a pressure tactic by wholesale traders to wrest control from the state over this sector. In discussing the events of October 1993, when the anti-Yeltsin opposition in parliament launched a violent attempt to seize the mayor's office, television facilities, and other centers of power, the authors use speculative and dubious accounts to suggest that the violence

was deliberately facilitated by Yeltsin's security forces. The goal was to justify the later use of tanks against the parliament in support of Yeltsin's ultimate purpose, "the destruction of Russia's parliamentarism for the sake of increasing his personal power" (p. 429). The authors find it plausible that the 1999 incursion by Chechen rebels in Dagestan was provoked by the Russian security forces (headed at the time by Vladimir Putin) in order to provide an excuse to start a new war in Chechnya.

Overall, though, despite its weaknesses and occasional lapses, Reddaway and Glinski's account provides an extraordinary wealth of information on the twists and turns of Russian politics during this formative period.

Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management. By Benjamin Reilly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. 232p. \$60.00 cloth, \$22.00 paper.

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Benjamin Reilly makes an important contribution to the debate on the appropriate institutional design of electoral systems for mitigating conflict and sustaining democracy in ethnically plural societies. The dominant position in this debate posits the importance of proportional representation (PR) systems. An alternative position, less widely accepted largely because of an ostensible absence of empirical examples, posits the importance of majoritarian preferential systems that encourage cross-ethnic vote pooling. Reilly extends this debate by drawing on heretofore unknown or understudied cases to examine the operation of both majoritarian (the alternative vote or AV and the supplementary vote or SV) and proportional (single-transferable vote or STV) preferential systems in different social contexts and in different elections (legislative and presidential).

The book's central argument is that, unlike the elite-based PR systems, preferential systems privilege the decisions of voters as the source of cross-ethnic vote swapping, forcing otherwise rational candidates to forgo ethnic outbidding in favor of seeking votes across ethnic cleavages. The argument turns on the notion of "centripetalism," which, for Reilly, refers to a "normative theory of institutional design" that seeks to 1) create electoral incentives for politicians to campaign for votes across ethnic cleavages, 2) establish arenas of bargaining for ethnic elites to transfer the lessons from electoral bargains to other political issues, and 3) foster centrist and aggregative multiethnic political parties instead of extremist and exclusively ethnic ones (p. 11).

Eschewing systematic theory testing, Reilly uses this normative theory as a loose framework to evaluate the performance of preferential systems in all cases (except Malta) that are known to have utilized them. Bracketing the case studies are an informative overview of the development of preferential voting systems from their origins in attempts in the nineteenth century to overcome the intrinsic weaknesses of majority runoff elections (Chapter 2) and a useful discussion of the technical variations in the institutional designs of such systems that also highlights the unexpected consequences of minor technical modifications in institutional design (Chapter 7).

The book's initial focus on Australia is useful, and not only because it has developed and refined all variants of preferential systems in national and subnational elections for almost a century. As an ethnically diverse but not an ethnically divided society (p. 25), it also serves as a controlled case for illustrating the advantages of preferential systems in achieving the three centripetal objectives. The fascinating case of Papua

New Guinea provides the clearest and strongest support for AV. One of the world's most ethnically fragmented societies, Papua New Guinea used AV in three elections between 1964 and 1972 to mitigate conflicts through cross-ethnic vote swapping negotiated by candidates who campaigned together among each other's ethnic groups, seeking second-preference votes on the correct calculation that rational voters would give their first preference to candidates from their own ethnic groups. The adoption of "first past the post" (FPTP) after independence in 1975 reinforced the advantage of AV, as the new FPTP system created severe cross-ethnic coordination problems, encouraging the entry of large numbers of candidates, with corresponding decline in winning vote ratios and increase in election-induced ethnic violence. The 1998 assembly election in Northern Ireland, held under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement, provides the clearest and strongest support for STV. In that election, STV helped, through vote transfers, to neutralize extremist sectarian parties and elect pro-agreement, centrist parties from each side of the otherwise deeply divided ethnic cleavages.

Fiji and Sri Lanka, however, provide weak support for the claimed effectiveness of preferential designs. In Fiji, where indigenous Fijians and Indo-Fijians have roughly equal population ratios but are otherwise ethnically, economically, and politically divided, the use of a partially engineered AV system in one parliamentary election produced limited preelectoral cross-ethnic vote-swapping agreements among erstwhile "monoethnic" parties. But the election results un-dercut even these limited agreements. In Sri Lanka, the use of SV in four presidential elections between 1982 and 1999 failed to counteract the overwhelming Sinhalese population advantage (74%) over Tamils (18%) and Muslims (7%), leading always to the election of Sinhalese candidates by an absolute majority of first-preference votes. A number of factors related to contextual variations and technical modifications in institutional design are adduced in an ad hoc manner to account for these differences between institutional expectations and electoral outcomes.

Beyond these major cases, the book also contains brief, informative discussions of the failed attempts to adopt AV in the United Kingdom, the one-time use of STV in Estonia's transitional election in 1990, the potential advantage of AV in the election of Bosnia-Herzegovina's tripartite presidency (an option that was considered but not implemented for the presidential elections there in October 2002), and the use of various preferential systems in several subnational elections in the United States and Canada.

The book does not systematically account for the mixed results from the major cases, exposing the analytical weakness of the "electoral engineering" approach. For instance, perhaps the most important insight of the book, which is found only in the last few pages (pp. 185–192), concerns the significance of two aspects of ethnic group demographics—fragmentation and concentration—in mediating the expected impact of preferential designs. With respect to fragmentation, ethnically heterogeneous districts are considered to be "the single most important demographic precondition for centripetal strategies to work effectively" (p. 185). Group concentration, on the other hand, creates ethnically homogeneous electoral districts, rendering the use of vote pooling highly problematic.

Reilly wisely uses these demographic variations to caution against a cookie-cutter approach to electoral engineering. Curiously, however, he does not systematically examine the implications of these variations in the case studies, even though ethnically heterogeneous districts are commonplace in Papua New Guinea and ethnically concentrated districts presumably exist in Northern Ireland, the two cases that pro-

vide unambiguous support for preferential systems. Also left unexamined is the failure of AV to produce the expected results in Fiji, where the ethnic group demographic (dispersion and geographic intermixing) is also considered favorable for the effectiveness of the design (p. 187). Examination of these issues requires a more rigorous analytical approach than allowed by the normative electoral engineering approach. It especially requires the use of quantitative techniques such as regression analysis to clarify the independent, additive, and interactive effects of institutional design and context on electoral outcomes. The two approaches, however, are not mutually exclusive. Quantitative analysis provides the systematic knowledge and understanding of the relative effects of institution and context that are necessary for realizing the prescriptive aspirations of the electoral engineering approach.

Reilly's book, therefore, does not close the debate on the appropriate institutional design of electoral systems for managing ethnic conflicts. But its coherent and convincing arguments in favor of preferential systems, and especially its coverage of heretofore unfamiliar and understudied cases that have employed them, advance and enrich it.

Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food. By Michael G. Schatzberg. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. 292p. \$49.95 cloth, \$22.95 paper.

Robert Fatton, Jr., University of Virginia

Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa is an insightful, refreshing, and original book that refines and expands our understanding of the so-called "politics of the belly." A phrase made famous by Jean Francois Bayart (The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, 1993), the politics of the belly is the phenomenon of "eating" the fruits of power. The extent to which officeholders monopolize or share these fruits with the larger community has, however, significant consequences for their legitimacy. As Michael Schatzberg suggests, a "moral matrix of legitimate governance" (p. 35) embedded in familial and paternal metaphors shapes these belly politics. In turn, he argues that the moral matrix is rooted in four major premises. The first and second are related to the image of the ruler as a "fatherchief," who has the obligation, on the one hand, to nurture and nourish his "family," and on the other hand, to punish his "children" when necessary and pardon them when they truly repent. The third premise concerns the status of women in society; while they are not considered equal to men, rulers should, nonetheless, respect their role as "counselors and advisers." The fourth premise "holds that permanent power is illegitimate and that political fathers... have to let their children grow up, mature, take on ever-increasing responsibilities in the conduct of their own affairs, and eventually succeed them in power" (p. 192).

Governments that respect these four moral premises are not necessarily democratic, but they enjoy legitimacy and thus will endure; neither the ballot nor the bullet is likely to overthrow them. When the "father-chief" "eats" within limits and guarantees his "family" access to food, while both knowing that his power is not eternal and listening to his "wives" and "daughters," he will win popular support. To that extent, Africans will be satisfied with a regime that responds to their own norms of accountability and legitimacy. These norms correspond to what Schatzberg calls "thinkability." Thinkability is not simply "that which is politically thinkable" but is also, in Schatzberg's eyes, legitimacy itself. Moreover, the author contends, legitimacy can be apprehended through an exhaustive study of the "mainstream political discourse" (p. 32).

Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa seeks to uncover this discourse by systematically examining daily state newspapers,

weekly magazines, primary documents, presidential speeches, and church and political documents of eight African nations—Senegal, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Cameroon, Congo/Zaire, Kenya, and Tanzania. In Schatzberg's view, this exploration leads to an understanding of what is and is not thinkable in Middle Africa; it provides the area's moral matrix of governance. In this sense, the book revives the neglected study of the role of ideas and language in the making and unmaking of regimes. It reemphasizes the significance of political culture as a lens that can illuminate the social land-scape. While the author argues for the specificity of historical circumstances and their decisive impact on the formation of moral matrixes, he does not claim that Middle Africa is unique.

In fact, Schatzberg contends that all societies have moral matrixes, but the substance and significance of their constituent elements vary depending on their respective histories. So, for instance, the metaphors of the ruler as "father" and society as a "family" are widespread in both industrial and developing nations. What differs, however, is their ideological pervasiveness; in other words, what is thinkable in one place may not be thinkable in another. Thus, people operate under diverse sorts of hegemonies and explain their world with distinct logics. As the author puts it: "Depending on time, place, and context, it is quite conceivable that some societies will share certain premises of a matrix while not sharing others" (p. 32).

Moreover, Middle Africans use their own specific means of understanding and shaping their existential conditions. Like any other people, they avail themselves of multiple methods to influence events and ultimately believe in different and indeed contradictory modes of causality. Depending on circumstances and objectives, they may resort to modern "rational" science while simultaneously appealing to the powers of the occult and sorcery. Middle Africans are certainly not the only ones making use of these multiple and often inconsistent forms of explaining and shaping social reality. As Schatzberg points out correctly: "Reliance on alternative understandings of causality may be quite universal" (p. 205). After all, under Ronald Reagan's presidency, astrology played a decisive role in the day-to-day running of the White House (p. 116).

Thus, Schatzberg is fully cognizant that certain basic political phenomena transcend place and time, but he warns us against assuming the universality of basic Western theoretical concepts. While one can compare and generalize, it is crucial to elucidate that which is historically specific. The conventional assumptions of American political scientists about the separation of church and state, and state and civil society, simply do not hold in Middle Africa. There, the parameters of politics derived from the Western experience are only partially, if at all, duplicated. According to Schatzberg, it becomes exceedingly difficult to draw neat analytical boundaries around politics, religion, sport, and labor because Middle Africa's governability is rooted in the ubiquity of paternal and familial forms.

This book is therefore a formidable challenge to the prevailing conventional wisdom; it shows the limits of current and dominant paradigms on democratization and civil society. It reestablishes the centrality and primacy of legitimacy as the critical "first step" in the establishment of any accountable regime. "Democratic" constitutions may be codified, elections may be free and fair, but they do not suffice; they are empty shells without the substance of legitimacy.

Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa is thus a major point of departure. One may wonder, however, whether Schatzberg's dependence on the "mainstream political discourse" to define "thinkability" and indeed legitimacy does not silence the hidden voices of subaltern groups and classes.

In other words, Schatzberg's moral matrix privileges what James C. Scott (*Domination and the Arts of Resistance*, 1990) has termed the "public transcript," that is, the common wisdom of rulers and dominant classes, and neglects the "hidden transcript" of the victims of power. A full understanding of the moral matrix of governance requires, therefore, a systematic study of "infrapolitics," the rather opaque and "unobtrusive realm of political struggle."

Schatzberg has written an important volume that will become indispensable to understanding contemporary African politics. While one may quibble with the author over particular interpretations, there is little doubt that this is a major book. Rich in detail, subtle in its investigation, and broad ranging in its theoretical and comparative scope, the book addresses challenging questions and provides provocative answers. It is essential reading for any serious student of comparative politics.

The Outsider: Prejudice and Politics in Italy. By Paul M. Sniderman, Pierangelo Peri, Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Thomas Piazza. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000. 218p. \$29.95.

## Harlan Koff, Duke University

The Outsider is a study of prejudicial attitudes toward migrants in Italy. The book contributes to the study of public reactions to non-European Union immigration because it statistically analyzes opinions that are usually addressed descriptively. Moreover, the work correctly studies the interaction between individual and social responses to migration. However, the overall contribution of this book to the comparative literature on xenophobia in Europe is limited by serious theoretical and methodological flaws.

The authors of *The Outsider* begin with two research questions: 1) Does race hold distinctive status in marking others as outsiders? and 2) What is the relationship between the psychological roots of prejudice and group competition for resources? In order to carry out these tasks, a telephone survey, including 4,558 interviews, was conducted to ascertain opinions regarding non-EU nationals as well as the North-South divide, which is a major characteristic of the Italian political culture. This latter aspect of the survey was utilized as a means for comparing group categorization in Italy and formulating a general theory of prejudice.

The authors constructed this survey on the incorrect assumption (which they admit) that race is the fundamental element of prejudice. They expected to find that "All, because they are immigrants, will bear the burden of intolerance, but those who are black, by virtue of being black, must bear a heavier burden still" (p. 15). This notion has been refuted in the recent literature on xenophobia in Europe (e.g., see Michel Wieviorka, *The Arenas of Racism*, 1995).

The authors show that intolerance to immigrants is prevalent within mainstream Italian society. Statistical analysis illustrates a reluctance to make positive remarks about migrants and a readiness to make negative ones. However, even though many of those interviewed demonstrated a willingness to criticize immigrants, the number of participants who agreed that migrants are "by nature inferior" was limited to 15%. The authors accurately argue that the interpretation of this result is open to discussion due to contemporary institutional and normative contexts. Nonetheless, it does show that classical discussions of racial superiority are not the most significant basis of prejudicial attitudes within Italian society. This refutes the study's initial hypothesis. The authors also questioned participants on their views regarding distinct racial categories, defined as "North African," "Central

African," and "East European." Their tables, which compare responses based on descriptive statistics and factor analysis, clearly indicate that race does not affect intolerance. In fact, the group most harshly judged in the survey was the East European category. This confirms the results of numerous qualitative studies that have stated that Albanians and Gypsies are the most ostracized ethnic groups in Italy.

Another strength of this study is the proposed definition of prejudice. According to the authors, "Definitions are tools. In gauging their value, the crucial question to ask is not about their validity but their utility" (p. 19). They base their definition of prejudice on the concept of consistency: "The more consistently one attributes negative characteristics, or alternatively, declines to attribute positive characteristics to a group, the more prejudiced he or she is" (p. 25). This definition allows the authors to create a scale of prejudice and evaluate whether intolerance is a mainstream or marginal value in Italy.

The authors also examine the roots of Italian intolerance through what they call "the Two Flavors approach." This combines both the inherent psychological roots of prejudice, which are proposed in normative studies, and the rational roots of conflict based on material competition (e.g., see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 1985, for descriptions of both approaches). While statistical tests do not completely validate the Two Flavors approach, the authors correctly argue that research on prejudice should not be marked by a clash of these competing perspectives. By attempting to reconcile them, the authors open an interesting avenue for future research on the relationship of these factors.

Despite these strengths, there are numerous concerns that detract from the book's overall contribution to the study of intolerance. The first regards analysis of the Italian case. Even though the authors correctly identify regional differences as a fundamental trait of Italian political culture, they utilize the state as the unit of analysis. Recent studies of public reactions to migration in Italy have shown significant variance between attitudes in the North, Center, and South (e.g., see Fondazione Nord-Est, *Immigrazione e cittadinanza in Europa*, in *Migrazioni: Scenari per il XXI secolo*, 2000, and Censis, *Le Paure degli Italiani*, 2001). Given socioeconomic and cultural divergences that exist at the regional level, this variance is fundamental to understanding the relationship between normative and rational roots of intolerance.

In addition, the ability to generalize the results of this research project is limited because Italy is hardly a critical case among European countries. It does satisfy the two conditions presented by the authors regarding the study of intolerance: the significant presence of prejudicial attitudes and at least one radical right party. However, given the declared objective of analyzing the role of race in the formation of prejudicial attitudes in contemporary Europe, the choice of Italy does not seem logical. Unlike France, Britain, Spain, Belgium, and so on, colonialism was never a major factor in the formation of public attitudes regarding immigrants. This element of historical development must be considered because it is so closely linked to psychological notions of racial superiority. In this sense, Italy is an outlier rather than a typical case.

Finally, the authors analyze the impact of intolerance on contemporary Italian party politics. They correctly argue that migration has become a salient issue that has contributed to the success of right-wing parties. The discussion of public attitudes and institutions, though, remains incomplete. There is no mention of mechanisms that fundamentally impact the formation of public views regarding migrant groups. Parties do not merely reflect intolerant positions; they also contribute to their formation. Moreover, many scholars have studied

the negative coverage that most Italian newspapers give to migration issues. Such mechanisms (e.g., media) need to be discussed in any study of public responses to migration. For these reasons, *The Outsider* addresses many questions regarding the nature of European prejudice and intolerance, but the answers it provides are incomplete.

Environmental Leadership in Developing Countries: Transnational Relations and Biodiversity Policy in Costa Rica and Bolivia. By Paul F. Steinberg. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001. 280p. \$65.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Pamela Stricker, California State University, San Marcos

Much of the literature on environmental policymaking in the Global South focuses on the role of transnational linkages, wherein ideas regarding environmental management are transplanted by intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations in the North to governments in the South. The perception that environmental management concepts are primarily transferred in this way stems in part from the resonance that Ronald Inglehart's work on postmaterialist societies and environmental activism has had on the field, as well as a paucity of studies examining the dynamics of the domestic political players in the creation of natural resource management policies in the South. Paul Steinberg's work, Environmental Leadership in Developing Countries, addresses this particular puzzle and takes on the too-oft accepted notion that domestic policy entrepreneurs play a small supporting role at best in bringing about environmental policies in the Global South.

Using a most different comparative case study based on participant interviews, archival research, and content analysis of leading Costa Rican and Bolivian newspapers, Steinberg reveals the efforts of such domestic players in the development of policy cultures around environmental ideas that impact the creation of conservation policies. He introduces the concept of bilateral activists to describe how activists seamlessly transcend borders and settings, moving freely between national and international meetings, speaking multiple languages, relying on knowledge of policy-making processes and international assistance programs, and possessing the talent to create and nurture professional, political, and financial relationships with potential allies abroad. These bilateral activists emerge at the intersection of John Kingdon's policy entrepreneurs and Peter Haas's epistemic communities working within E. E. Schattschneider's ideational context, armed with the political savvy to leap over domestic political landmines and in through windows of opportunity.

As the responsibility for solving domestic environmental problems falls largely within the realm of the nation-state, Steinberg's work directly takes on the premise that given the often crushing weight of poverty and foreign debt, most nations of the Global South opt to utilize the natural resource base in order to attempt to provide for their population's needs, as well as to create goods for sale in the global market, rather than engage in debates over environmental conservation. Steinberg draws upon polls conducted by Riley Dunlap and Gallup (1993) as well as Lewis Harris, which demonstrate that peoples from the Global South have high levels of concern about the environment, to situate his argument on the two cases. Further, when compared with per capita levels of GNP, environmental concern is ranked higher by peoples from poor countries than those in industrialized nations in 8 of 11 measures (p. 37). This finding was repeated in another poll (Kidd and Lee, 1997), which found that peoples in poorer countries were also more willing to pay

(via income or increased taxes) to prevent pollution than were their compatriots in the more affluent industrialized world (p. 40).

From these findings, Steinberg delves into the content analysis on both nations to establish whether this ideational component shaped the policy culture within which these bilateral activists could work. Both Costa Rican and Bolivians citizens first embraced what he terms "proto-environmental" attitudes in response to questions of national sovereignty as opposed to foreign control of the nation's natural resource base (p. 105).

To make his point on the efficaciousness of bilateral activists, Steinberg takes the reader through four aspects of domestic resources: political learning, agenda setting resources, networks of social influence, and process expertise. He succeeds quite nicely by demonstrating in the Costa Rican case that government officials set the environmental policy agenda that in turn spurred a groundswell of green sentiment from the populace. In the Bolivian case, we see the policy come about in a different order; environmental nongovernmental organizations set the environmental agenda, defining issues and setting forth priorities, which later would be addressed by government. In the process, however, some activists, such as Bolivian naturalist Noel Kempff, lost their lives fighting to preserve the natural world.

But not all activists were included in the dialogue in Bolivia. Indigenous peoples, typically marginalized by political and economic elites, were left out of initial environmental protection debates; later, common ground was forged by environmental activists and the indigenous peoples when the latter began linking self-determination arguments to environmental concerns (pp. 115-16). Steinberg's discussion of the development of Thomas Lovejoy's debt-for-nature swaps in Bolivia is another reason this text is quite useful for comparative environmental policy seminars. While details of Costa Rica's environmental history are generally more widely known, the chapter is still quite fresh with segments on former President José María Figueres's announcement that sustainable development would guide his environmental policy and on the complicated stories of national park development.

The only shortcoming in the text is a small unanswered question. Steinberg says he chose his cases on the basis of temporal variability on policy outcomes (within the most-different-systems approach), yet he does not fully explain why the outcome—policy changes—occurred in a different order. Perhaps it is linked to features within the different systems, but he does not say so.

Yet despite that small shortcoming, which arguably is a difficult question to answer, the final outcome was quite similar and the results do show that in both cases, bilateral activists play an exceedingly (and in the literature, quite overlooked) significant role. Further, he has done a wonderful job of reconstructing how these policy cultures developed in the nations and how these policy activists were able to foster the creation of such policies. In doing so, he makes an important contribution to the literature in comparative environmental policymaking. The text also analyzes environmental policy successes (in contrast to failures), which have been understudied in both comparative politics and comparative policymaking. Through this work, Steinberg has clearly laid to rest the somewhat condescending notion that only policy entrepreneurs from the environmentally privileged North can "help" nations of the Global South to protect their natural resource base and demonstrated that poverty does not necessarily cloud one's desire to preserve the natural world.

Abortion Politics, Women's Movements and the Democratic State: A Comparative Study of State Feminism. Edited by Dorothy McBride Stetson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 380p. \$72.00 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Sheila Shaver, University of New South Wales

This book deals with the politics of abortion and abortion law reform as they have developed in 11 countries of Western Europe and North America during the period of the women's movement's second wave. The stories that are told vary a good deal, even among countries apparently similar in religious composition, political tradition, and legal culture. They include the early and comparatively uncontroversial move to allow abortion on grounds of the mother's physical or mental health in Great Britain, more radical reform in the Netherlands making early abortion available on demand, and the continuing division in Ireland where judicial affirmation of a woman's right to travel outside the country must be counted a win. It is an interesting and worthwhile book for this alone.

The primary focus of the book is not, however, on abortion per se but on the political forces and relations shaping abortion law reform. Dorothy McBride Stetson and her colleagues are interested in the contribution of "state feminism"—women's policy units established within the state—to the achievement of the women's movement goals, and the conditions under which feminists working "inside" the state can have greatest effect. Abortion serves here as empirical material for a systematic exercise in theory construction and hypothesis testing. The book is a formidable achievement in these terms. It is empirically detailed, methodologically rigorous, and fruitful in informing social movement theory.

The study is part of a larger project, in which Stetson's Comparative State Feminism (edited with Amy Mazur, 1995), focusing on equal opportunity policy, was the first installment. It is to be one of three studies of women's policy areas, the others focusing on job training (State Feminism, Women's Movements, and Job Training Policy in the Global Economy, Amy Mazur, ed., 2001) and on prostitution and traffic in women. As such, the 11 country studies making up the present volume have been conducted on a standardized template framed for the purposes of the overarching theoretical inquiry. The countries included in the project represent most of Western Europe, though unfortunately not Scandinavia or Finland, and North America; their representation of advanced industrial democracies is weakened by not including Japan or Australasia.

The first chapter sets out the framework structuring the national studies and defines variables that are used. The comparative strategy underlying the research design relies less on the comparison of countries than on political issues and decisions, with the author of each national study selecting three specific debates as representative of the political decision-making arenas and decisive events in the history of abortion politics over the period. This temporal element gives the research a longitudinal dimension, enabling it to track the succession of political events and the rise and waning of women's movements in each country. As a result, there are 32 "debates" in national sequences of three (only two were included in the case of Spain). For each debate, authors discuss and classify the characteristics of the women's movement and its impact, women's policy agencies, the framing of the debate, policy outcomes, and the characteristics of the policy environment.

The final chapter addresses the meaning and character of these debates in terms of five hypotheses: 1) that women's movements have been successful both in influencing the content of policy and in gaining participation in policymaking processes; 2) that these movements have been more successful where women's policy agencies have acted as insiders in the policymaking process; 3) that the resources and institutional capacity available to women's policy agencies matter for their ability to link women's movements and policymakers; 4) that the characteristics of the women's movement and policy environments matter; and 5) that equally effective linkages between women's movements and state responses will not be made in the absence of women's policy agencies.

The evidence is more conclusive on some points than others. Generally, it is suggested that women's movements were successful in more instances than not, with that success growing as the abortion issue itself continued in debate. Such success was greater where women's policy agencies had been able to act as an insider in the policymaking process, and was lesser in those cases where agencies had only a symbolic presence. In general, women's policy agencies tended to be remote from power and low in resources. The nature of their mandate appears to matter more directly than resources in their capacity to confer insider status on women's movement forces. The most important aspect of the women's movement in gaining insider status was its closeness to left-wing parties and the political strength of those parties. The unity of the women's movement and the priority it gave to the abortion issue were also very important. Except in closed policy environments, women's policy agencies do appear to be necessary to the movement's success in influencing the content of policy and gaining participation in policymaking processes.

These findings are of considerable interest and significance. I was disappointed, then, that the book does not do more to situate and develop them in the social movement and policy literatures. The inquiry itself is not situated by means of a literature review, and its findings are not put in context with respect to social movement theory or the findings of other empirical studies. As a result, the book reports the conduct and findings of a rigorous empirical study, but treats the implications of this inquiry for its own and related fields as self-evident.

The tight focus of the book leaves little room for exploring a range of other issues about abortion access and the politics of abortion law reform. A number of such issues are threaded through its pages and the national political histories they contain. One of these is the gap between formal access to abortion and the effectiveness of access in the face of economic, institutional, and other barriers. The 11 country accounts show considerable variety in the accessibility of abortion services and the institutional route a woman must follow to secure them. Medical gatekeeping is more important in some countries than others, and has been a central point at issue in women's movement struggles throughout the period of abortion law reform. (Paradoxically, it was also doctors, many of them male, who pioneered the establishment of free-standing abortion clinics and broke the power of medical control institutionalized in hospital settings.) Similarly, the effective accessibility of abortion depends a good deal on the nature of a nation's health-care system and its coverage of the costs. For women in Ireland, and also in much of the nonmetropolitan United States, the cost of travel is a significant extra burden. The gap between a civil right to abortion in the sense of legal entitlement to abortion in approved circumstances and a social right to abortion independent of income is a political as much as a personal issue. Another recent comparative study of abortion politics (Julia S. O'Connor, Ann Shola Orloff, and Sheila Shaver, States, Markets, Families, 1999) showed that social rights to abortion are weaker in the United States and Canada, where first-trimester abortion has had judicial recognition as a right of the woman and where there are strong movements in opposition to it in the legislatures, than in Britain and Australia where it has been routinized as a form of medical care under the protection of medical professional interests.

Similarly, the tight structure of the book makes it difficult to see connections among the politics of abortion reform in different countries. There is, for example, little opportunity to see the impact of an event such as the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Roe v. Wade* on abortion politics in other countries. Equally, it is unclear whether the European Union provided a vehicle for European policy agencies to work together, or to promote policy borrowing from one country to another. These are small complaints in a book that is a fine research achievement.

The Origins of Nonliberal Capitalism: Germany and Japan in Comparison. Edited by Wolfgang Streeck and Kozo Yamamura. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 304p. \$45.00 cloth.

Richard Deeg, Temple University

Motivated originally by a concern for the future of the German and Japanese economic models, the authors in this volume actually probe the origins and evolution of these two varieties of nonliberal capitalism. German and Japanese capitalism is nonliberal in that the economies of these countries are more socially and politically regulated than are their Anglo-American counterparts. Markets are also more "embedded" to the degree that economic transactions are also constrained to serve noneconomic objectives, such as social cohesion, or are supported by noneconomic social ties. Embeddedness, it is argued, creates higher levels of "committed labor" and "patient capital" and thus a long-term focus (and cooperation based on loyalty and trust) in economic relations among actors. One of the more intriguing findings of the volume is that formally, very different institutions generate functionally equivalent outcomes and systemic logics across the two cases.

The similar national paths of Germany and Japan are traced to a common starting condition in the late nineteenth century: In both, industrialization preceded democratization, and each had fairly strong and autonomous state elites who sought to build a market order while preserving social stability by granting social (in lieu of political) rights to selected groups. However, influenced by different cultures and institutional legacies, the two nations diverged in how these groups were incorporated into the emerging socioeconomic order. In Germany, they were typically brought in via corporatist arrangements between associations and the state. Japan, on the other hand, drew on the cultural idea of *ie* (family-like community) and the large firm became the key organizational locus of the modern political economy.

The contribution by Gerhard Lehmbruch explores the origins, evolution, and impact of the ideas that shaped each capitalism. He argues that in societies there are competing discourses and that usually one is hegemonic. This, in turn, supports the formation of institutions that follow its logic. Interestingly, he argues that in the midnineteenth century, German and Meiji elites—the latter influenced by the thinking of the former—were quite enamored with liberalism. Yet in both nations, a nonliberal discourse became hegemonic in the late nineteenth century. Subsequent crises presented challenges to this discourse, but it survived through adaptation.

Like Lehmbruch, Philip Manow sees the beliefs and actions of bureaucratic elites as crucial to the process of welfare state formation. Both nations developed nonliberal welfare regimes by first extending social rights to the skilled and employed (male) workers. They differed in that Germany

developed a corporatist pattern in which functional groups (unions and employer associations) came to play key roles in administering welfare state policies. Different conditions in Japan led the state to foster the internalization of the welfare regime within large firms. In a final argument, Manow stands the conventional view on its head by arguing that the nonliberal welfare regimes actually facilitated the emergence of labor relations regimes based on trust-based, long-term production (rather than the other way around).

Gregory Jackson explores the corporate governance regime of each nation and finds them functionally similar in that both command long-term commitment from providers of capital and labor. They achieve this through a combination of a closed ownership structure of large firms and a bank-based financial system—which precludes a market for corporate control and thus makes long-term commitments by management and capital possible—and a regime of 'industrial citizenship' that makes participation of labor in management possible. Jackson uses the idea of coevolution to explain how the two subsystems—property rights and industrial relations—gradually came to "fit together" to form these distinctive corporate governance regimes.

Sigurt Vitols analyzes the bank-based financial systems. Contrary to the common perception, he argues that both nations had liberal banking regimes before the 1930s. It was only in their responses to the banking crises of the late 1920s and early 1930s that these nations turned toward more interventionism and favored banks over equity markets in order to use the former to serve their respective national policy goals. The postwar preeminence of banks was furthered by the relatively higher income equality and absence of private pension systems in Germany and Japan, which meant that savings flowed to a much greater degree into the banking system than into the market.

The final contribution by Kathleen Thelen and Ikuo Kume analyzes how each nation found a different way to overcome the endemic collective-action problem of skill formation; that is, if left to markets alone, employers will underinvest in worker skills because worker mobility means that they cannot capture sufficient returns. The German solution came to be based on "solidarism" in which occupational groups that cut across firms were linked to the state. The collective-action problem was overcome because all firms bear the costs of training in an open external labor market. Japan's solution was "segmentalist," relying on social cohesion within the firm and creating internal labor markets through lifetime employment and related mechanisms.

One of the more interesting general findings of the volume is that decisions and events in the early phase of industrialization, while very important, did not definitively set these two nations on their nonliberal paths. For all of the authors, many of the key features of the postwar German and Japanese models are traced to the 1930s and the rationalization measures taken under strongly authoritarian regimes. These regimes were effective at overcoming the endemic friction between traditionalist particularism and modern universalism (and reconciling incompatible sectoral regimes) that beset them prior to this time in what Wolfgang Streeck, in his introductory chapter, calls the first synthesis (p. 29). The second synthesis came after the war and undid the first one by finding ways to integrate full democracy, free markets, and independent trade unions while still retaining a strong nonliberal character. Although I do not dispute this characterization, it bears a certain risk in that one could too easily be left with the impression that the midnineteenth to midtwentieth century was a (very) long period of continuous institutional disequilibrium, while the last half century has constituted (at least until recently) a strong equilibrium. Such a perception

would run counter to the intent of the authors. For, as is clear in a brief but penetrating exposition by Streeck (pp. 25–38), the authors actually avoid the holism that plagues much of the national varieties of capitalism literature: For these authors, internal contradictions between institutional subsystems are endemic and one of the key motors of institutional change.

To the book's credit, all of the authors invoke ideas, power, sequencing, and timing in explaining institutional formation and change. They also rely on a broad conception of path dependency to explain patterns of change; this, however, strikes me as a missed opportunity to break new theoretical ground by building more explicitly upon some of the more recent thinking in path dependency theory. Nonetheless, the book constitutes an exemplary and skillful application of historical institutional analysis by master practitioners. For this reason alone it is well worth reading. It is all the more deserving of attention because it also provides us with a unique and highly insightful comparative analysis of two leading national economies and suggests why they, despite tremendous success over a long period of time, may now be moving from nonliberal to liberal capitalism.

The Ramparts of Nations: Institutions and Immigration Policies in France and the United States. By Jeffrey M. Togman. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2001. 176p. \$49.00.

Leah Haus, Vassar College

Faced with similar economic circumstances, France and the United States adopted different immigration policies at various times in the twentieth century. Jeffrey Togman asks why. To account for this variation in public policy outcome, he points to the different structure of political institutions in the two countries.

Two examples of cases when the United States and France adopted quite different immigration policy measures are the period of economic prosperity in the 1950s and the beginnings of hard times in the early 1970s. In the former period, the United States enacted the restrictionist and discriminatory McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. This act largely retained the national-origins quota system that had been introduced in the early 1920s, and it remained in place until 1965 when it was replaced by more liberal measures. By contrast to the restrictionist McCarran-Walter Act, France instituted a liberal policy in the 1950s. When hard times began in the early 1970s, France adopted restrictionist measures that mandated a stop to legal labor immigration. Despite calls for increasing restrictionism from certain societal groups, the United States government did not enact major new immigration policy laws in the 1970s.

To explain these variations in public policy outcome, Togman sits with those scholars who stress the need to go beyond cultural and economic variables. For example, those who point to cultural traditions to explain a country's immigration policy fail to account for the sharp changes in American immigration policy during the course of the twentieth century. Togman draws instead on insights from the broader comparative political economy literature that discusses the role of state institutional structure to explain variations in government policy in the face of similar economic circumstances. He shows that insights from this broader literature can be fruitfully applied to the issue area of immigration policy.

Togman convincingly demonstrates that political institutions played an important role in shaping immigration policies in the United States and France. He shows that the fractured nature of the American state left multiple points of access for a broad range of interest groups to advocate, or

block policy proposals. As a result, Togman argues, any potential link between economic conditions and immigration policy outcome was broken in the U.S. case, rendering the policy outcome highly unpredictable. Sometimes policy moved in the direction of restrictionism, and at other times in the direction of openness. He then shows that the unitary and relatively autonomous nature of the French state allowed officials to broach immigration policy in a technocratic manner and to uphold a link between economic circumstances and immigration policy, adopting liberal measures in the postwar period of prosperity and restrictionist measures when hard times set in. To illustrate the role of institutions, he provides a historical narrative of changes in American immigration policy during the twentieth century and of French immigration policy since World War II.

Togman covers some policy shifts that are in the direction of greater restrictionism and others that move to greater openness. In discussing both, he brings an important balance to the scholarship on immigration policy by reminding us that the political institutional structures of "liberal democracies" have led to the adoption of restrictionist measures, not just liberal measures, at various times in the twentieth century; and that these institutions have allowed restrictive forces, not just pro-immigration business, to organize effectively.

The book begins to address the question of why there are sometimes movements in the direction of restrictionism and why at other times there are movements in the direction of openness, or variations in policy outcome over time. He shows that France's unitary state structure enabled the government to adopt a technocratic approach that allowed economic circumstances to influence the direction of immigration policy. In contrast, Togman argues, in the United States it is difficult to know when "pro-immigration or anti-immigration coalitions will carry the day, or when coalitions will shift" (p. 19).

The author leaves no guidelines for understanding the direction of policy change in the fractured American state over time throughout the twentieth century. Moreover, as he notes, there have been recent changes in French political institutions in the direction of the more fractured institutional structure that exists in the United States. This leaves us with few guidelines for understanding the direction of immigration policy changes in France as well.

Togman could go further in considering alternative possible explanations for variations in American immigration policy over time, and counter them if he wishes to argue that there are no guidelines. For example, one might suggest to him that heightened concerns with national-security circumstances help us to understand the direction of immigration policy change, or variations over time. The restrictionist legislation of the early twentieth century came during or shortly after World War I and the "Red Scare" (beginning with the literacy test for immigrants that was enacted in 1917, and then intensifying with the Emergency Quota Act of 1921, which also came in a year when unemployment hit 11%). The restrictionist McCarran-Walter Act came at the height of the Cold War. And, most recently, although not yet enacted, the discussions over the adoption of a new amnesty program that figured prominently in the summer of 2001 disappeared from the agenda after September 11. By contrast, movements in the direction of openness came at times when there was no particularly heightened concern with nationalsecurity circumstances.

The book would likewise be strengthened by including a preliminary discussion of a broader range of countries in order to broach more thoroughly the question of variations across country, and to give some guidelines for conducting future research to explore further the importance of political institutional structure. There were other advanced industri-

alized countries, such as Switzerland, that adopted policies fairly similar to those in France, encouraging immigration in the postwar period of prosperity, and imposing restrictive measures when hard times set in. But they did not share the same institutional structure as France. A thorough assessment of the ways in which political institutions shape immigration policies would benefit from some initial discussion of these other cases.

The Ramparts of Nations is a succinct and clearly articulated book that will be of benefit to those readers interested in immigration policy.

Elusive Reform: Democracy and the Rule of Law in Latin America. By Mark Ungar. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 273p. \$55.00.

Pilar Domingo, Queen Mary, University of London

Elusive Reform is an important and welcome addition to the still underdeveloped area of political science analysis of judicial institutions in Latin America. Few volumes to date have undertaken such an in-depth study of the complex issue of rule of law and its problematic construction in fragile democratic systems in the region. The book analyzes the experience of rule of law reform in Argentina and Venezuela, with some comparative reference to other Latin American countries.

Drawing on the transitions literature, the author seeks to address a number of challenges that new democracies face, with particular regard for the issues of legal accountability of public office, mechanisms of rights protection and independent adjudication, and access to justice—all critical elements of rule of law. To its merit, the book goes beyond the more policy-oriented approaches to the study of judicial reform processes, and takes on board a more ambitious discussion of the complex relationship between rule of law, state formation, and democratic consolidation in Latin America. With different political trajectories, the two case studies present contrasting examples of the range of factors that motivate rule of law reform, on the one hand, and facilitate or hinder the effectiveness of these reforms, on the other. In Venezuela, reform in recent decades was prompted by a desire to improve executive responsiveness and judicial access; in Argentina, following a history of violence and authoritarianism, judicial reform was expressed in a concern with limiting executive dominance and improving judicial accountability.

Two running themes of the book are brought together as an explicative framework from which to assess the weaknesses of rule of law: the issues of executive domination—seen as either too repressive or too unresponsive—and judicial disarray—understood as the whole gamut of problems within the different judicial agencies, ranging from corruption, delay, bureaucratic obstacles, and insufficient resources to political obstacles. In an analysis of the different levels at which the judicial function operates, Mark Ungar seeks to disentangle the complex web of factors that affect the workings of the legal processes and rights-protection mechanisms. As he rightly point out, this has implications for the prospects of building regime legitimacy and facilitating democratic consolidation.

The book begins with a historical review of the process of state formation in Latin America, in which rule of law lagged behind other political and state priorities, while centralist trends, personalism, and a recurrent recourse to coercive strategies by embattled executive branches prevailed as the route by which to build a sense of national cohesion. Although the historical analysis adds somewhat to existing historiography on the development of rule of law in the region, of greater interest are the author's observations on the contemporary relationship between democratization, the state,

and the rule of law. These are developed particularly in the early chapters. Here the multilayered analysis of the judicial function and its workings throughout the state bureaucracy not only within judicial institutions—is rich with insight regarding the complexities of law enforcement and the many opportunities available to thwart rule-of-law enhancement. As Ungar rightly points out, law enforcement is not only a matter for judicial institutions; it takes place throughout the state at different levels of the public administration, within both the executive and legislative branches. Following from this, he identifies two types of necessary reforms: administrative reforms aimed at improving state agencies' functioning so that they better uphold the law in their daily actions; and accountability measures that monitor the degree to which these agencies adequately protect constitutional rights and make justice accessible.

From this analysis, the author raises interesting questions about the timing of reform initiatives, and he follows the process through from the political moment of passage of reform to the range of institutional and attitudinal problems that obstruct the implementation phase, and ultimately undermine the effectiveness of well-intentioned reforms. Critical political moments in which the balance of political and social forces is restructured, for instance during a regime transition, may indeed open up opportunities for reform. New democratic governments may seek electoral approval through reforms that combat corruption, illegality, and rights abuses. But despite appearances of change and renovation, continuities from the past within state bureaucratic structures obstruct the implementation of reforms that are perceived as threatening to a variety of vested interests. This combines with a legacy of nondemocratic attitudes and codes of practice that diminish the effectiveness of reforms. Ultimately, despite these obstacles, Ungar suggests that piecemeal reform initiatives can establish pockets of improvement in rule of law, and encourage law-abiding practices within the lawenforcement bodies and other state agencies that may eventually redirect old attitudes that fostered corruption and lack of accountability.

While Ungar's dialogue with transition theory is commendable, and suggestive questions are raised, ultimately the book falls short of developing a clear theoretical proposition regarding the place of rule of law in the recent democratic processes. The theoretical concerns introduced at the beginning of the book are not fully developed in the later, more empirical chapters. Instead, the later discussion of specific aspects of rule of law at times falls into the more prescriptive trappings of other judicial reform studies.

Nonetheless, the case studies are important in themselves. Chapters 3 to 7 focus on specific areas of the judicial function. Notably, much attention is given to the criminal justice system, with particular emphasis on the workings of the police, viewed by the author as being especially illustrative of the state's capacity and degree of commitment to abide by constitutional principles. Other key areas are the issues of judicial independence, the recent experience with judicial councils and defensorías del pueblo (human rights ombudsman), judicial access, and community justice. The chapters are based on thorough and extensive research, and do in large measure build up an integrated picture of the ways in which rule of law operates in the two case studies, the advances that have been achieved, and the areas where resistance to reform still persist. Moreover, the contextual and political analysis so often lacking in judicial reform studies—is insightful and highly suggestive of the complexities of reform processes.

The book is an important addition to the study of rule of law in the region and will be a key text for students and scholars of judicial politics in Latin America. Its major contributions lie, firstly, in prompting further theoretical probings into the role of rule of law and justice mechanisms in democratic processes. Secondly, it develops a suggestive analytical framework that unpacks the complex elements that constitute rule of law. And finally, the book is an insightful study of two telling experiences of judicial reform in the region.

Basic Income on the Agenda: Policy Objectives and Political Chances. Edited by Robert van der Veen and Loek Groot. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2001. 290p. \$32.00.

Robert Henry Cox, University of Oklahoma

This book tells the story of a dog that did not bark. Since the 1980s, a number of European scholars have advocated a system of income support that would eliminate the stigma attached to most forms of poverty assistance and would be simple, easy, and cheap to implement. Their idea, which has various forms, is to provide all citizens a guaranteed level of support that would have no strings attached. Organized as the Basic Income European Network (BIEN), these scholars have met regularly to discuss the subject of basic income and have endeavored to make their research useful to policymaking by promoting their group's ideas in their home countries. The problem is that after more than a decade of activity, the group cannot claim any major success. To the contrary, many countries have striven to make unemployment and social assistance more conditional by attaching work requirements or lowering thresholds of eligibility.

Basic Income on the Agenda is a chronicle of these efforts. Based on the papers presented at the seventh annual meeting of the BIEN scholars, held in 1998, the volume suffers the predictable unevenness of a conference proceeding. Some contributions are shrill and polemic. One contribution is missing its bibliography (p. 154). The volume's content is divided into two parts. The first part consists of general essays, some conceptual, some polemical in tone. Taken together, the essays of the first part provide a rich picture of what the debate over basic income is and why the members of the BIEN network are so passionate about it as a policy solution. For those unfamiliar with the debate, the editors offer a sound overview that outlines various forms of basic income proposals, ranging from negative income tax to tax credits to "citizens' wage" schemes.

These essays also demonstrate that there is no party line within the group of scholars who study and advocate for basic income. One by Phillipe van Parijs, the intellectual majordomo of the movement, compares the likely effects of basic income with the earned income tax credit and reductions of social security contributions. His conclusion is that even a partial basic income is superior to the other two if the policy objective is to maximize the "real freedom of the worst off" (p. 80). Other contributions to the first part of the volume analyze such themes as the likely egalitarian effects of basic income, its consequences for gender relations, or its merits compared to workfare schemes. All of this has a rather speculative character. Perhaps the most grounded essay comes from Fritz Scharpf who, considering the question of whether the European Union could provide a vehicle for pressuring countries to adopt basic income, concludes that he is doubtful of basic income's political viability and dubious of its normative soundness (p. 155)

The second part of the book is a survey of countries where basic income proposals have been under discussion. Here the stories of failure outnumber the successes, and for reasons that support Scharpf's skepticism. Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Germany are countries where basic income

proposals have failed to get off the ground. In these countries, basic income proposals have been rejected even by the social democratic Left, which sees a duty to work as a prerequisite for social solidarity. In Ireland, a plan to create an income tax credit is gaining support, while basic income has withered. France appears to have acquired a basic income scheme as an unintended consequence of a scheme originally designed to reintegrate people into the workforce. Its Revenu Minimum d'Insertion (RMI), adopted in 1988, was intended to combine income assistance with reintegration into the workforce. In the face of high unemployment, however, French officials dropped the return-to-work requirements of the RMI program, leaving behind only the income assistance program. In Belgium, a political party called VIVANT was created by a business entrepreneur to promote a basic income program. After gaining some attention in 1999, the party, like all singleissue movements, proved to be a one-election phenomenon. Among the Belgian mainstream, there is no support for basic

Finland appears to be the only country where real basic income has any political support, but even here it is the small,

left-wing parties that have embraced the idea. Among the political mainstream it continues to be dismissed, and there is no real proposal under consideration. Indeed, one could say that the success of the idea in that country is a direct consequence of an embarrassment of riches. With high economic growth and low unemployment, providing unconditional assistance to the poor is less controversial, and therefore the advocates of basic income have been afforded a wider audience.

As this volume indicates, basic income has been a noble ideal, but its political impact has been minimal. For anyone interested in the history of this idea, the second part of the volume provides a nice summary of social policy discussions in many European countries. These contributions are valuable descriptions of the life and death of a policy idea. The first part of the volume is less useful, owing to the uneven quality of the contributions. And most of the contributions in the first part are too speculative or polemical to have much lasting value. As the debate over the future of Europe's welfare states progresses, the issue of basic income is likely to remain a peripheral topic with a dedicated, if ineffective, following.

## International Politics

Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe. By Karen J. Alter. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 284p. \$60.00.

Leslie Friedman Goldstein, University of Delaware

Before 1990, American political and even legal scholarship paid little attention to the mystery and the marvel of the role played by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in constituting the European Community (EC; now European Union, or EU) as something very like a transnational, federated state with its own higher law constitution and supremacy of union-level law, enforceable and enforced against memberstate (i.e., member-country) laws or constitutional provisions to the contrary. Legal scholars Eric Stein and Joseph Weiler and political scientist Mary Volcansek (with a comparative judicial politics approach) had produced sustained bodies of scholarship on the subject, and Stuart Scheingold had offered a book on it back in 1971 (which took an international relations approach), but not much else was available for the curious American academic. The decade of the 1990s changed this picture. Now a generation of young scholars and some more recently engaged established scholars have taken up the challenge of attempting to understand this remarkable, and in many ways unprecedented, phenomenon.

With this book, Karen Alter adds to the corpus of recent volumes (Andrew Moravscik, The Choice for Europe, 1998; Walter Mattli, The Logic of Regional Integration, 1999; Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Constituting Federal Sovereignty, 2001) that attempt to explain the remarkable transformation of the European Economic Community (EEC) within the space of 12 years from a group of six countries loosely bound by a treaty aiming to eliminate tariff barriers into what was in legal terms a quasi-state arranged like a federation. Within this community, 1) the Treaty of Rome functioned as a supremelaw-of-the-land constitution, rendering void any memberstate (i.e., nation-state) laws or constitutional provisions to the contrary, including ones adopted later than the treaty; 2) EC regulations and directives—in other words, EC-level law—adopted under the authority of the Treaty of Rome also were supreme over member-state laws or constitutional

provisions; 3) member-state courts were enforcing these rules, that is, treating their own countries' laws as void on the grounds of conflict with Euro-level law; and 4) member-state governments by and large (although not without some prominent exceptions) were going along with this system.

Moravscik's book treats the EC/EU as a remarkably impressive example of international integration and attempts to understand it by a close examination of the motivations of domestic political actors who pushed for and/or accepted an increasingly tight union. Mattli's book uses a comparative approach, comparing EU development with the evolution of other customs unions in Europe. Goldstein's, too, uses a comparative approach, offering a historical institutionalist analysis of four modern, voluntarily federated unions, some with a dominant judiciary and some without. Karen Alter, too, in this book has produced a comparative, historical institutionalist account of the ECJ's self-transformation into what she terms "a Constitutional Court for Europe, able to practice judicial review of European law and national law" (p. 225).

Unlike the other explanatory efforts, this one zeroes in on judicial politics. What it compares is the reactions of the French judiciary and the German judiciary, and of the political (i.e., electorally accountable) branches of their respective governments to the various union-building decisions of the ECJ, and to each other's reactions. The way that it is historically institutionalist is that it examines the operation and changes over time of both incentives and constraints on political (including judicial) actors that the politico-legal institutions of each country and of the EC/EU establish.

Her first chapter sets up the riddle: How did this result emerge from a treaty whose authors and ratifiers did not either spell out or intend this higher law judicial review system? She breaks this down into three core questions: "Why did national courts accept a role enforcing European law supremacy? Why did national governments [by which she means the political branches] accept the ECJ's supremacy doctrine and national court enforcement of European law supremacy? How did the transformation of the European legal system contribute to the emergence of an international rule of law in Europe?" (p. 27). Her answers fill more than two hundred pages, and a brief summary cannot do them justice.

She focuses on France and Germany and conducted several dozen interviews of high-level players, scholars, and journalists, scoured the secondary literature and read the relevant cases. Party politics sometimes mattered; individual judges sometimes mattered; the fact that the ECJ's innovation gave judicial review power to many judges and constricted the judicial review power of certain high courts sometimes mattered; national legal traditions sometimes mattered. And it mattered a lot that—as is always the case with judicial review relying on documents that require unanimity or even a supramajority for alteration—the power to interpret (the Treaty of Rome or Euro-level law) gave tremendous power to the interpreter (the ECJ); in order to overcome an interpretation, one has to secure unanimous or near-unanimous agreement on an alternative. She concludes that the long-term interaction of resistance-acquiescence among the various institutions is best characterized as a process of negotiation (pp. 44-45)

Prodigious research underlies this book; the analytic account of the French and German cases is rich, nuanced, detailed, and carefully contextualized. She engages the arguments of other scholars in impressive ways. She has unearthed an example of member-state resistance to the ECJ that was omitted from other accounts: In 1966 the administrative court in Frankfurt flatly declared invalid a European regulation, in effect rejecting the supremacy doctrine (p. 76). (The Constitutional Court implicitly reversed this ruling a year later [p. 78].) She also mentions a report in an unpublished paper that in 1976, the French parliament gave itself power to nullify European law (p. 152), but this may be spurious, since it is omitted from published accounts by scholars such as Hialte Rasmussen (On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice, 1986) and M.-F. Buffet-Tchakoloff (La France Devant La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes, 1985).

Perhaps in a research effort this massive and this detailed, it is inevitable that one finds an occasional error: She asserts that John Marshall did *not* exercise the power of judicial review in the case of Marbury v. Madison (which is famous precisely because Marshall did exercise the power there, declaring a federal law unconstitutional); and she gives as the date of the French parliament's legislated defiance of the Euratom Treaty of 1978 (again relying on her unpublished source, J.-P. Jacqué) when Buffet-Tchakaloff's book (p. 366) dates it at 1980 (the proposal having been tabled in 1978). At a more substantial level, one can disagree with some of her arguments. (In particular, she seems not to have reflected as much as one would like on what "democratic accountability" would mean in a federated system, and on its desirable relationship to judicial independence and the protection of fundamental rights, [see pp. 207-8]). And one can even disagree with her rhetoric: She insists throughout on describing ECJ law as "international law" when most scholars use the term "transnational" or "supranational" to connote that this legal regime is so tightly integrated that a new term is needed for it. Nonetheless, for now, this book stands as the definitive account of the judicial politics that indeed produced "the making of an international rule of law in Europe."

The Frontiers of the European Union. By Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort. New York: Palgrave, 2000. 235p. \$65.00.

Erik Jones, University of Nottingham

The "borderless world" is an early twenty-first century cliche, particularly in Europe. Overlapping processes of globalization and regional integration have done much over the past decades to alter the political and economic nature of geographic boundaries. As a result, the tendency is to anticipate

a fundamental deterritorialization of politics and economics. However tempting, it would nevertheless be hazardous to rush to judgment. Through a series of overlapping case studies—essays, really—Malcolm Anderson and Eberhard Bort demonstrate that frontiers remain important both within the European Union (EU) and without. Politics and economics continue to be rooted in geography despite the transformations of the late twentieth century. This is true not only in practical terms but also in relation to individual and group identities. As the authors suggest, "there remains in Europe a highly developed sense of territoriality" (p. 11).

Such arguments may find few converts among the statistically inclined. Rather than measure the flows of activity across borders, Anderson and Bort have relied on interviews with an odd assortment of individuals having some direct linkage with the management of geographic boundaries. Police officials, local councillors, civic administrators, and other interested parties form the backdrop against which the authors reflect upon developments both in the world and in our understanding of it. In turn, the insights they derive are organized into surveys of general theory and specific problems, French borders, European borders, and the changing boundaries between Europe's East and West. At times the overlap between these essays becomes slightly repetitive—as when the authors recount the push of migrants across the Swiss-German border in near-identical language on pages 102 and 126. The authors also tend to throw in allusions or concepts that interested readers may find unfamiliar—such as the distinction between boundaries and frontiers as implied by the Roman word limes.

Nevertheless, Anderson and Bort make a persuasive argument that is usefully documented and selectively detailed. Their discussion of European efforts to encourage the development of transfrontier cooperation (pp. 45–74), for example, sheds welcome light on the context, design, and implementation of a raft of different programs—each of which serves as an umbrella for an even more diverse collection of specific projects. Given this sea of variety, the authors can be forgiven a somewhat anecdotal approach. Readers are expected to have confidence in the authors as they "attempt at a general political assessment" (p. 10), and yet the authors provide sufficient basis for believing that such confidence is warranted.

Anderson and Bort also raise a number of points that seem obvious upon reflection, though counterintuitive at first glance. Foremost among these is that the spread of English-language learning may have the effect of strengthening rather than lessening national divisions (pp. 51–54). Alsatians and Saarlanders no longer make the effort to learn German or French, at least not in numbers comparable to those before World War II. Moreover, the same is true in virtually all bilingual border regions—such as French-Italian, French-Spanish, Italian-German, and so forth. Even populations in plurilingual countries such as Belgium show more interest in learning English than in learning the languages of their compatriots. Hence, the authors suggest that "language frontiers" are resistant to the fast pace of economic change and will develop "only as a consequence of long-term social processes" (p. 54).

As if linguistic divisions were not enough of a problem, Anderson and Bort suggest that cross-border cooperation may itself give rise to conflict (p. 73). As diverse groups engage in collective action across political boundaries, it is only natural that they should scrutinize the distribution of costs and benefits. And where collective action is unsupported by collective identity (or common purpose), the likelihood that different groups will object to differences in distributive outcomes cannot be discounted. They suggest that this is where central authorities have a role to play, bolstered where possible by the European Union. Given the structure of the argument,

however, it is unclear what that role should be (at least in general terms) or why central authorities would choose to play it.

Along a similar vein, Anderson and Bort posit a contrast between the western expansion of the United States and the eastern enlargement of the European Union (p. 143). This contrast is at the same time self-evident and yet worthy of repetition. The American pioneers of the nineteenth century sought to bring an untamed wilderness into the ambit of "civilization." The European enlargement negotiators of the twenty-first century must contend with existing states thatwhatever their current difficulties—are unlikely to discard their values and cultures. Enlargement is about collective action and not manifest destiny. Hence, it is also potentially a source of cross-border conflict. Moreover, should enlargement succeed, it will have the effect of pushing the borders of the European Union outward toward an even more unstable East-heightening the vulnerability of the union as a whole and shunting much of the responsibility for shielding the union onto its new entrants. Indeed, given the structure of the enlargement process, much of these expansion effects have already begun to take place.

Borders remain important, geography matters, and territoriality runs deep. This is hardly an idealistic conclusion, and neither it is likely to prove popular. Still, it is realistic. And it leaves considerable scope for change nonetheless. For while Anderson and Bort succeed in documenting the resilience of territorial politics, they also provide substantial evidence of the will of policymakers at all levels to make the most of cross-border cooperation. Implicit in the evidence provided by the authors is a strong persistence to improve upon a politics and an economics that are (and are likely to remain) geographically structured. As a result, geographic boundaries will remain important, even as the nature of that importance continues to evolve. Whether internal or external, the frontiers of the European Union are not static. And more than anything else, it is the adaptive nature of these frontiers that explains their continuing relevance to economic and political life in Europe.

The Guilt of Nations: Restitution and Negotiating Historical Injustices. By Elazar Barkan. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. 456p. \$18.95.

Waldemar Hanasz, University of Pennsylvania

It seems timely and appropriate that the twentieth century—the century of the Holocaust, the Gulag Archipelago, the Killing Fields, the Cultural Revolution, and the "ethnic cleansing" in the Balkans and Rwanda—ended with a wave of growing interest in healing past injustices. Human rights organizations and international commissions investigate violations of human rights. International tribunals judge political leaders, warlords, and their soldiers. Historians, political scientists, and legal theorists study the implications of such crimes and punishments.

While most recent studies concentrate on the tortuous procedure of putting perpetrators on trial—Martha Minow's Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence (1998), Howard Ball's Prosecuting War Crimes and Genocide: The Twentieth Century Experience (1999), and Gary Jonathan Bass's Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals (2000)—Elazar Barkan's book outlines the worldwide trend of victim restitution for past sufferings. By analyzing some cases in which wrongdoers or their descendants have embraced guilt and responsibility, Barkan is able to explore "how various national and ethnic identities change as a result of in-

teractions between rival groups and the attempts of groups to redress through negotiation painful historical injustices" (pp. x-xi). According to the author, these interactions between offenders and victims not only solve local problems but also generate a novel system of global morality.

The book is divided into two parts, each presenting a number of cases. The first part covers some of the consequences of World War II: West Germany's reparations for the Holocaust, the U.S. governments handling of the internment of Japanese Americans, the case of the Japanese army's sex slaves, the story of Jewish accounts and Nazi gold in Swiss banks, and some complex debates about restitution in East Central Europe. The second part deals with the residues of colonialism, especially the cases of indigenous groups in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. The demand for reparation for American slavery is also discussed. Barkan's presentation of these cases is comprehensive and interdisciplinary. His knowledge of local cultures, history, sociology, and international law meets the book's high demands. Although there is no doubt that he welcomes the whole process of restitution, his evaluations of the complicated cases are quite well balanced.

The fact that some perpetrators or their descendants are pressed to admit their guilt and express apologies is not entirely new. What is new is the voluntary willingness of the past offenders to enter into negotiations with their victims and to meet some of their demands, including the demands for material compensation. Restitution agreements are reached without coercion and third-party engagement. The process of negotiation, Barkan argues, redefines the historical identity of offenders and victims alike. Of course, both sides want to achieve different goals. Past offenders want to end accusations and to defend their status quo, while victims want their harms to be acknowledged and, if possible, restitution.

In each case, the ideas of moral responsibility and justice are redefined, too. Barkan argues that the restitution cases illustrate a new framework of global morality—he calls it "a neo-Enlightenment morality"—based on negotiation and voluntary agreement between antagonistic groups. The idea of fairness is rooted in the culture of each rival group and the historical context of particular conflict. The neo-Enlightenment morality recognizes that global justice depends on multicultural negotiations. Again, the demand that social groups act morally is not entirely new; what is new is the demand that antagonistic groups respect the cultural principles of their opponents. Moreover, the dialogue of rival groups upgrades the traditional framework of rights. As such, according to Barkan, this morality goes beyond the principles of liberalism. First, it includes not only individual rights but also group rights. Second, it articulates "a relation between universal values and local customs as fundamental rights" (p. 329). Third, it can validate the particular goals as legitimate values and rights. That continuous interplay of universal principles and practical patterns constitutes a new universe of moral and political values.

However, Barkan's assumption that the liberal tradition needs to be reformed because individual rights neglect group identities and group interests is rather unconvincing. It is by no means clear why classical liberal principles would need such reform. After all, individual rights easily explain why it is wrong to execute innocent civilians in concentration camps, imprison them in internment camps, force them to become sex slaves, or confiscate their estates and banking accounts. In most cases, individual rights can also cogently legitimize restitution claims.

In fact, trying to explain these injustices in group terms is, in a sense, a step back, because it returns to the discriminatory language of past perpetrators. The victims of the Holocaust

or the ethnic cleansing deserve redress for their suffering as human individuals, not only as Jews or Muslims. Locke, Kant, J. S. Mill, and other fathers of liberalism lived in a world filled with group privileges and viewed the moral philosophy of individual rights as a significant advancement. It is a fundamental principle of liberal philosophy that each individual is free to decide to which religious or political groups to belong. Consequently, the public institutions and policies of contemporary liberal democracies—concerning security, health, education, and so on—apply to all citizens as individual human beings, regardless of their group identity.

Despite an impressive eloquence of its descriptive part, Barkan's book does not prove that a return to the world of group rights would be an improvement today. It is to be hoped that legal theorists and philosophers will continue discussing the importance of group rights.

## Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action. By Susan Burgerman. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 186p. \$29.95.

Ann Marie Clark, Purdue University

A lot of scholarly attention has been devoted to demonstrating that transnational activists "matter" in explaining international outcomes. Having paid those dues, it can be argued that scholars of transnational activity can safely shift from a documentary focus to a more profound inquiry concerning how, why, and to what extent nonstate actors matter. On the other hand, to understand the work of transnational activists for the international implementation of moral and legal standards—not a completely new area of inquiry, but a burgeoning one-still requires a considerable amount of empirical documentation of exactly what that work entails. Only time-intensive, border-hopping research provides the names, dates, and actors' words, deeds, and intentions that comprise whatever political activity there is to be theorized about. Thus, both empirical documentation and theorizing about transnational and multilateral processes are demanding, and interdependent, scholarly necessities. In her book Moral Victories: How Activists Provoke Multilateral Action, Susan Burgerman presents finely articulated empirical research that is a welcome contribution to the literature on human rights in multilateral political processes.

The centerpiece, and in my view the strong point, of Burgerman's nicely written and relatively brief book is the case study research. Through interviews, primary documents, and secondary sources, she chronicles the development and implementation of United Nations-negotiated peace settlements through the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) and the UN Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA). ONUSAL, deployed in 1991, was the first such agreement to incorporate human rights monitoring into its peace-building component. MINUGUA, deployed in 1994, did so as well. These cases are inherently important in that they represent, as Burgerman notes, early examples of "the latest, most interventionist stage in the implementation of human rights norms" (p. 21). The book stands firmly on its merits as a balanced study of the development of the two Central American peace processes in their complex domestic and international contexts (which included human rights activism). She maintains, as the title suggests, that activists were very important in making sure that human rights considerations for both countries stayed on the international agenda. She relies on the transnational advocacy network concept, originated by Kathryn Sikkink and elaborated by Margaret Keck and Sikkink in Activists Beyond Borders (1998), to characterize that role. While highlighting the visibility of human rights advocates in her cases,

Burgerman's study does not plow new theoretical ground in this area; instead, it carries the transnational advocacy concept to a new institutional context, as one explanatory factor among others. I mention this because the book's subtitle seems to suggest a more sustained elaboration on the causal role of transnational human rights advocacy in relation to multilateral action.

El Salvador and Guatemala experienced decades-long civil wars between government-backed forces and armed guerrillas. After a brief history of each conflict, the case studies open at the beginning of the 1980s, a time of severe human rights violations in both Central American countries. This was also a period of significant growth for the transnational human rights advocacy network, that is, the network made up of domestic and international human rights activists, officials pursuing a human rights agenda within the foreign policy arms of some governments, and the agents of international organizations' human rights mechanisms.

Both conflicts were fueled in large part by Cold War concerns and externally supplied armed forces. In El Salvador, the fight reached what Burgerman calls a "hurting stalemate" before the parties could be coaxed to the table after the withdrawal of U.S. support for the government in 1989. In Guatemala, the guerrillas never were strong enough to claim a military stalemate, but neither did the government enjoy overwhelming material support from the United States after the 1970s. Still, reputational incentives in a post-Cold War international context finally resulted in a "tenuous" agreement to negotiate a peace in Guatemala, although the negotiations

themselves spanned six years (see pp. 102–3).

Burgerman analyzes ONUSAL and MINUGUA to determine the most important factors behind the incorporation of "human rights enforcement" in the agreements. (For the author, enforcement refers to binding and interventionary, but not necessarily military, action on the part of the international community [pp. 18–19]). As appropriate for a study of two cases with similar outcomes (in which human rights standards were, in the end, incorporated into the agreements), Burgerman posits five necessary but not sufficient conditions that determine the profile of human rights in the countries' UN-backed peace processes. These factors work together to "determine the extent to which the international community" will employ "sanctioning mechanisms of the human rights regime" against a state with human rights violations (p. 5). They are 1) the existence and legitimacy of international human rights norms, which have become increasingly institutionalized; 2) lack of interference by a major power with overriding political or economic interests in the country, which can inhibit human rights enforcement; 3) activism by the transnational human rights network, which puts pressure on the target state; 4) a domestic political elite that comes to believe that its reputation or that of its country is on the line if human rights violations continue, and which can control its domestic military counterparts; and 5) a domestic human rights network, which can maintain links with its transnational counterpart (pp. 4-5).

These factors have strong roots in the international relations and comparative literature on the politics of human rights. Burgerman applies them in a new domain, by examining multilateral human rights enforcement decisions by the international community, and her findings are corroborative in the new context. On the subject of human rights activism, this research illustrates the role transnational advocacy networks have played on the stage of UN peace processes. Given that transnational advocacy networks by definition are made up of many different kinds of actors, a further direction for theoretical work may be to specify, both theoretically and practically, the differing causal impacts of different

members of the network. This is something she should consider pursuing further, based on the elements that comprise her promising set of necessary conditions for human rights enforcement.

A commitment to enforcement raises the stakes of multilateral action significantly, and Burgerman's study suggests that to muster collective action on human rights requires a special set of conditions that are complex but that possess a general profile applicable to other cases. She herself does so briefly with a limited study of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in her final chapter, and briefer discussions of a few other cases. Her conclusion that network pressure is necessary for the international community's enforcement of human rights principles is strengthened by comparison with the UNTAC process, implemented in the early 1990s. Among other problems her discussion outlines, UNTAC received less attention from the human rights network, resulting in a less prominent place for human rights in the agreement. In the conclusion, the author also presents a well-informed discussion of her study's policy implications for the design of future operations.

Burgerman's *Moral Victories* is a solid and very readable contribution to the literature on attempts to implement the international human rights regime. The book would be suitable for an upper-division undergraduate or graduate course on international organization, comparative Latin American politics, or human rights, and is to be recommended as a study of human rights in UN peace processes.

Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory. Edited by Kevin C. Dunn and Timothy M. Shaw. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 242p. \$65.00.

Clement E. Adibe, DePaul University and The Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory, edited by Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw, offers a timely reflection on the content and nuance of international relations theory in an era of "the new inequality" (Craig Murphy, "Political Consequences of the New Inequality," International Studies Quarterly 45 [September 2001]: 347–56). The central question posed by the authors is: How international is international relations theory? In the authors' view, not very much. As a consequence, their objective in the volume is "to replace the dominant/dominating denotative reading of the IR text with a more pluralist connotative reading" (p. 8; my emphasis). Drawing on African experiences in the discipline of international relations, all 13 chapters of this engaging volume take aim at various manifestations of the Eurocentricity and "provincialism" of international relations theory then and now. Very early in the volume, Dunn sets the stage for a deliberate and systematic engagement with the discipline for its relegation of Africa to the footnote of international relations theory (p. 4).

For the past decade, the marginalization of Africa in world affairs has been the staple of comparative politics. But as the essays in this volume show, Africa has not fared better in international relations theory and analyses either. The reason, according to Dunn (Chapter 4), may be too nuanced to constitute a bona fide analytical variable for the parsimonious inclinations of much of contemporary international relations theory. Consider, for instance, the pervasive assumption of savagery—that "Africans were just being Africans"—that echoed in sections of the international media and policymaking constituency in the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 (p. 4; and Philip Gouvrevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories

from Rwanda, 1998). Not surprisingly, such glaring insensitivity in policymaking and in scholarship to the plight of Africans has raised questions about the continuing centrality of race in international politics (Chapter 8).

This volume is, however, much more than an oversized catalogue of the misrepresentations and disrespect of Africa in the discipline of international relations, although it would appear to be doing precisely that at first glance. Indeed, it offers a rich and insightful discussion of the two poles of international politics: power and powerlessness. If the former has been overemphasized in international relations from the classical to the modern era, the relative neglect of the latter should be of concern to modern-day theorists who must formulate universal theories of international politics. Herein lies the strength of this volume as a bold attempt to "demonstrate the centrality of the experience of the [African] continent to every theoretical approach to IR" (p. ix). In this regard, Siba Grovogui's excellent comparative analysis of the "problem" of sovereignty and quasi statehood in Africa (Chapter 3) and John F. Clark's compelling attempts to apply realist and neorealist traditions to Africa's post-Cold War international relations (Chapter 6) merit a closer reading.

Unlike Dunn (Chapters 1 and 4) and Assis Malaquias (Chapter 2), who argue willy-nilly that Africa is sui generis, Grovogui and Clark contend that the content and outline of Africa's international relations are not nearly as different from those of Europe and other parts of the world as had been widely and erroneously assumed. Take, for example, the notion of the artificiality of the boundaries of African states, which has been discussed ad nauseam by innumerable works on the state in Africa. In dismissing this as a "special" attribute of the African state, Grovogui argues quite pointedly that "Belgium and Switzerland display the same 'artificial' features as their contemporary African counterpart, the Congo" but have enjoyed a much better fate than the latter (p. 31). Obviously, then, a causal analysis of Africa's international relations must seek other variables and move beyond what he calls "the oft-repeated but unfounded allegory of privation—that is, of an Africa chronically engulfed in chaos owing to inherent antagonism of opposing 'tribes' or the obsessive pursuit by domestic groups of their own selfinterest, unrestrained by state or civil institutions" (p. 41). Grovogui's timely thesis, therefore, is that, contrary to all appearances and misconceptions, the responses of African states to the varied domestic and external contingencies that they face are remarkably rational, and that the observable "tensions between state and civil society in relation to post-colonial governance" are indeed necessary, even if unfortunate (p. 41).

Clark advances the discussion of the purpose of state behavior in Africa by applying realist insights to the conflicts that have engulfed several African regions since the end of the Cold War. Using the notion of "regime security" as an analytical tool, he seeks to "understand why African state leaders have frequently intervened in one another's affairs, and why they have just as frequently refrained from doing so" (p. 94). His finding, which could easily have been predicted by the classical theorists of international relations, is at variance with those contemporary observers who attribute the behavior of African states simply to primordial instincts. According to Clark: "For the most part, African rulers understood that intervention in neighboring states would evoke counterintervention, usually through support of insurgencies. Thus the principled statements of mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity [of states] made in Addis Ababa in 1963 [by the Organization of African Unity] and ritualistically repeated thereafter reflected not only devotion to an ideal, but also the best insurance of regime security" (p. 97). What we see, then, are two sources of rationality of the African state: first, the self-interest of age-old realpolitik, and, second, the altruism of modern-day constructivism.

If we can now move beyond those seemingly omnipresent images of African exceptionalism and savagery, which were successfully reinforced by Robert Kaplan ("The Coming Anarchy," Atlantic Monthly [February, 1994]: 45-76), it is possible to see in this volume new opportunities for enriching international relations theory in several respects, such as Janis van der Westhuizen's examination of South Africa's marketing power as the other "Rainbow Nation" (aside from the United States) as a means of attracting tourists and foreign investors (Chapter 5); the problem of sanctioning "rogue states" (Chapter 9); the enigma of the Westphalian system (Chapter 10); the coalescence of "modernists" and "antimodernists" to protect the environment in southern Africa (Chapter 11); the impact of U.S. foreign policy on stability in southern Africa (Chapter 12); and the trend toward "new regionalism" in Africa as a response to security and developmental challenges (Chapter 13).

It is difficult for a diverse collection of essays, such as those contained in this volume, to measure up to the unenviable expectation of the editors to "replace the dominant... reading of the IR text" with another, obviously theirs. This volume does not come anywhere close to meeting that objective. What it does achieve, however, is raise a question that has been made even more important by the events of September 11, 2001, and that is whether the world is getting closer, as proponents of globalization would have us all believe, or growing farther apart, as "the clash of civilizations" thesis suggests. Either way, this volume is best seen as a call for a truly *international* theory of international relations and, for that reason, deserves the attention of scholars and practitioners alike.

The Phantom Defense: America's Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion. By Craig Eisendrath, Melvin A. Goodman, and Gerald E. Marsh. Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001. 216p. \$24.95. Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security: Agendas, Perceptions, Technology, and Policy. By Roger Handberg. Praeger, 2001. 264p. \$62.00.

Rockets' Red Glare: Missile Defenses and the Future of World Politics. Edited by James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2001. 368p. \$28.50.

David Goldfischer, University of Denver

As Michael O'Hanlon concludes in his excellent contribution to Rockets' Red Glare: "We should . . . get used to the debate over ballistic missile defenses. It has been around a long time, and no final resolution is imminent" (p. 132). In one sense, a review of these three recent books makes clear that many analysts had grown a bit too used to positioning themselves in terms of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Preoccupied with arguments over whether the treaty should be preserved, modified, or rewritten in light of a changing strategic and technological context, no one seemed to have anticipated that President George W. Bush would simply withdraw from it, invoking Article XV's provision that either party could withdraw if "extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." Even many strategic defense supporters who deemed the treaty obsolete (as Robert Joseph persuasively maintains in his contribution to Rockets' Red Glare) generally believed that it should only—and would only—be scrapped if negotiations over U.S.proposed changes broke down. ("The Bush Administration," surmises O'Hanlon, "will surely try very hard to amend it before going to such an extreme") (p. 112). In the event, the president's team disavowed even the word "negotiation," saying they were willing only to "consult" the Russians regarding the treaty's impending demise.

While the sudden arrival of the post-ABM Treaty era, coupled with the new light thrown by 9/11 on the entire subject of homeland security, leaves all three of the books under review sounding slightly anachronistic, the central arguments advanced by the authors retain their relevance. The reason, as Roger Handberg notes in Ballistic Missile Defense and the Future of American Security, in summing up the historical record of four decades of debate over national missile defense (NMD), is "the fragile nature of any NMD deployment decision" (p. 182). After all, four previous American presidents committed themselves to some version of NMD (Lyndon Johnson to "Sentinel," Richard Nixon to "Safeguard," Ronald Reagan to the "Strategic Defense Initiative," and George H. W. Bush to "Global Protection Against Limited Strikes"), only to have some mixture of domestic and international politics, along with daunting technological hurdles, result in the decision's being reversed or deferred. For those who wish to acquire a detailed understanding of the domestic political obstacles confronting deployment, Handberg's book provides a detailed and insightful commentary. The missile defense lobby, he shows, has had to contend with more than just the community of dedicated opponents of NMD. Pursuit of deployment has repeatedly been stymied by a defense establishment wary of seeing funds diverted from existing missions, members of Congress who are similarly worried about the fiscal health of their cherished domestic policies, and a defense industry ambivalent about a program with such an uncertain future. Moreover, the slow pace of technological progress, combined with the opportunity provided by the budget process to revisit decisions annually, has until now provided ample time for economic downturns or diminishing external threats to take the steam out of efforts to deploy a defense.

Handberg divides the principle antagonists across four decades of debate over missile defense into "Wilsonians," who believe that deploying an NMD will increase the danger of war, and "believers," who are relentlessly committed to the pursuit of a U.S. national advantage. (His third group, the "pragmatists," will be discussed shortly.) These ideological perspectives, Handberg argues, drive the competing technical assessments that have attended a succession of prospective defensive systems. Those who believe in NMD for other reasons simply regard setbacks like test failures as temporary hurdles on the road to inevitable success (unless the "Wilsonians" successfully impede technical progress). Those who oppose defenses as fundamentally dangerous, by contrast, will predictably declare whatever technology is under consideration as either hopelessly flawed or easily overcome with cheap countermeasures.

Handberg characterizes both groups as under the sway of the same belief in a "technological imperative": Opponents "fear its success," even as supporters "push for that outcome." That observation is questionable. To the extent that opponents are motivated by a belief in a technological imperative, it is that the nuclear revolution, embodied in the offensive arsenals constructed by the Cold War superpowers (most dramatically in the form of long-range ballistic missiles), made defense in its traditional sense forever obsolete. NMD "believers," by contrast, assume that the offense-defense balance remains largely subject to human will. For those who have come to regard mutual assured destruction (MAD) as inescapable, episodic outbreaks of technological optimism about ballistic missile defenses must be countered by scathing critiques of prospective defensive technologies, coupled

to the more general admonition that security requires the regulation of armaments and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

That rationale for mutual "offense-only" deterrence animates a very large literature that dates back to the dawn of the missile age, to which The Phantom Defense is the latest substantial contribution. As in many such efforts to sway the attentive public, one encounters in this well-written book an occasional tension between assertions that defenses are bad because they are fundamentally unworkable, and, alternatively, that they are bad because they might seem effective enough to tempt a future American leader into launching war against another nuclear power. Each of those positions can slide into polemical overkill, as when we are told, without supporting documentation, that "an overwhelming majority of scientists and engineers who have considered national missile defense have deemed it a fantasy" (p. xviii). Or: "Since a national missile defense could never be tested in battlefield conditions, any shortcomings would not become apparent until it was too late" (p. 147).

That tendency to assert that defenses are both obviously unworkable and supremely dangerous is particularly unfortunate in a volume that also includes some strong, eloquently conveyed arguments against U.S. deployment of an NMD. Thus, Chapter 4 effectively depicts the great distance that the states now known as the "axis of evil" must travel before they can hope to deliver mass-destruction weapons to American territory via missiles, and Chapters 5 and 6 convincingly poke holes in some of the optimistic technical claims emanating from the strategic defense lobby (some of which they document as blatant misrepresentations). In short, the NMD lobby has probably both exaggerated the near-term missile threat from "rogue states" and greatly understated the technical challenge of coping with offensive countermeasures. The reader is left uninformed, however, of plausible responses to those concerns, just as the authors fail to address ways in which defensive deployments might not result in a world of arms racing, major power hostilities, and growing likelihood of nuclear war. While it is true, as James Wirtz notes in his introduction to Rockets' Red Glare, that "those involved in political advocacy feel no compulsion to explain the downside of their policies to their audience" (p. 6), it is also true that engaging serious counterarguments can ultimately be more persuasive than belittling or ignoring them.

The Phantom Defense was produced by the Washington-based Center for International Policy, which promotes a foreign policy "based on democracy, social justice and human rights" (p. 183). Their association of those hugely important goals with a fairly sweeping pacifism (as when they assert that "[d]iplomatic solutions to major problems will not be reached as long as the United States resorts to the military instrument," p. 155) is likely to have more limited appeal in the aftermath of 9/11. Of course, opposition to U.S. unilateralism in nuclear policy need not rely on such broader condemnations of the use of force, nor does a willingness to consider ballistic missile defense necessarily mean a wholesale rejection of nuclear arms control, let alone diplomacy in general.

Between the group Handberg labels "the believers" (who indeed sometimes seem to fit the bellicose stereotype depicted by the authors of *The Phantom Defense*) and the antidefense "Wilsonians," there is indeed an important, probably growing middle group. Handberg approvingly calls them the "pragmatists," that is, those who are always willing to "reweigh their choices in light of changing international circumstances and technology issues" (p. 157). This middle group, which holds the balance of power in domestic po-

litical battles over NMD, has been shifting toward support for deployment, Handberg notes, over the past five years. Accounting for that shift has been both increased concern over hostile states acquiring missiles of increasing range and a general belief that missile defense technology appears to be making significant advances.

The Wirtz and Larsen book, for the most part, is representative of that pragmatist camp. Most of the contributors endorse what is probably the mainstream view among experts: that while the Russians and Chinese can probably develop affordable and effective countermeasures to prospective U.S. ballistic missile defenses, the next several years may well bring us to the point that NMD deployment merits serious consideration. Astutely anticipating the general direction of policy, Wirtz and Jeffrey Larsen directed their contributors (noted experts drawn from universities, think tanks, and the government) to assume that the United States will deploy missile defenses, and to judge the consequences of three basic policy options: limited defense in a cooperative setting, enhanced defenses that might undercut cooperation, and unlimited defenses unconstrained by treaty. Although the contributors did not uniformly engage each scenario, the editors clearly succeeded in generating the sort of detailed inquiry that can help move the debate forward.

The first three chapters do a fair job of acquainting nonexpert readers with the origins and evolution of events bearing on the adoption and subsequent challenges to the ABM Treaty, followed by three chapters that look at the political, strategic, and arms-control implications of alternative defensive architectures. (As noted, the chapter by O'Hanlon stands out, although all are worth reading). The third and strongest section of the book deals with regional responses, with separate chapters devoted to China, Russia, South Asia, and U.S. allies. The China chapter, by Bradley Roberts, is particularly good, dramatizing both the intensity of China's desire to avoid coercion by the United States and the types of steps China can take to undercut any benefits from a unilateral move toward NMD (none worse than returning to its "old ways" of assisting other states in their programs of unconventional weapons and missile delivery systems). The inclusion of a chapter on South Asia, by Timothy D. Hoyt, is obviously timely, and it usefully lays out the contagion effects throughout the region should China counter U.S. defenses with a stepped up nuclear buildup. Those predisposed to embrace the Bush administration commitment to NMD should read this section carefully; they may well conclude, as Larsen points out in the conclusion, that the United States must go much further than it has to date in addressing the concerns of allies and potential adversaries (i.e., Russia and China).

Does that mean giving up on defense entirely? Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of Rockets' Red Glare is its evidence that the pragmatic center is beginning to contemplate a policy direction that transcends the sterile four-decades-old debate between the "believers" and the "Wilsonians." Several of the contributions, most strongly the one on Russia by Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Goldgeier, pay serious attention to the desirability of moving toward an arms-control regime that engineers a transition from today's nuclear world of total offense dominance to one of mutual defense emphasis. While the "road to a cooperative transition is long," they note, it is "in both countries' interest that they begin the journey" (p. 228). If 9/11 is to have a long-term impact on the debate over missile defense, one may hope that it strengthens prevailing views on the need for major power cooperation, even if it has also tragically demonstrated the need for homeland defense. Rockets' Red Glare helps prepare the groundwork for efforts to reconcile those objectives.

Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and a Critique of World Politics. By Mark F. N. Franke. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 265p. \$59.50 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

David A. Welch, University of Toronto

It's not every day that you find a book that argues for its own irrelevance. This is not, of course, how Mark Franke characterizes his project in *Global Limits*—but it is the upshot, and he is admirably candid in putting together the individual pieces of the argument pointing to it.

Noting a recent upsurge in interest in Kant, Franke sets out to demonstrate that Kant does not, in fact, have "a theory" of international relations (IR), and that most modern scholars who invoke him either misunderstand or misappropriate him. Whatever Kant has to say about the subject, Franke insists, must be understood in the context of his broader philosophical project, and not merely with isolated reference to those few works to which IR scholars are usually attracted-most notably, "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" (1795). Franke stresses the critical nature of that larger project, but argues that "in engaging questions of international politics, Kant ultimately fails to meet his own standards of critique' (p. 195). At the end of the day, Kant is dogmatic and conservative: He takes the sovereign territorial state for granted; he mistakes parochial philosophical commitments for universal truths (particularly in his ethics, and especially in his conceptions of autonomy and moral personality); and he lacks the imagination to see that the parameters of international politics are constructed and constantly renegotiated. Franke suggests that if we were to take Kant seriously, pushing his critical project to its logical conclusion, we would embrace a radical critical position reminiscent of Richard Ashley and R. B. J. Walker. "In taking up a critique of world politics," Franke writes, "the only appropriate response to world politics is to always place the effects of worlding into doubt. The disciplinary guide for a critique of world politics could only be one that allowed the critic to place any claim to the world into doubt to begin with" (p. 192).

Thus, Franke maintains, Kant does not speak to modern IR theory; he cannot speak to modern IR theory; and, properly straightened out, he would refuse to speak to modern IR theory. As Franke puts it, "To consider in earnest Kantian theory and the debt that studies of international politics have to it is to ultimately deny the practicability of attention to international politics from the start" (p. 23).

If Franke is right, one might well ask: Why bother? As far as international relations is concerned, Kant is beside the point. And insofar as Kant has a point, international relations does not. There is simply nothing to say. The book is a performative contradiction.

Fortunately, Franke does not succeed in being irrelevant. Any scholar of international politics interested in Kant will want to reflect on what Franke has to say—for there is more than enough merit in some of the individual moves of his argument to warrant our close attention, and just enough error in his conclusions to save us from his skepticism.

Franke is quite right to insist that we put Kant's treatment of international politics in the broader context of his thought as a whole, and one of the book's great merits is the superb effort it makes to do so (drawing heavily not only upon the originals, but also upon an impressively thorough and thoughtful survey of important commentators). Franke is particularly interested in reading Kant's relatively short discussions of international relations in the light of the *Critique of Judgment*, and for this he makes an intriguing and provocative case in Chapter 3. Not everyone will find this compelling; I myself

find the Critique of Practical Reason and the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals more helpful. But disagreements of this kind fall well within the range of normal interpretive debate. Franke is also right to insist that Kant does not have a theory of international politics, if by the term we mean (as Franke usually does) a social scientific theory that we might test in the quest for valid empirical generalizations.

We are not obliged, however, to embrace Franke's curiously anachronistic stance on the relationship between Kant and modern IR scholarship. Franke wants us to reject a "democratic peace" reading of Kant on the ground that Kant did not subscribe to the ontology, epistemology, or methodology undergirding democratic peace research. Fair enough. Kant was no modern social scientist. But Franke also wants us to reject the very possibility of this kind of research because of what Kant ought to have said, in his view, on the subject of international politics. To this we are entitled to ask: Why should we? Can we not take inspiration from Kant without subscribing to his philosophical system as a whole, or to Franke's rereading thereof? Must we go All The Way With Immanuel K.?

More importantly, Franke has run wild with that part of Kant's critical project that requires us to question the presuppositions of our understanding of the world, and has neglected that aspect of it that was designed to enable us to know the world. Kant's main philosophical project was to reconcile faith and reason; it was not intended to demonstrate the impossibility of both. "[W]hile reason can never refuse to submit to criticism," Kant writes in the Critique of Pure Reason, "it does not always have cause to fear it" (A739/B767). Like Aristotle, Kant was aware that to say anything at all about the world, one has to take some aspects of it for granted. For Kant, these are phenomena, and he invites us to ask what we must believe about things-in-themselves in order to make sense of them. In contrast, Franke exhorts us merely always to question.

It is plain that Franke thinks this a worthwhile activity, and this is why he would deny my suggestion that his book is irrelevant by design. But his success in failing to be irrelevant does not lie here—for asking questions is pointless unless one believes in the possibility of answers.

The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire. By Roy H. Ginsberg. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 256p. \$79.00 cloth, \$27.95 paper.

Carolyn Marie Dudek, Hofstra University

Since the Cold War, the United States as well as other countries have struggled with the "new world order." Further integration of the European Union, mostly in economic and political ways, has given it recognition as an actor within the international arena. During the crisis that followed the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the international community witnessed the EU's failure to bring a speedy end to the genocide and violence in the region. The EU's inability and lack of efficacy in the situation tarnished its image and prompted it to begin working toward the creation of a European Common Foreign and Defense Identity. More recent events of September 11, as well as increased violence between Israel and the Palestinians, once again beg the question: What is the role of an integrated Europe? As the United States takes on its war against terrorism, it looks to its closest allies in Europe to be supportive and to help in the endeavor. Actions or opinions from individual member states, however, seem to gain more public attention in the United States than those from the EU as a single entity acting in the global arena.

Roy Ginsberg's book sheds light on the seemingly elusive role of the EU in foreign policy. The author provides a rich qualitative empirical analysis of its role in international relations, with a close examination of the EU's part in Yugoslavia, the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and the Union's influence upon the United States. What is truly unique and laudable about this study is the author's nonrealist perspective on the impact of EU foreign policy. At the outset of the book, he establishes that it is inappropriate to judge the EU with the same criteria as nation-states, rightly pointing out, "The EU and the nation-state are not governmental equals" (p. 5). In addition, Ginsberg does not claim to be assessing the failure or success of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, but rather examining if the Union had an impact on global politics.

Ginsberg provides several examples of the EU's participation in or influencing upon international events, covering a broad range of world regions. Although this provides a fascinating litany, it lacks a logical ordering and ranking in importance. Perhaps this is less the fault of the author than due to the complexity and difficulty of the topic he is addressing.

To examine whether the EU has had an impact on international politics, Ginsberg constructs a conceptual model and evaluative structure that is then applied to the three specific cases mentioned above. The model focuses on the relationship between foreign policy inputs and outputs. He explains that EU outputs have created a feedback mechanism for the formulation and decision-making process of foreign policy.

The empirical portion of the book is rich, dense, and ambitious. The author covers the turmoil in the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East with attention to historical details. In the case of Yugoslavia, Ginsberg provides a nontraditional interpretation of the EU's role. Most discussions regarding the impact of the EU in the Yugoslavian crisis concern its failure to implement a successful foreign policy (e.g., cited in Ginsberg, Philip Gordon, "Europe's Uncommon Foreign Policy," *International Security* 11, no. 3 [Winter]: 27–74). Ginsberg, however, suggests that given the resources it had, the EU did have a significant impact. For instance, if we look at humanitarian aid efforts or the influence the EU had upon the new republics, it is clear that it did play a significant but often overlooked role.

Coverage of the EU's impact in the Middle East was an even clearer case study than that of the former Yugoslavia. Ginsberg's third case study deals with how the EU has influenced the United States. This chapter has less depth than the other case studies due to the breadth of the topic at hand. One minor criticism of the chapter is that no distinction is made between the EU's influence over U.S. domestic policy (e.g., the death penalty) and its influence over U.S. foreign policy, which seem to be very different issues.

At the conclusion of each chapter, the author provides an extensive table of each issue or input that was examined in each case study. He provides an impressive number of issues/inputs for each case study, and from this empirical research constructs his findings. Although Ginsberg provides many examples of EU involvement or lack thereof, he does not qualitatively distinguish the importance of one event over another. If the EU had a significant impact on a significant event, it should hold greater weight than its impact on a less important event.

Overall, this is a well-researched book of impressive quality. The theoretical framework is well thought out and appropriately addresses the role of the EU. I would highly recommend this book for its historical and empirical strength and its relevance to current world events. Roy Ginsberg has taken on a very important and complex issue in his book and he rises to the occasion.

Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Nigeria. By Ufot B. Inamete. Selinsgrove, PA: Susquehanna University Press, 2001. 313p. \$48.50.

Michael Anda, University of Arkansas at Little Rock

This elaborate study analyzes the Nigerian foreign policy decision-making structures and processes from 1960 (when Nigeria became an independent country) until 1999. Using Graham Allison's conceptual models of decision making (the rational-actor model, the organizational process model, and the bureaucratic politics model), Ufot Inamete examines how foreign policy decision making during the Balewa, Ironsi, Gowon, Muhammed/Obasanjo, Shagari, Buhari, Babangida, Shonekan, Abacha, Abubakar, and Obasanjo governments manifested both changes and continuities (p. 289). Importantly, theory from Allison's model is well integrated with the substantive and analytical portions of the book, and, thus, it goes beyond the theory of a strong-leader approach in Third World countries to demonstrate that developing countries do have organizational structures that deal with foreign policies.

From the Balewa to the Obasanjo government, foreign policy decision-making dynamics mostly reflected the rational-actor model. In the areas of the economic and cultural components of foreign policy, where the Federal Ministry of External Affairs had to work with other ministries and agencies, some tendencies of the bureaucratic politics model of foreign policy decision making often cropped up. However, this model was often superseded by the rationalactor model of decision making in the final phases of foreign policy. In the aspects of political, security, cultural, and economic components of foreign relations that dealt with routine and mundane activities, the foreign policy decision-making dynamics mostly reflected the organizational process model, since the ministries or agencies involved often simply followed the standard operating procedures of decision making used in such ministries or agencies (p. 292).

The foreign policy decision-making system in Nigeria is complex and Inamete's research shows that various organs, ministries, and agencies were involved in all its facets. This study shows that such federal ministries as those for external affairs, trade, and information are deeply involved in the shaping of the country's foreign relations (p. 289).

The external affairs ministry remained at the hub of decision making in terms of the political dimensions of the country's foreign policy. During the Balewa government, the office of the prime minister handled much of the foreign policy formulation rather than the Federal Ministry of External Affairs. The Supreme Military Council and the Supreme Military Headquarters managed a significant portion of the formulation activities that the Federal Ministry of External Affairs dealt with during the Muhammed/Obasanjo government. In the current Obasanjo government, the presidency is active in some foreign policy formulation (p. 290).

As this study shows, certain national leadership bodies played important roles as foreign policy decision-making coordinating structures. In cases of vital and sensitive foreign policy issues, the final decisions were made by these bodies: for example, the decision of Nigeria to recognize the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government (during the Muhammed/Obasanjo government), the decision to nationalize the British Petroleum Company in Nigeria (during the Muhammed/Obasanjo government), the decision to boycott the 1986 Edinburgh Commonwealth of Nations Games (during the Babangida government), and the decision to lay the foundations for the formation of the African Petroleum Producers' Association (during the Babangida government).

Since the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Federal Ministry of National Planning has had primary charge of Nigeria's relations with this regional body. Thus, this ministry is responsible for one of the most important foreign policy goals of Nigeria—the economic integration of the West African subregion, with the attendant increase in Nigeria's economic and, in recent times, military role in this subregion. The Federal Ministry of External Affairs plays a subsidiary role in terms of handling ECOWAS affairs. This means that the Federal Ministry of National Planning is primarily in charge of Nigeria's multilateral international relations in the West African subregion, with the Federal Ministry of External Affairs handling bilateral international relations.

State governments sometimes get involved in helping to shape the country's foreign relations, especially the leaders of states that share some of their borders with a foreign country. They assist the relevant federal organs, ministries, and agencies in managing or minimizing border conflicts and promoting economic and cultural contacts with bordering countries. Significantly, the cultural heritage that some of the border states share with neighboring countries also prompts them to promote cultural and economic links (p. 293). Yet, the author argues that Nigeria's repeated mediatory involvements in Chad have been dictated "by the imperatives of national security rather than any pan-African ideals" (p. 92).

From the Balewa to the Obasanjo government, the various components of foreign policy are shown to have manifested themselves differently. The Balewa government emphasized the political components. The Ironsi and later the Shonekan governments were very brief and also had very unstable domestic political systems. The Gowon government, during the civil war, gave much attention to the security components of foreign policy due to the need for arms to handle the conflict. After the war, attention was devoted to the economic components of foreign policy because that government led and championed the creation of ECOWAS and also because petroleum export revenues were increasing greatly. The Muhammed/Obasanjo government had a more assertive foreign policy profile and a stronger role in Africa—thus focusing more on the political components of foreign policy. During the Shagari government, all the salient components of foreign policy were handled in a mostly routine way since a nonassertive foreign policy posture was in

The Buhari government's strong stand on the problem of undocumented aliens from neighboring countries, its general determination to stop the smuggling of goods through its borders, and its desire to extradite former politicians to Nigeria to face corruption charges led to an emphasis on the security dimension of foreign policy. However, during the Babangida government, the economic facet was formally adopted as the primary focus of the country's foreign policy. Nigeria's very active, elaborate, and expansive role in Liberia and Sierra Leone, as well as in the United Nations peacekeeping missions in various parts of the world, meant that the security aspect of foreign policy was also very important during the Babangida government. The emphasis on economic and security facets of foreign policy continued during the Abacha, Abubakar, and Obasanjo governments.

The book is very detailed about the Muhammed/Obasanjo government. As noted earlier, the regime formally placed Africa as the centerpiece of Nigeria's foreign policy. Many succeeding governments have continued to see Africa in this way. Nigeria's foreign missions in Africa, in terms of both staffing and material resources, have been strengthened. The salient dimensions of Nigeria's foreign relations have focused on Africa. Despite Babangida's emphasis on the economic facet of foreign policy, Nigeria's economy took a turn for the worse during his era; the Nigerian economy (especially the currency) was greatly devalued during his regime. Was the international political economy largely to blame for this? This well-written book builds upon existing scholarship and is highly recommended.

The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States. By Robert Jackson. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 464p. \$29.25.

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Robert Jackson's recent book The Global Covenant is a work in the tradition of the international society school that extends the perspective of that school to today's world events and theoretical debates. Jackson's argument has several important components: that we live in a society of states that operates according to particular norms having significant ethical implications for the conduct of world politics; that this society of states can be distinguished from both the amoral perspective of the (neo)realists and the universalism of cosmopolitans; that this world must be examined primarily through the words and actions of statespeople, its primary articulators; that this world is distinguished by values of antipaternalism, normative pluralism, and the observance of sovereign rights of nonintervention and self-determination; and that recent crises (e.g., the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, etc.) demonstrate more the continued durability of this world (which has existed roughly since Westphalia) than its decline or demise.

Taken together, the components of Jackson's thesis form a strong argument that draws on previous work, including primarily that of Hedley Bull, whose name is synonymous with the international society school, but also from Michael Oakeshott in theory and Terry Nardin in law. Jackson, however, employs the insights from these bodies of scholarship to develop his own thesis regarding the form, normative and ethical implications, and durability of the "global covenant." This thesis also draws on his own previous work on Africa. It is certainly a thesis that holds considerable power and therefore must be treated seriously. It is also a thesis that remains problematic, and Jackson's assessment of its critics is generally inadequate.

The global covenant, for Jackson, is both an empirical fact and something to be valued normatively. It is based on the concept of formal, de jure sovereignty in international law: that is, the notion that states respect each other's territorial integrity and political independence and thus refrain from any threat or use of force that violates another's sovereign boundaries. The global covenant, as such, also reduces "unnecessary political confrontation based on value conflict" (p. 182) over such issues as religion and ideology, and is therefore to be valued as contributing to international order and peace.

The concept of the global covenant is based, for Jackson, on understanding international politics as a human activity and a type of human relations. Focusing on the human and rejecting the idea that international relations are determined by mechanical forces distinguishes his conception (and the international society school in general) from many forms of realism, particularly neorealism. On the other hand, Jackson insists that his conceptualization of world politics differs significantly from other powerful conceptualizations articulated by critical theorists and constructivists. While his critiques of these bodies of theory are not very satisfying (for example, he often charges poststructuralists of various kinds with making "category mistakes," but does not sufficiently account for the

partiality of his own categories), he spends more time in differentiating his conceptualization from critical cosmopolitans such as Richard Falk. Here, Jackson employs the concept of the global covenant to take issue with the activism of contemporary humanitarian interventionists (among whom Falk is not easily placed). Jackson raises critical issues for debates about intervention, the export of democracy, and what is commonly called humanitarian action today.

Jackson argues that there is no basis in the global covenant for these types of intervention. For example, despite the existence of what he and others call "failed states," usually in Africa, that is, states that exist in name only but "cannot or will not safeguard minimal civil conditions for their populations" (p. 296), there is nothing that justifies intervention on the part of humanitarians or democracies to put things right. This is a powerful Kantian argument, one that many of those who disagree with Jackson on other grounds would strongly support. However, in making this argument, Jackson attempts to elide much of what actually goes on in world politics.

Jackson wants to focus on the "human," rather than the mechanical, and explicitly states that his liberal view of the global covenant precludes cosmopolitan universalism with regard to the type of values that should be practiced within states. Thus, he distinguishes between societas and universitas. The former is a juridical conceptualization of the relations between states, whereas the latter, for Jackson, is "sociological" and cannot, therefore, be addressed within the confines of the global covenant. While it is fine from this point of view (as well as many others) to criticize value-based universalism, Jackson does not sufficiently acknowledge that in promoting the global covenant as both empirical fact and worthy of normative support, he, too, is engaging in a type of universalism that can easily be questioned. Moreover, he does not escape from either ideological or sociological preconceptions. His conceptualization, while powerful and in many ways useful, promotes one layer of sociological understanding—that long promoted by diplomats and more recently by many international relations theorists—over others. It also reveals a worldview based, despite his own partial criticism of it, on what we might call colonial and/or paternalistic understandings of power politics. For example, the Persian Gulf War, which he justifies in a manner more thoughtful than most, can also be criticized from an international society perspective on paternalistic grounds.

It is interesting, moreover, that Jackson strongly adheres to a notion of security that limits it to the idea of individual and state "safety." While this is certainly an important aspect of security, adhering to it as the only definition that counts is a matter of contention, one easily challenged by both postcolonial and feminist theorists. How, for example, can we say that the threat of war looms larger for most people in sub-Saharan Africa than the threat of bodily harm from AIDS? Yet the latter is excluded from Jackson's limited conceptualization of security. In including the AIDS crisis or economic devastation in our understandings of security, one does not, as Jackson would have it, engage in "muddled thinking." Rather, to include such issues is merely to acknowledge that, as Jackson argues later in support of his conceptualization of the global covenant, people conceptualize the world differently and hold differing values and virtues preeminent. Following from this, the conception of security most important to some people in the First World or to (male) elites is surely not that which is critical for many others, including Third World women and/or those ravaged by AIDS, hunger, or environmental catastrophe. Jackson's antipaternalist stance, based on classical political philosophy, would do well to incorporate the critically important insights of contemporary feminist international relations scholarship in this regard, namely, that the global covenant is itself a gendered construction that benefits some and ignores or marginalizes others.

Such a recognition is necessary for any fully realized notion of value pluralism in our world. Jackson makes an important argument with many thoughtful implications for world politics today. But his central thesis still provides us with only one view of international politics, which is and will continue to be contested, both theoretically and substantively.

Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure. By Bruce D. Jones. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001. 200p. \$49.95.

Barbara F. Walter, University of California, San Diego

By almost all indicators, Rwanda's civil war should have ended in a successful negotiated settlement. Both the Tutsi rebels and the Rwandan government had agreed to participate in negotiations brokered by a team of Tanzanian mediators whom most people considered highly skilled. The two parties to the negotiations were able to reach and sign a detailed peace settlement that guaranteed both parties representation in the legislature and a set percentage of slots in the military. And the United Nations offered to "guarantee" the security of the two sides during the implementation period. Almost all factors purported to lead to a peaceful solution were present at the time the Arusha accords were signed in 1994. Rwanda's civil war, however, did not end peacefully. Instead, a peace process that seemingly had all the elements of success ended in one of the most rapid genocides in recorded history.

Bruce Jones attempts to explain this puzzle in his wellresearched book on the subject. Why did the Rwandan peace process fail despite the efforts of so many international and regional actors? And what can the international community learn from this failure? Existing explanations for the failed peace process and subsequent genocide tend to fall into two camps. Journalists have tended to view the posttreaty genocide as a continuation of the decades-long ethnic feud between the minority Tutsis, who had enjoyed a privileged position in society during German and Belgian colonial rule, and majority Hutus, who dominated government at the time of the peace in negotiations. The New York Times (Donatella Lorch, "UN in Rwanda Says It Is Powerless to Halt the Violence," 15 April 1994, sec. A3), for example, described the genocide as "centuries-old tribal hatred," while USA Today (Marilyn Greene, "Two U.S. Envoys Dispatched to Rwanda," 3 May 1994, sec. A5) portrayed the killings as "long-smoldering tribal hatred boiled over." Academics, on the other hand, have tended to place blame on a flawed peace process that gave key segments of the government few incentives to implement the deal (see Rene Lemarchand, Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide, 1994). Uneven treaty terms imposed on the Rwandan government by outside states not only gave Hutu elites few incentives to implement their side of the bargain, but also created a deeply disaffected but heavily armed minority group, the Akazu, with no stake in the successful implementation of the accords.

Jones, however, correctly points out that the Akazu's first victims were not Tutsis but politicians, journalists, and civil rights activists who supported a democratic transition, many of whom were Hutus. Ethnic hatreds and fear, therefore, cannot fully account for the outbreak of violence. Jones also argues against those explanations that place the blame solely on the terms of the Arusha accords that favored the Tutsi rebels. President Juvenal Habyarimana certainly faced considerable outside pressure to reform his government and negotiate with the rebels, but Jones points out that "at several points"

the external delegations, or observers, actually tried to limit the concessions made in Arusha," fearing that government concessions were too generous and could create a backlash

Instead, Jones convincingly argues that peacemaking in Rwanda failed due to a combination of four factors: the unwillingness of the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) to offer the incumbent regime more attractive terms; the lack of a coherent and consistent plan on the part of regional and international actors to help implement the accords; the lack of a coherent strategy by outsiders to manage "spoiler" groups; and a lack of will by the major powers to become and remain involved once the genocide was under way. Most of the blame, therefore, is placed squarely on third-party peacemak-

To substantiate his argument, Jones offers a detailed account of the entire peacemaking process, and this is his greatest contribution to the growing literature on the Rwanda tragedy. Numerous accounts exist of the Rwandan genocide, but only Jones uncovers and recounts the details of the negotiations themselves. He begins with the opening set of peace talks, describing the delegations to the talks, the observers, and the mediator. He then moves through the issues discussed at each of the negotiations, the agenda, the timetable, and the key stumbling blocks on which the negotiations stalled. Scholars interested in conflict resolution and in understanding the causal process by which a conflict moves from war to peace will find no better descriptive account of a settlement process than Jones's account of the process held in Arusha.

What is the main lesson drawn? Rwanda, according to Jones, is not a tale that illustrates the need for early intervention by outside parties. Rather, it is a cautionary tale about the potentially disastrous consequences of peacemaking done poorly. In the case of Rwanda, peacemaking failed because those involved in the process, especially the United Nations, failed to understand that rebuilding a state in the aftermath of civil war requires a difficult choice. Either peace treaties must incorporate potential spoilers into any new government, or third parties must be willing to actively contain them. If spoilers are neither included nor contained, as was the case in Rwanda, disastrous consequences are likely.

Taken together, Jones's careful analysis of the peace process, his collection of information surrounding these negotiations, and his final conclusions will be a must-read for scholars interested in the dynamics of bargaining in war resolution, and for policymakers interested in designing more effective strategies for conflict management.

Money and Power in Europe: The Political Economy of European Monetary Cooperation. By Matthias Kaelberer. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 254p. \$49.50.

Peter Henning Loedel, West Chester University

The puzzle of European monetary cooperation—namely, why sovereign nation-states would relinquish monetary autonomy in return for some measure of exchange rate stability—has produced a growing body of highly informed and theoretically strong works on European integration. Matthais Kaelberer's account fits nicely into this mold. The author argues convincingly that European monetary cooperation—especially Germany's leading contribution to the European Monetary Union (EMU)—is the result of a structural conflict of interest between weak and strong currency countries over the rules of monetary cooperation. In laying out his "structural" argument, Kaelberer's analysis, as he notes in his own words, "complements rather than substi-

tutes for other explanations of European monetary cooperation" (p. 6). In making this claim, his work will not settle the extremely lively theoretical debate on European integration, and European monetary cooperation more specifically. However, it is an important contribution to the literature and fills in some of the theoretical void involving concepts of "leadership" and "asymmetry" of power that help explain European integration.

Kaelberer's work is developed clearly and concisely and his analysis unfolds systematically. The author wastes no time in developing his thesis. He argues that the "relative bargaining power of both weak and strong currency countries has shaped an enduring patter of negotiations over the rules of exchange rate cooperation in Europe" (p. 1). Bluntly stated, strong currency countries—Germany in particular—bring to bear their structural power in the process of European monetary negotiations. Germany, for example, maintains influence over the bargaining agenda, is more successful in getting what it wants during negotiations, and strongly shapes the final outcomes of the negotiation. These conclusions are neither new nor surprising, but the framework that the author employs to account for Germany's structural power is illuminating and well worth the read. Furthermore, the argument highlights why, in particular, Germany would sacrifice some measure of monetary sovereignty in return for exchange rate stability (other works in this area include Karl Kaltenthaler's Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money, 1998).

What accounts for Germany's structural power? It is not, as many might suspect, the Bundesbank's authority in Germany and Europe (e.g., Dorothee Heisenberg, The Mark of the Bundesbank, 1999). Rather, Kaelberer focuses on two critical explanatory factors contributing to Germany's structural power. First, Germany's historically strong balance of payments position, which provides it greater freedom or "choice" (p. 2) in terms of macroeconomic adjustment, allows it opportunities that weak currency countries with negative balance of payment positions do not have. Second, Germany's leadership in providing a "standard setter" (p. 3) for monetary negotiations helped to focus the negotiations on a set of rules generally in line with German policy-based preferences. European monetary cooperation would ultimately be determined by the interplay of these two factors—Germany's bargaining leverage and German policy-based leadership.

Chapters 2 and 3 develop the core of Kaelberer's argument. The author is careful to fully operationalize and define his key concepts and variables. While these two chapters require some extra time to push through all the ins and outs of his analysis, his attention to detail and his own recognition of the strengths and weaknesses of his approach add to the credibility of his theoretical framework. He demonstrates a strong command of the minutiae of macroeconomic adjustment policies, balance of payments politics, and international cooperation. He is well versed in the literature on all of these subjects and provides adequate documentation and biblio-

graphic support for his arguments.

Chapter 2 lays out in great detail the "structural logic" of Germany's strong currency status and the bargaining advantage that such leverage provides in terms of negotiations. Bottom line: Germany maintained a strong ability to maintain macroeconomic autonomy and to externalize the costs of macroeconomic adjustment required to bring Europe's currencies closer together. Chapter 3 tackles the slippery notion of leadership. Germany's leadership, for example, is not resource based. In fact, Kaelberer is insistent that German leadership should not be analyzed in terms of hegemonic stability theory. Rather, Germany's leadership is policy based setting the focal point for European monetary negotiations on the basis of specific policies. Furthermore, the focal point would have to coincide with Germany's insistence that any cooperation not encroach upon domestic priorities.

The rest of the book is divided into four chapters that examine five major attempts to achieve greater bargaining exchange-rate cooperation. The cases include the Action Program of 1962 (Chapter 4), the Werner Report and the operation of the Snake (Chapter 5), the European Monetary System (Chapter 6), and the politics of European Monetary Union (Chapter 7). The chapters are uniformly well written and developed, and Kaelberer has a firm understanding of the historical details of each round of bargaining. Much of this material has been examined before, and those familiar with the cases will not find much new material here—other than in the notable way the author applies his theoretical framework. Moreover, while his contention that his work is the "first book" (p. 3) that analyzes the history of European monetary cooperation from the 1960s to the 1990s is a bit overstated (see Kenneth Dyson, Elusive Union: The Process of Economic and Monetary Union in Europe, 1994), the historical analyses do provide a convincing account of the ongoing patterns of European exchange-rate cooperation based on German structural power and Germany's policybased leadership. Most notable is Chapter 4's analysis of the Action Program, which sheds new light on the early efforts at European monetary cooperation.

The weakest link in Kaelberer's analysis is his concept of leadership. For example, he notes that Germany's leadership position "of monetary strength...derives largely from its balance-of-payments position. In other words, its monetary power is not so much resource based as policy based" (p. 56). Yet one could argue that the generally large German balance-of-payments surpluses are indeed resource based. This resource provided the Germans with the leverage (power) over their European partners. Is that not a form of hegemony? In short, Kaelberer's analysis of German leadership will not settle the debate over German hegemony in Europe. In fact, it may provoke some heated responses.

Finally, the implication of some of the analysis—most clearly set forth in Chapter 2 (pp. 22–26)—that Germany maintained great freedom or "choice" in terms of macroeconomic adjustment underestimates the powerful political constraints imposed on German policymakers. With such constraints coming from the Bundesbank, from domestic and partisan interests, and from European and global actors (the United States in particular), German government officials were constantly under pressure to make concessions on macroeconomic adjustment. While Kaelberer duly notes these concessions, his account only highlights the limits of German "choice."

These points should not distract from this important contribution to the ongoing debates on European integration and monetary cooperation. The book is highly recommended for all those interested in understanding the process of European integration and international relations theory more broadly. Most importantly, students and scholars of Germany's interests and power will find much to dissect and debate.

Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. By Stuart J. Kaufman. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001. 262p. \$45.00 cloth, \$19.95 paper.

Chaim Kaufmann, Lehigh University

Stuart Kaufman's *Modern Hatreds* is a serious, original contribution on a highly policy relevant question, which is strengthened by his scrupulous case study design and deep regional expertise. Kaufman asks: when do intercommunal rivalries escalate to large-scale ethnic wars? His answer integrates a

number of existing strands of explanation around the central idea that myths, or as he calls them, ethnic symbols, are the root cause of ethnic violence. His core claim is that "people make political choices based on emotion and in response to symbols" (p. 29). Ethnic wars results from the lethal combination of two particularly noxious types of myths: myths justifying the political domination of specific territory, and myths of past atrocities by others that lead to widespread fears of genocide. The realities behind these myths are far less important than that they are pervasive "in each group's mainstream history texts written before the conflict began" (p. 30).

Thus, Kaufman draws on both of the existing mainstream approaches to explaining the proximate causes of ethnic wars—elite manipulation (mainly constructivist) models and structuralist (a.k.a. realist) explanations. Constructivist explanations operate top-down, explaining large-scale ethnic violence as a side effect of identity manipulation efforts by political entrepreneurs whose main goal is usually simply to retain power. The best example is V. P. Gagnon's "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia" (International Security 19 [1994/95]: 130-66). Gagnon explains that in the late 1980s, Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian Communist Party defused a growing crisis of regime legitimacy by wrapping themselves in Serbian nationalism, blaming all Serbia's problems on exploitation by other Yugoslav nationalities. This identity manipulation effort successfully preserved Milosevic's authority but at the same time set the conditions for the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and eventually Kosovo.

Structuralist explanations, by contrast, operate bottom-up. As Barry Posen explains in "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict" (Survival 35 [spring 1993]: 27-47), neither particularly bad prior histories of intergroup hostility nor malicious manipulation by elites are either necessary or sufficient to cause serious ethnic violence. Whenever communal groups can no longer trust the state to protect them against possible intergroup violence, all groups must mobilize for self-defense. Often, however, the best measures for group defense necessarily also threaten others. The most common, recruitment of ethnically based militias and the hypernationalist rhetoric that often accompanies this—are easily observed by other groups and quite rightly perceived by them as threatening. This "security dilemma" is most severe when relatively low military-technical sophistication forces both sides to rely on mass armies, and when patterns of settlement of the rival groups are deeply intermixed, making it impossible for either side to define defensible enclaves without first engaging in offensive ethnic cleansing against others. Posen argues that the decline in central authority in Yugoslavia following Tito's death created conditions that led to the Croatian and Bosnian wars in exactly this way.

Kaufman's explanations operate both top-down or bottomup, sometimes focusing on prior mass attachment to dangerous symbolic beliefs, and sometimes on elite manipulation in the immediate prewar crisis. Although he recognizes absence of a central authority to suppress violence as an important enabling factor, he argues that intergroup security dilemmas are principally the results of symbolic myths and fears, not independent causes of escalation (see diagrams, p. 35). Thus, his main intellectual target is Posen. The main thrust of his six case studies—Nagorno-Karabakh, the Abkhazian and South Ossetian Wars in Georgia, the 1991-92 civil war in Moldova, and the Croatian and Macedonian secessions from Yugoslavia—is to show that in all six, the strength (or weakness) of symbolically generated hatreds and fears was sufficient to explain the outcomes but that structural conditions were neither necessary nor sufficient.

The case study work is excellent; well-organized, detailed. honest, and methodologically sophisticated. On three of the cases—Armenia, Moldova, and Georgia—Kaufman is himself one of the leading English-speaking scholars. The cases studied are a near universe of the southwestern fringe of the collapsing socialist camp in the late 1980s to early 1990s. Sticking to the period of socialist collapse strengthens the design, allowing Kaufman to hold more or less constant such possible perturbing variables as major cultural differences and prior institutional strength, avoiding the necessity to get into fullscale debates with authors like Samuel P. Huntington about "civilizations" or Jack Snyder and Karen Ballentine about democratization. Kaufman is careful to ensure the comparability of the sets of questions asked of each of the cases, and to focus on the theoretically important issues. In sum, he has set up a nice level playing field for two midlevel theories of ethnic war: his own symbolic politics theory versus structurally based security dilemma explanations.

However, one of the contenders—Kaufman's—remains essentially unfalsifiable because the core independent variable—ethnic symbols—is not well defined. Kaufman does not set operational limits on what sorts of beliefs or facts should qualify as the sorts of symbols that should be expected to cause ethnic conflict. For instance, in some instances, grievances that he calls symbolic actually appear to be quite real material grievances, such as ethnic preference in awarding better jobs. In other words, he establishes no clear analytic boundary between "symbol" and "structure," making it impossible to carry out crucial tests that could falsify his theory.

As a result, in the end Kaufman loses his own argument. Near the end of each case he quite rightly devotes a section to asking: "Could this war have been avoided? What would it have taken to prevent it?" If either symbolic politics or elite identity manipulation were behind the outbreak of a given war, then it should be possible to identify particular decisions by particular leaders that, if they had chosen differently, would have prevented escalation of the conflict. Of his six cases, Kaufman can credibly claim one and effectively surrenders two others, while three remain indeterminate. He is convincing that the war in Moldova was fully avoidable, although this was by far the smallest. In two other cases, he is compelled to admit that structural conditions made war unavoidable. The Nagorno-Karabakh war was driven by the insecurity of the isolated Armenian minority, which was so severe that no plausible level of reassurance could have satisfied them (pp. 76-78), while in the South Ossetian case, initially relatively mild chauvinist pressures, mainly from the Georgian side, were enough to set off an uncontrollable multiround spiral of escalating mutual fear and mutual mobilization (p. 125). The last three cases are indeterminate. Macedonia's secession was threatened by neither a security dilemma nor especially dangerous myths. The Abkhazian story is too complex to be called decisively in favor of either theory, while scholars have long contested the Yugoslav cases; Kaufman claims that war erupted only because key leaders intentionally started it in March 1991 (p. 191), but he provides no new evidence to sway the balance of the existing debate.

The greatest need now is for genuine crucial tests, of two types. First are cases in which anarchy, geography, and the other structural conditions pointed to by Posen were unusually bad, but in the absence of particularly bitter prior conflict history the supply of manipulable bad symbols was low. An example of a hard case for this condition would be the Arab-Israeli conflict, whose conflict history and associated myths were relatively mild before 1929 or even 1947. Second are cases with long conflict histories that provided ample supplies of bad myths, but where largely separated communities

faced only weak security dilemmas. A hard case of this type might be Cyprus since 1974, which has been tense but almost completely peaceful. Undoubtedly, several good Ph.D. dissertations will be built in part on Kaufman's book.

The Real and the Ideal: Essays on International Relations in Honor of Richard H. Ullman. Edited by Anthony Lake and David Ochmanek. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001. 320p. \$45.00.

Miriam Fendius Elman, Arizona State University

This collection of essays celebrates more than four decades of international relations research by the distinguished scholar and practitioner Richard H. Ullman. The book demonstrates the dilemma faced by the organizers of a Festschrift for a prolific author with wide-ranging interests: Should the chapters focus on, and collectively do justice to, one topic alone; or should the book take a wide-ranging approach that is more representative of the broad spectrum of subjects analyzed by the honoree? The editors of this volume have some success in following both routes simultaneously, albeit with some necessary trade-offs.

Written primarily by Ullman's former students at Princeton University who have gone on to make their own considerable contributions to the field, it is unsurprising that that the chapters are substantively rich and thoroughly researched. Most of the essays focus on the theme of human rights and intervention: Does international anarchy rule out the possibility for ethical behavior? What lessons are to be learned from recent U.S. policy in Kosovo and Somalia? How can the United States improve its track record in humanitarian intervention? This focus appropriately reflects Ullman's extensive writings on U.S. foreign policy in the Third World. Particularly noteworthy was a controversial article that challenged the Carter administration to bring down Idi Amin's regime by boycotting Ugandan coffee—even if doing so ultimately meant violating state sovereignty and GATT rules (Richard Ullman, "Human Rights and Economic Power: The United States versus Idi Amin," Foreign Affairs 56 [April 1978]: 529-42). Building on Ullman's work in this area, 9 of the volume's 13 chapters assess humanitarian intervention and, more generally, the use of force in defense of interests that go beyond traditional definitions of national security.

Following the editors' helpful overview of Ullman's work (Chapter 1), the first three chapters of the volume, in addition to Chapter 9, focus on the philosophical underpinnings of an intervention strategy. Each does a good job of demonstrating how a foreign policy resting on both the rule of law and the necessities of power might be constructed. For example, inspired by Ullman's insistence that the United States could do both "good (promoting values)" and "well (promoting interests)" in its foreign policy (p. 35), David C. Gompert convincingly argues (Chapter 2) that the way we think about intervention is slowly but surely moving into line with Ullman's insistence that intervention is required when foreign governments pass the "boundaries of decency" in their treatment of their own citizens (pp. 15, 45). According to Gompert, illegitimate regimes-states that have not secured the respect and allegiance of their people—can no longer bank on "shield[ing] barbarism" (p. 38) behind the principle of sovereignty, which "depends on lawfulness, not only in a state's behavior but also in the basis for its existence" (p. 39).

Michael W. Doyle's (Chapter 3) essay, which also examines the trade-offs between ethical and pragmatic considerations in international intervention, is a gem. Doyle argues that "international anarchy does not make ethical behavior impossible" (p. 52), but it does provide the "grounds for

cautious modesty" (p. 54) in the way that we practice it. As he correctly notes, humanitarian intervention involves making controversial judgment calls because it is plagued by both moral diversity and uncertainty: "It is hard enough to understand what is happening in Boston, New York, London, or Chicago; do we know what to approve or condemn in Eritrea?" (p. 54).

Chapters 4 to 8 offer assessments of recent U.S. efforts to apply power on behalf of humanitarian goals. I. M. (Mac) Destler (Chapter 5) presents new polling data suggesting that the American public supports "sensible" international engagements "to right grievous wrongs," provided that there is a reasonable likelihood of success (p. 87). Thomas G. Weiss (Chapter 6) shows how humanitarian values have influenced the definition of U.S. national interests in recent years. Eliminating ethnic cleansing, for example, is no longer considered a human rights policy that neglects national interests but a policy that is a vital interest (p. 102). Michael O'Hanlon (Chapter 7) revisits Kosovo and Rwanda and suggests steps that the United States and other NATO members might take to restructure their militaries in order to improve their capacity to prevent genocide. Finally, David Callahan (Chapter 8) offers a comprehensive analysis of the sources for ethnic violence in Kosovo in the 1990s and the belated U.S. military response.

The final four chapters in the volume move away from the focus on U.S. intervention abroad and examine the NATO alliance, U.S.-European relations, Germany's foreign policy in the 1990s, and the future of security competition in East Asia. The compromise between depth of analysis and breadth of coverage means that these four chapters sit somewhat uneasily with the earlier part of the book. That being said, since each of these essays is of such high quality, it would have been a pity to exclude them in the name of thematic integration. Ronald R. Krebs (Chapter 10) examines alliance politics, suggesting that rather than promoting cooperation and a collective identity, alliances such as NATO foster conflict among their members. Krebs does a superb job of critiquing the constructivist reading of alliances, but since his essay is also critical of the liberal perspective, it stands in stark contrast to the essays that proceed it. Additionally, while the earlier chapters are more concerned with U.S policymaking and the controversial empirical cases to hand, Krebs's chapter is given over to theory development. Similarly, the chapters by John S. Duffield, Thomas Banchoff, and David B. H. Denoon (Chapters 11 to 13) tease out the foreign policy predictions of alternative perspectives—realism, constructivism, and liberalism—at the cost of deflecting attention away from the volume's earlier guiding theme of human rights and intervention. In addition, Denoon's game theoretical approach to alignments in East Asia juxtaposes with the main methodological thrust of the volume.

The most striking lacuna in an otherwise excellent book is the authors' reticence to engage Leslie H. Gelb's commitment in the Foreword to elucidate Ullman's "commonsense" liberalism (p. ix). This is unfortunate because such a discussion would have dovetailed nicely with contemporary controversies in the international relations subfield. Despite the proliferation of liberal theorizing in recent years, there is still no consensus on how to delineate the research program's core elements. Some scholars contend that only arguments about state-society relations are liberal, and that claims about international institutions and ideas are best left to different programmatic areas (Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," International Organization 51 [Autumn 1997]: 513-53). Reiterating and popularizing Ullman's understanding of liberalism would have provided an important opportunity to weigh in on the debate, and in particular the direction that liberal theory has taken.

Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention. By Anthony F. Lang, Jr. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2001. 256p. \$65.50 cloth, \$21.95 paper.

Richard W. Mansbach, Iowa State University

Anthony F. Lang's Agency and Ethics is an effort to reinterpret international intervention from a normative perspective, normative in this instance referring to activities that construct identities and provide policy guidance. Although he describes himself as a "realist" (p. 3), Lang sets out to explain the outcome of military intervention in terms of the interaction between the normative dimension and the "political," which he defines as the competitive elements in a situation. He argues that states intervene in one another's affairs owing to what they believe are the norms that define their role(s) in international politics, and he shows how norms produce conflict as well as cooperation. In the cases that follow, Lang focuses on three norms—liberalism, colonialism, and humanitarianism: The first focuses on democracy, individual rights, and national self-determination; the second on responsibility for politically and economically less developed societies; and the third on assisting those in need. He ascribes the failure of intervention to normative disagreement among both friends and adversaries within and between participating countries, and he uses what Alexander George calls a "focused comparison" of cases to illustrate his claim.

Like increasing numbers of contemporary international relations scholars, Lang is reacting to what he believes is neorealism's distortion of the "classical" realism typically associated with E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau, in which facts and values remain intermingled. He also rejects the structural determinism that is closely associated with neorealism. Instead, Lang argues persuasively that state agency is dominant in international politics as viewed through the prism of intervention. In constructing his argument regarding norms, he makes use of those he refers to as "positive constructivists," "legal constructivists," and "ethicists" (p. 5). Lang's position regarding agency is based largely on his provocative reading of Hannah Arendt, especially her book (1958) The Human Condition. From Arendt, he derives his definition of politics and the relationship between action and self-definition. More importantly, Lang views Arendt's argument as more centrally normative than ontological.

Although Lang's tilt toward agency is desirable and defensible, the aggregation principle he uses to determine state agency is less so. Here he turns to Morgenthau for assistance, especially the contentious claim that the state as a collective actor only exists at times of military or diplomatic action. Since the cleavages and conflicts within states are every bit as common in those moments (as his cases make clear), Lang's argument is less convincing here. In contemporary international politics and eroding state sovereignty, it has become increasingly questionable whether or not there is a "national purpose" (p. 18) and, if so, whether or not any diplomat can represent it. In fairness, he does admit that his readers may conclude that he is a realist after all (p. 21). In addition, his debt to constructivism is unmistakable.

Following his riveting introductory chapter, Lang turns to three twentieth-century cases of failed military interventions—the American, British, and French incursions into Bolshevik Russia at the end of World War I; the British and French (and Israeli) occupation of the Suez Canal zone in 1956; and the United Nations and United States intervention in Somalia in 1992–93. All are fascinating cases,

but the selection criteria that the author uses are not entirely convincing. It is hard to see why the fact that they are from different time periods in the same century justifies their selection. In addition, it is hard to believe that military intervention has never achieved its objectives. It would assist the reader if the author shared with his readers the cases that were considered and rejected. And if there are any successful interventions, it might be more instructive to examine them and compare them to the failures (as Alexander George did in his *Coercive Diplomacy*, 1995) in order to determine which features were most crucial in determining failure.

In the relatively brief space available, the author does a good job in describing the cases he has selected, though little is added to what we already knew about them. Nevertheless, Lang's explanations of the outcomes of the cases are much more satisfying when the element of normative misunderstanding and collision, especially among allies and domestic agencies or political parties, are integrated in them. Power distribution alone hardly suffices to explain the failure in Russia in 1917 and 1918 or the rapid withdrawal from Somalia in 1993. And Lang's discussion of normative clashes among the French and British, as well as between them and the Americans, adds importantly to an understanding of how three allies brought about a disaster for the Western alliance. What the analyses also need, however, are discussions of why other explanations such as partisan and interagency conflict are not sufficient on their own.

Perhaps the major contribution of this book is its thoughtful and logical evaluation and explanation of why and how state norms, self-identities, and agency are critical to explaining the outcome of military intervention, with its implication for foreign policy more broadly. In particular, Lang's contention that gaps between normative visions are as great a source of conflict as gaps between narrowly defined interests makes this volume worth reading. One need not agree about the particulars to recognize the nature of this contribution in moving us away from sterile power-based explanations. I suspect that we shall see other analyses of this sort in the near future. In particular, I would hope to see follow-up efforts to refine Lang's work and to broaden it to other areas of international politics.

Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War: Allied Force or Forced Allies? Edited by Pierre Martin and Mark R. Brawley. New York: Palgrave, 2001. 246p. \$49.95.

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The obvious advantage of edited collections, such as this interesting book, is that they allow a range of authors with a huge cumulative breath of knowledge about a subject to cover virtually all aspects of it. This they certainly do in *Alliance Politics, Kosovo, and NATO's War*, examining the way in which both NATO as a whole and its most important members reacted to and handled the Kosovo crisis of 2000.

What comes over most clearly from reading the collection is a paradox: The various NATO members reacted in different ways to the crisis in the Balkans, with stances ranging from unease in the case of Italy and the Czech Republic, to wholehearted support and "hawkishness" on the part of the British. Yet NATO remained relatively cohesive throughout, and the allies managed to carry out the air strikes and force Milosevic's exit from Kosovo without any serious fissures developing within the alliance.

A second major theme to emerge from the book is the oversimplicity of many accounts that view NATO either as a badly disguised form of American hegemony or as a European sleight of hand intended to tie the Americans to the Old Continent and to security threats that do not really concern them (see the chapter by Charles Kupchan). In reality, while acting under a variety of different pressures—both external and internal—neither were the various allies dragged into a conflict against their will by Washington, nor did they trap the Americans into a conflict in which they had no interest. A complex and subtle combination of perceptions of national interest, domestic pressures, and human rights concerns conspired to induce each state to participate in the NATO operation of its own free will.

Three of the chapters are particularly rewarding. Alan Henrikson provides a fascinating insight into the arguments surrounding the issue of the legitimacy of NATO's intervention in the Balkans—a subject often overlooked in the more politico-military accounts of the conflict that tend to predominate. Neil Macfarlane considers the challenges that exist to Euro-Atlantic security and argues provocatively that the very lack of these might represent a problem for Europe's security institutions. Underlining the paradoxes and uncertainty of the environment facing the allies (pp. 38-39) he concludes that "the absence of imminent "threats" may weaken the cohesion and diminish members' investment in Alliance structures. This will...draw into question its reputation and its associated dampening effect on potential...processes of conflict on the margins. In this respect, one of the more compelling challenges to European security may be the absence of compelling challenges to European security. The weakening of the Alliance, in turn, may produce the threats that the Alliance could be useful in addressing."

Finally, Louise Richardson provides a clear, analytical account of British policies toward the conflict. Rather than adopting—as, unfortunately, some of the contributors do—a purely descriptive, narrative approach, she sets forward a compelling explanation of why it was that the Blair government, or more precisely Tony Blair, put himself at the forefront of those desiring resolute military action in Kosovo. Comparing various competing explanations, she argues convincingly that one crucial element of any explanation must be quite simply that the British prime minster thought intervening was the right thing to do.

A problem inherent in putting together such a book is that of a lack of overall coherence and fidelity to the themes outlined by the editors. The volume fails to live up to its promise to make a contribution to theoretical debates about alliances. Stephen Walt's chapter is interesting, but it represents little more than a literature review. This would be fine if the theoretical issues he raises were addressed relatively systematically in the subsequent chapters. Yet fleeting references to constructivism and institutionalism take the place of a sustained debate concerning the theoretical implications of the crisis. Perhaps it is more an indictment of the state of the discipline than of the contributors themselves that even with such interesting stories to tell, they felt the need to make token genuflections toward theory. Be this as it may, the book would have been stronger had the theory either not figured at all or been dealt with more systematically throughout.

Finally, for a book that deals with NATO's first explicit involvement in an armed conflict, there was surprisingly little discussion of NATO itself. The chapter entitled "The Atlantic Alliance and the Kosovo Crisis" is in fact about NATO's newest and prospective members, rather than a discussion of NATO per se. What makes this particularly strange is the fact that in both Walt's chapter and thereafter, institutionalist approaches are mentioned as potential ways of explaining the development of the conflict. Yet the defining feature of

many institutionalist approaches is that they focus attention on the nature and functioning of institutions. In a book such as this, it would have been helpful to see a chapter devoted to asking and answering questions such as: Did NATO represent a dependent or independent variable during the conflict? To what extent did the NATO bureaucracy use the conflict as a means of self-legitimation (a point raised fleetingly in the introduction [p. 7, n. 3] but then ignored)? Did the Americans dominate decision making within NATO during the conflict? In this respect, more discussion of the spat between Generals Wesley Clark and Michael Jackson over whether to send troops to the Pristina airport would have been helpful.

This would have been a better collection had it addressed such issues. Yet it would be churlish to end on such a negative note. The book is an enjoyable and informed one that raises many of the major issues connected with NATO's first war. Anyone interested in the Kosovo conflict, and more particularly the West's reaction to the crisis, should certainly read it.

Foreign Policy and the Utopian Imagination. By Susan M. Matarese. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2001. 164p. \$28.95.

H. W. Brands, Texas A&M University

The last decade of the nineteenth century was a traumatic time for many Americans. The federal constitution was a hundred years old, and it no longer fit the nation so neatly as it once had. A new class of economic warlords, commonly called robber barons, made a mockery of some hallowed democratic principles; from behind the walls of their well-defended monopolies they laughed at notions that business should serve the public. "The public be damned!" jeered William Vanderbilt. Meanwhile, millions of immigrants flooded American shores; to many of the native born (or merely earlier arrived), the newcomers appeared an alien horde that would drive down wages, depress the standard of living, and change the character of America even as they were already changing its face. In the West, the frontier was disappearing—in fact, had already disappeared, in the statistical judgment of the director of the 1890 census—depriving the country of the demographic and psychic safety valve that had long bled off the worst of American discontent. As if all this were not enough, the 1890s witnessed the worst depression in American history to that point, closing hundreds of banks and factories and throwing hundreds of thousands of breadwinners out of work and onto the streets and highways.

One response to all this bad news, as Susan M. Matarese demonstrates, was an outpouring of utopian literature. A later generation would consider self-help a private project; the last generation of the nineteenth century adopted a communitarian approach, contending that personal happiness would follow a reorganization of the national life. Some of the road maps to redemption were stunning commercial and popular successes: Edward Bellamy's 1888 dream of a socialist paradise, Looking Backward, sold millions and spawned scores of Bellamy clubs devoted to promoting the peaceful revolution their author-founder described. Other works found smaller niches. Gustavus Pope's 1894 Journey to Mars posited the discovery of a red-planet civilization modeled on the best of American values (and some suboptimal ones as well; the Martians, like Americans since Francis Scott Key, struggled with the "Star-Spangled Banner").

Matarese has performed a valuable service in surveying the literature of the once-and-future America. She has tracked down titles long forgotten (understandably, in many cases)

and identified themes that ran through the genre. Introversionism was one: The utopianists argued that the answer to American woes lay within America itself, and paid little attention to the world beyond American shores. American uniqueness was a second theme: America had little to learn from the rest of the world. Related to American uniqueness was a third theme: an abiding sense of American moral superiority. Americans had the moral capacity to lift themselves above the rest of humanity, and in doing so to set an example for the rest of humanity.

It is when Matarese goes beyond her survey of the utopian literature to attempt a reconstruction of the worldview underpinning American foreign policy at the beginning of the twentieth century that she runs into trouble. Her taxonomy of American thinking on foreign policy is plausible enough. She identifies in her literature three conceptual models for an American role in the world: the United States as moral exemplar, as active crusader, and as benevolent superpower. But when she taxes the utopians for unrealism regarding the true state of the world and for believing that America was "somehow exempted from the ordinary relationships that burden and limit the choices of other nations" (p. 40), the reader is tempted to remind the author that these were, after all, *utopian* novels. The whole point was to ignore reality and create an alternate universe.

More problematic is Matarese's failure to identify a link between what the utopians wrote and what the policymakers did. To be sure, establishing connections of this sort is one of the most difficult tasks of any historian or political scientist. Matarese places her own work in the literature on national images, citing such other authors as Nathan Leites, Alexander George, and Michael Brecher. Yet although these scholars encounter similar problems, the best of their work demonstrates—through the writings and speeches of their subjects—that the policymakers subscribed to the national images the authors identify. In Matarese's case, there is scant effort to show that policymakers actually held the views proffered by the utopian writers. She argues that the utopian views were in the air and intimates that since policymakers breathed that air, they shared the views. Maybe they did. But it is worth remembering that for all the popularity of the utopian genre, most of its authors were considered crackpots. To claim a connection between the utopians and the policymakers is much like saying that American foreign policy today reflects the attitudes of the television series "X-Files." Doubtless there are "X-Files" fans in the State Department and perhaps even in the White House, but there are better explanations for the current condition of American foreign policy.

Matarese fills out her slim book with chapters on the sources of the American national image and on the possible relevance of the utopian literature of the 1890s for the post-Cold War era. On the whole, she provides a welcome overview of the work of some of the big thinkers of American history and diplomacy. Graduate students and nonspecialists will find her notes illuminating, and her appendix of utopian titles will cause many readers to wonder what in the world the authors were writing about, and perhaps to track down those titles themselves.

The International Politics of East Africa. By Robert Pinkney. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001. 242p. \$74.95 cloth, \$24.95 paper.

Claude Welch, State University of New York at Buffalo

Robert Pinkney, a respected British Africanist, takes on an ambitious task: examining the interaction of three Anglophone states (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) with the international community since independence, but primarily since the end of the Cold War opened up new avenues for mutual influence.

I stress the adjective *mutual*, for Pinkney is careful in delineating how and with what degrees of latitude these countries have been able to deal with international financial institutions (IFIs), the European Union, the United States (to a far lesser extent than the EU), and others. As expressed on pages 2–3: "But the realities of power, or lack of it, meant that the room for manoeuvre of African states was severely constrained by the demands of Western governments, supranational bodies and global capital. . . . While African governments might have moved in the direction of economic and political liberalisation anyway, especially in view of the failure of the alternatives, Western pressure left them with little choice."

The International Politics of East Africa has its greatest value, in my estimation, in its portrayal of how the regimes of Presidents Daniel Arap Moi (Kenya), Yoweri Museveni (Uganda) and Ali Hassan Mwinyi (Tanzania) softened these external pressures with a variety of strategies. These ranged across a wide gamut of stalling, partial implementation, tactical concessions, and unfulfilled promises, discussed in detail in Chapters 6 to 8, each devoted to one of the three states.

In terms of organization, the book is divided into four sections. Part I takes on the difficult task of situating East Africa on the world stage during the past decade, a period of major transformation (the end of the Cold War and of apartheid) with immense significance for the region. Pinkney explores East Africa relative to the global political environment, the world of economic ideas, and interaction with Western governments and institutions. Part II, which constitutes the most interesting section, first explores state, society, and external influences, then examines the three states individually. Parts III and IV are relatively brief, examining the search for regional stability and integration, including the newborn East African Co-operation, and wrapping up.

According to Pinkney, East Africa's changing international environment is affected by three factors, none of which will surprise Africanists and readers of the APSR: globalization, the political and economic decline of Africa, and the ending of the Cold War. Each of these significantly reduced the leverage that Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania enjoyed relative to external pressures and, conversely, significantly increased the leverage of the international (read, Western) community. However, the minuets of powers that were danced followed subtle choreographies of their own. All three governments had distinctive power bases, and each was important to the outside world in different ways. Although economic initiatives may have passed largely from African governments to Western governments and IFIs, they could dictate only within limits. Africa and the West are symbiotic based on resources of the former and order in the latter. In essence, the three East African states, like their counterparts elsewhere on the continent, are seeking marginal adjustments rather than fundamental

Perhaps the most ambitious part of *The International Politics of East Africa* involves state-society interactions. Pinkney contrasts two models (p. 93): the postindependence model, characterized by centralized government, bureaucratic domination, clientelism, military influence or domination, and material values in a collectivist setting; and the post-Cold War model characterized by governance, elements of new public management, external tutelage, increased armed insurgency, and entrepreneurship, self-help, and postmaterialism. The next 90 or so pages focus on the implications of the post-Cold War model. Obviously, drawing generalizations is hazardous, and the author is wise to concentrate on three

states (at least until postindependence dynamics drove them apart) that shared a common colonial master, a common currency and possessed rudiments of an economic community. However, the economic and political contexts of the three differed dramatically, as explored in Chapters 6 through 8.

Pinkney contrasts these five elements of change with five equally important elements of continuity: limited democracy beyond elections; survival of elites as a primary political goal; civil society with limited economic and political resources; ethnic conflict or threats of it; and continued and possibly increased dependence of both state and society on the West. Finally, in setting forth his model, he looks at changes (real or projected) and external attitudes. One of the most important is external aid being tied to retrenchment and increasingly to specific economic and administrative reforms.

What specifically has happened in the three states? For Tanzania, Pinkney concludes, "if the Western powers set the limits to what Tanzania could do, the nature of the Tanzanian state, society and political culture all helped to determine the extent to which it was feasible or expedient to follow policies which accorded broadly with Western wishes" (p. 138). Kenya experienced reluctant but significant transformation through external pressure. Uganda showed that, if a country sets its economy right, Western governments will not be unduly concerned with the extent of democratization or internal politics generally. But, in the last resort, he concludes, explanations of Western attitudes may hinge largely on the personalities of Presidents Moi and Museveni. There is less a crude trade-off between economic liberalization and maintenance of a noparty state than a series of adjustments. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant change in the extent to which the West has deferred to African opinion and the extent to which African governments have felt it prudent or worthwhile to pursue policy objectives in different lands. There is far less willingness on the part of the West to intervene militarily. Its aid has been reduced. Well-documented creative tension has existed between the Western pressure for economic liberalization, democratization and more competent, accountable governments, and African governments' desire to attract aid and retain as much autonomy as possible as well as preserve their power bases. The International Politics of East Africa takes on a formidable task, and caries it out well.

Sanctions Beyond Borders: Multinational Corporations and U.S. Economic Statecraft. By Kenneth A. Rodman. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001. 288p. \$75.00 cloth, \$26.95 paper.

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The 1990s saw a resurgence in demand for economic sanctions. The United States imposed extraterritorial sanctions on Cuba through the Helms-Burton Law and on Iran and Libya through the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Environmental and human rights activists also sought, albeit with limited success, to impose sanctions against the military regimes in Burma and Nigeria.

Kenneth Rodman's timely and provocative work Sanctions Beyond Borders tries to explain an interesting paradox here: Why, after the spectacular failure of the Reagan administration's 1982 attempt to impose extraterritorial sanctions on a pipeline project designed to bring natural gas from the Soviet Union to Western Europe, did such sanctions enjoy renewed popularity in the 1990s? The failure of the pipeline sanctions had, after all, "generated a scholarly and policy consensus that such measures do not work" (p. 231).

The academic consensus here is derived primarily from two different bodies of international relations theory. First, advocates of the growth of transnational relations or globalization argued that increasing economic interdependence and the globalization of production meant that multinational corporations were increasingly independent "stateless" actors who would no longer acquiesce to home-country government control of their business operations. Second, hegemonic decline theorists argued that the United States could no longer secure multilateral support for sanctions because its declining economic preponderance meant that its allies were increasingly unlikely to follow U.S. leadership here. Though coming at the issue from different vantage points, both perspectives agreed that the United States would be increasingly constrained in its use of sanctions.

Rodman tests these theories against evidence from the early days of the Cold War through to the late 1990s. His basic conclusion (pp. 14–16, 231, 237) is that the sanctions case-study evidence presents fundamental problems for both globalization and hegemonic decline theories and that U.S. domestic political variables offer more and better explanatory power than either of these theories.

The transnational relations or globalization literature is, for Rodman, correct that "economic interdependence renders extraterritorial sanctions both ineffective and costly" (p. 15). It grossly overstates, however, the independence of multinational corporations from their home-country governments in the area of economic sanctions. He points out that the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations voluntarily complied with sanctions against Libya (pp. 109-14) and Iran (pp. 121-26), even though these sanctions did not include an extraterritorial component and hence technically did not apply to them. Domestic political variables similarly deterred corporations from challenging extraterritorial sanctions applied against Cuba (pp. 114-21). Rodman concludes that multinational corporations have been "more reluctant to use their global networks to escape home state sanctions regulations than they have been in relocating to minimize tax liabilities or shift production to more favorable business climates" (p. 15).

The hegemonic decline argument correlates well with the observable pattern of a decline in the use of sanctions by the U.S. government from the 1950s to the 1970s, yet Rodman argues that its explanatory power here is minimal. Hegemonic decline theorists ignore the fundamental reluctance of the United States to impose sanctions during the height of its hegemony in the 1950s, and they underestimate its continued ability to influence corporate behavior today, even though its share of world GNP is now much lower.

The relative decline in the use of sanctions in the 1970s and their resurgence in the 1990s can instead, Rodman argues, best be explained by changes in U.S. domestic politics (pp. 14–16). During the era of détente, domestic hostility to communism declined, enabling corporations to do business with socialist countries with less fear of political or consumer reprisals. The increased salience of social activists, ethnic lobbies, and a Congress less deferential to allied sensibilities than it was during the Cold War similarly offer better explanations for the return of sanctions in the 1990s.

The state centricity of Rodman's argument provides a necessary correction to the more exaggerated claims of transformation and state decline made by some globalization theorists. At times, however, he does perhaps downplay the role of nonstate actors more than he should. He argues that a fundamental difference between nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and states is that the former can only provide inducements for corporations to behave in certain ways whereas the latter can exercise commands (p. 223). While he is technically correct, evidence from large multinationals like

De Beers, Nike, and Shell clearly illustrates that NGO inducements are having substantive effects here. Beyond this, the shifts in domestic political sentiment, which carry much of the explanatory weight in his argument, indicate the possibilities for change and progress. Along these lines, Rodman emphasizes the importance of state policy changes in explaining the increased efficacy of sanctions against the apartheid South African regime in the late 1980s (p. 224). He is correct, but he minimizes the importance of activists and public opinion in prompting those state policy changes in the first place.

Rodman convincingly presents a standard liberal politicaleconomy argument against extraterritorial sanctions and the damage they cause, but he does not offer any alternatives to just doing business as usual with whatever human rights violator, tinpot dictator, or racist regime happens to be in power at the moment. The book ends by stating that "extraterritorial sanctions will pose credible risks to business ties between pariah states and any multinationals actively involved in the United States" (p. 244). Somehow, the implied alternative of pursuing only the lowest common denominator policies that multilateral consensus will support also seems less than satisfactory. One is reminded here of E. H. Carr's (1939) argument in *The Twenty Years' Crisis* that consistent realism breaks down because it fails to provide any ground for purposive or meaningful action.

That said, Sanctions Beyond Borders is arguably the single best introduction to the topic available today. It is comprehensively researched, theoretically sophisticated, rich in empirical detail, and well written. Aside from those scholars interested in sanctions specifically, the book should also appeal to those investigating domestic–international linkages, methodologists interested in testing theories against case studies, Cold War historians, and teachers of U.S. foreign policy looking for interesting case study material to integrate into their courses.

Manipulating the Market: Understanding Economic Sanctions, Institutional Change and the Political Unity of White Rhodesia. By David M. Rowe. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001. 256p. \$52.50.

A. Cooper Drury, University of Missouri

One of the big questions concerning economic sanctions is why they so often fail. A widely accepted answer to this question argues that economic sanctions increase the political solidarity within the target nation because the targeted public rallies behind its leader in the face of external pressure (Johann Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, with Examples from the Case of Rhodesia," World Politics 19 [1967]: 378–416). David M. Rowe calls this explanation into question and shows that the unity behind the white regime in Rhodesia was politically constructed by the government and not a spontaneous rally effect generated by nationalism or racial unity.

In Manipulating the Market, Rowe modifies open market theory to increase the importance of the government's ability to influence how external economic shocks, such as economic sanctions, affect domestic actors in order to increase their political power. He argues that shocks (economic sanctions) create collective action problems for firms that are concerned with the distribution of the sanction's costs and benefits. For example, a sanction can cause a price war between exporting firms competing for the few remaining foreign buyers who are willing to bust the sanctions; such a price war could potentially destroy most or all of the domestic producers. As a consequence, firms have an incentive to request the government to solve these collective action problems through institutions

that control the domestic market and subsequently affect the nation's purchasing ability. Rowe shows that once the government has been given the power to manage these markets, it can control any opposition to its rule that might come from the domestic firms.

As evidence, Rowe analyzes the comprehensive economic sanctions led by Great Britain against Rhodesia. The sanctions were aimed at compelling Rhodesia to accept eventual majoritarian rule. Even though the sanctions had devastating effects on parts of the economy, Ian Smith's regime faced no organized opposition to its white rule policy and Universal Declaration of Independence. Rowe shows that this lack of opposition and therefore silent support for the regime was not a consequence of national or racial unity, but instead politically constructed by co-opting firms through 1) threats of retaliation, 2) new institutions that created a dependency on the government and conflicts of interest between the different businesses, and 3) disparity benefits for the different markets. Using case studies of the tobacco, commerce, and oil industries, Rowe shows how in these cases, the government used the markets for each good to control the different industries. In many instances, the evidence is based on source material only recently made available. Rowe uncovers a wealth of information about the British goals and impressions of the sanctions, including a threat of countersanctions from South Africa.

Of course, there are limitations to this study, as there are with all research. Most weighty is the question of generalizability. Rowe's theory of how economic sanctions affect the target's economy may hold to all levels of sanctions, but the incentives for governmental intervention in the market and subsequent government control of the markets probably apply only to comprehensive, or at least severe, economic sanctions. The argument asserts that a large disruption in the target's market leads firms to seek governmental intervention. However, if the sanctions do not have such a large impact on a given market, then no such incentive is created. Only the near cessation of inelastic goods to the target will lead to such an incentive. Thus, Rowe's argument holds primarily for cases such as Iraq and Yugoslavia, but less so for many cases such as the U.S. sanctions against Colombia for drug trafficking or against India and Pakistan for nuclear proliferation.

A second limitation in the study is the assumption that the target regime has the ability to manipulate the market. While a safe assumption in many cases, very weak governments may not be able to control the market to their benefit. Considering the number of weak states bordering on failure, the theory may be limited in scope. Additionally, many democracies do not have the authority to take the actions that the Smith regime took to protect itself, further narrowing the study's scope.

These limitations are far from acute. The study provides a very useful understanding of how economic sanctions affect a target, and how the target may react. In addition to better understanding of economic sanctions, Manipulating the Market also provides a good example of strong qualitative research. Although case studies of sanctions are not new to the literature, Rowe provides strong evidence for a theory that, while not completely generalizable, can be applied to many other sanction cases. Rowe also makes an excellent case for the importance of politics when considering economic outcomes. Consider the tobacco farmers giving their considerable political power to the government in hopes that they would be protected from the sanctions impact, only to have the regime use that power to destroy the farmer's market and political clout. Clearly, the power wielded by the regime is crucial to an understanding of both the economic and political outcomes of the sanctions.

Competing for Capital: Europe and North America in a Global Era. By Kenneth P. Thomas. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000. 333p. \$65.00.

Alison M. S. Watson, University of St. Andrews

Much has been written over the years about the impact of increasing levels of capital mobility both on national governments and on the international economic system as a whole. Owners of capital can now "shop" among a variety of economies for the investment climate that suits their needs most—lower inflation, better interest rates, less restrictive labor policies, and so on. In this sense, the increase in capital mobility over the last few decades has meant that investors (particularly large investors) are no longer restricted to searching for investment opportunities in their domestic economy. Thus, domestic economic policy must increasingly accommodate the needs of the international marketplace.

Competing for Capital sets out to examine what, in the voluminous literature on capital mobility, has been a previously neglected area: the process of competition for investment. The aim of such an analysis, Kenneth P. Thomas argues, is to advise on ways in which the impact of such high levels of international capital mobility can be controlled. Overall, the text provides a detailed, and timely, examination of the market for investment.

The analysis begins with the assertion that government and corporate actors occupy an asymmetric position in the market for investment. Such asymmetry arises for a number of reasons. First, not only is capital highly mobile, but that mobility has also increased throughout the course of the last century, particularly in the period since World War II. Second, it is "generally easier for capital than governments to organize, and capital often need not even organize collectively" (p. 27). Finally, and importantly, firms have very good information about governments, but the information that governments have regarding firms is much less reliable. Such information asymmetry is particularly significant when governments are contemplating their bid for a specific investment project because they are unsure about when exactly the next investment opportunity will come along.

From this basic position, Competing for Capital introduces what the author terms the "rising-n-person prisoners" dilemma (RNPD) model of investment attraction in Chapter 2. This model anticipates that under situations of increasing capital mobility, governments will find it increasingly difficult to avoid the use of location subsidies to attract investment. Likewise, the increasing mobility of capital also suggests that the negotiating power of mobile investors will increase, compared to that of states. These are important points, but could have been made more accessible to the reader. In particular, although the North American automobile industry is put forward as a pertinent example, much more could have been made of different types of industry and different examples of this model in operation.

From here, the author describes, in turn, the way in which the European Union controls state aid (in Chapter 3), and how this state aid regime has been developed (Chapter 4). These two chapters provide in many ways the clearest analysis. Given the fact that European policymakers have long realized that offering a subsidy in one country can result in unemployment in others, policies for restraining state aid (such as tax breaks) to firms have been in place since the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, such policies of control are a significant element in EU competition policy as a whole, particularly since the inception of the Single European Act. What is particularly important here is the discussion of regional aid. As the author himself acknowledges, in a significant way the regulations that control regional aid are the pivotal element

in EU state-aid control because they identify the maximum amount of assistance that can be granted to a firm within the Union. Although some discussion is made here of enlargement and regional problems, it would have been interesting to see some discussion of possible future Central and Eastern European enlargement. This is particularly the case given the fact that there may be considerable regional difficulties involved in their accession, and also given that the EU has already seen major capital investments by firms in these areas.

From this discussion of Europe, Competing for Capital goes on to contrast EU state-aid policies with North American ones, noting that for North America there is "virtually no policy to address the competition for investment" (p. 148). Thomas argues that such a situation is indicative of the RNPD model, and of the number of levels of authority in the U.S. system in particular. In the latter, the actors include those at state level, as well as numerous county and municipal administrations, all of whom are involved in the process of attracting firm investment. Hence, for any specific investment project, increased capital mobility has also increased the number of suitable investment sites that are pursuing it.

After returning once more to the European case and specifically to the European Commission's role, the author argues that two theoretical conclusions in particular can be drawn. First, predictions regarding the likelihood of successful cooperation cannot simply be derived "from the potential availability of third-party enforcement of agreements, as one might surmise that federal North American governments are capable of providing" (p. 250). Second, efforts to control investment activity must be extensive. If they are not, states will avoid them by taking part in activities that have similar effects but are outside of the existing regulatory regime. From these conclusions arise a number of policy recommendations that Thomas puts forward well. First is that there should be a periodic collection of data on federal and subfederal subsidies. Second is that relocation subsidies should be banned. Finally, he argues for the efficacy of banning, ideally at the national level, local government use of investment incentives.

This book is an interesting one, is well researched, has some intriguing conclusions, and could indeed provide interesting policy recommendations in the face of increasing capital mobility. One major criticism, however, is that it is not as structured and well organized as it could have been. This detracts from the force of the arguments and could have been easily remedied in the editorial process. In addition, and perhaps related to the former point, it is not always evident who this book is most clearly aimed at. Nevertheless, for those readers willing to deal with a somewhat confused structure, Competing for Capital can provide original insights into the impact of international capital mobility on domestic policies and the competition for investment.

Gendering World Politics: Issues and Approaches in the Post-Cold War Era. By J. Ann Tickner. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001. 262p. \$45.00 cloth, \$17.50 paper.

Sandra Whitworth, York University

J. Ann Tickner's Gendering World Politics revisits—in the best sense of the term—many of the same themes she explored in her pathbreaking 1992 book, Gender in International Relations. The current volume comes almost a decade after that first book appeared—a decade during which both the field of international relations and the subfield of feminist IR have seen dramatic change and, especially in the case of the latter, exponential growth. Gendering World Politics

brings us up to date on the current state of debates within IR and provides a thoroughgoing and sophisticated introduction to what is now a very sizable feminist IR literature. Perhaps the most important contribution of this book, however, is that it allows Tickner to move forward an agenda she has been exploring for a number of years now, to encourage "conversations" between mainstream and feminist IR, and, in particular, to ask why authentic conversations, despite a decade of both turmoil and growth, have not been more forthcoming. As she writes in the Preface, "I have spent much of this time trying to understand why the intellectual gulf between different IR approaches is so wide and why conversations between proponents of these various approaches can be so difficult" (p. x).

Tickner's answer to that question provides the other theme around which much of the book is organized: With bases in very different metatheoretical traditions (one positivist and the other postpositivist), mainstream and feminist IR scholars construct knowledge differently. They pose different types of questions and they answer those questions in fundamentally different types of ways. While one focuses on how scientific a research methodology might be, the other raises concerns about inclusivity and the way in which the very posing of questions sets up boundaries for what counts as knowledge. Feminism's contribution to IR, Tickner points out, has been to ask different types of questions: "Listening to voices not previously recognized in the discipline has allowed IR feminists to see different worlds, ask new questions and begin to build the kind of practical knowledge necessary to construct more democratic theories and practices" (p. 147). Operating with such different premises makes conversations between traditional and feminist IR scholars, at best, difficult.

But not impossible. Judging from the way the book is organized—and in keeping with her desire to initiate conversations—Tickner's first intended audience is likely the IR student or scholar looking for an introduction to the feminist IR literature. She begins with an overview chapter of feminist theories, but the substantive part of the book comprises three chapters that review what she describes as some of the traditional topics in IR: "War, Peace, and Security," "The Global Economy," and "Democratization, the State and the Global Order." Within each, Tickner explores the way in which conventional sets of questions were posed around these themes, the challenges that emerged within IR from the 1970s onward, and the contributions that feminists have made to each of these sets of literatures.

By covering the "state of the field" around each of three issue areas, she grounds the discussion (and grounds it very comprehensively) within IR. Her review is a very good one, which is to be recommended to both newcomers and advanced students and scholars of IR. Having established the familiar ground, Tickner then moves to the varieties of feminist analysis that exist around each particular issue. This is where I was prepared to be disappointed—having staked her claim so clearly within IR, I fully expected that the feminist literature would receive short shrift or necessarily be presented in an overly simplified manner. But indeed, Tickner manages to convey both the breadth and the subtleties of feminist contributions in IR, and does so with a number of goals in mind: first, to show the extent to which there is enormous debate among feminists (it is to be hoped that having read this and other feminist work, no IR scholar can again talk about the feminist view as if there were only one); and second, to demonstrate the ways in which the feminist IR literature is sometimes similar to other critical approaches within IR, but also how the feminist literature is often quite unique. For example, and briefly, while many critics of mainstream IR have pointed to the ways in which the modern state can

no longer (if it ever did) provide security to its citizens, it is usually feminists who point to the ways in which prevailing norms of militarized citizenship, and militarized masculinity, contribute to many women's *insecurity*, whether or not those women's states are actually at peace or at war.

Much as Tickner hopes to establish more, and more extensive, conversations among traditional and feminist IR scholars, she does not water down what she sees as the ultimate implications for IR of feminist analyses. As she writes in her conclusion, "feminist perspectives on IR take us on paths that venture far from the conventional discipline" (p. 125). IR, as Tickner would have it, will not be the same if its more traditional practitioners take feminism seriously. Nor should

it be. It will focus on the "real world" issues of wartime rape, of trafficking, of the gender-biased impacts of structural adjustment policies, and of women's representation in international institutions, to name only a few, as much as it has previously focused on states, militaries, global finance, and international institutions. Tickner both begins and ends *Gendering World Politics* with a reminder that the formal field of IR was established by academics and practitioners who sought a more peaceful and just world. Continuing that important tradition will be possible, as Tickner notes, only by paying attention to feminist and other previously excluded voices, those who are drawing our attention to the real-world complexities of global politics in a new century.

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
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
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




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
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
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
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
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
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
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



















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
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


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
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
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


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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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


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